J. K. ZAWODNY

Man and International Relations:

VOLUME II: INTEGRATION

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Man and International Relations

Contributions of the Social Sciences to the Study of Conflict and Integration

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To my mother and sister,
two noble hearts, who did not surrender
human dignity in a concentration camp.

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Man and International Relations

Volume II: INTEGRATION

PART A

Personality Integration

1. Love

2. Theories of Personality Integration

CHAPTER 1 • Love

Love

KARL MENNINGER, M.D., WITH THE COLLABORATION OF
JEANETTA LYLE MENNINGER

. . . the scientific theory of love has become the theory of the interaction and fusion of the erotic and destructive instincts. . . . It is necessary for the ego to make compromises between what our instincts demand and what our intelligence and sense of social reality permit us. Primitive man could kill what he liked and could gratify his love instinct without reference to any restrictions. Contemporary man can do neither.

It is this idea of fusion that must be emphasized. Love . . . is capable of modifying the hate impulses and bringing them within the range of social acceptability and usefulness. But, on the other hand, the love instinct itself has to be modified and altered. "All the instinctual impulses that we can study are made up of such fusions or alloys of the two kinds of instincts. Naturally, they are to be found mixed in the greatest variety of proportions."[1] There is, therefore, no such thing as pure love (or pure hate).

The expression of the life instinct, then, is to be seen in love, and love in three forms. First of all, it is absorbed in the partial or complete neutralization of the destruction instinct—in other words, in the accomplishment of sublimation. Secondly, it is expressed in diffuse ex-

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[1] Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis*, Norton, 1933, p. 144.

From Chapter 13, pp. 260–295, Love Against Hate *by Karl Menninger, copyright 1942, by Karl Menninger and Jeanetta Lyle Menninger. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes renumbered.*

tensions of love to nonsexual objects, or to objects that are not sexual in the ordinary sense of the word. I refer here to the love we have for nature, inanimate objects, pets, social friends, and society at large. The energy for such attachments comes from the erotic instinct, but the object selected and the feelings experienced for it are not consciously recognized as pertaining to sexuality. Finally, the love is expended directly upon objects which must be called "sexual" in any meaning of the word.

. . .we shall devote this chapter to a consideration of the direct expressions of love and the possible means of encouraging these. To begin with the more attenuated expressions of love, we might speak first of those investments which become deflected from human beings to inanimate objects. One frequently sees a concentration of affection upon automobiles, watches, garments, books, and many of the other tools of living. These objects become almost a part of the self but are praised, adored, and tenderly cared for with a highly sentimentalized affection. It might be assumed that such affection is entirely denatured of any conscious sexual element, but sometimes this is obviously not the case. Of Napoleon's cannoneers, who dragged their dismembered guns over the Alps, Abbott wrote:

> It was now the great glory of these men to take care of their guns. They loved tenderly the merciless monsters. They lavished caresses and terms of endearment upon the glittering, polished, death-dealing brass. The heart of man is a strange enigma. Even when most degraded it needs something to love. These blood-stained soldiers, brutalized by vice, amid all the horrors of battle, lovingly fondled the murderous machines of war. . . . The unrelenting gun was the stern cannoneer's lady-love. He kissed it with unwashed, mustached lips. . . . Affectionately he named it Mary, Emma, Lizzie.

It is only a step from the love of inanimate objects to the love of animate but nonhuman objects, such as flowers, trees, birds, and especially domesticated animals and pets.[2] The personification of inanimate and nonhuman objects and the bestowal of love upon them is a familiar phenomenon of childhood; dolls, rabbits, dogs, toys of all kinds take on human qualities and are beloved, sometimes even beyond any human beings.

---

[2] The affection of many people for animal pets and the faculty that some people have of dealing with them successfully is common knowledge. Precisely how the interchange of feeling takes place is not very well understood. Certainly love can be expressed by gentleness and in other subtle ways which defy description but which permit it to be perceived and reacted to even by wild animals. This has been reported in some scientific articles as well as in many legends such as that of Androcles and the Lion and such novels as White's *Andivius Hedulio.* I know of nothing more impressive, however, than the work of Grace Wiley of Minnesota and California who, originally terrified by all kinds of snakes, so completely overcame this fear and so skillfully mastered the technique of gentleness that she feeds and handles hundreds of the most dangerously poisonous and notoriously unpredictable snakes, including mambas and cobras. (Grace O. Wiley, "Taming King Cobras," *Natural History Magazine*, 39:60–63, January 1937, and "With Fangs Withheld," *Nature Magazine*, 34:429–432, October 1941).

* * * *

2

Leaving now the nonhuman object investment of love, ambivalently tinged with little or much hate, we shall turn our attention to the many ways in which human beings attach themselves to one another in groups, in a supposedly nonsexual way. This has been called gregariousness and described by some, more eloquently than accurately, as due to a "herd instinct"[3] similar to that which impels the flocking of certain birds and beasts into large assemblies. But there is no need to postulate any such special instinct. Men gather together at times for the simple reasons of greater economy or greater safety or greater power. But there are other gatherings that occur daily, in villages and by roadsides and hearthsides, in which the affection of people for each other is the moving spirit. In the custom to which our own country is so particularly given, of organizing clubs, societies, associations, unions, and the like, one can see a spontaneous tendency toward increasing the opportunities for loving and understanding one another. The words ascribed to Jesus, "where two or three are gathered together in my name, there will I be also," are usually interpreted by the Church to refer to the circumstances under which religious services may be considered to have a quorum. But these words have a far more profound meaning. Where two or three people are gathered together, there is bound to be an exchange of feelings and the mutual stimulation of affection. It is an unusual individual who does not to some extent enjoy meetings and gatherings, and we are all better for them.

* * * *

I am aware that some readers unfamiliar with psychological science will find it difficult to believe that the feelings of positive attraction that bind the members of groups and that bind doctor and patient are identical in nature with those bonds which exist between a lover and his sweetheart, or a man and his wife. They will fall back upon the conventional distinctions between liking and loving. But there is no scientific justification for this distinction; liking and loving differ only in intensity. If we leave aside large groups of people and think for a moment of those intimacies which spring up between friends, let us say between two friends, there will be less difficulty in accepting the thesis. Whether it is between father and son, or father and daughter, or the fathers of two sons, the essential nature of the positive attraction and feeling is the same. It is true that it will be differently expressed, and this we shall presently discuss further.

The cultivation of friends and of friendships is certainly of more importance than is generally recognized. If friends are merely recreational resources or convenient distractions from the routine of life, the relationship with them is of minimum value psychologically; it can scarcely be called friendship. The man with no friends has already abandoned himself to the fate of his own self-destructiveness. Psychiatrists realize from clinical experience what poets have proclaimed in inspired verse, that to retreat permanently into the loneliness of one's own soul is to surrender one's claim upon life.

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[3] W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, Benn, 1916.

But at best it is hard for human beings to really get together; it is hard for even the best of friends to understand and to feel with one another sufficiently to promote a continuous, peaceful affection. This gives rise to that vague feeling with which we are all familiar of having parted from even our best friend without having fully expressed the affection we feel or fully realized the affection we hope he feels for us.

Observing the timid and conventional approaches which people make toward one another, the forced cordiality, the jovial and often crude "razzing" which they inflict on each other, the necessity many people feel to have a few drinks in order to "break the ice" and to feel closer to one another, the fatigue that sets in so quickly after a social round, one cannot help sensing the tremendous striving for love, appreciation and companionship that all people have, and also the barriers that prevent their receiving these gifts in full measure. Ferenczi said, "They want to love one another but they don't know how." Frustrated and hungry for a word, a touch, a smile, a shared experience that would satisfy this universal hunger, many people try feverishly to fill the void with semblances of love: activity, popularity, philanthropy, prestige—there are thousands of ways of extracting recognition in lieu of love, none of them satisfactory.

Love is experienced as a pleasure in proximity, a desire for fuller knowledge of one another, a yearning for mutual identification and personality fusion. This we show to one another by our efforts to be understood, and by indulging the less imperious longing to understand. To be understood means, of course, that some of our *worst* impulses as well as our best ones are recognized by our friend, who knows all about us and likes us, anyway.

Once this mutual understanding and identification are established, friendship merges into love. And how is it shown? "They do not love that do not show their love." In the vast majority of instances our love for one another is expressed in nonphysical ways, in the interchange of ideas or the common enjoyment of some pleasure. One of the time-honored forms is the ritual of eating (or drinking) together. Being given food is the first expression of love which the child understands; it is his introduction to love. Hence the symbolic value of being fed remains high throughout life. In the unconscious Food = Love. It is understandable, therefore, why the dinner party or the social luncheon, for all its banality, is a perpetual medium of friendship. One of the first impulses of two people attracted to each other is to eat together, and while these occasions are generally thought of as mere expedients—opportunities for conversation or a setting for courtship—the symbolic meaning of the eating[4] is deeper than the conscious meaning of the words exchanged. The Christian religion recognizes this in the institution of a service in which an act of eating is actually designated "communion."

The sharing of food as an expression of love, going back as it does to the maternal function of nursing, leads directly to the allied form of expressing love—the giving of gifts. The child has little to give in return for the food given him, but that little he tries to give. As he grows older his gifts become more substantial, and represent—increasingly—a sacrifice of something prized by him. The gift expresses love because it symbolizes the giver himself or an important part of himself; it may even be his life—"greater love hath no man than this."

Thus the gift is more than a bribe, a purchase price offered for love; we rebel in our minds against the thought that love is "bought" or "earned" or "repaid"; nevertheless, it is a fact that a certain exchange is made and a certain balance is inevitably established. We do measure love and weigh it, even if not accurately. We are most inaccurate when we assume that the balance is in the favor of the recipient rather than the giver. That it is more blessed to give than to receive is psychologically true because giving stimulates love while expressing it. "The mother gives [milk] to the child. By her giving she creates her love. To create love we must begin by sacrifice. Afterwards it is love that makes the sacrifices. But it is we who must take the first step."[5] Here then is a practical suggestion for the fostering of love.

Another way in which love can be fostered is by talking together. It has been said, in various forms and by several writers, that speech was given us for the purpose of disguising our thoughts. We do use it so, no doubt; and yet understanding does come through words finally, through many words—and through more than words, for actions speak louder. Especially differences, disagreements, and dissatisfactions should be talked out by friends—or lovers. The reason that the course of true love never does run smoothly is the fact that true love can endure only if the provocations of anger and resentment which inevitably develop are freely expressed and discussed and readjusted to. I certainly do not mean wrangling; both parties must make some conscientious effort to achieve objectivity and not simply indulge in temper tantrums. "A soft answer turneth away wrath but grievous words stir up [more] anger." It always seemed to me significant that among the Jews, where there is such a noticeable tendency to express aggressions in argument and verbal combat, there are so few divorces and so little physical violence. It is my idea that, even if the Roman Catholic church did not forbid it, divorce would still be infrequent among the Irish and Italians, because of their relatively great facility in expressing their emotions. It is often assumed by the silent, dignified, sulky Anglo-Saxon that the avoidance of verbal or even physical conflict between husband and wife promotes peace and happiness. The story of the European peasant woman who wept because her husband had not beaten her for a month seems grotesquely and pathetically amusing, but it is psychologically true. If a woman has to choose between being ignored and being beaten she will certainly choose the latter. Although this might be construed as a recommendation of wife-beating, that is certainly not what I mean; I do mean that if hostilities cannot be repressed or diverted, it is better to have them *out* than to have them *in.*

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[4] It is also true, of course, that eating has an unconscious aggressive meaning which extends back to the primitive customs of devouring one's enemies. See *Man Against Himself*, pages 40–46 and 122–123.) In the normal individual this meaning is deeply buried, while the erotic meaning is very near the surface of consciousness.

[5] Antoine de Saint Exupéry, *Flight to Arras*, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1942.

* * * *

3

There remains to be discussed finally the function of physical union in the expression and cultivation of love. Logical and obvious though this may be, it is a curious fact that until relatively recent times love was not considered an aspect of the sexual life. In discussing this, Havelock Ellis said[6] that while our concept of love is found, it is true, among some lower races, its development in Occidental civilization was slow.

> The Greek poets, except the latest, showed little recognition of love as an element of marriage. Theognis compared marriage with cattle-breeding. The Romans of the Republic took much the same view. Greeks and Romans alike regarded breeding as the one recognizable object of marriage; any other object was mere wantonness and had better, they thought, be carried on outside marriage. Religion, which preserves so many ancient and primitive conceptions of life, has consecrated this conception also, and Christianity. . . at the outset offered only the choice between celibacy on the one hand and, on the other, marriage for the production of offspring.
>
> Yet, from an early period in human history, a secondary function of sexual intercourse had been slowly growing up to become one of the great objects of marriage. Among animals, it may be said, and even sometimes in man, the sexual impulse, when once aroused, makes but a short and swift circuit through the brain to reach its consummation. But as the brain and its faculties develop, powerfully aided indeed by the very difficulties of the sexual life, the impulse for sexual union has to traverse ever longer, slower, more painful paths before it reaches—and sometimes it never reaches—its ultimate object. This means that sex gradually becomes intertwined

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[6] Havelock Ellis, *On Life and Sex, Essays of Love and Virtue*, Garden City Pub. Co., 1937, I:64–66.

with all the highest and subtlest human emotions and activities, with the refinements of social intercourse, with high adventure in every sphere, with art, with religion. The primitive animal instinct, having the sole end of procreation, becomes on its way to that end the inspiring stimulus to all those psychic energies which in civilization we count most precious. This function is thus, we see, a by-product. But, as we know, even in our human factories, the by-product is sometimes more valuable than the product.

It is surely no secret that, despite all that has been said and done scientifically, the popular attitude towards sexual pleasure is still largely a mixture of salaciousness and shame. Such pleasure is still regarded officially as something incidental to the serious business of procreation, and—apart from that—sinful, bestial, and unmentionable. How can one otherwise interpret the fact that so serious a condition as the absence of conscious sexual pleasure, a condition for which thousands of physicians are consulted daily by a small fraction of the total number of persons who are distressed about it, should receive almost no mention or discussion in the standard medical works of the day? How else could one explain the fact that the theater, the cinema, the night clubs, the newspapers, the popular novels, in fact all official public representations of contemporary life, are permitted by public consent to make obscene allusions, sneers, jests, and hints, but are forbidden any honest or frank or truthful representation of either the normal or the frustrated phenomena of sexuality? How else could one explain the fact that although physicians, lawyers, and judges intimately acquainted with the facts state that the overwhelming majority of divorces spring from inadequate sexual satisfaction, this is legal ground for divorce in only two or three states of the Union and is almost never cited in court? That sexual temptation and the necessity for a healthful solution of the sexual life are important features in a college career is not officially recognized, so far as I know, in any institution in this country. A few forward-looking individuals—physicians, clergymen, student counselors, and others—are not themselves blind to this fact, but work without popular support or assistance and without much scientific understanding or help.

One of the best definitions of love, and a very scientific one, was written by the poet Shelley: "That profound and complicated sentiment which we call love is the universal thirst for a communion not merely of the senses, but of our whole nature, intellectual, imaginative and sensitive. . . . The sexual impulse, which is only one, and often a small part of those claims, serves, from its obvious and external nature, as a kind of type of expression of the rest, a common basis, an acknowledged and visible link."

* * * *

. . . although they may differ in their explanations of the reason for it, the economist, the sociologist, the religionist, and the psychologist agree on the fact that civilization wars against sexuality. They word it somewhat differently—the economist stressing the falling birthrate, the sociologist deploring the lessened importance of the home, and the theologian pointing to the extent of immorality, divorce, marital unhappiness, childlessness, and celibacy. The psychiatrist, both from his psychological bias and from his medical experience, is impressed with the prevalence of overt sexual maladjustment and frustration; and the energetic absorption in business affairs, competition, production, and commerce which the economist is likely to view with satisfaction strikes the psychologist (the psychiatrist) with dismay. The man of religion says that these things are too worldly and indicate a neglect of the real purpose of living, that the means has become more important than the end. With this the psychiatrist would agree, but he would put it somewhat more empirically. He would say that men are more interested in their competition with one another than in their devotion to their wives and children, that they invest more energy in work and fighting than in the constructive problems of love.

The horror with which some parents learn of their children's interest in various forms of experimental sexual play is a reflection of the ambivalence in adults' attitude toward sexuality, especially to their own children's sexuality. Freud pointed out that parents are actually jealous of their own children, that they try as long as possible to prevent them from any theoretical or practical acquaintanceship with sexuality, punishing them for premature excursions into this forbidden field. It is an interesting corollary to this observation that the sexual approach of adults to children is associated with the most intense feelings of social disapproval; such episodes have not infrequently served as the basis for mob violence against the offender. The assumption is, of course, that children are irreparably ruined by such experiences. Without intending in the least to justify or excuse such criminal behavior, I may nevertheless point out that in the cold light of scientific investigation no such devastating effects usually follow (a fact which I hope will be of some comfort to certain anguished parents). Two psychiatrists (Lauretta Bender and Abram Blau) recently made a careful follow-up study of such cases and concluded that children exposed to premature sexual experiences with adults frequently turn out to be "distinguished and unusually charming and attractive in their outward personalities."[7]

The conclusions to be drawn from such observations need not be shocking; they simply bear out our contention that sexuality is not the evil and horrible thing it is generally conceived to be. Such experiences are traumatic to the child only when connected with deep hostilities; the furtive and desperate nature of such attacks, combined with the attitude of society toward them, tends entirely in the direction of unbearably stimulating the child's hostilities so that he conceives of sex as brutality. But when the experience actually stimulates the child erotically, it would appear from the observations of the authors cited just above that it may favor rather than inhibit the development of social capabilities and mental health in the so-called victims.

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[7] Lauretta Bender and Abram Blau, "The Reaction of Children to Sexual Relations with Adults," *Am. J. Orthopsychiatry*, 7:500–518.

Of course, most children do not encounter such incidents, but all children meet with a conspiracy of silence and implied disapproval with respect to sexuality which effects deep, often insuperable, blockades of normal expression in later life. For many people it seems irreverent, indecent, and immoral to place any esteem upon the pleasurable satisfactions of sexual intercourse. They regard it as the transitory, inconsequential bait which nature uses as a stimulus to the perpetuation of the race, an insidious and rather shameful pleasure which impels a couple to do their duty by the world. For those who esteem it for its own sake without the wish for or expectation of a child, the occurrence of pregnancy is regarded as a punishment. In my professional practice I have often seen families in which the birth of a child is clearly looked upon as the inevitable sentence pronounced by nature for indulgence in "sins of the flesh."

Another obstacle to the direct gratification of the sexual instinct is ignorance of the technique of love-making, sexual play, and sexual intercourse. Ninon de l'Enclos is said to have declared that "it requires far more genius to make love than to command armies." The reasons for failure from ignorance and clumsiness probably include unconscious factors of the familiar sort, but as a practical matter it is an obstacle that can be overcome, granted the conscious wish to do so. Many doctors, by instructing their patients, greatly improve their sexual adjustments. But the trouble is or has been that the general taboo on sex extended even to the doctors, so that there was an actual lack of information on the part of many of them and a reluctance on the part of many others to discuss the subject. Thirty-odd years ago an intrepid physician (Robie), impressed by the astonishing ignorance of many of his patients in regard to elementary principles of sexual behavior, began a collection of case histories, recording in a very earnest, if at times somewhat naive, manner precisely what the experiences of a considerable number of his patients had been in this respect. These books were privately published and of course immediately banned, but they were followed by others, until gradually the investigation of the actual sexual behavior of twentieth-century human beings has become recognized as a proper subject for scientific study. Statistical investigations, more elaborate and careful histories, systematic treatises, and books of practical counsel have by now been published in considerable numbers; but even today a vast ignorance prevails concerning the actual sexual experiences of "normal" civilized human beings. At the present time, with the assistance of the National Research Council, a number of psychologists are attempting to collect statistical information in this field on a rather large scale. Although such data are likely to confuse the conscious interferences with the sexual life due to ignorance with those due to unconscious repressions, this is a step in the right direction.

* * * *

While it is true that the former conspiracy of silence about pleasure in the marital relationship has been to some extent broken down, so that a considerable number of intelligently written books are now on the market, it should be remembered that this has been bought at a price—the violent denunciation, the humiliation, persecution, and imprisonment of the writers who first ventured to state publicly what every mature person must have recognized as truth. Furthermore, the very fact that such books have to be written, that young men and women need to be told and encouraged to believe that they have a right to enjoy one another, is in itself an amazing condemnation of the so-called moral attitude of civilization—an attitude which can only be described as immoral, obscene, and essentially destructive.[8]

* * * *

Some objectors will ask: Even granting the importance of a normal sexual life, is it not against public policy to remove the restraints that exist to curb its promiscuous expression? Are we not in danger of sexual license and the widespread dissemination of illegitimacy and venereal disease if we abandon completely the taboos that have attached for so many centuries to sexual manifestations? Does not the experience of the Romans during the decline of the Empire indicate that sexual freedom does not further the happiness of the human race? And is it not true that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics found that the removal of barriers to divorce led to an unhealthy situation which had to be corrected by revision of the laws?

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[8] See the bold proposals of Réné Guyon in *Sexual Freedom* (translated from the French by Eden and Cedar Paul, published by John Lane, London, 1939). On this book the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* (January 1940) commented: "M. Guyon is an able exponent of the extreme left wing of sexual reform. He approaches the problems of sex from the point of view of 'integral rationalism,' according to which sexual pleasure is healthy and desirable and therefore legitimately obtainable in any and every form, provided there is no interference with the rights of others; any attempt to curtail the opportunities for such pleasure, whether on religious, moral or legal grounds, being an unwarrantable interference with the liberty of the individual, which should be resisted by all who realize the immense importance of adequate sexual satisfaction for physical and mental well-being. . . . A reading of M. Guyon's book provides us with a salutary stimulus, inasmuch as it is calculated to make us realize very forcibly the tremendous gulf that exists between our actual attitude to sex, determined as this is by centuries of superstition and taboo, and the attitude that might ensue from a rational hedonism—an attitude such as might consistently have been adopted by some of the Nineteenth-Century hedonists, but which they certainly have lacked the courage to advocate. . . . The purely rationalistic approach requires, however, to be supplemented by the psychological one, and it is here that M. Guyon's treatment, for all its brave discarding of the lumber of tradition, is apt to appear a little naive."

These are weighty questions, but in part they misconstrue the meaning of what I have said. I have nowhere suggested that the unregulated, uncontrolled expression of the sexual instinct is desirable or practicable. Sexual freedom is *not* promiscuity, as I have already made clear in dealing with such phenomena as the Don Juan type. As for the ancient Romans, I think we know too little about the actual life of the average Roman citizen to draw any fundamental conclusions, for the life led by rich aristocrats is not the life of the people of a country. And in Russia there are still too many conflicting elements for us to draw conclusions. For although both Marx and Lenin inveighed against profligacy and so-called freedom, no less than against puritanism, in the rush of the Revolution the pendulum swung from the one extreme to the other, and may now be swinging back. "When Lenin had criticized the 'hypocrisy of bourgeois morality,' he did not mean to attack such an institution as monogamy, but only the use and pious misuse of it under capitalism. 'Healthy bodies, healthy minds!' he had exclaimed. 'Neither monk nor Don Juan!'"[9]

In refuting these objections, the important point is that the exaltation of the sexual life does not and *should* not imply debauchery and promiscuity, for the reason is that these things are not love, even though they may use some of the physical techniques of love. Judas used the same technique to betray Jesus that a lover uses to reassure his sweetheart. The same act is performed by the reverent visitor to the Pope when the latter extends his hand and ring. And just as a kiss may have various connotations, so other forms of physical contact may vary in implication, taste, and wholesomeness.

* * * *

Not only in regard to sex, but in regard to all human rights there has been a vast change in social attitudes. In spite of human frailties and errors, we may ultimately achieve a less artificial, more psychologically sound civilization. It is not impossible to conceive of a time when the expression of love—in all the forms in which it manifests itself—will be as natural, as spontaneous, and as magnificently organized as is the expression of rage and hate at the present moment.

Of that time I cannot predict the outward forms of life; but I know of no better expression of the spirit in which our lives could be lived than has been set down by Rebecca West in her contribution to *Living Philosophies*:[10]

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[9] Arthur Behrstock, "Love Is Sweeping the Soviets," *Esquire*, October, 1939, p. 49.

[10] Rebecca West, [*Living Philosophies*, Simon & Schuster, 1940.]

I have no faith in the sense of comforting beliefs which persuade me that all my troubles are blessings in disguise. . . . But I have faith in a process, in a particular process that is part of the general process of life, though it is sometimes annulled by it. I find an ultimate value in the efforts of human beings to do more than merely exist, to choose and analyze their experiences and by the findings of that analysis help themselves to further experiences which are of a more pleasurable kind. I use the word pleasurable in its widest sense; to describe such experiences as come from good food and wine, exercise, the physical act of lovemaking, the practice of a beloved craft or art or science, a happy marriage, the care of children or the sick or the old by those who enjoy it, the service of valid ideas, or the administration of worthy institutions, or the pursuit of agreeable sensations. *Trahit sua quemque voluptas.* By indulgence in these experiences life is made more pleasant from day to day. That is in itself of the first importance. That end would be worthwhile pursuing if no other benefit were obtained. But it also serves the purpose of furnishing each human soul with access to the avenue along which it can advance farthest toward the comprehension and mastery of life. Pleasure is not arbitrary; it is the sign by which the human organization shows that it is performing a function which it finds appropriate to its means and ends. I take it as a prime cause of the present confusion of society that it is too sickly and too doubtful to use pleasure frankly as a test of value.

But indeed we need no further argument in favor of taking pleasure as a standard when we consider the only alternative that faces us. If we do not live for pleasure we shall soon find ourselves living for pain. If we do not regard as sacred our own joys and the joys of others, we open the door and let into life the ugliest attribute of the human race, which is cruelty . . . the root of all other vices.

* * * *

The Theoretical Importance of Love

WILLIAM J. GOODE

Because love often determines the intensity of an attraction[1] toward or away from an intimate relationship with another person, it can become one element in a decision or action.[2] Nevertheless, serious sociological attention has only infrequently been given to love. Moreover, analyses of love generally have been confined to mate choice in the Western World, while the structural importance of love has been for the most part ignored. The present paper views love in a broad perspective, focusing on the structural patterns by which societies keep in check the potentially disruptive effect of love relationships on mate choice and stratification systems.

* * * *

The Problem and Its Conceptual Clarification

The preceding propositions (except those denying that love is distributed widely) can be grouped under two main questions: What are the consequences of romantic love in the United States? How is the emotion of love aroused or created in our society? The present paper deals with the first question. For theoretical purposes both questions must be reformulated, however, since they implicitly refer only to our peculiar system of romantic love. Thus: (1) In what ways do various love patterns fit into the social structure, especially into the systems of mate choice and stratification? (2) What are the structural conditions under which a range of love patterns occurs in various societies? These are overlapping questions, but their starting point and assumptions are different. The first assumes that love

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[1] On the psychological level, the motivational power of both love and sex is intensified by this curious fact: (which I have not seen remarked on elsewhere) Love is the most projective of emotions, as sex is the most projective of drives; only with great difficulty can the attracted person believe that the object of his love or passion does not and will not reciprocate the feeling at all. Thus, the person may carry his action quite far, before accepting a rejection as genuine.

[2] I have treated decision analysis extensively in an unpublished paper by that title.

William J. Goode, "The Theoretical Importance of Love," American Sociological Review, *Vol. 24, No. 1 (Washington: American Sociological Association, 1959), pp. 38–47. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

relationships are a universal psychosocial possibility, and that different social systems make different adjustments to their potential disruptiveness. The second does not take love for granted, and supposes rather that such relationships will be rare unless certain structural factors are present. Since in both cases the analysis need not depend upon the correctness of the assumption, the problem may be chosen arbitrarily. Let us begin with the first.[16]

We face at once the problem of defining "love." Here, love is defined as a strong emotional attachment, a cathexis, between adolescents or adults of opposite sexes, with at least the components of sex desire and tenderness. . . . The experience can be referred to without great ambiguity, and a refined measure of various degrees of intensity or purity of love is unnecessary for the aims of the present analysis.

Since love may be related in diverse ways to the social structure, it is necessary to forgo the dichotomy of "romantic love—no romantic love" in favor of a continuum or range between polar types. At one pole, a strong love attraction is socially viewed as a laughable or tragic aberration; at the other, it is mildly shameful to marry without being in love with one's intended spouse. This is a gradation from negative sanction to positive approval, ranging at the same time from low or almost nonexistent institutionalization of love to high institutionalization.

The urban middle classes of contemporary Western society, especially in the United States, are found toward the latter pole. Japan and China, in spite of the important movement toward European patterns, fall toward the pole of low institutionalization. . . . individual love relationships seem to occur everywhere. But this fact does not change the position of a society on the continuum.

Second, reading both Linton's and Lowie's comments in this new conceptual context reduces their theoretical importance, for they are both merely saying that people do not *live by* the romantic complex, here or anywhere else. Some few couples in love will brave social pressures, physical dangers, or the gods themselves, but nowhere is this usual. Violent, self-sufficient love is not common anywhere. In this respect, of course, the U.S. is not set apart from other systems.

Third, we can separate a *love pattern* from the romantic love *complex*. Under the former, love is a permissible, expected prelude to marriage, and a usual element of courtship—thus, at about the center of the continuum, but toward the pole of institutionalization. The romantic love complex (one pole of the continuum) includes, in addition, an ideological prescription that falling in love is a highly desirable basis of courtship and marriage; love is strongly institutionalized.[19] In contemporary United States, many individuals would even claim that entering marriage without being in love requires some such rationalization as asserting that one is too old for such romances or that one must "think of practical matters like money." To be sure, both anthropologists and sociologists often exaggerate the American commitment to romance;[20] nevertheless, a behavioral and value complex of this type is found here.

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[16] I hope to deal with the second problem in another paper.

[19] For a discussion of the relation between behavior patterns and the process of institutionalization, see my *After Divorce*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956, Chapter 15.

But this complex is rare. Perhaps only the following cultures possess the romantic love value complex: modern urban United States, Northwestern Europe, Polynesia, and the European nobility of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.[21] Certainly, it is to be found in no other major civilization. On the other hand, the *love pattern,* which views love as a basis for the final decision to marry, may be relatively common.

Why Love Must Be Controlled

Since strong love attachments apparently can occur in any society and since (as we shall show) love is frequently a basis for and prelude to marriage, it must be controlled or channeled in some way. More specifically, the stratification and lineage patterns would be weakened greatly if love's potentially disruptive effects were not kept in check. The importance of this situation may be seen most clearly by considering one of the major functions of the family, status placement, which in every society links the structures of stratification, kinship lines, and mate choice. (To show how the very similar comments which have been made about sex are not quite correct would take us too far afield; in any event, to the extent that they are correct, the succeeding analysis applies equally to the control of sex.)

Both the child's placement in the social structure and choice of mates are socially important because both placement and choice link two kinship lines together. Courtship or mate choice, therefore, cannot be ignored by either family or society. To permit random mating would mean radical change in the existing social structure. If the family as a unit of society is important, then mate choice is too.

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[20] See Ernest W. Burgess and Paul W. Wallin, *Engagement and Marriage*, New York: Lippincott, 1953, Chapter 7 for the extent to which even the engaged are not blind to the defects of their beloveds. No one has ascertained the degree to which various age and sex groups in our society actually believe in some form of the ideology.

Similarly, Margaret Mead in *Coming of Age in Samoa,* New York: Modern Library, 1953, rates Manu'an love as shallow, and though these Samoans give much attention to love-making, she asserts that they laughed with incredulous contempt at Romeo and Juliet (pp. 155–156). Though the individual sufferer showed jealousy and anger, the Manu'ans believed that a new love would quickly cure a betrayed lover (pp. 105–108). It is possible that Mead failed to understand the shallowness of love in our own society: Romantic love is, "in our civilization, inextricably bound up with ideas of monogamy, exclusiveness, jealousy, and undeviating fidelity" (p. 105). But these are *ideas* and ideology; *behavior* is rather different.

[21] I am preparing an analysis of this case. The relation of "courtly love" to social structure is complicated.

Kinfolk or immediate family can disregard the question of who marries whom, only if a marriage is not seen as a link betwen kin lines, only if no property, power, lineage honor, totemic relationships, and the like are believed to flow from the kin lines through the spouses to their offspring. Universally, however, these are believed to follow kin lines. Mate choice thus has consequences for the social structure. But love may affect mate choice. Both mate choice and love, therefore, are too important to be left to children.

The Control of Love

Since considerable energy and resources may be required to push youngsters who are in love into proper role behavior, love must be controlled *before* it appears. Love relationships must either be kept to a small number or they must be so directed that they do not run counter to the approved kinship linkages. There are only a few institutional patterns by which this control is achieved.

1. Certainly the simplest, and perhaps the most widely used, structural pattern for coping with this problem is child marriage. If the child is betrothed, married, or both before he has had any opportunity to interact intimately as an adolescent with other children, then he has no resources with which to oppose the marriage. He cannot earn a living, he is physically weak, and is socially dominated by his elders. Moreover, strong love attachments occur only rarely before puberty. An example of this pattern was to be found in India, where the young bride went to live with her husband in a marriage which was not physically consummated until much later, within his father's household.[22]

2. Often, child marriage is linked with a second structural pattern, in which the kinship rules define rather closely a class of eligible future spouses. The marriage is determined by birth within narrow limits. Here, the major decision, which is made by elders, is *when* the marriage is to occur. Thus, among the Murngin, *galle*, the father's sister's child, is scheduled to marry *due*, the mother's brother's child.[23] In the case of the "four-class" double-descent system, each individual is a member of *both* a matri-moiety and a patri-moiety and must marry someone who belongs to neither; the four classes are (1) ego's own class, (2) those whose matri-moiety is the same as ego's but whose patri-moiety is different, (3) those who are in ego's patri-moiety but not in his matri-moiety, and (4) those who are in neither of ego's moieties, that is, who are in the cell diagonally from his

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[22] Frieda M. Das, *Purdah*, New York: Vanguard, 1932; Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, p. 112. There was a widespread custom of taking one's bride from a village other than one's own.

[23] W. Lloyd Warner, *Black Civilization*, New York: Harper, 1937, pp. 82–84. They may also become "sweethearts" at puberty; see pp. 86–89.

own.[24] Problems arise at times under these systems if the appropriate kinship cell—for example, parallel cousin or cross-cousin—is empty.[25] But nowhere, apparently, is the definition so rigid as to exclude some choice and, therefore, some dickering, wrangling, and haggling between the elders of the two families.

3. A society can prevent widespread development of adolescent love relationships by socially isolating young people from potential mates, whether eligible or ineligible as spouses. Under such a pattern, elders can arrange the marriages of either children or adolescents with little likelihood that their plans will be disrupted by love attachments. Obviously, this arrangement cannot operate effectively in most primitive societies, where youngsters see one another rather frequently.[26]

Not only is this pattern more common in civilizations than in primitive societies, but is found more frequently in the upper social strata. *Social* segregation is difficult unless it is supported by physical segregation—the harem of Islam, the zenana of India[27]—or by a large household system with individuals whose duty it is to supervise nubile girls. Social segregation is thus expensive. Perhaps the best known example of simple social segregation was found in China, where youthful marriages took place between young people who had not previously met because they lived in different villages; they could not marry fellow-villagers since ideally almost all inhabitants belonged to the same *tsu*.[28]

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[24] See [George Peter] Murdock, [*Social Structure*, New York: Macmillan, 1949], pp. 53 ff. *et passim* for discussions of double-descent.

[25] One adjustment in Australia was for the individuals to leave the tribe for a while, usually eloping, and then to return "reborn" under a different and now appropriate kinship designation. In any event, these marital prescriptions did not prevent love entirely. As Malinowski shows in his early summary of the Australian family systems, although every one of the tribes used the technique of infant betrothal (and close prescription of mate), no tribe was free of elopements, between either the unmarried or the married, and the "motive of sexual love" was always to be found in marriages by elopement. B. Malinowski. *The Family Among the Australian Aborigines*, London: University of London Press, 1913, p. 83.

[26] This pattern was apparently achieved in Manus, where on first menstruation the girl was removed from her playmates and kept at "home"—on stilts over a lagoon—under the close supervision of elders. The Manus were prudish, and love occurred rarely or never. Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea*, in *From the South Seas*, New York: Morrow, 1939, pp. 163–166, 208.

[27] See Das, *op. cit.*

[28] For the activities of the *tsu*, see Hsien Chin Hu, *The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions*, New York: Viking Fund Studies in Anthropology, 10 (1948). For the marriage process, see Marion J. Levy, *The Family Revolution in Modern China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949, pp. 87–107. See also Olga Lang, *Chinese Family and Society*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946, for comparisons between the old and new systems. In one-half of 62 villages in Ting Hsien Experimental District in Hopei, the largest clan included 50 per cent of the families; in 25 per cent of the villages, the two largest clans held over 90 per cent of the families; I am indebted to Robert M. Marsh who has been carrying out a study of Ching mobility partly under my direction for this reference: F. C. H. Lee, *Ting Hsien. She-hui K'ai-K'uang t'iao-ch'a*, Peiping: Chung-hua p'ing-min Chiao-yu ts'u-chin hui, 1932, p. 54. See also Sidney Gamble, *Ting Hsien: A North China Rural Community*, New York: International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954.

It should be emphasized that the primary function of physical or social isolation in these cases is to minimize informal or intimate social interaction. Limited social contacts of a highly ritualized or formal type in the presence of elders, as in Japan, have a similar, if less extreme, result.[29]

4. A fourth type of pattern seems to exist, although it is not clear cut; and specific cases shade off toward types three and five. Here, there is close supervision by duennas or close relatives, but not actual social segregation. A high value is placed on female chastity (which perhaps is the case in every major civilization until its "decadence") viewed either as the product of self-restraint, as among the 17th Century Puritans, or as a marketable commodity. Thus love as play is not developed; marriage is supposed to be considered by the young as a duty and a possible family alliance. This pattern falls between types three and five because love is permitted before marriage, but only between eligibles. Ideally, it occurs only between a betrothed couple, and, except as marital love, there is no encouragement for it to appear at all. Family elders largely make the specific choice of mate, whether or not intermediaries carry out the arrangements. In the preliminary stages youngsters engage in courtship under supervision, with the understanding that this will permit the development of affection prior to marriage.

I do not believe that the empirical data show where this pattern is prevalent, outside of Western Civilization. The West is a special case, because of its peculiar relationship to Christianity, in which from its earliest days in Rome there has been a complex tension between asceticism and love. This type of limited love marked French, English, and Italian upper class family life from the 11th to the 14th Centuries, as well as 17th Century Puritanism in England and New England.[30]

5. The fifth type of pattern permits or actually encourages love relationships, and love is a commonly expected element in mate choice. Choice in this system is *formally* free. In their 'teens youngsters begin their love play, with or without consummating sexual intercourse, within a group of peers. They may at times choose love partners whom they and others do not consider suitable spouses. Gradually, however, their range of choice is

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[29] For Japan, see Shidzué Ishimoto, *Facing Two Ways*, New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1935, Chapters 6, 8; John F. Embree, *Suye Mura*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950, Chapters 3, 6.

[30] I did not mean, of course, to restrict this pattern to these times and places, but I am more certain of these. For the Puritans, see Edmund S. Morgan, *The Puritan Family*, Boston: Public Library, 1944. For the somewhat different practices in New York, see Charles E, Ironside, *The Family in Colonial New York*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. See also: A. Abram, *English Life and Manners in the Later Middle Ages*, New York: Dutton, 1913, Chapters 4, 10; Emily J. Putnam, *The Lady*, New York: Sturgis and Walton, 1910, Chapter 4; James Gairdner, editor, *The Paston Letters, 1422–1509*, 4 vols., London: Arber, 1872–1875; Eileen Power, "The Position of Women," in C. G. Crump and E. F. Jacobs, editors, *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1926, pp. 414–416.

narrowed and eventually their affections center on one individual. This person is likely to be more eligible as a mate according to general social norms, and as judged by peers and parents, than the average individual with whom the youngster formerly indulged in love play.

For reasons that are not yet clear, this pattern is nearly always associated with a strong development of an adolescent peer group system, although the latter may occur without the love pattern. One source of social control, then, is the individual's own 'teen age companions, who persistently rate the present and probable future accomplishments of each individual.[31]

Another source of control lies with the parents of both boy and girl. In our society, parents threaten, cajole, wheedle, bribe, and persuade their children to "go with the right people," during both the early love play and later courtship phases.[32] Primarily, they seek to control love relationships by influencing the informal social contacts of their children: moving to appropriate neighborhoods and schools, giving parties and helping to make out invitation lists, by making their children aware that certain individuals have ineligibility traits (race, religion, manners, tastes, clothing, and so on). Since youngsters fall in love with those with whom they associate, control over informal relationships also controls substantially the focus of affection. The results of such control are well known and are documented in the more than one hundred studies of homogamy in this country: most marriages take place between couples in the same class, religious, racial, and educational levels.

As Robert Wikman has shown in a generally unfamiliar (in the United States) but superb investigation, this pattern was found among 18th Century Swedish farmer adolescents, was widely distributed in other Germanic areas, and extends in time from the 19th Century back to almost certainly the late Middle Ages.[33] In these cases, sexual intercourse was taken for granted, social contact was closely supervised by the peer group, and final consent to marriage was withheld or granted by the parents who owned the land.

Such cases are not confined to Western society. Polynesia exhibits a similar pattern, with some variation from society to society, the best known examples of which are perhaps Mead's Manu'ans and Firth's Tikopia.[34] Probably the most familiar Melanesian cases are the Trobriands and Dobu,[35] where the systems resemble those of the Kiwai Papuans of the Trans-Fly and the Siuai Papuans of the Solomon Islands.[36] Linton found this pattern among the Tanala.[37] Although Radcliffe-Brown holds that the pattern is not common in Africa, it is clearly found among the Nuer, the Kgatla (Tswana-speaking), and the Bavenda (here, without sanctioned sexual intercourse).[38]

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[31] For those who believe that the young in the United States are totally deluded by love, or believe that love outranks every other consideration, see: Ernest W. Burgess and Paul W. Wallin, *Engagement and Marriage*, New York: Lippincott, 1953, pp. 217–238. Note Karl Robert V. Wikman, *Die Einleitung Der Ehe. Acta Academiae Aboensis (Humaniora)*, 11 (1937), pp. 127 ff. Not only are reputations known because of close association among peers, but songs and poetry are sometimes composed about the girl or boy. Cf., for the Tikopia, Raymond Firth, *We, The Tikopia*, New York: American Book, 1936, pp. 468 ff.; for the Siuai, Douglas L. Oliver, *Solomon Island Society*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, pp. 146 ff. The Manu'ans made love in groups of three or four couples; cf. Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa, op. cit.*, p. 92.

[32] Marvin B. Sussman, "Parental Participation in Mate Selection and Its Effect upon Family Continuity," *Social Forces*, 32 (October, 1953), pp. 76–81.

[33] Wikman, *op. cit.*

A more complete classification, making use of the distinctions suggested in this paper, would show, I believe, that a large minority of known societies exhibit this pattern. I would suggest, moreover, that such a study would reveal that the degree to which love is a usual, expected prelude to marriage is correlated with (1) the degree of free choice of mate permitted in the society and (2) the degree to which husband-wife solidarity is the strategic solidarity of the kinship structure.[39]

Love Control and Class

These sociostructural explanations of how love is controlled lead to a subsidiary but important hypothesis: From one society to another, and from one *class* to another within the same society, the sociostructural importance of maintaining kinship lines according to rule will be rated differently by the families within them. Consequently, the degree to which control over mate choice, and therefore over the prevalence of a love pattern among adolescents, will also vary. Since, within any stratified society, this concern with the maintenance of intact and acceptable kin lines will be greater in the upper strata, it follows that noble or upper strata will maintain stricter control over love and courtship behavior than lower strata. The two correlations suggested in the preceding paragraph also apply: husband-wife solidarity is less strategic relative to clan solidarity in the upper than in the lower strata, and there is less free choice of mate.

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[34] [Margaret] Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa*, [New York: Modern Library, 1953,] pp. 97–108; and Firth, *op. cit.*, pp. 520 ff.

[35] Thus Malinowski notes in his "Introduction" to Reo F. Fortune's *The Sorcerers of Dobu*, London: Routledge, 1932, p. xxiii, that the Dobu have similar patterns, the same type of courtship by trial and error, with a gradually tightening union.

[36] Gunnar Landtman, *Kiwai Papuans of the Trans-Fly*, London: Macmillan, 1927, pp. 243 ff.; Oliver, *op. cit.*, pp. 153 ff.

[37] The pattern apparently existed among the Marquesans as well, but since Linton never published a complete description of this Polynesian society, I omit it here. His fullest analysis, cluttered with secondary interpretations, is in Abram Kardiner, *Psychological Frontiers of Society*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. For the Tanala, see Ralph Linton, *The Tanala*, Chicago: Field Museum, 1933, pp. 300 – 303.

[38] Thus, Radcliffe-Brown: "The African does not think of marriage as a union based on romantic love, although beauty as well as character and health are sought in the choice of a wife," in his "Introduction" to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and W. C. Daryll Ford, editors, *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage*, London: Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 46. For the Nuer, see E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Kinship and Marriage Among the Nuer*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1951, pp. 49 – 58. For the Kgatla, see I. Schapera, *Married Life in an African Tribe*, New York: Sheridan, 1941, pp. 55 ff. For the Bavenda, although the report seems incomplete, see Hugh A. Stayt, *The Bavenda*, London: Oxford University Press, 1931, pp. 111 ff., 145 ff., 154.

[39] The second correlation is developed from Marion J. Levy, *The Family Revolution in China*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 179. Levy's formulation ties "romantic love" to that solidarity, and is of little use because there is only one case, the Western culture complex. As he states it, it is almost so by definition.

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Conclusion

In this analysis I have attempted to show the integration of love with various types of social structures. As against considerable contemporary opinion among both sociologists and anthropologists, I suggest that love is a universal psychological potential, which is controlled by a range of five structural patterns, all of which are attempts to see to it that youngsters do not make entirely free choices of their future spouses. Only if kin lines are unimportant, and this condition is found in no society as a whole, will entirely free choice be permitted. Some structural arrangements seek to prevent entirely the outbreak of love, while others harness it. Since the kin lines of the upper strata are of greater social importance to them than those of lower strata are to the lower strata members, the former exercise a more effective control over this choice. Even where there is almost a formally free choice of mate—and I have suggested that this pattern is wide-spread, to be found among a substantial segment of the earth's societies—this choice is guided by peer group and parents toward a mate who will be acceptable to the kin and friend groupings. The theoretical importance of love is thus to be seen in the sociostructural patterns which are developed to keep it from disrupting existing social arrangements.

The 'Ethics of Sympathy'

MAX SCHELER

Before entering upon analysis, let me first briefly set out the reasons why an *ethic* which finds the highest moral value in fellow-feeling, and attempts to derive all morally valuable conduct from this, can never do justice to the facts of moral life.

(1) The ethics of sympathy does not attribute moral value primarily to the *being* and attitudes of persons *as such*, in respect of their character, action, volition, etc., but seeks to derive it from the attitude of the *spectator* (i.e. one who reacts emotionally to the experience and attitude of someone else); in this, however, it invariably *pre*-supposes what it is attempting to deduce. It is certainly *not* moral to sympathize with someone's pleasure in evil, his chagrin in contemplating goodness, or with his hatred, malice or spite. Can we really suppose that a fellow-feeling such as that of rejoicing with A's pleasure at B's misfortune is morally valuable? Clearly, the sharing of another's pleasure can only be moral when the latter *is itself moral*, and warranted by the value-situation which evokes it. This immediately indicates *one* of the essential differences between fellow-feeling and love. Loving another, we may often be constrained to regret that he should take pleasure in something, for instance, when he cruelly enjoys tormenting someone else; but mere fellow-feeling is, as such, quite regardless of the value of its objects. In acts of love and hate there is certainly an element of valuation present, positively or negatively . . . but mere fellow-feeling, in all its possible forms, is in principle *blind to value*.[1]

(2) It would be quite wrong to suppose that an ethical judgement can only arise through the medium of fellow-feeling. There is, for one thing, the whole class of ethical judgements we pass upon *ourselves*. Is there any fellow-feeling to be found, for instance, in the 'pangs of conscience',

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[1] Fellow-feeling can itself have a value, *independent* of the value content which gives rise to joy or suffering in others; but then its value cannot be derived from the latter.

Max Scheler, "The 'Ethics of Sympathy,'" The Nature of Sympathy *(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.), Chapter I, pp. 5–7. Reprinted by permission.*

in remorse, or in judgements of self-approval? Adam Smith thought this to be so, holding that no man on his own would ever immediately ascribe ethical value to his experience, volition, action or existence. Only by adopting the standpoint and attitude of an onlooker praising or blaming his conduct, and thus ultimately contemplating himself through the eyes of an 'impartial spectator', and by participating directly, through fellow-feeling, in the hatred, anger, indignation and impulses of revenge which the *latter* directs towards him, does there arise in him also a tendency to self-judgement either positive or negative. Thus the 'pangs of conscience' for instance, are no more than an immediate participation in such detached acts of disapproval on the part of a spectator. As to this, we may observe that it is certainly true that in judging our own case we all too often succumb to the infection, as it were, which is transmitted by the attitude of other people towards us; *their* estimate of us seems to displace the immediately given value of our own self-appraisal and hides it from us. This used to happen, for instance, in the mediaeval witch-trials, when many witches felt that they were indeed guilty of witchcraft and justly condemned to death. But is this more than just a *delusion* of conscience, due to the fact that its own counsels are overlaid by social suggestion? According to Adam Smith, a man unjustly condemned and universally considered to be guilty should also acknowledge his guilt himself. Indeed (apart from errors of fact), he really would *be* 'guilty'. This is certainly not so. Our conscience knows nothing of such an almighty social authority. On the other hand, if a man having no conscience at all, and therefore no sense of the vileness of his conduct, were to behave quite naïvely, exactly 'as though he hadn't done anything', then, given the necessary conviction for such effrontery, he might ultimately so infect others with his sense of innocence, that they too would hold him guiltless. From Adam Smith's point of view he ought then actually to *be* guiltless. But he certainly could *not* become so in such a fashion.

The ethics of sympathy is also found wanting in that it clashes from the outset with the self-evident law of preference,[2] whereby all positively valuable 'spontaneous' acts are to be preferred to merely 're-active' ones. But all fellow-feeling is essentially a reaction—as love, for instance, is not.

Nor is it only self-judgement which can be carried out without the intervention of acts of sympathy; judgement of others cannot possibly be effected through fellow-feeling either . . .

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[2] For the nature of 'self-evident laws of preference', cf. my book, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*.

The Psychogenesis of Empathy

DAVID A. STEWART

Freud used the term transference to designate the bonds of affection that are formed by the patient to the analyst in the identification process. Negative transference occurs when the patient resists and resents the analyst. If the analyst tries to dominate, to force his influence upon the patient, the more resistant the patient becomes, prolonging the therapy unnecessarily and effecting a dubious recovery. Early in his career, Freud discovered this when he abandoned hypnosis as a technique and adopted a freer easier going relationship with his patients.[1]

Is it likely that in transference, in the ideal state of its occurrence, the empathic process, where control is absent, we shall find THE key to all interpersonal relations? For where transference can be mutual as in empathy (not in counter-transference) rather than a one-way process, communication thrives. Messages are returned as well as sent out in effective communication. Truth is more likely to emerge where all forms of restriction or censorship are removed, as they are in empathic communication. It seems to me that not only personality theory but ethics, too, can hardly fail to take account of mutual transference in empathy, for the process of empathy appears to be disciplined by good-will. Lest this term, which I have frequently used appear to be vague, I shall indicate what I mean by it. If good-will meant no more than the integrity and open-mindedness which characterise every genuine scientific effort, it should be nearly enough for its meaning in this context. But because it involves persons in a relationship that does not obtain in the scientist's setting, its exercise is more in the nature of an art than a scientific method, for the responses of people require a skill of counter-response varying in different situations, that is not required in dealing with chemical, physical, or mathematical objects.

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[1] Sigmund Freud: *An Autobiographical Study*, p. 75, 2d ed., tr. by James Strachey: London; Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1946.

David A. Stewart, "The Psychogenesis of Empathy," reprinted from The Psychoanalytic Review, *Vol. 41, No. 3 (1954), pp. 216–218, through the courtesy of the editors and the publisher, National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis, Inc. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

Can ethics and personality theory, concerned more with actions among people than with events among things, ignore the importance of a process in which human behavior and ways of knowing it are explored on grounds proper to its nature and are revealed under nearly ideal conditions—the free interchange of ideas, unhampered by fear?

The ground of all knowledge is moral in the wide sense that every scientific and human effort is marked by discipline and intention. We need a knowledge of action that is in action if we ever hope to put interpersonal knowledge effectively into practice. You cannot, for example, verify good-will. You can only illustrate it in action, and this is to know it in action.

The universal phenomenon of transference is an illustration of a downright natural process arising spontaneously in any human relationship. Thus it is *a priori* because while instances of it must arise in experience, it is the *basis* of *all* interpersonal experiences. When this *a priori* process becomes conscious, it is clear that it did not spring from a logically worked out plan, though logical plans of action can of course take it into account *a posteriori* and build systems of ethics and of psychology upon it. When the value of transference is noted as a means to interpersonal knowledge it can only be promoted by good-will—the conscious form of that which unconsciously and spontaneously is the very ground of the transference process. Let there be either ignorance of the means by which transference is fostered, or a lack of finesse in applying the means, and resistance will arrest the process and the transference will be negative; a wall comes up, and mutual acquaintance is delayed. Moreover, when good-will is consciously behind the positive transference process both therapist and patient are more free to communicate with one another than when it is absent. Good-will thus stirs the springs of action, or puts them in motion and gives them direction. How this is done is dependent on the particular situation and calls forth the inventive talents of those concerned. Thus some people are better than others in interpersonal knowing, not because they "know" more about good-will, but because they know how to be friendly.

What is the will like when it is good, what are we like when we are well disposed towards others? Do not many people find it either difficult or impossible to feel kindly? Only the persons concerned can answer the first question, and only they can bring about good-will in those who do not know it. It is because no one knows scientifically what the good is that keeps it from being a goal scientifically attainable. If the good were known to be A caused by B then we could proceed logically from B to A without either ethics or psychology. It is because the good requires universally to be seen as a personal goal, because it is *not verified but only illustrated in experience*, that it cannot become a scientific, but must remain a psycho-ethical problem. Still, if we cannot say scientifically what "the good is", we may yet try to justify psychologically what is meant by saying that if anything in the world can be called good without exception, it is the good-will. If we can trace the source of the good-will in a natural human process as the sine qua non of all knowledge, we may be able to support psychologically what Kant set forth as the logical ground of all ethics, though such supports may modify the original Kantian argument. To do this will be, I believe, to trace at the same time the psychogenesis of empathy from identification through imitation.

The process of identification has acquired a number of complex meanings. Generally, in spite of its different shades of meaning, it is agreed that identification is unconscious and spontaneous, unless it is qualified as deliberate. In this context, identification is chiefly of the sort which arises "with every new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct. The more important this common quality is, the more successful may this partial identification become, and it may thus represent the beginning of a new tie."[2] But in this type of identification, as in any other, being spontaneous and unconscious, discipline is lacking, and there will be the tendency to overidealize and to introject into oneself what may not be a trait or aim of the other. This tendency is revealed in the process of *resistance*. Of the three sorts of resistance, two are processes of mistaken identification.

(a) a kind of identification in the sense that, later, in empathy, it is seen to be the perception of an undesirable trait in the other that is as much a trait of oneself. As something resisted, as supposedly belonging to another, it is, in resistance, encountered as a trait foreign and threatening to oneself. Hate or resentment arise, first directed against the other, then against oneself, until understood in empathy.

(b) A mistaken projection onto the other of a trait belonging neither to the one nor to the other. Over-idealization, both of oneself and of the other. As ideals collapse on behavioral evidence, there follows similar dynamics of hate and resentment as in (a), as expressions of resistance.

(c) Not a form of identification as in (a) and (b); this sort of resistance is simply grounded in the face of the unknown, a form of ignorance for which neither (a) nor (b) are facades. It could be called identification in the sense that one identifies one's own insecurity and fear with that confronted in the other and thus magnifies them. Hate and resentment as in (a) and (b), until otherness is seen as similar to those features of one's own life which are forever unfathomable and beyond one's control, and yet a necessary part of one's life.

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[2] Sigmund Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 65, 66—tr. by James Strachey, London; Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1922.

Though it has been suggested that resistance in the form of imposed imitation halts or impedes the knowing process, and that it is well, therefore, to foster free imitation, this was not to infer that resistance can or should be eliminated. Resistance asserts itself again in the development from free imitation to empathy. By now, having learned in free imitation that types (a) and (b) of resistance are mistaken identifications, we restrict resistance in the empathic process to type 3 of resistance. But at first, in empathy, resistance is seen largely as self-resistance. For in empathy I deliberately identify with another and consciously seek the qualities we have in common. Here there is less ground for hostility than in one who does not appear to share common feelings and common wants. Therefore much of my resistance in the interpersonal relation with the other with whom I have deliberately identified will be self-resistance. But besides self-resistance I may encounter behavior really foreign to myself. Yet even here it appears that I can come to know this foreign element in the other only through analogy with my own experience. Thus the concept of "the other", as distinct from myself, arises most genuinely when I confront something which so far as I know is more than, or other than, the "dark side" of myself. This foreign element often arouses resistance in the form of fear, of hostility, of resentment. Such obstacles to personal knowing are reduced to the extent that common needs and common feelings are shared in the interpersonal situation. Still, this foreign element, when it does not remain unknown and feared, is a condition both of my identity and of the other's. How is the foreign to be known? It is hard to see how it can be known other than by analogy with one's own experience, first, on the basis of what one already knows, and then, by imagination, to suppose how it must be with the other, recalling every conceivable experience similar to the one which is "foreign". Suppose I am an alcoholic, and you are a gambler—I happen not to be a gambler, and you happen not to be alcoholic. Suppose too that we both wish to correct what we regard as defects, and we desire to overcome in one case alcoholism and in the other gambling. Basically we share an awareness of defect and a desire to overcome it. Further we may learn that we share certain traits of what is called immaturity. By an interchange of views about our problems a good deal may be seen to be shared in common as to impulsiveness, grandiosity, wishful thinking, in our own terms, and each in his own way. Each will be restrained from making quick judgments like "This man can't really understand me", "Gambling is immoral and I am sick", "Alcoholism is a sign of weak will". But such restraint will be self-imposed, on cues indeed from the other, though not from direct injunction of the other. I proceed to an understanding of your gambling problem not by being informed about gambling, but by comparing your feelings on the activity with mine about drinking. We may come to share much with regard to a common compulsion, on the one hand to drink, on the other to gamble.

As to the experiences themselves of drinking and gambling we can never quite exchange them, even in imagination, but much can be done mutually to understand one another's personal problem better by seeking out all the common grounds we share, and then proceed by all these cues available from the other which set in motion similar experiences in oneself. The fact that one is conscious of evoking not the same but similar experiences is sufficient support for the elaboration and clarification not only of otherness but also of one's personal identity. The awareness of *analogy* at work is demonstration of otherness as well as clearer understanding of one's own experiences. Thus we need to distinguish between "being informed" and personal knowing. For I may be ever so well informed about gambling and gambling problems but will never know it unless I have gambled, have got entangled in gambling problems, or by empathy have come to understand it by analogy with a problem of my own, seen and felt to be similar to gambling.

But even where two alcoholics are concerned, excluding the problem of their differences on countless grounds other than their drinking problem, the feeling of oneness-with will accompany the feeling of respect for the other as different from oneself. This may be expressed as a distinction within the empathic process corresponding to Einsfühling and Einfühling.[3] In Einsfühling—being at one with another—we do not differentiate. We live in and with the feelings of the other. Practically speaking we completely agree on the meaning of certain drinking experiences. In such agreement, we should also, no doubt, agree on a common therapy, if this therapy proved helpful to one of the two. In Einfühling—each implicitly confers on the other his identity by imagining the other to be what he is, after comparing some item of the other's behavior with behavior of one's own. In Einfuhling, therefore, the other gets his personal identity—insofar as he gets it, from me. This may be illustrated in his account of a drinking experience which I cannot quite duplicate. But there is something similar I can recall which leads me to an understanding of it—an understanding which, among other similar processes of understanding, contributes to my knowledge of you, to my knowledge of your personal identity.

In the empathetic process, constituted by these two phases, deliberate identification and consciousness of difference, each person concerned will increasingly see that resistance in form of fear, hostility and resentment, obstacles which block personal knowing, is reduced as the process becomes disciplined. Resistance is primarily reduced in learning that many of its forms are actually self-resistance because, in the noting of common qualities, what was formerly thought to be an external threat to one's well being is now an internal threat that may be handled completely by oneself. Thus, an alcoholic cannot continue to criticize a certain tendency of another alcoholic after he has learned that he shares this tendency. In this way the phenomenon of resistance in the interpersonal situation finds its proper place through empathy. Where it might have been unwarranted fear, hostility or resentment it becomes, ideally, *respect for the other.* Hate thus appears to be grounded in ignorance of the person hated, or to be an expression of distaste for what turns to be an unsavoury aspect of oneself.

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[3] Mitchell, Cf. Sir Wm.: *Structure and Growth of the Mind* (1907) quoted in E. F. Carritt, Philosophies of Beauty, p. 258 and footnote, Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1931.

Here is a recovered alcoholic in empathy with an active addict. He knows the situation and the psychological condition of the sufferer because he has been in a similar state, but he does not confuse his awareness of this state with the actual distress of the sufferer, and formerly, of himself. He knows *that* his friend is suffering and intends, say, to have a drink within the hour because he, too, once was similarly distressed and under compulsion to have "a quick one" as soon as possible. He knows *that,* only because he once knew *how* it was to feel this way. But in knowing *that,* he does not share the sufferer's compulsive intention. To feel clearly the feeling of the sufferer is not, in the recovered man, to suffer or to want a drink. It is one thing to understand well that an alcoholic is in pain and wants a drink, and quite another to experience that pain and desire oneself. Yet here is the process of deliberate identification required by the first phase of empathy. It is identification surely, because by comparing certain tense gestures of the sufferer with those of his own, years ago, the recovered man says, "There I am, as I was, and I got drunk". But it is deliberate, because the recovered man intends during the interview, to discover how many tendencies they have in common. But tendencies can be shared which do not necessitate shared overt behavior. Thus the recovered man can deliberately identify with the sufferer without becoming him; he can know his pain and his desire without having them, though he cannot know them as well as he does unless he once did experience them. Thus, in deliberate identification there is a clear awareness of oneself as distinct from the other, for one is not overcome by the feelings of the other, as in primitive identification. Nevertheless, one comes naturally by the ability to identify deliberately because of the spontaneous tendency to identify with other persons, especially with those similar to oneself.

Now what of the foreign element confronted in the second phase of empathy? It is here that unnecessary resistances have to be cleared out of the way in order to cope only with genuine necessary resistance. The recovered man learns that the sufferer beats his wife and neglects his children. At first he is shocked. He may be silently hostile and unreceptive to "this cruel drunk" until he sights common ground in mutual carelessness and in the infliction of pain. The recovered man never abused his wife and children directly, but he sought comfort from them in self-pity during hangovers, and neglected them while he was on his binges. He probably inflicted as much pain on his family as the man does who abuses his wife in open aggression. Foreign elements in the behavior of the other are thus known in the discovery of higher common levels of abstraction. Concrete differences, often very distinct, remain to distinguish one person from the other. Yet it seems to require a higher common category of behavior with which both can identify in order to see well the more specific differences contained within it which confer on each his personal identity. This process appears to require the work of imagination and of good-will quite as much as the work of intellectual processes. Yet even these processes have their limits. One finally admits that there are elements in the behavior of the other which he simply cannot understand. But now, through empathy, there is sufficient common ground for one to communicate with the other and to engage in mutually understood actions. Resistance, psychologically, becomes respect for the other.

Thus empathy, both in its aspect of deliberate identification and in its aspect of confronting foreign elements, makes possible not only social interaction but also personal identity.

He who empathizes goes beyond free imitation in a circle back to identification, but now he identifies deliberately, without having to enact and feel the experience in the other with which he identifies, except in imagination. In free imitation, he strove to feel and to do just what his exemplar attracted him to feel and to do. This may also occur in empathy, but in addition there will be the ability to identify without enactment, though action will nevertheless mark the empathic process in the good-will operative in the interpersonal situation. The recovered man empathizing with the sufferer may indeed wish freely to imitate some admirable trait in the other, but at the same time he identifies, for example, with the sufferer's drinking compulsion without feeling any need for a drink. Thus, though empathy develops from free imitation, there is a clear difference between them. Anyone can empathize who is not cowed into inaction by the belief that he must have special sanctions from those who "know better." And he who can empathize will be a creator, for he will be freed of externally imposed rules, of social prestige, and of professional status, and in this freedom he gives to his imitations the control and direction of his own personality. If intelligence, breeding, and training are introduced as factors relevant to the fostering of empathy, it would appear that persons with these advantages should expect more of themselves, while remaining uncritical of those less well endowed.

But an act of good-will can be performed by any human being. Those to whom it is impossible or difficult have only to be allowed, often and consistently enough to speak and act without fear of censure, ridicule, disdain or coercion.

This is how I interpret Freud's sequence from identification through imitation to empathy, a sequence he stressed as the main path to our knowledge of other people. In imitation there is purpose, for one is at least partly conscious of what one is doing. But there is more personal purpose in free imitation than in imposed imitation because in the former one chooses to imitate, whereas in the latter one may be overpowered or controlled by another. Where there is free imitation, there can be empathy, when identification has become deliberate and when resistance is felt as respect for the other.

Spontaneous identification is that without which imitation is impossible, and free imitation is that without which empathy is impossible. Within empathy, resistance takes the form of respect for the other. To complete the sequence, empathy is that without which fellowship is impossible. But the pattern is circular, for identification is made easy in fellowship. Thus the spontaneous process of identification, though psychologically prior to imitation, empathy and fellowship, can be set in motion and directed by conscious efforts to imitate, to empathize, and to be friendly.

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CHAPTER 2 • Theories of Personality Integration

Human Motives and the Concept of the Self

ERNEST R. HILGARD

No problems are more fascinating than those of human motivation, and none are more in need of wise solution. To understand the struggles which go on within economic enterprise, to interpret the quarrels of international diplomacy, or to deal with the tensions in the daily interplay between individuals, we must know what it is that people want, how these wants arise and change, and how people will act in the effort to satisfy them.

American psychologists typically believe that adult motivational patterns develop through the socialization of organic drives. . . . Despite the variations in the detailed lists of primary drives which different ones of us offer, and some alternative conceptions as to the ways in which socialization takes place, we find it easy to agree that adult motives are to be understood through an interaction between biology and culture.

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The Mechanisms of Adjustment in Motivational Theory

The mechanisms of adjustment were the features of Freudian theory that we earliest domesticated within American academic psychology. They now

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have a respectable place in our textbooks, regardless of the theoretical biases of our textbook writers.

The mechanisms did not burst all at once upon the psychological scene. Freud had begun to write about them in the '90's, and by the time of his *Interpretation of dreams* (1900) he had named repression, projection, displacement, identification, and condensation. In his *Three contributions to the theory of sex* (1905) he added fixation, regression, and reaction formation. It remained for Ernest Jones to give the name rationalization to that best-known of the mechanisms. He assigned this name in an article in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* in 1908. Among the books which brought the mechanisms together and called them to the attention of psychologists none was more popular than Bernard Hart's *Psychology of insanity*, which appeared in 1912 and went through several editions and many reprintings. Hart treated especially the manifestations of identification, projection, and rationalization, and introduced that by now familiar friend, logic-tight compartments.

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The lack of systematic treatment of the mechanisms has had consequences for their development as part of psychological science. When there is no effort to be systematic, problems are not sharply defined. When problems are not sharply defined, anecdotal evidence is used loosely, and sometimes irresponsibly. A consequence is that very little evidence of experimental sort is introduced into the chapters on the mechanisms. This does not mean that evidence does not exist. It means only that problems have to be more carefully formulated before the relevance of existing evidence is seen, and before gaps in knowledge are discovered which evidence can fill.

The Mechanisms and the Self

It would take us too far afield to review the individual mechanisms at this time, and to consider evidence in relation to them. Instead, we may examine some of their most general characteristics, as they relate to motivational theory. These characteristics lend support to a thesis which I propose to defend: the thesis that all the mechanisms imply a self-reference, and that the mechanisms are not understandable unless we adopt a concept of the self.

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Let us examine two of the characteristics of the mechanisms to see how the thesis of self-reference is implied. We may choose to view the mechanisms as defenses against anxiety, or we may see them as self-deceptive.

1. *The mechanisms as defenses against anxiety.* The natural history of anxiety in relation to learning has been much illuminated by the series of experiments with animal subjects performed by Mowrer, *e.g. (13)*, Miller, *e.g. (12)*, and their collaborators.

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The natural history of anxiety, according to this view, is somewhat as follows. First, the organism has experiences of pain and punishment—experiences to be avoided. These are followed in turn by *threats* of pain and punishment, which lead to *fear* of the situations in which such threats arise. Other situations are assimilated to these fear-provoking ones, so the added circumstances may lead to apprehension. Fears with these somewhat vaguer object-relations become known as anxiety states. Sometimes as the apprehensive state becomes more and more detached from particular frightening situations, clinicians refer to it as a state of free-floating anxiety. All of these acquired states of fear, apprehension or anxiety are tension-states. Any one of them may serve as an acquired drive and motivate learning. Activities which lessen fear and anxiety are reinforced because tension is reduced. Thus behavior mechanisms become reinforced and learned as ways of reducing anxiety.

The Mowrer-Miller theory of the origin of fear, and of its role as an acquired drive, is acceptable as far as it goes. But it needs to be carried one step further if it is to deal with the kinds of anxiety which are found in the clinic. This step is needed because in man anxiety becomes intermingled with *guilt-feelings*. . . .

In many cases which come to the clinic, the apprehension includes the fear lest some past offense will be brought to light, or lest some act will be committed which deserves pain and punishment. It is such apprehensions which go by the name of guilt-feelings, because they imply the responsibility of the individual for his past or future misbehavior. To feel guilty is to conceive of the self as an agent capable of good or bad choices. It thus appears that at the point that anxiety becomes infused with guilt-feelings, self-reference enters. If we are to understand a person's defenses against guilt-feelings, we must know something about his image of himself. This is the kind of argument which supports the thesis that if we are to understand the mechanisms we shall have to come to grips with a concept of the self.

2. *The mechanisms as self-deceptive.* Another way of looking at the mechanisms is to see them as bolstering self-esteem through self-deception. There is a deceptive element in each of the mechanisms. Rationalization is using false or distorted reasons to oneself as well as to the world outside; using reasons known to be false in order to deceive someone else is not rationalization but lying. It is entirely appropriate to consider self-deception as one of the defining characteristics of a mechanism. As another

example of what I mean, let us consider when aggression should be thought of as a mechanism. Aggressive behavior which is a form of fighting directly for what you want or as a protest against injustice is not a mechanism at all, even if it is violent and destructive. It is then simply a direct attempt at problem-solving. But displaced aggression has the characteristics of a mechanism, because false accusations are made, and the object of aggression may be related only remotely to the source of the need to express aggression. Displaced aggression thus contains the elements of self-deception, and fits the pattern of the mechanisms.

There are two chief ways in which we deceive ourselves. One is by *denial* of impulses, or of traits, or of memories. The second is through *disguise*, whereby the impulses, traits, or memories are distorted, displaced, or converted, so that we do not recognize them for what they are. Let us see what evidence there is for denial and for disguise.

The clearest evidence for denial comes through amnesia, in which memories are temporarily lost. If such memories can later be recovered without relearning, support is given to an interpretation of forgetting as a consequence of repression. Often in amnesia the memories lost are the personal ones, while impersonal memories remain intact.

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Disguise, as the second form of self-deception, shows in many ways. The most pertinent evidence from the laboratory comes in the studies of projection defined as the attribution of traits. Undesirable traits of his own of which the person prefers to remain unaware are assigned in exaggerated measure to other people (Sears, *18*). In some cases, the deception goes so far as to become what Frenkel-Brunswik calls "conversion to the opposite." In one of her studies (*4*) it was found that a person who said, "Above all else I am kind," was one likely to be rated unkind by his acquaintances. In the studies of anti-Semitism which she later carried on collaboratively with the California group she presents evidence that anti-Semitism is sometimes a disguise for deepseated attitudes of hostility and insecurity having to do with home and childhood, and nothing to do directly with experience with Jews (5).

If self-deception either by denial or by disguise is accepted as characteristic of a mechanism, the problem still remains as to the source of or reason for the self-deception. The obvious interpretation is that the need for self-deception arises because of a more fundamental need to maintain or to restore self-esteem. Anything belittling to the self is to be avoided. That is why the memories lost in amnesia are usually those with a self-reference, concealing episodes which are anxiety or guilt-producing. What is feared is loss of status, loss of security of the self. That is why aspects of the self which are disapproved are disguised.

In this discussion of the mechanisms I have tried to point out that they may be integrated with other aspects of motivation and learning provided their self-reference is accepted. Then it can be understood how they provide defenses against anxiety, and why they are self-deceptive through denial and disguise.

The Self Present in Awareness

The mechanisms are comprehensible only if we accept a conception of the self. This poses us the problem of the nature of the self-concept that we may find acceptable. Two main approaches lie before us. One approach is to look for the self in awareness, to see if we can find by direct observation the self that is anxious, that feels guilty, that tries various dodges in order to maintain self-respect. The second approach is to infer a self from the data open to an external observer, to construct a self which will give a coherent account of motivated behavior. Let us examine these two possibilities in turn.

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. . . the reason for rejecting a purely introspective approach to the search for the self is not limited to the historical one that earlier attempts have proved fruitless. It is based also on the recognition that defense mechanisms and self-deception so contaminate self-observation that unaided introspection is bound to yield a distorted view of the self.

Having said all this by way of warning, we may still allow some place for self-awareness in arriving at our concept of the self. Two aspects of the self as seen by the experiencing person appear to be necessary features in understanding self-organization.

The first of these is the continuity of memories as binding the self, as maintaining self-identity. To the external observer, the continuity of the bodily organism is enough to maintain identity, but the person himself needs to have continuous memories, dated in his personal past, if he is to have a sense of personal identity . . . .

The second feature of self-awareness which cannot be ignored in forming our concept of the self is that of self-evaluation and self-criticism. I earlier pointed out that we need to understand the feelings of guilt which go beyond mere anxiety. Guilt-feelings imply that the self is an active agent, responsible for what it does, and therefore subject to self-reproof. The other side of self-evaluation is that the self must be supported and must be protected from criticism. One component of the self is provided by those vigilant attitudes which are assumed in order to reduce anxiety and guilt. It is this vigilant self-criticism in its harshest form which is implied in Freud's concept of the superego . . . .

Despite the difficulties in introspective approaches to the self, we find that our self-concept needs to include some information based on private experience. The continuity of memories maintains personal identity, and the awareness of the self as an object of value organizes many of our attitudes. More is needed, however, to enrich the concept of the self and to make it square with all that we know about human motivation.

The Inferred Self

This points up the need for a more inclusive self-concept, one which will make use of all the data. Such a self-concept I shall call the inferred self. Like any other scientific construct, it will prove to be valid to the extent that it is systematically related to data, and it will be useful to the extent that it simplifies the understanding of events.

I wish to suggest three hypotheses needed in arriving at an inferred self. Each of these, although plausible, is not self-evident, and therefore requires demonstration. In order to be scientifically useful, it is important that the inferred self should go beyond the obvious. The inferred self will prove acceptable only if these hypotheses, or closely related ones are supported.

The first hypothesis is that of *the continuity of motivational patterns.* This means that the organization of motives and attitudes that are central to the self is one which persists and remains recognizable as the person grows older. Reactions to the present situations will be coherent with reactions to past situations. For those who prefer the habit concept, the inferred self may be thought of as a pattern of persisting habits and attitudes. The organization or structure which is implied is a learned one, and like any habit structure it carries the marks of the past in the present. When new goals are substituted for old ones, there is continuity with the past in the ways in which the goals are selected and in the ways which gratification is obtained. This is all plausible, but it is by no means self-evident, and it is greatly in need of empirical study. It is a matter for study and demonstration whether or not a continuity can be traced between nursing arrangements, thumb-sucking, nail-biting, cigarette-smoking, and overt sexual behavior. The first hypothesis implies that there is such a continuity, whatever motivational strands are being followed, so that one form of gratification shades imperceptibly into the next. If we but knew enough, we could trace the continuity throughout the life span.

The second hypothesis supporting the inferred self is that of *the genotypical patterning of motives.* This hypothesis suggests that motives unlike in their overt or phenotypical expression may represent an underlying similarity. It will do no good to try to appraise personality by a study confined to its superficial expression. What we know about the mechanisms of denial and disguise tells us that the genotypical pattern will have to be inferred. Unless we move at the level of inference and interpretation, much behavior will be baffling or paradoxical.

The inferred self goes beyond the self of awareness by including for purposes of inference much that is exluded from self-awareness. Awareness includes the not-self as well as the self. In dreams and hallucinations we have products of the self, present in awareness, but products for which the self takes neither credit nor responsibility. It is hard to see the self as giving the stage-directions for the dream, or as selecting the epithets hurled by the hallucinated voices. Yet in making a reconstruction of genotypical motives, these products of the self enter as evidence. Some items, then, remain in awareness, but are not part of self-awareness. Other items are excluded from awareness by inattention or amnesia. Facts such as these necessitate indirection in the inference to motivational organization. A description of overt conduct is not enough to permit an accurate appraisal of motivational patterning.

These assertions may be made with some confidence, but again confidence of assertion does not constitute proof. We need to show by rigorous proof that predictions based on the concept of genotypical patterning of motives will account for behavior either more economically or more accurately than predictions based on phenotypical manifestations of motivated action.

3. The third hypothesis is that *the important human motives are interpersonal both in origin and in expression.* Despite the fertility of Freud's mind and the penetration of his observations, this is one hypothesis about the self which he never fully grasped. By good fortune he laid his emphasis upon the one organic need—sex—which is inevitably interpersonal in its fullest expression. Even so, he remained within the instinct tradition. Once we reject the self as the unfolding of an inevitable pattern, but see it instead as an individual acquisition, we are impressed by the part which other people play in the shaping of an individual self. Because the parents and others who transmit the culture are themselves a part of the culture, there are some uniformities in socialization, producing pressure in the direction of a modal personality (*10*). In addition, there are diverse roles which are ready-made for the individual, to which he conforms with greater or less success. There are the roles of man and of woman, of eldest and youngest child, of mother and father and in-law, of employer and employee, of craftsman and white-collar worker. Finally there are the individualizing influences of heredity, of birth accidents, of childhood experiences. There are many details to be filled in, but there is little doubt about the general course of socialization, leading in the end to internalizing much of the culture in the form of personal ideals and standards of conduct.

The self is thus a product of interpersonal influences, but the question remains whether the end-product is also interpersonal in its expression. Does the self have meaning only as it is reflected in behavior involving other people, either actually or symbolically? Is it true that you can describe a self only according to the ways in which other selves react to it? I am inclined to believe that the self, as a social product, has full meaning only when expressed in social interaction. But I do not believe that this is obvious, because I can conceive that it might not be true, or might be true in a limited sense only.

These uncertainties about the truth of the hypotheses regarding the inferred self need not be regarded as signs of weakness in the concept. On the contrary, the concept has greater potential richness of meaning precisely because it goes beyond the self-evident and requires empirical study and justification. If it turns out that in some meaningful sense motivational patterns are continuous, that we can unravel their genotypical organization, and that we can know in what precise way they are interpersonal, then we will have a concept of an inferred self that will be genuinely useful.

What does the inferred self imply as to the unity of personality? It does not necessarily imply unity. Conflict as well as harmony may be perpetuated through genotypical organization. The healthy self, however, will achieve an integrative organization. Note that I say integrative and not integrated. It is the integrative personality which can handle the complexity of relationships with other persons in a culture like ours, a culture which makes plural demands. An integrated personality soon leads to its own isolation or destruction if it is not also integrative. Lest this seem to be an idle play on words, let me point out that the paranoid psychotic with highly systematized delusions is among the best integrated of personalities. He is integrated but not integrative. The genotypical patterns of motivation which comprise the inferred self may or may not be integrative.

A Laboratory for the Study of Psychodynamics

I have argued that we need a self-concept if we are to understand the richness of human motivation, and I have proposed that we adopt an inferred self as the unifying concept. Now what shall we do about it?

* * * *

Instead of assigning these problems to any one group of psychologists, I propose that we proceed to establish laboratories for the study of psychodynamics fully commensurate with laboratories for the study of perception or learning or other problems of general psychology (*11*).

A laboratory for the study of psychodynamics differs from the clinic in its intent, though there will be overlap in staff, in procedures, and in problems. I am assuming that people are referred to a clinic or come there voluntarily in order to be helped with their personal problems. By contrast, subjects are invited to come to a laboratory because they fit into an experimental design. The laboratory permits delimitation of problems and control of variables in a manner usually less possible in a situation geared to service.

In order to make the picture of the psychodynamics laboratory concrete, we may sketch a few specimen problems likely to be worked upon. Many of these problems will have had their origin in clinical experience, and many fruitful hypotheses will have come from the clinic. But the task of achieving precision in the testing of scientific generalizations belongs to the laboratory.

Of first moment are the problems involved in the natural history of the self. This will mean concentrated study of young children, under arrangements which permit the testing of hypotheses. For many years we have given assent to the importance of language as an instrument of socialization, but we have a paucity of data. Piaget asked many of the right questions, but his conjectures have to be refined and put to the test in a manner more convincing to American psychologists. I should assign the study of the child's language as a task of high priority in the psychodynamics laboratory. This is but one aspect of discovering in what ways the self is a social product.

Other problems include the details of influence by important people in the child's environment. Some studies now under way at Stanford (*8*) suggest that patterns of sibling rivalry among young children are often traceable to unresolved rivalries going back to the parents' childhoods. A parent may act as a director of the drama, assigning the roles to the children, and calling the turns on a new performance that largely reenacts one of a previous generation. While there is satisfactory evidence from case histories that this sort of parental influence goes on, just how it comes about, and just how the parent is protected from becoming aware of what is being done, need to be studied under laboratory-type controls.

Another developmental problem worthy of careful exploration has to do with the magical ideas of childhood, sometimes referred to as the feeling of omnipotence. While the stubborn realities of the environment soon trim down the sense of power to more finite proportions, magical conceptions continue even into adult life, influencing the interpretations of causal sequences. I do not refer simply to superficial manifestations, as in the prevalence of superstition. When the investigator begins to look, he finds that there are many ways in which individuals believe themselves to have magical powers, to be among the specially gifted, to be so precious as to be specially vulnerable, to be able to shape events through willing them to be. In a scientific age like ours, these magical ideas are taboo, and consequently may influence behavior while being largely out of awareness. If we understand this desire to gain satisfaction through the expression of magical power, we would better understand some of the most puzzling aspects not only of an individual's behavior, but of the dynamics of economic and political life.

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Let me turn now to a set of problems in the answer to which experiments with animal subjects are particularly promising. These are defining experiments on the concepts of anxiety, shame, and guilt. I have already referred to the excellent start made by experiments on fear and anxiety in rats. It may take a more sociable animal, such as the dog, to exhibit the behavior we call shame. There is no doubt that the dog can act as if ashamed. I do not know whether or not a dog can act as if guilty. Shame may be thought of as a response to being caught by someone else in socially disapproved behavior: guilt may be thought of as a response to catching yourself in behavior discordant with your own conscience. Can both shame and guilt go on outside of awareness, or is guilt alone subject to unconscious expression? Is the concept of guilt applicable only to man? We need better definitions, but we also need to know what is the case. I should like to see the psychodynamics laboratory work on the problem of clarifying what is meant by anxiety, shame, and guilt, and instructing us about the principles according to which these processes occur.

The psychodynamics laboratory is the place in which to make a direct study of the self-organization which permits conflicts within the self as dramatized in the Freudian notions of id, ego, and superego . . . .

Another problem is that of rapport which arises because we need to know the circumstances under which a person can freely report private experience with a minimum of distortion . . . .

Another problem is that of insight as a factor in personality reorganization . . . .

In studying the achievement of insight we have an opportunity to compare the self present in awareness with the inferred self. What we mean by insight in this context is essentially that the self of which the person is aware comes to correspond to the inferred self,—in other words, that the person comes to see himself as an informed other person sees him. This is what is meant by an objective attitude toward the self. The self may be granted the privilege of privacy, but even the view of the self held in private is such as could be communicated to a trusted outsider. This explains the enigmatic statement of the late Harry Stack Sullivan that one achieves mental health to the extent that one becomes aware of one's inter-personal relations (22, page 102). When the relations to other people become communicable to oneself and potentially to another, then these relations are no longer confused by the distortions of neurotic mechanisms.

It is sometimes said that the mechanisms are blind and inflexible, little subject to the ordinary principles of learning (25). But they can be unlearned; this is, in fact, one of the chief tasks of psychotherapy. There are perhaps two main ways in which, through insight, the mechanisms can be defeated.

The first of these methods is to become aware of the mechanisms, so that the person can catch himself using them. He may learn to interpret his own headaches and his own outbursts of temper. Because he knows what he is doing, he is able to control his conduct. Insight here is into symptoms and the chain of events of which these symptoms are a part. Following insight the chain of events may be broken, so that the sequences do not flow to their usual conclusions . . . .

The second method overlooks the detailed action of the mechanisms entirely, while seeking insight into whatever has made the mechanisms necessary. There is a reevaluation of the self and its motives, a willingness to accept features of the self which were previously unacceptable. If more security can be achieved by abandoning the mechanisms than was achieved by them, they do not have to be fought. The mechanisms simply dissolve because they are no longer needed.

It is important to know whether or not this is a two-stage process, or an interaction between two methods of solving the same problem. This is not something to be debated, but something to be studied and understood.

We are ready today, as we might not have been a few years ago, to establish psychodynamic laboratories to attack and answer many of the questions which I have raised. Such laboratories will provide opportunities for co-operation between experimental and clinical psychologists on problems of mutual concern. The staff to be invited to work in these laboratories will include psychologists with a variety of backgrounds, united in their acknowledgment that the search for the self is a significant scientific endeavor.

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The Integration of Behavior

EDWIN GUTHRIE

When a honeybee is collecting honey from a flower its abdomen can be removed and the forward end of the bee will go on drawing honey, only to have it discharged into the open air. This is a failure on one part of an animal to take into account what the condition of another part is. The illustration is not a perfect one because, even if the forward end had wind of what had happened to the rear, it is possible that there would still be nothing better to do in the circumstances. But at least the unfortunate bee will serve to illustrate a failure of communications which interferes with the coordination of action. The interaction of the parts of an organism so as to conserve the identity of the whole we may call integration. . . .

The structure responsible for learning is the system of intercommunicating nerve fibers which enables man to respond to conditions in one part of his body with changes in a distant part. . . .

We take for granted the elaborate and precise integration of most of our own behavior. We notice it only when it fails. Much of this complex integration we have acquired. Many of the lower animals come into the world with their behavior much more "of a piece" than is the behavior of a new-born infant. In the rabbit or the cat a very early age finds them able to right themselves when dropped from a height of a foot or so. This is not learned; without any previous experience the ability appears at a certain stage of the animal's growth.

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The German physiologist Magnus has described in great detail many elaborate postural reflexes. Standing erect in animal or man is a complicated performance. It means that numerous muscles are working together. Walking is similarly complicated. And the presence of any coordinated posture places strict limitations on the actions that can be performed.

Abridgment of pp. 20–30, The Psychology of Human Conflict, the Clash of Motives, *by Edwin R. Guthrie. Copyright 1938 by Harper & Brothers. Reprinted with the permission of Harper & Row, Publishers.*

A man cannot jump unless he is in the posture for jumping; he cannot walk without a preliminary shift of posture; he cannot throw a ball without getting set for the action. Our freedom of action is regularly limited by our postural sets.

Many of our important integrations are learned. It requires much practice to swim, to dive, to ride a bicycle. Early efforts betray the fact that the muscles of the body may work at cross purposes. Behavior can include confusion and interference, conflicting postural adjustments. To the sources of such confusion and to the results of such confusion we must give some attention.

Human acts normally begin with the stimulation of a sensitive area and the initiation of a nervous impulse which follows a group of nerve pathways to muscles. The stimulus acts as a goad which releases energy along the communication path and finally in the muscle. . . . So far as can be observed, nearly all action is occasioned by stimuli. The muscles which serve to move our members contract only as the result of nerve impulses, which are normally set up in sense organs. It is true that some of the most important stimuli to which we react are stimuli furnished by our own movements, but these are none the less stimuli. . . .

For most stimulus patterns there are no names and there never will be names. Words are used only for a few outstanding types of situation. This interferes seriously with our ability to predict behavior. But we must do the best we can with the weather signs at our disposal. It is this difficulty in prediction that leads psychologists to speak of stimulus-response tendencies or action *tendencies*. By the word "tendency" we indicate that we are not too certain what will happen. Other stimuli are always acting along with the ones we name or the ones we observe. The sensitive areas of the body are being continuously assailed. There are always conflicting tendencies to be considered. We can never be sure of any response. If we assert that men *tend* to scratch mosquito bites, we say this knowing that no one scratches while chasing his hat down a windy street.

In spite of our inability to take account of any total situation or to be accurate in the description of any stimulus, we find our fellow men predictable. We greet others on the street, fairly certain of having our greeting returned. Students trust that the instructor will have followed his routine and appear to deliver his lecture. The behavior of the insane may be even more predictable than the behavior of the normal man.

With these cautions, we may go on to consider the nature of the interplay of human actions. If a stimulus combination which has in the past been an occasion for a certain action now again occurs, we expect the action to recur. But there are a number of things which may interfere with that action. Other stimulus patterns may also be present and other action tendencies aroused. In general, one action system may affect another in one of two ways. It may *facilitate* the other. If you grip your hands just as your patellar tendon is struck, your resulting knee jerk will be much exaggerated. Blows directed at fighting dogs may be intended to break up the fight, but may have the effect of making the struggle all the more fierce. A sudden noise which catches us in the course of a movement will ordinarily exaggerate that movement. A loud and unexpected whistle just behind a man who is starting to raise his coffee cup to his lips may make him splash its contents about with a too vigorous lift. Action that is under way tends to enlist reinforcement from whatever stimuli accompany it. It is the lasting effects of this enlistment that are the basic phenomenon of learning.

Psychologists have in the past given the name "dynamogenesis" to this phenomenon, but it has not received the attention that it deserves. We know only that something of the sort takes place. A few studies have measured increase in work done when loud music is played. The added speed and energy of city dwellers may depend on the noise of city streets. Those high school and college students who have in the last few years taken to studying with the radio sounding in the room undoubtedly often benefit by this. Noise and disturbance in our environment which do not interrupt our activity are very likely to add to the energy we give to what we are doing. We might paraphrase the old expression that possession is nine points of the law. An action system under way has the advantage. Unless new stimuli force in a competing action system these new stimuli will simply contribute to the energy of the going act. We fail often to realize this. We argue bitterly with our friends, not knowing that our efforts only add to the strength of their convictions.

Students who work to the accompaniment of the radio almost unanimously report that this is possible only with musical programs. When the music is replaced by a lecture or by an advertising talk, study becomes difficult or impossible. This is because music can be followed by keeping time with muscles which do not interfere with study, by foot-tapping or swaying the body, or by nodding. But our responses to the sound of words occupy our own muscles used in speech, and these very muscles are necessary in reading the textbook. We cannot pronounce to ourselves two different words at the same time because the slight tongue and throat movements which we use in inner speech conflict and interfere. Any person who is not convinced through self-observation of the reality of these movements which accompany inner speech or thinking will find convincing evidence in the work of L. W. Max reported over the last four years. Muscular action is accompanied by slight action currents which can be amplified and recorded. Max attached electrodes to the lips and to the fingers of deaf-mutes and of normal persons. When either "thought" a sentence, action currents were discovered in the appropriate place.

The lips of deaf-mutes were inactive, but their fingers busy. The fingers of normal persons were quiet, but their lips registered muscular activity. In neither case were the slight muscle contractions accompanying thinking always visible nor were the subjects always aware that such activity had been going on.

When added stimuli do not increase and facilitate a going act but diminish or suppress that act, this effect is called *inhibition*. The notion of inhibition takes an important place in psychoanalytic explanations. Unfortunately it has never been objectively defined by the psychoanalysts. The term *inhibition* is best reserved for the situation in which one of two competing action systems suppresses the other through the central nervous system. G. R. Wendt has marshaled the evidence for the view that "an activity is inhibited when some other behavior system takes its place." This is my own opinion . . . One action can, through the stimuli it gives to sense organs in muscle and tendon, prevent a competing action. This is what we mean by *inhibition*.

Not all interference between rival action systems is the result of inhibition. The rival systems may fail to settle the rivalry in the central system, and both systems appear in muscles. The effect is a tug of war, a state of conflict in which two incompatible systems are both active. *Conflict* is a failure of inhibition. And conflict may have distressing results. Action may become confused and inefficient. Prolonged conflict causes exhaustion and exhaustion may in turn exaggerate and prolong the conflict. . . .

There is considerable evidence that conflict is the most important source of exciting emotion. Excitement is a bodily condition in which the general musculature is tense. In such a state any action which occurs will be exaggerated. Such states of tension activate endocrine glands, the adrenal medulla and possibly the thyroid. The effects of the adrenal secretion in the blood stream are to speed up heart action and to raise blood pressure, to release blood sugar from the liver, and to counteract the effects of fatigue in muscle. The result of all this is that the state of excitement is increased and maintained.

Conflict is not the only means of arousing excitement and general tension. Any intense stimulation will do it. . . .

A number of years ago Watson wrote that fear in human beings had only two original and instinctive stimuli, loud sounds and falling. Dunlap promptly called attention to the fact that the response of babies to these stimuli is not properly described as fear. It is better described as "startle," the rather stereotyped response which Landis has made familiar by taking extremely rapid motion pictures (over 1500 per second) of people who have been startled by the noise of a pistol shot. When the baby does more than "start" at a noise he is probably responding more to his own self-stimulation from the start than to the sound. Watson's statement was misleading in another respect. The effect of startle can be produced by a sudden douche of cold water, a flash of a bright light, a bump, or by many more of those unfortunate mishaps to which babies are exposed.

In the physiological laboratory it has been established that stretching a muscle or offering sudden resistance to the contraction of a muscle is responsible for volleys of sensory impulses from that muscle which traverse the central nervous system and emerge as motor impulses to the first muscle and to other muscles. This is the physiological basis for the exciting nature of conflict. In conflict, muscles are working against each other. The result of conflict is a general increase in tension.

Intense stimuli and conflict gives rise to excitement. Resistance to any movement or obstacles to action likewise cause excitement. Excitement may also result from what may be called *accumulation.* Sherman and Sherman report that drawing the edge of a card along the sole of a baby's foot will at first result only in a local response in the foot, a plantar reflex. But if the stimulus is repeated at short intervals each repetition leaves the baby with a slight increase in general muscular tonus. The effect of a series of stimuli is to produce a state of excitement and crying that cannot be distinguished from the effect of a single intense stimulus. This accumulated effect of stimuli is nicely demonstrated in one of the studies of Max already mentioned. If a sleeper receives a series of stimuli (tapping on the bed) the responses to the last of the series are greater than to the first. If the tapping occurred during one of those restless periods which Johnson had described in his studies of sleep, there was a much exaggerated response.

States of conflict and states of excitement play an all-important part in directing learning. They determine to a great extent what it is that we will learn to do, what habits we will form, what interests we will acquire. . . .

Suggested Reading

Sherrington's *Integrative Action of the Nervous System* (1906) was the pioneer work in the description of the integrative functions of the brain and spinal cord and remains one of the best general accounts of the means by which neural integration is achieved. Herrick's *Brains of Rats and Men* and the same author's *The Thinking Machine* are more recent accounts of the rôle of the central nervous system in behavior. Pieron's *Thought and the Brain* should be also read.

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Personality, Ideology, and Cognitive Functioning

MILTON ROKEACH

. . . findings . . . suggest that we categorize people and groups of people in terms of the extent to which their beliefs are congruent or incongruent with our own. We generally seem to prefer, to one degree or another, those with belief systems that are more congruent with our own.* Our findings suggest that this organizing principle is far more important than other kinds of categorizations, such as race or ethnic grouping, in determining our relations with others. If race or ethnic categorizations are important it is primarily because they are convenient symbols that stand for complexes of beliefs which to one degree or another are seen to be similar to and different from our own. . . .

However, the general tendency to organize people in terms of belief does not mean that we are all equally misanthropic. There are individual differences among us in the *absolute* extent to which we are willing to accept and reject others on this basis, and there are *relative* degrees of preference for those with similar versus opposed beliefs. The reason Christ-like figures such as Gandhi and Schweitzer are idealized is that they have the capacity to love those who disagree with them no less than those who agree with them, and to love all to a far greater extent than most men are capable of. . . .

Another thing we learn about the nature of belief systems is that for all individuals, even those whose systems are relatively closed, the categorization of people and groups is continuous rather than dichotomous. From the literature on prejudice and authoritarianism, one would expect

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* Other research which sums to support this generalization is that of Izard (1959), Lott and Rosell (1959), Lundy (1958), and Rosenfeld and Jackson (1959).

Milton Rokeach, "Personality, Ideology, and Cognitive Functioning," The Open and Closed Mind *(New York: Basic Books, 1960), Chapter 22, pp. 391–410. Reprinted by permission.*

that those who are intolerant, or authoritarian, or closed, characteristically show either-or, black-white categorizations of people. But the data we have presented on disbelief systems show that this is not so. Disbeliefs are seen to be arranged by virtually everyone in terms of a continuum of similarity. For persons holding religious beliefs, for instance, atheism is generally seen to be at the tail end of this continuum, and is rejected more than other "isms." Other religious systems are accepted more and more, the more similar they are to their own. . . .

There is no reason to think that these generalizations apply only to the religious realm. They probably apply to other realms as well—political, philosophical, scientific, and so on. . . . But the organization of disbelief systems is probably far more complicated than we have been able to show. . . . A person's belief system is not just a religious one or a political one, or a scientific one. However fruitful such categories may be from a sociological standpoint, we doubt that the mind can be profitably broken down into such compartments. We regard the findings on religious disbelief systems merely a crude approximation of yet more complex psychological organizations, which because of their very complexity are difficult to study.

The view we have taken here about the way we organize the social world in terms of the principle of belief congruence leads us to view man's intolerance to man in a way that differs in certain important respects from those currently held. In order to state what these differences are as clearly as possible, we present them here in tabular form:

TABLE 22.1 CONTRASTING CHARACTERISTICS OF PREJUDICE AS CONVENTIONALLY CONCEIVED AND AS CONCEIVED HERE.

As Conceived Here	*As Conventionally Conceived*
1. The basic criterion of categorization is a belief criterion: how much we like and dislike those whose belief-disbelief systems are similar to or different from our own.	1. The basic criterion of categorization is an ethnic or racial criterion: how much we like and dislike Jews, Negroes, foreigners, etc.
2. The definition is a psychological one, the exact cleavages of groups shifting according to the specific issue under consideration, and shifting according to the specific belief system under consideration.	2. The definition is a sociological one, the criterion for prejudice being external to individuals, applying primarily or solely to institutionalized forms of prejudice, forever fixed in its lines, and allegedly applicable to all persons within a culture regardless of differences in the content of their belief systems.
3. The definition is a general one, being equally applicable to phenomena of intolerance in the world of politics, religion, art, and science; to different historical eras; to past, present, and future forms of intolerance regardless of specific manifestations.	3. The definition is primarily concerned with a form of intolerance typical of the political right. It is not generally applicable.

As Conceived Here	*As Conventionally Conceived*
4. The definition is a structural one, cutting across specific ideological content. In the Opinionation Scale this is achieved by having two parts, a left opinionation and right opinionation subscale, so that no matter whether one's ideology is left or right of center, individual differences in degree of intolerance may be measured.	4. The definition is a substantive one, being applicable only to groups specifically mentioned. Intolerance toward individuals and groups not mentioned may still exist but are not measured.
5. Acceptance of those who agree (opinionated acceptance) is as much a manifestation of intolerance as is rejection of those who disagree (opinionated rejection). Conversely, tolerance is defined as the extent to which others are accepted regardless of whether they agree or disagree with us.	5. Acceptance of minority group is a manifestation of tolerance, rejection a manifestation of intolerance.
6. Extent of acceptance-rejection of ingroup is equal in importance to extent of acceptance-rejection of outgroup.	6. The primary focus is on the acceptance-rejection of minority groups. There is less concern with acceptance-rejection of majority groups.
7. Outgroups are seen to be arranged along a continuum of similarity to the ingroup.	7. The ingroup-outgroup distinction is more or less a dichotomous one.
8. Cognitive similarity of outgroup to ingroup is perhaps a more important determinant of social discrimination than individual differences in personality dynamics.	8. There is great emphasis on personality dynamics as a determinant of social discrimination. Sheer cognitive dissimilarity as a determinant of social discrimination is overlooked.

The principle of belief congruence governing the organization of belief systems helps us to organize not only the world of people, but also the world of ideas and authority in relation to each other. . . . Recently, a number of others have proposed similar views. Festinger (1957) talks about cognitive dissonance between two elements in a system and the ways people try to reduce such dissonance. Heider (1958) talks about structural imbalance that motivates the individual to strive toward structural balance. Newcomb (1956) expresses similar ideas, and so do Osgood *at al.* (1957) when they talk about attitudinal congruity and incongruity.* . . . In summary, we organize the world of ideas, people, and authority basically along lines of belief congruence. What is not congruent is further organized in terms of similarity to what is congruent. Much of our behavior with respect to diverse belief systems, and with respect to persons and authorities identified with such systems, seems, at least in part, to be determined by such cognitive organizations.

The major portion of our research effort, however, concerns the ways in which belief systems differ from each other. In this connection, we have talked of such things as individual differences in isolation, differentiation, time perspective, the specific content of primitive beliefs, the formal content of beliefs about authority and people, and the structure of peripheral beliefs. We have tried to show that all these properties may have something in common that ties them together and justifies our considering them as but different expressions of a yet more fundamental variable. We are referring to the capacity to distinguish information from source of information and to evaluate each on its own merits. This variable, in the extreme, describes the essence of the open and closed mind and, with its diverse manifestations, is at the cornerstone of our attempts to understand whatever relationships may exist among personality, ideology, and cognitive functioning. These considerations have served to guide us in our attempts to define and to measure individual differences in general authoritarianism and intolerance; they have led us to see that the interrelations that exist among the acceptance and rejection of authority, of people, and of ideas have a common structural basis and also a common functional basis; they have permitted us to proceed from the study of the properties of single beliefs to the study of the properties of systems of belief; and we can now see better than before that the experiencing and enjoying of something new is enhanced to the degree that the "significant other" is thrown off when we are encountering the new.

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* It would be a worthwhile task to examine more closely the extent to which these various concepts overlap each other, the respective ranges of their application, and how they may be more integrated with each other.

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. . .we can point to a number of variables that determine the ability to form new systems. These may be briefly reiterated as follows:

1. The ability to remember or to keep in mind all the new parts to be integrated;
2. A willingness to "play along" or to entertain new systems;
3. Past experience, which determines whether a particular system is, psychologically speaking, new or not new;
4. Presenting new beliefs to be formed into new systems all at once or gradually. In closed persons the formation of new systems is facilitated when the new beliefs are presented all at once, in which case the new beliefs do not have to be reconciled with old ones. In open persons, it makes no difference whether the new beliefs are presented gradually or all at once; the subjects work them through cognitively in either case.
5. The degree to which there is isolation within the belief system. The greater the isolation—that is, the less the intercommunication between individual beliefs—the more is the formation of new systems retarded.

. . . we have also pointed to a number of implications of these findings which may again be briefly restated:

1. The psychological processes involved in ideological functioning can be studied by analogy in the laboratory.

2. Many important aspects of intellectual functioning in particular and cognitive functioning in general can be attributed to personality rather than to intelligence, as presently conceived and measured. If intelligence does exert an influence on the ability to analyze and to synthesize, it probably does so in interaction with personality.

3. It is possible to investigate many spheres of activity—ideological, conceptual, perceptual, and esthetic—via the common structural bond that ties them all together in the person's belief system.

4. In dealing with the formation of new systems in open and closed persons the essence of the difference between them is in the ability to synthesize rather than analyze. This suggests that the ability to synthesize is far more important to creativity than the ability to analyze. Although we have not been directly concerned here with the problem of creativity as such, our investigations of open and closed systems may be seen as a contribution to the study of creativity.

5. A person's cognitive functioning is not a thing apart from his affective or emotional functioning. They are seen to be different facets of a person's total behavior. This point merits further elaboration. What is the relation between the cognitive and the affective and in what way does our theory, which is a cognitive theory, address itself to affective as well as cognitive aspects of behavior?

Let us begin by saying that, to our minds, analysis in terms of beliefs and systems of beliefs does not necessarily restrict us only to the study of cognitive behavior. We assume that every affective state also has its representation as a cognitive state in the form of some belief or some structural relation among beliefs within a system. With respect to the enjoyment of music, for example, we all build up through past experience a set of beliefs or expectancies about what constitutes "good" and "bad" music. It is in terms of such expectancies, which are more often implicit than explicit, that we enjoy a particular composition. Thus, a person who is exposed to a particular piece of classical music or jazz may enjoy it, even though it may be totally unfamiliar to him, because it is congruent with an already-existing set of beliefs he has built up over time. Depending on the extent to which he is prepared to entertain new systems, he may or may not enjoy Schönberg or other music perceived as incompatible with his own beliefs about what constitutes good music. . . . In all cases, enjoyment or its opposite is the affective counterpart of a belief organization and can be thought of as being in one-to-one relation (isomorphic) with it. Thus, our cognitive approach is as much concerned with affection as with cognition.

In much the same way, *authoritarianism* as an affective personality state can also be conceived in terms of cognitive beliefs about the nature of authority; a *fear* of aloneness and isolation can be represented as a cognitive belief that "Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature" . . . *anxiety* can be represented as a cognitive belief that "It is only natural for a person to be fearful of the future" . . . In precisely the same way such affective states as self-hate, a need for self-aggrandizement, and a paranoid outlook on life can all be seen as having their cognitive counterparts within the belief-disbelief system.

Thus the traditional distinction between what is cognitive and what is affective may be a convenient one but not a necessary one. Our conceptual and research strategy has been to translate the affective to the cognitive. This in no way denies the reality of the affective states of man nor implies that our cognitive approach has ignored it. Indeed, a way is paved for the study of a person's emotions through an examination of his cognitions. For all the things a person feels and wants must surely be represented by what he believes and knows . . . .

The relation between the cognitive and the affective brings us to the problem of functional aspects of belief systems . . . . Such systems are seen to serve two opposing sets of functions. On the one hand, they represent Everyman's theory for understanding the world he lives in.* On the other hand, they represent Everyman's defense network through which information is filtered, in order to render harmless that which threatens the ego. The beautiful thing about a belief system is that it seems to be constructed to serve both masters at once: to understand the world insofar as possible, and to defend against it insofar as necessary. We do not agree with those who hold that people selectively distort their cognitive functioning so that they will see, remember, and think only what they want to. Instead, we hold to the view that people will do so only to the extent that they have to, and no more, for we are all motivated by the desire, which is sometimes strong and sometimes weak, to see reality as it actually is, even if it hurts.

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Our research program proceeded on the assumption that while a person's belief-disbelief system is a relatively enduring structure, the extent to which it influences behavior, and the extent to which it is open or closed at any particular moment, is jointly influenced by situational conditions interacting with personality. A person's belief-disbelief system is never totally activated or engaged at any one time. Each situation, according to its structure and according to the motivational forces it gives rise to, activates only certain beliefs relevant to that situation . . . . For example, when we look at a particular painting only those beliefs directly concerned with or in communication with the realm of painting are aroused; when we interact with an employer only that part of the belief-disbelief system is activated that is directly concerned with or in communication with beliefs about employers. In this connection let us also point again to the research on belief versus race as determinants of discrimination. Although a person may align himself with others primarily in terms of belief, such alignments may be assumed to be continually changing as situations change, as each situation involves different issues, thus activating endless kaleidoscopes of beliefs relevant to each situation.

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* A similar view has recently been expressed by Kelly (1955) when he implies that everyman is his own theorist, employing his own system of concepts to interpret and understand himself and his world.

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. . . what is to be emphasized here is that the interaction between personality and the situation is an enormously complicated affair, sometimes leading to similarities and sometimes to differences in behavior. Such complications can sometimes be predicted in advance by a personality approach to behavior, providing its concepts are so formulated that, in their application, they are sensitive to situational variations.

* * * *

Turning our attention now to other issues that merit further theoretical and empirical research, we wish to single out especially the following:

1. Our theory regarding the organization of belief systems is by no means complete. There are probably other properties of belief systems that have been overlooked in the present work. And a good deal needs yet to be learned about the internal structure of belief systems, a problem we have thus far by-passed. For example, it would be desirable to know to what extent the various defining characteristics of open and closed systems are interrelated and indeed characteristics of open and closed persons.* For example, will a person with an isolated belief system also show isolation in the disbelief system, isolation between belief and disbelief systems, and isolation among peripheral beliefs? Similar questions could be asked about the state of differentiation in various parts of the system.

2. Another variable we have not studied thus far is the breadth or scope of the belief-disbelief system. People will obviously differ in this respect. A person may know a lot (or little) about the total spectrum of possible belief systems or he may know a lot (or a little) about a narrow band of the spectrum "close in." We cannot assume that an open-minded person is

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* Some of these problems have recently been investigated by Alson (1958) and Vidulich (1958). Alson uses methods that are modifications of those first developed by Zajonc (1954) for the analysis of cognitive structure, and Vidulich uses interview methods that attempt to get at similar variables. Unfortunately, the results of both investigations, which yield partly positive and partly negative findings, are difficult to evaluate because of methodological complications in their research which are too involved to discuss here.

necessarily broad, or that a closed-minded person is necessarily narrow. We can think of some persons we have known who have struck us as extremely erudite as far as breadth is concerned but closed-minded about what they know. Despite this, some of them have struck us as highly creative in their own fields and we tentatively hypothesize from this that closed-minded persons may be creative providing their belief systems are broad and providing that they are their own authority, and thus not dependent upon external authority.

3. Another problem worthy of investigation is how belief-disbelief systems are formed in childhood and the conditions under which they change.

4. We have made much of the notion of *system* variables, such as forming a system, enjoying a system, and defecting from a system. It would be fruitful to try to isolate other system variables and study behavior with respect to them.

5. We need to know more about pre-ideological beliefs and their relation to ideological beliefs. We have called the former "primitive beliefs." We suspect that if we knew more about the nature of such primitive beliefs, their organization, and how to modify them, we would know more about the conditions leading to the formation and modification of belief systems. This should have important implications for the psychology of politics, personality, mental health, psychotherapy, and education.

6. In a similar way, we need to study also the nature of the "meta-beliefs" we build up about authority. As has already been pointed out, all persons must necessarily rely on authority as a "liaison system" in their efforts to cognize the world they live in. This "liaison system" may be thought of as having a structure of its own. How it develops and changes, and how it is related to primitive beliefs on the one hand and to peripheral beliefs on the other are problems that merit further study.

7. Since the Dogmatism and Opinionation Scales are structure- rather than content-oriented, it is now more feasible to study such phenomena as authoritarianism and intolerance in other cultures and to compare such results with those we have obtained in the United States and England. Most interesting in this connection would be the study of closed and open orientations in the Soviet Union and in other eastern European countries.

8. The structural properties that define the organization of belief-disbelief systems may be merely the cognitive representation of parallel structural properties existing in social organizations. A systematic attempt to explore such possible parallelism might lead to an integration of psychology and sociology.

9. What are the conditions that lead to temporary and enduring modifications of various aspects of the belief system, particularly with respect to its open and closed dimension? Relevant here is the informal observation

that in the immediate academic setting in which we have pursued our research there has been a marked reduction in the frequency of use of opinionated language, probably as a result of an awareness of its psychological significance. This suggests that everyday interpersonal relations may sometimes be changed without too much effort. It also has implications for propaganda. Perhaps the use of opinionated language on the "Voice of America" or "Radio Moscow" has effects opposite to that intended.

The preceding are not meant to be exhaustive. They supplement other methodological and theoretical issues that have already been raised in the various chapters of this book. The reader will perhaps raise yet other issues and see yet other implications arising from the present work. There is no reason to think, as we end here, that the study of the organization of belief systems has been completed. More likely, it has just begun.

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The World of Values

GARDNER MURPHY

Throughout the study of motives and the learning process we have been finding not only that individuals want different things, but that they set up complex personal systems of wants which are relatively enduring and are maintained even in the absence of external reminders; they carry around within themselves personal systems of values. Personality is in large measure this personal value system; hence the latter calls for closer study.

A good deal, although not all, of this personal predilection is illuminated by the study of language . . . . The continuity of language may be viewed not only in terms of the sheer continuity of available tools—as one keeps the same saws and scissors for recurring needs—but also in terms of the constancy of those semi-conscious or unconscious sets which mark off what is really *important and valuable*. The maintenance of individual language is a clue to the maintenance of stable life values. Let the life outlook change catastrophically, as in Tolstoy's conversion, and words instantly mirror the fact; they begin to "laugh and cry" in a new way. The symbol pattern reveals the value pattern.

But words not only *mirror*; they also help in some degree to maintain and organize sets or values. They define what to expect or what not to expect, what is to be emphasized or not emphasized (i.e., they inhibit outer response). They help to maintain constancy of attitudes to *want* or *not to want* (i.e., to value or not to value). On the basis of the more or less random utilization of words provided by the culture, one discovers for himself which words provide, in terms of denotation and connotation, the most effective service with respect to these three functions. We should therefore expect that the fineness of distinctions, the number of terms indicating varieties within a species, would portray the richness and intransigeance of individual wants. The richness of terminology reflects the subtlety of needs. An individual's language will be richest where central values, through manifold

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Abridgment of pp. 270–286, Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure, *by Gardner Murphy. Copyright 1947 by Harper & Brothers. Reprinted with the permission of Harper & Row, Publishers.*

expression and long experience, have called for the greatest specification. We all want color; but the handicraftsman usually needs color more than the engineer, the poet more than the handicraftsman, the artist even more than the poet. It is because the poet and the artist actually *need* color, not simply because they have been conditioned longer to color terms, that they have actually enriched the language.

The maintenance of set . . . is partly a matter of conditioning to inner stimulation. The words spring to the tongue or pen as the old need springs to life again. The words, however, have a second function; they establish, again through conditioning, their own inner circuits, their own linguistic supplements; they come back in droves as a single dear old word activates the constellation of which it was once a part. Through a process of cross-association, any word partaking of a given flavor or aroma in terms of the qualities felt tends to bring back all the words of that familiar affective type.

This is peculiarly true of affective dispositions which take hold of the individual compulsively, which drive him forward to reiterate his old demands or to crystallize ever more rigidly his old anxieties. The pathology of rigid personality structure is partly the pathology of such inner circuits. Let a dietetic indiscretion or a poorly ventilated bedroom produce a vague distress, and one awakens with a word or word pattern that takes the conditioned form of a specific worry for the day; and the worry, ramifying into all the day's events, serves like a cramp to maintain the anxious state.

We should expect, if this is true, that verbal conditionings, being profoundly overlearned, being dovetailed into a system of mutually reinforcing associations, and being intimately related to the value world of human society, would be fraught with richer consequences than the conditionings which are based on symbolic elements that are not parts of the world of words. An experiment was designed by Razran to test this hypothesis. One group of subjects was given a nonsense syllable as a conditioned stimulus for salivation, no information being supplied to indicate anything special or peculiar about the syllable. Another equated group of subjects was given the nonsense syllable and was told that it was a word from "Benga, an African language." Apparently because a real word, part of the profoundly significant symbolic system of human beings, carried richer connotations, the conditioning process was established more quickly and more firmly in the second group, and extinction was slower.

The Development of Values

When simple canalizations are thoroughly established, they may be called values . . . . Most values, however, have to do with objects that are physically not present. By virtue of representative factors . . . such wants may persist despite long separation from their goal objects, and symbolic activity may keep them at a high pitch of intensity. Ordinarily, indeed, activity in pursuit of value objects is maintained partly by symbols. Need may give rise to inner symbols, as in fasting subjects who, as their hunger increases, give more and more verbal associations referring to food; the symbols in turn circularly reinforce the intensity of the need, so that the ravenously hungry man is told to resort to distraction, to think of something else. But though symbols greatly complicate the process, the central fact about values is that they arise from definite wants . . .

The relation of values to motives is clear. Values are not imposed on an unready individual but, like all other expressions of motives, are developed by organism-environment interaction and can never reach beyond the tissue needs from which they originally spring. The tissues themselves, however, have changed as the drive developed . . . so that it is a different individual who now wants the Bach music or the Masefield poem.

Since symbols play so large a part in the life of values and since they are for the most part conditioned stimuli, it should be stressed that values normally involve both canalization (the heightened drive tendency toward specific goals) and conditioning (the connection of the goal object with a symbol). Continuity in values is provided both by the general inextinguishability of the canalizations and by the frequent reinforcement of the conditionings. This continuity of value-seeking behavior in the physical absence of the valued object appears in every act of anticipation, from the simple conditioning setup or the maintenance of muscular tone to the preparation for a period of trial far in the future or for a happy escape from otherwise unendurable distress. One lives in some degree as if he were already about to enter upon, or were actually embedded in, a world of satisfactions which has no existence at the time. Such anticipation meets the specifications for conditioned responses; it can be put down as a form or a rough equivalent of motor set. It is subject to extinction, reinforcement, and spontaneous recovery; it can be built up with other anticipations according to a hierarchieral scheme. One anticipation is dominant over another, absorbing the competitor when the two are antagonistic, and articulating with it if the two are compatible. All such anticipation, or preparation, or set is a response to continuing bodily activity, not merely an aftermath of previously existing overt stimulation. The child may not, like the mouse, need to keep his nose pointed in the direction of the expected reward, but he keeps *himself* pointed or focused—his fantasies and dreams prove that.

Is there not a difficulty here? The process of valuing, by its definition, gives satisfaction. But if the value system is maintained symbolically, *without* satisfaction from the goal object, why does not the symbolic pattern, a sheer system of *conditioned* stimuli, gradually die out? How can drive satisfaction be derived from the inner play of symbols when the symbols serve in no way to advance the attainment of a goal? I may play delightedly with symbols of a vacation when they advance the effectiveness of my planning and so make the vacation more complete. But this does not explain why such images are manipulated in the absence of any possibility of having any vacation at all, or even why they are persistently developed, as the psychiatrists show, as compensation for vacations which manifestly will not be given.

The answer lies perhaps in the fact that under certain circumstances internal symbols may play a much richer role than that of mere preparation for future activity. If the vacation scene I call up is one from a previous year, it is quite possible to regain some of the earlier pleasures by touching off some of the internal responses which made the other occasion a happy one. The fantasy projected into the future may be merely an elaborate form of reliving, together with a little wishful elaboration. The canalization and conditioning principles are appropriate for the illumination of a wide variety of repetitive inner behaviors, as in the case of other forms of reliving, such as haunting fears or pointless recapitulations of old behaviors . . . . The greater the stress of present circumstances, such as solitary confinement or cold or hunger, the greater the futility of any overt response, the greater the blockage in activities which are manifestly futile in removing the outer threat, the greater becomes the relative strength of the repetitive patterns of response. Under such circumstances, there is indeed time and opportunity for much reliving, with additional decorative details which the possibility of eventual departure from the prison or what not may encourage. If, moreover, it is satisfying to contemplate a geometrically or esthetically adequate pattern before one's eyes, it is satisfying to contemplate a similar pattern in the mind's eye, the symbol world. The inner world is literally the external world with simplification, elaboration, or distortion in accordance with local blockages or facilitations.

Furthermore, if hard experience has taught that the reality is never quite as good as the foretaste which an indulgent imagination has presaged, the habit of depending upon the latter, distrusting or even paradoxically refusing contact with the external, can become deeply ingrained. The dreamer and the delusion builder are not necessarily so foolish; under certain conditions the value world is dealt with more safely and completely when most of it is anchored deep within the skin . . . .

When the absent object continues to be valued, the tension related to it is evident in proportion to one's eagerness, but we have just seen that symbolic response (as in talking or thinking of the object) may be satisfying. And since the satisfied value response, being based on canalization, seems not to be extinguished but to be maintained through each repetition, the symbolic conditionings attached to it (so as to lead to satisfaction) cannot extinguish; for with each rearousal of the original drive by the conditioned stimulus there will, by definition, be some satisfaction of the drive . . . . The low-arched doorway that leads to the mysterious attic, the fading green envelope that the absent friend addressed are conditioned stimuli that will not be extinguished because as they are experienced they lead to renewed inner symbolic satisfactions. But if they frequently appear in *other contexts*, involving a different response, and are non-dominant in the resulting competition, they can readily die out. It is easy to forget that the response to the absent valued object ordinarily continues and that the number of such objects and consequently of their possible patterns of comparison, their hierarchies, constantly increases. A life worth living becomes more and more topheavy with absent but cherished things. This habit of living with absent things may broaden into the inventor's or the poet's continuous preoccupation with beloved possibilities.

One of the chief facts that needs to be known about each enduring value tendency is whether it does its work by virture of continuous, *persisting* internal tensions, constantly activating behavior, or whether it is only a tissue disposition, a potentiality for response, which remains *ready to discharge* when and only when externally aroused. A person grows thirsty on a warm day whether there are bubble-fountains nearby or not; the continuing tension makes him seek them. But one who has seen no potato chips for a month may suddenly "hunger" for them when, and only when, he sees them. It is not extravagant to say that the body is thirsty because of its own tissue situation, but it would be extravagant to say that before it encounters potato chips it is hungry for them in the same way. The fact that both classes of motives exist needs hardly be labored; but the issue as to classification is important, for otherwise we might forever be assuming that whatever men do springs from something already wound up within them. A single example of the magnitude of the issue at stake: Do we mean by an "aggressive" man one who is ready to fight when stimulated by external pressures, or one who is constantly "spoiling for a fight?" There are both kinds of aggressive men; and the same distinction holds in relation to almost every impulse. The chief practical difference between the two appears to lie in the maintenance, in the one case but not in the other, of continuous symbolic machinery that activates the tensions leading to overt behavior. One "carries around" aggression; the other does not . . . .

Phrasing the matter in this way immediately suggests a third possibility. Sometimes the inner disposition sensitizes the action patterns, but nothing further happens until the external push is given. Both the delayed-reaction experiment and the persistence, during long years of toil and privation, of goal-seeking tendencies which will be fulfilled when one's ship comes in indicate that in man there is a system of events which somehow tends to obliterate the distinctions that must be drawn sharply at a simpler level. One may nurse a grudge or a dream; he may not only sensitize himself for the future moment when an expected stimulus will come, but act as if that stimulus were already present.

It is important not to think of anticipation as necessarily a fixed and abiding tissue disposition left over, once and for all, from a past era. Rather, it exhibits some elements of relative continuity, many elements of cross conditioning and inner reinforcement; it is constantly strengthened or complicated by new external stimulation, and abundantly enriched or modified by other anticipations, whether in verbal or other form. Consequently, anticipations change in accordance with the dominant stimulations; in other words, they show the phenomenon of trial and error, the constant change of response to outer objects though the inner need remains unchanged. Let the need reach a certain pitch, and the act to which it leads may become and remain dominant, the usual shifting patterns of trial and error being inhibited. Hamilton's human and animal subjects, when frustrated after making wrong responses, were sometimes in such distress that the need to escape mounted, the inner factors being reinforced and the outer cues serving no purpose—they went on furiously doing the wrong thing time and again. The sheer stress of a situation may prevent the ordinary lability to which the term "trial-and-error" learning is applied. The child or adult may fixate, because of suffering, the very response that causes the suffering. The "rigid," the "cocky," the diffuse, the "irritable," the "withdrawn" personality are not necessarily end results of successful adaptation to environment; they are often crystallized expressions of *failure to adapt.*

Huge individual differences in the lability or fixity of such orientations, the capacity to shift one's instrumental activity as the need persists, are among the most important factors in personality; hence it will be well to find out what is known about their origin. The hints about perseveration given earlier . . . are of some use; negativism . . . , the resistance to outer pressure, is of more importance. The complexity of the nervous system and the number of acquired skills available play an important part; the richness of verbal means of constructing alternatives is more important still. Beyond it all there may well be a disposition of the type discussed by Rorschach, a basic tendency toward the maintenance of set; a basic rigidity, perhaps, as contrasted with the proneness to attention shift.

It is anyone's guess as to the exact structure of this complex of factors that make for persistence or the lack of it; hence one more guess may be ventured here by way of a first step toward a hypothesis. Our guess is that repeated and intense frustrations have not taught the individual *only* that this and that particular act get him nowhere; his response is much more generalized. The pattern is: "Whatever I do is wrong." This is exactly the pattern which some animals suffering from experimental neurosis . . . . have shown—a cowed defeatism, a form of "rigidity" which may even mean muscular rigidity, or another manifestation of the same inability to do anything about the situation, namely, "waxy flexibility" of the extremities. This might be defined as a generalized withdrawal attitude . . . which in some cases takes the form of passive helplessness, and in others (where there is some record of a successful struggle against the outer world) prolonged defiance. There may, however, be pressure to escape not only from the outer world but *from one's own patterns*, and the result may be extreme vacillation, a grasping at every straw in the outer world. The extreme spotty "extratensive" pattern (the jumping of attention from one to another external object) may well be a pattern of escape from an inner symbolic world which, no matter how one looks at it, is frustrating. In contrast to the "flight *from* reality," is the "flight *into* reality."

It follows that rigid or stereotyped persistence and utter lability may prove at times to be not extremes on a continuum but contrasting forms of the same thing. In any event, the persistence of set, as both a qualitative and a quantitative problem, is among the major tasks upon which a theory of conditioning should shed light. Perhaps such a theory will prove inadequate to cope with problems at this level of complexity; at any rate, its use in personality study cannot be pushed very far until a way is found to predict, from a knowledge of persisting dispositions, which among a variety of outer conditioning situations will "take effect" upon the individual.

Value tendencies, then, arise not only from the direct confrontation of valued stimuli but from the cues associated with them. Two forks on the table suggest pie for dessert, a value through which the expressed attitude is activated. In other words, conditioning applies to value tendencies and to attitude tendencies (the fork is the symbol of the pie). Most symbols in the attitude sphere are verbal. In a complex symbolic world the conditioned stimuli are likely to confront us more often than the originals. The people of our own group are just ordinary people; they need no classification tag, and for the most part call for none. But members of out-groups—those who live across the tracks—are less frequently met, need to be symbolized, may be confronted in generic terms in every conversation or newspaper. Since generalization is a usual attribute of conditioning, such symbols normally control generalized attitudes. Skin color or accent or clothing may have served as a conditioned stimulus in a disturbing situation; similar though not identical skin color or accent or clothing may precipitate a response. So, too, since language seeks largely to crystallize the general that arises in a series of particulars, the verbal terms applied to a group, anchored upon a general criterion such as skin color, may touch off in the listener the general responses to the entire group designated.

Attitude

As one looks at the development of attitudes in the individual child, he finds them first appearing in the form of conditioned postural responses, including elements of attack and escape, and dispositions to modify the stimulus world. Affective and motor elements are integrated or almost fused . . . . From these earliest attitudes of acceptance and rejection, which in their affective form we may call attitudes of outgoingness and of repugnance, wide generalization is to be expected and does in fact occur; it proceeds here, like all generalization, until differentiation is forced upon the individual . . . . The child structures a world of positive and a world of negative orientation, regions of safety and of danger; and with repetition the affective and conative features have an opportunity for deep fixation. The symbolic elements in the configuration which touch off the attitude behave like other symbolic elements; a term of opprobrium regarding one's own social group may thus touch off a hostile reaction after many years of friendly contact between that group and another. It is even possible that the sudden interjection of verbal cues will touch off components never otherwise seen, as when a light-skinned Negro who has passed for white and lived as a white among whites is labeled "nigger" by those who know his genealogy, and a sharp shift in the behavior of whites toward him ensuses. According to the theory developed here, a complex of canalizations and conditionings connected with satisfying and frustrating experiences was early established toward the group designated by a given skin color; but this complex of responses was tied to verbal symbols, so that the whole force of the conditioned response to "nigger" is available when the verbal conditioned stimulus is given. Or, on discovering that the verbal stimulus was inappropriate, that is, that a mistake has been made, the individual may revert to the earlier patterns. The basic canalizations toward social groups in terms of the drives which they activate remain in force, but they are manipulated by verbal symbols. A method similar to this was used in Hitler's Germany to reactivate attitudes toward Jews, Czechs, and Poles, with whom, in German communities, most Germans had lived reasonably amicably. The least desirable aspects of the stereotypes about these groups were emphasized and a generalized conditioned response was established in the form of each of these stereotypes; the individual Pole, Jew, or Czech in each town and village, despite earlier good status, then suffered from the transfer effects of the stereotype.

The principle of dominance applies as much to the verbal as to all other conditionings, and the attitudes of fear and disgust in relation to basic disturbances in the child's experience can be redirected toward the criteria by which a social group is recognized—mannerisms, gestures, speech patterns, etc.—which then serve as cues for these deeper dispositions. Were the canalizations less constant, were the individual less rooted in his basic social and personal needs and fears, he would be infinitely more plastic under the pressure of suggestion and propaganda; infinitely less effort would be required to remodel him through social and political pressures.

We have written as if the earliest social attitudes were rooted in the helpfulness or hostility of others toward ourselves, and in the safety or danger with which our dealings toward them are carried on. But, in reality, attitude toward the *self* is coeval with attitude toward every other individual . . . .Canalization upon the parent is of necessity canalization upon oneself, so far as there is any resemblance between child and parent, and such resemblance is of course magnified in many ways. There is also constant derivation of drive satisfactions from one's own person. The sensory and activity drives are largely gratified by sight, sound, contact, and muscular responses, all centered in the self; the little child plays happily with his toes and gurgles and smiles as he does so. Even the visceral responses are to some extent based upon the self, the simplest example being the thumb-sucking of the hungry child; a more complex illustration is seen in the self-satisfaction or vanity pattern of enacting little plays for one's own vigorous self-approbation. Consequently one develops attitudes toward others in relation to the developing system of attitudes toward oneself. Not only are other persons friendly to our physical existence, they are friendly toward the attitudes of self-enhancement which we need. Or, though not injuring us physically, they may thwart these tendencies—they may "hurt our feelings." Children's and adults' records of their earliest memories are as rich in humiliation episodes as in overt fear or disgust episodes. The child's attitude toward others is, then, dictated in large measure by the degree to which they develop or frustrate his own attitude needs in relation to his own person. It is indeed probable that adult enchancement of the self-regarding needs of the child underlies the generalized security or insecurity noted by Pallister . . . ; it is probably the adult tendency to tease or humiliate the child which offers the chief basis for the later withdrawal tendency.

Whether we dignify one group of symbols above another or not, symbols seem to owe their existence largely to dominance; and for that reason they are likely, as they lead to effective adjustment, to be constantly reinforced and maintained. If personality is a multiple-tension system, it should be possible to work out a gradation among the tensions in accordance with the depth and degree of permanence of their roles in the total. Certain striped- and unstriped-muscle groups that are activated by inner symbols referring to the self display exceptional constancy, invariability of response. While some parts of the body, such as the postural and locomotor muscles, may vary in a given person from very high to very low tension at a moment's notice, depending upon the context and the inner situation, others, such as the muscles of the arterial walls and the gastrointestinal canal, may show a much greater stability or rigidity because they are constantly excited by inner symbolic activity. Equally rigid, in other persons, would be certain striped-muscle patterns representing implicit responses toward the self, the matrix from which expressive gestures arise; the characteristic postural air of diffidence or self-esteem betrays itself in the muscles of the neck, chest, and shoulders. We should expect to find "hypertension" often due to chronic attitudes of aggression and fear, or cramps due to prolonged excitement or worry; all are rooted to some degree in chronic hyperactivity of the sympathetic system. That this is the case has been shown repeatedly, as in the recent work of Binger and his collaborators which emphasized a long history of violent pent-up aggressive tendencies prior to the first record of their patients' arterial hypertension.

Among the stable and frequently unconscious muscular dispositions related to attitude toward self are, of course, those of the speech apparatus. And the words most centrally located in the personal symbolic system are most easily activated. It is not only the poet who betrays himself in his favorite words; every person's favorite words suggest patterns for classifying the world and his relation to it. Within the matrix lie a few words which, because they represent ways of regarding the self, are among our most important clues to the study of personality. In describing the ego, Freud emphasizes auditory material. Although we need not go so far, nor do we need to deny the importance of non-verbal, indeed non-auditory, symbols of various types, we do, however, need to give the symbolic act of self-reference a prominent position in the symbolic system.

In spite of the great continuity of wants, especially those related to the self, that is implied by these examples, the frequent *changes* in the pattern of wants must also be considered. If one views enough ego levels and enough cultures, will he not find as great a need for novelty, for change, for the unknown, as for the tried and familiar? With satisfaction comes satiation, and the right of way is given to what is new. Man turns from one satisfaction to another. Caught between these two basic principles, the need to continue and repeat and the need to give up and change, he builds up habitual sequences in the pursuit of his goals; there is a temporal structure in his living that provides for the interweaving of connective tissue between his needs. Usually the needs tend to be set up in pairs, like waking and sleeping or working and playing; and these pairs become functionally ingrained so that habits of alternation are formed—the primal reconciliaton of opposites, or logic of dialectic, that so delighted Hegel and Marx. At the human level, however, the opposites are only functional, not necessarily logical. They are reminiscent of a sonata, in which the second movement is not a "contradiction" but a contrast to the first, and in which the third, revealing and fulfilling both, shows their oneness as well as their contrast.

It is widely recognized that one's "interests" change more often than one's "values." The reason, we believe, is to be found in the difference between the types of learning process involved. Just as the concept of "attitude" seems to be clarified by both the "canalization" and the "conditioning" processes, so the concept of "interest" rests upon both processes.

The relation of value to interest follows from the theoretical distinction made above between conditioning and canalization. Interests change rapidly as the mode of satisfying needs varies. I am interested in the program of a music recital because the Tchaikovsky that is to be played satisfies my own value; an extraordinary variety of programs may interest me so far as they are related to the value in question. Instantly upon hearing that the great conductor cannot lead or that the favorite pianist is ill, I lose interest in the sheet of paper announcing the program; the value is unaffected, but the piece of paper before me has lost its conditioned connection with the value. Interests, we suggest, are conditioned stimuli pursued because of their relations to goal objects which are valued. Interests in turn are extinguished, as all other conditioned responses are extinguished, when the relations to the drives involved are destroyed.

The Classification of Values

The number of values developed within the individual is never fixed, simply because no one ever finishes with canalization. And in the nature of the process, values overlap and fuse so that the classification of their ultimate types could serve no purpose. It is convenient, nevertheless, to put them into some sort of order, in the fashion, for example, of Spranger who set up six basic value types. In presenting his scheme, we shall offer some simplification to adapt the system to the general framework developed.

The *theoretical type* seeks to grasp the nature of things. When the reality sought is not local and temporary but cosmic, we have the *religious type*. When not the abstract relations but the persons about one are valued, we have the *social type*. In the person for whom individuals are significant not for themselves but as pawns in a game for power, we have the *political type*. The *economic type* finds value in the relations of gain and loss. The *esthetic type* values the relations between sensory objects that are directly and immediately satisfying.

The chief usefulness of this classification for our present purpose is the fact that it can be employed to demonstrate the continuity of values within the individual from year to year, the relatively greater permanence of values than of interests, as called for by the theoretical distinction made above, and the close relation between values and the specific intellectual orientations of young adults. On this last point, for example, there is evidence from the Allport-Vernon test that students of arts are higher than students of business and engineering on theoretical and esthetic value.

Another much more complex classification of values could, however, be defined; the more complex, the more subtle, the more variegated it is, the better it will be for the description of individuals. As Spranger's scheme was devised expressly to describe types, a given individual incorporates in himself something of all the types and a great many more besides. Indeed, there are many values partly because it takes so long to grow up. The longer the period of immaturity, the period during which the organism is plastic, the greater the number of values it can form, the more complex the hierarchies it can establish in both its intellectual and its emotional life, the greater its opportunity for experimentation. What it learns during this period it learns with a less differentiated, less diversified nervous system. The values are values of the organism as a whole, and have a less compartmentalized character than those acquired later. In fact, this prolonged immaturity may be a reason why human nature is so complex, quite aside from the factor of greater intellectual power. Some have thought that the greater plasticity of the human drives might be due solely to this "prolonged infancy." We have attributed the range and subtlety of human motives to the great complexity of our nervous system; McDougall would ask whether the time required for the nervous system to develop might not be as important as the total complexity achieved.

The reason why values can be classified is that they transfer and generalize. . . . Earlier we used the illustration of the hungry man and his *attitude* toward food; seated at the dinner table, he has a more specific attitude toward his favorite dish. The attitude is often visible behavior; the eyes and hands reveal it, and even in the well-behaved the salivary glands primitively betray it. At their core, attitudes are dispositions toward stimuli moving in the direction of more complete external responses. There are attitudes—incipient responses—toward *all* situations. Since every situation resembles certain other situations, attitudes are likely to prove general to some degree; but since each situation is definitely itself, differing from every other, attitudes are likely to prove specific to a certain extent. The behavior of attitudes suggests, therefore, that they are conditionings that exhibit the usual transfer and differentiation.

Attitudes are present dispositions which have developed through a long and complex process. Like all behavior, they are *motivated*, and they are adjustments to present situations. On all three counts they remind us directly of values; indeed, the more closely they are regarded, the more difficult it is to find any essential difference between values and attitudes. Current practice makes a convenient distinction in terms of the symbolic machinery expressive of the two; inwardly one pines for his old home, valuing it above his present home, but outwardly he expresses the attitude, as when he symbolizes verbally the fact that Centerville is a "dear old place." The value is conceived to be the feeling of which the attitude is the conditioned verbal expression. Attitude is defined by some as *value expression*. There is sense in this definition, for its central point embodies a canalization process; but the process is aroused by a word of some other symbol, and when aroused, the whole inner complex is likely to seem a conditioned stimulus for both verbal and behavioral expression. It would be more accurate to say that preverbal attitudes of the sort just described exist, and that words become a focal part of the attitude pattern. Value and attitude can be distinguished only by a convenient surgical separation whose utility is subject to doubt.

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Psychologically Adjusted Man and the Abolition of War

EDWARD CHACE TOLMAN

. . . Drucker's thesis [is] that since the beginning of Christianity, Western Europe has been dominated by a series of some four myths as to the Nature of Man. Each myth consisted in the belief that certain ones only of man's needs were important. If these really important needs could but be satisfied, then universal individual welfare and happiness would, it was believed, result. These myths were, according to Drucker, successively those of Spiritual Man, of Intellectual Man, of Economic Man, and of Heroic Man.

* * * *

What, now, as to the future? Spiritual Man, Intellectual Man, the two subforms of Economic Man, and Heroic Man all have failed to bring the desired welfare and happiness of all individuals. The world is suffering as never before. What then can we hope for? My answer is that, if we can but combine the emphasis upon the biological drives with a moderate amount of self-assertion and a large amount of collectivity and add to this easy identification with parents, we shall arrive at a new and this time truly workable myth—a myth that in reality would save the world from its horrors. I shall call this the myth of *The Psychologically Adjusted Man*. That is, . . . my doctrine would be that a truly stable and happy society would be brought about, if we could but embody in that society the following six prescriptive principles:

(1) The biological needs are basic and must be satisfied in all individuals.

(2) Both the Self-Assertive Techniques and the Collective Techniques are instrumentally useful means toward the biological satisfactions and both are to be accepted as equally appropriate and necessary types of activity.

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(3) The Self-Abasive Techniques, because of their accompanying repressed hostilities, which then tend to come out in individually and socially disruptive activities, are bad. Self-abasement and accompanying repression are to be reduced to a minimum.

(4) Good identifications with parents or other accepted authorities are, on the other hand, to be encouraged.

(5) Group loyalty (the Collective-Assertive Technique) appears to be something to which human beings, like chimpanzees, are tremendously prone. We probably cannot much diminish or obviate such loyalties. We must try instead to redirect them into more useful and less harmful channels. That is,

(6) Instead of permitting such group loyalties to express themselves primarily in wars between nations, we must redirect them into the mere policing of recalcitrant subgroups and into campaigns against hostile Nature.[2]

A society which embodied these six prescriptions would be one which lived according to the Myth of Psychologically Adjusted Man. And such a society can tend to be brought about, I would suggest, by the development of three main practical devices:

(A) We must evolve an economic order which will abolish too great biological frustrations.

(B) We must invent an educational and social system which encourages and makes possible easy identification with parents or other acceptable authorities.

(C) We must create a supranational state to which individuals, wherever they may be, can become more loyal than they then will be to their narrower national groups.

Let us consider each of these three devices in more detail.

(A) No Too Great Biological Frustrations

The ultimate and basic needs are . . . the biological ones: food, shelter, sex, maternity, nurturance and all the other biological appetites, plus the aversion-needs of security from pain, security from blockings, and security from loneliness. These are the basic demands. Any society which does not permit a large measure of their satisfaction in *all* individuals is *ipso-facto* bad. First, and most obviously, it is bad because such non-satisfactions mean a tremendous load of direct biological sufferance. And, secondly, it is likewise bad because such a society also means that many individuals will be driven to become too strongly self-assertive. And, when such over-assertiveness is frustrated (as it inevitably will be), not all of the resultant hostility can be drained off into acceptable identifications with parents (or other authorities). Much self-abasement with accompanying repressed hostility is bound to occur. And such repressed hostility will then come out in individually and socially disruptive ways, such as: sentimentality, self-punishment, crime, cruelty to inferiors, and neurotically motivated war.

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[2] This last is, of course, essentially the notion long since advocated by William James in his *The Moral Equivalent of War* (New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1910). More accessible in *Memories and Studies* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911).

But next, we must ask, just how are such frustrations of the biological drives to be prevented? The answer is clear. What we need is to utilize to the limit the modern techniques of production and to add to them a better system of distribution. This points quite frankly in the direction of more socialism (at least more socialism than we have as yet achieved here in America).

* * * *

(B) Easy Identification with Parents or Other Authorities

In the postwar Utopia, which I am envisaging, it will be particularly important that children shall be able to identify (more easily than they often now can) with parents, or other suitable adults. For they will then be able to drain off such frustrated self-assertion as they still have in socially acceptable ways and will not be driven into the self-abasive techniques. However, the factors which will make such easy identifications are by no means now completely known. But it seems probable that one of the difficulties, which in our present highly class-structured societies interferes with such easy identifications, is that our different professions and occupational callings are too loaded with prestige values. We today are forever trying to force our children into moulds which are appropriate, not for their capacities and temperamental traits, but only for satisfying our own social strivings. If we can but arrive at a real psychology of individual differences—whereby we can really measure traits, abilities, and capacities—then we can more intelligently help the child to find its own appropriate models to copy and identify with. Further, in such a Utopia as I am envisaging, farmers, laborers, industrial workers, doctors, lawyers, business executives, etc. would all be living close together and forming integrated social units so that every child would be exposed to all the different adult patterns and could more easily come to pick out or identify with that pattern which most truly expressed his own needs and capacities. In any case, it seems obvious today that the energy of too many of our children goes into trying to be like parents whom they are not like, or in trying to be unlike parents whom they are like. The Psychologically Adjusted Man will be one who as child and youth achieves good and appropriate identifications.

Finally, let us turn to our third proposed device which, from the point of view of the present essay, is the most important.

(C) A Supranational Group to Identify With

Collective living as well as individual self-assertion is, as we have seen, a fundamental propensity in human beings. And collective living means not merely internal collaboration within the group but also, because of the individual's tendency to identify with the group, a collective-assertion of the group against outsiders. When a group is threatened, the component individuals rush to its defense. They behave like Köhler's chimpanzees. Individuals whose ultimate goals are, or should be, their own biological satisfactions voluntarily rush to the front, or send their sons, because their group has been attacked, or because they have been led by clever leaders into believing that their group has been so attacked, or at least that it has been threatened with an attack. And these identifications with, and loyalties to, the group go very very deep. One has only to observe the reactions of all of us since "Pearl Harbor" to be convinced how fundamental this process is. The new society living by the myth of Psychologically Adjusted Man will not be able to eliminate group identifications and resultant loyalties.

But how then, we may ask, are such group loyalties to be shorn of their present disastrous consequences? My answer is to declare that as a result of the last war and of this war we can now see (that is, we can *learn*) that to federate is an alternative and that it is, in fact, the only really successful method of maintaining group existences. We can see that we must develop a group—a community—which is supranational. It must be something with which individuals everywhere all over the world can be made to identify more strongly than they then will identify with their own narrower national groups. This *World-Federation*, or superstate, or whatever we may want to call it, must command all our allegiances more strongly than our national states now do. Just as I am more loyal to the United States than I am to California, so in the future I must be more loyal to this World-Federation than I am to the United States. And not only I, but you, and the corner grocer, and the American Legionnaire, and the boys who return from this war, and the capitalist who now hates Russia, and the Russian himself who now scorns the "backward" democracies, and the Chinese, and the Hindus, and the Africans, and the Indonesians, and the Germans, and the Italians, and the Japanese—all, all must then be made to adopt this one greater loyalty. All must feel that they belong to one such greater whole. For, if no such whole be consummated, then we may most certainly expect another and more terrible war when a fresh and unwitting generation shall have been raised to fighting age.

* * * *

Catharsis and the Relief of Hostility

PHILIP WORCHEL

Catharsis, in one form or another, occupies a central position in all psychotherapeutic procedures. Corsini and Rosenberg (4), in reviewing the dynamics of group therapy, found that ventilation, or the release of feelings and expression of ideas usually repressed in other nontherapeutic situations, was one of the most frequently mentioned mechanisms in about 300 articles examined. Despite its importance, considerable confusion exists concerning the meaning and rationale for the efficacy of catharsis. Rotter (12) pointed out the many different ways in which catharsis is currently viewed and evaluated the different techniques of attaining catharsis from a learning point of view. Dollard and Miller (5) emphasized the importance of the events following the expression of feelings or past memories rather than the sheer act of catharsis. The therapist as a nonpunitive agent helps to extinguish certain avoidance reactions or to develop new learning by pointing out associations not originally perceived by the patient. Alexander and French (1) attributed the therapeutic outcome following catharsis to insight or new learning rather than to any purging effect of the unconscious. New learnings may also occur merely as a result of new relationships perceived by the patient as he verbalizes previous experiences.

Relatively few investigations have been undertaken to validate the clinical impression of the psychotherapeutic efficiency of catharsis or test any hypotheses as to its rationable. . . .

. . . ambiguous and contradictory results concerning the efficacy and the nature of effects of catharsis may be due to the untested assumption that catharsis in whatever form is equally applicable to all kinds of disturbances regardless of the underlying dynamics. It is suggested, however, that catharsis is effective to the extent that it sets up conditions for reducing threat to need-satisfaction patterns. Conflict may arise from a need to express hostility or a threat to self-esteem or between the moral values

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of the super-ego and the libidinal impulses of the id. Mere expression of anxiety feelings concerning an anticipated failure, for example, may not, in and of itself, eliminate the underlying threat. An analysis of the source of conflict in the expression of hostility suggests certain hypotheses concerning the role of various responses in the reduction of the conflict. The goal of the hostility drive is attack and removal of the stimulus arousing hostility. The threat to such direct behavior, however, is the anticipated punishment derived from earlier experiences in expressing hostility in this manner. It is hypothesized, therefore, that hostility will be reduced if the therapeutic situation provides socially acceptable conditions for the expression of hostility or attack at the instigator.

There has been some question (12), however, concerning the generalization of the relief of such feelings when expression of hostility is made to a third party (e.g., the therapist) or displaced upon some object or person other than the original instigator. On the one hand, expression directly to the instigator, even under nonpunitive conditions, may still arouse anxiety concerning the anticipated consequences of such attack. On the other hand, a number of experiments (9, 10) have indicated the generalization effect occurring under conditions of displacement. A second objective, therefore, of the present series of studies is to compare the effect of expressing hostility directly to the instigator, and expressing hostility indirectly to or about others.

Method

Subjects

From nine sophomore and junior classes in elementary and educational psychology, 52 subjects (*S*s) were selected from each of the three largest groups, 52 *S*s from two smaller groups, and 52 *S*s from the two smallest groups. The five groups were randomly assigned to the experimental treatments and were identified as follows: Group I, Catharsis-Experimenter (E); Group II, Catharsis-Assistant (A); Group III, Catharsis-Fantasy (F); Group IV, Control (Talk); Group V, Control (Silence). Sex was about evenly divided in all groups: in Group I, there were 23 women and 29 men; in Group II, 25 women and 27 men; in Group III, 23 women and 29 men; in Group IV, 28 women and 24 men; and in Group V, 22 women and 30 men.

Experimental Tasks

Basically, the design involved the arousal of hostility in groups of *S*s, exposing them to different conditions of ventilating feelings, and then testing the efficiency of the experimental conditions in the reduction of the disruptive effects of stress on performance. Hostility was aroused by an insult technique similar to the one used by Feshbach (6) with one modification; insult was directed at the performance of *S*s in an ego-involved task, an intelligence test. In the present experiment, catharsis refers to the release of hostility feelings, verbally expressed by volunteers in a group, under nonpunitive conditions. The tasks used to assess the degree of the reduction of stress were a digit-symbol test and a test of incidental recall of the titles of a bogus intelligence test. The basic assumption underlying the use of performance measures as indices of the disruptive effects of stress follows from the interference interpretation of the effects of frustration (2) by Child and Waterhouse (3): Responses such as anxiety and anger evoked by frustration in one activity may interfere with the quality of performance in a second activity.

Procedure

To increase involvement, *E* introduced himself as professor of psychology and director of clinical psychology. Each group of *S*s was told that as a part of the general routine of the Department of Psychology, students were given a series of tests measuring learning ability and intelligence. The scores were entered in each student's file for purposes of guidance, recommendations for scholarships and jobs, and consideration for admission to graduate study if the students applied for such admission.

As a pre-experimental test of learning ability, each group was given a one-minute digit-symbol test, the code consisting of letters and geometrical figures. Then a bogus intelligence test (14) entitled "The University of Texas Intelligence Test", and consisting of 14 subtests, each prominently labeled by a single word describing the contents, was administered to each group. The instructions, read verbally by *E*, indicated that this test consisted of a number of subtests, each highly related to academic success, and that the time limits of 45 to 90 seconds allowed sufficient time for most students to complete each subtest. At the beginning of each subtest, *E* said, "This test is called a test of——. It is a measure of your ability to——. Are you ready? Begin!" The time limits for the first two subtests permitted most of the students to complete them, but for the remaining 12 subtests, the material became much more difficult and the time for completion was sufficient for only a very few *S*s. In order to arouse hostility feelings, *E* went around the room, critically remarking at the poor and slow performance of the *S*s, urging more rapid solutions, and stating how much faster and better other classes were in this test.

The conditions during the period of eight minutes following the intelligence test varied for each group depending upon the experimental situations involved. In Group I (Catharsis-E), *S*s were informed that there would be a slight rest period before the next test and that during this time the examiner would like to know how they felt about the test and the administration of the test. For Group II (Catharsis-A), *E* said that he would have to go to his office to bring more test material but that a teaching assistant would come in to take over until his return. The assistant, who had been instructed beforehand to profess ignorance concerning the events in the classroom, asked the group to inform him as to what had happened and to give him their reactions. The role of *E* or assistant for each group was merely to accept the statements without evaluation or comment except for a "hmm" or repetition of the statement. At the end of eight minutes, *E* walked in with more papers and continued the experiment. During the rest period for Group III (Catharsis-F), *E* mentioned that the university had surveyed student opinion a year ago concerning "irritations at the campus." As a follow-up on the previous survey, the class was asked to discuss their evaluation of the present situation.

In order to control the effect of "just talking" as against actually expressing hostility, a "neutral" topic was assigned for discussion in Group IV (Control-Talk). There had been recent publicity concerning the shortage of science majors. The students were asked to suggest methods of encouraging more students in high schools to major in science. Finally, *E* lectured to Group V (Control Silence) for eight minutes on the preparation of majors in psychology, allowing neither "just talking" nor the expression of hostility.

Following the "rest" period, each group was given another form of the digit-symbol test (numbers and different symbols). At the end of one minute, *S*s were asked to write down the titles or brief descriptions of all the subjects in the intelligence test (incidental recall). All groups were tested within a two-day period to minimize communication to other *S*s.

When all five groups had been tested, *E* described the nature of the experiment and full procedure with particular emphasis on the function of the bogus intelligence test to all *S*s in order to relieve any doubt concerning their intellectual status.

Results

Expressions of Hostility

. . . Though it is difficult to assign a global rating of the intensity of expression for the group as a whole, the nature of the remarks indicated rather clearly that reports of expressed hostility were more frequent and intense in Groups II and III than in Group I. Even though *S*s in Group I were encouraged to express their feelings, they gave mild criticisms only of the test.

* * * *

Learning

It was predicted that hostility feelings would be reduced under conditions encouraging expression of attack or hostility. Specifically therefore, scores on the digit-symbol test should be higher for the three experimental than for the two control conditions. . . . Since adjusted mean digit-symbol scores for Groups I, II, and III are significantly higher (.01 level) than those for Groups IV and V, the hypothesis seems clearly supported. There is no significant difference, however, among the adjusted means of Groups I, II, and III. Nevertheless, Group IV, which merely discussed a neutral topic, did significantly better (.01-.02 level) than Group V, where the *S*s maintained silence.

Incidental Recall

The results of the test for incidental recall not only confirm the findings on the digit-symbol test of significantly superior performance by the three experimental over the two control groups, but also point to a significantly superior performance by Groups II and III over Group I. . . . incidental recall following expression of hostility to the instigator about other authority figures or following expression of hostility about the instigator to another authority figure seems to have a significantly more facilitative effect on performance than the direct expression of hostility to the instigator.

Discussion

If the learning and incidental recall indices can be accepted as indirect indicators of the effects of the relief of aggressive tension, then the results clearly indicate (*a*) the therapeutic effects of catharsis on the relief of aggressive tension, and (*b*) the differential effects of varying cathartic conditions. It may be that hostility was relieved by ventilation or that expression of hostility about E or other similar figures in the cathartic situation permitted a reduction of hostility feelings towards E in the postexperimental test situation (generalization). Certain limitations in the present experiment, however, should be recognized. Since groups rather than individuals were employed in the study, relatively few *S*s reported their feelings during the brief cathartic period. It may be that the silent members relieved hostility feelings vicariously as others expressed aggression, or the effect may have been largely restricted to the more verbal members. The experiment warrants replication so that the differential effects on the verbal and silent members may be studied.

Another factor to be considered in interpreting the results is the brief and "single-shot" nature of the cathartic period. It is possible that hostility would be more extensively relieved in Group I (direct expression to E) if a number of cathartic sessions were used. A number of trials might be necessary for *S*s in Group I before the free expression of hostility feelings could occur. Though the results indicate that hostility feelings were reduced as much if not more in Groups II and III than in I, nothing can be said as to the duration or generalization of these feelings (postexperimental sessions). Experiments on displacement (9, 10, 11) suggest that the approach gradient would rise for the original goal after approach to similar stimuli. Brief encounters with *S*s in the corridors after the testing of the initial groups and prior to the explanation of the experiment suggest that hostility was still strong towards *E*. In the present experiment the conditions in Groups II and III might be conceived as involving displacement of hostility feelings. In one case, the object of attack, *E*, was kept constant, but the person to whom the feelings were expressed varied from *E* (Group I) to the assistant (Group II). In the other case, the feelings were expressed to the same person, *E*, but the object of attack varied from *E* (Group I) to other staff members (Group III). Traditionally, the latter case is more appropriately an example of displacement since the object of attack is similar but not identical to the original instigator. The former case, more like the therapeutic situation, may nevertheless be considered an example of displacement since the punitive agent to whom hostility is expressed differs from the original.

One final consideration involves the role of *E* in the two control groups. *E* had to be present in order to equate the condition of his presence in Groups I and II, but a more complete design to test the effect of the assistant in Group II should include a replication of the two control groups with the assistant rather than *E* in charge of the eight-minute control period. It is possible that the lecture by *E* in Group V might have heightened temporarily any feelings of hostility, or that discussion concerning increasing the number of science majors in Group IV may have reduced hostility feelings through some critical comments about poor teaching. Either situation, the lecture by *E* in Group V or the discussion of science majors in Group IV, might explain the significantly better results for Group IV on the digit-symbol test.

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Basic Principles in Improving Human Relations

GORDON W. ALLPORT

Three Areas of Progress

I am reminded of the fact that President Roosevelt, in his last public address, made the now famous statement that we need a science of human relations—a discipline for all men by which to live and work together in the same world, at peace. That was a prophetic last utterance and since President Roosevelt's death the progress made toward this goal has been little short of spectacular—and I use that word advisedly. As far as this country is concerned, I think we may note very marked advances especially in three areas.

First, in the political-legal sphere of action we find a procession of city ordinances, state laws, federal bills, rulings by the United States Supreme Court, projects of the United Nations—topped by the Bill of Human Rights—all combining to make an impressive array. Statutes, as well as codes and constitutions, influence men's social and personal expectations and set new and higher norms for human behavior. It is only partially true to say that we cannot legislate prejudice out of existence. People like laws that reinforce their own consciences. To be sure, at preliminary hearings they may object and predict dire consequences from legislation that defies their own pet bias; they may also worm their way around it if the legislation is passed. Still, experience shows that such laws, if soundly written and basically in conformity with the public conscience, are generally accepted in the long run. Even when honored in the breach, as they often are, they do tend to change social expectations and thus eventually make for improvement in human relations.

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The beginning of this article is omitted.

The second sphere in which progress may be noted has no single focus but covers those lines of research and reform that we may call cultural-economic. The assumption of practitioners in this area, for which there is much support, is that hate runs deepest among insecure, frustrated, and socially inadequate people, and that this brew of hate is concocted by disorders within the social structure and within cultural tradition. Those who believe that prejudice is largely an economic phenomenon belong under this head. They point to the use of the Negro as cheap labor and the wish of exploiters to keep him "in his place" in order to preserve their own advantage. They point out, at the same time, that marginal white workers join in the oppression because they feel insecure lest upward mobility among Negroes displace them into the ranks of casual labor.

Some people believe that only throughgoing economic reform can change this pattern. Recent investigation shows that persons dissatisfied with their jobs are more often anti-Semitic than those who are satisfied. The evidence is clear that, in times of social crisis, scapegoats are looked for by an anxious public and irrelevantly abused. The present Red hysteria, in this country, cannot possibly be understood without reference to the widespread insecurity and unrest that attend postwar adjustment. On the whole, there is much to be said for theories of social, historical, and economic determinism.

But it is with the third area of progress, that of personal attitudes, that we shall be chiefly concerned here. Most educators and psychologists, I presume, share the conviction that it is in the minds and hearts of men and women that the mainsprings of their social relations are to be found. For we all know people who need neither the external control of law nor a secure social structure in order to be fair-minded and benevolent in their dealings with their fellows. Conversely, we know people who in spite of legislation, prosperity, and social ease are ugly and vindictive. Important as the environmental situation is, human beings have a way of perceiving this situation and responding to it in terms of their own inner character. In the last analysis, therefore, prejudice is a personal matter. The individual himself harbors the motives and viewpoints that make for concord or discord in human relations. Given enough benevolent minds in our society, there will be peace and decency; given enough malevolent minds, there will be fatal conflict. We may adopt this fundamentally personalistic view without in the slightest degree opposing legal and social reform which undoubtedly aids in shaping secure and balanced personalities.

Investigators today are studying human relations in many different group settings: in the classroom, in the community, and in industry. It is exciting to watch the results of a research converge. A common thread seems to run through every set of findings so that before long, we may hope this thread will lead to a unifying theory.

* * * *

. . . People want to remain integrated human beings in a work situation as well as at home. It is the whole individual who goes to school, to work, or to war. He desires congenial informal relations with his fellows and wants to participate in his own destiny. And he will not for long tolerate patronage. The common thread that emerges seems to have two interwoven strands. People in any form of human association wish to preserve their self-esteem—their self-love, if you wish—and simultaneously to have warm, affiliative relations with their colleagues. No one seems initially to want to hate. But hatred, nonetheless, grows up in many lives as a consequence of blocked self-esteem and blocked affiliation.

Let me sum up my argument thus far. Modern research in human relations reveals that men are basically eager for friendly relations with their fellows of a sort that respect their own sense of integrity and self-esteem. Up to now we have failed to design our industrial and political life so that this pattern of need can be widely realized among the people of the world. And, as educators and psychologists, we have not studied deeply enough the basic nature of affiliation and hostility, of love and hate. We know that the character structure of the individual is the core of our problem, social conditions being important only as they affect character. We know, too, that hatred can easily take command of this structure. Studies show that prejudice is an appreciable factor in the style of life of perhaps four-fifths of the population. (These, of course, are American studies and American figures.) And yet all the while the affiliative need somehow remains fundamental to everything else.

Love and Hate in Human Personality

Such being our quandary, I offer no apology for directing attention more closely to the subject of love and hate. The topic is not quite so abstract as it sounds, for fortunately there exists considerable accumulated research by which to guide our speculations. There are two questions in particular that I shall try to answer. First, what is wrong with our prevailing theories of love and hate? Second, how does it happen that hostility comes so readily to take over the management of a life?

* * * *

. . . From the moment of its inception the business of life calls for adherence, for affiliation. *In utero* the mode of life is symbolic; the associative relationship reigns supreme and there is no evidence of destructive instincts. After birth the affiliative attachment of the child to his environment still remains dominant while nursing, playing, resting. The social smile early symbolizes contentment with people. Toward his entire environment the baby is positive, approaching nearly every type of stimulus, every type of person. From no human being does he withdraw by instinct; his life is marked by eager outgoingness.

To be sure, in the process of relating himself positively to his environment, the child may do damage and may unwittingly violate the rights of others. A two-year-old is, in one sense of the word, very "destructive." But his depredations are psychologically irrelevant to what he is trying to do. From his point of view he is greedily ingesting his environment, eagerly affiliating with it, nothing more. When the negative emotions of fear and anger arise, they owe their whole existence to some check to this zeal for approach. Affiliative tendencies, when threatened or frustrated, give way to alarm and defense. Suttie puts the matter picturesquely, "Earth hath no hate but love to hatred turned, and hell no fury but a baby scorned."

So obvious is the priority of the affiliative groundwork that one must perform contortions in order to give equal standing to the alleged aggressive instincts. By some psychoanalysts the feat is achieved by assuming that eating—perhaps the most conspicuous of an infant's activities—is a destructive act, "oral aggression" it is called. Our primordial ancestors, writes one Freudian, "were cannibals." "We all enter life with the instinctive impulse to devour not only food, but also all frustrating objects. Before the infantile individual acquires the capacity to love, it is governed by a primitive hate relationship to its environment." That is a quotation from Ernest Simmel, in his book *Anti-Semitism, A Social Disease*. Now, this statement precisely reverses the order of love and hate in ontogenetic development. Furthermore, it inverts the meaning of the act of feeding. When I devour roast beef it is not from hate but from love. Acts of incorporation into myself are, from my point of view, affiliative.

Now the truest statement that can be made of a normal person is that he never feels that he can love or be loved enough. He always wants more love in his life. One reason why religion is an almost universal expression of mankind is that, in religion, the basic love relation of the individual with some embracing principle is maintained. The major religions represent not only a free, indestructible, attachment to one's Creator, but likewise the unattained ideal of human brotherhood. When we imagine a perfect state of being we invariably imagine the unconditional triumph of love.

But love when threatened turns to anxious fear. No one can remain indifferent if the bid he is making for affiliation is rebuffed. A recent study of delinquent boys shows that, in virtually every case of incorrigible delinquency, there was gross emotional inadequacy in the home. The boys were either rejected by their parents or had parents incapable of providing affectional security. We, in Cambridge, have just finished a particular study of 325 boys with control groups, and I think that our clearest finding is that the serious delinquents among them invariably had bad relations at home; they had no security in their affections. But half aware of their trouble, when their bid for affiliation was blocked, they had turned to antisocial acts in defense. During the war, a thirteen-year-old boy who had been rejected at home is reported to have "spat on the American flag and announced that the other boys were fools to believe in our government, that he was for Hitler and Nazism," and that he "intended to become a traitor." "I hate all Americans," he is said to have added. When deprived of secure affection, children have often ranted against "dirty Niggers," "Jew bastards," and the like.

Misanthropy—I think we may now generalize—is always a matter of frustrated affiliative desire and the attendant humiliation to self-esteem. What is so fascinating psychologically is the displacement that frequently occurs in the resulting hatred. Few of the children in the project I have cited were aware of the source of their misery. They did not blame their parents; they did not know what was wrong with them. Their aggression was directed against irrelevant things. Parenthetically, I may remark that although I am criticizing Freud's basic theory of motivation, I gratefully accept his theory of the numerous mechanisms of ego defense, as he calls it, including here the mechanism of displacement. We are pretty sure that there is such a thing as displaced aggression—displaced hatred—and that is a Freudian contribution. We do not have to accept Freud's analysis of the basic drives in order to accept his brilliant theory of ego defense. As appears from the recent study of anti-Semitism in California, the process of displacement is often subtle. Highly prejudiced college girls were found ordinarily to profess complete love and respect for their parents—more often than tolerant girls. But further study indicated that their lives were marked by considerable hostility against their parents. In spite of appearances, they did not have a free affiliative relation at home and, farfetched as it may seem, their anti-Semitism reflected this situation.

* * * *

Motivation as Post-Instinctive

I have tried thus far to prove that hostile sentiments and aggressive action are not simply the inevitable outpouring of instinctive energy. In proportion as man's affiliative needs are met these negative reactions tend to disappear. They are thus contingent phenomena and, accordingly, at least theoretically avoidable. Awareness of this fact constitutes the first requirement for improving human relations. The next step is to find the techniques of implementation. Concretely the task becomes one of maximizing situations that are genuinely participant and affiliative in home, school, factory, and in international assemblies.

But we need one additional improvement in our theory of motivation. Far more than most current views allow we must recognize the post-instinctive character of our impulses. It is our *contemporary* attitudes, our current loyalties and aversions, that rule our behavior, not, as Freud and others maintain, unchangeable instinctive forces. Fatalism hovers over any doctrine of instinct, certainly over the view that holds prejudice to be a channeling of primordial aggression. I have already given my reasons for challenging the assumption that aggression is, in Freud's sense, primordial. Now I challenge his parallel dogma that "the structure of the Id never changes." I do not believe that we can view the myriad forms of attachment and repulsion in the ever-growing human personality as merely so many outlets for the permanent instincts of sex, aggression, or anything else.

Motivation—it seems so obvious to me—is always a contemporary process directed toward the future, comprising attitudes, beliefs, and forms of adjustment that to the individual's mind bind him successfully to his world. There is a concrete character in motivation to which instinct doctrines cannot do justice. While men are busy leading their lives in a forward direction, psychologists are busy tracing them backward.

What clearly happens in the case of love is that a child develops systems of positive attachment. He loves *his* mother, not someone else's mother. His initial undifferentiated audience is quickly polarized by objects. He soon develops attachments to groups of which he is a member, to his family, to his church, his ethnic group, and later to his lodge, office, and to his own offspring. The love and loyalty are concrete. They are fashioned into sentiments and these sentiments are learned, and are, I am arguing, the ultimate motives of life, the personality. To say that a person's positive attachments are nothing but an adventitious channeling of the sex instinct is less than helpful.

Hatred, too, is concrete. When a Negro child makes friendly advances to a white child and suffers a rebuff, and the humiliation turns into hate, shall we say that the instincts of aggression have become channelized? Or shall we say that a very particular attitude of resentment is built up and becomes dynamic in its own right because the child must hereafter adjust to this new phase of his experience? The hatred did not exist until it was learned. Always the growing child learns specific sets of ideas concerning specific sets of people, and builds his sentiments accordingly. It is these sentiments, not instincts, that thereafter guide his behavior. And it is these post-instinctive units in personality that are basic to the understanding of human relations, for they alone specify the course that the individual will take.

How these post-instinctive units are formed is, of course, the riddle of learning—a subject we cannot go into here. We know that in part attitudes take shape under the pressure of conformity and imitation, and that traditional categorizing and symbolizing play an immensely important role. We know that parents are the chief influences but that educators likewise do their part for good and for ill. We know that displacement and rationalization loom large in the process. We know, too, that a curious projectivity marks all hostile attitudes. The person we dislike is always regarded as wholly to blame; it never occurs to us that the basis for our hate may be within ourselves. No person ever asks to be cured of prejudice because he feels that the disorder lies in the other fellow, not in himself. Hate is in this respect like jaundice. The state of the liver is forgotten; to the sufferer it is the world out there that appears maliciously yellow.

Some hostility, as I remarked earlier, can be logically justified in the sense that the hated individual or group has deliberately obstructed our path. But it seems to be one of the hardest tasks in the world to persuade anybody to sift his hostile attitudes, and to separate correctly the causes that lie *out there* from those that lie *in here,* to distinguish the elements that are justified from those that are jaundiced.

The view of motivation that I am here proposing says that the important thing is a person's systematized design for living. This design—not his hypothetical instincts—is the dynamic force in his life. Whenever an adjustment confronts him he will make it with his existing equipment—with his current prejudices, attitudes, sentiments. It is to the credit of most neo-Freudians that they see this point. They recognize that the ego is not as passive as Freud made out, and that the ego's present philosophy of life may hold the key to individual conduct. One person views the world as a jungle in which men are basically evil and dangerous, and acts accordingly; another sees it as a friendly place inhabited by potentially congenial fellow beings, and acts accordingly.

Implications for Social Learning

This post-instinctive view of motivation has two great merits. First, it brightens the outlook for improving human relations. We are not doomed by our "instinctual aggression." We don't have to worry about it. If we ever had it, it is now structured into concrete sentiments, prejudices, and neuroses. We have learned them. Presumably the next generation can be prevented from learning quite so many. The second merit is that we can now grapple fruitfully with the hardest problem of all: how the affiliative needs of an individual can be reconciled with his self-love and self-esteem. You recall that I summarized current researches by saying that they disclosed this double strand.

The issue, I think, may be formulated as follows: how far in his course of social learning has the individual's sense of selfhood become extended? Does his picture of his own security and personal integrity include only a few affiliative relations? Does he say, as did E. M. Forster's Englishman in India, "We must exclude someone from our gathering, or we shall be left with nothing?" How many we invite to our gathering is purely a matter of learning. We may fashion a tiny island of selfhood embracing a small affiliated circle, or else a larger island where our self-esteem is identical with the interests of a large affiliated circle. In order to improve human relations it is necessary that personal selves feel actually stronger when they reach further in their attachments, instead of, as at present, strong only when they have a little island of security; stronger when they invite *more* people to the gathering, instead of *fewer* people.

Each person lives by the worldview that he fashions, and our revised motivational theory must do justice to these transformations that occur in the sense of self. Whether one's values become enlarged or progressively ingrown, they comprise the style of life that here and now determines one's behavior. Why is it that in the world today the narrow, exclusionist philosophy of life predominates? Most people seem to feel secure only on a slender island of loyalty. They seem unable to enlarge their sense of self to include the larger gathering.

The answer to this question, I am convinced, has something to do with the principle of least effort. There is marked short-run economy in holding a negative view of other people. If I can but reject foreigners as a category, I won't have to bother with them—except to keep them out of my country. If I can then ticket all Negroes as comprising an inferior and objectionable race I conveniently dispose of a tenth of my fellow citizens. If I can put the Catholics into another category and reject them kit and caboodle, my life is still further simplified. I then pare down again and slice off the Jews, the Democrats, and labor unions. As for experts, professors, and reformers, they are easily exiled along with all the other "communists." Soon there isn't much left for me to worry about excepting my own group on Suburban Heights—and I can proceed at leisure to destroy them one by one through gossip. And I shall probably do so in proportion to the extent of the emotional deprivation there is in my own life.

That this easy exclusionist way of life is exceedingly common is shown not only by recent studies in the extent of prejudice, but by the strikingly high correlation that exists between various forms of prejudice. A person who is anti-Negro is usually anti-Semitic, anti-labor, anti-foreigner. Conversely, if a person's self-esteem and his esteem for others have blended, he is likely to be friendly with members of *all* groups. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the improvement of human relations is this ease in treating groups as categories for total rejection. It represents a simple, socially sanctioned way to sort one's emotions, to integrate one's behavior. The process is especially clearcut in wartime. To make a fair-minded statement about the enemy in time of conflict is regarded as treason, or at least as weakness; similarly to criticize one's own kind is taboo. We divide our sentiments sharply between institutional friend and institutional foe. To the out-group we ascribe all vices, all evil intentions, all atrocities. To the in-group belong all virtues. By such a simple device the in-group flourishes and our lives are economically arranged.

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The exclusionist philosophy, besides being economical, is very obdurate. We have made little progress in combating it in the personalities of children or of adults. I do not think we can report, except in a very few projects, much progress in changing people's philosophy of life. But I think we can report great progress in *understanding* this insular type of personality organization. I have in mind the recent studies of the Californian investigators who have analyzed the structure of what they call the "authoritarian personality."... Its authors are Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford.

* * * *

In Conclusion

One wonders what the chances are for widening the scope of affiliative sentiments within our preferred political structure, democracy. Note two contrasting views. E. M. Forster, in an essay of 1938, wrote: "Two cheers for democracy—one, because it admits variety and two, because it permits criticism. Two cheers are quite enough; there is no occasion to give three. Only Love, the Beloved Republic, deserves that." The opposite view is found in the concluding sentence of the book I have just referred to, *The Authoritarian Personality*. The very concluding words, which you gratefully reach on page 1000, read: "If fear and destructiveness are the major emotional sources of fascism, *eros* belongs mainly to democracy."

Overlooking the narrow implications of the term, *eros,* it would seem self-evident that the chances for human beings to broaden their affiliative relations must be better under democracy than anywhere else. Yet Forster, too, is right in saying that, while democracy allows diversity and criticism, it has not so far found methods for releasing the potential of love in human relations. History does not indicate that unaided it will ever do so. If I may say it, even organized religion today would seem to require technical assistance. This aid, I believe, can come from the combined efforts of education and social science, operating according to modern principles of inquiry and action.

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Annotated by Gordon W. Allport

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I. Suttie. *Origins of Love and Hate* (London: Kegan Paul, 1935). A book too little known. Though psychoanalytic in orientation, reverses the customary emphasis of Freudian psychology. Aggression and destructiveness regarded, not as primordial instincts, but as disorders imposed upon the more basic impulses of affiliation and love.

Sublimation and Aggression

Henry Harper Hart, M.D.

Perhaps the greatest problem facing man today is how to sublimate his aggression. His capacity to destroy threatens to outstrip his capacity to build and integrate. . . . Our crucial question then seems to be how much of his destructive aggressiveness can man transform into socially integrative institutions, and how can this transformation be effectively brought about?

Our notions of sublimation are none too clear. Freud[1] first used the term in his *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* in 1905. Three years later[2] he referred to the ability to exchange the original sexual aim, for another, no longer sexual but psychically related. It is noteworthy that the term sublimation came first to be applied rather more to the sexual drive than to aggression. . . . Desexualization is therefore regarded as an indispensable part of the process. A purely libinal satisfaction becomes in some way an ego-mastery satisfaction. As the subject becomes further explored the sexual elements which require sublimation are found to be infantile and "pregenital" in nature, unrealizable in civilized life and requiring abandonment, or else repression.

. . . Deri,[6] considering the process in more detail, finds that sublimation is determined by: (1) deflection of the instinct from the original aim, (2) deflection from the original object, and (3) a relatively higher cultural value of the substitute. All these observations emphasize the necessity of sublimation as an adaptive mastery in the ego, superior to the primitive instinct mechanisms which are less flexibly adjusted to reality. Thus flexibility appears at the very outset to be an inherent prerequisite for sublimation.

With this ability to deflect both aggressive and libidinal drives from

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[1] Freud, Sigmund: Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud. P. 584. Modern Library. New York.

[2] Freud, Sigmund: Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness. Collected Papers, II:82, 1908.

[6] Deri, Frances: On sublimation. Psychoan. Quart., VIII: 330, 1939.

Henry Harper Hart, "Sublimation and Aggression," Psychiatric Quarterly, *Vol. 22, No. 3 (1948), pp. 389–421. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

primary objects and aims to more socially acceptable ones, sublimation becomes dependent upon the phenomenon known as displacement. Flügel[7] says that sublimation comprehends all the more desirable cases of displacement, and Alice Balint[8] finds that displacement and sublimation enable some instincts to express themselves legitimately, contrasting with repression which blots out unfulfilled wishes completely.

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. . . Bergler[20] finds that the weakness of neurotic sublimation lies in the paucity of aggressive energy left over for defense against the super-ego. He declares that, in both normal and neurotic persons, successful sublimation is brought about by that portion of the ego which is healthy and which is dedicated to the productive use of aggression. A thorough investigation of this problem would answer the following questions: 1. What is the connection between the super-ego and the quantity of aggression available to the individual? 2. What is the exact relationship between the aggressive and libidinal components in both symptom and sublimation? 3. Is sublimation interfered with by the aggressive drives of the individual and in what way? 4. To what extent can aggressive drives be sublimated, and what determines the extent? 5. Is the aim of aggression more difficult of change than that of the libidinal drives?

* * * *

. . . the conclusions in regard to the relation of aggression to sublimation. . . . can be listed as follows:

1. The important process in sublimation is not desexualization, nor delibidinization, but "de-aggressivization" if one can use such a horrible word. This is because the aggression-laden pre-genital components are those ingredients in sexuality which need in any case to be disposed of in sublimation.
2. The displaceability of instinctual aims is related to the displaceability of erogenous zones in the period of pre-genital development when the first sublimations and renunciations are made, with the development of the super-ego.
3. The ability to form sublimations is proportional to the ability to endure frustration, and to the faculty of renunciation. When endurance of frustration and renunciation are done with love, sublimation results; when done with fear, reaction formation and repression follow.

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[7] Flügel, J. C.: The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family. Leonard and Virginia Woolf. P. 25. Hogarth Press. 1926.

[8] Balint, Alice: Identification. Year Book of Psychoanalysis, 1:317, 1945.

[20] Bergler, Edmund: On a five layer structure in sublimation. Psychoan. Quart., XIV:94, 1945.

4. The nature of the super-ego is decisive; when it is lenient and tolerant, the sublimation is free; when it is intolerant, reaction formation occurs.

5. Erotic and aggressive drives are inextricably connected, both in neurotic symptom and sublimation; but neither sexual indulgence nor abstinence is decisive by itself; but the capacity to love, which permits renunciation to occur is decisive.

6. The opportunity to satisfy crude aggression does not lead by itself to sublimation.

7. Sublimation derives no small share of its security from a state of narcissistic equilibrium between the super-ego and the ego.

8. It is not aggression *per se,* which interferes with sublimation but infantile omnipotence, inciting the aggression which needs to be renounced in sublimation.

9. Pleasure in the mastery of reality, and the capacity for identification are important sustaining factors in sublimation; but love and tenderness pave the way for these forces to develop.

10. Aggressiveness is most successfully sublimated when the ego has at its disposal a vast array of different forms, modes, and intensities of aggression, appropriate for each current situation.

11. The greater the quantity of aggression available for sublimation, the greater the need for crude levels of sublimation, and the greater the disturbance can be on the more refined levels of sublimation.

12. Woman has less need for sublimation than man because she has less aggression and less need for it. Those women whose sublimations have been most striking are the most aggressive.

13. Masochism, however much associated with desexualization and renunciation, is not to be confused with sublimation, as it turns aggression on the self and operates through self-punishment because of guilt, hence is inherently weak in pro-social and mastery pleasures.

14. We may define sublimation as symbolic and largely unconscious displacement of libidinal and aggressive energy, whereby largely pre-genital and omnipotence components are transmuted into socially-valuable and narcissistically-satisfying channels—a process brought about by renunciation through love and identification with parental love objects and, hence, with reduction in guilt and greater mastery of reality.

It is appropriate, I think, before concluding this paper, that certain therapeutic implications should be drawn. If the sublimation of his aggression is man's prime problem, we should be doing something about it. The need for increasing technical skill in the manipulation of our engines of destruction might seem to impose some restriction, if it were not for the fact that increased technical skill can be associated with complete indifference to its destructive application.

Two approaches to the problem present themselves: the group or educational, and the individual or therapeutic. Because the most important steps in sublimation are laid down in childhood, the group educational field presents the greatest potentiality for molding the super-ego while it is yet plastic and flexible. The correct balance between instinctual satisfaction and the tolerance of instinctual frustration can be striven for. This balance could be accomplished only under the direction of mature, analyzed and creative personalities with warmth, tolerance, and originality. Such rare and gifted persons are not attracted to our overcrowded, overorganized and underpaid educational systems. Better-trained foster parents and better foster homes for children deprived of parental love are obviously needed, since no overcrowded school system can give individual love. Indulgence in competitive aggressive sports from childhood on, for all those whose creative gifts are inadequate, or whose sadistic drives require more physical muscular discharge, is another approach. We know that there is an inverse ratio of crime to the availability of recreational facilities.

Unfortunately the most anti-social, criminally-destructive persons get too little personal glory out of sport which imposes restraint on sadistic impulses and gives too little encouragement to the surrender of their omnipotence. Hitler and Attila could hardly have been staved off by wood-carving or wall-papering. Nevertheless, in 20 centuries some progress seems to have been made, for our modern populace which enjoys bull fights and prize fights, or slapstick wrestling would probably not stomach a Roman gladiatorial display, or the glory massacres of men and beasts, that the Roman populace demanded in the amphitheatre. The example of the Zuni culture, in which aggressiveness was taboo and was replaced by social feeling, indicates that the problem, even on a group level, is by no means insoluble when instinctual gratification and frustration are properly balanced. In western culture we are far from attaining this balance.

Individually, the problem of sublimation of aggression raises important questions such as the following, the elaboration of which would merit a paper in itself:

1. Since the drive of sublimation is related to the quantity of available aggression, what means of measurement of constitutional potentialities can be worked out on a physiological basis?
2. What range and depth of sublimatory achievement did the individual patient reach in childhood and adolescence, and what stimulated or inhibited this achievement?
3. What has since been the development and stability of the individual's sublimations?
4. At what point do guilt and omnipotence become insuperable barriers to a strong positive transference, and to a change in the ego?

5. To what extent are we justified in exploring the instinctual basis of successful or partially successful sublimations, or those which arise in analysis.
6. Is there a relationship between inflexibility of the super-ego, immobility of guilt, rigidity of libido, and paucity of creative resources?
7. In the absence of strong powerful positive transference, to what extent can stable sublimations be built upon narcissistic foundations, in which some renunciation of omnipotence cravings has been developed through treatment?

All these questions and many more need to be answered before we can master the problem of how to enable each person to sublimate his aggression successfully. Many people have the most extraordinary difficulty in doing this while others are often able. . . to find a solution for themselves. Since analysts are often identified with super-ego figures out of the past, their creative influence in the transference can be variable and not at all determined by the analysts' personal creative and perceptive potentialities.

Conflict and Integration

DONALD K. ADAMS

One of the variables of personality that is much referred to in psychological theory, but rarely clearly described in general terms, is integration. Nearly every current conception of personality makes use of the notion and usually, I suppose, with a meaning something like "freedom from conflict." But how this state of affairs comes about and how the concept of integration is to be integrated with the other concepts required by psychological theory are generally left obscure. It seems unlikely that substantial clarification can be accomplished without at once both drawing upon the *data* of developmental psychology, including child psychology, and reaching some accommodation with the *theory* of development.

I propose here briefly to indicate one way in which a concept that is so ubiquitous in personality theory as to seem indispensable may be exploited for the understanding of integration. This concept has borne many names. It has been variously called disposition, mental system, psychical system, means-end readiness, attitude, belief, derivation, metanerg. Krech (5) used to call it "cognitive structure" but now regards the notion as illegitimate. I suspect his present concept of dynamic system will soon develop into the same thing. I shall call it "sentiment" for which there is ample and illustrious precedent.

Systematically, a sentiment may be defined as "a part of a personality identified by its reference to an object." ("Personality" may readily be defined by exhibition or pointing, cf 1.) Without any violence whatever to the systematic definition, a sentiment may also be conceived as the totality of conditions within an organism that make a given object what it is for a given animal. This would, of course, include vastly more than the cortical engram or memory trace of the object. It would include all sorts of anatomical, physiological, and chemical conditions. It would often include height, weight, or strength. The *k* in Crozier's equation for the orientation of young rats on an inclined plane was found to be a species characteristic

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and thought to consist in part of such things as locus of the animal's center of gravity, angle of pelvic girdle, etc. In contemporary American society one set of the conditions determining a person's cognition of many objects is undoubtedly the color of his skin and the adaptations that he has made to it.

What this totality of bodily conditions for the cognition of a given object by a given person may be, physiology has not yet told us. It may be a very long time until it does. In the meantime, we have to go ahead and make psychology. There is a tendency among psychologists, whenever a new neurological idea comes along, to seize upon it with a glad "Eureka" and to announce to a palpitating psychological world: "Here, at last, is the engram." This was the story of the reflex arc, the final common path, the all-or-nothing law, and, more recently, of reverberating circuits and feedback mechanisms. It is well that every such notion should be exploited to the limit. Unfortunately we are so avid, owing perhaps to our Cartesian inheritance, for a clear bodily correlate for our perceptions of objects that we are apt to be uncritical in our acceptance of these notions, and it may take a lifetime of work by gifted and energetic researchers to disenchant us. Moreover, it is dangerously easy to go from the belief that "this is it" to the conviction that any phenomenon incompatible with the currently fashionable neurological model is either an artifact or "outside the scope of science." Somehow, sometime there will doubtless be a satisfactory account of the physiology of sentiments, but the physiology of that day may resemble current psychology as much as it does current physiology. Physics is a long way from complete, and it may well be compelled to resort to concepts that are now regarded as distinctively biological or even psychological. In any event, if we choose our concepts and assumptions carefully, make and test our constructs and hypotheses responsibly, we can be assured that they will be congruent with a more developed physics. With enough confidence in the uniformity of nature and in a developing scientific method, we need not be disturbed by our inability to give an account of sentiments in terms of present-day physics.

With the supposed epistemological difficulties of knowing what a given object is for another organism (which for convenience I shall call a psychological object), I have recently dealt elsewhere (2). Let it suffice here to say that they are of precisely the same order as those of knowing a physical object. The *practical* difficulties are sometimes greater, sometimes less; but there are errors and limits in our knowing of physical objects, and we use the same fallible instrument, the organism of the observer, for all our knowledge of the world, even when the latter is reduced to pointer readings. The only test is intersubjectivity in any case, and this can be applied as well to our perceptions of another organism's values as to our perceptions of things.

Each object that a person[1] has commerce with has some value for him; the value may be positive or negative, consummatory or instrumental, transient or enduring, specifically instrumental or generally instrumental, large or small, but not zero. Now this valued character of the object is an integral component of the sentiment for that object. Actually, the identity of the value or affective component of one object with that of another may be so great as to evoke a false recognition of the present object as in the phenomenon of *déjà vu*. The object of sentiment may be, literally, anything: person or thing, concrete or abstract, "real" or "imaginary," an act or a state of affairs. It may be an activity, though McDougall (8, p. 239) used the special term "tastes" to distinguish those sentiments which have activities for their objects. For our present purpose this distinction is not required.

> A crucial question for personality organization then is: what relations among sentiments correspond to the cognized relations among objects? What reasonable assumptions can be made, tentatively at least, about this?
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> It would seem natural to suppose that my sentiment for (attitude toward, cognitive structure for) this building is in some sense a part of my sentiment for the class buildings. To put it more generally, if object A is a member of object B, sentiment A′ is a member of (or part of, or region of) sentiments B′. Moreover, if object A is a *property* (or a *sign*) of object B, it seems evident that sentiment A′ must in some sense be a member of sentiment B′. Thus, my sentiment for the height of this room is a part of my sentiment for this room. In general, it would seem that all the constitutive relations obtaining among a personality's objects can be ordered to relations of membership among the sentiments corresponding to those objects.
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> Of peculiar importance among these is the relation of instrumentality: if A is instrumental to B, positively or negatively (i.e., as means or as barrier), sentiment A′ is a member of sentiment B′. If we use the sign → to signify "is a means to" and the sign ⊂ to mean "is a member of," the notion could be expressed by the equivalence:
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> $$A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow E \ldots\ldots\ldots \equiv A' \subset B' \subset C' \subset D' \subset E' \ldots\ldots\ldots$$
>
> Thus, a given hierarchy of means-end relations among the objects in a person's psychological environment is represented in the personality by a sentiment with precisely the same number of hierarchically organized member sentiments on the same number of membership levels. If all the objects of a given person's environment are instrumentally related to one, then all his sentiments are members of the sentiment for the object, and the personality is said to be integrated. (1, pp. 53 f.)

But to understand the *process* of integration, we have to look at the process of personality development. An analogy with bodily development will compress the exposition. Organic growth is a process of differentiation from a single cell, itself highly structured and integrated. In the process of differentiation this integration is maintained by the dominance of regions of higher metabolism over regions of lower metabolism, these regions themselves often determined by environmental circumstance in the earliest stages.

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[1] Or other animal. Henceforth I shall speak, for simplicity of exposition, only of persons although many of the considerations advanced apply to other animals as well.

The infant personality is also slightly differentiated and highly integrated. There are few objects in his world, and hence few sentiments in his personality. His few objects are, moreover, highly consummatory. He has few or no instrumental objects. This, I think, is what the Freudians are getting at when they tell us that the neonate is all id. The infant's integration is indicated by his complete involvement in whatever he is doing. Although he may be frustrated, he seems incapable of conflict in the sense of simultaneously wanting incompatible things. This may be due largely to the relative absence of a future in the young infant to which William Stern (10) has called attention: to the absence of what L. K. Frank (4) and Kurt Lewin (6, pp. 53, 75) have called time perspective.

The infant personality also undergoes differentiation corresponding exactly to his discriminations among the objects of his world. At first all objects small enough to be grasped appear indiscriminately to be food and he carries them to his mouth, much to the distress of young mothers. But with experience of their properties he makes behaviorally obvious discriminations, and his "graspable objects" sentiment undergoes corresponding differentiations. At the moment when a child distinguishes pines from oaks, his "tree" sentiment undergoes mitosis into a "pine" sentiment and an "oak" sentiment although both remain members of his "tree" sentiment.

The intelligence tests aim to measure the degree of this differentiation by sampling it in areas of the personality that have had approximately equal environmental opportunity, within a given culture, for differentiation to occur, such as money, language, etc.

Evidence from twin studies, together with the Iowa and Stanford investigations of recent years, suggests that this aim is imperfectly realized and that about 25 per cent of the variance in test scores or I.Q. is due to differences in environmental opportunity of various sorts, affective as well as cognitive. The other 75 per cent is usually attributed to a constitutional variable which we may, for the present purpose, call flexibility and define as "facility of differentiation" or, more generally, of restructuring.

It is not difficult to see how deprivation of most of the common objects of a culture or of its language would preclude or reduce differentiation in the regions sampled by the tests, even for the most constitutionally flexible personality, the potential genius. But one of the Iowa studies, I believe by Skeels (9), suggests that even an environment objectively rich in objects may fail to evoke maximum differentiation if the child's commerce with them is limited by the impersonality of the regime, while one objectively poorer in objects but permeated by an atmosphere of love, which evoked maximum commerce with such objects as it had, produced increased intelligence quotients. This is not hard to understand: we are told both by child psychologists and by psychoanalysts that love produces security in the young child. One expression of security is uninhibited commerce with, and maximum exploitation of, whatever objective environment the child may have. This is bound to produce maximum discriminations and hence differentiation of sentiments for a given degree of constitutional flexibility.

Now it might be supposed—in fact, by some anthropologists it appears almost to have *been* supposed—that if this differentiation of sentiments, evoked by his commerce with objects in the satisfaction of his biological needs, were allowed to proceed uncluttered by the intervention of the culture, the original high integration of the child would never be lost and that no problem of integration would arise. Certainly it cannot be denied that the social induction of values antithetical to his biologically given values by society (doubtless earliest and most intensively, but by no means exclusively, through the mother) is a potent and probably the most important source of intrapersonal conflict, especially in an emulative, occidental, middle-class culture. In such a culture, indeed, the valuative or affective component of a sentiment for an object is often induced by parental attitudes long before its cognitive component is at all differentiated and so powerfully that later commerce with the object, and hence differentiation of its sentiment, is prevented, impaired, or perverted.

But it would be rash to assert that this is the only way in which integration is broken down. Perhaps Aesop was right in imputing a super-ego to the fox whose frustration of the grapes was transformed into failure by ascription to the self and hence required the famous rationalization by devaluation. Even if there were no social inductions or values opposed to the biological ones, there might, it seems, still be island-sentiment-clusters (functionally autonomous value systems) which, in a given environment, could come into conflict with the rest of the personality. In fact, any substantial extension of the environment, such as that contingent on leaving home to go to school or to get a job, brings with it a host of new objects, the valuative components of whose sentiments have to reach some accommodation or organization with those of the pre-existing sentiments. If it be argued that this results in conflict only because of the earlier and unrealistic social induction of values, we have to admit that we cannot experimentally disprove the assertion until some way is found to bring up a child without socially inducing *any* values; which is equivalent to saying without any communication at all.

In one way or another, at all events, every individual experiences intrapersonal conflict. He may want commerce with one characteristic of an object and be repelled by another while the two are objectively inseparable. To use Lewin's excellent language, the same object may be both positively and negatively valent, like the puppy which the child is afraid of but still wants to pat. This type of conflict was found by Masserman (7) to be profoundly disturbing to his cats; and it may, in human life, be both most persistent and most difficult to deal with practically.

A second type, and one especially frequent in childhood, occurs when the person is psychologically between two negative valences and his field is so constricted that he can escape, in the level of reality, only through commerce with one or the other; as when stern father tells dilatory son that he must stack the wood in the woodshed by nightfall or undergo certain bodily indignities in the same place; or when conscientious mother tells anorectic daughter that she must eat her spinach or else. Incidentally, the devaluation of implied parental values that occurs when, in this and related situations, including that of command with prospect of reward, a parent misjudges the quantitative relations of the valences involved is, I believe, Lewin's explanation for the period of childhood negativism. The wide variation in its severity would be accounted for by variations in parental use of the procedure and its time of onset by the development of language and time perspective required for its employment.

But the kind of conflict that is most quickly illuminating for the problem of integration is probably that in which a person wants commerce with two incompatible objects, is between two positive valences. A young man in our (at least theoretically) monogamous society wants to marry Fifi and also to marry Mimi. A boy wants to take part in an important ball game but also to go to the circus which takes place at the same time. In the interest of brevity—and perhaps also of discretion—I shall develop only the latter illustration.

Sometimes in such cases a decision is reached early and easily: the boy sees the parade or hears the calliope and decides for the circus; or his buddy tells him that the team is depending on him and he decides for the ball game. But mere decision is not the whole story. The unsatisfied appetite, the undischarged tension of the rejected alternative is still there unless a further process, which may be called "conflict resolution," takes place.

Let us suppose that for the boy in question at his stage of development both ball game and circus are consummatory values. Actually, for conflict to occur, I think they must be at least partly so for a choice between paths or routes or values instrumental to the same goal is easy and almost automatic by way of economy, least effort, parsimony, or whatever you call it. If now our boy restructures the situation (and hence the sentiments involved) and experiences an insight such that the conflicting consummatory values are seen as alternative instruments or means to a single one, the conflict is resolved. For this implies, according to our assumption about the organization of sentiments, that the conflicting sentiments have become members of a single superordinate one. Thus our boy may perceive for the first time that ball game and circus are both means to recreation in general and that this long-term goal will be better served by going to the circus which comes but once a year or by playing ball, in which case the money saved can be applied upon a bicycle. In either case, the alternatives will have been set in a larger context and the conflicting sentiments integrated into one.

It will be evident by now that integration is the opposite of functional autonomy, Allport's (3) very appropriate name for the well-known phenomenon of the usurpation of the end by the means. In functional autonomy, as the term itself implies, we have a process of *dis*integration, the release of a sentiment for an originally instrumental object from the dominance of the superordinate sentiment of which it was formerly a member. In integration we have the reduction of an originally consummatory object to instrumental status and, by our hypothesis, the incorporation of its sentiment into a superordinate one. Every time a conflict is resolved in the way described, a step in the integration of the personality is accomplished; and this may proceed to the complex but orderly and hierarchical subordination of all values, all objects, to one. This is often regarded as an unconditionally healthy state of affairs but I am not sure that this is always the case. It can be said, however, that that person is fortunate in whom these revaluations or restructurings or insights occur as the conflicts arise rather than letting the latter accumulate until they precipitate a more or less violent, wholesale, and uncritical revaluation of valued objects. Some of these characterological crises, of course, cannot be avoided entirely when the life space is suddenly enlarged, as in the cases of infant negativism and the adolescent rebellion already mentioned. And sometimes a constricting life-space can be extended only through a thoroughgoing shake-up, with or without outside help.

My examples have, of course, presented a grossly oversimplified picture, for since an object may be a means to many ends its sentiment may be a member, not of one only, but of many more inclusive sentiments. A sentiment that has become functionally autonomous may be reincorporated in another than its original superordinate sentiment, or it may attain autonomy in one of its contexts and not in another. It is interesting to note that the most consummatory objects, those with the greatest integrating potential, usually involve the longest time perspective. This makes understandable the disintegration of personalities and their behavior when the time perspective is sharply curtailed, as sometimes happens in war. The other types of conflict mentioned may be dealt with in the same way, and though the process becomes a little more complex, it involves no additional hypotheses.

The role of the self-image or self-regarding sentiment, as McDougall called it, in personality organization is too long a story to go into here; it may be noted, however, that in so far as it is literally self-regarding, its organizing potential is limited. And the whole fascinating question of the value of integration itself—whether it is possible to pay too high a price for it—would have to be treated in quite another context than the present one.

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Compliant Behavior and Individual Personality

REINHARD BENDIX

During the last two decades there have been increasing efforts to integrate the various fields of study in the social sciences and related disciplines. A case in point is the study of society and the study of the individual. Many promising areas of research have been opened up, because sociology and psychiatry[2] have been related one to the other. On the other hand, there are many pitfalls in applying the concepts and theories of one discipline to another field. Hence, work designed to integrate the social sciences not only calls for an understanding of the indivisibility of the subject matter but also for an acute awareness of the differences which exist between the disciplines. How, then, does the study of society and culture relate to the problems with which psychiatry deals? And how does the study of psychiatry relate to the problems with which sociology deals?

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V. Culture and Personality Reconsidered

It may be useful to recapitulate the preceding discussion. Psychiatric theory has emphasized the importance of childhood for the formation of the adult personality. It has emphasized also the tendency of familial

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[2] The following essay makes only reference to the body of theories which is sometimes designated as "depth psychology" and which has grown out of the pioneering work of Sigmund Freud. The terms "psychiatry" or "psychiatric theory" will be used in this general sense. The term "therapy" will be used for the empirical base on which psychiatry rests. The term "psychodynamic" is commonly used to single out those emotional processes, often unconscious, which can be traced to childhood experience and which in their entirety constitute the character structure or personality of an individual.

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patterns to perpetuate themselves from generation to generation. It is probable (*a*) that catastrophic events as such will not have fundamental psychological effects and (*b*) that historical changes which transform the prevailing patterns of family life are likely to destroy them rather than to establish new patterns.[31] People tend to resist major changes of their character structure and of their familial way of life. Many social and cultural changes are possible without major psychological transformations.

But, although it will not do to attribute a character structure to a cultural pattern, it is still possible to investigate the relation between these patterns and the psychological responses of large numbers of people. The traditions of a country, its institutions and ideologies, the experiences of its people with war and peace, with depression and prosperity, *have* significant psychological repercussions. How shall we interpret these if we do not resort to analogies from the psychodynamics of the individual?

The specific example chosen . . . may serve as an illustration. It is probably true that Germans are more authoritarian than Americans are. But this statement refers to the whole complex of traditions and institutions in the two countries. There is no evidence to date that the *proportion* of people with compulsive traits is significantly larger among Germans than among Americans. People may be compulsive in their adherence to various forms of conduct, whether the prevailing culture pattern is authoritarian or otherwise.[32] But in each society people confront very distinct problems with which they have to cope, e.g., it is certain that questions of authority present different problems in Germany and the United States. It is merely a sophisticated ethnocentrism, which ignores this situational difference and which applies to the people of one society standards of mental health pertaining to the people of another society. Hence we must guard carefully against the fallacy of attributing to character structure what may be a part of the social environment. And we must resist the temptation of attributing to the people of another culture a psychological uniformity which we are unable to discover in our own.[33]

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[31] As applied to the German case this would mean that the destructive effect of the Nazi experience on German family life is of much greater interest and relevance (for theoretical reasons) than is the supposed contribution of German family life to the rise of fascism.

[32] The literature which deals with these matters is noticeably ambiguous when it treats the conventionality of American life, which is so strongly anti-authoritarian, since conventionality is quite compatible with compulsive personality traits. By the same token, writers have often ignored the strong individualism of German life, which is combined with being "authoritarian." This confusion is rather marked in Fromm, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–56, but absent from Adolf Lowe, *The Price of Liberty* (London: Hogarth Press, 1937).

[33] Because of this we should attempt to discover in each society the diversity of responses which is hidden beneath the uniformity of conventional behavior that is "apparent" to the outside observer. A case in point are two recent books on Germany: Bertram Schaffner's *Father Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) and David Rodnick's *Postwar Germans*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). One author finds that the father is dominant, the

In terms of the preceding discussion I believe it to be more in keeping with the observed incongruity between institutions and psychological habitus to assume that all cultures of Western civilization have the same range of personality types. The differences between these cultures must then be accounted for at a level of abstraction with which the psychiatrist is not equipped to deal. In his study of a Mexican community Oscar Lewis has suggested recently that we might call this psychological dimension the "public personality" which is characteristic of a society.[34] When we study different societies or the same society over time, we notice differences in conventional conduct and in the expectations with which people in a society regard one another. For example, it is probable that in the United States among middle-class circles intensive, lifelong friendships are relatively rare compared with some European countries. Now this fact, *if* it is a fact, *could* be related to many aspects of American middle-class culture. Great mobility, a large number of relatively casual personal contacts, the degree to which the expression of personal feelings is restrained, the relative absence of social distance between people in different walks of life—these and many other aspects of the culture discourage intensive friendships between people of the same sex.[35] This fact and the conventional optimism and friendliness of interpersonal relations which is its related opposite are aspects of the "public personality" in the United States which differ from the character structure of the individual. They refer to a "public personality" in the sense that conventional behavior patterns (the type of conduct which we engage in because others expect it of us) make demands upon the emotions of the individual. I believe that two conclusions follow from this analysis.

The first is that we must avoid the idea, which Fromm has suggested, that men "desire to act as they have to act." It does not follow, for example, that Americans could not form intensive friendships under other circumstances; and the relative absence of such relations probably exacts its emotional toll. Nor is it convincing to argue, as Fromm seems to do, that

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child insecure and starved for affection; the other finds that the mother is dominant, the child secure and much loved. It is notable that both authors find it easy to relate their conflicting data to the "authoritarian pattern." Further research along these lines might be improved methodologically, but I doubt whether it would reveal a more consistent pattern of family life than these two studies taken together.

[34] Oscar Lewis, *Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951), pp. 422–26.

[35] The external factors which might account for the absence of friendship, such as distance and the infrequency of seeing the same friend often enough in a country of great geographic mobility, do not really explain much. My father, who was a lawyer in Germany, maintained a friendship with a fellow-student over a period of over sixty years, with an occasional exchange of letters, although this friend was a medieval historian, although they did not meet more than six times during this whole period, although they lived at a considerable distance most of their lives, and despite the interruption caused by an official (Nazi) prohibition of their correspondence.

Americans have "adjusted" to this situation and now do not want the kind of friendship which the circumstances of American life seem to have discouraged. Nor does it follow, finally, that the absence of friendship and the prevalence of friendliness are total liabilities, since this pattern makes for considerable ease in interpersonal relations, though it may give rise to a feeling of emptiness among a minority of especially sensitive people.[36] All this need not mean that men never desire to act as they have to act. It implies, rather, that men accommodate themselves to their circumstances and to social change as best they can. The conflicts which frequently arise between their desires and their conduct are reflected in the psychological tensions of everyday living. Different individuals will show greater or less tolerance for them, depending on their character structure as this is related to childhood experience. Hence, particular social changes will not lead to a determinable psychological response among masses of people. Rather, such changes will impose particular emotional burdens which some people can tolerate more easily than others, and those who can will have a greater opportunity for action.[37]

This interpretation leads to a second conclusion. We can infer the emotional problems with which masses of people were faced as a result of specific historical experiences; we cannot infer the emotional meaning of their response. An example from the preceding discussion may make this point clearer. The superficial friendliness of interpersonal relations was discussed as a characteristic of American middle-class culture. This conventional behavior pattern which makes superficial contacts between people easy and pleasant, while it makes deeply personal relationships appear difficult and full of risk, does not reveal what meaning it has for the individual. There will be those who take it seriously and make it a way of life, for example, the "typical" salesman or public relations man. There will be others who respond to this friendliness with cynicism. Others yet will enjoy being friendly but will not take it seriously. People who despair of its superficiality will seek intensive friendship, while others really enjoy the ease in casual personal contacts. Indeed, it would be rewarding to analyze the variety of responses which this behavior pattern elicits. But, for our purposes, it is sufficient to remark that large numbers of people have certain problems and certain conventional behavior patterns in common; they *do not* make a common response to these problems or conventions.

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[36] Much impressionistic evidence seems to point to a reversal of this pattern in the "public personality" that characterizes German life, namely, intense friendships but an absence of friendliness and a considerable distance in the casual contacts of everyday life. See, e.g., David Rodnick, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–8. See also the striking discussion of Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), pp. 3–33, where the author contrasts these conventional patterns (in the United States and Germany) in terms of the different degrees to which the individual's privacy is accessible to another person.

[37] As an example of this type of analysis, though it is not consistently carried through, I cite Norbert Elias, *Ueber den Prozess der Zivilisation* (Basel: Haus zum Falken, 1942) in which the author shows strikingly the emotional burdens which frequent exposure to physical aggression imposed on the nobility in early medieval France. The implication of this analysis is that only those were successful in this struggle who were equal to it emotionally. Elias shows that the concentration of power in the hands of the king forced the nobility, if it wanted favors from the court, to adopt the manners of polite society. But it does not follow, as Elias seems to imply, that the people who developed these polite manners at court were somehow the same people who had, not long before, excelled in physical aggression. Rather, the new circumstances of the court favored those who excelled at the subtleties of courtly behavior, while those who excelled in aggression were kept away from the court, or did not attend, and were unsuccessful in the supercilious maneuvers of a court society when they did attend. In this sense it is possible to speak of psychological aptitudes which given historical conditions probably favored without implying that those who were ill-adapted emotionally disappeared because they now desired to act as they had to act. It is more probable that they tried to act as they had to act, without desiring it and without being too good at it either.

When we analyze the "social character" of a society, we are in fact characterizing the emotional problems with which the people are typically faced and which arise out of the institutions and historical traditions of that society. These institutions and traditions always elicit certain conventions, but they also elicit a wide range of responses to the conventions themselves, roughly corresponding to the range of personality types. We should therefore be properly sensitized to the emotional burdens *and* opportunities, to the psychological liabilities *and* assets, which every culture pattern entails. And we should learn to recognize that the traditions and institutions of every society present each of its members with peculiar emotional problems which he must resolve for himself in keeping with his psychological disposition. Hence, when we contrast one culture with another we refer to the typical psychological burdens which the demand for conformity imposes on the people. And if we attribute to these peoole a "social character" or a "national character" or a "basic personality type," we simply confuse the response with the stimulus and attribute to the people a uniformity of response which is contrary to all observed facts.

Pavlov, Freud and Soviet Psychiatry

LAWRENCE S. KUBIE

Foreword

It is not easy to make an accurate appraisal of the attitude of Soviet psychiatrists to current trends in psychiatry. The behavioral scientist in America and England is constantly seeking an harmonious integration of organic and psychological approaches to the causes of psychopathological processes, and to their resolution (21). The more-or-less official attitude of Soviet psychiatrists to these same problems seems to contrast sharply with this. The attitude to psychoanalysis is one indicator of their position, but not its sole manifestation. In seeking to explore these attitudes we have had to depend chiefly on accounts by the few informed psychiatrists who have travelled in Russia and talked to Russian psychiatrists there, plus our own opportunities to talk to Russian psychiatrists in Western Europe towards the end of the war, and more recently in this country, many of these interchanges requiring the intermediation of a translator. The author of this paper is depending on notes made during the course of several such encounters, and upon a recent article written by Fedotov (2), the reply by Reider (31), and the book on psychology in the Soviet Union (32) which has recently been published. The latter confirms an impression that the Russians still think of the physiological and psychological approaches as irreconcilable, instead of as bands on a continuous spectrum.

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Areas of Agreement between Pavlov and Freud

(1) As is true of all creative minds Pavlov's own point of view evolved and changed with the years to such an extent that were he alive today he would not be in accord with the present attitude of Soviet psychiatrists towards psychoanalytic theory and technique. It is true that at the start Pavlov had exacted fines from any student in his laboratory who used such words as "conscious" or "voluntary." Only a few years later, however, he found not

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*Lawrence S. Kubie, "Pavlov, Freud and Soviet Psychiatry," *Behavioral Science, *Vol. 4, No. 1 (1959), pp. 20–34. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

only that he had to use these terms himself, but that he had also to make a differentiation between conscious and unconscious psychological processes. He discussed how the one can influence the other; and he wrote of those "favorable conditions under which the unconscious synthesis may enter the conscious field." Anyone who deals with the problems of behavior in such terms as these is thinking psychoanalytically, by whatever name he chooses to call it. To this evolution of Pavlov's thinking there is an illuminating parallel in the development of Watsonian Behaviorism. In his early days Watson would not use the words "Conscious" and "Unconscious." In a later period he found himself forced to use "Verbalized" and "Unverbalized" as equivalent terms (10, 12, 28, 29, 30).

(2) Furthermore, Pavlov explored the occurrence of mutual interference among concurrent mechanisms. He wrote of the mode and role of conflict among various conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, and of the corresponding conflicts among derivative psychological states. Here again he was thinking and writing in terms which parallel psychoanalytic data.

(3) Pavlov and Freud approached all problems of behavior and of psychology from a biogenetic basis. This is an important bridge between the two. Yet Soviet psychiatrists seem to be unaware of it; misled perhaps by the fact that the investigator of conditioned reflexes and the psychoanalyst work at different levels of the continuum called "Behavior." At these different levels the method of study and the criteria of validity and of prediction must differ (15, 17); but the study of no level of integration can replace or make unnecessary the study of other levels. In all integrative hierarchies, science must investigate every level, confident that in the course of time they will converge to illuminate one another (16). Therefore, there is nothing inconsistent in the study of such neurophysiological mechanisms as the conditioned reflex, and the study of those psychological phenomena to which the conditioned reflex makes a vital contribution.

(4) Both Freud and Pavlov made use of techniques of sampling under conditions the constancy of which is maintained carefully, so as to control all variables except those whose changes are to be studied. In Pavlov's work the sampling device is the conditioned reflex under the constant conditions of the laboratory. In psychoanalysis the sampling device is the technique of free association under the constant conditions of the analytic procedure. How constancy of extrinsic variables is achieved in psychoanalysis has been fully described in certain technical studies (15, 17, 18).

(5) Finally, it has been shown that the psychoanalytic technique of free association is actually the mirror image of the conditioned reflex itself (9).

Each of these five points involves complex technical issues which are developed in detail in the appended references. They indicate that although there are differences, there are no irreconcilable conflicts between these two systems for the exploration of behavior. Concurrently they are making fruitful contributions to our understanding of human psychology and its aberrations. Therefore it is regrettable that Soviet psychiatrists seem still to be unaware of the studies which have built a bridge between them. It is further regrettable that their misinformation about the misconceptions of analysis are so elementary, as Reider has shown (31, *v.i.* Epilogue).

A consideration of the philosophy and methodology of scientific development gives further support to my argument that these two disciplines are mutually supplementary and not opposed. Thus it is an obvious fallacy to maintain that to study the properties of hydrogen and oxygen is irreconcilable with a study of the properties of water; merely because we cannot as yet predict all of the properties of water from the properties of its components. What one can say is that in the meantime it is essential for the investigator at each level to understand the work of others, to search out their implications for his own, and above all never to misrepresent the work of others for the empty satisfaction of attacking his own misconceptions. Yet this is what many Soviet psychiatrists are doing today in their criticisms of what they mistakenly believe psychoanalysis to be.

If he wanted to engage in this kind of useless interdisciplinary warfare, the psychoanalyst could point out many limitations to the relevance of the conditioned reflex to human psychology. Thus the conditioned reflex is operative only when conditioned and unconditioned stimuli are separated by relatively brief intervals of time, intervals measurable in seconds and minutes. Human mental processes on the other hand can bind gaps in time and space that span both oceans and years. Similarly the conditioned reflex plays only a minor role in the development and function of symbolic processes, which are man's most unique trait. To the analyst, however, it is of less value to emphasize the limitations of the conditioned reflex than its contributions. He wishes that a similar attitude towards psychoanalysis would prevail in Russia.

Reasons for Bias

There may be reasons for this bias, the origins of which are not scientific. In fact, underlying this needless controversy is an array of sociological, ideological and economic issues, which should play no role in arguments about scientific problems. Indeed, their intrusion always weights the scales with irrelevant considerations. Not long ago extraneous ideological considerations threatened to distort the work of Soviet geneticists. In psychiatry similar extraneous considerations based on a series of erroneous assumptions are injected into this discussion.

(a) One such assumption is that psychoanalysis attempts to make people accept without protest or concern the existing inequities of any given social, cultural, or economic system. The invalidity of this charge has been demonstrated in detail on other occasions (13, 14). Actually it is wholly unfounded. The goal of analysis is to emancipate a man from his enslavement to those unconscious mechanisms over which he has no voluntary control, precisely because they are unconscious. This frees him from the dominion of automatic repetitive mechanisms, whether compulsive or phobic. The man who is psychologically free in this specific sense is not afraid to fight and sacrifice for human betterment. Nor is he on the other hand an automation under the dominion of his own unconscious. Therefore he is not blindly conformist, blindly enslaved, nor blindly rebellious. He is not readily subjugated by any form of party-line thinking, whether economic, political, religious or scientific (19, 20). A psychologically healthy man accepts dictation from no one. Can it be an accident therefore that the two human institutions whose opposition to psychoanalysis has been most bitter have been the most authoritarian of all churches* and the most authoritarian of all politico-economic systems? And is it not likely that the misinformation and ignorance which is manifested in such statements as those of Fedotov (2) have their origins in bias?

(b) The psychoanalyst can study and treat only a few people at a time. Therefore his use of his technique constitutes at best a pilot demonstration of methods which can lead gradually to prevention, but which can never hope to be used as a mass cure-all. Those who want rapid mass cures will be impatient of the slow and humble methods by which analysis has acquired microscopic data on the neurotic process. In the early years of psychoanalytic history, because it could gain no official acceptance in teaching hospitals or medical schools (and for other reasons as well which are not relevant here), most psychoanalytic patients were relatively wealthy, or at least comfortably off. Consequently it is easy to jump to the conclusion that the analyst protects the special interests of the wealthy and is blind to human suffering and poverty. This fallacy has also been fully exposed elsewhere (14, 20).

(c) The data on human life which confronts the analyst makes it impossible for him to make a scapegoat of either poverty or wealth, of excessive leisure or fatigue, of indolence or overwork. He knows that the neurotic process arises out of roots which are more universal than any such circumstances. It is clear to him that unhappy life situations have many serious secondary consequences for the neurotic process; but he also knows that they are never its primary source (20).

(d) The analyst has learned to distrust the consequence of naked competition for power, even more than the consequences of competition for wealth. He has come to realize that although many of the by-products of the struggle for wealth and display denigrate human values, these are rarely as brutal or as destructive to life and liberty as is the direct struggle for power. The bread-line is not a pretty spectacle; but it is neither as savage nor as irreversible as is the mass liquidation of those who stand in the way of ambitious men who conspire for power. Consequently in the present stage of human culture the analyst views the struggle for money, in spite of its many sordid and neurotic features, as a socially protective device. Money, like the policeman, is for the time being a necessary if imperfect protection against the frailties of man. Although the psychoanalyst deplores these frailties and the inequities of distribution in which they result, he looks upon them as a symptom of human maladjustment rather than its cause. Consequently he feels that the Utopian expectations of those who believe that the elimination of competition for wealth and display will solve the problem of human neuroses are merely an expression of good-hearted naivete. This skepticism about an assumption which is basic to orthodox communist philosophy is naturally a challenge which the dedicated communist finds disturbing and unwelcome (14, 19).

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*Lest this be misunderstood and misquoted I would point out that the Roman Catholic attitude to psychoanalysis while wary is not officially hostile. Some Catholic dignitaries talk, preach and even write as though they expressed an official condemnation. They do this without official reproof, but also without official sanction. There are Freudian analysts who are devout Catholics.

Lest this argument be taken as an expression of blind ideological partisanship, I would point out that recently, in a still unpublished lecture, I discussed before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston on December 11, 1957, the difficulties and possibilities of a truly preventive psychiatry (*Daedalus* in press). In considering this I pointed out that human ingenuity has not yet succeeded in devising a political, economic, educational, cultural or religious system which does not mask, exploit, reward and thus intensify the workings of the neurotic process. I indicated that authoritarian forms and democratic forms interact with the neurotic process in different ways; but that neither is free of guile or responsibility with respect to it. Similarly, I stressed the fact that despite the differences in the neurotogenic effects of the Russian and American systems, both must devote themselves to searching self-examina ion and self-criticism if either is to rid itself of those features which are destructive to human values and human life. Therefore there is no self-righteous chauvinistic bias in my pointing out that the Soviet view of psychoanalysis is warped by ideological refractive errors. We have our own refractive errors too; but they happen not to be relevant to this particular issue.

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A Critical Analysis of Freudianism [Soviet View]

F. V. BASSIN

. . . A hitherto unknown work by Freud, *The Project*, written in 1895, was discovered and first published in 1954. In the light of this work the entire history of Freudianism emerges as a process of constantly increasing scientific degradation of psychoanalytic ideas, a process closely connected with the rejection of the mechanistic interpretation Freud adhered to in the early phase of the elaboration of his concept. In view of this interpretation we are faced with the necessity of drawing a line between Freud's early clinical-psychological ideas, which are limited to a mechanistic world outlook and show a definite potential for productive development, and all the speculative, scientifically and philosophically inadequate interpretations which came later and which in the end transformed Freudianism into one of the most reactionary manifestations of modern bourgeois ideology, profoundly hostile to genuine scientific progress.

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A study of more than half a century of evolution of Freudianism enables us to divide it into four successive stages.

The first dates back to the last fifteen years of the past century. In this period Freud, jointly with Breuer, published two monographs* in which the basic theses of his theory of repression were first formulated and which later became the basis of the psychoanalytic theory of functional disorders. The essence of these theses is that every emotional experience which produces an urge to definite action possesses a store of energy that tries to manifest itself in behavior. Suppressed, this energy can provoke hysterical symptoms.

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*S. Freud and J. Breuer, *On the Psychic Mechanism of the Phenomena of Hysteria,* St. Petersburg, 1899; *Essays on Hysteria,* St. Petersburg, 1900.

F. V. Bassin, "A Critical Analysis of Freudianism," The Soviet Review, *Vol. 1, No. 5 (1960), pp. 3–14. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

There is no doubt whatever that in this early phase Freud was not as yet an adherent of antiphysiological idealism. On the contrary his investigations, which attempt directly to deduce the basic psychological laws from the specificities of excitation and inhibition of the cortical neurons, characterize him as a positivistically minded neuropathologist who concentrated on studying first aphasia and children's paralyses and later problems of the therapy of functional disorders, and who tried to base himself on all the real knowledge which had accumulated by the end of the 19th century. In his study of aphasia he criticized the narrow localization theories of Broca and Wernike from a broader position, close in spirit to Hughlings Jackson's. There is no indication in Freud's work at this stage of any inclination towards speculative psychological theories.

In the second stage, which has been frequently criticized in our literature, Freud advanced the theory of psychological factors which suppress the instincts that are striving for fulfillment, a theory which uses the pretentious symbols of *ego, super-ego,* and *censor*; an analysis was made of the conditions under which the pathogenic energy of the suppressed impulse could be neutralized (the chief of these conditions being to achieve consciousness of the suppressed desire); methods for psychoanalytically revealing the repressed affects were elaborated; and finally a complex system of concepts on the nature of suppressed desires was created. From the viewpoint of orthodox Freudianism these suppressed desires are almost exclusively of a sexual nature.

Freud's methodological views in this period are reflected in his characteristic conviction that inasmuch as we know little about the physiological mechanisms of the brain, psychological theory must be elaborated independently of physiology. This refusal to include physiological concepts in psychological analysis is characteristic of Freudianism of that period. It is the very anthithesis of Pavlov's famous refusal in the early 20th century to include psychological concepts in a system of physiological analysis. History has shown what a high price Freud paid for his attempt to build a theory of the activity of the brain while ignoring the physiological theory of the brain mechanisms. In refusing to have anything to do with physiology, he naturally was compelled to turn to generalizations in the socio-historical sphere. And inasmuch as Marxist ideology remained profoundly alien to Freud throughout his lifetime, his excursions into the field of sociology could not but end in historical idealism and finally obscurantism. This may be clearly seen in such latter-day theories as that of the origin of human society based on the oedipus complex, the concept of wars being biologically determined by an innate instinct of aggression, denial of the value of cultural progress, the theory of the existence of a special death instinct, and a number of other metapsychological concepts.

The period when these works dealing with sociological questions were written covers the last two decades of Freud's life and constitutes the third stage in the development of the psychoanalytic concept. The fourth and last stage of Freudianism refers to the post-war period and the present.

What is most characteristic of this fourth stage is the unexpected change in the attitude of psychoanalysts towards physiology. The insoluble difficulties encountered by psychoanalytic theory in connection with its traditional antiphysiologism, and the consequent ideological blind alley in which Freudianism found itself have given rise to profound differences of opinion within the camp of Freudians themselves and have led to a revision of attitudes towards the concepts and methods of modern neuro- and electrophysiology. This change is strikingly evident in a report made by L. Kubie, one of the most eminent Freudians in the USA, at the Fourteenth International Psychological Congress held in 1954 in Montreal, and in a number of other recent works by Freudians. The new orientation which they were obviously forced to accept underscores the sterility of the basic trends pursued by psychoanalysis in the past. At the same time it sets the critics of Freudianism the task of disproving certain physiological pseudo-arguments advanced by modern psychoanalysts.

Such are the four basic stages which characterize the evolution of Freudianism. My purpose, however, is to discuss only the first and the fourth of these, since the second stage has already been the subject of extensive criticism and it seems to me superfluous to discuss Freud's pseudo-scientific metapsychology.

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As already mentioned, Freud and Breuer started with the theory that inhibited impulses create conflicts and become pathogenic. How did Freud develop this idea later?

It is hardly necessary to point out that the concept of the pathogenic nature of the conflict of impulses is in itself an important general thesis which Pavlov advanced clinically quite independently of Freud's theory. Physiologists of the Pavlov school convincingly showed how serious functional and organic disorders may develop as a result of vital affective conflicts.

It follows that the idea of the pathogenic nature of the conflict of impulses can in no way be equated with the Freudian psychological interpretation. This must be stressed since there still, unfortunately, exists the widespread and incorrect idea that conflicts of impulses are being studied only by Freudians.

In order to make clear our objections to the Freudian presentation of the problem of affective conflict we must recall the very specific explanation of the mechanisms of conflict as advanced by Freud, apparently under the influence of Charcot's ideas. This was based on the supposition that an absolute relationship exists between the nature of the suppressed impulse and the nature of the manifest clinical syndrome, so that the clinical syndrome is not only caused by the suppressed impulse but also symbolically expresses it in behavior.

The work conducted in our clinics shows that most often the disorders treated concern non-specific changes which are in no way connected with the psychological content of the patient's inner conflicts. As regards the considerably rarer cases of hysterics seen in our clinics, when a definite tie exists between functional disturbances arising from conflict and the psychological content of this conflict, we can speak of the specific manifestation of the suppressed impulse in the pathological syndrome, but not of the symbolic transformation of these impulses. A hysterical disorder can undoubtedly be adaptive in nature. For example it can produce a reaction which helps the patient achieve a definite goal (such as the appearance of hysterical motor paralysis which relieves the patient of the need for activity he finds undesirable). However, to regard such a disorder as symbolical expression of a suppressed impulse is no more permissible than, let us say, to interpret ordinary behavior as a symbolic expression of normal motivation.

It can thus be granted (and as we shall see further on there are sufficient clinical and experimental grounds for this) that the pathological syndrome provoked by the conflict sometimes really does reflect the psychological content of the suppressed impulse. But we have no basis for assuming that such a manifestation of suppressed impulses results from some obligatory symbolic transformation of them.

We have dealt in detail on the specific features of the Freudian approach to the problem of conflict because the psychoanalytical method for revealing suppressed impulses is essentially based entirely on the assumption of the existence of a process of compulsive symbolical transformation of the impulses. Having once accepted this idea, Freud seemingly should have paid serious attention to analyzing its objective laws. In actual fact however he followed an altogether different principle. In considering symbolic emotional experiences which allegedly arise both during sleep and while awake as a type of intuitive knowledge, Freud from the very first introduced into psychoanalytical technique the greatest arbitrariness of interpretation, thus depriving his method of all cogency and objectivity. His works are filled with long lists of images and explanations of their symbolical content but it is impossible to ascertain either from Freud's own works or those of his disciples on exactly what basis the psychoanalyst reaches the conclusion that a given image symbolizes a given content. Freudianism does not offer any experimental control of the hypothesis of symbolical transformation or theoretical grounds for the presumed tie between emotional experience and its symbolical expression.

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The second thesis of early Freudianism is that a drive or impulse to action can become a factor influencing behavior even when it remains unconscious. Again, in discussing the problem of the conflict of impulses, we must point out the difference between the psychoanalytic interpretation of a phenomenon and the fact of the existence of this phenomenon. While we disagree with the psychoanalytic interpretation of the mechanisms of unconscious drives, there can be no doubt whatever that unconscious emotions do exist, that they can be expressed in behavior and leave a definite impress on the dynamics of the psychological, physiological and clinical processes and, at the same time, can be connected with definite psychological content.

Pavlov, as we know from his *Clinical Wednesdays* (see the issue of June 6, 1934 and others) frequently pointed to the possibility that various complex, psychologically significant emotional experiences may become inhibited, and thus disappear from the sphere of the conscious, but without being destroyed. They are preserved for a long time in an inhibited state and may again penetrate into consciousness later on, when the inhibition is less. The Pavlov school gave an analysis of the physiological basis for this when studying the phenomena of dis-inhibition (the inhibiting of inhibition, which results in the freeing of the inhibited reactions), and many other processes of a similar type. It has been convincingly shown through clinical and experimental investigation that such unconscious emotional experiences, when inhibited, nevertheless can actively manifest themselves and leave a profound impress on the dynamics of both elementary physiological reactions and complex forms of behavior.

Data obtained by the method of delayed post-hypnotic suggestion effectively demonstrated that it is possible for a hypnotized person to retain for a considerable time intricate instructions which remain unconscious, yet are carried out under proper objective conditions. Experimental investigation along these lines includes studies of the ability to wake spontaneously from normal sleep at a definite time set beforehand; studies of the ability to accept complex verbal instructions during normal sleep and to retain them after awakening; a study of the influence exerted on the electroencephalogram, the skin biopotentials and other autonomic indices by auditory signals lying below the threshold of audibility, a study of unconscious perception of speech during functional hearing loss; the study, during hysterical blindness, of conditioned reflex reactions evoked by light signals of various intensity, and many other works.

The data thus obtained lead to the conclusion that any theory which states that perception and certain higher forms of nervous activity connected with definite psychological content are capable of influencing behavior, whether or not the processes themselves remain unconscious, cannot be rejected and deserves further clinical and experimental study. A most important precondition for the success of such study is an elaboration in terms of Pavlov's physiology and psychological theory of concepts regarding the mechanisms of such unconscious factors.

Before we leave our characterization of early Freudianism, we must consider one more question. What is the essence of the Freudian concept of emotional experience as an impulse to action, a sort of energy-charged vector? Is this merely a figure of speech or does it have concrete meaning?

In the first place it should be noted that Freud never even attempted to establish the precise significance of this initial concept. We stress this fact because many critics of Freudianism base their entire evaluation of the psychoanalytic concept on the indisputable vagueness of Freud's central idea. Such, for instance, is the approach of Harry K. Wells.

However, a close analysis of Wells' rather skeptical conclusions shows that he himself commits certain inaccuracies and so fails sufficiently to stress what is in effect the most profound, fundamental defect in Freudianism.

True, Freud does not offer any physiological exposition of the concept of the functional tension of impulses. As far as his later works go, this is probably due to his antiphysiologism. But he can hardly be reproached for the absence of such an explanation at the time this concept was born, since it would have been an impossibility for physiology to provide it at the end of the 19th century. Even in our day, after the discovery of so-called non-specific cortical-subcortical projections and tonic influences exerted upon various forms of higher brain activity by the reticular formation of the brain stem, the question of a physiological basis for the affective tension of emotional experience connected with concrete psychological content remains essentially obscure. Moreover we know that at the time he developed his concept of the functional tension of the impulse Freud was ideologically inspired by the materialist, not the idealist trend in neurology.

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In summing up we may say that the history of the development of Freudianism is one of the most striking and instructive illustrations of the dependence of the fate of scientific investigation on the methodology on which it is based. It is an established fact that the earliest stage in the formation of Freud's own ideas was characterized by his adherence to the ideas of a mechanistic and physiological order. During this phase Freud posed certain problems which, if correctly developed, might have been of great scientific importance. Later however a radical change took place in his general orientation which predetermined the pseudoscientific nature of the entire system he was to create and transformed the theory of psychoanalysis into one of the most reactionary modern bourgeois sociological and philosophical concepts.

Yet Soviet psychoneurology and psychology should not ignore the problems posed by Freud in the initial period of his activity. It would be a mistake to assume that either the question of the psychological, physiological or clinical manifestations of unconscious factors of behavior or those of the functional tension of these affects were born of the psychoanalytical concept, or that they can be developed only on its basis. Like the problem of the pathogenic role of the conflict of impulses, they can and should be developed from the viewpoint of Pavlov's classical ideas. If we approach them in any other way a whole important group of facts prove to be essentially beyond the range of study.

Similarly we have no reasons whatever for refusing to recognize the important role of subcortical structures in the fulfillment of most complex processes of the higher nervous activity. The recognition of this role does not imply a deviation from the classical Pavlovian interpretation of the functions of the subcortex or from the concept of the functional pre-eminence of the cortex, which have been confirmed a thousand times. Our purpose, on the contrary, is to further develop these ideas.

Such is the general conclusion we draw from what has been said above. A methodologically distorted, idealist, pseudo-scientific interpretation has, for many years, been given to psychological problems of the unconscious and physiological problems of the participation of subcortical formations in the processes of higher nervous activity. Having refuted this interpretation, it is our task to preserve both problems for scientific analysis and to develop them on the basis of concepts which have nothing in common with the categories of Freudianism.

European and American Theories of Personality

GORDON W. ALLPORT

. . . while national character is a dangerous concept, it still stands for some measurable truth (5). Indubitably there are national flavors in theories of personality. I wish that some public-spirited psychologist would make an accurate content-analysis of publications in different lands to discover what topics are most prominent, and precisely what theoretical conceptions and interpretations are most commonly employed. Lacking such empirical guidance we can only proceed with caution to make impressionistic comparisons.

. . . Ellenberger, in comparing Switzerland and the United States, writes: "The dominant American view believes in the almost unlimited flexibility of the human personality, shaped by the life history and social influences. There is a great deal of emphasis on 'reactions to stress' and 'interpersonal relations.' In Switzerland there is more of a belief in the relative constancy of the basic character structure; sociology is not as fully developed; and rather more importance is ascribed to genetics, characterology, and constitutional psychiatry." The same point is made by Wolff, who draws on etymology to support his argument. Wolff contrasts the American preference for the term "personality" with the European preference for "character" and "characterology" (an "ology" seldom named in America). Americans, he concludes, are attracted to the *mask* implications (persona), and Europeans to the deeper implications of engraving (χαρακτηρ).

Shall we then say that by and large American theorists view personality in terms of outer behavior, surface attributes, motor components, interpersonal relations, and modifiability? Do Europeans, by contrast, adhere to concepts of deep disposition, constitutional determination, structural

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Gordon W. Allport, "European and American Theories of Personality," Perspectives in Personality Theory, *edited by Henry P. David and Helmut von Bracken (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1957), pp. 3–24. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

firmness, relative independence of society, and therefore relative unmodifiability? This tempting bifurcation, though it contains a kernel of truth, is certainly too broad. We find many exceptions. Why, for example, if America is motor and behavioristic, has it developed so little theory respecting expressive behavior? Would it not seem more logical, if Europe is "deeper," to find Europe preoccupied with projective methods, and America preoccupied with expressive methods? In actual fact the situation seems almost reversed. And why is it that the development of psychotechnology, which is surely motor, practical, and meliorative, is more advanced in Europe than in technological America?

Before we pursue the matter further let us take note of the protest made by Franks in his chapter on "Personality Theory in Britain." He objects strongly, and quite rightly, to painting all European theories with a single brush. There may be national trends, he thinks, but scarcely a single European trend, certainly not if Britain is included in Europe. In his review of British developments he points out that, with a change of investigators' names, these developments could be considered fairly typical of what is happening in the United States. The same kinds of theories—psychoanalytic, factorial, positivistic, projective, and interpersonal—prevail in the two countries. Franks' statement of the case seems convincing; one should speak jointly of Anglo-American trends. David's excellent bibliography strengthens this impression.

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On the whole there does seem to be a constellation of trends that might be considered typical of Anglo-American countries and a constellation typical of the Continent—always admitting, of course, plentiful transnational borrowing as well as residual national characteristics. With some trepidation I shall venture to suggest what seem to me the distinguishing marks of Anglo-American and Continental theories respectively . . .

Philosophical Assumptions

There is a basic difference in philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of mental life, the Lockean tradition being dominant in England and America; the Leibnitzian and Kantian on the Continent. This statement, I think, is broadly true, in spite of extensive borrowings of theory back and forth across the English Channel.

The Lockean tradition, in brief, holds that man's mind by nature is *tabula rasa* (environmentalistic leaning); mind does what it is made to do (a leaning toward reactivity and behavioristics); its components are basically discrete (simple ideas), and its organization therefore a matter of cementing bonds (associationism). While not all these doctrines are fully developed by Locke himself, his particular brand of empiricism paved the way directly for

Hume, Hamilton, Mill, and later for objectivism. Darwin gave the tradition a functional turn, and borrowing from Freud gave it depth. But the tradition remains clearly traceable.

By contrast, the Leibnitzian and Kantian positions have been dominant and, in my opinion, are still dominant on the Continent. They are clearly reflected in present-day characterology. To Leibnitz, as to Kant, the intellect was perpetually self-active (not merely reactive). When Locke said *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu,* Leibnitz gave his famous retort . . . *excipe: nisi ipse intellectus.* To him, the inner and spontaneous workings of the mind were at least as important as its content or productions. His concept of the self-active monad easily became the "person" who with his entelechtive strivings pursued a unique destiny (cf. Stern's personalism). It was easy for such a unit to become differentiated into strata, the higher levels of which are bent on autonomy and self-actualization.

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While neither Kant nor Leibnitz was directly concerned with the nature-nurture controversy, it seems clear that by and large the emphasis on the constitutionally given (noted by several Continental contributors) fits more readily into this general tradition. Stratification theories start with the assumption that much, if not most, of personality is given. Kretschmer, Pende, and Le Senne do the same. But at this point a word of caution is in order. In England, too, there has been a strong genetic and nativistic tradition (Galton, McDougall), and an American (Sheldon) advanced and formalized Kretschmer's typology and won for it considerable acceptance in the United States. Yet, all in all, it seems safe to say that most American theories do not ascribe as large a role to constitution and native temperament, to inborn ability and disposition, as do Continental theories.

Not every Anglo-American theorist is a Lockean, and not every Continental theorist is Leibnitzian. But I am of the opinion that these two contrasting trends are still reflected in current theories of personality in the two regions, as well as in all basic psychological thought. I have argued this point at greater length elsewhere (2).

The Whole and Its Parts

Continental theories tend to focus on the "whole man"; Anglo-American theories, by contrast, are more often concerned with parts of the whole—with traits, attitudes, syndromes, factors, or performances.

The "whole man" is an elusive creature; there doesn't seem to be much that science can do with him. For psychologists to talk about him seems to Eysenck a vague and "philosophical" thing to do. Yet with notable tenacity Continental theorists (and particularly the German) focus upon wholeness even while they engage in the task of analysis. Stratification theories are a clear case in point. They aim to differentiate, yet to retain the whole. The same goal marked the concepts of structure prevalent in the 1920's, reflected particularly in Stern's personalism, in Krueger's *Strukturbegriff*, and in Wertheimer's application of Gestalt concepts to personality, e.g., radix. Lewin's view of the person as a differentiated region is another example of having your whole and analyzing it too.

The school of *Verstehen* (which is not widely accepted or understood in Anglo-American countries) is a particularly bold attempt to preserve wholeness. To Spranger *Verstehen* means "to grasp events as fraught with significance in relation to a totality." And to this school of thought the "totality" of a person is largely a matter of his system of values. Therefore, to understand any single act one must locate it within the personal value-context of the individual life. Typologies pretend to cover (or nearly cover) the complete person. Finally, existentialism . . . places stress above all else on the acceptance of man's complete subjective experience as the point of departure and of return. While Germany is surely the principal happy-hunting ground for wholes, the movements here mentioned have had wide currency on the Continent, and by contrast, relatively little popularity in Anglo-American lands.

Candor compels us to say that most of these movements have met with suspicion, and occasionally with scorn, in England and in America. Yet, since the problem of wholes (organization) is inescapable, it is fair to ask how Anglo-Americans handle it. The question is too complicated to answer here in full; but we may hazard the assertion that associationism in one form or another is the fashion. One hears much about conditioning, integration, habit-hierarchies, and cell-assemblages. Associationism is certainly more alive in Anglo-American countries than on the Continent.

There is also in America a not infrequent attempt to deny internal unity to personality. What apparent consistency personality has is said to be due to fixed cultural demands, to the stability of stimuli within the environment, or to the recurrence of interpersonal contacts. Extreme situationism of this sort is found in theories advanced by Coutu (3), by much that goes on under the name of "role theory" (11), and in the writings of Sullivan who, for example, defined personality as "the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life" (13). Thus, unity of personality is commonly regarded either as an associative phenomenon or else as an epiphenomenon of the constancies in the world of stimuli. (The reader will understand that I am not saying *all* American writers endorse these solutions.)

Points of View

A further difference lies in the tone of meliorism and optimism that marks most American approaches (less so, the British). By contrast there is a note of fatalism and *pessimism in many Continental approaches.* While the distinction I have in mind is especially clear in the practice of therapy, it is also prominent in theory.

Let me offer one or two examples: Freud—and this is virtually unquestionable—bequeathed to us a pessimistic view of the possibilities of human nature. A tyrannical Id, an obdurate environment, a second-hand super-ego; these oppressive instruments fashion us fatefully at an early age. The most significant changes in this Continental Freudianism, unless I am mistaken, have taken place chiefly under American aegis where so-called "ego psychology" has developed to shift the emphasis drastically. By ego psychology I do not mean merely an interest in defensive processes (Anna Freud), but the view that a person's conscious life, his rational capacities, and his acquired goals provide the "go" of his nature to a far greater degree than allowed for in orthodox Freudianism. In American neo-Freudianism culture is also more fully admitted as a formative and curative factor.

Or take the course of existentialism. Its stress on the acceptance of all truth, including all passions, conflict, guilt, unintelligibilities, hopelessness, could, I think, have developed only in Europe where the total, existential, suffering, and self-active man is the focus of attention. . . .

What form does existential therapy take in the United States? It is, I think, most typically represented in the systematic work of Rogers who, like European existentialists, starts with the self-concept held by the sufferer. But far from remaining content with the exploration and description of this state, Rogers starts both his theory and his therapy with the changing self-concept in relation to the patient's commitments and plans for the future. Here the therapeutic process gives a hopeful twist to existential "freedom." It is not a freedom doomed to fail when it encounters "no exit" from life's dilemmas. The air is one of expecting, encouraging, and discovering successful solution (10). I do not wish to imply that existential analysis in Europe is burdened with hopelessness; but I doubt that it has the incorrigible buoyancy of the American approach.

Tillich has marked this peculiarly resilient nature of American courage. "The typical American," he writes, "after he has lost the foundations of his existence, works for new foundations" (14). Tillich finds this response to the existential dilemma expressed in all the specifically American philosophies: pragmatism, process philosophy, the ethics of growth, progressive education, crusading democracy. He might have added all the lively forms of therapy as well, ego psychology, non-directive treatment, guidance movements, counseling, and popular literature which produces an avalanche of books on peace of soul, maturity of mind, search for self, and on the power of positive thinking.

This passion for self-improvement in America (forty-eight million adults are enrolled in adult education courses) must have some impact on the theoretical perspectives held by American psychologists. Might we hazard the opinion that both in America and in Europe theorists are, without fully knowing it, attempting to account for the types of "national character" most familiar to them? We have some evidence, for example, that college youth in the United States consider their highest value to be the development of a rich, full, well-rounded life; whereas in France, Germany, and Italy they place more emphasis upon intensity of inner experience and the formation of a definite character in spite of difficulties (4). It does indeed seem possible that theories of mutability, reactivity, and meliorism are more appropriate to the types of personality found in the United States; whereas theories of innerness, fixity, and stubborn integrity are a better fit in Europe.

Social Interaction

American theories normally allow for social interaction to a greater extent than do Continental theories. (In this comparison I shall not venture to include British theories.) The person, according to William Stern's definition, is "self-contained" but at the same time "open to the world about him." Most Continental theories, it seems to me, stress the self-contained quality of the person; most American theories his openness-to-the-world.

The American fondness for the interactional view no doubt rests on the pragmatic philosophy and "social self" bequeathed by James, Mead, and Dewey. This perspective is vigorously championed by sociologists who by professional necessity are forced to reject the proposition that personality is completely self-contained. Two sociologists, Parsons and Shils, for example, argue that the personality system is no more fundamental than the social system. Both systems are real enough, but we cannot gain complete insight into the personality unless we view the interlocking sets of roles played by the individual in his many social relationships (8). A man's behavior is seldom, if ever, a function of simon-pure inner traits; it is rather a response to, and stimulus for, reciprocal behavior in others.

Working from a different perspective, but reaching analogous conclusions, F. H. Allport speaks of an "inside" and an "outside" view of structure. For example, we may say of a certain woman, following the inside view of her traits or trends, that she is always trying to be helpful; she is, in trait terms, a "generous soul." But this inside structure cannot manifest itself excepting in some outer event-structure; e.g., by taking a plant to a sick friend, by bringing cakes to a church supper, or by knitting warm garments for needy children. She can be herself only through the medium of social interactions. But if taking the inside view of personality alone, i.e., viewing it as a stratified structure in its own right, is a hollow thing to do, taking the outside view alone is distinctly misleading. There could be no social system without individuals possessing some memories, habits, traits, or other manifestations of internal structure. There could be no giving of plants, no baking of cakes, or knitting of garments, unless there were first a donor, baker, or knitter. While both the outer view and the inner view are essential, there is something altogether basic about the latter (1). A sociologist might not like this reasoning but it comes natural enough to a psychologist, and particularly, if I am not mistaken, to the Continental psychologist.

At the moment there seems to be a strong tendency among American psychologists to favor the outside view. Increasingly, conceptualizations of personality seem to employ such analytical units as "role," "interaction" (Bales), or "tinsit" (Coutu's term for tendency-in-a-situation), or other outer-oriented units (such as "interpersonal relation"). In part this turn in theorizing results from experiments which show repeatedly how big the gap can be between an individual's alleged traits or needs, and his overt behavior which often varies sharply from situation to situation. This realization is clearly expressed in a statement made by Sears in his presidential address before the American Psychological Association in 1951, "There is no virtue in a descriptive statement that a person possesses such-and-such a trait or need unless that statement is part of a larger one that concludes with a specification of a kind of action to be performed. To describe a person as having 'high emotionality' or 'low sensitivity' or 'diffuse anxiety' is systematically acceptable only if other variables are added that will, together with these internal personal properties, specify what kind of behavior can be expected from him under some specific circumstances" (12).

It seems fairly evident that this tendency to empty the person (at least partially) and to view personality as modes of social interaction appears far more readily where the Lockean tradition is strong than where the Leibnitzian tradition holds sway. Leibnitz's monads, we recall, had no windows. They went merrily on their way oblivious of society. While Continental theorists have certainly inserted windows, still the emphasis on the person as such—on his self-contained nature, on the "inside" system—clearly prevails.

Brain Models

Anglo-American psychologists are currently more interested in "brain models" than are Continental psychologists. . . .

In general the neurological urge in Anglo-American psychology is traditional. The reflex arc, the switchboard analogy, a neurological image of the integrative process, have all been standbys, especially as sanctioned by Watson, Sherrington, and Hull. It is true that some movements have had little use for brain models, e.g., psychoanalysis, factorial studies, and certain ultra-positivistic approaches, such as represented by Skinner. At the same time, there is something congenial to Anglo-American psychology in assuming (and in searching for) neural equivalents of psychological processes. Special adulation is given to investigators such as Cannon, Lashley, and Penfield, who clarify the functions of the neurohumoral system and indicate its significance for psychology. It seems to be a special passion of Anglo-American psychologists to work with concepts that are operationally denotable, and a definable neurological or physiological process seems to satisfy this need. . . .

The difference I am describing here is only relative. There certainly are exceptions to the trend noted. . . . Some British and American writers have no use for speculative neurology and advocate a purely psychological psychology. On the other hand, some workers on the Continent, including stratification theorists, employ the evidence and the postulates of neurophysiological science. A major impetus in seeking brain models came to America through Köhler's conception of isomorphism—a clear case of importation. Yet, on the whole, the phenomenological side of psychophysical equation seems to offer greater attraction to Continental theories, the physical side to Anglo-American theorists.

Methodology and Creativity

The final, and clearest, comparison lies in the field of methodology. *The ideal of rigorous positivism seems to prevail in Anglo-American psychology to a greater extent than it does on the Continent.*

. . . Eysenck flails mightily at "unscientific" characterology. In so doing he expresses the animus of many (but not all) Anglo-American psychologists. Eysenck wears no kid gloves, and does not expect those who disagree with him to wear them. He invites controversy; and controversy is the *sine qua non* of psychological progress.

Eysenck levels three charges at German characterology: He finds it obscure, philosophical and unscientific, and addicted to knocking down straw men.

To begin with the third charge—it is, I think, partially justified. Some Europeans show a certain condescension toward the New World. Specifically, in psychology, a professional villain occasionally is created who is a soulless mechanist, addicted to muscle twitches, mathematics, and raw meat. Usually the villain is American, but he can be British. I recall that in my student days in Berlin, in the early years of the Gestalt school, I was forcibly struck by the lecturers' almost universal habit of starting their discourse with a stabbing attack on Hume. As an elementarist and associationist Hume was considered the incarnation of intellectual evil. The portrait was exaggerated, basically a caricature, but it served each lecturer's purpose. Similarly, American psychology was thought to contain nothing more than the primitive behaviorism of Watson. As such it was tossed overboard. Such oversimplification is, of course, regrettable since it destroys the possibility of fruitful detailed controversy. One cannot argue with a man of straw.

Over-categorization (i.e., stereotyping) is the essence of prejudice. But at the same time let us admit that exaggeration of an opponent's position is a not uncommon device. It may even have heuristic merit.

Is the tendency to over-categorize all on one side? Do we not detect the same trend in Eysenck's indictment? His opening sentence reads: "In recent years there has been growing up in Germany an approach to the problems of personality variously called characterology, stratification theory, or the phenomenological approach." He then proceeds to attack "the proponents of this viewpoint" on the three grounds mentioned above. Eysenck, I fear, is guilty of considerable over-categorization. Characterology, stratification theory, and phenomenology do not constitute a single viewpoint. There have been many varieties of characterology in Germany since Bahnsen first employed the term in his two-volume *Beiträge zur Charakterologie*, published in 1867. Stratification theory is only one of many brands of characterology. And phenomenology has only a slight overlapping relation with either characterology or stratification theory. It is scarcely fair to lump the three perspectives into one.

What about the charge that some of the perspectives . . . are vague and "philosophical" and "unscientific"? Such vagueness as exists is certainly due in part to the exigencies of translation. It seems peculiarly difficult to render German psychological idiom into English. But Eysenck means something more. He believes a perspective that is not "scientific" may properly be called "philosophical." Every reader, at least every Anglo-American reader, will immediately understand what he means, and perhaps sympathize with his contention.

There is, however, a logical pitfall in this line of reasoning. To limit science to a matter of currently fashionable method is an arbitrary thing to do. Etymologically speaking, *scientia* (like *Wissenschaft*) has a far broader meaning (viz., knowledge). When one says, as do Eysenck and Franks, that to be acceptable, statements about personality must be "scientifically established," one is acting as a philosopher—restricting knowledge to material obtained by a particular epistemological outlook (in this case, the positivistic). If there is a distinction between the German and the Anglo-American approaches it is thus between two philosophies (not between philosophy and science). Factorial units are no less philosophical than are the units of stratification, for both represent assumptions regarding the basic constitution of personality based on arbitrarily accepted postulates.

. . . Franks sets forth in clear fashion "the more important criteria by which a truly scientific study can be recognized." It is useful to have this list and, no doubt, a good idea to follow it faithfully when it is relevant. The difficulty is that it is definitely restrictive in our search for good theories. It leads us carefully to skirt all questions about personality that are not answerable by an arbitrary methodology borrowed from natural science. The central bulky problems of personality will remain untouched by "science" if we are too niggardly concerning our conceptions of admissible procedures. . . . All in all there is no doubt that we find insistence on "science" more common in Anglo-American than in Continental literature. But this fact does not mean that Continental theorists are blind to the prevailing standards set for scientific communication. Let me quote from. . . Wellek . . . : "Not only can and should the phenomenologist satisfy the operationist by providing him with experimental and statistical evidence, but the operationist should also admit that his results, such as those from factor analysis, need the verification and interpretation of phenomenology." . . .

The scientific ideal which we all share—though we may define it variously—has one serious charge against it. It has provided practically none of the substance for current theories of personality. To state the matter differently, Anglo-American theorists, who are more exacting in methodology, are shameless borrowers. They have created few basic ideas of their own (apart from method), and have appropriated the heart of their theories from their "philosophical" colleagues on the Continent. Let us ask ourselves what would be left in Anglo-American theories if we removed the more fruitful typologies (e.g., Jung's, Kretschmer's, Spranger's)? Could we have built our extensive attitude research excepting on the foundations set by the Würzburg school? Where does our current interest in perception and projective tests come from? Are not the basic psychometric and psychodiagnostic methods of Continental origin (Binet, Jung, Rorschach)? So far as we handle problems of expressive behavior, or develop theories of knowing other personalities, our concepts are importations. Even our work on small groups and interpersonal relations owes most to the creative labors of Lewin. He, as well as certain other innovators, became refugees in America, but this fact does not belie the European origin of their contributions. Existentialism, now influencing American thought, is of Continental origin. We are deeply indebted to Pavlov, Adler, Stern, Janet, Piaget, all of whom instituted fundamental ideas that were eagerly seized upon and developed by Anglo-American theorists. Last, but not least, think of the cataclysmic impact of Freudian theories of motivation, ego defense, and personality structure. Where would we be without them?

It would be difficult to attempt to trace the reasons for this difference in creativity. Is the longer and richer cultural history of the Old World responsible for it? Or is there perhaps a certain merit in the tradition of loose and "unscientific" thinking that provides new insights which later can be tested in countries having a harder empirical tradition? (It is interesting to note that Eysenck's own research has established the empirical validity of certain of Jung's and Kretschmer's insights.) On the whole it seems ungracious for western countries to hurl charges of vagueness and "philosophy" at those from whom they borrow so extensively in building their own theories.

In America the opposition between creative insight and scientific method has sometimes been expressed in contrasting the roles of "clinical" and "experimental" (or "statistical") psychology. Wyatt's chapter reflects how keenly the problem is felt. Another particularly poignant example is the recently published debate of a leading clinician with himself. In an autobiographical fashion Rogers sets forth his mental conflict (a true American dilemma). On the one hand, as clinician, he knows that important leads for theory come primarily, if not exclusively, from observing concrete personalities in action, giving special attention to their phenomenological worlds. On the other hand, he feels keenly the need for irreproachable, repeatable, operational methods. After setting forth an agonized account of the conflict, he states the conclusion he has reached in the following words: "Science is a way of preventing me from deceiving myself in regard to my creatively formed subjective hunches which have developed out of the relationship between me and my material. It is in this context, and perhaps only in this context, that the vast structure of operationism, logical positivism, research design, tests of significance, etc., have their place. They exist, not for themselves, but as servants in the attempt to check the subjective feeling or hunch or hypothesis of a person with the objective fact" (9).

In a very real sense Rogers' conflict with himself is but a miniature repetition of the conflict between perspectives of the Old World and the New. The solution he reaches, if widely adopted, might help resolve the international strain. Excessive methodological purity, as advocated by some Anglo-Americans, can result in bigotry and sterility. On the other hand, if fresh insights, phenomenological deliverances, and hunches are freely allowed, disciplined method can at the proper stage help sift the wheat from the chaff. We need ideas before we can apply rigor.

Personality and General Psychological Theory

The reader has surely noted that much of our discussion has dealt with general problems of psychology, not merely with the theories of personality. . . . Why? It is because the specific condensation of human nature into discrete patterns of personality cannot proceed apart from the laws of mental life in general. Personality is only a special focus of interest within general psychological theory. Just as there are schools of psychology, there are inevitably corresponding schools of personality theory.

Indeed at the present time—at least in America—we need an explicit movement of protest against considering personality theories apart from general psychological theory. Klein and Krech, for example, view with disapproval such statements as "personality influences cognitive and motivational functions" (7). To them, personality cannot be anything apart from these functions. One cannot speak of personality as though it were a secret and separate center which "issues outward into channels of learning, perception, cognition."

This line of reasoning helps to explain why in recent years the topic of perception has loomed so large in connection with research in personality. Klein argues that while a single process is at work in learning, cognition, and motivation (in all phases of personality), this process can be most clearly traced in a person's habits of perception (his *Anschauungen*) (6).

Unless I am mistaken, a similar basic logic prevails in Europe. Interest in perception (phenomenology) is widespread, and no one seems to care whether the resulting research is regarded as a contribution to general psychology or to the theory of personality. The line is hard to draw. There are indications everywhere that people's perceptions (the *Anschauungen*, images, perceptual structurings) vary appreciably with their needs, interests, and values. Anxious people erect perceptual defenses or perhaps fail to perceive a threatening stimulus. People with strong values readily perceive objects related to these values. Prejudiced people tend to over-structure an ambiguous stimulus, thus betraying their basic insecurity. A person who is dependent in his contacts with other people proves to be similarly "field dependent" in his perceptual performance, while more active individuals free themselves of the outer context, and perceive objects independently of the field (15). This type of work is congenial today to theorists whether working in Europe or in America. Some prefer to regard it as general psychology, some view it as an aspect of personality research.

This may also apply to motivation. . . . [Nuttin] argues that since cognitive functions create a vast region of ideational relationships, these must enter into theories of motivation as fully as do the promptings of physiological needs. "The human personality," he writes, "consists of building up, progressively and by means of personal behavior, an individual constellation of ego-world relationships." Motives are "personal projects," peculiar patterns of ego-world relationships in a state of tension.

It seems to me that theories of this sort in the areas of perception and motivation mark an important forward step. It may soon be old-fashioned to oppose mind-in-general to mind-in-particular, that is to say, to separate psychology and characterology. General theories, we are discovering, are most acceptable when they allow for particularized operations. The day may come when psychological formulations will be regarded as invalid unless they are written to accommodate personal patterns of functioning, personal attitudes, and personal projects. A good general psychology will then be a theory of personality.

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A Computer Program That Simulates Personality

JOHN C. LOEHLIN

The Computer Model

Aldous

First, let me describe the model briefly. I've named him Aldous—his is a Brave New World. Aldous is fairly modest as computer models go: about 750 computer instructions loaded into a smallish, not-very-fast computer, the Burroughs 205. Once set up, Aldous can be presented with "situations" (coded as seven-digit numbers) to each of which he "responds" by printing out a number. Depending on the nature of his response and the nature of the situation, he may or may not receive further consequences, and hence may or may not learn from his experience.

The main subsystems within Aldous which mediate his response to his environment are three in number. First comes *recognition*. Here the incoming "stimulus" establishes contact with Aldous's memory, which includes the traces of previous encounters, if any, with this particular situation, as well as with the more general classes of situations to which it belongs. Aldous occasionally makes errors—occasionally he mistakes a situation for another perceptually similar one.

The second subsystem in Aldous is *emotional reaction*. Here Aldous develops an emotional response to the situation (as he perceives it). Aldous has three emotions. One is positive—call it attraction or desire or love—and two are negative, anger and fear. The development of Aldous's emotional response gets moderately complicated; there may be components of all three emotions present, and they may interact in various ways which differ with the emotions involved. The particular response developed to a situation

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will depend on Aldous's past experience with the situation and others like it, as well as on his current mood (his reaction to one situation persists and influences his response to the next one).

The third subsystem mediating Aldous's response is *action preparation.* Here an appropriate action is selected. Aldous has a limited repertoire of behaviors: he can approach positively, attack, or withdraw, corresponding to predominant emotions of attraction, anger, or fear; each of these behaviors may occur at two levels, mildly or vigorously. If the two strongest emotional tendencies are approximately equal, Aldous will display conflict behavior. If emotional arousal is slight, he will do nothing at all; if it is extreme enough, emotional paralysis will ensue.

In addition to the three systems described, Aldous has two memory systems, immediate and permanent memory, with a learning subsystem that modifies the latter. Aldous's permanent memory retains a cumulative record of his encounters with particular situations and classes of situations; i.e., it consists of attitudes rather than memories of particular events. Aldous's "laws of learning" are such that the attitude shift produced by a single encounter with a situation is inversely proportional to the amount of prior experience Aldous has had with that situation, and at the same time recent experiences carry relatively more weight than less recent ones in determining Aldous's current attitude toward a situation.

Besides overt behavior, Aldous can introspect; that is, he can respond to three "questions" about his experience of particular situations (or abstract attributes thereof) by printing out a coded "verbal report" instead of an action. Such a "report" gives a more detailed account of Aldous's "feelings" about a situation than could readily be inferred from his overt action. Aldous is honest and fairly insightful—obvious opportunities for increased verisimilitude exist here!

Aldous's Environment

Now, what about Aldous's environment, the situations which confront him? As indicated earlier, each of these is represented by a seven-digit number. This number consists of two parts. The first three digits represent the perceptual or discriminable characteristics of the situation—those features by which Aldous can recognize it and react accordingly. The last four digits describe what Murray (1938) would call the "press" of the situation; what it can do to or for Aldous. The nature of the press is defined in three dimensions —situations may be to varying degrees satisfying, frustrating, and painful. Also included in the description of the press is an indication of the power of the situation to impose its consequences on Aldous. Some situations produce their positive or negative consequences only if approached by Aldous. Others may be able to impose punishment or reward despite vigorous evasive action on his part.

While a great variety of environments might be set up using different kinds and sequences of situations, the experiments I will describe in the present paper involve only two environments. These are identical in perceptual terms: each consists of situations identified by three perceptual dimensions of ten steps each, giving rise to a possible total of 1000 discriminable situations. The environments differ markedly, however, in terms of their press. One world is a benign one—most situations are predominantly satisfying, and the power of the injurious and frustrating situations tends to be low. The other world is hostile—injurious and frustrating situations are frequent, and their power tends to be high.

As Aldous is confronted with a series of such situations, he gradually develops a set of attitudes toward the events of his world. On some occasions his behavior and the nature of the situations he confronts will lead to encounters with his world that will increase his knowledge of it; on other occasions he will come away with his preconceptions undisturbed. Sometimes this latter outcome will represent successful avoidance of a realistic threat; on other occasions it may mean loss of a potential real satisfaction.

Some Program Details

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When Aldous is confronted with a situation, the recognition subroutine first determines if an error is to be introduced (by consulting a random number), and, if so, changes one of the descriptive digits by plus or minus one (also at random), i.e., Aldous misrecognizes the situation as a similar one. The program is normally set to introduce errors on about 6% of trials. The subroutine then computes seven addresses where relevant memory is located—namely, Aldous's attitude toward the situation itself, toward the classes defined by the three pairs of attribute values contained in it, and toward the classes defined by the three individual attribute values.

Next, the emotional reaction subroutine computes a response which is a weighted combination of Aldous's current mood and his relevant attitudes. The subroutine first examines immediate memory (which stores data from the preceding trial). If there were no consequences on the preceding trial, Aldous's initial emotional reaction on that trial is used. If there were consequences, Aldous's reaction to these is weighted 2/3 and his initial reaction 1/3. (This last should be changed, I suspect; the initial reaction might even be weighted negatively to reflect a contrast of event with expectation.) Next the relevant permanent memory locations are examined and weighted values are computed for fear, attraction, and anger. If the situation is a familiar one, the reaction is based mainly on previous experience with the situation itself, experience at the higher levels of abstraction being weighted 1/10 and 1/100 respectively. If the particular situation has only been encountered a few times, it is given less weight; this varies with the emotion involved. If it has never been encountered, the reaction is based on experience with the classes of situations to which it belongs. Immediate mood and memory are then combined, with a 1 to 4 weighting. The final step is to compare the three emotional tendencies; if one is dominant it interacts with its competitors to weaken them; this varies with the emotions involved.

In the action preparation subroutine, an action corresponding to the dominant emotion is selected. (If none is dominant, conflict occurs.) In general, if the strength of the dominant emotion is 0–2, no action occurs; if 3–5, mild action of the appropriate kind; if 6–8, vigorous action; and if 9, emotional paralysis.

When Aldous acts, a routine (external to Aldous) determines whether, in the light of Aldous's action and the (real) press of the situation, consequences to Aldous will ensue. In general, if Aldous approaches, consequences always occur; if Aldous does nothing, consequences occur if the power of the situation is 3 or greater; if Aldous avoids or attacks mildly, consequences occur if power is 5 or greater; if Aldous avoids or attacks vigorously, consequences occur only if power is 8 or 9.

If no consequences are experienced, no change occurs in memory, except an increase in the familiarity of the situation. If consequences are experienced, the reaction to the consequences affects the attitudes in the seven relevant memory locations, with a weight which depends on the amount of experience with the situation or class of situations . . . A single trial will thus ordinarily lead to more attitude change toward the particular situation than toward the general classes of situations to which it belongs.

Experiments with Aldous

Development in the Two Worlds

Initial experiments done with Aldous involved "raising" him in the benign and hostile environments, and checking up periodically on his attitudes by administering a "personality questionnaire" to him. This "questionnaire" measures Aldous's attitudes toward a sample of the situations in his universe. It yields scores on the average level of attraction, hostility, and fearfulness of the sample of situations; an adjustment index which reflects the correspondence of Aldous's attitudes with reality; and a score which indicates the *kind* of errors Aldous makes in judging his world—is he impulsive, inclined to approach frustrating and injurious situations, or are his misjudgments mainly avoidance of potential satisfactions?

In these experiments Aldous's behavior clearly showed the effects of his environment within the first dozen trials or so, an effect that became progressively more marked over the first couple of hundred encounters with the environment, by which time Aldous's behavior had stabilized at approach on about 85% of trials in the benign world, and virtually no approach in the hostile world. The personality measures showed improving adjustment in both environments, rapid at first and then slowing down, with the curves leveling off pretty well after about 700 trials. Adjustment proceeded somewhat faster in the favorable environment, but reached a similar level in both. (Of course Aldous's attitudes toward particular situations would continue to change for a very long time after this, since after 700 trials he would not yet have even encountered a majority of the potential situations in his world, let alone have formed any stable response to them.) The direction of adjustment errors was opposite in the two worlds, and represented overgeneralization in each case: Aldous tended to be even more optimistic in the benign world than was justified, and overly pessimistic about his chances in the hostile one.

Shifts between Worlds

Next some experiments were done in which Aldous was "raised" in one environment for 500 trials, and then shifted to the other without notice. In all these experiments, Aldous did readjust to changed conditions; however, the process tended to go faster when he was shifted from the benign to the hostile world than in the opposite case. A fearful Aldous took longer to discover the altered state of affairs.

Trait Changes

In a further series of experiments, various of Aldous's "personality traits" were altered, and his adjustment and readjustment in the benign and hostile worlds were studied. . . .

I will describe briefly three experiments in which trait changes were made, involving different parts of Aldous's reaction system.

The first of these involves a variation on the basic model which I will call "Abstract Aldous." Abstract Aldous differs from Standard Aldous by virtue of his predilection for dealing with events in terms of general categories rather than in their concrete individuality. . . . Abstract Aldous tends to be slightly more consistent (and slightly more extreme) in his behavior than Standard Aldous. He approaches somewhat more in the benign world, and avoids somewhat more in the hostile world. He also shifts from approach to avoidance behavior (or vice versa) more rapidly when the environment is changed. In terms of the over-all adjustment of their attitudes to reality, however, the two Aldouses do just about equally well; the same can be said of their readjustment to a changed world.

In another experiment, hesitant and decisive versions of Aldous were used, which differ from Standard Aldous in the constants that govern translation of emotion into action. Hesitant Aldous does not act at all unless his predominant emotional reaction to a situation is a fairly strong one, and his resulting action is diffident in any event, unless emotion is fairly extreme. Decisive Aldous, on the other hand, acts with even the slightest emotional involvement, and usually acts vigorously. This difference showed up clearly in their behavior in the two worlds. In 500 trials in the benign world and 500 trials in the hostile world, Decisive Aldous failed to respond a total of just three times, while Hesitant Aldous took no action on 242 and 287 trials, respectively. Despite their very different behavior styles, however, the adjustment of their attitudes to reality showed little over-all difference: Decisive Aldous's vigorous approach gave him a slight advantage in adjusting to the benign world, but Hesitant Aldous more than held his own in the hostile environment. In readjustment to a changed world, however, Hesitant Aldous's more passive role gave him an advantage, especially in making the shift from the hostile to the benign world.

In a third experiment, versions of Aldous were used which differ in several constants related to the influence of past experience. One Aldous tends to live in the present, the other is relatively dominated by the past. The first, whom I will call Radical Aldous, is more influenced in his emotional reactions by his current mood, and has a memory that changes more rapidly; hence he is more influenced by recent than distant past events. Conservative Aldous, on the other hand, is more influenced by permanent than by immediate memory, and his memory changes more gradually, giving more weight to the distant past. In behavior, Radical Aldous and Conservative Aldous did not differ as much from Standard Aldous as Decisive Aldous and Hesitant Aldous did; of the two, Radical Aldous acted more like Decisive Aldous, and Conservative Aldous more like Hesitant Aldous. In adjustment, Radical Aldous had a slight edge on Conservative Aldous, and, as one might suspect, this was even more true when it came to readjustment in a changed world. In terms of the *kind* of adjustment discrepancies, Radical Aldous ran more to extremes, with a higher proportion of both approach errors in the benign world and avoidance errors in the hostile world than Conservative Aldous had.

What general comments can be made about this last group of experiments on the manipulation of personality traits? First, the changes did affect the characteristic behavior of Aldous. Decisive Aldous, Radical Aldous, and Abstract Aldous were more inclined toward extreme actions than was Standard Aldous. Hesitant Aldous and Conservative Aldous were more likely than the others to take no action at all. Decisive Aldous was the only one who ever got his emotions worked up to the point of paralysis: this occurred three times during his series of 500 trials in the hostile world.

Secondly, differences in over-all adjustment tended to be considerably less striking and consistent than differences in styles of behavior. Plotted on graphs, curves representing the adjustment of the different Aldouses over trials are close together and cross each other frequently; curves representing behavior are spaced more widely and seldom cross. In computer models, too, apparently, quite different "styles of life" may lead to equally satisfactory adjustments.

A third point worth noting is that the success of a particular Aldous's adjustment to his environment depended somewhat on the nature of the environment. Hesitant Aldous, for example, did not do particularly well in adjusting to the benign world, but was the most successful of all the Aldouses in the hostile world.

In a sense, the most striking outcome of these experiments was the stability of Aldous. Changing constants in the system by factors of 4, 8, 10, or more produced temperamental changes, all right, but did not gravely hamper Aldous's ability to adjust to his environment and readjust when it was changed. Perhaps the human personality is a more delicately balanced system; on the other hand, when one reflects on the variety of people in different societies who come to reasonably satisfactory terms with their widely differing environments, perhaps not.

Computer Models and Personality Theory

Now let me tackle . . . two questions . . . The first of these . . . : Is it appropriate to describe Aldous as a *personality* model at all? The second: Is Aldous an entirely satisfactory personality model? . . .

Now clearly, whether we answer the first question "yes" or "no" depends somewhat on how we conceptualize personality, and I don't have to tell you that there are a good many views extant on this topic. . . .

Now I'm not going to be able to give all these issues, and many more, careful attention with respect to Aldous, but I would like to examine a few which seem particularly relevant to our general question: whether Aldous (or models like him) can reasonably be described as *personality* models . . . Aldous need not have all the attributes of a person to be a successful personality model, but unless he incorporates at least some of the more basic features of personality, there would seem to be serious doubts as to his claim to the title.

But back to business. First, Aldous appears to possess most of the broad qualities of personality . . . he is organized, individually distinctive, and somewhat autonomous and enduring—yet subject to influence and change. However a good many things that aren't personality also possess these qualities; it may prove more instructive to be a little less general, and to look at Aldous from the more restricted perspectives of some major viewpoints within personality theory.

Three Perspectives on Personality

Contemporary personality theorists may, with a little gall, be divided into three parts. I will, in the interests of alliteration, describe these groups as the system, the surface, and the subjective theorists. These three categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, which is regrettable but is entirely due to the fact that personality theorists are a notoriously untidy lot, persisting in taking all sides of any issue you care to name, to the grave inconvenience of those of us who have to teach courses about them. But be this as it may, at least our three groups will provide us with three perspectives from which to view Aldous and others of his kind as models of personality.

In the first of these three camps we find what we may call the *system theorists*. For them, personality is a complex dynamic system that mediates the adjustment of the organism to its environment. Often, but not always, progressive development of the system according to some principle of growth or differentiation is part of the theory. Some writers include the environment as well as the organism as part of a single personality system; others treat the personality system as contained within the organism. The system may be defined purely psychologically, or given physiological underpinning. On the whole, some variation of a system-theoretical view-point appears to be the dominant trend in personality theory in this country. . . .

The second of our three groups of personality theorists, also with a long and honorable tradition in this country, may be called the *surface theorists*. These give priority to the personality psychologist's descriptive task. They are inclined to be highly empirical and operational, and to look with grave suspicion on concepts inferred to lie in the organism's depths. . . . The third main group of personality theorists we may call the *subjective theorists*. These are theorists who tend to approach personality from the viewpoint of the person observed. The way an individual perceives and reacts emotionally to himself and his world are the most essential facts about him for a personality psychologist of this persuasion . . .

Three Perspectives on Aldous

Now let us take a brief look at Aldous through the spectacles of system, surface, and subjective theorists.

First, system theory: Here computer models like Aldous should be most at home. If the personality is conceived of as a complex, interlocking series of subsystems mediating an individual's characteristic behavior, Aldous should provide a natural mode of representing personality. Computers, as a model-building medium in which such hypothesized systems can be set up and their interrelationships studied, would seem to offer inviting possibilities to theorists of system inclinations. . . .

Proponents of the second approach to personality, the surface approach, should have less interest in Aldous; however they could certainly study him by their methods if they wished. . . . For example, as part of the initial check-out of Aldous to see that he worked properly, I happened to examine his responses to repeated presentations of several systematically varied situations. It wasn't until after I had done this that I realized I had performed a classical learning experiment on Aldous. So I promptly plotted the data as a family of learning curves and felt much edified by it all.

Incidentally, it is interesting to speculate what results could be obtained by empirical methods in discovering the principles of Aldous's operation. One could use either correlational or experimental approaches; the latter would probably prove more powerful. Aldous's ability to give verbal reports, limited as it is, should be a very valuable supplement to direct observation of his behavior. It ought to be possible to establish some empirical "laws" by such experiments. However, I suspect that these "laws" might not give the investigator much of a picture of Aldous's inner operation.

Let us return to look at Aldous from the third perspective—that of the theorists who favor the subjective approach to personality. Aldous can certainly be viewed in this way. He "perceives" the situations that confront him and "reacts emotionally" to them. His reaction to each situation is a unique resultant of the situation's properties, his own mood and temperament, and his previous relevant experience. Aldous's actions follow from his feelings about the perceived situation, not from the situation as it independently exists. To be sure, Aldous's perceptual capacities are extremely limited, and he does virtually no thinking at all, but . . . these limitations are by no means inherent in a model of this kind.

One point on which most subjective theorists will find Aldous deficient is his lack of an explicit self-concept. One might, of course, arbitrarily designate one of the attributes of the situations Aldous faces as "degree of self-involvement," and thus define classes of more or less self-related experience from which a self-concept and attitudes toward the self could be inferred. I suspect that some expansion of Aldous's cognitive capacities would be necessary before such an enterprise would yield very plausible results; however, a proper "self-concept" should not be in principle impossible for a model of Aldous's kind.

Some Problems with Aldous

Where, now, do we stand? We have looked at Aldous from three current perspectives on personality and concluded that he has *some* qualifications as a personality model from each viewpoint, although he will presumably be a lot more congenial to some theorists than to others.

Our final task is to point up some of Aldous's more severe shortcomings, and to indicate roughly some of the kinds of changes that might make him more adequate as a personality model.

First, and perhaps as serious as any, is Aldous's limited foresight and ability to plan. He does not organize his behavior around long-term goals, approached stepwise in an interlocking series of plans, but just reacts to situations as they come along. He does anticipate immediate consequences, and acts accordingly, but clearly he needs to be equipped with considerably more long-range integrating ability before he can do real justice to personality. Now this defect is not in any way inherent in computer models—in fact Miller, Galanter, and Pribram in their recent book (1960) specifically work out their theory of plans in terms of computers. It's just that in the designing of Aldous some things had to go to keep him within bounds, and the elaboration of action patterns was one capacity that went.

In general, Aldous's perceptual system is also very limited, particularly from the viewpoint of a subjective theorist. A few emotionally-based perceptual distortions, and other such interactions with other systems, might lend considerable tone, and could readily be introduced. Similar possibilities exist with respect to the memory system and the action selection system: repressions, compensations, and reaction formations could be added more or less ad lib. One additional cognitive defect I have already mentioned: lack of a concept of self. I will simply note again that this defect exists, and should be curable.

Another possible refinement on Aldous would be to introduce provisions for gradually modifying some of his basic parameters during operation, either "maturationally," i.e., as generalized changes over time, or in connection with particular kinds of experience. Thus one might, for example, introduce progressive changes in the constants affecting learning, as part of an "aging" process, or have a blunting of affective responses result from a traumatic experience.

One further issue . . . These models tend in a sense to be highly "nomothetic"—certainly Aldous is intended to represent various general mechanisms of personality. And yet, paradoxically, any given model is in fact a highly particular system, in which every parameter has a definite value, and the system components interact in a particular and definite and idiosyncratic way. What is lacking would seem to be some way of getting from the idiosyncratic person to the idiosyncratic model. A major part of this problem, of course, is getting an adequate description of the person to start with—if one could get a full account of the processes constituting a particular person, one should be able, in principle, to set up a corresponding computer model (although it would not necessarily be a model practical for present computers). . . .

Let me conclude with a final bit of speculation on the future of computer models in personality theory. In the first place, I believe they do have a future, and an important one. When you want to represent a complex dynamic system, there is some advantage in *using* a complex dynamic system—as against, say, a point in a multidimensional hyperspace or a few thousand well-chosen words. And an electronic digital computer is the only medium I know of in which you can build a model of anything like the requisite complexity, and still have it definite and concrete enough to examine bit by bit to any desired degree of analytic detail.

I do not wish to suggest that our other conceptual models are obsolete—far from it. I suspect that for some time to come the ideas embodied in computer models will be ideas that have previously been expressed, often better expressed, in words or mathematical symbols.

I do think, though, that one day a computer program will take a vast mass of data about a person . . . and formulate a more complex and comprehensive representation of his personality than any single human brain could comprehend. And on that day we may begin to see some *real* predicting in the area of personality.

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PART B

Interpersonal and Group Integration

1. *Factors Affecting the Individual's Integration with the Group*
2. *Approaches to Group Integration*
3. *Nonviolence as a Problem-Solving Technique*
4. *Cultural Factors and Social Integration*

CHAPTER 1. *Factors Affecting the Individual's Integration with the Group*

Psychoanalytic Theory and Social Attitudes

IRVING SARNOFF

In the field of attitude research, the impact of psychoanalytic theory was not felt until quite recently. Indeed, the major impetus behind this impact may be attributed, in all probability, to a single book, *The Authoritarian Personality,* which appeared only ten years ago.[2] Since that time, however, psychoanalytic concepts have been increasingly and fruitfully utilized in studies which have sought to illuminate the motivational determinants of attitude formation and change.[3]

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[2] T. W. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson, and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality,* New York, Harper, 1950.

[3] Cf. A. R. Cohen, "Experimental Effects of Ego-defense Preference on Inter-personal Relations," *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology,* Vol. 52, 1956, pp. 19–27; D. Katz, C. McClintock, and I. Sarnoff, "The Measurement of Ego Defense as Related to Attitude Change," *Journal of Personality,* Vol. 25, 1957, pp. 465–474; I. Sarnoff, "Identification with the Aggressor: Some Personality Correlates of Anti-Semitism among Jews," *Journal of Personality,* Vol. 21, 1951, pp. 199–218; I. Sarnoff and S. M. Corwin, "Castration Anxiety and the Fear of Death," *Journal of Personality,* Vol. 27, 1959, pp. 374–385; I. Sarnoff, "Reaction Formation and Cynicism," *Journal of Personality,* Vol. 28, 1960, pp. 129–143.

Irving Sarnoff (Professor of Psychology, New York University), "Psychoanalytic Theory and Social Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly, *Vol. 24, No. 2 (1960), pp. 251–279. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in the original.*

Conceptual Framework

Because of the growing interest in psychoanalytic theory among students of social attitudes, it may be useful to spell out a conceptual framework by means of which several basic tenets of psychoanalytic thought may be systematically applied in research on attitudinal phenomena. The concepts of *motive, conflict, ego defense,* and *attitude* will serve as points of anchorage for this presentation; and an attempt will be made to show how the cement of psychoanalytic ideas may be used to interrelate these broad concepts in approaching the investigation of particular social attitudes.

Motive

. . . *A motive is an internally operative, tension-producing stimulus which provokes the individual to act in such a way as to reduce the tension generated by it and which is capable of being consciously experienced.*

* * * *

Conflict

Whenever two or more motives are activated at the same time, their coalescence produces a state of conflict. Stated somewhat differently, conflict emerges from the fact that the individual is required simultaneously to reduce the tensions generated by all the motives which are operative at any point in time; and since different motives require different responses if their special tensions are to be reduced, the individual cannot respond to any one of the motives without necessarily postponing the reduction of tension generated by all of the other motives.

* * * *

Generally speaking, the intensity of a motive is a function of the extent to which its reduction determines the survival of the organism. In the case of socialized human beings, however, motives concerned with the perpetuation of the self-concept generate a degree of tension which may be equal to, if not greater than, any of his motives which are related to his biological survival. And while motives pertinent to one's self-concept may be learned initially in the process of reducing the tension of survival-linked motives, they often seem to take precedence over the latter in the individual's response repertoire. . . .

Ego Defense

According to Freud, the growing child is caught in a struggle between his innate, physiologically based motives and the demands of his environment. . . . Since the child must adapt to his environment if he is to survive, he is obliged to learn how to reduce the tension of his motives in a socially prescribed manner. In the course of this learning, the child develops a configuration of perceptual and motor skills which helps him to *maximize the reduction of the tension of his motives within the scope of the constraints of his environment*. Freud has called this configuration the *ego*.

It follows, from the circumstances which promoted its development, that the chief perceptual function of the ego is to maintain a state of consciousness in which the individual can correctly assess the properties of both his motives and his external environment. For unless the individual can accurately perceive his motives, he cannot reduce the tensions which they generate. Similarly, unless the person can accurately perceive the constraints of his environment, he cannot make those responses which maximize the reduction of his tension and, at the same time, minimize jeopardy to himself.

Just as the threat of danger provides a major impetus to the origin of the ego, so do threatening events exert the greatest strain on the ego's perceptual function. For these threatening events—parental punishment, for example—induce the motive of fear.

* * * *

. . . the individual responds by eliminating from conscious awareness (1) the fear motive when it exceeds his threshold of tolerance for fear, and (2) any other motive associated with the evocation of a threatening event which has, in the past, aroused excessive fear. These are the. . . covert responses to which Freud applied the name *ego defense*, since their aim is to preserve the functioning of the ego.

* * * *

While all of the ego defenses function to eliminate the perception of consciously unacceptable motives, only two of them—*denial* and *identification with the aggressor*—bring about such an elimination by distorting the perception of objects in the *external* environment. That is, denial and identification with the aggressor aim at obliterating the individual's perception of those aspects of his environment which, he has learned, are capable of arousing intolerable fear. Thus, by not perceiving or by failing fully to acknowledge threatening aspects of his world, the individual can prevent those aspects from exerting the fear-arousing effects they would otherwise have.

Apart from denial and identification with the aggressor, the ego defenses described by Freud aim directly at eliminating the perception of an internal stimulus, i.e., the unacceptable motive *per se*.

Ego defenses and anxiety. . . . anxiety represents an anticipation of the fear which the individual would experience if he should attempt overtly to reduce the tension of *the repressed motive and if such an overt response were to elicit the same kind of punishing reactions from others that led the individual to repress the motive in the first place.*

But while anxiety may well be a warning signal which functions in the interest of the ego defenses, it is also a very powerful motive in its own right. That is, unlike the entirely imperceptible functioning of the various ego defenses, anxiety is experienced as a noxious affect. Indeed, since the anxiety motive, by nature of its historical development, is linked to fear, its tension-producing qualities are as intense as those of the fear motive. Hence, when anxiety is aroused, it exerts, like fear, the greatest priority in the individual's hierarchy of motives. But whereas the individual can reduce the tension of his fear by separating himself from an obvious external threat, he is unable, typically, to find an external provocation for his anxiety. If anything, he may feel that something is clearly "wrong" with him, since his anxiety emerges in situations which, he knows, others may face calmly. Because the source of anxiety inheres in the possible perception of one's consciously unacceptable motives, the only effective way of reducing the level of anxiety is through the use of one of the individual's ego defenses. Thus, just as the imminent emergence into awareness of a repressed motive triggers off anxiety, so does the ego-defensive obliteration of the perception of those motives tend to reduce the tension of the anxiety motive.

* * * *

Ego defenses and symptoms. Although the ego defenses eliminate the perception of threatening motives, they do not thereby reduce the tension generated by those motives. On the contrary, to reduce the tension of a motive it is necessary to make *overt* responses, the quality of which is determined by the special properties of the motive in question. But in the case of an unconscious motive, the individual's anxiety would be aroused if he were to respond to the motive's special qualities with the same kind of overt responses which elicited the punishment that led to the original ego-defensive purging of the motive from consciousness. Hence, the individual must develop a new repertoire of overt responses which function to reduce the tension of his unconscious motives. In Freudian parlance, these newly learned responses are called *symptoms.*

A symptom is, therefore, an overt, tension-reducing response whose relationship to an unconscious motive is not perceived by the individual. . . .

Attitude

The definition of attitude used here is one about which a certain amount of agreement exists among contemporary psychologists: *a disposition to react favorably or unfavorably to a class of objects. . . .*

Since attitudes are inferred from overt responses, and since overt responses are made in order to reduce the tension generated by motives, we may assume that attitudes are developed in the process of making tension-reducing responses to various classes of objects. In short, *an individual's attitude toward a class of objects is determined by the particular role those objects have come to play in facilitating responses which reduce the tension of particular motives and which resolve particular conflicts among motives.*

* * * *

Discrepancies and Congruities in the Relationships between Attitudes and Motives

An individual's attitude may appear to be either consonant with or discrepant from the motive whose tension it is functioning to reduce. Thus, at the extreme of congruence, the attitude merely anticipates those overt responses which directly and maximally reduce the tension of a motive of which the individual is consciously aware. On the other hand, at the extreme of discrepancy, the attitude indicates the operation of covert ego-defensive responses which—in the interests of anxiety reduction—not only preclude direct and maximal reduction of the tension generated by an individual's repressed motives but which aim, in fact, to obscure his perception of their very existence.

Attitudes and Consciously Acceptable Motives

In reducing the tension of a motive, the individual develops a repertory of responses to it. If the motive is one he can consciously accept, the individual's overt responses to it will maximally reduce the tension generated by that motive. To maximally reduce tension, the individual's overt (observable) response must (1) directly mirror the special properties of the motive, and (2) persist for a length of time proportional to the intensity of the motive. In addition, *the individual will be cognizant of his motive as well as its functional relationship to his overt tension-reducing responses.* Finally, the individual will experience no anxiety as a result of his awareness, nor will he be obliged to expend a portion of his available energy in making ego-defensive responses.

Given the above conditions, the individual will orient himself toward objects in his environment in such a way as maximally to reduce the tension of his motive. In terms of his acceptable motives, the objects in the individual's environment fall into two classes: (1) those to which he must have access and toward which he must make a specific overt response if the tension of a given motive is to be maximally reduced, and (2) those which facilitate or thwart the possibility of making the specific overt response necessary to reduce the tension of a motive. Frequently, these facilitating or thwarting objects either lead to or block the individual's access to those objects to which he must respond in a specific way if the tension of his motives are to be maximally reduced.

Because attitudes are dispositions to respond favorably or unfavorably to objects, they should, *in the case of consciously acceptable motives,* be determined by the role which objects play in the maximal reduction of tension generated by the individual's motives. Thus, if an individual's motive is known to be acceptable to him, it should be possible to predict a variety of his attitudes toward objects in his environment.

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. . . The aggressive motive is often provoked by objects which thwart the individual in his attempts at motive satisfaction. Once it is induced, the aggressive motive can be maximally reduced only by making hostile or combative responses to those objects which provoked it. And since attitudes anticipate responses, it follows that the individual will develop an unfavorable attitude toward those objects to which he must respond with hostile acts in order to reduce maximally the tension of his aggressive motive.

Paradoxically enough, but in accordance with the formulation presented here, people will tend to develop favorable attitudes toward those objects which facilitate the maximal reduction of their aggressive motive. Thus, if someone in Individual X's office were to help him in bringing about the downfall or embarrassment of one of X's hated rivals, X would tend to have a favorable attitude toward his accomplice. It is conceivable that the reduction in prejudice which many white troops in integrated combat units appeared to experience in regard to their attitude toward Negroes[7] can be attributed to the fact that they were in a position to observe Negroes in the process of reducing a strong motive which they shared with them—hatred of the enemy.

Quite frequently, the objects which provoke aggression also provoke the fear motive. Thus, both fear and aggression are likely to be aroused when the individual is confronted with an object which directly threatens his survival. If the individual is able to accept his fear consciously, he attempts to make overt responses which will maximally reduce its tension. Accordingly, he will respond by attempting to separate himself from the feared object; the unfavorableness of his attitude toward the threatening object ought to be influenced by his distance from it, i.e., its capacity to harm him. The closer the object gets to him, the greater his fear of it and, hence, the more unfavorable his attitude toward it. As the threatening object loses its capacity to harm, the individual should grow less fearful of it and develop a more favorable attitude toward it. Similarly, the individual ought to develop favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward other objects which he perceives either to thwart or facilitate the making of those responses to the threatening object which will maximally reduce the fear induced by that object.

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[7] S. A. Stouffer *et al., The American Soldier,* Vol. I, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1949.

Even if all the motives which comprise a particular motivational conflict are consciously acceptable to him, the individual obviously cannot respond in any way which will provide simultaneous and maximal reduction of the tensions of all his motives. In order to obtain a maximal reduction in tension for any one of his consciously acceptable motives, the individual must keep his responses to the other motives in abeyance. The two kinds of response which permit the postponement of maximal tension-reducing responses to consciously acceptable motives [are] inhibition and suppression . . . It only remains to be pointed out, therefore, that attitudes may be formed in the process of facilitating the effect of these postponing responses as well as in the eventual process of reducing the tensions of the consciously acceptable motives *per se*. Considered from the standpoint of inhibition, for example, an individual's disposition to respond favorably or unfavorably to an object may be determined by the extent to which a given disposition is required if the individual is to avoid making an overt, tension-reducing response to the inhibited motive. Such phenomena as hypocrisy, duplicity, and other types of interpersonal deception may involve just such a discrepancy between an individual's behavior (from which his attitude is inferred) and his conscious and inhibited motive.

Another example of attitudes which are formed in order to facilitate either inhibition or suppression can be found in Katz and Schank's classical observation of discrepancies between publicly and privately expressed attitudes.[8] From the standpoint of the preceding discussion, one's publicly and privately expressed attitudes are equally "real" or "valid." For they both facilitate the making of responses to motives. However, it is likely that the publicly expressed attitudes more often reflect the facilitation of inhibiting or suppressing responses to motives. Thus, if the attitude implies tension-reducing responses which the respondent believes might evoke unwanted disapproval, the respondent may wish to inhibit such responses when they are open to public scrutiny. One way of preventing the overt emergence of potentially punishable responses is to make them with less force or, still better, to make qualitatively different sorts of response which are not commonly associated with the inhibited motive. In private, however, when the individual feels free from potential punishment, he can permit the overt expression of those responses which maximally reduce the motive he had inhibited or suppressed in public. Consequently, his attitude should change as he changes from a motive-inhibiting response to a motive-reducing response.

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[8] D. Katz and R. L. Schank, *Social Psychology*, New York, Wiley, 1938.

Attitudes and Consciously Unacceptable Motives

From the standpoint of his consciously unacceptable motives, the individual's attitudes toward objects are determined by their function in facilitating (1) covert ego-defensive responses aimed at precluding the perception of consciously unacceptable motives and (2) overt symptomatic responses which permit the individual to reduce the tension produced by his consciously unacceptable motives.

Because the reduction of the tension of a consciously unacceptable motive is mediated by ego-defensive responses, the relationship between an attitude and a consciously unacceptable motive is considerably more complicated than the relationship between an attitude and a consciously acceptable motive. And knowledge of any given attitude *per se* is an insufficient basis for inferring the particular consciously unacceptable motive to which it is functionally related, or, indeed, for inferring that it is related to a consciously unacceptable motive rather than a consciously acceptable one. . . .

Because the individual's consciously unacceptable motives cannot be reliably predicted solely on the basis of his manifest attitudes, a precise determination of the functional relationship between an attitude and a consciously unacceptable motive involves a postulation of which *combination* of consciously unacceptable motive and ego defense might plausibly account for the *particular* overt responses from which the attitude is inferred. After conceptualizing this most plausible combination of ego defense and consciously unacceptable motive, one must proceed *empirically* to demonstrate the relationship between that combination and the attitude it is presumed to support. In general, such attempted empirical demonstrations have, in the past, employed correlational methods. Thus, as exemplified by the extremely influential research report, *The Authoritarian Personality,*[9] responses to attitude scales are correlated with responses to personality scales, projective tests, or interviews. The particular measures of personality are coded in terms of the motivational and ego-defensive categories required by the investigator's guiding hypotheses. The resulting correlations between the attitudinal and personality measures provide the evidence on the basis of which the hypotheses are evaluated.

The other method of testing hypotheses concerning the functional relationships between attitudes and consciously unacceptable motives is, of course, experimental. While the logical advantages of an experimental over a correlational approach are quite apparent, so are the difficulties of contriving adequate experimental manipulations for, and controls over, the complex variables involved. These difficulties may, perhaps, account for the fact that relatively few experiments have been conducted in this area. In any case, an experimental test of the functional relationship between an attitude and a consciously unacceptable motive would require, depending on the particular prediction, either the manipulation of the ego defenses which presumably function to obliterate the perception of the consciously unacceptable motive whose functional relationship to the attitude has been postulated, or the arousal of the motive against whose conscious perception the individual is supposed to be defending himself by use of a particular mechanism of ego defense. If manipulation or arousal produce the predicted changes in those responses toward objects from which the attitude in question is inferred, the experiment is held to have supported the original hypothesis.

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[9] Adorno *et al., op. cit.*

It may be useful now to give examples of the process of logical inference by means of which conceptual links may be built between particular attitudes, on the one hand, and particular ego-defensive and symptomatic responses to consciously unacceptable motives, on the other. For the making of such conceptual links is not merely an exercise in logical reasoning. On the contrary, it would appear that systematic empirical research in this area is feasible only if one can first adequately conceptualize the relationships among attitudes and consciously unacceptable motives.

Attitudes Which Facilitate the Perceptual Obliteration of Threatening External Stimuli

As previously stated in the section on ego defense, a threatening external stimulus is one which is capable of arousing a motive which the individual cannot consciously contain. According to Freud, the individual can preclude such an arousal by using two mechanisms of defense—denial and identification with the aggressor—which in different ways serve to obliterate those aspects of external stimuli which are threatening to him.

Attitudes which facilitate the ego defense of denial. The defense of denial is inferred from the individual's failure to perceive, or to acknowledge the perception of, a stimulus which impinges on his sensorium and which is presumed to have threatening implications for him. More commonly, perhaps, denial is inferred by a failure or reluctance to acknowledge the magnitude of the threat inherent in a stimulus which the individual does, in fact, perceive as a threatening one. Although no empirical research has yet demonstrated the relationship between the defense of denial and the formation of any particular attitude, a number of examples, some taken from attitude research, illustrate how attitudes facilitate the responses involved in denial.

Concerning the reluctance to acknowledge the perception of an occurrence which has threatening implications for the individual, an example is the commonplace reaction to the news of the death of a relative or close friend. Frequently, such news evokes the response: "Oh, no!" Here we see an almost reflexive rejection of the threat contained in the fact of death. . . .

Quite analogous behavior is exhibited by adults who assert, in the face of impending doom, "It can't happen to me." Variations are reported in Allport, Bruner, and Jandorf's study of victims of Nazi terror.[10] . . .

It is possible that the use of the defense of denial contributes to one of the curious attitudinal phenomena reported in recent years. That fear-inducing appeals sometimes effect a resistance to attitude change[11] may be partly accounted for by the fact that some people begin to fail to perceive or refuse to acknowledge their perception of the threatening communications. Indeed, the fact that some people reacted to the fear-inducing communication by changing their attitudes in a direction opposite to that intended by the appeal may indicate both that they have a low threshold for the tolerance of fear *and* that they tend to make use of denial, rather than some other mechanism of ego defense, in preventing a threatening stimulus from exceeding their tolerance for the conscious perception of the fear motive.

* * * *

. . . the threatening stimulus against which the individual uses the defense of denial need not always be entirely separate from himself. On the contrary, one's own behavior or one's own body may contain threatening aspects which the individual wishes to deny. For example, certain clinical cases dramatically underscore the extent to which a person may go in denying those aspects of his anatomy which have come to have threatening implications for him. Thus, lesbians and homosexuals sometimes undertake to alter their appearance to look as much as possible like members of the opposite sex.

Attitudes which facilitate the ego defense of identification with the aggressor. Identification with the aggressor is inferred when an individual adopts the behavior and attitudes of a person who threatens to arouse his intolerable fear. In doing so the individual ceases to perceive the aggressor as being so separate from and at such odds with himself. In short, as he comes to share the aggressor's characteristics, the individual becomes less capable of perceiving a difference (between himself and the aggressor) which might lead the aggressor to threaten him.

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[10] G. W. Allport, J. S. Bruner, and E. M. Jandorf, "Personality under Social Catastrophe: Ninety Life-histories of the Nazi Revolution," in C. Kluckhohn *et al.*, editors, *Personality in Nature, Society, and Culture*, New York, Knopf, 1953, pp. 436–455.

[11] I. L. Janis and S. Feshbach, "Effects of Fear-arousing Communications," *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology*, Vol. 48, 1953, pp. 78–92.

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It should be noted that identification with the aggressor, like the other mechanisms of ego defense, functions unconsciously and automatically. That is, the individual is not aware of the fact that he is adopting a particular behavior or attitude in order to minimize his perception of the threatening implications of another person's behavior toward him. This lack of awareness is not true, of course, in the case of conscious emulation or hero worshipping—conditions in which an individual *deliberately* attempts to practice and learn the behavior of someone whom he *likes or admires.*

. . . examples of the use of this particular mechanism of defense are not difficult to find: a pupil involuntarily mimicking the grimaces of a menacing teacher;[12] a child forcing another child to submit to an "examination" after he has himself been disquieted by a genuine medical examination;[13] prisoners turning on their fellow inmates with the same cruelty with which they themselves have been treated by their guards.[14] Indeed, Freud postulated that this mechanism of defense was to be found at the heart of the process by means of which all of us develop an enduring conscience: parents, however kindly they treat their children, are inevitably obliged to exercise some form of coercive discipline and, hence, evoke the child's tendency to resort to the defense of identification.

Insofar as ethnic minorities are exposed to disparagement by majority groups members, they are placed in an interpersonal context which is likely to encourage the use of identification with the aggressor. Accordingly, the prejudices which members of a social minority develop toward their own group may be viewed as possible reflection of such a process.

With this reasoning in mind, the phenomenon of Jewish anti-Semitism has been studied in an effort to test several hypotheses derived from the concept of identification with the aggressor.[15] In the study an attempt was made to predict personality differences between Jews who have tended to internalize the anti-Semitic attitudes emanating from majority-group bigots and Jews who have been relatively resistant to the internalization of such hostile attitudes. Specifically, it was found that subjects classified as High in anti-Semitism differed from those in the Low category in the following predicted ways: (1) The Highs had more negative attitudes and fewer positive attitudes toward themselves and their parents; (2) The Highs tended more frequently to be passive in the face of interpersonal hostility and were less prone to retaliate actively against aggressors.

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[12] A. Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, New York, International Universities Press, 1948.

[13] A. Balint, *The Psychoanalysis of the Nursery*, London, Routledge, 1953.

[14] B. Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations," *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology*, Vol. 38, 1943, pp. 417–452.

[15] Sarnoff, "Identification with the Aggressor."

Since the results of this study were derived from a small and relatively homogeneous population of male college students, they preclude generalization to all members of the Jewish group. However, the results of the study do lend empirical support to some aspects of the Freudian theory of identification with the aggressor.

Attitudes Which Facilitate the Perceptual Obliteration of Threatening Internal Stimuli

While denial and identification with the aggressor function to eliminate the perception of external stimuli which threaten to arouse consciously unacceptable motives, other defenses of the individual help him to eliminate the perception of internal stimuli which are associated with the consciously unacceptable motive *per se*. Three of the chief defenses against the perception of threatening internal stimuli are repression, projection, and reaction formation.

Attitudes which facilitate the ego defense of repression. Repression is inferred when the individual cannot voluntarily recall a motive of which he had once been consciously aware, or a sensation or cognition, associated with a motive, of which he had once been consciously aware.

Freud conceived repression to be the most fundamental defense against the perception of threatening internal stimuli. Although repression has been utilized as an explanatory intervening variable, its *unique* relationship to a particular social attitude has not been clearly demonstrated.

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. . . From an experimental viewpoint, hypnosis might be a feasible way of solving the methodological problem. For example, the ingenious hypnotic manipulations used by Erickson would appear to indicate that via post-hypnotic suggestion it is possible to induce the repression of a motive of which the subject was clearly aware prior to the hypnotic state.[17] By attempting to re-arouse that motive in the post-hypnotic condition, the experimenter can observe the emergence of the behavior which the individual uses to maintain repression and from which repression-facilitating attitudes may be inferred. For example, the subject whose repressed motive is being stirred may become restive and develop a keen interest in some activity by which he would hope to divert his attention, as well as the experimenter's, from the consciously unacceptable motive. Under these circumstances, the subject may suddenly develop a disposition to respond to objects which facilitate repressive responses to his incipient but consciously unacceptable motive.

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[17] M. H. Erickson, "Experimental Demonstrations of the Psychopathology of Everyday Life," in S. Tomkins, editor, *Contemporary Psychopathology*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1944, pp. 517–528.

Attitudes which facilitate the ego defense of projection. . . . By attributing his own consciously unacceptable motives to others, the individual is able to avoid perceiving them as belonging to him. Thus, projection permits the individual to be preoccupied with the perception of other people's motives rather than his own.

Owing to their content, prevailing social prejudices would appear to be especially attractive to persons who use projection as a way of precluding the perception of their consciously unacceptable motives. Social prejudices involve the ascription of undesirable traits and characteristics to various groups. In our own culture, these undesirable characteristics often include behavior which overtly reduces the tensions of the motives of sex and aggression. With our tradition of Judeo-Christian morality, we tend to disapprove of the sexual and aggressive motives. People who have been punished for attempting to reduce the tension of their own sexual and aggressive motives will be inclined to repress these motives. If, following such repression, they *also* use the mechanism of projection to preclude the conscious emergence of the tensions which their unconscious motives continue to induce, they will tend to attribute their sexual and aggressive motives to others. Thus, they should be inclined to accept prevailing prejudices which depict given groups as possessing the culturally disapproved sexual and aggressive motives.

In a similar way, other culturally disapproved behavior may be functionally related to motives which the individual cannot consciously accept. Thus, greediness and slovenliness may be indirectly associated with the reduction of motives stimulated by repressed oral and anal libido, respectively; individuals who tend to project those motives in an effort to remain consciously unaware of them may readily accept social prejudices which characterize various groups as being grasping and unclean.

. . . it begins to appear that—*insofar as consciously unacceptable motives do form the basis of an individual's disposition to agree with prevailing anti-minority stereotypes*—projection plays a larger role than any of the other mechanisms of ego defense. Thus, in planning a series of experimental studies on the motivational bases of attitude change, Sarnoff and Katz first thought it reasonable to use a composite measure of several ego defenses in order to categorize subjects on a general dimension of ego defensiveness.[18]

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[18] I. Sarnoff and D. Katz, "The Motivational Bases of Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology*, Vol. 49, 1954, pp. 115–124.

It was predicted that the level of a subject's ego defensiveness would determine the extent and the direction of change in his attitude toward Negroes upon his being exposed to two kinds of communication: (1) those which provide insight into the psychodynamic relationship between anti-Negro attitudes and ego defensiveness, and (2) those which provide accurate information about Negroes.

Although subjects with various amounts of ego defensiveness did show some of the predicted differential changes in their attitude toward Negroes,[19] a close examination of the indices which comprised the ego-defensiveness measure suggested that projection was the only mechanism which actually contributed to the predictive power of the composite ego-defensiveness score. This *ex post facto* finding stimulated a follow-up experiment which provided evidence that the measure of projection, when separately employed, could predict attitude change, while the measure of the other ego defenses failed to yield reliable predictions.[20]

Attitudes which facilitate the ego defense of reaction formation. The defense of *reaction formation* is inferred when an individual makes overt responses which are directly contrary to those required for the maximal reduction of the tension generated by a consciously unacceptable motive. By behaving in this way the individual expends the energy, the *counter-cathexis* in Freudian terminology, necessary to keep the motive repressed, and maintains a perception of himself as being responsive to motives which are as dissimilar as possible to those which he does, in fact, possess.

The particular flavor of reaction formation may, perhaps, best be imparted by comparing its behavioral effects to that of another ego defense against the same consciously unacceptable motive. Let us suppose that two individuals use different mechanisms of ego defense against the same consciously unacceptable aggressive motive. If individual A uses projection, he tends to attribute his own consciously unacceptable aggressive motive to other persons. Hence, he would be inclined to see others as being driven by aggressive motives. Individual B, however, has learned to use the defense of reaction formation rather than projection as a way of supporting his original repression of the aggressive motive. Consequently, B might develop a repertory of outgoing and affectionate behavior toward others. Indeed, he might be inclined to forgive quickly and turn the "other cheek," even if unfairly treated by others. Finally, in order to facilitate his use of reaction formation, he might readily accept idealistic views of mankind and enthusiastically propound attitudes which favor peace, brotherhood, and tolerance among men. Although this behavior might, in another person, reflect genuine and consciously acceptable motives of affection and generosity, for the person using reaction formation against aggression it represents a variety of ways of precluding his own awareness of a motive which is consciously unacceptable to him.

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[19] D. Katz, I. Sarnoff, and C. McClintock, "Ego-defense and Attitude Change," *Human Relations*, Vol. 9, 1956, pp. 27–45.

[20] Katz *et al.*, "The Measurement of Ego Defense as Related to Attitude Change."

Recently, the author undertook an experiment to evaluate a hypothesis, derived from the foregoing reasoning, about the dynamics of reaction formation.[21] In this experiment the social attitude of cynicism was viewed as facilitating the use of the defense of reaction formation against a consciously unacceptable motive of affection for others. From the definition, it may be deduced that an individual who uses reaction formation as a defense against the perception of his own unconscious affection ought to behave coolly, if not with blatant hostility, toward others. By accepting skeptical and uncomplimentary views of human nature, the individual can more readily respond to others with the coolness and hostility required by his reaction formation against affection. Hence, the acceptance of a cynical attitude toward mankind may help the individual to remain unaware that he actually harbors affectionate feelings toward others.

From this theoretical analysis, it follows that one would expect empirically to obtain a positive correlation between a measure of reaction formation against affection and a measure of cynicism. Such a correlation ought not necessarily to be very pronounced, since all cynics are not the victims of reaction formation. Any given individual may have learned cynicism through experience or may be quick to endorse cynical comments out of conformity to some perceived norm. But although there may not be a very close correspondence between the habitual strength of an individual's reaction formation against affectionate feelings and his general level of cynicism, the individual's level of cynicism ought, at least temporarily, to reflect the effects of reaction formation against unconscious affectionate feelings toward others, *under conditions which arouse those unconscious feelings*. For when confronted by stimuli which evoke his affectionate feelings, the person who has a strong reaction formation against such feelings should become anxious. In order to reduce his anxiety (which is itself unpleasant) and to preclude the danger which the anxiety connotes, the individual has to expend a fresh charge of energy against his newly aroused unconscious motive. If the individual uses reaction formation as a defense against his unconscious affection, his fresh expenditure of energy ought to be reflected by a rise in the intensity of his level of consciously felt cynicism. Finally, assuming that an intense arousal of affection evokes more anxiety among individuals with a strong reaction formation against affection than among those whose reaction formation against affection is weak, the former individuals should become relatively more cynical than the latter as the intensity of the affection-arousing stimulus increases.

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[21] Sarnoff, "Reaction Formation and Cynicism."

The methodology of this experiment, therefore, was designed to test the specific hypothesis that persons who are high in reaction formation against affection (HRF) would become more cynical after the arousal of their affectionate feelings toward others than persons who are low in reaction formation against affection (LRF).

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. . . this experiment is interpreted as having provided some empirical support for the psychoanalytic concept of reaction formation.

Attitudes Which Facilitate Overt Symptomatic Responses to the Tensions of Consciously Unacceptable Motives

It is often impossible for the individual to use denial effectively to avoid the perception of those of his overt responses from which he might infer the existence of a consciously unacceptable motive. Thus, for example, many of the individual's tension-reducing responses are made to other persons; and even if an individual were not inclined to perceive the behavior involved in the reduction of tension of his consciously unacceptable motives, the persons affected by the behavior not only frequently perceive it but also call it to the individual's conscious attention. Moreover, since repressed motives continue endlessly to generate tension, the individual is obliged to reduce their tensions in a manner which will permit him both to perceive the overt behavior which does, in fact, reduce the tensions of his repressed motives and to remain unaware of the relationship between the perceived behavior and the repressed motives whose tensions it is reducing.

The individual has two ways of accomplishing this dual objective . . . . The first technique is to make direct and maximally reductive responses to the consciously unacceptable motive, but, having perceived those responses, to misinterpret their true motivational intent. The second technique is to make overt responses which indirectly and partially reduce the special tensions of the consciously unacceptable motive, but, having perceived these responses, to misinterpret their motivational intent. Both these techniques involve the use of an ego defense, *rationalization*, which permits the individual to misinterpret the motivational aim of those perceived aspects of his behavior which reduce the tension of a consciously unacceptable motive.

Attitudes which serve to facilitate the rationalization of behavior which is maximally reductive of a consciously unacceptable motive. As may be concluded from the foregoing material, rationalization is inferred whenever the individual interprets his behavior in the light of his consciously acceptable motives, although it is, in fact, reductive of his consciously unacceptable motives. Since rationalization permits an individual to have his cake and eat it too, it is a widely used mechanism of ego defense. Its use in our own culture appears to be especially encouraged by our emphasis on logic and reason, on the one hand, and religious values, on the other. Thus, in our society one can hardly pass a day without being obliged to offer a rational or morally acceptable reason for some aspect of one's behavior.

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Of course, consciously unacceptable aggression is not the only motive whose maximally reductive responses are widely rationalized. . . . our society also tends strongly to disapprove of the sexual motive. Consequently, behavior which is obviously related to the reduction of sexual tensions may be rationalized as an expression of motives other than the sexual one. Extreme examples of this sort of rationalization may sometimes be seen among persons who serve on censorship boards—agencies, often self-appointed, which presume to protect the moral virtue of the public in general or that of some particular social group. Such persons may seek to justify their constant contact with pornography as expressing their altruistic concern for the tender hearts and minds of the youth of the nation; or, once again, they may see themselves as instruments of God's will, helping to guard His flock from sin and Satan.

To support such rationalizations, a censor may be inclined to accept the following sorts of attitude: (1) that man is essentially a creature of unbridled impulse; (2) that social life and, indeed, civilization itself would be destroyed if people were not taught to check their licentious inclinations; (3) that it is criminal to shirk active participation in work which contributes to the moral elevation of mankind.

Attitudes which facilitate the rationalization of partially reductive responses to consciously unacceptable motives. It has already been shown how attitudes may facilitate the rationalization of maximally reductive overt responses to a consciously unacceptable motive. But insofar as partially reductive symptoms are perceived by the individual, they must also be rationalized. There are, for example, individuals who feel compelled to wash their hands so frequently that their skin gets raw and chaffed. This compulsive symptom may indirectly reduce the guilt which is aroused by an unconscious masturbatory motive. . . . Thus, he may seek to justify it as an appropriate precaution in a world rife with germs and filth. Accordingly, he may develop very positive attitudes toward public health agencies and measures, principles of sanitation, new drugs, disinfectants, and pesticides. Conversely, he may develop very unfavorable attitudes toward dirt, old-fashioned plumbing, and hotels which do not provide a sink in the bedroom.

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Summary

In an effort to implement the systematic application of psychoanalytic theory to empirical research on social attitudes, this paper has shown how various facets of psychoanalytic thought may be used to interrelate the concepts of motive, conflict, ego defense, and attitude. After defining and discussing each of these four broad concepts, the presentation focused upon the particular manner in which specific attitudes may contribute to the reduction of tension generated by specific motives. Accordingly, the functional relationships between attitudes and both consciously acceptable and consciously unacceptable motives were explored in detail. Finally, since it was held that the expression of an unconscious motive is always mediated by one of the ego defenses, examples were given of the ways in which social attitudes may facilitate the operation of the following ego defenses: denial, identification with the aggressor, repression, projection, reaction formation, and rationalization.

Group Dynamics and the Individual

DORWIN CARTWRIGHT, PH.D. and RONALD LIPPITT, PH.D.

How should we think of the relation between individuals and groups? Few questions have stirred up so many issues of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Do groups have the same reality as individuals? If so, what are the properties of groups? Can groups learn, have goals, be frustrated, develop, regress, begin and end? Or are these characteristics strictly attributable only to individuals? If groups exist, are they good or bad? How *should* an individual behave with respect to groups? How *should* groups treat their individual members? Such questions have puzzled man from the earliest days of recorded history.

* * * *

Five Propositions about Groups

This assumption that individuals and groups must necessarily have incompatible interests is made so frequently in one guise or another that it requires closer examination. Toward this end we propose five related assertions about individuals, groups, and group dynamics, which are intended to challenge the belief that individuals and groups must necessarily have incompatible, or for that matter, compatible interests.

* * * *

To recapitulate our argument: groups exist; they are inevitable and ubiquitous; they mobilize powerful forces having profound effects upon individuals; these effects may be good or bad; and through a knowledge of group dynamics there lies the possibility of maximizing their good value.

A Dilemma

* * * *

Dorwin Cartwright and Ronald Lippitt, "Group Dynamics and the Individual," International Journal of Group Psychotherapy, *Vol. 7, No. 1 (1957), pp. 86–102. Reprinted by permission of the authors and the publisher.*

We seem . . . to face a dilemma: the individual needs social support for his values and social beliefs; he needs to be accepted as a valued member of some group which *he* values; failure to maintain such group membership produces anxiety and personal disorganization. But, on the other hand, group membership and group participation tend to cost the individual his individuality. If he is to receive support from others and, in turn, give support to others, he and they must hold in common some values and beliefs. Deviation from these undermines any possibility of group support and acceptance.

Is there an avenue of escape from this dilemma? . . . The need for social support for some values does not require conformity with respect to all values, beliefs, and behavior. Any individual is a member of several groups, and he may be a successful deviate in one while conforming to another (think of the visitor in a foreign country or of the psychologist at a convention of psychiatrists). Nor should the time dimension be ignored; a person may sustain his deviancy through a conviction that his fate is only temporary. These refinements of the issue are important and should be examined in great detail, but before we turn our attention to them, we must assert that we do *not* believe that the basic dilemma can be escaped. To avoid complete personal disorganization man must conform to at least a minimal set of values required for participation in the groups to which he belongs.

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Pressures to Uniformity

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First, a great deal of evidence has been accumulated to support the hypothesis that pressures to uniformity will be greater the more members want to remain in the group. In more attractive or cohesive groups, members attempt more to influence others and are more willing to accept influence from others. Note that here pressures to conformity are high in the very conditions where satisfaction from group membership is also high.

Second, there is a close relation between attempts to change the deviate and tendencies to reject him. If persistent attempts to change the deviate fail to produce conformity, then communication appears to cease between the majority and the deviate, and rejection of the deviate sets in. These two processes, moreover, are more intense the more cohesive the group.

* * * *

Third, there is the question of what determines whether or not pressures to uniformity will arise with respect to any particular opinion, attitude, and behavior. In most groups there are no pressures to uniformity concerning the color of necktie worn by the members. Differences of opinion about the age of the earth probably would not lead to rejection in a poker club, but they might do so in certain fundamentalist church groups. The concept of *relevance* seems to be required to account for such variations in pressures to uniformity. And, if we ask, "relevance for what?" we are forced again to look at the group and especially at the goals of the group.

Sources of Heterogeneity

We have seen that pressures to uniformity are stronger the more cohesive the group. Shall we conclude from this that strong, need-satisfying, cohesive groups must always produce uniformity on matters that are important to the group? We believe not. We cannot, however, cite much convincing evidence since research has focused to date primarily upon the sources of pressures to uniformity and has ignored the conditions which produce heterogeneity. Without suggesting, then, that we can give final answers, let us indicate some of the possible sources of heterogeneity.

Group Standards about Uniformity. It is important, first, to make a distinction between conformity and uniformity. A group might have a value that everyone should be as different from everyone else as possible. Conformity to this value, then, would result not in uniformity of behavior but in nonuniformity. Such a situation often arises in therapy groups or training groups where it is possible to establish norms which place a high value upon "being different" and upon tolerating deviant behavior. Conformity to this value is presumably greater the more cohesive the group and the more it is seen as relevant to the group's objectives. Unfortunately, very little is known about the origin and operation of group standards about conformity itself. We doubt that the pressure to uniformity which arises from the need for "social reality" and for group locomotion can simply be obliterated by invoking a group standard of tolerance, but a closer look at such processes as those of group decision-making will be required before a deep understanding of this problem can be achieved.

Freedom to Deviate. A rather different source of heterogeneity has been suggested by Kelley and Shapiro (12). They reason that the more an individual feels accepted by the other members of the group, the more ready he should be to deviate from the beliefs of the majority under conditions where objectively correct deviation would be in the group's best interest. They designed an experiment to test this hypothesis. The results, while not entirely clear because acceptance led to greater cohesiveness, tend to support this line of reasoning.

It has been suggested by some that those in positions of leadership are freer to deviate from group standards than are those of lesser status. Just the opposite conclusion has been drawn by others. Clearly, further research into group properties which generate freedom to deviate from majority pressures is needed.

Subgroup Formation. Festinger and Thibaut (8) have shown that lower group-wide pressures to uniformity of opinion result when members of a group perceive that the group is composed of persons differing in interest and knowledge. Under these conditions subgroups may easily develop with a resulting heterogeneity within the group as a whole though with uniformity within each subgroup. This conclusion is consistent with Asch's (1) finding that the presence of a partner for a deviate greatly strengthens his tendency to be independent. One might suspect that such processes, though achieving temporarily a greater heterogeneity, would result in a schismatic subgroup conflict.

Positions and Roles. A more integrative achievement of heterogeneity seems to arise through the process of role differentiation. Established groups are usually differentiated according to "positions" with special functions attached to each. The occupant of the position has certain behaviors prescribed for him by the others in the group. These role prescriptions differ, moreover, from one position to another, with the result that conformity to them produces heterogeneity within the group. A group function, which might otherwise be suppressed by pressures to uniformity, may be preserved by the establishment of a position whose responsibility is to perform the function.

Hall (10) has recently shown that social roles can be profitably conceived in the context of conformity to group pressures. He reasoned that pressures to uniformity of prescriptions concerning the behavior of the occupant of a position and pressures on the occupant to conform to these prescriptions should be greater the more cohesive the group. A study of the role of aircraft commander in bomber crews lends strong support to this conception.

In summary, it should be noted that in all but one of these suggested sources of heterogeneity we have assumed the process of conformity—to the norms of a subgroup, to a role, or to a group standard favoring heterogeneity. Even if the price of membership in a strong group be conformity, it need not follow that strong groups will suppress differences.

More Than One Group

Thus far our analysis has proceeded as though the individual were a member of only one group. Actually we recognize that he is, and has been, a member of many groups. In one of our current research projects we are finding that older adolescents can name from twenty to forty "important groups and persons that influence my opinions and behavior in decision situations." Indeed, some personality theorists hold that personality should be viewed as an "internal society" made up of representations of the diverse group relationships which the individual now has and has had. According to this view, each individual has a unique internal society and makes his own personal synthesis of the values and behavior preferences generated by these affiliations.

The various memberships of an individual may relate to one another in various ways and produce various consequences for the individual. A past group may exert internal pressures toward conformity which are in conflict with a present group. Two contemporaneous groups may have expectations for the person which are incompatible. Or an individual may hold a temporary membership (the situation of a foreign student, for example) and be faced with current conformity pressures which if accepted will make it difficult to readjust when returning to his more permanent memberships.

This constant source of influence from other memberships toward deviancy of every member of every group requires that each group take measures to preserve its integrity. It should be noted, however, that particular deviancy pressures associated with a given member may be creative or destructive when evaluated in terms of the integrity and productivity of the group, and conformity pressures from the group may be supportive or disruptive of the integrity of the individual.

Unfortunately there has been little systematic research on these aspects of multiple group membership. We can only indicate two sets of observations concerning (a) the intrapersonal processes resulting from multiple membership demands, and (b) the effects on group processes of the deviancy pressures which arise from the multiple membership status of individual members.

Marginal Membership. Lewin (13), in his discussion of adolescence and of minority group membership, has analyzed some of the psychological effects on the person of being "between two groups" without a firm anchorage in either one. He says: "The transition from childhood to adulthood may be a rather sudden shift (for instance, in some of the primitive societies), or it may occur gradually in a setting where children and adults are not sharply separated groups. In the case of the so-called 'adolescent difficulties,' however, a third state of affairs is often prevalent: children and adults constitute two clearly defined groups; the adolescent does not wish any longer to belong to the children's group and, at the same time, knows that he is not really accepted in the adult group. He has a position similar to what is called in sociology the 'marginal man' . . . a person who stands on the boundary between two groups. He does not belong to either of them, or at least he is not sure of his belongingness in either of them" (p. 143). Lewin goes on to point out that there are characteristic maladjustive behavior patterns resulting from this unstable membership situation: high tension, shifts between extremes of behavior, high sensitivity, and rejection of low status members of both groups. This situation, rather than fostering strong individuality, makes belonging to closely knit, loyalty-demanding groups very attractive. Dependency and acceptance are a welcome relief. Probably most therapy groups have a number of members who are seeking relief from marginality.

Overlapping Membership. There is quite a different type of situation where the person does have a firm anchorage in two or more groups but where the group standards are not fully compatible. Usually the actual conflict arises when the person is physically present in one group but realizes that he also belongs to other groups to which he will return in the near or distant future. In this sense, the child moves between his family group and his school group every day. The member of a therapy group has some sort of time perspective of "going back" to a variety of other groups between each meeting of the therapy group.

In their study of the adjustment of foreign students both in this country and after returning home, Watson and Lippitt (26) observed four different ways in which individuals cope with this problem of overlapping membership.

1. Some students solved the problem by "living in the present" at all times. When they were in the American culture all of their energy and attention was directed to being an acceptable member of this group. They avoided conflict within themselves by minimizing thought about and contact with the other group "back home." When they returned to the other group they used the same type of solution, quickly shifting behavior and ideas to fit back into the new present group. Their behavior appeared quite inconsistent, but it was a consistent approach to solving their problem of multiple membership.
2. Other individuals chose to keep their other membership the dominant one while in this country. They were defensive and rejective every time the present group seemed to promote values and to expect behavior which they felt might not be acceptable to the other group "back home." The strain of maintaining this orientation was relieved by turning every situation into a "black and white" comparison and adopting a consistently rejective posture toward the present, inferior group. This way of adjusting required a considerable amount of distorting of present and past realities, but the return to the other group was relatively easy.
3. Others reacted in a sharply contrasting way by identifying wholeheartedly with the present group and by rejecting the standards of the other group as incorrect or inferior at the points of conflict. They were, of course, accepted by the present group, but when they returned home they met rejection or felt alienated from the standards of the group (even when they felt accepted).
4. Some few individuals seemed to achieve a more difficult but also more creative solution. They attempted to regard membership in both groups

as desirable. In order to succeed in this effort, they had to be more realistic about perceiving the inconsistencies between the group expectations and to struggle to make balanced judgments about the strong and weak points of each group. Besides taking this more objective approach to evaluation, these persons worked on problems of how the strengths of one group might be interpreted and utilized by the other group. They were taking roles of creative deviancy in both groups, but attempting to make their contributions in such a way as to be accepted as loyal and productive members. They found ways of using each group membership as a resource for contributing to the welfare of the other group. Some members of each group were of course threatened by this readiness and ability to question the present modal ways of doing things in the group.

Thus it seems that the existence of multiple group memberships creates difficult problems both for the person and for the group. But there are also potentialities and supports for the development of creative individuality in this situation, and there are potentialities for group growth and achievement in the fact that the members of any group are also members of other groups with different standards.

Some Conclusions

Let us return now to the question raised at the beginning of this paper. How should we think of the relation between individuals and groups? If we accept the assumption that individuals and groups are both important social realities, we can then ask a pair of important questions. What kinds of effects do groups have on the emotional security and creative productivity of the individual? What kinds of effects do individuals have on the morale and creative productivity of the group? In answering these questions it is important to be alerted to both good and bad effects. Although the systematic evidence from research does not begin to provide full answers to these questions, we have found evidence which tends to support the following general statements.

Strong groups do exert strong influences on members toward conformity. These conformity pressures, however, may be directed toward uniformity of thinking and behavior, or they may foster heterogeneity.

Acceptance of these conformity pressures, toward uniformity or heterogeneity, may satisfy the emotional needs of some members and frustrate others. Similarly, it may support the potential creativity of some members and inhibit that of others.

From their experiences of multiple membership and their personal synthesis of these experiences, individuals do have opportunities to achieve significant bases of individuality.

Because each group is made up of members who are loyal members of other groups and who have unique individual interests, each group must continuously cope with deviancy tendencies of the members. These tendencies may represent a source of creative improvement in the life of the group or a source of destructive disruption.

The resolution of these conflicting interests does not seem to be the strengthening of individuals and the weakening of groups, or the strengthening of groups and the weakening of individuals, but rather a strengthening of both by qualitative improvements in the nature of interdependence between integrated individuals and cohesive groups.

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Character Structure: Its Rôle in the Analysis of Interpersonal Relations

ERNEST BEAGLEHOLE

All who have tried to apply the viewpoint and insights of interpersonal theory to the analysis of human interaction must at times have felt the need for some sort of framework or structure within which the multitude of various and varying interpersonal relations might find some sort of classificatory order. Unless it is ultimately possible to classify interpersonal relations according to classes, types and variations, it would seem that it is likely to be difficult ever to bring within the compass of scientific study the apparently unnumerable ways in which persons interact with one another. It is true that a preliminary classification of interpersonal relations on the basis of the kinds of satisfactions and securities towards which persons strive is illuminating. But it still remains true that, taking the broadest perspective, considering primitive as well as civilized societies, something more comprehensive is needed as the basis of a classificatory scheme than one which deals only in terms of alleged primary or original human needs.

By its very nature and in order to preserve its existence as a satisfier of the human need for security, every society offers to its members a series of patterns or norms of feeling, thought and behavior which it insists that its members follow. Phrased in Linton's terminology,[1] every culture orders the interpersonal relations of its carriers on the basis of a set of universals and alternatives. The universals are those types of interaction that everyone must follow if he is to remain a member of the group. The alternatives present sets of variant interactions that may be followed according to certain

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[1] Linton, Ralph, *The Study of Man;* New York, Appleton-Century, 1936 (ix and 503 pp.)—refer to pp. 271–287.

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defined conditions. As one passes from the most general to the less frequent human responses, one finds that ways of interaction are defined first of all by culture; secondly, by class and clique or caste—or perhaps by both class and caste; thirdly, by family and other group patterns. It is first necessary to consider in turn and briefly each of these major ways of determining interpersonal relations.

Culture

Presumably, the function of any culture is to offer a way of life that will satisfy certain and selected human needs. What needs are chosen for satisfaction and what techniques are offered whereby satisfaction may be obtained varies greatly from one culture to another. But without culture man would be determined entirely by the press and tension of his biological drives. Growing within culture, man is able in large degree to 'turn tables' on his biological inheritance by controlling it; whereas in a non-cultural condition, it would control him. Follow Frank in this connection and note the ways in which any culture so provides for human needs that a social and not merely or only an animal life is made possible.[2]

Frank observes that persons everywhere face three persistent life tasks. To come to terms with the environment so that the group may survive physically is the first task; the second is to organize a group life that preserves order, regularity and security; the third, to construct ideas, beliefs and feelings within the person that will fit him into this group life. According to Frank, in order to perform these tasks, all peoples have developed a number of basic organizing concepts: the first is a conception of the universe—its origin and its control; the second is a conception that places man in this universe showing how he in turn originated and is controlled; the third conception places man in society according to such relationships as age, sex, class, caste, status, rank and their rights and duties; the fourth conception contains a theory of human nature and conduct, providing an interpretation of motives, a theory of the self, the sanctions of conduct, and therefore, a justification for a specific type of education and child socialization. These four conceptions thus represent the basic organizing dimensions of culture. They provide a framework for interpersonal relations in such fashion that the person may learn how to participate in group life and how to order his own conduct with a view to furthering desirable integration with other members of the group. Every known culture uses the focal points of sex and age to determine the person's place in the social group. Thus the basic dimensions will provide a slightly different frame for the person according to his own age and sex and those with whom he is expected, or desires, to integrate personal situations.

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[2] Frank, Lawrence K., Science and Culture. *Scientific Monthly* (1940) 50:491–497.

Through the use of each and all of these four basic concepts what, in effect, culture does is to say to its carriers: if you wish for certain culturally valuable satisfactions, then your interpersonal relations with other members of the group must be directed and controlled in order to achieve these goals. Any particular culture naturally will provide its own specific variations as to the way in which interpersonal relations are ordered for the purpose of achieving these goals. But, some ordering there must be. Therefore, in the broadest manner, the primary structuralization[3] of interpersonal relations is determined by culture in general and by a specific culture in particular.

Class and Caste

It is to be noted however that these cultural directives are often broad and general in the extreme. In societies which are numerically large or in which economic factors appear to grade persons according to occupation, wealth, education, tradition and the like, some more specific directives are needed before people can learn how to provide themselves with security in their contacts with other people. These further directives are given by the person's class, clique and caste membership. Through the internalization of these directives, a person learns how to order his interpersonal relations to his equals, his social inferiors and superiors, to those with whom caste forbids or enjoins specific types of contact. These directives then control such explicit relations as those involved in earning a living or raising children or courting or getting married. They indicate, for instance, how, when, with whom one should establish sex relations. The permissible or perhaps compulsive forms of sex relation—whether monogamy, polygamy, polyandry—are set by the specific culture. Class and caste directives further define or delimit certain kinds of interpersonal relations integrated by sex in terms of specific membership patterns fixed by these class and caste groups.[4]

In the field of social intercourse, class and caste directives may often be embodied in a system of etiquette or a set pattern of social ritual. The person's ability to understand and to control this system makes it possible for him to order both his formal and his more informal or intimate social and private relations with other people. These social relations will be personally fitted into patterns of integration largely determined either positively, by these class and clique directives, or negatively, by playing with the rules of the social game in order to achieve some further advantage or satisfaction to himself.

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[3] Although phraseology is not momentarily of any importance, one might interpolate the major directives or integrations.

[4] Good instances of the way this class and caste patterning functions in sex integrations are to be found in the case studies of Negro girls given in Brenman, Margaret, Urban Lower-Class Negro Girls, PSYCHIATRY (1943) 6:307–323.

Institutional Groups

Within the limitations set by class and caste, such institutions as the family, school, play, neighborhood and church groups exist as tools or techniques for passing on the major cultural directives. However, so far as education is concerned, according to one modern definition, not only with cultural transmission but also with cultural renewal, it seems clear that a knowledge of the patterns of education in any community is necessary in order to interpret certain of the interpersonal integrations of this community. A person who has absorbed the traditions of Eton or Andover, Oxford or Princeton, will tend to redefine common cultural integrations in a fashion somewhat different from one whose education has been gained at the Little Red Schoolhouse. Some of these differences are class differences, but others relate to the presence or absence of a tradition and to the peculiarities of the poverty or richness of the subculture that has been developed in the particular educational institution concerned.

In a similar fashion, the major rôle of the family in respect to the young is to provide for emotional satisfactions while completing the preliminary socialization of the child according to the major directives of the society. But, because the family not only transmits but at the same time, remakes, in small and often subtle fashion some of the patterns of society, it may often possess relative importance in redefining the emphasis of certain cultural dimensions. Thus may be contrasted here the patterns of authority in a conservative rural family with those in an urban "equal partnership" family—or perhaps the treatment of thumb-sucking and childish sex plays in an old-fashioned conventional family may be compared with that which similar infantile habits receive in a modern family saturated with the teachings of modern dynamic psychology. The impact on the growing child of these differences may be slight from a gross or molar social point of view, but from the molecular viewpoint, that is in terms of interpersonal integrations, they may be important personal determinants in critical situations.

It is clear theoretically, even if still impossible practically, that one should be roughly able to predict how a person will integrate an interpersonal situation when the nature of the major directives that have patterned his life are known—in other words, when one knows his age, sex, culture, class or caste, education, religion, family background—and those of the other person or persons with whom the situation is being integrated. This can be done the more readily when the situation involved is a relatively simple one—the reaction to death, for instance, or leadership-authority. It is much more difficult to make predictions when the situation is complex enough to carry various overtones of private meaning—for example, the reaction to frustration or defeat. Such forms of popular art as the movies and 'pot-boiler' novels depend for their appeal on the fact that after the hero, heroine and villain are introduced to audience or reader through the use of various stereotypes, then the audience is sufficiently sensitive to the impact of major directives embodied in such stock characters that it is able to follow through, as if in a familiar world, the variations on the usual interpersonal integrations that make up typical movie or novel fare. To use the terminology of Allport,[5] as long as the person is integrating situations on the basis of the major directives, his behavior is subject to nomothetic psychological laws. When, however, he acts in a private and personal way, presenting a variation on the compulsions of these major directives, his behavior is subject to idiographic laws that derive ultimately from the specific and unique life history of the person involved.

The important idea in all this is the fact that, when the person is acting according to the major directives he is really acting according to a personal organization or structure of his own needs, emotions and thoughts which is in congruence with the emphases of the major directives themselves. In other words the person has developed a character structure in response to the specific pressures of his own culture. When a person acts idiographically, he is determined by a personal variant on this character structure, that is, by the specific drives of a unique personality. A person's integrations can be predicted when it is known that his personality corresponds rather exactly to the character structure of the group. One is often at a loss to predict the course of a person's integrations when how different or how alike his personality is to this character structure is not known.

Analysis of Character Structure

Character structure may be thought of as an organization of the needs and emotions within each person that fits him to respond adaptively to the major social values of the group—to the "of courses" as Lynd calls them.[6] If these values center round the theme of the ideal man's being ruthless, aggressive, or competitive, then the character structure fits the person to adopt these ideals as his own. If on the other hand, the ideal man is generous, friendly, a sharer of all that he has with other members of the group, then the character structure of all but the deviants of this group will be of such a nature as to make them feel at home in generous, friendly, interpersonal integrations and to strive after such integrations as the preferred and valuable ones. In both cases the function of anxiety is that of exercising a form of social and therefore individual control by making the person feel fearful, lonely, insecure and afraid when his behavior does not conform to the preferred evaluations of his group.

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[5] Allport, Gordon W., *The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science;* New York, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 49, 1942 (xix and 210 pp.)—in particular, Chapter 4, Nomothetic and Idiographic Uses; Chapter 12, The Problem of Conceptualization.

[6] For Lynd's list of these "of courses" and his discussion of their sociological significance refer to Lynd, Robert S., and Lynd, Helen M., *Middletown in Transition:* New York, Harcourt Brace, 1937 (xviii and 604 pp.)—pp. 402–486. The patterns of American culture are considered from a more theoretical viewpoint by Lynd, Robert S., *Knowledge for What?;* Princeton, University Press, 1939 (x and 268 pp.)—refer to pp. 54–113.

It is clear from modern study of infancy and childhood that one must look for the origin and development of the character structure within the person in the process of socialization whereby the animal human is turned into a human animal. Through the techniques of reward and punishment, of frustration and gratification, that any particular group uses in the discipline, control and development of the growing infant and young child, the primary organization of needs, emotions and ways of thinking is gradually fabricated, mainly unconsciously, in the child. Thus, by the time the child reaches adolescence and adulthood, he is conditioned positively to respond by the nature of his own psychological organization to the ideas and values of his group. To the degree that his family is like other families this psychological organization will correspond to that of other members of the group. So far as his family is different, he will develop a personality that differs by so much or so little from the preferred personality of the group.

It is worth noting here that while psychologists of what may be called the neo-psychoanalytic school—to whom in fact is owed this concept of character structure—would agree with classical psychoanalysts on the importance of the period of infancy in the development of the person's emotional life, the newer school would disagree with orthodox Freudians as to how this development may be best conceptualized. Orthodox Freudians tend to think in terms of permutations, combinations and transformations of the primary libidinal drive with its component or conflicting instincts. It is customary also for many contemporary psychologists to think of the development of the person in terms of transformations and fusions of a number of primary needs, drives, tensions or dependable motives—for them of course, nothing so naïve as instincts; but the puzzled student is often hard-pressed to distinguish clearly between an older concept of 'instinct' and a modern one of 'drives.' By contrast it is probably fair to say that, to this neo-psychoanalytic school, what constitutes human nature is largely irrelevant to the main job of analysing this human nature—it is one of those questions which should never be asked because it only sidetracks and does not advance research.

What happens when one objectively examines interpersonal relations is that one observes a number of permanently uniform integrations common to all people controlled by the same major directives. The aim of these integrations seems to be that of achieving various satisfactions and securities. One also observes uncommon, unique or atypical integrations or else common integrations used for purposes or meanings other than those usually accepted by the group—sex integrations made for security purposes or for the sake of prestige, for instance. The uniform integrations, so far as they conform to a common pattern, are explainable in terms of the common character structure of members of the group, developed in infancy. The atypical integrations are due to unique personality deviations from this common cultural theme of character structure. How many of these common integrations are original in the sense of being determined by intra-personal biological needs, irrespective of character structure organization, is of no particular significance. The important aim is to 'pin down' the specific type of intra-personal organization that is responsible for both common and unique interpersonal integrations.

The integration-determining structure of needs and feelings constructed during infancy is generally reënforced and supported by the continued conditioning of the middle years of childhood and adolescence and by all the "of courses" of culture as the person learns to participate more and more in the ever-widening circles of group activity. Hence this original character structure may very well be called the primary character structure of the person. Under normal circumstances and in relatively static societies, it will be the only character structure that the person possesses. In certain societies, however, and under certain critical conditions it is clear that the person may very well build or be forced to develop, either for permanent or temporary change, a secondary character structure which will enable him as a person to react dynamically and adaptively to a new set of major directives. With the advent of revolution, for instance, especially a revolution that brings with it profound change in the cultural values of the group—the Russian revolution or the French as compared with endemic Latin-American revolutions, the older generations may be forced to develop a secondary character structure, not so deeply or pervasively organized perhaps as the primary structure, that will enable them to adapt at least on a surface level to the newer pattern of social values. For some this process of development may be difficult, for others it may be more easy—much probably depends in this instance on the personality, whether it is of the hoarding, retentive obsessional type or of the more extravert new-experience-welcoming type.

Another illustration would be the impact of modern war on a complex contemporary Christian society. War means many things to many persons. But with modern conscript democratic armies it means, for the ordinary recruit, a process of training and indoctrination which will fit one for dynamic adaptation to the values and purposes of army life. So far as the values vary a great deal from those of peace time civilian life and the purposes of war contradict specifically and directly some of the major functions of peaceful group existence, it is both necessary to develop in the soldier a secondary character structure and logical to expect that some should 'break down' under the pressure of the training process.[7] The civilian, after all, has been trained to make certain automatic integrations to women, or to persons with authority or to friends and companions of the same sex. Army indoctrination and the conditions of army life—the army is an instance only, the process is of course parallel in other branches of the armed services—set a premium and a reward on integrations of a contradictory type. The person who has been reared to value and to follow compulsively certain work motivations and to feel anxiously guilt-ridden if he does not work in this way, may find the work motivations of the Armed Forces—work only as much as you have to, never take responsibility if you can possibly avoid it—work motivations in one sense of medieval man—so unacceptable as to produce positive anxiety. Nonetheless, so long as the person remains in the Army, he has either to incorporate this aspect of secondary character structure into his own personality or remain a misfit and an outsider in his Army unit.

Many, probably the majority, are able to develop this secondary character structure with a minimum of psychic 'wear and tear.'[8] Presumably the majority will also be able to 'slough off' this secondary character structure with the minimum of trouble when the day of demobilization comes. For others, however, the rewards for building a new set of integrations or the rewards for trying to integrate interpersonal relations on the basis of the major directives of Army life are so slight that a state of intrapersonal conflict develops. There is conflict between the primary integrations and the secondary structure. Anxiety becomes acute. The person in effect tries to integrate situations at the secondary level but the primary integrations persist as parataxic integrations. Under some stress, war neurosis develops as a reaction to long continued strain, or else desertion or some form of personality disorder.

From this view, therefore, the war neurosis is the result of the person's trying to harness two sets of contradictory integrations: those due to the primary and to the secondary character structures. It is not surprising that some develop disorder before the actual battle is joined: to them stress and strain began the day they reported to the induction camp. But the reason why they 'broke down' and others never 'break down' at all is not to be found in the further explorations of character structure. The answer to this problem presumably lies in the field of personality study.

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[7] In fact, some of those who are classified for selection experience severe personality disorder before induction into the Armed Forces. It is likely that many conscientious objectors come within this category of pre-induction neurotics.

[8] Some aspects of the sort of character structure demanded by Army life may be inferred from a study of Maskin, Meyer H., and Altman, Leon L., Military Psychodynamics. Psychological Factors in the Transition from Civilian to Soldier. PSYCHIATRY (1943) 6:263–269. Also of value in this connection is Bartlett, F. C., *Psychology and the Soldier*; Cambridge, University Press, 1927 (viii and 224 pp.).

Some persons join to their primary character structure a more elastic or flexible self which enables them so to compartmentalize their values that the secondary character structure can for a time become the main director of interpersonal integrations. Others with not so flexible selves, or perhaps with more obsessional personalities, find new integrations disturbing, annoying, anxiety-producing. To them the newer, secondary structure of values is nothing but an evil incubus whose weight becomes ever harder to bear and whose deposition in the end by way of neurotic disorder becomes a relief of the greatest magnitude.

This is one way of answering the question: "What is the cause of war neurosis?" It is the most general conceptual answer that can be given. Much of the current theoretical discussion as to the cause of war neurosis not only misleadingly argues backwards from results allegedly secured by the use, and only the use, of a specific therapeutic technique—as if all the conditions producing a cure were under the control of the psychiatrist, which is manifestly impossible—but also rest on methodological confusions as to the logical nature of cause and the level of explanation at which cause is to be detected and described.

The ætiology of interpersonal disorder is difficult to analyse at any time unless there is available a carefully formulated logical structure that will make possible various necessary distinctions between such operating factors as cause, necessary condition, immediate condition, negative condition, co-existence and the like.[9] Even with these logical distinctions and the employment of a logical method, as many a logician has shown since the days when John Stuart Mill heroically wrestled with the question, this problem of discovering or demonstrating the operation of casual factors in any particular flux of events is by no means simple. The matter is not made easier but more difficult if one has to evaluate the impact on the "civil" personality structure of such complicated factors as are involved in the stresses and tensions of modern warfare.

The Study of Character Structure

In the light of what has been said about the nature of character structure it may be worthwhile briefly to mention some representative investigations that have been made into the problem of cultural dynamics where the investigator has attempted to order his material with the aid of this concept of character structure or one essentially comparable to it.

Going back no further than the year 1935, one may first recall Margaret Mead's study of the relation between sex and temperament.[10] In order to suggest that temperament is not sex-linked but is conditioned for male or female by cultural factors, Mead made use of the concept of the standardized personality. Thus she was able to characterize the Arapesh people as mild, maternal, responsive, the Mundugumor as violent, ruthless and aggressive, the Tchambali woman as dominant, impersonal and managing, the Tchambuli man as emotionally dependent. By linking these culturally preferred personalities in each of these three different cultural groups with specific types of infant socialization, Mead was further able to show the way the adult personality pattern could be plausibly derived from the early experiences of the child and the way also in which it received support from the total phrasing of all the social values of the culture concerned. One may suggest here perhaps that the term character structure more nearly expresses the essential nature of what Mead was describing for these New Guinea people than the term personality. Character structure, as has been emphasized, refers to the dynamic organization of needs and emotions that the members of a particular culture have in common. Personality refers to the variation on this common organization that persons possess as persons. Hence, it is the character structure of Arapesh people that basically determines their peaceful, mild and maternal types of integrations one with another. On this character structure is superimposed the secondary determining factor of individual personality.

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[9] A recent interesting excursion into this field is provided by Halliday, James L., Principles of Ætiology, *Brit. J. Medical Psychol.* (1943) 19:367–380.

[10] Mead, Margaret, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies;* New York, Morrow, 1935 (xxii and 335 pp.).

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. . . The concept of character structure is basic for the understanding of the dynamics of many social processes. It is therefore a concept that serves to bridge a gap between psychology and sociology. It offers a genuine nuclear concept around which various aspects of social science research may very well be orientated.

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Studies in Dominative and Socially Integrative Behavior

HAROLD H. ANDERSON, PH.D.

In biology, as in psychology, there are degrees, or stages, or milestones along the circuitous road toward unity. There is a continuum from atomistic, unsocial behavior to behavior of a highly social, organismic, integrative nature. There are biological cells that subdivide but do not cohere or live together in any sense contributing to the mutual welfare of each other. On the other hand, there are biological organisms that are composed of billions of cohering cells, each cell having an individuality of its own, but all behaving in a way that could be characterized as "groping toward unity."

It is noted that those cells that behave atomistically are not very highly specialized. They are said to represent a very low form of biological existence. On the other hand, cells that behave in a biologically integrative way, that show a biologically common purpose, become highly differentiated.

In fact, in most discussions of growth are mentioned these two characteristics or criteria: a progressive specialization on the one hand, and a progressive working or living or behaving together on the other.

These two characteristics of growth are referred to by different names. The progressive specialization designates a process by which the cell or the group of cells becomes more unique, takes on a character or an individuality of its own; it is called, in fact, a process of individuation, or of differentiation. The other characteristic is called integration, the developing of a one-ness or a together-ness of functions that could otherwise be separate or disintegrated. Man considers himself to represent a "higher form of life" because of the relatively greater differentiation of his several

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Harold H. Anderson, "Studies in Dominative and Socially Integrative Behavior," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, *Vol. 15, No. 1 (1945), pp. 133–139. Copyright, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc. Reproduced by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

billion cells which over millions of years of biological history have made relatively greater progress in their circuitous groping toward unity.

It is to be noted, however, that while the phenomena of differentiation and of integration are not found alone in biology, in sociology, or in psychology, most biologists, neurologists, and psychologists give higher regard to, and mention first in their discussion of growth, the phenomenon of individuation or differentiation. Since the two aspects of growth exist only together, what difference does it make whether one or the other is emphasized? Probably no one can ever show a causal relationship that differentiation makes possible or causes integration or that integration causes individuation. It is assumed here that these two aspects are not separate and distinct, nor can they be; they are merely different ways of considering one phenomenon—growth.

It is postulated here that the consistent emphasis on individuation has contributed gravely, if educators have any influence whatsoever on the behavior of students, to confusion in human motives, to frustration in pedagogical objectives, to unnecessary conflict in all forms of human relations.

Plant (16) has reminded us of the tendency in school for each child to move up as an individual, as an atomistically behaving individual; that in each child there is an almost utter disregard for the growth and development of others. Plant has said that psychiatrists, psychologists, educators, and parents must find some means whereby a schoolroom of children can grow and develop as socially participating individuals. Each child *could* contribute more than he does to the others. And in this interplay of differences each would show immeasurably greater progress in his own specialization or individuation. Plant would change the atomistic character of educational objectives to organismic or socially integrating behavior.

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Neither Plant nor the writer is advocating that children all become Pollyannas, going about thinking uniquely of each other. They would be as far from growing at their optimum as they now are in thinking about themselves. One can see preschool children on occasion so engrossed in an activity that their behavior is almost selfless. And occasionally one sees adults working together in some common purpose with such interest, energy, and enthusiasm that it is meaningless to say that any is considering himself first, second, or last. It is this kind of social participation that illustrates the point made by Follett that there is no difference between individual good and social good (13, ch. 2). Growth is self-abandoning, it is a giving up. The ideal is to be engrossed in an activity and to be oblivious of oneself.

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It is assumed that growth is biologically meaningful behavior; as such it is voluntary or spontaneous (15). It emerges from within. It cannot be coerced. If one feeds the baby too much cod liver oil, nutritionists say the baby assimilates what it can use, what is biologically meaningful, and it discards the rest. It is by this process that nutritionists define "too much." If one feeds the baby something that can neither be integrated for the welfare of the whole organism nor eliminated, the baby runs a temperature, which is an expression of lack of biological harmony. Psychologists and educators have an analogy in the phenomenon of learning which is a voluntary, spontaneous, psychologically meaningful experience. If learning could be coerced or if meaning could be compelled, what a lot of wise men there would be in the world! When a teacher tries to force meaningless material on a child, the child, like the baby with the cod liver oil, eliminates everything he cannot use. We call it day-dreaming, sleeping in class, inattention, lack of interest. If the student cannot eliminate such meaningless material he may run a psychological temperature and shoot paper wads or draw cartoons of the professor in his notebook.

A further assumption follows: growth emerges only in a propitious environment; in this sense and to this extent, growth is not a characteristic of the individual as such, nor a characteristic of the environment as such. Growth is a characteristic of the interplay between a changing individual and a changing environment. This proposition does not bother a botanist or a farmer, but it does seem to be confusing to psychologists. The reason why growing cotton is not commercially profitable in Minnesota is to be found not in the analysis of the structure or characteristics of cotton as such, nor in the analysis of soil and climate of Minnesota, but in the interacting process between cotton plants and the environment afforded in Minnesota.

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If one's interest in personality is on the product it is possible to ignore the process. But if one's interest is on the process he cannot disregard the product. Allport says that "Personality *is* something and *does* something" (1, p. 48). Personality would be defined here rather as a rate of growth. Culture becomes relevant not only, as for Allport, *when* "it has become *interiorized* within the person" but *while it is becoming* interiorized. It is postulated here that "relatively enduring" personalities are found only in environments that afford relatively constant factors affecting the rate of growth. This assumption is consistent with the point of view elaborated by Angyal: "... the life process does not take place *within* the organism, but *between the organism and the environment*" (10, p. 31–32.)

To say further that growth occurs through the confronting of differences in a world where no two persons are alike becomes meaningful only when one postulates degrees of confronting and degrees of differences. If we all thought and behaved alike we could learn little from each other.

A further important assumption is that the confronting of differences does not necessitate a conflict of difference. This assumption is important because to accept it is to deny the validity of several other widely (and traditionally) accepted concepts in the psychology of personality. Consistent with the negation of absolutes there is no relationship of perfect harmony. Perfect harmony would require not only an intent to work perfectly with others, but a perfect understanding. At best one always causes others some inconvenience. At best one's own spontaneity is interfered with to some degree by others.

Growth is to be conceived as represented by a continuum. At a given moment one is somewhere between a theoretical zero, representing complete atrophy, disintegration, or extermination, and a theoretical optimum, represented by infinity, which one can more and more approach but never achieve.

Near the optimum there are high degrees of harmony with one's environment and correspondingly high degrees of spontaneity in one's own behavior. Harmony is defined as a *working together* in a common purpose, an absence of conflict. Conflict, in turn, is defined as a *working against* another. Spontaneity is defined as behavior in the absence of fear or coercion. Harmony and spontaneity, as aspects of growth, are not different from integration and differention of biologists or from "homonomy" and "autonomy" of Angyal (10). Rapport is a term that designates a relationship of high degrees of harmony and spontaneity. So do many other terms such as security, love, joy, ecstasy, and Stevenson's apt phrase, the "inspired moment" (18). In these relationships, at these moments, one is never perfectly spontaneous. The environment always makes *some* incursion on one's spontaneity. It is not meaningful to refer to behavior in these higher moments by such terms as conflict, fear, aggression, ascendance, mastery, dominance, submission, or timidity.

Domination is behavior that attacks the spontaneity of another. Dominative behavior in the environment is inversely proportional to one's own spontaneity. Farther down the growth scale the environment makes more incursions on one's spontaneity. One tends to ignore or to avoid the increased inconvenience. There may come a time or a relationship in which the domination of others is sufficient to incite resistance. From this point to the very bottom of the growth scale it becomes meaningful to speak of conflict. Thus at these lower levels there is still more spontaneity in resistance, ascendance, negativism, disobedience, and delinquency than there is in shyness, timidity, withdrawing, submission. The former were regarded by Wickman's (19) clinicians as behavior having less serious mental hygiene consequences than the latter.

In these research studies one question has been uppermost: to what extent can these theoretical postulates be reduced to quantitative research? Infants respond to mothers without verbalized formulations of the involved dynamics of their mother's personalities. Each of us responds to strangers in the same way. We make some interpretation of each situation and our response reflects our estimation of the degree of spontaneity which the environment permits. It makes a difference, for example, whether the teacher calls the child level-headed or flat-headed.

The research method has been observational. Descriptive behavior has been classified into categories. *Working with* has been distinguished from *working against*. In published studies (2) (3), it was found that behavior is circular: that domination in one child incited domination in the companion, that attack evoked resistance. It was also found that socially integrative behavior tended to induce cooperation or socially integrative behavior in others. Preschool children, when allowed to play in pairs, tended to have higher frequencies of integrative behavior than of dominative behavior, that is, their social behavior was more frequently on the higher growth levels of mutual, social participation, of fostering the interplay of differences, than it was on the lower levels of conflict, of stifling the interplay of differences and resisting differences. It was found (2, pp. 355–359) that teachers could rate children more reliably for their dominative behavior than for their integrative behavior.

Measures of the behavior of teachers and of children in the actual schoolroom situation were devised (3). After working two years on the general problem of reliability of the observers, the categories of dominative and of socially integrative behavior were further refined (4). Domination by the teacher was recorded when there was *evidence of conflict* with the child, when there was *no evidence of conflict* with the child, and when there was some evidence that the teacher was *working with* the child. Socially integrative behavior by the teacher was recorded when there was no evidence that the teacher and the child were working in a common purpose, and when there was evidence of *working together*.

Joseph E. Brewer (11) devised twenty-eight categories of child behavior, including four categories of problem-solving behavior, twelve of social contributions to others, several representing the child's spontaneity, others in which were recorded conformity and nonconformity to teacher domination. In two second grade rooms he found highly and consistently contrasting differences in the classroom personalities of the two teachers. One was consistently more dominative and consistently less integrative. He found significantly more problem-solving, social contributions to others and spontaneity in the children with the more integrative teacher.

Reed (17), studying the same teachers with different children the following year, found smaller, but still significant and consistent differences in the classroom behavior of the two teachers, and again corresponding behavior in the new groups of children. The children who moved on to the third grade with different teachers showed a low stability of patterns of classroom behavior.

Other studies (5) showed the method and the categories applicable to the fourth and sixth grades. In a comparison of fall and winter behavior of third grade teachers Anderson and Brewer (8) found that five months' acquaintance with the children made little difference in the mean frequencies of conflict situations and that one of the teachers *worked against* her children more frequently than she *worked with* them.

Recently (6) the procedure has been shortened so that a sampling of a teacher's classroom behavior can be obtained in two and a half days, which allows one-half day for the observer to learn the names of the children.

By this procedure Clifton (12) has gathered a sampling of data on the classroom personalities of twenty-five second grade teachers in one large school system. Some teachers were more dictatorial than they were democratic; some were more frequently democratic in their contacts with children than dictatorial. Most teachers so far observed have tended to dominate boys more than girls.

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Interpersonal Behavior as Influenced by Accuracy of Social Perception

IVAN D. STEINER

This paper presents a critical examination of two propositions which link accurate social perception with competence in interpersonal behavior and with group efficiency. The first of these propositions maintains that the more knowledge an individual has concerning the intentions, preferences, and beliefs of other persons, the more effectively he can participate in group activity with those other persons. This proposition provides the rationale for much of the training we give to teachers, social workers, clinical psychologists, and others whose work involves continuing interaction with people.

Attempts to verify this proposition have ordinarily involved the use of high sociometric status or high sociometrically evaluated productivity as indexes of the individual's interpersonal competence. With these indexes as criteria, considerable empirical evidence has been produced in support of this proposition.

* * * *

The second proposition to be examined here involves an extension of the first. It maintains that groups composed of individuals with accurate social perceptions will be more efficient than groups composed of members with less accurate social perceptions. Faith in this proposition guides much of our marriage counseling and has sometimes been a factor in the selection of work crews and play groups.

* * * *

Although . . . studies . . . provide some basis for confidence in each of the two propositions, other studies have failed to produce positive findings.

Ivan D. Steiner, "Interpersonal Behavior as Influenced by Accuracy of Social Perception" (excerpted), Psychological Review, *Vol. 62, No. 4 (1955), pp. 268–274. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

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The existence of contradictory findings suggests that the two propositions are neither completely true nor completely false. It is probable that each is a true statement of a relationship which exists under certain limiting conditions, but a false statement when those limiting conditions do not prevail. If this is the case, it is desirable that the limiting conditions be identified and that the propositions be altered to take them into account.

* * * *

Assumptions Concerning Collective Action

The term "collective action" will be used in this paper to designate the behaviors of two or more persons who are attempting to satisfy needs or attain goals through cooperative effort in a "face-to-face" situation. Certain assumptions concerning the nature of collective action are implicit in the propositions cited above. It is implied that efficient collective action is accomplished through a dyadic process in which each participant adjusts his own behavior in response to the intentions and preferences of others. This view of collective action has received wide support in the literature.

* * * *

. . . efficient collective action often does require that each participant anticipate the behavior of others. If individuals engage in role taking, maintain simultaneous orientations, or have mutually shared fields, their collectively produced behavior sequences may constitute what Sears (19) has called a "dyadic system." Group behavior can become "more than a fortuitously useful conjunction of individual actions" or a mere piling up of "parallel monadic sequences." It can be interlocking behavior which leads to the achievement of individual or group goals with a minimum of wasted effort or needless duplication of behavior. However, there are reasons for doubting that this conception of collective action is universally valid.

Basic to this conception of collective action is the assumption that individuals are relatively free agents who are permitted to alter their own behaviors in response to their perceptions of the intentions or preferences of others. Furthermore, it is assumed that the changes which such perceptions produce in the individual's behaviors will lead to a more thoroughly integrated dyadic system. Unless these assumptions are met, accurate social perception, whether it be achieved through role taking, simultaneous orientation, or shared psychological fields, can scarcely be expected to increase interpersonal competence or group efficiency. In the remainder of this paper it will be contended that much of our most efficient collective action occurs when neither of these assumptions is met, and under circumstances which make accurate social perception relatively unimportant.

Even when these two assumptions are met, accurate social perception may fail to permit or encourage efficient collective action. It should be expected to do so only when the attributes, preferences, or intentions which are accurately perceived are relevant to the task at hand. Accurate perception of irrelevant qualities in the other person may only prove to be distracting in its effect. In the remainder of this paper "accurate social perception" will refer to the perception of qualities, preferences, and intentions which are relevant to the activities of the group.

Role Systems and Social Perception

Role systems often permit or compel individuals to produce efficient dyadic behavior sequences even though they know little about one another's intentions or preferences. This contention will be clarified by the construction of a model with which to represent some of the characteristics of a role system.

It will be helpful to imagine a matrix of columns and rows, creating a system of cells. Each of the columns will bear the name of a category of persons who are recognized as functionally distinct by the members of the collectivity. Such categories may fall along any of a number of dimensions like age, sex, material wealth, occupation, etc. It is not at all necessary that the categories be unidimensional, and in the case of most collectivities they will not be. It is only necessary that the members of the collectivity be capable of distinguishing between the people who belong in different categories. This requirement is easily met, for if people are not naturally distinguishable they may be made artificially distinguishable through the use of special clothing, insignia, spatial arrangements, and a variety of other means.

The rows in the matrix will each carry the name of a category of situations. Although groups may seldom categorize situations as explicitly as they categorize persons, the multiplicity of stimulus situations precludes the possibility that each can be responded to as something totally unique. As Merton (15) has pointed out, groups tend to evolve standard ways of classifying the situations which are most frequently encountered in collective action. Similar situations tend to be classified into the same category and to be treated as though they were equivalent. Here, as in the case of categories of persons, there need be no apparent logic to the system. It is only necessary that participants be capable of assigning each situation to its proper niche. Standard assignment of situations to their appropriate categories can be achieved through a variety of socialization and indoctrination procedures.

Into the cells which are created by the intersection of columns and rows will be placed the designation of the special behavior which is enforced by the collectivity. Thus, if the collectivity is a symphony orchestra, the cell created by the intersection of the column "first violinist" and the row "third bar, Brahms' Lullaby" might carry instructions to produce specific musical tones at a specific tempo. Not all cells will receive unique entries, and some cells may receive no entry at all because no special behavior is required of a category of persons in the situation represented by a row in the matrix.

In terms of this model, a role consists of all those behaviors which are in the cells of a single column of a complete matrix. In the case of a symphony orchestra, the role of each participant is ordinarily described in detail by the musical score and each musician will know his own role though he may have only a limited understanding of other persons' roles. The role system is represented by the entire matrix and includes the role of each participant. It constitutes a system because the various roles are interlocked in a way which produces highly integrated collective action. The behaviors expected of one person supplement those expected of others. Often, as in the case of a work group, the role of one participant cannot be enacted unless others are enacting their roles properly, and the inadequate performance of any one role may disrupt the entire system.

It is the advantage of role systems that behavior synthesis has been incorporated into the system itself, and that participants need not infer the strategies of their associates or improvise an effective synthesis as they engage in collective action. They need only to produce the behaviors which are situationally appropriate for members of their categories. To be sure, other people and their behaviors will often be important elements in the situations to which the individual must respond. But this ordinarily means only that each individual must take into account the overt behavior of other categories of persons; it does not mean that he must make inferences concerning the idiosyncratic intentions or preferences of *unique* individuals. Although participants may develop enduring expectations concerning the unique qualities of specific other individuals, these expectations are not part of the role system. Indeed, participants in a role system are often required to ignore unique qualities and to treat one another as though each were a standard representative of a whole category. The individual who accurately projects himself into the unique psychological fields of others is likely to find it difficult to perform as a standard person or to treat others as such. And as Merton (15) has observed, any deviation from standard performance or standard treatment of others is likely to disrupt the whole role system. Consequently, those individuals who deviate from standard practice are likely to be ostracized. Given the existence of a role system, perceptual accuracy which goes beyond that required for correct categorization of others may decrease group efficiency and reduce interpersonal competence. In this connection it is instructive to recall that Hemphill (12) found that members of large groups (30 or more persons) tended to prefer leaders who did not treat them as unique individuals.

A large proportion of all collective action must be presumed to occur within the framework of role systems where the intentions and preferences of other persons may be largely irrelevant and where the individual's freedom to adjust to such intentions and preferences is, in any case, highly restricted. Naval crews, office staffs, and surveying teams are probable examples of groups which do have elaborate role systems. It is to be noted that investigations of such groups have generally failed to obtain a positive relationship between accuracy of social perception and group efficiency or interpersonal competence. A possible contradiction of this trend is represented by the study of infantry squads (10) in which accuracy in predicting the sociometric status of squad members correlated with group efficiency. However, accuracy in perceiving a status hierarchy is a particular type of accuracy which may be a by-product of efficient use of a role system. If, as may be expected, the efficiency of a squad is a function of the degree to which its members adhere to a role system, then efficient squads will be those which demand that members enact specified roles, and deviation from standard role performance will serve as a major reason for rejection of members. Members of efficient squads would then tend to make accurate predictions of one another's positions in the status hierarchy because each will be aware of the major criterion which has guided the creation of that hierarchy. In squads where adherence to the role system is less highly stressed, efficiency should be lower and members should have more difficulty predicting the number of sociometric choices each man will receive. Until the correctness of this explanation is ascertained, it is probably unwise to regard this study as a clear contradiction of what appears to be a general trend.

Although the published reports of research in this area are not sufficiently detailed to permit categorical statements, the reported findings seem to support the contention that efficiency in groups which operate within the framework of a role system is not increased by accurate understanding of others' preferences and intentions. What are needed here are controlled studies in which groups with and without the benefit of a role system are confronted by situations requiring coordinated action. If role systems do, in fact, have the properties described above, accuracy of interpersonal understanding should have no relationship (or perhaps a negative relationship) to the efficiency of groups which have appropriate role systems. On the other hand, there should be a positive relationship between the perceptual accuracy and the efficiency of groups without role systems, assuming, of course, that members are motivated to cooperate.

Summary

This paper has examined two propositions which maintain that accurate social perception is responsible for increased interpersonal competence and group efficiency. Although such propositions have provided a basis for considerable "applied psychology," empirical research has sometimes raised doubts concerning their validity. In order to discover some of the limiting conditions under which the propositions are likely to be valid, it has been necessary to examine the conception of collective action on which they are based.

This examination has led to the following conclusions. Accurate social perception should promote interpersonal competence and group efficiency if: (*a*) the group members are motivated to cooperate; (*b*) the accurately perceived qualities are relevant to the activities of the group; (*c*) members are free to alter their own behaviors in response to their perceptions of other members; and (*d*) the behavioral changes which are a consequence of accurate social perception are the kinds which produce a more thoroughly integrated dyadic system. Whenever any *one* or more of these conditions is not met, accurate social perception should fail to have the effect predicted by the two propositions which have been the major concern of this paper.

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Social Integration, Social Rank, and Processes of Interaction

PETER M. BLAU

The relationships between patterns of social interaction and informal status observed in a recent field study of white-collar work groups in a complex organization seem to contradict some conclusions reached in an earlier study. This paper presents an attempt to reconcile these apparently conflicting findings by refining the theoretical conceptions underlying the earlier interpretation.

The systematic study of social interaction is essential for an understanding of work groups and, indeed, of all kinds of human groups. It is in the course of social interaction that group norms emerge and are enforced, that the relationships between group members become defined, and that informal status becomes differentiated along various dimensions. Processes of interaction define the social structure of work groups and the informal status of their members, and they, therefore, exert an important influence on the operations of the organization.

Whereas systematic research on interaction processes in small groups has received increasing attention in recent years, for example, by Robert F. Bales and his associates,[1] field studies of work groups in formal organizations, in contrast to experiments with laboratory groups, have not been conspicuous in the development of this new approach.

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. . . A possible reason for this is that a conceptual confusion has plagued this method for many years.

A crucial concept in the systematic study of social interaction is that of

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[1] A number of studies on small groups, many of which use the method developed by Bales, are collected in A. Paul Hare *et al.*, *Small Groups*, Knopf, New York, 1955.

Peter M. Blau, "Social Integration, Social Rank, and Processes of Interaction," Human Organization, *published by the Society for Applied Anthropology, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter, 1959–1960), pp. 152–157. Reprinted by permission. Footnotes numbered as in original.*

origination of action. But this concept has been used to refer to two distinct social processes, which has resulted in much confusion, as William F. Whyte has recently pointed out.[8] Some investigators have employed the term to refer to the tendency of one individual to originate the *interaction* or social contacts between himself and others, whereas other investigators referred by it to the tendency of one individual to originate *activities* for others. This distinction can be easily illustrated. If A goes up to B and asks him, "What shall I do now?" and B tells him and A does it, then A has originated the interaction with B, but B has originated an activity for A. These are clearly two entirely different phenomena. The frequency of origination of interaction indicates the extent to which a member of a group takes the initiative in bringing about social contacts. The frequency of origination of activities for others, in contrast, indicates the degree of influence a member exercises over the rest of the group. The latter measure, but not the former, distinguishes leaders from followers. Whether the individuals who often initiate social contacts also tend to exert a disproportionate influence over the activities of others is, of course, an empirical question and not one which can be decided on logical grounds or by definition.

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Social Integration and Social Differentiation

The accepting interaction of others with a member produces his integration in the group, and the deferential interaction of others with a member produces his superior rank. An important difference is that rank becomes differentiated in unilateral social processes, whereas integration arises in reciprocal ones. Ego's deference which helps to *raise* alter's social rank simultaneously *lowers* his own, but ego's acceptance which contributes to alter's integration does not impede but often improves his own. Friendly acceptance invites, and, indeed, depends on, a corresponding accepting attitude of the other, whereas there is no such mutuality in deference. Both the process of integration and the process of differentiation involve an exchange of social utilities,[13] but the nature of the exchange is quite different.

In order to become integrated in a group, an individual must motivate the other members freely to associate with him. Unless they find him attractive, they will not be inclined to seek his company. The newcomer, therefore, has strong incentives to try to make a good impression by displaying his attractive qualities and concealing any qualities which would make him unattractive in the particular group. But his attempts to present an exceptionally impressive front will make him appear unapproachable and involve him in effect, in competition with the others for maximum popularity in the group. Although feeling attracted to him, the others will also feel threatened by his attractiveness, and this will put them on the defensive and prevent them from acting on their feelings of attraction and from approaching him to draw him into friendly social intercourse. To overcome these obstacles to becoming integrated, the newcomer must prove that he is easily approachable and that he wants to be accepted by the others and not to compete with them. The form this usually takes is self-depreciation. Completely reversing his earlier strategy of attempting to impress others with his outstanding qualities, the individual now flaunts his weaknesses by talking about experiences which reveal him as blundering, foolish, or generally non-threatening. Such modesty is disarming, because it demonstrates that the individual does not try to exploit his attractiveness to achieve superior standing in the group but only seeks to win full acceptance. It obviates the need for defensiveness and consequently induces the others to accept the newcomer as one of them. To maintain his integration, the individual exchanges his accepting attitude of others for their acceptance; the exchange is reciprocal.[14]

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[8] William F. Whyte, *Man and Organization: Three Problems in Human Relations in Industry,* Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Ill., 1959, pp. 49–53.

[13] See George C. Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange," *American Journal of Sociology,* LXIII (1958), 597–606.

In order to achieve superior rank in a group, an individual must motivate the other members to respect his suggestions and defer to his wishes. In the competition for relative standing in the group, each member has an incentive to withhold respect and deference from the others as much as possible. These defensive tactics in the competition for maximum respect produce a potential impasse, just as those in the competition for maximum popularity do, but the method of breakthrough is different. While an individual achieves integration by surrendering any claim to superior standing, a person achieves superordinate status by making a claim for deference which cannot be denied by others. This requires that a person have resources which enable him to furnish important services to others. For example, his competence makes it possible for him to help others in their work. By rendering services to others, an individual establishes social obligations. These obligations constrain the others not to oppose his suggestions but to follow them, that is, to become subordinate to him. Their deference to him is not simply a concomitant of their respect for his ability but the result of the obligations which his ability has permitted him to establish. It is this exchange of instrumental services for deference which gives rise to differentiation of social rank in a group.

Let us now return to the question of why received contacts were related to social rank in the federal agency. In a consultation, where A asks B for advice, A originates the social interaction with B, and A also pays his respect to B by acknowledging B's superior competence implicitly in asking for his advice. Moreover, by accepting the advice, A lets his behavior be influenced by B's directives, and if the consultation is part of a recurrent pattern, he incurs obligations which will constrain him to follow B's suggestions in other situations.[15] The exchange which occurs in consultations gives rise to differentiation of status; it makes the informal rank of consultants, who are also the recipients of the social contacts, superordinate to that of the questioners.

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[14] A more detailed analysis of the tentative theory of social integration adumbrated here is presented in a forthcoming article.

If all the social interactions under observation were consultations, therefore, received contacts would be indicative of superior rank. Of course, this is hardly a plausible assumption. A variety of other task-oriented social contacts occur in work groups, and a large proportion of the social interaction in most work groups, if not in all, are sociable rather than instrumental; this certainly was the case in both organizations studied. However, a larger proportion of the observed interactions in the federal agency than of those in the welfare agency were consultations (although no quantitative measure of the exact difference is available). This may well be one reason why received contacts were associated with social rank in the former agency but not in the latter. But this technical factor alone cannot answer the more basic substantive question of why social integration and social rank were related in the federal agency but not in the welfare agency.

Most federal agents were strongly identified with their work and highly valued expertness as a law enforcement officer. On the basis of this orientation, expertness became a characteristic which made an official generally attractive as an associate among his colleagues. In contrast, the thorough knowledge of procedures required for expertness in the public welfare agency was negatively valued by many workers, who considered a concern with procedures detrimental to good casework service. As a result of these conflicting values, expertness commanded only limited respect and did not make a worker a particularly attractive associate for most colleagues. In short, the respect commanded by technical competence had a halo effect which gave experts prestige and made them generally attractive in the federal agency, but not in the welfare agency. Moreover, turnover was lower and cohesiveness was higher in the federal group than in any of the groups of caseworkers. Long-established relations in the cohesive group discouraged the experts in the federal agency from exploiting their superior standing by making too great demands for deference. But in the welfare agency, experts often made such demands of newer workers, for example, by asking them to bring something for them. Social distance between those of superior and inferior rank seemed to be greater in the latter than in the former organization.

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[15] [Peter M. Blau, "The Dynamics of Bureaucracy," University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1955, pp. 105–110.]

In the welfare agency, then, experts were neither particularly attractive nor easily approachable. Workers went to experts for technical advice when they had problems with procedures, and they paid for the advice they got with deference, but they usually found other workers most attractive and thus did not tend to select experts as sociable companions. The process of differentiation of informal rank and the process of integration remained distinct in this situation. In the federal agency, on the other hand, experts were found to be particularly attractive and they remained relatively easily approachable. Officials often went to the same persons for advice with whom they also engaged most often in sociable interaction. Hence, the process of differentiation and the process of integration became somewhat fused in this organization.

Conclusions

Social scientists have often emphasized that social differentiation occurs along several dimensions. Max Weber's distinction between social status, economic class, and political power is the most famous case in point.[16] Although economic and political institutions do not have exact counterparts in small groups, other dimensions of social status can be distinguished there, too. Much research on small groups, however, fails to make such distinctions. Laboratory studies often introduce experimental variations in the feeling of being accepted by others and implicitly assume that they are dealing with differences in hierarchical rank. Field studies tend to contrast isolates and leaders in work groups, ignoring that these concepts refer to social position along two different dimensions.

To be sure, there are some exceptions. Thus, Bales and Slater distinguish an instrumental and a socio-emotional dimension of leadership.[17] The distinction made in this paper between social rank and social integration also refers to an instrumental and a sociable dimension of informal status in face-to-face groups, but there is an important difference between the two dichotomies. Bales and Slater examine two aspects of *relative* standing in the group, whereas the concept of social integration is defined as a non-hierarchical dimension of informal position, in contrast to social rank, which is, of course, a hierarchical dimension of status. To be sure, there are differences in integration in most groups; some members are more fully accepted than others. And, occasionally, there may be little or no differentiation of rank in a group; equality reigns and no member commands the deference of others. In principle, however, integration does not refer to relative standing in the group, while rank does, because acceptance is not an intrinsically scarce resource in small groups, but deference is. To express feelings of acceptance toward some new members does not require withdrawal of acceptance from some of those who have already been integrated, but to manifest deference to a new leader inevitably involves withdrawing deference from the former leader, since by following the directives of one person, the group members, at least implicitly, refrain from following those of another. Moreover, the acceptance of others is won and secured by being accepting of them and their normative standards and this reciprocity exerts an equilibrating force on social integration. To achieve a superordinate rank, in contrast, requires that a person command the deference of others *without* reciprocating by manifesting deference to them.

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[16] H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1946, pp. 180–195.

[17] Robert F. Bales and Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small, Decision Making Groups," in Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1955, pp. 259–299.

The sentiments of the members of a group toward one of them as they find expression in their interaction with him define his informal status. An individual is considered to be integrated in a group if most others fully accept him and express their acceptance by often drawing him into sociable interaction. An individual is considered to have superior rank in a group if he commands the respect and deference of most others and this manifests itself in the influence he exerts over their activities. The frequency with which others originate sociable interaction with an individual is the most direct measure of his integration. (On the assumption that the majority of social interaction in most work groups is sociable or has sociable elements, the total frequency of received contacts may be taken as an indication of integration.) The frequency with which an individual originates activities for others is the most direct measure of his rank.

Differences in informal rank arise in social processes in which instrumental services are exchanged for deference. The person who renders services to others—for example, by helping them with their work—establishes social obligations which constrain them to defer to his wishes. Social integration, on the other hand, is the result of reciprocal social processes in which competitive advantages are ostentatiously relinquished in exchange for social acceptance. After proving himself to be an attractive associate, the newcomer must demonstrate his accepting attitude of the group by modestly refusing to compete with the others for maximum popularity and by strictly conforming with group standards before he will be accepted by the other members as one of them.

The conceptual distinction between these two dimensions of informal status helps to clarify apparent contradictions in the findings of two studies on work groups in bureaucratic organizations. The frequency of social contacts received from colleagues was related to more aspects of social conduct in the one organization than in the other. The reason for this was that informal rank and social integration, as indicated by received contacts, were related in the first organization, but these two factors were not related in the second organization. In the first agency, therefore, the influences of social rank as well as those of social integration on conduct were reflected in the correlations with received contacts. The data from the second agency, where this was not the case, make it possible to distinguish between these two kinds of social influence. Patterns of conduct that depend on feelings of security but that do not involve competition among the members of the ingroup are influenced by the individual's integration among colleagues, because the social support inherent in an integrated position reduces feelings of anxiety and insecurity in the work situation. Conduct which places an individual into competition with the rest of his own work group, however, is influenced by social rank and not by integration, because only rank gives a person a competitive advantage over other members of his own group.

Some Effects of Cooperation and Competition upon Small Group Behavior

MARTIN M. GROSSACK

Cooperative and competitive social situations are often said to have differential effects on group behavior. This paper reports an experiment testing specific hypotheses that concern some of these differences. The theoretical rationale is based on the following three assumptions:

1. A cooperative situation is one of "task direction" (1), while a competitive situation is not. A situation of task direction is defined as one in which an individual goal is reached by the achieving of a group's task.

According to Deutsch (2), the basic difference between cooperation and competition is in the way an individual achieves his goal in both situations. Cooperation was defined by him as a situation in which no individual reaches his goal unless all other individuals also enter their goal regions. Competitive situations were defined as those in which no individual reaches his goal unless all other individuals are unable to enter their goal regions.

2. Cooperation may be viewed as an example of cohesiveness due to task direction. Back (1) demonstrated that a relatively high amount of cohesiveness ("total field of forces which act on members to remain in the group") existed in situations where the group mediated individual goals.

3. Conditions of task direction (e.g., cooperation) are likely to produce "instrumental communications," while competitive situations will tend not to have such an effect. Festinger (4) described instrumental communications as those "in which the reduction of the force to communicate depends upon the effect of the communication on the recipient."

Martin M. Grossack, "Some Effects of Cooperation and Competition upon Small Group Behavior," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, *Vol. 49, No. 3 (1954), pp. 341–348. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

Competition, as defined here, requires that an individual's success lead to the failure of other group members. Instrumental communications (influencing another member to accept an accurate solution to a problem, exerting pressures toward uniformity or communicating relevant information) would serve to minimize a competitive individual's own chance of reaching his goal.

Hypotheses

1. Indications of cohesiveness will be more frequent among cooperative than among competitive individuals.

a. Cooperative individuals will attempt to influence others more than competitive individuals will.

This prediction is based on the second assumption. It has empirical substantiation in findings reported by Back (1) and Festinger, Schachter, and Back (5) that cohesiveness is a determinant of social influence, and has the following theoretical rationale:

> The magnitude of change the group can induce (its internal power) will be equal to or less than the magnitude of the resultant force on the member to remain in the group (its cohesiveness) (5, p. 166).

b. Cooperative individuals will send and accept more pressures toward uniformity than will competitive individuals.

This hypothesis is derivable from Festinger's theoretical treatment of communication (4). Results of Festinger and Thibaut (7) show more acceptance of pressures toward uniformity when greater pressures are induced on individual members. In a cooperative situation we can assume such pressures to exist because of the need to locomote as a group.

c. Cooperative individuals will send more relevant communications than will competitive individuals.

Communications of relevant information may be considered instrumental for cooperative group locomotion, but not for individuals in a competitive situation. Interpersonal communication of an instrumental type may be considered the means by which cooperative individuals facilitate one another's goal achievement.

2. Cooperative individuals will send and receive more communications, more instrumental communications, and fewer consummatory communications than will competitive individuals.

Communications of opinion and information are considered instrumental, while those of tension and antagonism are coordinated to consummatory communications (those in which "the reduction of the force to communicate occurs as a result of the expression and does not depend upon the effect . . . on the recipient" [4, p. 281]).

a. Cooperative individuals are more likely to take group functions (actions that facilitate group solidarity or smooth functioning) and less likely to take individual functions (actions not directed toward group goal achievement, e.g., aggression, blocking, etc.) than are competitive individuals.

This is a replication of Deutsch's hypothesis (2).

Method

Eighteen female student groups of five individuals each were created for experimental study. Seats in the experimental room were so arranged that subjects (*S*s), upon entering and receiving places, had to face a wall, and were unable to see one another.

The participating *S*s were asked neither to speak nor turn around and to raise their hands if there were any questions. After five *S*s were seated and assigned letters from A to E, the experimental group meeting was ready to begin.

Creation of Independent Variable

Each *S* received a sheet containing a different set of instructions except for the fifth person, who was given one of the other four randomly. The types of instructions distributed were:

1. *High motivation, cooperative.* The *S*s were told that the *group* would be rated as a *group* on its solutions to a human relations problem. The best *group* would be rewarded.
2. *High motivation, competitive.* Here *S* was told that she would be rated *individually* and that the *individual* with the best solution would be rewarded.
3. *Low motivation, cooperative.* The *S* was told that *E* was just studying how *groups* solve problems, that *S*s will be rated as a *group* but that no one will ever know about the group's rating.
4. *Low motivation, competitive.* The *S* would be rated as an *individual.* The *E* was described as interested in how *individuals* solve problems, but not interested in whether any specific person does well or poorly.

(The motivational aspects of the instructions were quite unsatisfactory in producing differences in response. An analysis of the data in terms of motivational effects was not completed.)

The *S*s were permitted to communicate by writing notes, if they wanted to, during three periods of four minutes each.

Group Task

The problem selected for use in this experiment was a short case study of a delinquent boy, Johnny Rocco (12). Individuals receiving the case study were asked to consider the problem from the point of view of a person responsible for the boy's future treatment. Schachter's love-punishment continuum, modified by the writer, was also distributed. The *S*s were asked three times during the experiment to indicate which of seven alternatives was the preferred treatment for the boy.

Control of Group Process

It was believed methodologically valuable to develop a technique that would control the operation of personality variables in the interaction situation. By systematically substituting a standard set of stimulus messages, designed by *E*, for those actually sent by the *S*s, control of this aspect of interaction became possible. Also, this prevented individuals from learning that each received different instructions. Some implications of this technique are discussed elsewhere (9).

Each *S* received a set of identical notes, supposedly written by the other four people in the group. The fifth individual was necessary so that each *S* would receive the same amount of notes (i.e., four). The standard stimulus messages had the following thematic content:

From A: Shows high motivation to work on the group's problem, wants to work together with others in the group and to reach a common solution.

From B: Shows high motivation and desire to work on the problem alone.

From C: Shows low motivation, is in field to the extent that communication mentions the problem and the "sender's" attitude toward it.

From D: Shows low motivation and tends to be out of field, horseplays.[3]

The experimenter collected messages written by the subjects; meanwhile, *S*s indicated preferences on the love-punishment continuum and reread the experimental instructions. Then *S*s were permitted to open the stimulus notes received. During the last writing period, however, *S*s *first* read the planted notes and *then* indicated their preferences on the love-punishment scale. A postsession questionnaire consisting of eighteen "agree-disagree" items, three sociometric, and one concerning the instructions was then distributed.

* * * *

Summary and Conclusions

From previous research on cooperation, competition, and studies of small groups, an attempt was made to formulate hypotheses that would integrate theoretical approaches to both areas of investigation. The main problem selected for study was to determine the consequences of cooperation and competition on small group cohesiveness, social influence, and communication.

The results of the experiment permit the following conclusions:

1. Cooperation may be considered a determinant of group cohesiveness. Cooperative *S*s showed significantly more cohesive behavior, attempts at influence, exertion and acceptance of pressures toward uniformity, and communications of relevance than did competitive *S*s.

2. Cooperation may be considered a determinant of instrumental communications. Cooperative *S*s (attributed senders of cooperative messages) received significantly more communications, more instrumental communications (opinion and information), and fewer consummatory communications (tension and antagonism). Also, they tended to send more communications and fewer consummatory ones (showing tension), but

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[3] The notes are more fully described in (10).

these findings were not quite significant statistically. A significantly greater frequency of nondirective influence by cooperatives was explained in terms of the fact that considerable effort in social influence is theoretically not necessary for cooperative *S*s as compared to competitive *S*s.

A prediction that cooperative *S*s would take more group and fewer individual functions than competitive *S*s was not supported. This was explained as possibly due to the fewer defensive reactions reported for note-writing group situations.

The experimental results support the following *ad hoc* hypotheses:

1. The frame of reference of an individual will determine his expectations of others.

a. Individuals who perceive themselves as cooperative will tend to expect cooperative behavior from one another.

b. Individuals who perceive themselves as competitive will tend to expect competitive behavior from one another.

Much remains unknown concerning differences between face-to-face and note-writing groups. In problem-solving settings, the latter may have much to offer as far as efficiency for research purposes is concerned.

The extent to which the norm introduced by having all *S*s receive communications and having the opportunity to send them caused competitives to communicate possibly can be determined by subsequent study. Also, the extent to which cooperative messages induced restraining forces against competitive and out-of-field responses should be determined.

Further research is needed to study the development of channels of communication in groups. The differences between cooperative senders in the content of communications received suggests some things about "who gets what" in the communication process. It would seem valuable to study perceptions that senders have of possible recipients and determinants of the content sent to specific receivers.

The relationship between determinants of cohesiveness and instrumental communication has not been studied intensively. Possibly, in situations where cohesiveness is due to attractiveness of members or group prestige, one may not expect as much instrumental communication as under conditions of task direction.

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A Theory of Social Integration

PETER M. BLAU

A fundamental dilemma of social life is that between being looked up to and being liked by associates. Both the respect and the affection of our associates are important to us, but our efforts to win the one often hurt our chances to win the other. Suppose a colleague has asked us to comment on the first draft of a paper he has written. If we make penetrating criticisms, this may increase his respect for our competence, but it will hardly endear us to him; and, if we make only complimentary remarks, he may feel more favorable toward us but see no reason to respect our judgment. Although he benefits from supportive comments as well as from valid criticisms, he benefits from them and reacts to them in different ways, involving for us either a gain in respect at the expense of warm acceptance or a gain in intimacy at the cost of respect.

This dilemma between commanding respect (which implies a superordinate relationship) and winning friendly acceptance (which implies an egalitarian one) is deeply rooted in group life.[1] It calls attention to the complex social processes through which individuals become integrated in groups and groups develop social structures. Concern here is not with differences in personality that predispose individuals to seek satisfaction in one kind of personal relationship rather than another but with processes of exchange in groups and the conflicting demands they make on the members.[2] This paper attempts to analyze the processes through which

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[1] The significance of this dilemma has been stressed by Bales. For an early study see Robert F. Bales and Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Phases in Group Problem Solving," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLVI (1951), 485–95.

[2] For a theory that deals extensively with the psychological processes underlying these patterns of interaction in groups see John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959). A different approach to the study of exchange processes is presented in William H. Schutz, *FIRO* (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1958).

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individuals become integrated in groups, and it presents a tentative theory of social integration.

Social Attraction

A group is distinguished from an aggregate of individuals by the social bonds that unite the members into a more or less cohesive social structure. These are bonds of social attraction. A cohesive group is one whose members are strongly attracted to one another. The concept of attraction refers to favorable sentiments toward others which find expression in an inclination to engage readily in social intercourse with them. Of course, only individuals can experience such feelings and manifest such conduct. Networks of sentiments between persons and patterns of interaction in groups, however, indicate attributes of social structures and not of individuals.

Bonds of social attraction can be looked upon from two perspectives: how *attracted* each person is to the group, and how *attractive* each person is to the rest of the group. The first perspective, which is that of Festinger and others in the tradition of Group Dynamics,[3] is adequate for such problems as the influence of group standards on behavior but not for the analysis of group structure and the integration of individuals in groups. A person's strong attraction to a group clearly does not make him an integrated member of it. Indeed, the conception of reference group directs attention to the fact that people are attracted to and influenced by groups of which they are not members at all.[4] To be sure, unless one is attracted to a group for some reason, he is not likely to become a member, but this attraction merely supplies him with a goal yet to be achieved. Only if he can make himself attractive to the other members will he attain an integrated position among them. A person is considered to be integrated in a group if the other members find him sufficiently attractive to associate with him freely and accept him in their midst as one of them.

The central sociological problem is what social processes are set in motion as every member of the group seeks to become or remain attractive to the others. Of special interest is the case of the face-to-face group in the process of formulation, where all members have yet to achieve integration and where the group's cohesiveness depends on their concern with doing so. But the patterns in already established groups probably differ only in degree, particularly if there is a considerable amount of turnover of membership.

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[3] See Leon Festinger *et al.*, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), pp. 164–66; and Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, *Group Dynamics* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1953), pp. 73–78.

[4] Robert K. Merton and Alice S. Kitt, "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in Robert K. Merton, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld (eds.), *Continuities in Social Research* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), pp. 47–51.

There are a number of factors that make a person attractive to others. If he has high social status in the society at large, they are likely to find him more attractive than if his social status is low. If his values and theirs are similar, they are more likely to enjoy association with him and to be interested in having him as a companion. If the personality needs he expresses in social interaction are complementary to their needs, they may derive some special gratification from him that draws them to him.[5] In general, if a person's qualities are valued by the other members of the group, he will tend to be attractive to them. However, every individual has a large repertory of qualities, and which of these find expression in his conduct in a given group is, of course, not a matter of chance.

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Reactions to Being Impressed

Paradoxically, the more attractive a person's impressive qualities make him appear to the others in a group, the more reluctant will they be, at least initially, to approach him freely and to draw him into friendly social intercourse. There are several reasons for this. Attraction to an individual makes us vulnerable and creates a need for defenses. If we are not interested in associating with somebody and do so only as the occasion demands it, he cannot hurt us by rejecting us; but, if we find him attractive, his possible rejection poses a threat against which we shall try to protect ourselves by resisting the temptation to make overtures to him. Indeed, this fear of being rejected by one who has demonstrated his impressive qualities is quite realistic. We are most impressed by qualities that are superior to our own and to those we usually encounter. Given this comparative frame of reference, a person whose qualities impress us is unlikely to find ours impressive. In a social situation, moreover, where many of us have been impressed by him and feel attracted to him, he is in a position to choose among a large pool of available companions, and this increases the chances that any one of us will be rejected. Hence the first reaction to being impressed is a defensive reluctance to initiate social contacts for fear of rejection.

It now becomes necessary to dispense with the fiction that there is *one* person who tries to impress the other members of the group. Actually, of course, every member wants to make a favorable impression on the others, particularly (but not only) in new groups. Indeed, every member has three formal roles in this interaction: first, each member is ego, the person who seeks to impress others; second, each member is alter, one of the others to whom ego wants to become attractive; third, each member is also alter ego, one of the individuals with whom ego competes for the attraction of alters.

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[5] Theodore Newcomb points out that both similar and complementary interests, although they seem to be opposites, make social interaction more rewarding ("The Prediction of Interpersonal Attraction," *American Psychologist*, XI [1956], 575–77).

Since it can be assumed that everybody likes to be popular among his peers, the members of a group compete *with* one another for being highly attractive *to* one another. The more successful ego is in impressing others in their role as alter with his outstanding qualities, the more will he antagonize them in their role as alter ego, because his impressive qualities threaten their popularity in the group. In contrast to economic markets, where a firm's competitors are distinct from its customers (other firms which sell the same product are generally not its customers), a group member's competitors are identical with the "customers" whose output of attraction is the object of the competition for popularity. Every member has an interest in witholding evidence of his attraction to others, since manifestations of it would give them a competitive advantage over him by contributing to their popularity. The reluctance freely to express attraction to others in the group is not merely a psychological defense mechanism but a strategic weapon in the competition for popularity.

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Demonstrating Approachability

The very characteristics of a group member that impress others also make him appear unapproachable to them. His superior qualities, which make associating with him inviting, also raise doubts in the minds of others as to whether he will find them attractive associates and threaten their own standing in the group; and these doubts and threats give rise to defensive tactics. Unless he can break through these defenses, he will not be able to achieve an integrated position in the group.

An important method for penetrating the defense of other group members (but not the only method . . .) is for a person to demonstrate that, even though he has attractive qualities, as he has already shown, he is quite easily approachable. Completely reversing his earlier strategy of presenting only the most impressive parts of his self, he now flaunts his weaknesses. Having first impressed us with his Harvard accent and Beacon Hill friends he may tell a story that reveals his immigrant background. After having talked only of the successes he has enjoyed in his career, he may let us in on the defeats he has suffered. Having earlier carefully protected himself against ridicule or even made jokes at the expense of others, he may relate an incident that makes us laugh at, as well as with, him. Whatever the content of his remarks, they show him as a person willing to admit his shortcomings. (Situations where a modicum of social integration must be achieved quickly, such as parties, furnish good illustrations of such changes in strategy from creating an impression to demonstrating approachability.)

Such self-deprecating modesty is disarming—literally so, since it obviates the need for defenses. As the listeners sympathize with a person's troubles or smile at his blunders, they will feel drawn to him, because he ceases to be a threat against which they have to protect themselves. By calling attention to his weaknesses and demonstrating his approachability, a person gives public notice that he withdraws from the competition for superior standing in the group and that all he wants to accomplish with his attractive qualities is to win full acceptance as a peer. Self-deprecation thus removes the threat his attractiveness has posed for the other members and induces them to act upon their feeling of attraction to him by engaging him in social intercourse. It serves, consequently, the function of contributing to social integration.

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Social Differentiation

An attempt to analyze processes of social integration in abstraction from other group processes is likely to be misleading, since it leaves out of consideration the influence the latter forces have upon the former. Thus people are not exclusively concerned with the position they occupy in the group in which they presently find themselves, as the previous discussion may wrongly have implied, but they have various other interests—such as obtaining satisfaction in their work, to name only one—and these also influence their interaction. Moreover, a group member's attractiveness to others depends not so much on his clever strategies in impressing them as on his actual qualities and performance, because social reality is not a mirage. Indeed, a basic difference between group life and more transient, isolated social relations—say, that between salesman and customer—is that members of a group have an opportunity to check the reliability of first impression, in subsequent interaction with a person and in comparing one another's impression of him. Finally, social acceptance as an equal is not the only form social attraction to a person may take, and other forms appear not to be contingent on approachability. . . . Oldtimers are presumed to be less approachable than newcomers, and this had the expected effect on their chances of being accepted on a first-name basis. Despite their greater unapproachability, however, oldtimers were more attractive consultants than newcomers, even when popularity (or respect, as a matter of fact) is held constant. These considerations raise some questions concerning the earlier conceptualization.

Unapproachability has indirect as well as direct social consequences, just as does impressive behavior and for the same reasons. If a person appears to have outstanding qualities, others will be attracted to him but will also infer that he may well not be attracted to them, because past experience tells them that people with superior qualities are generally not easily approachable. On the basis of the same past experience, however, people will also infer that an aloof and unapproachable person probably has outstanding qualities, otherwise he would not be so self-assured. And since people do make these inferences, self-assured and even arrogant conduct can serve as a strategy to impress others (hence people cultivate poise). But whether one employs this strategy or another to impress the members of a group, he still must cope with the defenses his implicit claim of superiority arouses in them. Sooner or later, he must prove his approachability or face the consequences.

This, however, is an alternative that has not yet been considered. A person may be willing to face the consequences of having impressed others and, instead of appeasing their defensive reactions, live up to the expectations his outstanding qualities have raised. Others expect some benefit from associating with a person who apparently has superior qualities, and, if he provides those benefits, he furnishes them incentives for associating with him. For example, a worker's superior competence motivates his colleagues to associate with him to obtain his advice. Or a person's sparkling wit at social gatherings induces his acquaintances to invite him to make their parties a success. An individual's ability to live up to the expectations of others depends not only on his capacity to supply desired services but also on his having the sagacity to refrain from presenting too impressive a front at first. The diffident person is one who anticipates this and carefully manages to raise only expectations that he can easily meet or even surpass.

There are, then, two different methods of dealing with the problem posed by the defensive reactions that occur in groups as each member tries to prove his attractiveness to the others. The situation at this stage may be described figuratively as an attractive force behind a defensive barrier that prevents its activation. The person who demonstrates his approachability lessens the attractive force somewhat but lowers the barrier enough to make it easy for others to associate with him. The person who provides services does not lower the barrier but increases the attractive force so much that the others are constrained by self-interest to relinquish their defenses and associate with him.

A member of a group who utilizes his superior qualities for the benefit of others not only makes himself an attractive associate but also earns respect and deference. By rendering significant services, he establishes social obligations. If he helps the rest of the group to attain important objectives, collectively or individually, they will be under obligation to him. The respect his demonstrated ability commands and the obligations his services create will induce others to follow his suggestions and defer to his wishes. Their deference is his reward for past contributions and his incentive for continuing to contribute in the future. These social processes, then, in which some members come to command the respect and deference of others, give rise to social differentiation in the group.[14]

Exchange Processes and Group Structure

The theory can now be reformulated briefly: A group is cohesive if bonds of social attraction unite its members. For social integration to prevail in a group and a cohesive unit to develop,[15] its members must be concerned with attracting one another. To prove himself an attractive associate, each member will seek to impress the others with his good qualities. But the resulting competition for popularity and defensive reactions against letting one's self be impressed by others threaten to lead to an impasse in which social integration would be impossible. If groups do not disintegrate, and many obviously do not, it is because other social processes forestall it.

In the course of the competition that motivates group members to reveal their best qualities to one another, it becomes evident that some have abilities that permit them to make important contributions to the achievement of common or individual goals. These contributions are a source of social attraction. Their significance forces other members to override their own defenses and seek to draw the person who makes them into the group and associate with him. At the same time the obligations incurred by the rest of the group to a member who contributes to the achievement of their goals constrains them to repay him with respect and deference. In short, the very processes required for social integration in a group give rise to other processes that lead to social differentiation. Hence social differentiation seems inevitable. (To state that some form of social differentiation is inevitable in face-to-face groups does *not*, of course, imply that all existing forms of social inequality are necessary prerequisites of collective life.)

The attraction and deference of other members to one who furnishes valued services intensify their need for integrative bonds simultaneously with relieving his. Since the benefits he has to offer make the others eager to associate with him, and since his abilities command their respect, he attains and sustains a secure position in the group without having to demonstrate his approachability. The others, however, are anxious to prove themselves attractive associates without having as yet been successful in overcoming one another's resistance to expressing feelings of attraction. Besides, paying respect and deference to him undermines their self-confidence, and it threatens the impressive image they have tried to present to one another, thus increasing their need for social support. Under these conditions a group member will be under pressure to dispel the defenses of others and induce them to accept him as a peer by demonstrating his approachability. In doing so, he turns to his advantage the fact that by his deference he has already given the rest some evidence of his willingness to surrender any claim to a superordinate position. These tendencies give rise to bonds of mutual attraction. Thus it appears that processes of social integration also promote differentiation and that processes of social differentiation, in turn, help to strengthen the group's integrative forces.

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[14] See Peter M. Blau, "Social Integration, Social Rank, and Processes of Interaction," *Human Organization*, XVIII (1959–60), 152–57.

[15] Group cohesiveness is here defined as the prevalence of integrative bonds among group members, but the cohesiveness of a group cannot be measured simply by adding the degrees of integration of all its members. A method for distinguishing the significance of cohesiveness (an emergent group attribute) and that of integration (a characteristic of individual members) is presented in Blau, "Structural Effects," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (April, 1960), 178–93.

Following Homans' suggestive conceptualization,[16] these patterns of social interaction may be looked upon as exchange processes. A person with superior qualities which enable him to provide services that are in demand receives the respect and deference of others in a group, which bestows superordinate status upon him, in exchange for rendering these services. A person who is not able to offer services that are in demand must settle for a lower position in the group. He can exchange his ready acceptance of others like him and his conformity to group norms for their acceptance of him. To put it into a somewhat different perspective, he wins social acceptance in exchange for ceasing to compete for superior standing in the group and for the contribution to social integration he thereby makes.

In conclusion, two important tasks required to improve the theory here suggested should be mentioned. The first is to derive operational hypotheses from the theory and test them in empirical research. One such hypothesis and preliminary tests of it have been presented. Many others have been implicit. To illustrate by making another hypothesis explicit: a person's tendency to demonstrate his approachability in a group to which he is attracted is expected to vary inversely with his ability to render valued services to its other members. The second task is to extend the theory and systematically analyze the dynamics of the exchange processes discussed. A few brief examples of these further dynamic processes must suffice at this point. Since deference is a high price, group members will search for ways to obtain needed services at less cost. They will be motivated to improve their own qualifications for furnishing those services. A person who succeeds in doing so not only can dispense with services for which he had to pay with deference but also earns the respect of others who up to then had merely accepted or liked him. Those unable to make any contributions that win them at least limited respect may leave the group, and new members with greater potentials may be recruited in their place. Group members may also exchange services with one another, instead of receiving them from one with superior abilities in exchange for deference.[17] Such practices threaten the position of the informal leader or leaders of the group. To avert this threat, informal leaders often seek to fortify their position by winning the loyalty or even affection of the others.[18] Such positive sentiments toward the leader make deferring to his wishes and complying with his requests less onerous for others—not as much of a burden from which they will try to escape. These tendencies also reflect the dilemma posed at the beginning of this paper. Group members who are liked by associates experience pressures to become concerned with earning their respect, and those who command the respect of others are constrained to devote efforts to courting their affection.

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[16] George C. Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (1958), 597–606.

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[17] See Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 108–9.

[18] An alternative strategy may be for the leader to form a coalition with the most popular member of the group (see Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Groups," *American Sociological Review*, XX [1955], 300–310). But this probably is only a short-run expedient; leaders who remain unpopular are unlikely to maintain their position for long, particularly in cohesive groups (see George A. Theodorson, "The Relationship between Leadership and Popularity Roles in Small Groups," *American Sociological Review*, XXII [1957], 58–67).

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CHAPTER 2 • *Approaches to Group Integration*

Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory

IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ

Few words in the vocabulary of contemporary sociology appears as soothing or as reassuring as consensus. The chain of agreeable associations of the term symbolize the final mating of the science of sociology and a theory of social equilibrium. What stands in need of investigation is the price paid for this essentially recent turn in sociological theory. Specifically it must be asked whether the movement away from traditional theories of conflict and conflict resolution represents a genuinely new stage in the secularization of social science or is in fact a narrowing down of the field brought about by social pressures.

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There are at least seven shadings of meaning which currently attaches to the term consensus beyond the common-sense usage of the word as a proper synonym for agreement between people. First and perhaps most commonly, sociologists define consensus as "adjustment of social dissension." This usage is borrowed from the present psychoanalytic definition of normality as social adjustment and neurosis as the absence of adjustment.[1] The second

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[1] J. O. Hertzler, *American Social Institutions: A Sociological Analysis* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1961), p. 63.

Irving Louis Horowitz, "Consensus, Conflict and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory," Social Forces, *Vol. 41, No. 2 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, December, 1962), pp. 177–188. Reprinted by permission.*

view has its point of departure in role theory. Consensus is seen as an accord between role behavior and role expectation.[2] The third position, while having a point of contact with an adjustment approach to consensus, lifts it out of the individual realm into a cultural framework. "Where an opinion is very widely held and cuts across all groups in society" there you have consensus.[3] The fourth theory sees our term as affiliated to hedonistic impulse, as "possible only when two or more parties want to maintain a relationship which each regards as in its own interest."[4] A cognate definition is offered by the same writer in terms of game theory. "Two parties or groups are playing to gain a maximum, but they are prepared to settle for less within the recognized limits."[5] The sixth account identifies consensus with the curbing of hedonistic impulse and instinct, and with the Durkheim notion of solidarity and social cohesion generally.[6] Our last author sees consensus in its barest atomic terms as a sharing of perspectives, as "nothing more or less than the existence on the part of two or more persons, of similar orientations toward something."[7]

Examining these definitions dispassionately, and leaving aside the truth content of each, it is difficult to understand why the concept of consensus has aroused such intense sociological interest. No logical unravelling of the above definitions will explain why consensus, barely a meaningful word in the sociological lexicon of previous decades, is now viewed as a fully matured theory. An accounting of the term is therefore required on extra philological grounds. The expanding uses and abuses of consensus theory overshadows the existing definitional ambiguities.

Consensus theory is now employed to settle a wide range of sociological problems. What is most frequently encountered is the identification of consensus with functional efficiency, and no less with the social requisites of political democracy.[8] In its simplest form, the bivariate equation is that increase in the amount of social consensus yields an increase in functional efficacy and democratic polity; while inversely, decrease in the amount of social consensus creates social disorganization and dysfunction. On a broader front, advocates of consensus theory see this as a new turn in sociology—away from the knotty issue of how conflicts arise and are settled to the spatially and temporally more durable issue of how men cooperate with one another. By defining the core of social action in terms of two functional references: (a) the maintenance of a pattern of orientation, and (b) the definition of the meaning of one or more situational objects, consensus comes to be equated with social equilibrium.[9]

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[2] Neal Gross, "The Sociology of Education," *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects*, ed. by R. K. Merton, L. Broom, L. S. Cottrell, Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 140.

[3] Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, *Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958, second edition), p. 278.

[4] Arnold W. Green, *Sociology: An Analysis of Life in Modern Society* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960, third edition), p. 65.

[5] Arnold W. Green, *ibid.*, p. 67.

[6] Ely Chinoy, *Society, An Introduction to Sociology* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 344–46.

[7] Theodore Newcomb, "The Study of Consensus," *Sociology Today, op. cit.*, p. 279.

[8] Seymour M. Lipset, "Political Sociology," *Sociology Today, op. cit.*, p. 114.

Before proceeding to the substance of my remarks, an historical observation is in order. It is clear that the early development of sociology from Marx to Simmel takes as its point of departure the idea that society is best understood as a selective and collective response to the needs of social interaction in a nonequilibriated world. This involved a rejection, conscious or otherwise, of the idea that society is best understood as a contractual or informal agreement made between equals to secure common goals. . . .

Nonetheless, it cannot be said that the history of social and political theory has been a one-sided acceptance of conflict theory and its underlying power thesis as the only explanation of social structure and social action. Such an assertion would have to discount the bulk of writings from Aristotle's "golden mean" to Dewey's "common faith." Thus the history of conflict and consensus has been a dialogue between exclusive frames of reference seeking to explain the same phenomenon—human cooperation.

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Perhaps the most widespread axiom of consensus theory holds that it is a necessary condition for social structure.[14] The social structure has come to be defined as excluding those patterns of human action which are spontaneous and unstructured. Social structure is said to consist in a "set of statuses" defined by relatively stable relationships between people. What follows is a mechanical notion of the relation of consensus and conflict as structured and unstructured modes of behavior respectively. Consensus involves objectification of position, group cohesion, collective representations, common traditions, and rules for inducting and indoctrinating new members; while conflict is seen as external to social structure, as spontaneity, impulsive action, lack of organization, intuitive response to immediate situations. In short, consensus differs from conflict as organization differs from deviance.[15] Thus to discuss social structure is by definition not to examine conflict situations, and of course, the pernicious *vice versa*, to examine conflict situations is to discuss something extraneous to social structure.

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[9] Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 507. This same view is even more forcefully developed in "The Point of View of the Author," *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons*, ed. by Max Black (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961), p. 327.

[14] cf. Robert E. Park, "Reflections on Communication and Culture," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (1939), 191–205.

[15] Kurt Lang and Gladys E. Lang, *Collective Dynamics* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1961), pp. 13–14.

To place conflict outside the framework of social structure, or to go beyond that and see conflict as necessarily destructive of the social organism, is to place a definite premium on social equilibrium. It strongly implies that a society can be changed only by apocalyptic or spontaneous methods. The identification of consensus with social structure reinforces the stereotyped view that change does not emanate from the Establishment and, keeping within the boundaries it informally sets, is deviant in relation to social order as such. Consensus theory thus tends to become a metaphysical representation of the dominant ideological matrix. It rests on a principle of "general interests" which every member of society is supposed to imbibe if he wishes to avoid the onus of being a deviant or an unconnected isolate. The sociology of small groups has been especially active in pushing this view; the implication being that a condition of social conflict necessarily is a world of deviants and isolates quite incapable of attending to problems of functional survival.[16] The possibility that differing goal orientations are consonant with a single functional agency is too rarely entertained.[17]

A social structure might well be considered as precisely a dynamic balance of disharmonious parts and therefore subject to endless change and redefinition. If we start from the position of real societies it is evident that conflict situations are intrinsic and organic to social structure. Considered in this manner, the group, the community, or the nation, is the particularized area of social activity in which conflicts arise and are resolved. Coser, following Simmel, has shown that conflict is intrinsic to social structure. Indeed, the form of society is itself defined by the quality and types of conflict situations tolerated if not openly sanctioned.

> Types of conflict and types of social structure are not independent variables. Internal social conflicts which concern goals, values or interests that do not contradict the basic assumptions upon which the relationship is founded tend to be positively functional for the social structure. Such conflicts tend to make possible readjustment of norms and power relations within groups in accordance with the felt needs of its individual members or subgroups.[18]

Briefly then, only when social function is narrowly defined as social equilibrium can a sociological theory of conflict be viewed as an overt or hidden menace to the social system.

A series of considerations which are increasingly being adduced to demonstrate the singular advantages of consensus theory over conflict theory relates to the difficulties of a social examination of unstable relations. Three factors in particular are pointed out: (a) the transitory nature of conflict situations, that is the actual behavior of a mass in an extreme situation, such as civil war or revolution, is so short lived and capricious that predicting conclusions or consequences of conflict situations is impossible; (b) the necessity for dealing with conflict situations in their natural social environment has as its corollary the absence of controlled experiments such as one finds in strictly delineated types of research; (c) the consequent necessity of presenting evaluations in terms of second and third hand materials such as newspaper reports, autobiographical sketches, and historical studies of unique events—all of which clearly involve the sociological researcher in commitments beyond the empirical confines of the sampling situation.[19]

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[16] Theodore Newcomb, "The Study of Consensus," *Sociology Today*, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

[17] Gideon Sjoberg, "Contradictory Functional Requirements and Social Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IV (1960), 198–208; also see, Eugene Litwak, "Models of Bureaucracy which permit Conflict," *The American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (1961), 177–184.

[18] Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 151–152.

The scrutiny of this series of objections reveals a transparency and shallowness that poses a serious threat to sociological research as such. The criteria of scientific analysis have never been reducible to the simplicity of an investigatory context. What the above objections fail to take account of is the need for a criterion of significance, of the importance of any specific undertaking to the general growth of sociological knowledge. . . .

To equate the worth of a theory (such as consensus theory *or* conflict theory) with ease of study, is a sophistical device which leads to a situation in which only those things are studied for which data already exists—which may help to account for that fantastic sameness and duplication of research efforts in present day small-group sociology. The greatest sociological requirement is precisely to fashion methods adequate to the tasks of studying problems of social order in a world of conflicting interests, standards, and values. Social order must itself be defined, and no less define, the larger universe of social change. The sociologist can hardly run the risk of being surprised by events of common currency in consequence of a theory of society bewitched by order and befuddled by change.

The faith in consensus theory as operationally more worthwhile than conflict theory often takes the form of a deep respect for the amazing complexity of social organization in industrial economies: the automation of production, the automation of human responsibilities, the precision of "chain of command" and "line" matrices, and the auto-regulative capacities of man in mass society to continually adjust to (and make adjustments in) bureaucratic procedures. The Parsonian school of sociology in particular seems impressed with the regularities which obtain between organization and society as such. Here the dilemma lies in equating organization to consensus. The stress and strain of organizational life gives rise to a definition of social action as that auto-regulative mechanism which adjusts for such "alienative" factors.

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[19] A fuller catalogue of objections to the study of conflict situations is contained in Kurt Lang and Gladys Lang, *op. cit.*, pp. 545–53.

Such a view suffers from the master problem in traditional laissez-faire economics; namely, the assumption that automatic marketing "laws" somehow operate over and above the actual desires and ends of men. To meet the laissez-faire implications in the theory of social consensus, certain functionalists have developed a theory of the "safety-value," such that organizations "provide substitute objects upon which to displace hostile sentiments as well as means of abreaction of aggressive tendencies."[21] But this sub-theory only reinforces the "metaphysical pathos" surrounding the theory of social organization since, far from being challenged, the assumption of institutional omnipotence and omniscience is reinforced. One is forced to conclude that the "clever" organization can even program small scale conflicts situations in order to guarantee the consensual apparatus as a whole.

The wide uses of consensus theory, particularly as a replacement for conflict theory, shows a close historical and analytical connection to the displacement of the language of social class with an alternate language of social status. It is a shift in viewing industrial society as susceptible to many and varied forms, to a vision of the industrial complex as growing omnipotent with time. Essentially, the Weberian theory of bureaucracy is a pessimistic vision, a view of organization as once and for all superseding production as the master social agency. In the theory of bureaucracy, the question of which class or group of classes hold the reins of power is secondary, since the "basic" bureaucratic factor continues to grow whatever economic organization might obtain. Bureaucracy comes to be viewed as omnipotent, subject to temporary setbacks but never to any real or sizeable defeat. If such is the case, then consensus theory is indeed no less omnipotent than the organizational procedures from which it derives its originating impulse.

Consensus theory has led to such a stress on continuities and similarities in the life of an industrial complex that all real differences between democracy and autocracy, ruling and being ruled, exploiting and being exploited, are eliminated—in theory at least. The "natural history of society" technique, which sees everything in terms of functional identities, has made a universe in which only grey cats and clever hounds exist. Political systems are reduced to "quantifiable" terms of how decisions are arrived at in system A or system B. The fusion of Michels and Weber being urged upon us, a fusion between "iron laws" of oligarchy and bureaucracy respectively, is not a resolution of the crisis in consensus theory, but a symptom of that crisis.[22]

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[21] Lewis A. Coser, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–156.

[22] Seymour M. Lipset, "Political Sociology," *op. cit.*, pp. 89–91.

Since everything is reduced to administrative techniques, goals of any specific organization vanish into functional identifications, and the individual is left with an impotence that derives from being a part of an association that has a consensual life over and above the person. Consensus becomes the ideological celebration of the corporate personality, possessing a reality which transcends human society as such.

The mystique of consensus theory is evident in the work of many students of complex organization. Here we are met with the impermeable and impenetrable sovereignty of total specialization: the narcotizing effect of role-sets, the functional value of constraint and persuasion, decision-making machinery, etc. The paradox is that consensus theory, far from acting as a bulwark of democratic social theory (as it starts out to be), is the very reverse. It is a theory not for reaching agreements, but one which states that harmony is intrinsic to the organization of the bureaucratic life: a harmony which exists over and above the actual accords reached by men. And such must consensus theory remain since any serious theory of agreements and decisions must at the same time be a theory of disagreements and the conditions under which decisions cannot be reached. Yet consensus theorists, starting from the metaphysical "need" for consensus as universal, can only talk about absolute and relative consensus, complete or partial integration but never about conflict as a means of expressing genuine social needs and aspirations.[23]

On this point, Gouldner has put matters rightly by pointing out that

> Instead of telling men how bureaucracy might be mitigated, they insist that it is inevitable. Instead of explaining how democratic patterns may, to some extent, be fortified and extended, they warn us that democracy cannot be perfect. Instead of controlling the disease, they suggest that we are deluded, or more politely, incurably romantic, for hoping to control it. Instead of assuming responsibilities as realistic clinicians, striving to further democratic potentialities wherever they can, many social scientists have become morticians, all too eager to bury men's hopes.[24]

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It cannot be stated as a theoretical first principle that consensus carries an implication of social equilibrium, or for that matter, that conflict entails disequilibrium. There is a distinction to be made between types and levels of conflict, especially between conflicts *over* the basis of consensus, and those conflicts arising *within* the consensual apparatus. There are, to draw an analogy from game theory, conflicts programmed for continuation of the game (such as parliamentary debates), and there are those programmed to end the game through a change of the rules as such (such as *coup d'états)*. In neither case is a theory of conflict tied to social disorganization or to deviance from norms. This is not to say that conflict situations do not contain possibilities of social disorganizations. Of course they do. . . . In short, both consensus and conflict are phenomena which may promote or retard social cooperation or political cohesion.

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[23] See in particular, Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938); James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley, *The Principles of Organization* (New York: Harper & Co., 1939); Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1 (1956), 63–85; Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," *American Sociological Review*, XIII (1948), 25–35.

[24] Alvin W. Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (1955), pp. 506–507.

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If consensus and conflict occupy the same social universe and logically imply one another, what is the basis for suggesting the empirical superiority of conflict theory as an analytical tool? Fundamentally, it is the impossibility of describing any but the most permissive and tolerant communities in terms of consensus matrices. While conflict theory, with its openness to problems of coercion, pressure groups, social classes, political myths, cultural clashes, racial strife, etc., more nearly approximates the going issues in *Gesellschaft* relationships. In short, from a descriptive point of view, conflict theory covers a wider and more profound range of questions. From a prescriptivist position it is, to be sure, better for men to settle their differences on the basis of free agreement rather than external pressures. But this is an entirely different level of sociological analysis, the level of what kind of decisions make for human cooperation. In any event, consensus theorists cut themselves off from this avenue of thought because of their uniform faith in a descriptivist sociology. They are thus reduced to platitutidinous statements that not enough attention has been given to the consensus apparatus in group relations. However, even admitting the validity of this claim, this does not carry with it a mandate to consider consensus as either a more virtuous—or what is more significant, a more practiced—form of arranging social affairs than custom, myth or even coercion.

The present turn to consensus theory is a change in direction of subjectivism, of elevating individual criteria and auto-evaluations concerning status and prestige to the level of objective fact. In the "Warner tradition" for example the definition of social class is reduced to what the community consensus says a class is.[30] The abandonment of serious consideration of the sociology of knowledge, to the forms of ideological distortions of social reality, leads to the naive and calamitous identification of truth with what popular consensus claims as true. This return to a culture and counting theory of truth reinforces the tendency to equate the function of science with a description of the mythic properties in thought. In this way, the manipulative aspects of a social science replace the traditional quest for discovery of social laws.

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[30] W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community—Yankee City Series*: Vol. I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 82, et passium. For a brilliant critique of anthropological subjectivism, see Ruth Rosner Kornhauser, "The Warner Approach to Social Stratification," in *Class, Status and Power: A Reader in Social Stratification,* edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), pp. 224–255. See also C. Wright Mills, "The Social Life of a Modern Community—An Evaluation," in *Power, Politics and People: The Collected Papers of C. Wright Mills,* edited by Irving L. Horowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 40–54.

Consensus theory has a narrowing effect on the conduct of sociological science as such. Consensual units are too frequently seen in terms of small group and small community relation, such as Newcomb's Bennington College dormitory students, Warner's Yankee City, Kaufman's Oldland, or Hollingshead's Elmtown. In this sense, consensus theory has a self-fulfilling prophetic dimension, in that what is examined already presupposes a high degree of social cohesion and interaction.[31] Precisely in the larger social and national units are such unifying agencies and symbols absent. Immigration waves, differences in cultural, racial and ethnic backgrounds, sectional, caste and class antagonisms, these type of situations stand in continual need of a sociological theory of conflict and conflict resolution; one which makes no assumptions as to the auto-regulative or equilibriated conditions of a specific social system. To declare, as a legion of small group sociologists have, that the only viable avenue of scientific study open to the sociologist is the group, since only in group relations can the study of consensus be presently undertaken, is not to prove the worth of consensus but only to demonstrate the extent to which larger units of social research have been hastily and needlessly surrendered to other social sciences.

That even the original intent of consensus theory, to establish a measurement of what public opinion maintains as true or desirable as any given point, has been subverted, has been forcefully made clear by the elitist corruption of consensus to signify what "prestige judges" think consensus to be.[32] . . . Reissman notes the central weakness of consensual definitions of social class. "There is the tendency, although not an inevitable one, to consider behavior as the result of the value system of class rather than as the effect of, say, economic factors, social power, education, or political forces. The crux of class distinction, thereby, becomes one of values, which in turn become the presumed causes of class difference in behavior."[33] It must thus be concluded, not that status factors are inoperative as independent variables, but rather that such a conclusion is not necessarily arrived at by a theory of consensus. Shifts in modes of behavior from class to prestige lines can be more readily and accurately gauged on historical grounds than on pseudo-psychological grounds of the instinctual need for togetherness and social acceptance.

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[31] This is not to imply that conflict situations, and thus conflict theory, is inoperative at small group levels. Quite the contrary, the most significant literature of this genre has shown a marked concern with conflict and conflict resolution as the essence of group interaction. See, for example, Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society: Class Power and Religion in a Rural Community* (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1960); Judith R. Kramer and Seymour Leventman, *Children of the Gilded Ghetto: Conflict Resolutions of Three Generations of American Jews* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and Kenneth Wilson Underwood, *Protestant and Catholic: Religious and Social Interaction in an Industrial Community* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1957).

[32] Harold Kaufman, *Prestige Classes in a New York Rural Community* (Ithaca: Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, March 1944), Memoir 260, p. 46.

Why then has the great shift from conflict theory to consensus theory taken place at this juncture in American sociology? Several hypotheses suggest themselves. First, that as American society becomes more democratic, more easy-going, the search for the consensual basis becomes more pronounced. . . .

A much more powerful line of reasoning has been suggested by Morris Janowitz, when he indicates that technical bureaucracies and team-member proficiency has tended to usurp the older power of formal authority as distinct from science. Which is to say that the older situation of science as isolated from policy making has disintegrated. With this, authority shifts from outright reliance on domination to a wider utilization of manipulation, on demonstrated managerial skills, operational proficiencies, and the capacity to develop positive organizational loyalties. Therefore, in such a context, consensus comes to be the decisive pivot upon which the success or failure of the manipulative society hangs.[35]

But perhaps the most powerful reason for the shift to consensus theory is the "enlightened" recognition that mass terror is not as powerful an instrument for extracting economic and political loyalties as mass persuasion. The entire theoretical edifice of small group theory comes to rest on the idea that the formal sanctioning of force is less potent a factor in individual or group motivation than the informal sanctions of the immediately involved reference-set. . . . The promotion of consensus as a theory has had as its asking price the conversion of sociology from a science to a tool of policy. A policy which, moreover, fails to reach the goal of harmony.[37] As White recently indicated, "There is nothing new in manipulated opinion and engineered consent. . . . Even the sheer bulk of distortion is not altogether new, merely more refined. What is new is the acceptability, the mere taken-for-grantedness of these things."[38]

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[33] Leonard Reissman, *Class in American Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 127 and 175.

[35] Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959), pp. 27–38. Janowitz' remarks are confined to the military. Responsibility for enlarging the scope and context of his argument is mine.

[37] David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, Revel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1954), pp. 306–307.

I want to terminate my remarks with a plea for sharper logical and linguistic distinctions, specifically to point out that the issue of human cooperation, while related to consensus and conflict, has a quite unique dimension and operational range. It must be pointed out that a decision in favor of consensus theory is not automatically a decision on behalf of cooperation. It is simply a decision to examine social structure to the partial or total exclusion of social dynamics; a decision to act as if breaks with tradition, shifts in the culture complex, disruption of moral patterns, can be described as marginal in character. There is indeed a kind of safety in the continuing, the prolonged, the enduring. But this safety gratuitously cloaking itself in the mantle of the secularization of science is nothing but the abdication of the field of social change, and hence an abandonment of the on-going problems confronting those most directly concerned with achieving human cooperation at group, regional, national, or international levels.

The functional successes of any given social structure should not define the limits of sociological discourse. For we may find ourselves celebrating our social order one day, and another the next—and in precisely the same "functional-structural" terms. The central task of sociology is explanation and prediction, each in terms of the other, and no theory which identifies consensus with the social order as such can fail to come upon hard times.

What then is the difference between consensus and cooperation? There seem to be three distinguishable factors to be identified. First: consensus stands for agreement internally, i.e., in terms of shared perspectives, agreements on the rules of association and action, a common set of norms and values. Cooperation for its part makes no demands on role uniformity but only upon precedural rules. Cooperation concerns the settlement of problems in terms which make possible the continuation of differences and even fundamental disagreements. Thus one can legitimately speak of cooperation between labor and management, while one speaks on the degree of consensus each side brings to bear at the bargaining table. Second: consensus is agreement on the content of behavior, while cooperation necessitates agreement only on the form of behavior. We speak of consensus if all members of the Women's Christian Temperance Union agree to abstain from drinking alcoholic beverages. But we speak of cooperation when agreement is reached on the forms allowed for drinking and the forms allowed for curbing the intake of liquor. As the "Prohibition Era" dramatically showed, the substitution of consensus for cooperation did not lead to a new morality but simply to chaos. Third: cooperation concerns toleration of differences, while consensus demands abolition of these same differences. If a game theory analogy be preferred, the distinction between cooperation and consensus might be stated in the following terms: consensus programs the termination of the game by insisting on the principle of unity and unilateral victory, whereas cooperation is pluralistic because it programs the continuation of the game by maintaining and insisting upon the legitimacy of differences.

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[38] Howard B. White, "The Processed Voter and the New Political Science," *Social Research*, XXVIII (1961), 150.

What is required at this juncture is a more adequate sociological theory of cooperation; a stipulation of the conditions of that minimum set of beliefs about man and his social universe that is constant with continued survival and growth. Such a theory of cooperation would insist on the need for maintaining life although leaving open the question of what to do with it; the need to secure the material and cultural needs of men although differing on the sort of social system best able to meet such needs. Beyond this, there is a need for a theory of conflict, a programming of conflict, that would allow people to shift and choose their conceptions of what constitutes progress, pleasure, etc., and the institutionalization of avenues of action to implement these conceptions. Consensus theory has done nothing to melt the present freezing of attitudes on either a national or international scale. Nor will it, unless sociologists show a willingness to expand their collective vision of the social universe beyond the confines of a dormitory or a hospital ward.

The unity required to evolve such a sociological theory of cooperation is methodological rather than systematic. It requires us to approach ideas and attitudes concerning cooperation as hypotheses whose truth content must be measured by the degree with which they can be correlated to objective circumstances. This is something quite different than placing men in a Procrustean bed of pattern variables which may or may not hold for previous or future generations—or, for that matter, for the present one. The methods of sociology do not exclude decisive choices in favor of specific objectives. It does caution us against ignoring alternative conceptual frameworks on the basis of their unpopularity or marginality. The concept of cooperation is essentially the programming of common standards in a world of conflicting interests and even different notions as to what constitutes interests. Precisely because a general theory of cooperation would offer no transcendental commitments to the eternal righteousness of any existing social order, it can place itself in the service of men. It would do well for sociology to perform a decisive role in the structuring of a theory of cooperation, both for the general values this would help establish and for a way to settle some long standing ambiguities in sociological research.

Social Conflict and Psychic Conflict

THOMAS M. FRENCH

Psychoanalysis has shown that the neuroses and many other mental disorders have their origin in psychic conflict, in conflicting motives within one and the same individual. In the study of social phenomena, similarly, considerable use has been made of the concept of social conflict, of conflicting interests, of conflicting motives within the social body. We often think of such social conflicts as conflicts between different individuals. The Marxian school tends to speak in rather simple terms of a class struggle, of a struggle between capitalist and proletariat classes, between those who own the tools of production and others without property whose interests demand the curbing of the unrestricted power of property-owners. Such a concept of a sharp division of society into conflicting classes may indeed be a useful one for the understanding of certain phenomena and in some cases may be a rough but essentially correct description of the facts.

But there are also those who insist that there is no fundamental conflict of interest within the social body. Such insistence upon the identity of interest of all groups within the community is perhaps more often used as a political slogan than advanced as a reasoned scientific conclusion, but the so-called "national governments" and totalitarian states have made us very familiar with the notion that there must be complete unanimity within the state.

In a more subtle form the same idea enters as an implicit assumption in most political discussions. We proceed in our political discussions as though there were no question of reconciling divergent needs and interests, as though we were in fact all agreed upon the goal of our deliberations and merely debating upon the best means to further this common goal.

There are also views intermediate between these two extremes. Very often, indeed, there are divergences of interest between different classes in the community, but the borderlines between these classes may be anything but

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sharply defined. In the conflict between property-owning and propertyless classes there are very large numbers of individuals whose interests do not lie exclusively with either of these two groups. There are many people who have enough possessions to make them feel threatened by any attack upon the rights of property but who are yet not secure enough in their property rights to be indifferent to encroachment upon the rights of propertyless individuals. There are also many whose economic status would place them in the proletarian class but who, due to other psychological motives, tend rather to identify with the capitalists. Communist writers complain that the so-called white-collar workers utterly ignore their own real interests by identifying themselves with the capitalist interests of their employers.

In psychoanalysis we distinguish between conscious and unconscious attitudes. Logically we should expect such individuals to be in conflict. Alongside of their conscious identification with property-owners and employers one might expect to find more or less envy of the more privileged classes and a less conscious identification with the underprivileged groups in their resentment and fear of encroachments upon the security and rights of the classes who have no property to protect them. Is there any evidence to confirm this deduction? Is there any evidence to suggest that social conflicts between classes involve many individuals, at least unconsciously, in conflicts between conflicting class loyalties?

Certain communities are today striving most desperately to deny the possibility of any fundamental divergence of class interest and to devote themselves with utmost loyalty to the ideal of absolute national harmony. It is precisely in these communities that we find in its most extreme form the problem of antagonism to minority groups and a widespread belief that some large group of people are plotting to overthrow this supposedly harmonious and unanimous regime. We need not deny that there is an element of truth in this belief. There are indeed individuals in all these communities who are actually plotting revolution. The point of interest, however, is the fact that whole classes of individuals who have little or nothing to do with these revolutionary activities are nevertheless suspected of them. How is this fact to be explained?

At this point we are tempted to draw upon psychiatric and psychoanalytic experience. Every psychiatrist has encountered numerous individuals who, quite without objective grounds for their beliefs, are nevertheless firmly convinced that they are the object of systematic persecution by some widespread and malicious organization. Psychoanalysis has shown that such delusions of persecution are based quite regularly upon the mechanism of projection. One attributes to others motives against which one is struggling in one's self. A husband who is struggling against temptations to be unfaithful to his wife refuses to recognize the existence of such motives in himself but becomes convinced that his wife is unfaithful to him.

It would seem almost certain that in the mass delusions of today we are seeing the manifestations of a similar mechanism of projection . . . .

. . . Here, too, there are vague fears abroad of mysterious subversive elements in the community. We call them communists, "reds," bolsheviks. Here too, of course, there has been a very small amount of objective justification for such fears. There are small groups who preach or who have preached revolution; but the brand of "communist" and the vague fears attached to it have been extended to apply to very considerable numbers of individuals who have not even the remotest connection with any sort of a plot to overthrow the government.

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Why do people have a vague fear of communists and why is this fear so indiscriminate as to include even the most mild-spoken advocates of the need for changes in our social order?

A first answer to this question seems rather self-evident. Recent events have made us vividly aware of the fact that revolutions are nearly always accompanied by violent excesses on a large scale. We have a horror, therefore, of all attempts at violent overthrow of existing regimes. There is a deep-seated tradition in this country that it is better to proceed slowly by legal means with the reform even of very serious abuses rather than to incur the dangers of social upheaval and indiscriminate violence.

But the victims of this propaganda are for the most part not advocates of lawless violence but rather individuals who are urging or actively engaged in the attempt to bring about changes by legal means. It is precisely such advocates of lawful change who are our best protection against revolution. If social discontent can find no legal outlet, then indeed we shall be in ever increasing danger of attempts to achieve by violence what cannot be achieved by legal means. How, then, can we account for the fact that just such advocates of peaceful and legal changes in our institutions can be so easily grouped together with advocates of violent revolution and can become the indiscriminate object of a fear of revolutionary agitators?

It is evident that it is not only revolutionary violence that we are afraid of. We seem also to be afraid even of the ideas propounded by those advocating peaceful social change. We react as though we felt that even the thought of changes in our institutions were somehow subversive—as if we felt that even the most sober and unemotional advocacy of a need for such changes involved a threat of violent revolution.

But how can an idea be dangerous? Obviously only if it somehow appeals to us or—what is often the same thing—if we fear that it will appeal to someone else. An idea that arouses no reverberations in the minds of others cannot possibly be dangerous. Any idea that we fear must therefore be one that awakens in us some powerful emotional response.

Let us turn again to analogies in psychoanalytic experience. We not infrequently encounter individuals who have a totally irrational fear of certain situations that other people find entirely harmless. A woman will be afraid to go upon the street unless she is accompanied by her mother or sister. A man will be thrown into a panic if a knife comes within his reach. Psychoanalysis has shown that the explanation of such fears is regularly based upon a fear of temptation. The woman is afraid to go on the street without a chaperone because she is afraid of her indiscriminate sexual impulses. The man is afraid of a knife because the sight of the knife reminds him of his desire to kill somebody with it.

It is legitimate to assume that our fear of subversive social ideas is based upon a similar mechanism. The advocate of social change is reminding us of problems that are not yet solved and that we are very reluctant even to think about. We do not like to be reminded that millions of people are out of work, that millions more are inadequately housed and fed and in other respects in dire need. We like still less to be reminded that very few of us are so secure that an unfortunate turn of fate might not reduce us to a similar situation of unemployment and want. It is distressing to realize that as society is now organized this sort of economic crises recurs over and over at periodic intervals, that our methods of dealing with such crises are slipshod and ineffective, and that some of the reasons why they are ineffective are based upon the fact that we are afraid of interfering in any way with the rights of private property. We are unwilling to face the fact that any rational and fundamental solution of these problems will inevitably demand of us sacrifices that we are very reluctant to make. Still less do we like to face the fact that, if these problems do not find adequate solution, there is always danger that general popular discontent is likely to rise to a point where a violent revolution will occur. This whole complex of thoughts is distasteful to us, and one temporary solution is to try to push the whole problem from our minds just as the patients we described a moment ago try to avoid going on the street unchaperoned or try to keep knives out of the reach of their hands. So long as we are successful in this we can have some peace, but the individuals who stubbornly insist upon reminding us of these problems threaten our peace of mind. The problems that we are trying to avoid thinking about contain within them the danger of revolution. Therefore, anyone who compels us to think about them is reacted to as though he were a revolutionary agitator.

With the help of psychoanalysis, we have arrived at a dynamic explanation of our fear of social innovators. The motives just considered concern exclusively the dynamics of the social situation, the state of organization of the community, and the like. Motives arising out of childhood situations, that are of such predominant importance in the analysis of the individual—such motives seem here to be playing a much less significant role. This fact points to a methodological distinction of considerable significance for the application of psychoanalysis to sociological problems. In the analysis of the individual also we must always start by attempting to understand his reactions in terms of the patient's real dynamic situation in the present, but these reactions to a present real situation regularly turn out to be founded upon reactions to earlier childhood situations. These childhood situations, however, differ greatly in each individual case. In mass reactions, on the other hand, these more variable features of the individual childhood situation tend to cancel one another out. Only the more universal and invariable aspects of the childhood situations of the group remain of significance. The momentary dynamic situation of the group as a whole becomes, therefore, of greater proportional significance.

Can psychoanalysis give us any insight as to a rational therapy? The patient with a paranoid delusion, as we know, is usually very difficult to help. The prospects of therapy for the patient suffering from irrational fears is usually much better. What is the principle of our therapy? What we usually try to do is to encourage the patient to talk about his difficulties, to help him to gain some understanding of what is it that he is really afraid of, and finally to bring him to the point where he dares to face frankly and think freely about the impulses from which he has been fleeing in such a panic.

Can we draw any hints from this analogy that could help us find a rational therapy for our phobia against the advocates of social change? Our therapy for the individual is to encourage him to talk freely. The analogous therapy for our social problem would seem to be free public discussion. By encouraging the individual sufferer to talk freely we help him bring his conflicting impulses face to face. His forbidden sexual or hostile impulses must be brought clearly into consciousness and contemplated face to face with the protests of his conscience against them. Only so is it possible for him to find a new way of trying to reconcile the two opposing forces within him. Similarly, it would seem that any fundamental solution of our social conflicts must be based upon a frank recognition of the fundamental issues involved and of the conflicting motives between which we are torn in attempting to find a solution.

In the treatment of an individual patient the solution found must take account of both of the opposing forces. No solution can be really stable that attempts to ignore either the instinctual demands or the claims of conscience. Cure of the neurosis depends upon the achievement of some sort of reconciliation between these opposing tendencies. In every case both instinctual demands and conscience must submit to some sort of modification.

Similarly in the social sphere any social order that hopes to maintain any real stability must find a way of reconciling the claims of those whose dire need makes imperative some change in the social order with the justifiable fears of more fortunate members of the community; for the fears of the latter are also well grounded, as too abrupt social change not only would destroy their own privileges but would also wipe away valuable institutions for which it might take decades or even centuries to find satisfactory substitutes.

But how is it possible to find a way of reconciling interests that are so bitterly opposed to each other? Only, I believe, by the same method that must be employed in the case of the individual patient—by frank recognition not only of divergent aims but also of the fundamental needs upon which they are based; by the freest possible public discussion in which the opposing groups attempt, not to outwit each other by clever propaganda, but honestly to understand the needs and point of view each of the other.

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If social conflicts are to be solved, it is plain that our political leaders must . . . have a comprehensive grasp of the conflict situation and of the fundamental and divergent needs upon which it is based; but they must also have the courage to bear the brunt of the public resentment against unwelcome insights and the tact to sense how much unpleasant truth a people can assimilate at one time. The art of real democratic[3] statesmanship is analogous to the art of therapy by insight; only it is many times more difficult.

But even with adequate leadership is it going to be possible to find a solution for our social conflicts in the forum of public discussion? Are not the passions that have already been aroused too violent to permit of any sort of effective friendly discussion in a spirit of mutual willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of a harmonious solution? When we ask this question we are really asking another: Is democracy really possible? For the essence of democracy is not so much its ballot boxes and its machinery of representation—important though these are. The essence of democracy is rather this spirit of attempting to settle differences by mutual deliberation and of readiness to make mutual sacrifices for the common good. If passions run too high, this democratic method becomes, indeed, impossible. Democracy today is indeed threatened from without, but, if it is to maintain its own inner vitality, it can do so by only one method—by the frank recognition of our diverging needs and the freest possible public discussion.

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[3] Really successful autocracies also demand statesmanship of a high order. An autocracy in order to be stable must also find ways of reconciling and satisfying the fundamental needs of the people, but the solution can be imposed from above. The analogy in individual therapy would be treatment by environmental manipulation without any attempt to give the patient insight into his conflict. In a democracy, on the other hand, we strive toward the ideal of self-government by an enlightened public opinion.

The Group Approach to the Reduction of Tensions and Conflicts

AMES W. CHAPMAN

There have been numerous developments, primarily during the last decade, involving the application of group methods in the prevention and treatment of social and personal disorganization. These efforts are not only suggestive as applied situations in the development of sound theory, but also represent the opportunity for a vocation. This work has consisted of efforts to work with groups of persons to overcome difficulties of various forms. Many of our readers are familiar with such projects as Alcoholics Anonymous, Addicts Anonymous, Shaw's Chicago Area Project, Lewin and his Research Center for Group Dynamics[9] which involve both theory and application.

Group psychotherapy, the current emphasis having chiefly grown out of the physical impossibility of treating tensions and conflicts individually during the war, is suggestive for sociological research. The efforts toward group psychotherapy have a history of development in many directions, including the work of Pratti with tubercular patients, of Marsh, Wender and Lazell in mental hospitals, of Moreno and his associates in psychodrama and sociodrama, and of Schilder, Redl, Slavson and Klapman on theory.[10]

Usually psychotherapy is thought of in two categories: *individual psychotherapy*, involving a treatment relationship between a therapist and one individual;[11] and *group psychotherapy*, involving a therapist and several

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[9] Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948).

[10] S. R. Slavson, *An Introduction to Group Therapy*, and J. W. Klapman, *Group Psychotherapy* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1946).

[11] Carl R. Rogers, *Counseling and Psychotherapy* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942), Ch. II. Rogers' approach is "nondirective." It is client-centered, permissive, treatment-interview therapy. The therapist does not take an active part; he does not advise, suggest, interpret, or show approval or disapproval to the action of the client. The therapist recognizes,

Ames W. Chapman, "The Group Approach to the Reduction of Tensions and Conflicts," Journal of Human Relations, *Vol. 1, No. 2 (1952), pp. 39–47. Reprinted from the* Journal of Human Relations *with permission of the publisher, Central State College, Wilberforce, Ohio, copyright 1952. The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in original.*

persons who obtain treatment in the group situation. The forms of *group psychotherapy*[12] are varied. On this point Giles Thomas says: "The literature on group therapy is so confusing that one thinks there are many forms of group therapy as there are practitioners."[13] The personality, experience and training of the therapist will, to a degree, determine the type of therapy he will employ. Thomas, employing Moore's classification of individual psychotherapy, grouped certain therapists on the basis of the emphasis of their method on a vertical line between two antithetical abstractions: repressive-inspirational and analytical.[14] Thomas believes that the trend in repressive-inspirational psychotherapy is to urge the patient to control himself, to suppress social or worrisome thoughts and wishes and to find an interest or inspiration in life, work, the community, religion, etc. In the other ideal type he contends that analytical therapy urges the loosening of repression, the conscious recognition and analysis of unconcious social wishes. It aims to free energy bound in needless repression and does not direct the patient's activity toward specific goals but holds that once the energies are free the patient will himself find outlets. In the selection of practitioners Thomas emphasizes the repressive-inspirational. The goal of the repressive-inspirational method is implied in its use of the emotional appeal of the evangelistic revival meeting and the commercial techniques of radio and television.

Regardless of the personality and training of the therapist, most have in common free discussion in an easy, informal, and permissive atmosphere where the origins and developments of tensions and conflicts may be traced, analyzed, and treated.

Abrahams and McCorkle,[15] at the Fifth Service Command Rehabilitation Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, utilized group methods on military deviates. They were attempting to give these military deviates a "total psychotherapeutic push" in order that they might be returned to military duty. In this experiment there were four large groups containing from 125 to 175 men (heterogeneous in nature) and 12 small groups containing from 12 to 35 men (relatively homogeneous). The smaller groups were divided into four categories: (1) aggressive, (2) depressed and withdrawn, (3) "normal," and (4) introductory. These groups met daily with the therapist who introduced material on mental hygiene, and sociological principles in relation to social,

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accepts, and clarifies the feelings which the client expresses about his problems and conflicts. He, thus, serves as a "mirror" in which the client sees himself.

[12] This method of therapy is referred to in a variety of terms: "group psychotherapy," "guided group interaction," "group therapy," "group psychoanalysis," etc.

[13] Giles Thomas, "Group Psychotherapy: A Review of the Recent Literature," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, V (April, 1943).

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Joseph Abrahams and Lloyd W. McCorkle, "Group Psychotherapy on Military Offenders," *American Journal of Sociology*, LI (March, 1946).

individual, and military adjustment in simple understandable language. The men discussed these principles in the sessions which were free and open to all. Many of them found that they were not alone in some of their attitudes which gave them support. Naturally, in the homogeneous groups (the small groups) there were men whose attitudes were quite different. With the aid of the therapist in the sessions these attitudes were gradually changed to those more socially acceptable in society.

On the basis of the preliminary follow-up study, the following post-treatment data were obtained: 78 per cent made satisfactory adjustment for a period of three months; 13 per cent were absent without leave or in confinement; 4 percent were honorably discharged; and 5 per cent were not reported upon.

The family group has not been entirely neglected in the experiments designed to reduce tensions and conflicts utilizing group therapy techniques. Stone and Levine,[16] at the Margaret Sanger Research Bureau, New York City, had eight separate groups, containing 72 women and 42 men, who had been referred for counseling. The chief problems presented were centered in sexual behavior. Each of the clients was given enough time to present his problems and to discuss them in a permissive, nonjudgmental atmosphere. Here, with the aid of the other clients and the therapists, the individual was able to gain insight into his problems.

Stone and Levine concluded that group therapy in sexual maladjustments eliminated the feeling of being isolated, of being different and inadequate; gave reassurance by the opportunity to talk freely without a feeling of disapproval or condemnation on the part of the therapists and fellow members of the group; revealed that sexual maladjustments are not necessarily due to physical inadequacies, but may be traced to such factors as early experience and conditioning, parental influences, and personality differences often reinforced by difficult economic situations, housing conditions, in-law problems and the like.[17]

Slavson developed a distinctive style of group therapy at child guidance clinics operated by the Jewish Board of Guardians, New York City. His approach is labeled activity group therapy, or therapy *by* a group. The chief difference between *activity* group therapy and *interview* group therapy is that there is practically no discussion in *activity* groups, but the emphasis is placed on physical and manual activity and interplay between group members. Reduction of tension, reduction of anxiety, discharge of drives is achieved by "acting out" through free interaction with other members of the group. The therapist's role is that of a *neutral* person who stays in the background. The basic process involves acting out hostilities in a permissive environment, experiencing the reactions of group members to behavior, changing attitudes toward one's self, and strengthening the ego through gaining status in the group.[18]

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[16] Abraham Stone and Lena Levine, "Group Therapy in Sexual Maladjustment," *The American Journal of Psychiatry*, CVII (September, 1950), pp. 195–196.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 201–202.

Another form of group therapy which is utilized in an effort to reduce tensions and conflicts is the psychodrama (action therapy). The psychodrama involves a breakdown of the two-way treatment process and the private nature of counseling. The "others" in the patient's world are played (either symbolically by an assistant or actually) in a spontaneous, dramatic form. The treatment becomes an open social interaction situation, approaching real life situations due to the nonverbal character of the action included. The person plays himself or someone else in his situation (reversal of role) and acts out his problems and conflicts.[19] Moreno points out that in psychodrama the private roles (a child, a mother, a father, a delinquent) and interpersonal relations are central.[20] Sometimes an audience profits by virtue of the similarities of roles of those individuals and those of the audience. This approach requires skilled personnel, but has much potential value in changing attitudes and conceptions of a person's roles in various situations.

Finally, we should mention the sociodrama which is similar to the psychodrama, except that the subject treatment is a group and the collective roles and intergroup relations are emphasized. Role of the father in a particular culture, or the role of the labor organizer are examples of the sociodramatic focus. Intergroup relations are explored, conflicts acted out, and treatment provided in the sociodrama.[21] Zeleny believes that the sociodrama has many possibilities for teaching social studies by acting out conflicts between various groups in society.[22]

Different styles of group and individual therapy are not necessarily alternative approaches, but may be used simultaneously as supplementary to each other.

It seems as if the most serious drawback to the group methods mentioned here is the lack of trained personnel. It is obvious that they have great potential. Some of the leading places for training are Moreno's Psychodramatic Institute, New York; Redl's Center at Wayne University, Detroit; and Slavson's inservice training at the Jewish Board of Guardians Child Guidance Clinics in New York.

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[18] S. R. Slavson, *op. cit.*, pp. 293–302.

[19] Robert Hass, "Action Counseling and Process Analysis," *Sociatry*, I (December, 1947), pp. 259–281.

[20] Jacob L. Moreno, "Sociodrama," *Psychodrama*, I (1946), p. 350.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 354–355.

[22] Zeleny, Leslie D., "New Directions in Educational Sociology and the Teaching of Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, XIII (June, 1948) pp. 336–341.

We have attempted to show in this essay that man is born into a culture biologically capable of adapting himself to the patterns of behavior of the group in which he finds himself. These patterns of behavior may be transmitted in a variety of ways, but primarily through formal and informal instruction and precept. Students of the behavior sciences, through their researches, have discovered that there are values and attitudes existing in one group which may not find their way into other groups. These values and attitudes of the varying groups may contribute to tensions and conflicts on both the individual and social levels. It is, then, necessary to conduct research to determine the values in one group which are different from those in another group. When the similar or dissimilar values have been discovered it is our premise that the human individual is a "social animal," seeking a satisfactory niche in this social setting; that he is, to a degree, a social product, whose inhibitions and repressions are motivated by mores of the group; that tensions and conflicts arise because of the different attitudes and values in various groups; and that these tensions and conflicts may be reduced through therapy techniques. Place the individual or individuals in a group with others who have problems and he will associate with them, release his aggressive tendencies, his hates, his loves and his wishes, without any accompanying sense of guilt. By working out his difficulties and achieving adjustment in the small group, he becomes able to face the larger group and to handle his problems on a normal basis.

Socially Integrative Behavior

HAROLD H. ANDERSON

What is this socially integrative behavior? How do we recognize it when we see it? Why is it important?

We have said elsewhere (5, 6) that socially integrative behavior is growth behavior. In physiology, growth has two essential criteria: differentiation and integration. The differentiation represents a succession of changes in which the organism becomes more and more refined, individuated, more and more an organism with characteristics uniquely its own, more and more itself. The integration refers to a process by which the parts work more and more in a functional unity, or in a common biological achievement of creating and maintaining this differentiating organism.

In psychology the essential criteria for growth are also two: they are, also, differentiation and integration, though other terms have been introduced for the same criteria. Allport has listed fourteen aspects of growth, the first two being differentiation and integration (2, p. 132). The other twelve, such as maturation, learning, self-consciousness, suggestion, etc., can be subsumed under his first two. Maturation, for example, is not something apart from differentiation and integration; maturation is differentiation and integration.

Allen (1) speaks of the child's differentiating himself from his mother, becoming more himself, a person unique. Hollingworth (15) spoke of "psychological weaning." But while there must be a progressive differentiating both for the child and, say, his mother, there *must* also be a developing harmony or integration of their activities. Why do we say *must?* Because behavior is circular in its effects. If the mother's differentiation, or self-realization, impedes the similar process in the child, or to the extent that her behavior impedes this process in the child, her behavior becomes dominating. Her domination tends to incite resistance. The resistance retards the mother's own differentiating (or growth) process. The circle

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Harold H. Anderson, "Socially Integrative Behavior," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, *Vol. 41, No. 4 (1946), pp. 379–384. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

becomes *vicious.* Because behavior is circular there must be harmony with those about one as well as differentiation or individuation within the person as such.

Instead of differentiation and integration, I like to use the concepts of *spontaneity* and *harmony* as the two criteria for psychological growth. Some psychologists have resented the use of the terms spontaneity and harmony as being too vague. In answer to this objection, I have this explanation:

Spontaneity and harmony are positive concepts introduced to supplant negative concepts.

Spontaneity is defined as behavior in the absence of fear. Since all things are relative, the relative degree of spontaneity in one's behavior is inversely proportional to the relative degree of fear. No psychologist hesitates to use the concept of fear.

If we start with the premises (1) that all individuals are different; (2) that all individuals have some degree of spontaneity; and (3) that behavior is circular, we find some conflict and frustration in the reconciliation of spontaneities. It is hard for two or more spontaneous persons to get along. Harmony is a positive concept. Harmony is what you have when you are not in conflict. No psychologist hesitates to use the term conflict.

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Spontaneity is not just the *absence of fear.* By comparison with spontaneity, fear is relatively simple. It is certainly much more specific. Studies have shown, for example, that small children are afraid of dogs, doctors, deluges, diseases, and other things. Spontaneity is creative; it is encompassed only by the whole universe; it is accompanied by a process of differentiation, the emergence of originals. It takes a higher level of observation to deal with the positive concepts of behavior than to deal with negative concepts. I mentioned that our observers invariably were more reliable in recording domination than integration.

Harmony is not merely the *absence of conflict.* Harmony, being the free, uncoerced interplay of many spontaneities, is also creative, growth behavior.

War and peace are no simple opposites. There is no simple continuum from destruction, on the one hand, to imagination, invention, or creativeness, on the other. Peace is not the absence of war; imagination and invention are not merely the absence of destruction.

Our preoccupation and befuddlement with negative concepts go even farther. For every positive emotion like joy, ecstasy, exhilaration, there are dozens of negative emotions listed. For every paragraph on a positive emotion in psychology books, there are several paragraphs on negative emotions. Some psychologists even define emotion as *disorganized* behavior. A textbook on child psychology begins a chapter on the meaning of personality with the center heading "Resistant Behavior." It would be an odd cook book that began a chapter on biscuits with a center heading, "Hard Indigestible Biscuits."

What are we doing when we are not at war? What are we doing when we are not afraid? What are we doing when we are not destroying? What are we feeling when it is not fear, or anger, or jealousy, or rage, or grief or remorse? What are we when we are not disorganized? These questions I submit as more difficult than the questions discussed in most psychology books.

As psychologists, we are preoccupied with negative concepts because they are simpler. As parents and teachers, we swat our children, because it takes a lower level of intelligence to behave that way than to discover some basis for common purposes. As citizens, we fight wars because we have not attained an evolutionary level of ability which is required to work out ways of living peacefully. We live dominatively because it takes a lower level of ability than to live integratively.

We have allowed ourselves for forty years to be bogged down by one unfortunate phrase of William James that we need to find a substitute for war. Biological growth is positive. Biological growth is high in differentiation and high in integration. If the cells of our bodies had not "learned" over millions of years to live harmoniously, we should never have emerged from the swamps. Differentiation and integration are *positive* and *basic*. Everything else less than differentiation and integration is a substitute.

Psychological growth is positive. Psychological growth is high in spontaneity and high in harmony. Spontaneity and harmony are positive and basic. Anything less than spontaneity and harmony is a substitute. It is time to re-examine William James's problem about finding a substitute for war. War is high in spontaneity, but low in harmony. Because domination incites resistance, war curtails the spontaneity of all participants. We are all less spontaneous in war than we are at peace. *War* is the substitute. We do not need a substitute for war. We need to move on to positive, basic, tolerant, participating, socially integrative behavior.

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Psychologists, however, are making some progress. Last year 2,038 members of the American Psychological Association endorsed a statement of ten points concerning "Human Nature and the Peace" (16). Point 5 stated, "Liberated and enemy peoples must participate in planning their own destiny." This statement was elaborated by two sentences. How many of the 2,038, do you suppose, realized that in the first of these two sentences they were endorsing a hypothesis about the vicious circle of domination, and that in the second they were advocating an opportunity for socially integrative, socially participating behavior?

The first sentence reads, "Complete outside authority imposed on liberated and enemy peoples without any participation by them [domination] will not be accepted [domination incites resistance] and will lead only to further disruptions of the peace." The second sentence, "The common people of all countries must not only feel that their political and economic future holds genuine hope for themselves and for their children, but, must also feel that they themselves have the responsibility for its achievement" (16).

The two criteria for *responsible behavior* are spontaneity and harmony (7). Behavior is responsible only to the extent that it is spontaneous and in harmony with the spontaneous behavior of others. Spontaneity and harmony are the criteria for growth and for socially integrative behavior.

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Methods of Modifying Behavior

CHARLES R. STROTHER

Changing Individual Behavior

The clinical psychologist, confronted with behavior that requires changing, proceeds by analyzing that behavior into a number of components. He distinguishes three basic aspects which may be described as

1. *instrumental acts*—the behavior under scrutiny, which is considered to be instrumental in some way in attaining satisfaction of the individual's needs;
2. *needs*—conditions within the individual which the given behavior is intended to relieve;
3. *instigations*—antecedent conditions or events which give rise to needs within the individual.

Stated more briefly, instigating conditions give rise to needs which result in behavior directed toward the attainment of need-satisfying goals.

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From this point of view, there are theoretically a number of alternative ways of modifying behavior. The instigating conditions may be eliminated or modified; the needs (motivational systems) of the individual may be altered; or a different set of instrumental acts may be learned. . . .

1. Changing the instigating conditions. In child guidance, instigating conditions may be modified by such procedures as changing the attitudes and behavior of the parents, changing conditions in the neighborhood, or eliminating frustrating situations in the classroom. In marital counseling, this procedure might involve removing the mother-in-law from the home or persuading the spouse to change the behavior which produces irritability, unhappiness, or frigidity in the partner. In psychiatry, it may be represented by removal of a drug which is producing a toxic psychosis.

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In industrial counseling, it would be represented by such things as changing a company rule, transferring an irritating supervisor, eliminating frustrating delays in the flow of materials, or improving physical conditions in the shop. In international relations, the same basic principle is involved in the transfer of populations, in equalizing access to raw materials, and in breaking down tariff barriers to the exchange or distribution of goods.

There are two major difficulties involved in the application of this procedure. In the first place, success is dependent on a correct diagnosis of the particular aspects of the situation that are the necessary and sufficient instigators. There is a multitude of conditions in any home which might be changed, but the undesirable behavior of the child will be affected only by modification of those particular conditions to which he is reacting. The elimination of competition for raw materials or for markets will reduce the likelihood of wars only to the extent that these factors have actually instigated conflicts.

The other difficulty lies in the fact that there are some instigating conditions that are unalterable. The clinician, the group leader, the teacher, the sociologist, and the politician are not infrequently confronted with situations in which it is not possible to change certain conditions. Under such circumstances, some other procedure must be resorted to.

2. *Changing needs.* The second general category of methods of changing behavior consists in changing the needs, or motivational systems, of the individual. Followers of the old "instinct psychology" maintained that human needs were innate and therefore unmodifiable. The contemporary psychologist, granting the existence of innate physiological needs, maintains that the psychological needs which govern the more important aspects of human behavior are acquired through social experience. From this point of view, three factors determine the nature and relative strength of an individual's needs: constitutional factors, inter-personal relationships, and cultural influences.

Dramatic changes in behavior may sometimes be brought about by modification of constitutional factors. Various chemical and physical agents or surgical procedures may be utilized by the pediatrician, the orthopedist, the plastic surgeon, the neuro-surgeon, the otologist, or the psychiatrist to bring about changes in behavior in a wide variety of conditions. Such procedures are resorted to, however, only where there is definite organic pathology or deficiency, or where, as in some psychoses, behavior is so abnormal that such treatment is required. There are always, it must be recognized, definite organic limitations to change that cannot be transcended. In many cases, there are specific physical factors limiting or determining behavior which cannot be modified. Physical traumata and delinquency diseases may set yet unappreciated limits to the modifiability of large segments of war-ravaged populations.

The most important factor determining the psychological needs of the individual is the culture in which he lives. Anthropological research has amply demonstrated the extent to which personality is a product of culture. The culture with its system of values, its rewards and punishments, its taboos and permissions, brings to bear on the individual all the force of its various institutions and largely determines his values, goals, attitudes, and needs, as well as the forms of his behavior. We cannot, then, doubt the possibility of radical alterations in behavior as a result of alterations in the culture of a group. The great difficulty involved in this procedure is, of course, the fact that culture is highly resistant to change.

An additional determinant of the psychological needs of the individual is the influence of his personal relationship with other individuals, as individuals, and not as "carriers of the culture." The personal characteristics of the mother, father or siblings, of friends, teachers, or heroes may be important influences on one's personality. This type of influence is frequently utilized by the psychotherapist or social worker to effect changes in behavior and personality. The psychoanalytic *transference* and what is called *relationship therapy* are specific examples of this procedure. Many of the other techniques of psychotherapy are also to be classified under this heading.

Relationship techniques require certain essential conditions for their successful application. On the part of the individual, there must be a desire to establish a personal relationship. There must be what the clinician calls "a capacity for rapport" or the ability to enter into a constructive emotional relationship with others. The lack of such desire or capacity is the principal reason for the failure of psychotherapeutic efforts in most cases of schizophrenia and of psychopathic personality. On the part of the therapist, there must be a capacity to enter into such a relationship and skill in the use of the relationship for constructive ends, for relationships may be destructive as well as constructive. They may encourage dependence and continued immaturity rather than develop independence and growth toward greater maturity. That this is true not only on the individual level is evidenced by the effect of different colonial policies on the governed peoples.

3. Changing the instrumental acts. The third general category of methods by which personality may be changed consists of procedures directed toward the substitution of a different set of instrumental acts as means of attaining the goal. Most of the techniques referred to as *re-education* belong in this category. The individual may be told, advised, or persuaded to behave in a different fashion, certain types of acts may be punished and other ways of satisfying the same need may be rewarded, or alternative courses of action may be suggested.

Techniques of direction, advice, and persuasion have a limited usefulness.

Their effectiveness depends on the status relationship existing between the individual and the therapist. The individual may readily deny, destroy, or ignore that relationship if the advice given runs counter to his needs, or if he is not readily convinced of the superiority of the suggested alternative. In many psychoneurotic and psychosomatic disorders the patient may be led to recognize the etiology and disadvantages of his present method of adjustment, only to choose to remain ill because, after all, his illness has enabled him to make some sort of adjustment and "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." A second major disadvantage of these techniques is that they may too easily lead to dependence on the therapist rather than to the ability to solve one's own problems, which is one of the important criteria of psychological maturity.

The use of punishment, too, is not without serious limitations. If too severe, punishment may discourage further efforts toward adjustment or may produce so intense a reaction as to disorganize behavior. It may easily result in hostility or aggression directed toward the administrator of the punishment. Punishment, as punishment, does not produce constructive changes in behavior. It is effective only when, having inhibited the punished act, the individual is enabled to discover a more acceptable and satisfying way of behaving. The criminologist is well aware that purely retributive punishment does not reform the individual. Some of the proposals for post-war treatment of Germany seem inclined to overlook this fact.

The most effective procedures for developing new sets of instrumental acts are those which create conditions in which the individual is encouraged to seek and discover for himself better ways of satisfying his needs. Some of the traditional analytic and non-analytic psychiatric procedures serve this function. Among the newer methods of psychotherapy, play therapy, the psychodrama, and Rogers' non-directive counseling have been used for this purpose. In contrast with the older directive methods, these procedures stress the necessity of the individual's active participation in the process of change. From this point of view, psychotherapy is looked on as a growth process. A free, permissive relationship is established in which the individual is encouraged to relieve himself of the "negative feelings" of doubt, guilt, or aggression which have prevented his making a satisfactory adjustment and is given reinforcement by the clinician in his growth towards more mature behavior.

This procedure requires a recognition on the part of the individual of the unsatisfactoriness of his present adjustment and a desire to effect a change. It is seldom, if ever, successful with an individual who is satisfied with his present adjustment or who, although not so satisfied, is unwilling to relinquish the known and more or less tolerable disadvantages of his habitual behavior for the unknown and perhaps intolerable difficulties of a new adjustment.

Changing Group Behavior

When he turns from individual therapy to group therapy, the clinician is on less familiar ground, although a considerable amount of experimental and clinical information has been accumulated in the past few years concerning the factors and techniques involved in modifying the behavior of individuals in groups or of groups. In procedures such as the psychodrama, group discussions of mental hygiene, or situations in which the role of the individual in the group is manipulated, the focus of attention is on the individual, and the group situation is used to supplement, reinforce, or to act as a substitute for the therapist. These procedures are merely an extension of the principles involved in individual psychotherapy. Control of the factors entering into the therapeutic process is more difficult than in individual psychotherapy, while, on the other hand, the group situation may offer stronger reinforcement and may facilitate transfer of training from the therapeutic situation to other social situations.

In other types of group therapy, effort is directed toward changing the organized behavior of the group. On an abstract level, it is possible to speak of changing instigating conditions, modifying the needs and goals of the group, or substituting different forms of group behavior as means of satisfying those needs. Attempts to equalize national opportunities for access to raw materials, prohibitions against anti-union activity on the part of an employer, or the removal of the company cook represent attempts to change conditions which are presumed to instigate undesirable group behavior. Propaganda directed toward establishment of a particular social, economic, or political philosophy, whether Nazi, American, Japanese, or Russian, is an attempt to affect the goals and needs of the group. Agreements establishing machinery for discussion, arbitration or adjudication of industrial disputes or of international conflicts constitute an effort to substitute a different set of instrumental acts for the methods of aggression previously utilized by the group.

There are many difficulties confronting efforts to change the behavior of groups. Some of these parallel closely the resistances to change presented by the individual; others differ. The group is more resistant to environmental change than is the individual, as the persistence of native cultures among minority groups transplanted into a new cultural environment will testify. The isolated individual will abandon his old habits in a new environment much more readily than will a group. The impact of cultural differences or of social disapproval is weakened by the presence of others who share it. There is, for example, little evidence to indicate that our efforts to convince the German people of their guilt have had any appreciable effect. Even if the group accepts the judgment of responsibility forced on it by a larger society, it may easily avoid any feeling of guilt by isolating a portion of itself to serve as a scapegoat. "It was the Nazis who were responsible for this, and none of us are Nazis." Punishment, too, is less likely to affect the behavior of a group than of an individual. In the group, the aggressive reactions of individual members to punishment reinforce one another and lead the group to resist or revolt where the individual would submit.

There are three particular techniques of changing the behavior of groups which deserve attention. One, which is an outgrowth of the work of Lewin, Lippitt, and White on "group atmosphere," involves changing the status relationships of individuals in the group and teaching new techniques of leadership. Lewin has discussed elsewhere the application of this technique to the reform of Germany.[5]

The second procedure for re-education of the group lies in a change in the culture of the group. This is a much larger and more difficult task than it may appear. A group culture is a highly complex, integrated structure. There are dynamic relationships among its various aspects that make it very resistant to change. In order to change a culture, it would be necessary to introduce new patterns into all phases of the organized life of the group. Take Germany as a case in point. We cannot hope to change the attitudes and behavior of the German people by changing merely the contents of the schoolbooks, the form of government, the composition of the courts, and by adding books to the library shelves. We must also change the pattern of family relationships, of religion, of youth organizations, and of all other major aspects of group life.

A third approach to re-education of the group consists in changing the atmosphere of the larger group of which it is a part. Fascism is an outgrowth not of German culture, although that gave Nazism its particular complexion, but of conditions which also exist elsewhere in society. Our ability to eliminate fascist philosophies and fascist behavior depends ultimately on the development of a truly democratic society both nationally and internationally.

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[5] Lewin, Kurt. "The Special Case of Germany," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1943. 7:555–566.

Revitalization Movements

ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE

Introduction

Behavioral scientists have described many instances of attempted and sometimes successful innovation of whole cultural systems, or at least substantial portions of such systems. Various rubrics are employed, the rubric depending on the discipline and the theoretical orientation of the researcher, and on salient local characteristics of the cases he has chosen for study. "Nativistic movement," "reform movement," "cargo cult," "religious revival," "messianic movement," "utopian community," "sect formation," "mass movement," "social movement," "revolution," "charismatic movement," are some of the commonly used labels. This paper suggests that all these phenomena of major cultural-system innovation are characterized by a uniform process, for which I propose the term "revitalization." The body of the paper is devoted to two ends: (1) an introductory statement of the concept of revitalization, and (2) an outline of certain uniformly-found processual dimensions of revitalization movements.

The formulations are based in major part on documentary data, mostly published . . . . Our files now contain references to several hundred religious revitalization movements, among both western and nonwestern peoples, on five continents. These represent only a small portion, gathered in a quick preliminary survey of anthropological literature. An earnest attempt to collect all revitalization movements described in historical, anthropological, and other sorts of documents, would without question gather in thousands . . . .

Accordingly, the formulations presented here are in an intermediate stage: a species has been recognized and certain characteristics (selected, of course, in the light of the author's theoretical interests) described, after the fashion of natural history. More abstract descriptions, in terms of the interaction of analytic variables, can only be suggested here, and other papers will present details of the dynamics of the revitalization process.

Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," American Anthropologist, *Vol. 58, No. 2 (1956), pp. 264–281. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

The Concept of Revitalization

A revitalization movement is defined as a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture. Revitalization is thus, from a cultural standpoint, a special kind of culture change phenomenon: the persons involved in the process of revitalization must perceive their culture, or some major areas of it, as a system (whether accurately or not); they must feel that this cultural system is unsatisfactory; and they must innovate not merely discrete items, but a new cultural system, specifying new relationships as well as, in some cases, new traits. The classic processes of culture change (evolution, drift, diffusion, historical change, acculturation) all produce changes in cultures as systems; however, they do not depend on deliberate intent by members of a society, but rather on a gradual chain-reaction effect: introducing A induces change in B; changing B affects C; when C shifts, A is modified; this involves D . . .and so on *ad infinitum.* This process continues for years, generations, centuries, millennia, and its pervasiveness has led many cultural theorists to regard culture change as essentially a slow, chain-like, self-contained procession of superorganic inevitabilities. In revitalization movements, however, A, B, C, D, E . . . N are shifted into a new *Gestalt* abruptly and simultaneously in intent; and frequently within a few years the new plan is put into effect by the participants in the movement. . . . As Mead has suggested, cultures *can* change within one generation (Mead 1955); and the process by which such transformations occur is the revitalization process.

* * * *

The Processual Structure

A basic methodological principle employed in this study is that of event-analysis (Wallace 1953). This approach employs a method of controlled comparison for the study of processes involving longer or shorter diachronic sequences (vide Eggan 1954 and Steward 1953). It is postulated that events or happenings of various types have genotypical structures independent of local cultural differences; for example, that the sequence of happenings following a severe physical disaster in cities in Japan, the United States, and Germany, will display a uniform pattern, colored but not obscured by local differences in culture. These types of events may be called behavioral units. Their uniformity is based on generic human attributes, both physical and psychological, but it requires extensive analytical and comparative study to elucidate the structure of any one. Revitalization movements constitute such a behavioral unit, and so also, on a lower level of abstraction, do various subtypes within the larger class, such as cargo and revival cults. We are therefore concerned with describing the generic structure of revitalization movements considered as a behavioral unit, and also of variation along the dimensions characteristic of the type.

The structure of the revitalization process, in cases where the full course is run, consists of five somewhat overlapping stages: 1. Steady State; 2. Period of Individual Stress; 3. Period of Cultural Distortion; 4. Period of Revitalization (in which occur the functions of mazeway reformulation, communication, organization, adaptation, cultural transformation, and routinization), and finally, 5. New Steady State. These stages are described briefly in the following sections.

I. *Steady State.* For the vast majority of the population, culturally recognized techniques for satisfying needs operate with such efficiency that chronic stress within the system varies within tolerable limits. Some severe but still tolerable stress may remain general in the population, and a fairly constant incidence of persons under, for them, intolerable stress may employ "deviant" techniques (e.g., psychotics). Gradual modification or even rapid substitution of techniques for satisfying some needs may occur without disturbing the steady state, as long as (1) the techniques for satisfying other needs are not seriously interfered with, and (2) abandonment of a given technique for reducing one need in favor of a more efficient technique does not leave other needs, which the first technique was also instrumental in satisfying, without any prospect of satisfaction.

II. *The Period of Increased Individual Stress.* Over a number of years, individual members of a population (which may be "primitive" or "civilized," either a whole society or a class, caste, religious, occupational, acculturational, or other definable social group) experience increasingly severe stress as a result of the decreasing efficiency of certain stress-reduction techniques. The culture may remain essentially unchanged or it may undergo considerable changes, but in either case there is continuous diminution in its efficiency in satisfying needs. The agencies responsible for interference with the efficiency of a cultural system are various: climatic, floral and faunal change; military defeat; political subordination; extreme pressure toward acculturation resulting in internal cultural conflict; economic distress; epidemics; and so on. The situation is often, but not necessarily, one of acculturation, and the acculturating agents may or may not be representatives of Western European cultures. While the individual can tolerate a moderate degree of increased stress and still maintain the habitual way of behavior, a point is reached at which some alternative way must be considered. Initial consideration of a substitute way is likely, however, to increase stress because it arouses anxiety over the possibility that the substitute way will be even less effective than the original, and that it may also actively interfere with the execution of other ways. In other words, it poses the threat of mazeway disintegration. Furthermore, admission that a major technique is worthless is extremely threatening because it implies that the whole mazeway system may be inadequate.

III. *The Period of Cultural Distortion.* The prolonged experience of stress, produced by failure of need satisfaction techniques and by anxiety over the prospect of changing behavior patterns, is responded to differently by different people. Rigid persons apparently prefer to tolerate high levels of chronic stress rather than make systematic adaptive changes in the mazeway. More flexible persons try out various limited mazeway changes in their personal lives, attempting to reduce stress by addition or substitution of mazeway elements with more or less concern for the *Gestalt* of the system. Some persons turn to psychodynamically regressive innovations; the regressive response empirically exhibits itself in increasing incidences of such things as alcoholism, extreme passivity and indolence, the development of highly ambivalent dependency relationships, intragroup violence, disregard of kinship and sexual mores, irresponsibility in public officials, states of depression and self-reproach, and probably a variety of psychosomatic and neurotic disorders. Some of these regressive action systems become, in effect, new cultural patterns.

In this phase, the culture is internally distorted; the elements are not harmoniously related but are mutually inconsistent and interfering. For this reason alone, stress continues to rise. "Regressive" behavior, as defined by the society, will arouse considerable guilt and hence increase stress level or at least maintain it at a high point; and the general process of piecemeal cultural substitution will multiply situations of mutual conflict and misunderstanding, which in turn increase stress-level again.

Finally, as the inadequacy of existing ways of acting to reduce stress becomes more and more evident, and as the internal incongruities of the mazeway are perceived, symptoms of anxiety over the loss of a meaningful way of life also become evident: disillusionment with the mazeway, and apathy toward problems of adaptation, set in.

IV. *The Period of Revitalization.* This process of deterioration can, if not checked, lead to the death of the society. Population may fall even to the point of extinction as a result of increasing death rates and decreasing birth rates; the society may be defeated in war, invaded, its population dispersed and its customs suppressed; factional disputes may nibble away areas and segments of the population. But these dire events are not infrequently forestalled, or at least postponed, by a revitalization movement. Many such movements are religious in character, and such religious revitalization movements must perform as least six major tasks:

1. *Mazeway reformulation.* Whether the movement is religious or secular, the reformulation of the mazeway generally seems to depend on a restructuring of elements and subsystems which have already attained currency in the society and may even be in use, and which are known to the person

who is to become the prophet or leader. The occasion of their combination in a form which constitutes an internally consistent structure, and of their acceptance by the prophet as a guide to action, is abrupt and dramatic, usually occurring as a moment of insight, a brief period of realization of relationships and opportunities. These moments are often called inspiration or revelation. The reformulation also seems normally to occur in its initial form in the mind of a single person rather than to grow directly out of group deliberations.

With a few exceptions, every religious revitalization movement with which I am acquainted has been originally conceived in one or several hallucinatory visions by a single individual. A supernatural being appears to the prophet-to-be, explains his own and his society's troubles as being entirely or partly a result of the violation of certain rules, and promises individual and social revitalization if the injunctions are followed and the rituals practiced, but personal and social catastrophe if they are not. These dreams express: 1. the dreamer's wish for a satisfying parental figure (the supernatural, guardian-spirit content), 2. world-destruction fantasies (the apocalyptic, millennial content), 3. feelings of guilt and anxiety (the moral content), and 4. longings for the establishment of an ideal state of stable and satisfying human and supernatural relations (the restitution fantasy or Utopian content). In a sense, such a dream also functions almost as a funeral ritual: the "dead" way of life is recognized as dead: interest shifts to a god, the community, and a new way. A new mazeway *Gestalt* is presented, with more or less innovation in details of content. The prophet feels a need to tell others of his experience, and may have definite feelings of missionary or messianic obligation. Generally he shows evidence of a radical inner change in personality soon after the vision experience: a remission of old and chronic physical complaints, a more active and purposeful way of life, greater confidence in interpersonal relations, the dropping of deep-seated habits like alcoholism. Hence we may call these visions "personality transformation dreams." Where there is no vision (as with John Wesley), there occurs a similarly brief and dramatic moment of insight, revelation, or inspiration, which functions in most respects like the vision in being the occasion of a new synthesis of values and meanings.

My initial approach to the understanding of these visions was by way of psychoanalytic dream theory. This proved to be of some use in elucidating the meaning of the vision. From an analysis of its manifest content and from the circumstances of the dreamer's history and life situation, it is possible to make more or less plausible interpretations of the nature of the prophet's personal preoccupations and conflicts. But conventional dream theory was designed to explain the conflicts represented in ordinary night dreams. Prophetic visions, while essentially dream formations, differ in several respects from ordinary symptomatic dreams: they often occur during a waking state as hallucinatory experiences, or in an ecstatic trance rather than in normal sleep; they impress the dreamer immediately as being meaningful and important; the manifest content is often in large part rational and well considered intellectual argument and cogent moral exhortation; and recollection of them is in unusually rich detail. This brings to mind Fromm's position (1951), that many dreams are not so much symptomatic of unconscious neurotic conflict as insightful in a positive and creative sense. But this additional consideration did not seem adequately to account for the most remarkable feature of all: the transformation of personality, often in a positive therapeutic sense, which these dreams produced. Prophetic and ecstatic visions do express unconscious conflict; they sometimes reveal considerable insight, but they also work startling cures.

We therefore became interested in pursuing the dynamics of personality transformation dreams. As a type of event, they would seem to belong to a general clinical category of sudden and radical changes in personality, along with transformations occurring in psychotic breaks, spontaneous remissions, narcosynthesis, some occasions in psychotherapy, "brainwashing," and shock treatments. There are, incidentally, some interesting similarities between the physical state of prophets and converts in the vision-trance, and patients undergoing shock (Sargant 1949, 1951). Physical stress and exhaustion often seem to precede the vision-trance type of transformation, and it seems probably that chemical substances produced in the body under stress may be important in rendering a person capable of this type of experience (Hoffer, Osmond, and Smythies, 1954). The relationship of this sort of sudden personality change to slower maturational processes, on the one hand, and to what happens in rites of passage, on the other, should be points of interest to social scientists generally.

Nonclinical analogues of the prophet's personality transformation vision appear in several contexts; in accounts of individual ecstatic conversions and experiences of religious enthusiasm; in the guardian spirit quest among American Indians and elsewhere; and in the process of becoming a shaman, which is similar in many cultures all over the world. Conversion, shamanism, and the guardian-spirit vision seem to be phenomena very similar in pattern. All three of these processes are distributed globally; in many cultures all three are normal phenomena; all involve persons who are faced with the opportunity (if not necessity) of assuming a new cultural role and of abandoning an earlier role in order to reduce stress which they will not be able to resolve if they stand pat. A precipitating factor in many cases is some sort of severe physical stress, such as illness, starvation, sleeplessness, or fatigue. After the vision experience, the individual is often able to assume a new role requiring increased or differently phrased emotional independence. In the vision experience, he has invented a fictitious, nurturing, parent-like supernatural figure who satisfies much of his need for authority and protection; thus he is presumably able to loosen emotional ties to certain cultural objects, roles, and persons, and to act without undue inhibition and anxiety. Inconvenient wishes are displaced onto a fictitious but culturally sanctioned supernatural pseudo-community, leaving the personality free for relatively healthy relationships to the real world. An essential function of the vision is that the demands for energy made by transference wishes are minimized by displacement onto supernatural objects which can in fantasy be perceived as uniformly supporting and protective.

Inasmuch as many prophets were suffering from recognizable and admitted mental disorders before their transformation, which they achieved by means of a type of experience (hallucination) that our culture generally regards as pathological, the relevance of psychopathology to the vision experience needs to be explored. We have under way some observations on the case histories of a series of persons in a state mental institution who have been known to attendants for their excessive religiosity. This survey, which we hope to extend to include interview materials, is not complete, but I can summarize our initial impressions. Chronic schizophrenics with religious paranoia tend to believe that they are God, Jesus, the Virgin Mary, the Great Earth Mother, or some other supernatural being. Successful prophets, on the other hand, usually do not believe that they are the supernatural, only that they have communicated with him (although their followers may freely deify them). Prophets do not lose their sense of personal identity but psychotics tend to become the object of their spiritual longing.

There are in this institution several persons who were hospitalized during the course of an experience which resembles in many respects the process of becoming a prophet. A man, burdened with a sense of guilt and inadequacy, and sensible of the need to reform his life, has a religious conversion in which he sees God or hears his voice; thereafter he displays a changed and in some ways healthier (or at least less rapidly deteriorating) personality; he undertakes an evangelistic or prophetic enterprise which is socially inconvenient to spouse, relatives, employer, warden, or other closely associated persons; he is thereupon certified as insane and hospitalized. Such frustrated prophets, being unable any longer to satisfy important human needs and suffering the obvious disapproval of the community, may also lose confidence in their relationship to the supernatural pseudo-community. They cannot return to their preconversion state because the hospital situation makes anything remotely approaching normal cultural and social participation impossible. Many therefore take the emotionally logical but unfortunate next step, and become the guardian spirit.

At this time, then, we would tentatively conclude that the religious vision experience per se is not psychopathological but rather the reverse, being a synthesizing and often therapeutic process performed under extreme stress by individuals already sick.

2. *Communication.* The dreamer undertakes to preach his revelations to people, in an evangelistic or messianic spirit; he becomes a prophet. The doctrinal and behavioral injunctions which he preaches carry two fundamental motifs: that the convert will come under the care and protection of certain supernatural beings; and that both he and his society will benefit materially from an identification with some definable new cultural system (whether a revived culture or a cargo culture, or a syncretism of both, as is usually the case). The preaching may take many forms (e.g., mass exhortation vs. quiet individual persuasion) and may be directed at various sorts of audiences (e.g., the elite vs. the down-trodden). As he gathers disciples, these assume much of the responsibility for communicating the "good word," and communication remains one of the primary activities of the movement during later phases of organization.

3. *Organization.* Converts are made by the prophet. Some undergo hysterical seizures induced by suggestion in a crowd situation; some experience an ecstatic vision in private circumstances; some are convinced by more or less rational arguments, some by considerations of expediency and opportunity. A small clique of special disciples (often including a few already influential men) clusters about the prophet and an embryonic campaign organization develops with three orders of personnel: the prophet; the disciples; and the followers. Frequently the action program from here on is effectively administered in large part by a political rather than a religious leadership. Like the prophet, many of the converts undergo a revitalizing personality transformation.

Max Weber's concept of "charismatic leadership" well describes the type of leader-follower relationship characteristic of revitalization movement organizations (1947). The fundamental element of the vision, as I have indicated above, is the entrance of the visionary into an intense relationship with a supernatural being. This relationship, furthermore, is one in which the prophet accepts the leadership, succor, and dominance of the supernatural. Many followers of a prophet, especially the disciples, also have ecstatic revelatory experiences; but they and all sincere followers who have not had a personal revelation also enter into a parallel relationship to the prophet: as God is to the prophet, so (almost) is the prophet to his followers. The relationship of the follower to the prophet is in all probability determined by the displacement of transference dependency wishes onto his image; he is regarded as an uncanny person, of unquestionable authority in one or more spheres of leadership, sanctioned by the supernatural. Max Weber denotes this quality of uncanny authority and moral ascendancy in a leader as charisma. Followers defer to the charismatic leader not because of his status in an existing authority structure but because of a fascinating personal "power," often ascribed to supernatural sources and validated in successful performance, akin to the "mana" or "orenda" of ethnological literature. The charismatic leader thus is not merely permitted but expected to phrase his call for adherents as a demand to perform a duty to a power higher than human. Weber correctly points out that the "routinization" of charisma is a critical issue in movement organization, since unless this "power" is distributed to other personnel in a stable institutional structure, the movement itself is liable to die with the death or failure of individual prophet, king, or war lord.

Weber, however, is essentially discussing a quality of leadership, and one which is found in contexts other than that of revitalization movements. In consequence, his generalizations do not deal with the revitalization formula itself, but rather with the nature of the relationship of the early adherents to their prophet. Furthermore, there is a serious ambiguity in Weber's use of the charisma concept. Weber seems to have been uncertain whether to regard it as an unusual quality in the leader which is recognized and rationalized by his adherents, or whether to regard it as a quality ascribed to the leader by followers and hence as being a quality of their relationship to him, determined both by the observed and the observer in the perceptual transaction. We have used it to denote the libidinal relationship which Freud described in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1922).

It would appear that the emotional appeal of the new doctrine to both the prophet and his followers is in considerable part based on its immediate satisfaction of a need to find a supremely powerful and potentially benevolent leader. For both the prophet and his followers, this wish is gratified in fantasy (subjectively real, of course); but the follower's fantasy is directed toward the person of the prophet, to whom are attributed charismatic properties of leadership (Weber 1946, 1947).

4. *Adaptation*. The movement is a revolutionary organization and almost inevitably will encounter some resistance. Resistance may in some cases be slight and fleeting but more commonly is determined and resourceful, and is held either by a powerful faction within the society or by agents of a dominant foreign society. The movement may therefore have to use various strategies of adaption: doctrinal modification; political and diplomatic maneuver; and force. These strategies are not mutually exclusive nor, once chosen, are they necessarily maintained through the life of the movement. In most instances the original doctrine is continuously modified by the prophet, who responds to various criticisms and affirmations by adding to, emphasizing, playing down, and eliminating selected elements of the original visions. This reworking makes the new doctrine more acceptable to special interest groups, may give it a better "fit" to the population's cultural and personality patterns, and may take account of the changes occurring in the general milieu. In instances where organized hostility to the

movement develops, a crystallization of counter-hostility against unbelievers frequently occurs, and emphasis shifts from cultivation of the ideal to combat against the unbeliever.

5. *Cultural Transformation.* As the whole or a controlling portion of the population comes to accept the new religion with its various injunctions, a noticeable social revitalization occurs, signalized by the reduction of the personal deterioration symptoms of individuals, by extensive cultural changes, and by an enthusiastic embarkation on some organized program of group action. This group program may, however, be more or less realistic and more or less adaptive: some programs are literally suicidal; others represent well conceived and successful projects of further social, political, or economic reform; some fail, not through any deficiency in conception and execution, but because circumstances made defeat inevitable.

6. *Routinization.* If the group action program in nonritual spheres is effective in reducing stress-generating situations, it becomes established as normal in various economic, social, and political institutions and customs. Rarely does the movement organization assert or maintain a totalitarian control over all aspects of the transformed culture; more usually, once the desired transformation has occurred, the organization contracts and maintains responsibility only for the preservation of doctrine and the performance of ritual (i.e., it becomes a church). With the mere passage of time, this poses the problems of "routinization" which Max Weber discusses at length (Weber 1946, 1947).

V. *The New Steady State.* Once cultural transformation has been accomplished and the new cultural system has proved itself viable, and once the movement organization has solved its problems of routinization, a new steady state may be said to exist. The culture of this state will probably be different in pattern, organization or *Gestalt,* as well as in traits, from the earlier steady state; it will be different from that of the period of cultural distortion.

Varieties and Dimensions of Variation

I will discuss four of the many possible variations: the choice of identification; the choice of secular and religious means; nativism; and the success-failure continuum.

1. *Choice of Identification.* Three varieties have been distinguised already on the basis of differences in choice of identification: movements which profess to *revive* a traditional culture now fallen into desuetude; movements which profess to *import* a foreign cultural system; and movements which profess neither revival nor importation, but conceive that the desired cultural end-state, which has never been enjoyed by ancestors or foreigners, will be realized for the first time in a future *Utopia.* . . .

These varieties, however, are ideal types. A few movements do correspond rather closely to one type or another but many are obvious mixtures. Handsome Lake, for instance, consciously recognized both revival and importation themes in his doctrine. It is easy to demonstrate that avowedly revival movements are never entirely what they claim to be, for the image of the ancient culture to be revived is distorted by historical ignorance and by the presence of imported and innovative elements. Importation movements, with professed intentions to abandon the ancestral ways, manage to leave elements of the ancestral culture intact, if unrecognized, in large areas of experience. And movements which claim to present an absolutely new conception of culture are obviously blinding themselves to the fact that almost everything in the new system has been modeled after traditional or imported elements or both. Although almost every revitalization movement embodies in its proposed new cultural system large quantities of both traditional and imported cultural material, for some reason each movement tends to profess either no identification at all, a traditional orientation, or foreign orientation. This suggests that the choice of identification is the solution of a problem of double ambivalence: both the traditional and the foreign model are regarded both positively and negatively.

Culture areas seem to have characteristic ways of handling the identification problem. The cargo fantasy, although it can be found outside the Melanesian area, seems to be particularly at home there; South American Indian prophets frequently preached of a migration to a heaven-on-earth free of Spaniards and other evils, but the promised-land fantasy is known elsewhere; North American Indian prophets most commonly emphasized the revival of the old culture by ritual and moral purification, but pure revival ideas exist in other regions too. Structural "necessity" or situational factors associated with culture area may be responsible. The contrast between native-white relationships in North America (a "revival" area) and Melanesia (an "importation" area) may be associated with the fact that American Indians north of Mexico were never enslaved on a large scale, forced to work on plantations, or levied for labor in lieu of taxes, whereas Melanesians were often subjected to more direct coercion by foreign police power. The Melanesian response has been an identification with the aggressor (vide Bettelheim 1947). On the other hand, the American Indians have been less dominated as individuals by whites, even under defeat and injustice. Their response to this different situation has by and large been an identification with a happier past. This would suggest that an important variable in choice of identification is the degree of domination exerted by a foreign society, and that import-oriented revitalization movements will not develop until an extremely high degree of domination is reached.

2. *The Choice of Secular and Religious Means.* There are two variables in-

volved here: the amount of secular action which takes place in a movement, and the amount of religious action. Secular action is here defined as the manipulation of human relationships; religious action as the manipulation of relationships between human and supernatural beings. No revitalization movement can, by definition, be truly nonsecular, but some can be relatively less religious than others, and movements can change in emphasis depending on changing circumstances. There is a tendency, which is implicit in the earlier discussion of stages, for movements to become more political in emphasis, and to act through secular rather than religious institutions, as problems of organization, adaptation, and routinization become more pressing. . . .

A few "purely" political movements like the Hebertist faction during the French Revolution, and the Russian communist movement and its derivatives, have been officially atheistic, but the quality of doctrine and of leader-follower relationships is so similar, at least on superficial inspection, to religious doctrine and human-supernatural relations, that one wonders whether it is not a distinction without a difference. Communist movements are commonly asserted to have the quality of religious movements, despite their failure to appeal to a supernatural community, and such things as the development of a Marxist gospel with elaborate exegesis, the embalming of Lenin, and the concern with conversion, confession, moral purity (as defined by the movement) have the earmarks of religion. The Communist Revolution of 1917 in Russia was almost typical in structure of religious revitalization movements: there was a very sick society, prophets appealed to a revered authority (Marx), apocalyptic and Utopian fantasies were preached, and missionary fervor animated the leaders. Furthermore, many social and political reform movements, while not atheistic, act through secular rather than religious media and invoke religious sanction only in a perfunctory way. I do not wish to elaborate the discussion at this time, however, beyond the point of suggesting again that the obvious distinctions between religious and secular movements may conceal fundamental similarities of socio-cultural process and of psychodynamics, and that while all secular prophets have not had personality transformation visions, some probably have, and others have had a similar experience in ideological conversion.

Human affairs around the world seem more and more commonly to be decided without reference to supernatural powers. It is an interesting question whether mankind can profitably dispense with the essential element of the religious revitalization process before reaching a Utopia without stress or strain. While religious movements may involve crude and powerful emotions and irrational fantasies of interaction with nonexistent beings, and can occasionally lead to unfortunate practical consequences in human relations, the same fantasies and emotions could lead to even more unfortunate practical consequences for world peace and human welfare when directed toward people improperly perceived and toward organs of political action and cultural ideologies. The answer would seem to be that as fewer and fewer men make use of the religious displacement process, there will have to be a corresponding reduction of the incidence and severity of transference neuroses, or human relationships will be increasingly contaminated by character disorders, neurotic acting out, and paranoid deification of political leaders and ideologies.

3. *Nativism.* Because a major part of the program of many revitalization movements has been to expel the persons or customs of foreign invaders or overlords, they have been widely called "nativistic movements." However, the amount of nativistic activity in movements is variable. Some movements—the cargo cults, for instance—are antinativistic from a cultural standpoint but nativistic from a personnel standpoint. Handsome Lake was only mildly nativistic; he sought for an accommodation of cultures and personalities rather than expulsion, and favored entry of certain types of white persons and culture-content. Still, many of the classic revivalistic movements have been vigorously nativistic, in the ambivalent way discussed earlier. Thus nativism is a dimension of variation rather than an elemental property of revitalization movements.

A further complication is introduced by the fact that the nativistic component of a revitalization movement not uncommonly is very low at the time of conception, but increases sharply after the movement enters the adaptation stage. Initial doctrinal formulations emphasize love, co-operation, understanding, and the prophet and his disciples expect the powers-that-be to be reasonable and accepting. When these powers interfere with the movement, the response is apt to take the form of an increased nativistic component in the doctrine. Here again, situational factors are important for an understanding of the course and character of the movement.

4. *Success and Failure.* The outline of stages as given earlier is properly applicable to a revitalization movement which is completely successful. Many movements are abortive; their progress is arrested at some intermediate point. This raises a taxonomic question: how many stages should the movement achieve in order to qualify for inclusion in the category? Logically, as long as the original conception is a doctrine of revitalization by cultural change, there should be no requisite number of stages. Practically, we have selected only movements which passed the first three stages (conception, communication, and organization) and entered the fourth (adaptation). This means that the bulk of our information of success and failure will deal with circumstances of relatively late adaptation, rather than with such matters as initial blockage of communication and interference with organization.

Two major but not unrelated variables seem to be very important in determining the fate of any given movement: the relative "realism" of the doctrine; and the amount of force exerted against the organization by its opponents. "Realism" is a difficult concept to define without invoking the concept of success or failure, and unless it can be so defined, is of no use as a variable explanatory of success or failure. Nor can one use the criterion of conventionality of perception, since revitalization movements are by definition unconventional. While a great deal of doctrine in every movement (and, indeed, in every person's mazeway) is extremely unrealistic in that predictions of events made on the basis of its assumptions will prove to be more or less in error, there is only one sphere of behavior in which such error is fatal to the success of a revitalization movement: prediction of the outcome of conflict situations. If the organization cannot predict successfully the consequences of its own moves and of its opponents' moves in a power struggle, its demise is very likely. If, on the other hand, it is canny about conflict, or if the amount of resistance is low, it can be extremely "unrealistic" and extremely unconventional in other matters without running much risk of early collapse. In other words, probability of failure would seem to be negatively correlated with degree of realism in conflict situations, and directly correlated with amount of resistance. Where conflict-realism is high and resistance is low, the movement is bound to achieve the phase of routinization. Whether its culture will be viable for long beyond this point, however, will depend on whether its mazeway formulations lead to actions which maintain a low level of stress.

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Achieving Change in People, The Group Dynamics Approach

DORWIN CARTWRIGHT

Group Dynamics

One approach to change problems which is receiving considerable attention is that of group dynamics. What is this approach? What is meant by group dynamics? The word *dynamics* comes from a Greek term meaning force, and group dynamics refers to the forces operating in groups. The investigation of group dynamics, then, consists of a study of these forces: what gives rise to them, what conditions modify them, what consequences they have, etc. The practical application of group dynamics (or the technology of group dynamics) consists of the utilization of knowledge about these forces for the achievement of some purpose. So defined, group dynamics is not particularly novel, nor is it the exclusive property of any person or institution. Significant contributions to it have been made by such men as Simmel, Freud, and Cooley.

Although interest in groups has a long and respectable history, the past fifteen years have witnessed a new flowering of activity in this field. Today, research centers in several countries are carrying out substantial programs of study designed to reveal the nature of groups and their functioning. The field is being developed both as a branch of social science and as a form of social technology.

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The Group and Social Change

... To begin with the most general proposition, we may state that the behavior, attitudes, beliefs, and values of an average person are firmly grounded in the groups to which he belongs. How aggressive or cooperative

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he is, how much self-respect and self-confidence he has, how energetic and productive his work, what he aspires to do, what he believes to be true and good, whom he loves or hates, the prejudices he holds—*all these characteristics are highly determined by the individual's group memberships.* In a real sense, they are properties of these groups, i.e., relationships among people. Whether persons change or resist change will, therefore, be greatly influenced by the nature of their groups. Attempts to change them must be concerned with the dynamics of groups.

In examining more specifically how groups enter into the process of change, it is useful to view groups in at least three ways. In the first view, the group is seen as a source of influence over its members. Efforts to change behavior can be supported or blocked by pressures on members stemming from the group. To make constructive use of these pressures the group must be used *as a medium of change.* In the second view, the group itself becomes the *target of change.* To change the behavior of individuals it may be necessary to change the standards of the group, its style of leadership, its emotional atmosphere, or its stratification into cliques and hierarchies. Even though the goal may be to change the behavior of individuals, the object of change becomes the group. In the third view, it is recognized that many changes of behavior can be brought about only by the organized efforts of groups *as agents of change.* A committee to combat intolerance, a labor union, an employers association, a citizens group to increase the pay of teachers—any action group will be more or less effective depending upon the way it is organized, the satisfactions it provides to its members, the degree to which its goals are clear, and a host of other properties of the group.

An adequate social technology of change, then, requires at the very least a scientific understanding of groups viewed in each of these ways. I should like to propose some tentative principles concerning the effective utilization of the group, first, as *a medium of change.*

(1) If the group is to be used effectively as a medium of change, those people who are to be changed and those who are to exert influence for change must have a strong sense of belonging to the same group.

Kurt Lewin describes this principle well: "The normal gap between teacher and student, doctor and patient, social worker and public, can . . . be a real obstacle to acceptance of the advocated conduct. In other words, in spite of whatever status differences there might be between them, the teacher and the student have to feel as members of one group in matters involving their sense of values. The chances for re-education seem to be increased whenever a strong we-feeling is created."[6] Recent experiments by Preston and Heintz have demonstrated greater changes of opinions among members of discussion groups operating with participatory leadership than among those with supervisory leadership.[7] The implications of this principle for classroom teaching are far-reaching, the same may be said of supervision in, for example, a factory, the army, a hospital.

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[6] Kurt Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 67.

(2) The more attractive the group is to its members the greater is the influence that the group can exert on its members.

This principle has been extensively documented by Festinger and his co-workers.[8] They have been able to show in a variety of settings that in more cohesive groups there is a greater readiness of members to attempt to influence others, a greater readiness to be influenced by others, and stronger pressures toward conformity when conformity is a relevant matter for the group. Important for the practitioner is, of course, the question of how to increase the attractiveness of groups. Suffice it to say that, obviously, a group is more attractive the more it satisfies the needs of its members. We have been able to demonstrate experimentally an increase in group cohesiveness by increasing the liking of members for each other, by increasing the perceived importance of the group goal, and by increasing the prestige of the group among other groups. Experienced group workers can add many other procedures.

(3) In attempts to change attitudes, values, or behavior, the more relevant these are to the basis of attraction to the group, the greater will be the influence that the group can exert upon them.

I believe this principle gives a clue to some otherwise puzzling phenomena. How does it happen that a group, for instance, a labor union, seems to be able to exert such strong discipline over its members in some matters, (let us say in dealings with management) while it seems unable to exert anything like the same influence in other matters, say in political action? If one examines why it is that members are attracted to the group, he will find that particular reasons for belonging are more related to some of the group's activities than to others. If a man joins a union mainly to keep his job and to improve his working conditions, he may be largely uninfluenced by the union's attempt to modify his attitudes toward national and international affairs. Groups differ tremendously in the range of matters that are relevant to their members and, hence, over which they have influence. Adult education could be improved by paying attention to this principle.

(4) The greater the prestige of a group member in the eyes of the other members, the greater the influence he can exert.

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[7] M. G. Preston and R. K. Heintz, "Effects of Participatory vs. Supervisory Leadership on Group Judgment," *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 44 (1949), 345–355.

[8] Leon Festinger *et al.*, *Theory and Experiment in Social Communication: Collected Papers* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1950).

Lippitt, Polansky, and Redl[9] have demonstrated this principle with great care and methodological ingenuity in a series of studies in children's summer camps. From a practical point of view it must be emphasized that the things giving prestige to a member may not be those characteristics most prized by the official management of the group. The most prestigeful member of a Sunday School class may not possess the characteristics most similar to the minister of the church. The teacher's pet may be a poor source of influence within a class. This principle is the basis for the common observation that the official leader and the actual leader of a group are often not the same individual.

(5) Efforts to change individuals or subparts of a group which, if successful, would have the result of making them deviate from the norms of the group will encounter strong resistance.

During the past few years a great deal of evidence has been accumulated showing the tremendous pressure which groups can exert upon members to conform to the group's norms. The price of deviation in most groups is rejection or even expulsion. If the member really wants to belong and be accepted, he can scarcely withstand this type of influence. It is for this reason that efforts to change people by taking them from the group and giving them special training so often have disappointing results. This principle also accounts for the finding that people thus trained sometimes display increased tension, aggressiveness toward the group, or a tendency to form cults or cliques with others who have shared their training.

These five principles concerning the group as a medium of change would appear to have readiest application to groups created for the purpose of producing changes in people. They provide certain specifications for building effective training or therapy groups. They also point, however, to a difficulty in producing change in people in that they show how resistant an individual is to changing in any way contrary to group pressures and expectations. In order to achieve many kinds of changes in people, therefore, it is necessary to deal with the groups as *a target of change*.

(6) Strong pressure for changes in the group can be established by creating a shared perception by members of the need for change, thus making the source of pressure for change lie within the group.

Marrow and French[10] report a dramatic case-study which illustrates this principle quite well. A manufacturing company had a policy against hiring women over thirty because it was believed that they were slower, more difficult to train, and more likely to be absent. The staff psychologist was able to present to management evidence that this belief was clearly unwarranted at least within that company. The psychologist's facts, however, were rejected as a basis for action. It was claimed the findings went against the direct experience of the foremen. Then the psychologist hit upon a plan for achieving change; namely, he proposed that management conduct its own analysis of the situation. With his help management collected all the facts which they believed relevant, making them their facts rather than those of an outside expert, and policy was altered without undue resistance. The important point is that "facts" are not enough. They must be the accepted property of the group if they are to become an effective basis for change.

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[9] N. Polansky, R. Lippitt, and F. Redl, "An Investigation of Behavioral Contagion in Groups," *Human Relations*, 3 (1950), 319–348.

[10] A. J. Marrow and J. R. P. French, Jr., "Changing a Stereotype in Industry," *Journal of Social Issues*, 1, No. 3 (1945), 33–37.

(7) Information relating to the need for change, plans for change, and consequences of change must be shared by all relevant people in the group.

Another way of stating this principle is to say that change in a group ordinarily requires the opening up of communication channels. Newcomb[11] has shown how one of the first consequences of mistrust and hostility is the avoidance of communicating openly and freely about the things producing the tension. If you will show me a pathological group, one that has trouble making decisions or coordinating member efforts, it is fairly certain that I can show you strong restraints in that group against communicating vital information. Until these restraints are removed there can be little hope for any real and lasting changes in the group's functioning. In passing, it should be pointed out that the removal of barriers to communication will ordinarily be accompanied by a sudden increase in the communication of hostility. The group may appear to be falling apart, and it will certainly be a painful experience to many of the members. This pain, and the fear that things are getting out of hand, may stop the process of change.

(8) Changes in one part of a group produce strain in other related parts which can be reduced only by eliminating the change or by bringing about readjustments in the related parts.

It is a common practice to undertake improvements in group functioning by providing training programs for certain classes of people in the organization. For example, a training program for nurses is established. If the content of training is relevant for organizational change, it must of necessity deal with the relationships that nurses have with other subgroups, such as doctors and patients. It is unrealistic to assume that these latter groups will remain indifferent to changes in the nurses. On the contrary, their tendency will be to re-establish the old equilibrium, to negate the changes.

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[11] T. M. Newcomb, "Autistic Hostility and Social Reality," *Human Relations*, 1 (1947), 69–86.

These eight principles represent a few of the basic propositions emerging from research in group dynamics. Since research is constantly going on and since its very nature is to revise its conceptions, we may be sure that these principles will have to be modified and improved as time passes. In the meantime they may serve as guides in our endeavors to develop a scientifically based technology of social management.

In social technology, just as in physical technology, *invention* plays a crucial role. In both fields progress consists of the creation of new mechanisms for the accomplishment of certain goals. Inventions arise in response to practical needs and are to be evaluated by how effectively they satisfy these needs. While inventions will be more effective the more they make use of known principles of science, they are in no sense logical derivations from scientific principles. They cannot proceed too far ahead of basic scientific development, nor should they be allowed to fall too far behind.

I have taken this brief excursion into the theory of invention in order to make a final point. To many people "group dynamics" is known only for the social inventions which have developed in recent years in work with groups. Role-playing, buzz groups, process observers, post-meeting reaction sheets, and feedback of group observations are devices popularly associated with the phrase "group dynamics." I trust that I have been able to show that group dynamics is more than a collection of gadgets. It certainly aspires to be a science as well as a technology.

This is not to underplay the importance of these inventions nor of the function of inventing. As inventions they are all mechanisms designed to help accomplish important goals. How effective they are will depend upon how skillfully they are used and how appropriate they are to the purposes to which they are put. Careful evaluative research must be the ultimate judge of their usefulness in comparison to alternative inventions. I believe the principles enumerated here indicate some specifications that social inventions in this field must meet.

Sociodrama: A Method for the Analysis of Social Conflicts

J. L. Moreno, M.D.

Everyone who comes to a theatre of the psychodrama for the first time wonders what connection a stage and a theatre have with psychiatry, education, sociology, anthropology, or any branch of social science. The methods of social science seem to be utterly unrelated to the theatre and the stage. . . . However . . . Aristotle, observed a psychological phenomenon in the spectators witnessing a Greek drama, which he called catharsis. He tried to explain by it the aesthetic and moral effect of dramatic content.[2] He had little idea of its consequences and the phenomenon remained buried in the libraries and for all scientific and practical purposes unnoticed by mediaeval and modern psychotherapies, psychoanalysis[3] included—until the psychodramatic method brought it back into the consciousness of the social scientist of our time. This process of healing—catharsis—did not take place in a physician's consultation room. It took place in the *group*, in the *open* spaces of an amphitheatre, aroused by fanciful, dramatic actions on a stage, apparently unrelated to the lives of the people witnessing the spectacles.

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[2] Aristotle maintained that tragedy tends to purify the spectators and listeners by artistically exciting certain emotions which act as a kind of homeopathic relief from their own selfish passions.

[3] Freud used the term catharsis in his early work with Breuer, "Studien Ueber Hysterie," 1895, but he used it for a different emphasis, not conscious of the psychotherapeutic implications of the drama milieu to which Aristotle had referred. He dropped the term, however, soon after this publication. It remained for psychodrama to revive the term and to re-discover the concept of catharsis and to explore its full meaning. (See Das Stegreiftheater, Berlin, 1923, and Psychodrama and Mental Catharsis, *Sociometry*, 1940.)

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Psychodrama has been defined as a deep action method dealing with inter-personal relations and private ideologies, and sociodrama[4] as a deep action method dealing with inter-group relations and collective ideologies.[5]

The procedure in the development of a sociodrama differs in many ways from the procedure which I have described as psychodramatic. In a psychodramatic session, the attention of the director and his staff are centered upon the individual and his private problems. As these are unfolded before a group, the spectators are affected by the psychodramatic acts in proportion to the affinities existing between their own context of roles, and the role context of the central subject. Even the so-called group approach in psychodrama is in the deeper sense individual-centered. The audience is organized in accord with a mental syndrome which all participating individuals have in common, and the aim of the director is to reach every individual in his own sphere, separated from the other. He is using the group approach only to reach therapeutically more than one individual in the same session. The group approach in psychodrama is concerned with a group of *private* individuals, which makes the group itself, in a sense, private.

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The true subject of a sociodrama is the *group*. It is not limited by a special number of individuals, it can consist of as many persons as there are human beings living anywhere, or at least of as many as belong to the same culture. Sociodrama is based upon the tacit assumption that the group formed by the audience is already organized by the social and cultural roles which in some degree all the carriers of the culture share. It is therefore incidental who the individuals are, or of whom the group is composed, or how large their number is. It is the group as a whole which has to be put upon the stage to work out its problem, because the group in sociodrama corresponds to the individual in psychodrama. But as the group is only a metaphor and does not exist by itself, its actual content is the interrelated persons composing it, not as private individuals but as representatives of the same culture. Sociodrama, therefore, in order to become effective, has to essay the difficult task of developing deep action methods, in which the working tools are representative types within a given culture and not private individuals. It is interested in the typical German father-role, in a generalized sense, and not in a particular sense, an individual father whose name happens to be Mueller, a German, living in Germany. It is interested in the role of the gentleman,—as it is held up as an ideal role in English-speaking countries—and not in *a* gentleman, a particular individual who happens to act like one.

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[4] Sociodrama has two roots,—socius, which means the associate, the other fellow, and drama, which means action. Sociodrama would mean action in behalf of the other fellow.

[5] See J. L. Moreno, "Sociometry and the Cultural Order," Sociometry Monographs No. 2, 1943, page 331.

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For the study of cultural inter-relations the sociodramatic procedure is ideally suited, especially when two cultures co-exist in physical proximity and their members respectively are in a continuous process of interaction and exchange of values. Examples are Negro-White, the American Indian-White, and the situation of all cultural and racial minorities in the United States. In culture A. every member has a mental picture of the role of the father, the mother, the judge, the mayor, the head of the state, the role of the priest, the role of God, the roles in each case modified somewhat by the subjective experiences of the members. But all these mental pictures refer to his *own* culture. The members of culture A. may have *no* images, or very *deficient* and distorted ones, of the representative roles in the neighboring culture B. And the members of culture B. may have no mental pictures, or very deficient and distorted ones, of the representative roles of culture A. This dilemma could be surmounted by reversal of role-playing as long as all roles in culture A. exist also in culture B. and vice versa. But the inter-cultural situation is often strained by another factor. Certain roles which exist in one culture, for instance, the role of God or the role of the gentleman, do not exist in another culture altogether or in a different form. Or a certain culture is so deficient in the development of a certain role, for instance the role of the warrior that it is continuously threatened by a neighboring culture in which the warrior role is highly developed. Furthermore, in one culture the same role may have a different or a totally opposite evaluation, for instance, the role of the private proprietor or capitalist in the U.S.A. or in Soviet Russia. The tensions arising from these problems cannot be alleviated by spreading of factual information only. Even if full information could be attained by observation and analysis, it has become certain that observation and analysis are inadequate tools for exploring the more sophisticated aspects of inter-cultural relations, and that deep actions are indispensable. Moreover the latter have proven to be of indisputable value and unreplaceable because they can, in the form of sociodrama, *explore as well as treat* in one stroke, the conflicts which have arisen between two separate cultural orders, and at the same time, by the same action, undertaking to change the attitude of the members of one culture versus the members of the other. Furthermore, it can reach large groups of people, and by using radio or television it can affect millions of local groups and neighborhoods, in which inter-cultural conflicts and tensions are dormant or in the initial phases of open warfare. Therefore, the potentialities of drama-research and role research[7] for giving clues to methods by which public opinion and attitudes can be influenced or changed are still unrecognized and unresolved.

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. . . It is inherent in the method that all phases of the sociodrama, even the most technical preparatory steps are initiated *within* the group situation and not outside of it. As nothing whatsoever is left out from observation and action, everything which happens is available to research and analysis. *There is no backstage and no back moment.* Subjects should not be prepared ahead of time as to what role to take, how to act and what situations to select and which to leave out. They should not be advised how to react to the situations on the stage and no one should be picked in advance to do the responding. In other words, the procedure should be carried out sub species momenti and sub species loci, at one time and in one place. (This does not necessarily mean that all parts of the session are to be available to all the members of the group at once. It is sufficient for instance if—when an informant warms up an auxiliary ego to a role—an observer follows them to their corner and records the process which is later communicated to the balance of the group.) The only factor which is brought into the situation and which is highly objectified, tested and re-tested, is the director himself and his staff of auxiliary egos. The preparation of director and staff is a desideratum in sociodramatic work. It gives them an objective approach to the situation and confidence in themselves. But the *spontaneity* of the subjects, of the informants as well as of the spectators, should be maintained by all means. Any rehearsal with informants ahead of the session will turn them into actors and often into bad ones. It would reduce the spontaneity and sincerity of the session, and turn it easily into an effort to imitate the theatre. In addition, it would deprive the spectators of a view into the development of the sociodrama from statu nascendi. Some of the most important factors may be barred from their experience in the warming-up process behind the scenes. What is lost in perfection and in show quality is gained in truthfulness and in the value which complete participation in the project offers to all members of the audience. The auxiliary egos are not necessarily used in every session. There are just *available* if an occasion arises. The director may choose *not* to use them and to prefer anonymous subjects from the group. Even the director is subordinated to the situation; it is a part of the strategy of psycho- and sociodrama that he must reduce his overt influence at times to a minimum, eliminating himself, leaving the direction to one or another member of the group.

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[7] For source material on role research see: Das Stegreiftheater, 1923. J. L. Moreno, "Psychopathology of Interpersonal Relations and Interpersonal Therapy," *Sociometry*, 1937, Vol. I, No. 1. Theodore Sarbin, "The Concept of the Role," *Sociometry*, 1943, Vol. VI, No. 3.

If the total record,[11] auditory and visual, of a session is recorded and repeated one experiences a conglomeration of strategic plans, test procedures, interviews, fragments of scenes, fractions of fragments, analytic interpretations, methodical remarks, riotous outbursts of excitement, pauses full of tension, a dozen seeds of undreamt of social dramas and tragedies. But notwithstanding that psychodrama and sociodrama are mixtures of factors and processes which do not seem to belong together, according to the labels and restrictions of the university departments of aesthetics, drama, ethics, or psychology, it exercises often a deeper effect upon the group than each of these could attain by themselves. It is probably because it is a truer counterpart to the ever unfinished and unpolished, half chaotic, and half cosmic life panorama in which we all take part.

Sociodramatic procedure needs careful planning. The planning is a task of the director which consists, first, in gathering all factual information necessary for the project which is to be improvised, this information to be communicated to his staff of auxiliary egos. Any information is, at best, a framework so that the egos should not be hindered in their improvisations by a lack of purely technical knowledge of the subject matter. It provides them with the atmosphere of a social conflict, for instance, the Negro-White situation in the southern states, or the Hindu-Mohammedan situation in India. Second, some training of the auxiliary egos for a project is necessary. An auxiliary ego as a private person may have, for instance, a bias against Nazi Germany, and be in favor of Soviet Russia. In a session which is dedicated to the presentation of the Nazi-Communist conflict, he may unconsciously show his leanings towards communism by giving a distorted portrayal of a Nazi soldier compared with that of a Russian soldier. Therefore, the auxiliary ego must learn to detach himself as far as possible from everything in his own collective life which might bias him toward one or another of the cultures portrayed. Elaborate spontaneity training may be necessary before his own collective conflicts cease to affect his function as an auxiliary in inter-culture relations. However, the most careful preparation and training of director and egos should not turn them into stereotyped role-takers. It should give them a solid basis for undertaking a difficult social and cultural project. Every session into which they enter is full of unpredictable elements; a group of people they have never faced may spring a surprise upon them. They are compelled to stay free from too much anticipation of forthcoming events. Last but not least, they must be able to subjectify rapidly the experiences of the actual informants. In order to do this it takes vigilance and spontaneity.

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[11] Records are made in the course of psychodramatic and sociodramatic procedure as a matter of routine—stenograms, photographs, films, phonograph records, etc., can be made. In this way the conserve returns but in a subordinated function, secondary to the function of spontaneity and creativity.

The exploratory value of sociodramatic procedure is only one half of the contribution which it can make, the other and perhaps the greater half of the contribution is that it can *cure* as well as solve, that it can change attitudes, as well as study them. An understanding of this is closely linked with the concept of catharsis with which I opened this paper. The meaning it has in sociodrama can be elucidated by comparing it with the primary meaning which Freud has given the psychoanalytic situation and to psychoanalytic therapy. Freud insisted upon the strict privacy and individual character of the psychoanalytic situation. He did not permit anyone to enter the situation, not even the closest kin of the subject under treatment. This was a logical procedure from the point of view of individual psychology and the strategy of the psychoanalyst, but it closed Freud's eyes to the essence of catharsis as it operates in sociodrama. Sociodrama deals with problems which, as we know, can neither be clarified nor treated in a secret chamber and by the seclusion of two. It needs all the eyes and all the ears of the community, its depth and breath, in order that it may operate adequately. It needs, therefore, a milieu which differs entirely from the psychoanalytic situation, a forum in which the group with its collective problems can be treated with the same earnestness as the individual is treated in a consultation room. The ideal form for this is the drama which all can share, the forum par excellence is the amphitheatre, and the effect is a community catharsis.

* * * *

Catharsis in the sociodrama differs from catharsis in the psychodrama.[12] The psychodramatic approach deals with personal problems principally and aims at personal catharsis.[13] In psychodramatic procedure a subject whether it is a Christian, a Communist, a Negro, a Jew, a Jap, or a Nazi is treated as a specific person, with his private world. His collective situation is considered only as far as it affects his personal situation. Therefore, he has to be *himself* the chief actor in the treatment procedure. In sociodramatic procedure the subject is not a person, but a group. Therefore it is not an individual Negro who is considered, but all Negroes, all Christians, all Jews, are considered. There are inter-cultural conflicts in which an individual is persecuted, not because of himself, but because of the group to which he belongs. It is not a Negro but the Negro, it is not a Christian but the Christian, and in reverse the persecutor is in the mind of the persecuted not a white man but the white people, not an individual German, but the Nazis. Therefore, in the sociodramatic session it is in principle immaterial which individual portrays the role of a Christian, a Jew, or a Nazi, as long as he is a member of the collective treated. Anyone can be an actor. An individual who takes the role of the Christian on the stage will portray it for every Christian, whoever takes the role of a Jew, for every Jew, as the aim of the procedure is not his own salvation, but the salvation of all the members of his clan.[14] The protagonist on the stage is not portraying a dramatis personae, the creative output of the mind of an *individual* playwright, but a collective experience. He, an auxiliary ego, is an emotional extension of many egos. Therefore, in a sociodramatic sense, it is not identification of the spectator with the actor on the stage, presuming some difference between him and the character which the latter portrays. It is *identity*.[15] All Christians, all Negroes, all Jews, or all Nazis are collective characters. Every Christian is, as a Christian, identical with every other Christian. In the primary phase of collective *identity*, there is no need, therefore, for identification. There is no difference between spectators and actors; all are protagonists.

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[12] See J. L. Moreno, "Mental Catharsis and the Psychodrama," *Sociometry*, Volume 3, No. 3, 1940, p. 227.

[13] The difference between psychodrama and sociodrama should be extended to every type of group psychotherapy. A difference should be made between the individual type of group psychotherapy and the collective type of group psychotherapy. The individual type of group psychotherapy is individual-centered. It focusses its attention upon the single individuals in the situation, of which the group consists, and not upon the group in general. The collective type of group psychotherapy is group centered. It focusses its attention upon the collective denominators and is not interested in the individual differentials or the private problems which they produce.

The drama production of the individual playwright has a number of intermediary phases to which little attention has been given in drama research. Between the initial phase and source—the dramatic life events themselves—as the Wars of Troy, the French Revolution, the World Wars I and II, the social upheavals accompanying them, and the dramatic works of Aeschylus, Shakespeare or Ibsen, is a long track of development which requires investigation. It is here that the sociodrama can step in and serve as a check and balance to cultural tensions and hostilities arising from world-wide events and as a means to social catharsis. In the form of the psychodramatic and sociodramatic conserve in film and television, the drama conserve may come back revitalized, opening a new vista for the future of the drama.

This is the genesis of the drama and of its original aim, that of collective catharsis.

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[14] One individual may of course be preferred to another in the portrayal of a particular role but only because of a greater ability to portray it, and not because his own situation differs in any way from the situation of every other member of his group. Just as there are some people who are photogenic, there are some individuals who are *dramatogenic,* especially sensitive for collective experiences and able to dramatize them easily.

[15] For further elaboration, see J. L. Moreno and F. B. Moreno, "Psychodramatic Theory of Child-development" *Sociometry*, Volume 7, No. 1, 1944.

The Role of Communication in the Reduction of Interpersonal Hostility

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JOHN W. THIBAUT AND JOHN COULES

It is the basic contention of the frustration-aggression theorists that aggressive tendencies may be aroused by the blocking of any goal-directed behavior. This general hypothesis and numerous related hypotheses have been explored in considerable detail (2, 3, 8). The present study is concerned in a restricted way with the "fate" of aggressive tendencies (or hostile impulses) once they have been aroused. Generally these tendencies or impulses may be either inhibited or discharged as overt aggression. If discharge occurs then presumably the level of hostile impulse is thereby lowered. In the language of the frustration-aggression theorists, ". . . the occurrence of any act of aggression is assumed to reduce the instigation to aggression. In psychoanalytic terminology, such a release is called catharsis" (2, p. 50).

Current interest in social communication (4), particularly in the communication of emotions, has led to a renewed concern with hypotheses of the "catharsis" variety. In the context of social communication the "catharsis" hypothesis is stated as follows: the communication of hostility through overt aggressive behavior toward a (personal) instigator will tend to reduce the residual hostility toward that instigator. The present study is designed to test this hypothesis.

* * * *

A secondary purpose of the present study was to examine the restriction imposed on the generality of the "catharsis" hypothesis by the "autistic hostility" hypothesis of Newcomb (9). This hypothesis states that a hostile attitude is protected from change by leading to a breakdown in the com-

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munication necessary for the alteration of the attitude. The relevance of the application of this hypothesis will become clearer in the discussion of the experimental results. At this point it is sufficient to suggest that the Newcomb hypothesis implies the following: there is a positive relationship between degree of hostility and relative effectiveness of inhibition of overt aggression. Thus, even without external barriers to aggression, it is assumed that the amount of overt aggressive discharge is not a direct function of the degree of hostility.

Experiment I

Subjects

The subjects (*S*s) were 41 volunteer male undergraduate students recruited from an elementary psychology course at Boston University.

The *S*s were scheduled to appear individually at the experimental rooms. On arrival each *S* was introduced to two paid participants who were students at a neighboring division of Boston University. The roles of the paid participants were standardized and well-rehearsed in advance. They pretended to be naive as to the purpose of the study and unacquainted with one another.

Procedure

The experimenter (*E*), in his preliminary instructions, reminded *S*s of the sentence completion test that they had completed at time of recruitment. He was interested in discovering, he said, whether undergraduate students could not perhaps learn as much about one another's personalities by direct communication as could professional psychologists working from test materials. This served as the pretext of the experiment.

At this point *E* designated the naive *S* as one "diagnoser" and, apparently arbitrarily, selected one of the paid participants (always the same one) as the other "diagnoser." The remaining paid participant was assigned the job of messenger. The two diagnosers were to communicate to one another *about themselves* and the messenger was to deliver the communications.

Each diagnoser was given his own small room in which to work. The two rooms were adjacent and separated by a large glass window. The diagnosers were seated at tables facing the window and hence each was in constant view of the other.

Before proceeding with the main business of communicating to one another, each diagnoser was instructed to write an initial "personality sketch," consisting of his first impressions of the other diagnoser. (Since these were to be seen only by *E*, the paid participant needed only to pretend he was writing a sketch.)

This much accomplished, *S*s began the communication process, on which two restrictions were imposed: all communication must be in the form of written notes and the content of communication must refer to self. The exact instructions given were as follows:

> We would like to have you go on now and write notes to each other. You can write as many notes as you want to. Here is some paper you can use. Write about

yourself, telling the other fellow whatever you want to about your personality, your ambitions, your likes and dislikes, and so on. But be sure you write only about yourself, telling as much as you can, so that at the end the other fellow will be able to write a better personality sketch of you. When you've finished writing a note, rap on the table and the messenger will come in and deliver it. As soon as you receive a note read it right away. Don't let the notes pile up.

In acting as second diagnoser, the paid participant initiated a standard set of eight notes. These were sent at intervals of two minutes. The first seven of these were intended to characterize him as arrogant and opinionated but not "strong" enough to inhibit the *S*'s aggression. Two of the notes will illustrate the effect intended:

Note 3: I know I'll succeed in my profession, because I am so far above everybody else in my class. I got 98 on my last biology exam and that's pretty good. I am the best student in the lab course also.

Note 7: Since I am kind of weak, I haven't been good in any sports—but that's just kid stuff, I want to be a *man*. I am sure if I wanted to be a good athlete I would be very successful even though I don't care much for physical contact of that sort.

The eighth note was calculated to act as the instigation to hostility. In this note the paid participant (referred to as the "instigator" in the next session) now ignored the instructions to write about self and sent off a strong denunciation of the *S*. The precise wording of the note was as follows: "You know, you're so full of bull—, that I'm not going to talk about myself anymore. You're the most egotistical, deceitful *liar* I've ever seen. How anybody can fake about his own abilities as much as you have I'll never know. I don't think you're the type of guy I'd care to associate with. Why don't you play it straight, fellow?"

Naive *S*s were assigned at random to one of two experimental treatments. Twenty of the *S*s (No-Com group) were not permitted to communicate after receiving the instigation (eighth note from the paid participant). As soon as the No-Com *S* was seen to have finished reading the instigation, *E* entered the room and announced that the allotted time was up. The remaining 21 *S*s (Com group) were permitted to write one additional note after the instigation. As soon as this had been delivered, *E* terminated the proceedings.

At the conclusion of the communication period, each of the two diagnosers wrote a final personality sketch of his partner (again the paid participant merely pretended). When this was finished, *E* informally interviewed the naive *S*, while a second *E* pretended to be similarly engaged with the paid participant.

Finally, before each *S* was dismissed, the nature of the experiment was fully explained to him and the paid participants were reintroduced to him, with apologies and a request for cessation of hostilities.

Coding Procedure

In treating the data, content analyses were done separately for the notes communicated by the naive *S*s and for their pre-experimental and post-experimental "personality sketches" of the paid participant (instigator).

For the notes the content analysis was made in accordance with four general categories, some of which were further subdivided. These categories provided the measures of overt aggression.

A. *Instigator as Referent*

I. *Direct aggression:* includes any wish, fantasy, or intention to commit a destructive act; attribution of undesirable property or denial of desirable property; direct expression of hostile feeling.

II. *Indirect aggression:* includes negative modeling and strong disagreement.

III. *Affective neutrality.*

IV. *Friendly statements.*

B. *Other Person, Group, or Institution as Referent*

Differs from A only in referent. The same sub-categories as above were used.

C. *Self as Referent*

I. *Self augmentation* (SA): attribution to self of importance, acclaim, achievement, virtue, etc.

II. *Self reduction* (SR): disparages, condemns, inculpates self.

III. *Self neutral* (SN): residual category.

D. *General and Miscellaneous*

Statements without personal reference.

In coding the notes, each sentence was taken as a unit. When a change in category occurred within a sentence both categories were scored, each as a separate unit. Two independent coders obtained an agreement of 72 per cent for all the categories, including subdivisions.

The code categories used in analyzing the personality sketches were similar to those for the notes. Analyses of the sketches provided the pre-experimental and post-experimental measures of hostility and friendliness toward the instigator. In brief, the categories included the following:

Hostile statements: includes expression of hostile feeling toward the instigator, attribution of unfavorable characteristics, negative modelling.

Friendly statements: includes all reference to instigator as object to be admired, liked, modelled; attribution of favorable characteristics.

Neutral statements: includes all nonaffective references to instigator.

General and miscellaneous statements: includes all comments having no apparent reference to the instigator.

The conventions for units and double coding were the same as in coding the notes. Two independent coders obtained an agreement of 75 per cent in coding this material.

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Experiment II

This experiment was similar in all respects to Experiment I up to and through the instigation. At that point the No-Com *S*s were interrupted by *E*, who talked to them for about three minutes in an informal matter-of-fact manner. The Com *S*s were permitted to write one note subsequent to the instigation before the informal interruption occurred. Then *S*s in both experimental treatments were permitted to continue communication with the instigator, who initiated an additional seven notes in a neutral vein. Units of aggression directed toward the instigator during the total period after instigation were counted for all *S*s. The count included units contributed by the Com *S*s in the note immediately after the instigation.

* * * *

Discussion

Qualitative Aspects of Communication

Let us now return to the main experiment, described earlier. . . . The two experimental groups appear to be fairly well equated before the experimental variable was introduced. Comparison of the Com group's distribution of its communication units in the notes reveals a marked shift after instigation toward aggression directed to the instigator and a concomitant reduction in neutral references to self.

Anticipating a variable that we will study more fully later, let us look at the relationship between initial disposition[6] toward the instigator and the qualitative aspects of the notes written before instigation. As a result of poor distribution in some of the process categories . . . only four of the categories could be analyzed. Of these four categories only self-reduction (SR) proved to be significantly related to initial disposition (hostility-friendliness). The biserial correlation[7] obtained was +.43, which for 41 cases is significant at beyond the .05 level. The more initial hostility toward the instigator the more self-reduction (or "introjection" of hostility) in the pre-instigation communications.

Conflict and Aggression

Now let us consider some of the additional differences between the two experimental groups. The following question was asked at the end of the experiment: "Do you feel that you would like to continue with this note-writing?" Forty per cent of the No-Com *S*s were opposed to continuing, whereas only 5 per cent of the Com *S*s were opposed. This difference is significant at beyond the .01 level.[8] In other words, virtually all of the Com *S*s were fairly well content with the situation, while a large proportion of the No-Coms were unhappy in the situation. It is possible that this difference may be attributable to relatively strong conflict in the No-Com *S*s. In these *S*s a strong tendency to approach behavior (aggression) was effectively restrained by a combination of internalized avoidance tendencies (the result of cultural pressure toward inhibition of aggression) and, more important, removal of the communication channel to the instigator. Avoidance of the entire situation might be a means of resolving the conflict, although, admittedly, renewed attacks on the barrier to communication might equally well be expected.

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[6] This measure is computed by subtracting the percentage of friendly units from the percentage of hostile units in the pre-experimental "personality sketches".

[7] The distribution of SR was such that dichotomization was necessary.

[8] In this and in all subsequently reported tests of significance, two-tailed tests are used, since either no prediction of the direction of the results was made or the prediction was ad hoc.

A similar situation appears to exist when "willingness to continue" is analyzed *within* the No-Com group. (Since only one of the Com *S*s expressed unwillingness to continue, we are not able to study the variable any further for this group.) When a measure of post-experimental residual hostility[9] is related to willingness to continue in the task, a biserial correlation coefficient of $-.47$ is obtained. This relationship is significant at the .05 level. Thus it appears that the higher the level of hostility in this kind of situation, the stronger is the desire to leave the field. This may be interpreted by assuming that as terminal (post-experimental) hostility increases, internalized tendencies to avoid aggression increase even more sharply. However, since we have no good measures of internalized tendency to avoid aggression, this interpretation cannot be evaluated in this study.

Newcomb's Autistic Hostility Hypothesis

The foregoing discussion of the relationship between hostility and avoidance of interaction can be encompassed in a general way in the autistic hostility hypothesis of Newcomb (9). This hypothesis states that a hostile attitude will tend to perpetuate itself by leading to a breakdown in the communication that would be requisite to altering the attitude. The first statement that the Newcomb hypothesis permits us to make is the following:

Initially hostile *S*s, when compared with initially friendly *S*s, will initiate a smaller volume of communication during the pre-instigation period. To test this hypothesis let us consider the relationship between initial disposition toward the instigator and numbers of units of communication up to the time of definite instigation. For this purpose the total group of 41 *S*s can be used, since the experimental variable operated only after the point of instigation. The product-moment correlation obtained was $-.32$, which is significant at beyond the .05 level. This relationship is consistent with our expectation that the initially hostile *S*s will tend to reduce their volume of communication.[10] The Newcomb hypothesis appears also to imply the following statement:

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[9] This measure comes from subtracting the percentage of friendly units in the post-experimental "personality sketches" from the percentage of hostile units.

The initially hostile *S*s, when compared with the initially friendly, will communicate a smaller amount of aggression after instigation. This relationship would be expected on the same grounds as the reduced volume of communication before instigation. We assume that the initially hostile *S* is in a relatively strong conflict situation about being overtly aggressive to the instigator and that this conflict is resolved by avoidance. If this is so, we would predict a lowered responsiveness to the instigator both before and after instigation. The data appear to bear out this supposition. For the Com group, initial hostility-friendliness was related to the frequency of aggressive units communicated to the instigator[11] in the note sent immediately after instigation. The biserial correlation (dichotomizing aggression) was $-.56$, which is significant at about .02 level. The sign of the correlation conforms to the expected relationship.[12]

Quite independently of the Newcomb hypothesis, we would suppose that in any case the initially hostile *S*, as compared with the initially friendly, would show less increase in hostility after instigation, since the stimulus value of the instigator will be perceived to have changed less. The initially hostile *S* regards the instigator as a "low-type" from the beginning and is not surprised to see his opinion confirmed.

Now let us consider the boundary conditions imposed on the catharsis-conflict effect by the Newcomb hypothesis. To the extent that increments in hostility as a result of instigation are a function of initial disposition toward the instigator, we would expect the catharsis-conflict effect to be dissipated when the data for the Com group alone are analyzed. No dissipation of the effect would be expected in comparisons of the two experimental groups, since initial dispositions of the *S*s are equated. But within the Com group, if those *S*s who interact less with the instigator (i.e., the initially hostile) also generate smaller increments of hostility in response to the instigation, we would not expect to find the catharsis-conflict effect operating.

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[10] Kelley (6) has reported confirmation of this hypothesis in some experiments done with groups of students in classroom settings.

[11] This measure includes only categories AI and AII, i.e., only categories referring to aggression directed toward the instigator. . . .

[12] Hence it appears that the same *S*s were initially hostile to the instigator, relatively nonaggressive after instigation, and self-reductive before instigation. It seems clear from our data, as well as from other sources, e.g., Sears's (10) investigations of overt and fantasy aggression in children, that in predicting presence or absence of aggressive behavior, the particular social stimulus conditions must be taken into account. Any attempt to treat intropunitiveness, extrapunitiveness, and impunitiveness as bases for distinct personality types must be qualified by the finding of intra-individual variation under different but closely related conditions.

When in fact, for the Com group, either a frequency or an intensity measure of amount of post-instigation aggression (derived from the last note written) is correlated with any of the measures of residual post-experimental disposition toward the instigator (as measured by the terminal personality sketch), no correlation coefficient exceeds .20 in either direction. Hence, these data offer no support for the supposition that the catharsis-conflict effect operates within the Com group.

Summarizing the main limiting effects which the Newcomb hypothesis will have on the generality of the catharsis-conflict effect in the present situation, we may say:

1. In general, opportunity for communication after instigation (when compared with the lack of this opportunity) should lead to relatively less shifting in the direction of unfriendliness toward the instigator. This we would expect from the general statement of the catharsis-conflict effect.

2. The amount of change from before to after the experiment in disposition toward the instigator should be a positive function of the initial friendliness of *S* toward the instigator. Initially hostile *S*s would be expected to change less than initially friendly *S*s. This expectation comes from two possible mechanisms, both of which are likely to be operating in the present situation: (*a*) the reduced interaction and heightened psychological insulation against the instigator which, from the Newcomb hypothesis, we would expect the initially hostile *S* to bring to the situation; and (*b*) the relatively smaller change in the stimulus value of the instigator from the point of view of the initially hostile *S*.

3. The difference in tendency to shift toward unfriendliness (proposition 1, above), in the comparison of those communicating after instigation, should operate most strongly for initially friendly *S*s, and least strongly, if at all, for initially hostile *S*s. This qualification of the catharsis-conflict effect comes directly from the application of proposition 1 to proposition 2. The catharsis-conflict effect will be expected to be least strong for those *S*s most resistant to change.

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Inspection . . . shows good general conformity between the data and the propositions stated above.[13]

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[13] The data possibly reflect to same extent a regression of post-experimental friendliness toward the mean, as a result of imperfect reliability of the measures used. This tendency probably does not seriously disturb our interpretation, in view of the nonrandom nature of the post-experimental data, i.e., the systematic differences between the two experimental groups and the restriction of changes in friendliness to negative values (confirming the supposition that the instigation produced hostility).

Summary

The purpose of this experiment was to test the hypothesis that overt acts of aggression in response to instigation to hostility will tend to reduce the level of hostile tension in the aggressor. Twenty-one *S*s were permitted to communicate back to an instigator immediately after instigation to hostility, while 20 *S*s were not permitted this final communication. The former *S*s showed relatively more post-experimental friendliness toward the instigator, thus giving qualified confirmation to the hypothesis.

A second experiment showed that the difference between the two groups in the first experiment may also be a function of relatively heightened hostility in the group whose communication is thwarted.

The effects predicted by the autistic hostility hypothesis of Newcomb are shown to dissipate the effects predicted by our major hypothesis as a function of the degree of initial hostility of the *S* toward the instigator.

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Communication, the Development of Trust, and Cooperative Behavior

JAMES L. LOOMIS

The research which this paper reports was concerned, first, with a description of the conditions under which an individual would, on the basis of trust, establish a cooperative relationship with another person, and, second, with the use of communication in establishing trust.

Trust as a Basis for a Cooperative Relationship

We took four conditions as essential for the establishment of a cooperative relationship based on trust. First of all, each individual must be committed to reaching some goal where the commitment is such that failure to achieve the goal would cost him more than he would be willing to risk in an uncertain venture.[2] Secondly, each individual must know that he cannot reach the goal without the help of other persons, and that they are able to help him. Thirdly, each individual must know that the other persons are similarly dependent upon him for their rewards, that is, that all the members of the association are *promotively interdependent.*[3] Fourthly, each individual must know that the others are each aware that the members are all mutually interdependent; in other words, there must be *mutually perceived promotive interdependence.*

An important implication of promotive interdependence is the fact that the group can prevent an uncooperative member from reaching his goal. This retaliatory power is the members' assurance that the group will function effectively until each member has achieved his goal.

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[2] We were not concerned with cooperative behavior based on the individual's willingness to *gamble*, that is, risk the probable loss of a small investment against the unlikely possibility of winning a great deal (Deutsch, 2, 3).

[3] The term *promotive interdependence* was suggested by Deutsch to describe the kind of cooperative relationship discussed here.

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The crucial factor in the establishment of mutually perceived promotive interdependence is the subjective impression that the individual has of each other member of the group. In the simplest association, that of two people, the individual, if he,

1. wishes to reach some goal;
2. knows that the other person also wishes to reach a similar goal;
3. is aware that he will reach his goal and the other person will reach *his* goal if they cooperate with each other, and that one cannot win if the other *fails* to cooperate; and
4. has the conviction that the other person's motivation, knowledge, and awareness are similar to his own,

should believe that he and the other person share the knowledge of their mutual interdependence. If this is the case, the prediction is that the individual will perceive:

1. *a cooperative intention*—the other person is trustworthy, that is, intends to cooperate;
2. *a cooperative expectation*—the other person is trusting, in that he perceives that the individual also intends to cooperate.

The perception of a cooperative intention and expectation may be termed a state of perceived mutual trust[4] in which the individual understands that the other person is aware, and believes that the individual is aware, that there is no reasonable alternative but cooperation available to either of them as long as they remain promotively interdependent.

The establishment of a cooperative relationship will depend on the individual's response to the other person's expectation and intention. We expect that *if the individual perceives mutual trust, he will cooperate*, and *if the individual does not perceive mutual trust, he will not cooperate*. In the first case, the individual should see that an uncooperative choice would be untrustworthy, a violation of the person's trust that would force the other person to withdraw from cooperation to prevent his own loss, and therefore prevent the individual from reaching his goal. In the second case, the individual should see, since he has no reason to expect that the other person will cooperate, that uncooperative choice is his best *defense* against undue losses.

The Use of Communication in the Development of Trust

The individual, we have suggested, must not only be aware of his role in the cooperative relationship, but he must know the other person's role, and he must be assured that the other person's thinking is similar to his own before there will be any basis for cooperation, unless one individual has already learned what to expect from the other person, he will have to depend for these awarenesses on communication between himself and the other person. As an example, suppose that the following note were to pass between the individual and the other person:

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[4] See Deutsch (1) for the general theoretical discussion of trust on which this definition of perceived mutual trust was based. The latest available statement is in Deutsch (3).

'I would like you to cooperate so that I can win' (call this the writer's *expectation*).

'I will cooperate so that you can win' (call this his *intention*).

'If you don't cooperate, then I won't cooperate, and you will not be able to win' (the writer's *retaliation* if the other person fails him).

'I will always be ready to cooperate if you cooperate, even if you may not have cooperated earlier' (the terms of *absolution* of a violation of the writer's trust).

The note expresses the writer's desire to win and recognizes that the other person's goal is the same; it expresses his awareness that neither can win without the other's cooperation; and it emphasizes the writer's desire to achieve a cooperative relationship that will serve both persons' interests. In addition, the note should serve as two-way communication. If they know that their roles in the relationship are identical, both the writer and the receiver should be aware that the terms of the note apply with equal force to both of them.

Research on the Development of Trust

Deutsch (2, 3) used a two-person game, in which the subjects were dependent on each other's cooperation for their wins, to investigate the effect of changing the subjects' orientation. The subjects were told alternatively to cooperate, to compete, or to play for themselves (individualistic orientation). With no communication, the cooperative subjects won a little or broke even. The competitive subjects lost a great deal, and the individually oriented subjects lost nearly as much.

Of greatest interest here are the experimental attempts to induce cooperation in the individual condition. The subjects reached a mutually beneficial agreement when they were allowed to announce their choices to one another and to change their choices until they were satisfied with their decisions. In another variation free communication was allowed, although the choices were made in secret as in the original studies. Cooperation was increased slightly. Most of the notes indicated that the subjects did not take the development of trust seriously, but said such things as, 'You'll just have to cooperate, or I won't let you win.' Solomon (5) put the subject on the receiving end of a *malevolent*, and *unconditionally benevolent*, and a *conditionally benevolent* relationship with another person. Where the power of the two persons was equal, the subject in the conditionally benevolent treatment (equivalent in strategy to that expressed in the note of the previous section) was most likely to perceive that the other person's intention was cooperative and to respond cooperatively to that perception. In effect, Solomon found that where the subject and the other person were promotively interdependent, the subject cooperated to the extent that he perceived that the other person's cooperation would depend on his cooperation.

Design and Procedure

The Social Game. A two-person game, designed to provide options of cooperating or not cooperating similar to those used in the initial investigations of trust (2), was used in this experiment. . . . The *S* was always Person I (PI) and the experimenter—*'stooge'* was Person II (PII or the 'other person').

Each person chose one of two possible courses of action on any of the five trials of the game: a cooperative choice (*X* for PI and *A* for PII) or an uncooperative choice (*Y* for PI and *B* for PII). The resultant wins or losses (the numerical values in the matrix) for each person depended on the combination of both persons' choices. There were four possible combinations: *XA*, where both persons won 10 points; *YA*, where PI won 20 points, and PII lost 20 points; *XB*, in which PI lost 20 points, and PII won 20 points; and *YB*, in which both persons lost 10 points. Only the *XA* combination enabled both persons to win. One or both had to lose if any one of the three remaining combinations occurred.

The low ratio of possible wins to possible losses (10 to 20) was used to discourage cooperation where the *S* was not certain that the other person would also cooperate. For example, if PI suspected that PII would choose *B*, the uncooperative path, he would choose *Y* to minimize his loss.

The *S* knew, before he played the first trial, that there would be a series of five trials, and that he would be informed at the end of each trial what the other person had chosen, and, consequently, how much each person had won or lost on the trial. Each *S* kept a record of his and the other person's choices—and wins or losses on each trial—on a 'trial form'.

Communication. Four kinds of statement were used by the note-writers (Senders) to communicate their understanding of the task to the note-receivers (Receivers):

(a) *Expectation*: 'I would like you to choose *A*.'
(b) *Intention*: 'I will choose *X*.'
(c) *Retaliation*: 'If you do not choose as I want you to choose, then on the next trial I will choose *Y*.'
(d) *Absolution*: 'If you do choose as I would like you to choose after first not doing so, then I will choose *X* on the next trial.'

These statements were successively combined in the notes to represent progressive stages or 'levels' reached in the communicative process. The note representing Level I, for example, used the statement of *expectation*; the note for Level II used the statement of *intention*; the note for Level III combined the statements of *expectation* and *intention*; the note for Level IV used the statements of *expectation, intention*, and *retaliation*; and the note at Level V represented the full communication of the conditions necessary to cooperative relationship by using all four of the statements. . . .

Ten experimental groups were created so that, for each of the five communication levels, half of the *S*s were Senders and half were Receivers.

A Sender was given a note-form corresponding to the communication level for which he had been chosen. For example, Level III Senders got note-forms which read, 'I am going to choose——.' 'I would like you to choose——.' The Sender was then asked to write in the choice he intended to make and the choice he would like the other person to make. If he did not write in the 'correct' choices (*X* to indicate a cooperative intention, and *A* to indicate the cooperative expectation), then his data were not used in the final analysis.

A Receiver at any communication level was given a note-form, identical to that of a Sender at the same level, in which the 'correct' choice had already been pencilled in by the experimenter.

Both Senders and Receivers were given supplementary instructions to help them to interpret the meaning of the note. The Senders received a mimeographed sheet explaining the use of the note-form. The Receivers were given a similar explanation, in part on a printed instruction sheet, and in part on the note in the form of pencilled comments. Both Senders and Receivers were told that they were not bound to the choices indicated in the note.

An eleventh group of *S*s, which neither received nor sent notes, was added as a control to obtain a measure of the trust and cooperative behavior that may have developed in the absence of communication. The treatment of the control *S*s was, except for the lack of note-passing, identical to that of the experimental subjects.

Subjects. The final sample of 198 *S*s whose data were used in the analysis was drawn from Queens College student volunteers, recruited primarily from freshmen and sophomore psychology, sociology, mathematics, and English classes.

The *S*s, both male and female (in the ratio of about one to two), were randomly assigned to the eleven conditions, until there were 18 in each condition.

The *S*s were told that the point of the game was to win as much as they could for themselves, and not to be concerned about what happened to the other person. Within this 'individual' orientation, the *S* was free to decide whether he would win more by cooperating or by competing with the other person.

The possible choices, the resultant combinations and their associated wins and losses, and the possible strategies available to each person were explained from both Person I's and Person II's points of view. After the game was explained, the *S* received a written quiz with questions tapping his understanding of the consequences, on a single trial and over a series of five trials, of different combinations of choices. If the *S* did not achieve a perfect score of 16 correct answers, his data were excluded from the final sample. To ensure that the *S* understood the game equally well from both PI and PII's position, he did not know from which person he would be until after he had taken the quiz, at which point he received a note that told him that he would be PI.

Personal interaction was eliminated by using at least 3—and generally 4 or more—*S*s at a time, and by telling the *S*s that they would not know with whom they would be playing the game. They were seated in booths so that they could see no one but the *E*, who insisted that there should be no talking.

Each *S*(PI) played the entire game against another person (PII) who was, in reality, the *E*. *E*'s responses to the *S*'s choices were determined by an 'optimally cooperative strategy' as expressed in the note of Level V. The *E* always made a cooperative choice on the first trial. Thereafter, his choice on any of the subsequent four trials was determined by the *S*'s choice on the previous trial. The *S* who cooperated on the first trial received a cooperative choice on the second trial. If, in this example, the *S* then made an uncooperative choice on the second trial, the *E* made an uncooperative choice on the third trial, and so on.

PI(*S*) was considered to perceive that mutual trust existed between himself and PII if he circled *A* in answer to the question, 'What do you think the other person will choose, *A* or *B*?' and circled *X* in answer to the question, 'What do you think he thinks you will choose, *X* or *Y*?' The *S* had to answer these two questions on the trial form before he made his choice on each trial.

Cooperative Choice and Trustworthy Behavior. For convenience, an *X* choice has been called a *cooperative choice* and a *Y* choice had been called an *uncooperative choice*.

On any trial, if *S* perceived trust, a cooperative choice was termed *trustworthy behavior* and an uncooperative choice was termed '*double-crossing*' *behavior*. On any trial where *S* failed to perceive trust, a cooperative choice was termed *risk-taking behavior* and an uncooperative choice was termed *defensive behavior*.

Experimental Procedure. The *E* seated the *S*s and told them that they were about to participate in a study of social behavior in games. He told them that to prevent friendships or first impressions from affecting their behavior, they would not be allowed to see or talk to each other, although later on some of them would be asked to write a note since the experiment was concerned with communication. Next, the *E* explained the game and then asked the *S*s to answer the questions on the game mechanics. After the quizzes had been collected, the *E* gave each *S* the trial forms and instructed him to keep a record of the game, i.e. to indicate for each trial what he thought the other person would choose; what he thought the other person thought he (*S*) would choose; what he actually did choose; what the other person actually chose; and what he and the other person won or lost. *E* said at the start of the game that there would be five trials, and then explained how to use the switches to indicate choices and how to read the other person's choices.[5]

*S*s were instructed: 'As I said, you will use the switch to signal your choice. Whenever a switch is thrown, my panel will light up, indicating the choice and who made it. When everyone has made his choice, I will throw a master switch, which will transmit your choice to the other person and transmit his choice to you. That way, there will be absolute secrecy of choices for each trial until everybody has made his choice on that trial. You won't know what the other person's choice is until you have made your own, and the other person won't know what your choice is until he has made his.'

The *E* then explained again and in detail the purpose of the game: they were not out to beat the other person, but were out to win as much as they could for themselves; it was not a competitive game or a cooperative game; both could win, both could lose or one could win and the other could lose.

Next, each *S* received instructions about the note-exchange (controls were told they would not have a chance to communicate). After the writing and reading of notes was completed, the *E* began the game. At the end of the fifth trial, he asked them to figure out their total wins and losses, had them fill out a short questionnaire, and explained the purpose of the experiment.

* * * *

Discussion

The major results of the experiment, clearly in line with our expectations, need be only briefly noted. First, a note exchanged at any communication level produced a high degree of perceived trust in both Senders and

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[5] Each *S*s control box had two light bulbs, one labeled *A* and the other labeled *B*. The bulb lit by the experimenter indicated PII's choice on the particular trail.

Receivers. Two-thirds of these communicating subjects, as against about one-tenth of the non-communicating subjects, perceived trust. Second, the percentage of perceived trust increased as communication increased from a minimal kind of note stating only the writer's *expectation* (Level I) to the note that contained the complete statement of the game relationship (Level V). Third, about 80 per cent of all the subjects made choices consistent with their perception of the relationship. These subjects, whether they passed notes or not, were either *trustworthy*, in that they perceived trust and cooperated, or *defensive*, in that they did not perceive trust and did not cooperate.

The patterns of inconsistent, or risk-taking and double-crossing behavior, of the remaining 20 per cent of the subjects raised some additional questions about the effects of note-passing that had not been anticipated. First, the control subjects were somewhat more likely to risk cooperation with the other person, and the experimental subjects were more likely to double-cross him. From the point of view of a subject with no objective basis for trusting the other person, there is more reason to risk cooperation and hope for a cooperative response than to expect cooperation from a person he planned to double-cross. The uncertainty of dealing with a person whose expectations and intentions are unknown is implicit in the risk-taking act and denied in the double-crossing act. Risk-taking, then requires little more than the desire and the hope that the other person will respond positively to the cooperative gesture, whereas double-crossing requires that the subject can simultaneously plan an untrustworthy act and have the expectation, unsupported by any objective information, that the other person will *not* prove untrustworthy.

That the act of double-crossing did require some knowledge about the other person's intentions is also suggested by the fact that Receivers were responsible for nearly 70 per cent of all double-crosses. With one exception (Level I), the note stated for the receiver the writer's intention to cooperate, and could be viewed by the Receiver and the Sender as publicly committing the writer to cooperate, at least on the first trial. Under these conditions, a Receiver could have double-crossed the other person without the onus that a Sender would incur from an open violation of his stated intentions. On this point, there is some slight additional evidence in the fact that, among the Senders, the most double-crosses occurred in that group who sent a note stating not their own intentions, but only what they expected of the other person.

Summary and Conclusions

We expected that the subject would perceive trust, that is believe that the other person intended and expected cooperation, if he was aware and knew that the other person was aware that each one's success in an experimental game depended on cooperation.

We also expected that the presence or absence of perceived trust would determine the subject's choice of cooperative or uncooperative behavior. If the subject perceived trust, he should cooperate, that is, behave *trustworthily* and not attempt to *double-cross* the other person; if he did not perceive trust, he should not cooperate, or, in other words, behave *defensively* and not risk cooperation.

Subjects who communicated were more likely to perceive trust than non-communicating subjects, and the probability increased as the level of communication increased. The large majority of all the subjects either trusted and cooperated, or did not trust and did not cooperate.

Conclusions. The subject who exchanged a note perceived that the other person was committed to cooperation, and that he believed that the subject was committed to cooperation. In the majority of cases, the subject co-operated because an uncooperative choice would have violated his perception of the game as an inter-dependent relationship in which mutual trust had been established. The majority of those who did violate this perception of trust had received a written statement that publicly committed the other person to cooperation.

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Group Cohesiveness and the Expression of Hostility

ALBERT PEPITONE AND GEORGE REICHLING

The field of interpersonal and intergroup hostility embraces several interlocked problem areas. There is, for example, the question of the conditions giving rise to hostility in the individual or group—the factors, in other words, that determine the hostile impulse. There is also the question—given the hostile impulse—of the conditions that govern the direction and quantity of its overt expression. A third question concerns the "fate" of the hostile impulse, particularly in relation to expression or lack of it. The phenomenon of "catharsis" illustrates this phase of the problem.

The present study is principally relevant to the problem of hostility expression. In particular, the experiment is concerned with the effect of group cohesiveness—as empirically defined in terms of the mutual attraction of members—upon the volume and direction of expressed hostility. The most pertinent data on this problem stem from an experiment by Wright (5). This investigator frustrated the play activity of paired children between three and six years of age, who had been previously classified by their nursery school teacher as being Strong or Weak friends. The observed behavior of these children under conditions of frustration showed that the pairs of Strong friends expressed more aggression than the pairs of Weak friends, and that such aggression involved a greater incidence of physical attacks against the experimenter, e.g. kicking, biting.

If it is assumed that the two children in their play activity during the experiment constituted a group, and if preexisting friendship affected *only* the cohesiveness of this group, we may propose a formulation that is suggested by the data and that seems well in line with everyday observation: Members of cohesive groups provide each other with strength and support, which enables them to overcome internal and external restraints against

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retaliation in the event of attack. Highly cohesive groups, in other words, will be less restrained when under attack than relatively less cohesive groups. This greater ability of highly cohesive groups to reduce restraints will be reflected, we hypothesize, in a greater volume of expressed hostility and a more direct expression of hostility with respect to its source.

Method

Male volunteers were recruited from introductory psychology classes by an Assistant, who announced that a national organization was conducting an intensive survey of student attitudes toward various social and academic phases of campus life. The kinds of questions germane to the study were colorfully illustrated, and the fact that the Ss were to participate as a group was carefully explained. As an added incentive, it was indicated that several universities were participating in the survey and that a published copy of the comparative results would be furnished to all volunteers. Prospective Ss then indicated their free hours on a prepared form, and, for purposes of creating the cohesiveness variable, checked a list of assorted personality traits in accordance with: a. the type of person they thought they were, and b. the type of person with whom they would most like to work. A few additional questions bearing on their interest in school activities were also included on the form.

Ss recruited from *different* classes were paired and assigned at random to the High or Low Cohesiveness Conditions (Hico and Loco Groups). There were 13 groups in each condition. Upon being ushered into a conference room used for the experiment, the purposes of the survey were reviewed. Particular stress was placed upon the necessity for participation as a group. Then, in accordance with their designation as a Hico or Loco Group, the following treatments were given in a manner designed to maximize the effect of the formal content.

The Creation of Cohesiveness

Hico Treatment "... another factor in the selection of participants is that we try to get people who are basically compatible in their personalities, that is, who get along well together. We do this by matching people in terms of the traits *they* possess with the traits of people they like. You probably remember doing this on the application form. I must say that, in your case, we were able to make an exceptionally good matching, so you should make an exceptional team."

Loco Treatment "... another factor ... (exactly the same as the Hico treatment) ... Unfortunately, we weren't able to make a good matching in your case, so I'm afraid you won't get along very well together."

The foregoing procedure is virtually identical with that successfully employed by Back for the purpose of inducing differential levels of group cohesiveness (1).

Following the cohesiveness treatment, the Assistant told the Ss that the "discussion leader" would arrive immediately.

The Creation of Hostility

On the basis of pilot studies, a technique was evolved that successfully aroused mild to strong hostility in these groups. In essence, the procedure was to treat the groups in an unjust, arbitrary, and insulting manner. The exact procedure followed was based wholly upon a well-rehearsed script, which was acted out in as natural and convincing a manner as possible.[2]

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To eliminate external restraints from the situation, the Instigator severs his formal connection with the group and leaves. However, so as not to terminate the proceedings altogether, the possible use of the group by another person is suggested. Finally, to block any interpretation of official, repressive action toward the "bad" group, the Instigator is described by the Assistant as having relatively low status:

Assistant. "By the way, that was one of the graduate students in the department. These discussion groups are usually led by Professor Arnold Welch (fictitious), but he's attending a conference in New York today. I'll check with Professor Jason to find out if he can use you. I'll be back in about ten minutes."

There followed a "free" period of approximately six minutes, in which the groups were entirely alone. During this time, an observer in an adjacent room recorded various categories of motor and verbal behavior, which could be seen through a one-way-vision glass and heard through a sound-amplification system.

Observations

A schedule of observation categories was developed on the basis of pilot studies. Included were:

1. *Hostility*—all implicitly or explicitly negative statements directed toward: the Instigator, the treatment and procedures employed by the Instigator or the Assistant, psychology and psychologists, the physical setting. In addition, there was a sub-category of general suspicion, which included all negatively toned statements of doubt, mistrust, and inquiry, without reference to any particular target.

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[2] Frequent checks by an independent observer indicated that the script was, in fact, being followed exactly as written.

II. *Mutual Background*—all statements intended to enhance the Ss' knowledge about each other's "background", including interests, courses, and activities.

III. *Silence.*

IV. *Physical Gestures and Movements.*

The observations were made in terms of the number of seconds in which a statement occupied *one* of the above categories. The one exception was in the case of Physical Movements; here, word-descriptions were recorded. The categories were treated as mutually exclusive, i.e. there was no multiple coding. The Ss were not distinguished as individuals, since our major interest was focused on the group as a unit. For purposes of temporal analysis of the observed behavior, the schedule was divided into six sections of approximately one-minute duration.[3]

Questionnaire

At the end of the free period of observation, the Assistant reappeared. On an ambiguous pretext that additional information was needed by the "Association", a three-item questionnaire was administered. Each S recorded his response on a six-point rating scale.

1. Frankly, how much interest do you have in the proposed discussion? (Point 1, absolutely not interested; Point 6, extremely interested.)

2. What is your feeling toward Professor Welch (the Instigator's name was substituted here) as a discussion leader? (Point 1, would dislike him thoroughly; Point 6, would like him pretty much.)

3. How do you feel towards your partner? How well would you get along in prolonged discussions and many meetings? (Point 1, would dislike him thoroughly; Point 6, would like him pretty much.)

Group Interview

Some thirty seconds after the questionnaires had been collected, the Instigator entered the room and announced to the Ss that they had been participating in an experiment and that it was all over. He then proceeded with a brief interview designed to uncover unexpressed feelings that Ss had during the experiment as well as their present sentiments. Responses to the standard set of open-ended questions were recorded verbatim by the Observer.

At the conclusion of the interview, appropriate time was taken for a complete explanation of the purposes of the experiment. Before the Ss were dismissed, apologies were tendered and, happily, in all cases accepted.

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[3] Actually, adding the time it took the Assistant to walk from the "one-way" room to the conference room, the free period was for all groups somewhat over six minutes. In addition, the observer tended to overestimate the length of statements. Presumably, this error was constant for all groups.

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Discussion

An increasing body of experimental evidence points to a close causal relationship between the cohesiveness of a group and the amount of mutual influence that is achieved among the members of that group (1, 2). In somewhat oversimplified terms, the theoretical basis for this relationship is essentially as follows: to the degree that, for whatever reason, members desire to remain in a given group, they will tend to originate and to accept pressures that are designed to preserve the group or to advance the group toward its goals. Thus, it may be said that the greater the cohesiveness of a group, the greater the power of that group to bring about change in its members. We propose a simple extension of this theory so that it may embrace phenomena other than influence pressures: The more cohesive the group, the greater the tendency for members to provide and accept support designed to overcome restraints that bar the removal of a threat to the group or that otherwise bar the locomotion of the group toward its goal. In other words, we may say that cohesiveness increases the group's "capacity" as well as its "power".

The foregoing general statement fits the results of the present experiment reasonably well. The members are attacked by the Instigator individually and collectively. They seek to remove this threat or at least retaliate against it. However, internal and perhaps external restraints tend to bar the expression of their hostility. The greater ability to reduce restraints assumed to characterize the Hico groups would account for the greater volume of hostility expressed, the greater directness with which hostility is expressed, and the apparently less restrained physical behavior.

Summary

1. The purpose of this experiment was to test the hypothesis that High cohesive groups are able to express more hostility than Low cohesive groups and that the hostility expressed by High cohesive groups will be more direct than that expressed by Low cohesive groups. Results tend to confirm these predictions at acceptable levels of confidence.

2. The Hico groups' physical behavior tended to be less restrained than that of the Loco groups.

3. There was some evidence supporting the psychoanalytic concept of catharsis. Having released a greater amount of hostility during a free period, the Hico groups rated the Instigator more favorably than the Loco groups.

4. In line with the proposed effect of cohesiveness in terms of the

provision and acceptance of mutual support, the number of groups in which both Ss showed cathartic responses was significantly greater under the Hico than under the Loco condition.

5. A general theoretical statement was offered to integrate the findings.

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Psychological Barriers to Communication

DANIEL KATZ

Accurate and adequate communication between groups and peoples will not in itself bring about the millennium, but it is a necessary condition for almost all forms of social progress. Physical barriers to communication are rapidly disappearing, but the psychological obstacles remain. These psychological difficulties are in part a function of the very nature of language; in part they are due to the emotional character and mental limitations of human beings.

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These general considerations concerning the psychological nature of language are the background against which more specific difficulties in communication can be understood. The following specific obstacles merit special attention: (1) the failure to refer language to experience and reality, (2) the inability to transcend personal experience in intergroup communication, (3) stereotypes: the assimilation of material to familiar frames of reference, and (4) the confusion of percept and concept: reification and personification.

Relation of Symbol to Fact

Psychological research abounds with illustrations of the principle that analytic thinking occurs not as the prevalent mode of human response but as a limited reaction under conditions of block or need. Men think critically and precisely only under specific conditions of motivation, and then only in reference to the particular pressing problem. Ordinarily they respond according to the law of least effort. In the field of language behavior, this appears at the most fundamental level in the tendency to confuse words with

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Daniel Katz, "Psychological Barriers to Communication," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Vol. 250 (1947), pp. 17–25. Reprinted by permission.*

the things or processes they name. The word and its referent are fused as an unanalyzed whole in the mind of the individual. Among primitives, for example, it is not permitted to mention the name of a person recently deceased. Since there is deep fear of the spirit of the departed, it is dangerous to bring up his name, fundamentally because the name and the person named are psychologically confused. Even in our own society, many obscene and sacred words are taboo because the name is regarded as the equivalent of the object or process for which it stands.

This inability to grasp the difference between the symbol and its referent is one reason for the failure to check back constantly from language to experience and reality. Much has been said about the virtues of scientific method, but one unappreciated reason for the tremendous progress in natural science has been the constant referral of scientific language to the realities which it supposedly represents. Without such an interplay between symbol and experience, distortion in the symbol cannot be corrected.

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Experiential Limitation

The important psychological fact that men's modes of thinking—their beliefs, their attitudes—develop out of their ways of life is not commonly and fully appreciated. Their mental worlds derive from everyday experiences in their occupational callings, and they are not equipped to understand a language which represents a different way of life.

Because language is symbolic in nature, it can only evoke meaning in the recipient if the recipient has experiences corresponding to the symbol. It will not solve the problem of the basic difficulties in communication between the peoples of the world to have them all speak the same tongue if their experiential backgrounds differ. The individual lives in a private world of his own perception, emotion, and thought. To the extent that his perceptions, feelings, and thoughts arise from similar contacts with similar aspects of reality as experienced by others, the private world can be shared and lose something of its private character. But language itself, even if exact and precise, is a very limited device for producing common understanding when it has no basis in common experience. The linguists who argue for a world language neglect the fact that basic misunderstandings occur not at the linguistic but at the psychological level.

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More and more, however, are psychologists and practitioners coming to realize the importance of common experience as the real basis of communication. Group workers and experimental educators are emphasizing the importance of role playing in true education. By assigning a person a new experiential role to play, it is possible to increase his understanding in a fashion which no amount of preaching or book learning could do. The modern trend in education, which emphasizes learning by doing, laboratory projects, and a mixture of work experience with book learning, is a recognition of the inadequacy of language divorced from experience to achieve much success in communication.

Surmounting the Difficulty. The difficulty of communication between people of different experiential backgrounds is augmented by the distinctive jargon which seems to develop in every calling and in every walk of life. Though groups may differ in their experiences, there is generally more of a common core of psychological reality between them than their language indicates. A neglected aspect of communication is the identification of these areas of common understanding and the translation of the problems of one group into the functional language of another. It is sometimes assumed that limitations of intelligence prevent the farmer or the worker from understanding the complexities of national and international affairs. Anyone, however, who has taken the trouble to discuss with the shipyard worker or the coal miner the economic and political factors operative in the worker's immediate environment will realize the fallacy of this assumption. Within his limited frame of reference, the coal miner, the steel worker, or the dirt farmer will talk sense. But he is unfamiliar with the language used by the professional economist or the expert on international affairs. He is capable of reacting intelligently to matters in this sphere if they are presented to him in terms of their specifics in his own experience. This translation is rarely made, because the expert or the national leader is as uninformed of the day-to-day world of the worker as the worker is of the field of the expert. And often the person most interested and active in talking to laymen in an understandable experiential language is the demagogue, whose purpose is to misinform.

Stereotypes

One aspect of the limitation imposed by one's own narrow experiences is the tendency to assimilate fictitiously various language symbols to one's own frame of reference. The mere fact we lack the experience or the imagination to understand another point of view does not mean that we realize our inadequacy and remain open-minded about it. Whether or not nature abhors a vacuum, the human mind abhors the sense of helplessness that would result if it were forced to admit its inability to understand and deal with people and situations beyond its comprehension. What people do is to fill the gap with their own preconceptions and to spread their own limited attitudes and ideas to cover all the world beyond their own knowledge.

In an older day it was popular to refer to this phenomenon through Herbart's concept of the *apperceptive mass*; later Lévy-Bruhl, in his anthropological interpretations, spoke of *collective* representations; twenty years ago psychologists embraced Walter Lippmann's notion of *stereotypes;* today we speak of assimilating material to our own frame of reference. Thus the farmer who knows little about Jews save from his limited contact with a single Jewish merchant in a nearby trading center will have an opinion of all Jews, and in fact of all foreigners, based on this extremely narrow frame of reference. In the same way he will feel great resentment at the high wages paid to the city worker, without any realization of the city worker's problems. The average citizen may assimilate all discussion of the Negro-white problem to the fractional experience he has had with Negroes forced to live in slum areas.

Nor need there be even a fragmentary basis in personal experience for the stereotype. The superstitions of the culture furnish the individual ready-made categories for his prejudgments in the absence of any experience. Research studies indicate that people in all parts of the United States feel that the least desirable ethnic and racial groups are the Japanese, the Negroes, and the Turks. When asked to characterize the Turk, they have no difficulty in speaking of him as bloodthirsty, cruel, and dirty, yet the great majority who make this judgment not only have never seen a Turk but do not know anyone who has.

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Though the oversimplified and distorted notions of racial and national groups are usually cited as examples of stereotypes, the process of assimilating material to narrow preformed frames of reference is characteristic of most of our thinking: of our judgment of social classes, occupational callings, artistic and moral values, and the characters and personalities of our acquaintances.

Motivation of the Stereotype. Stereotyping applies primarily to the cognitive weakness or limitation in our intellectual processes. But this stereotyped prejudgment has an emotional dimension as well. Many of our stereotyped labels or frames carry heavy emotional loading and so are the more resistant to fact and logic. Emotion attaches to them in many ways. Because they give the individual a crude and oversimplified chart in an otherwise confused universe, they afford him security. They tie in with his whole way of thinking and feeling and acting. To abandon them would be mental suicide. A famous British scholar, completely committed to spiritualism, enthusiastically witnessed a mind-reading performance by the magicians Houdini and Mulholland. When they tried to explain to him afterward that it was all a cleverly designed trick, he would have none of their explanation, and insisted that it was a clear instance of spiritualistic phenomena.

Emotion clings to words through association with emotional events which are never dissociated from the label itself. The feeling of dependence and affection that the child has for his mother saturates the words "mother" and "home" and related phrases. These conditioned words can then be used to call up the old emotions in logically irrelevant situations. In the same way the child acquires emotional content for the stereotypes of his group. If the hierarchy of social status is built on stereotypes about Negroes, foreigners, and the lower classes, then these stereotypes are not neutral but are invested with the emotional color associated with the superiority of the upper groups.

This last example suggests a further motivational basis of the stereotype. People cling to their prejudiced beliefs in labels because of the specific psychic income to be derived from the stereotype. If people the world over are to be judged solely on their merits as human personalities, there is little ego-enhancement in belonging to an in-group which bestows superiority upon its members merely through the act of belonging. The poor whites in the South are not going to abandon their notion of the Negro when this stereotyped belief itself makes them superior to every member of the despised group. The more frustrated the individual, the more emotionally inadequate and insecure, the easier it is to channelize his dissatisfaction and aggression against a stereotyped target.

Reification and Personification

The oversimplification of the stereotype is equaled by the extraordinary opportunities which language provides for reification and personification. We easily forget the distinction between words which refer to percepts, or as aspects of perceived experience, and terms which designate concepts and abstractions. As a result, we take a concept like the state, which stands for many complexities of human interrelationships, and make that concept into a thing or person possessed of all the attributes of the object or person. Thus the state, like the individual, does things. It takes the life of a criminal, it glows with pride at the patriotic sacrifices of its citizens; it can grow old, become feeble, or wither away and die. When pressed, we readily admit that we do not mean to be taken literally, but are speaking metaphorically and analogically. Yet our thinking is so shot through with personification and analogy that the tendency is a serious impediment to our understanding and to our intelligent handling of important problems.

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Research Needed

In brief, the psychological barriers to communication are of such strength and have such a deep foundation in human nature that the whole problem of social communication between individuals and groups needs to be reexamined in a new light. No simple formula will solve the problems arising from the many complex causes and widely ramifying aspects of the limitations of the symbolic mechanism and other psychological processes. The older attempt at an easy solution was the study of the dictionary. One instance of this type of thinking was the college faculty committee which tried to discover the dividing line between legislative matters of policy and executive matters of administration by looking up the words involved in the dictionary. The newer approach of the semanticists, though more sophisticated and more promising, sometimes ignores the psychological difficulties and sometimes begs the question in an uncritical operationalism.

Perhaps the whole problem of communication is inseparable from the larger context of the over-all social problems of our time. There might well be possibilities of significant advance, however, if we were to employ the research methods of science in attacking the many specific obstacles to communication. Procedures are already being worked out on the basis of research evaluation for the alleviation of minority group prejudice. Studies now in contemplation would provide functional dictionaries to supplement the standard etymological works. The process of interpersonal communication has been the subject of some research in studies of rumor.

Though the importance to accurate communication of a maximum of objective reference in language symbols has experimental support, the fact remains that such complex and involved communication is much more feasible in science than in popular discussion. It is probable that precise scientific language, with its exact reference to the objective world and objective operation, will not solve the problem of communication in practical life, where short cuts in communication are essential. But it may be possible to determine the type of short-cut symbol which conveys meaning with minimum distortion. The problem invites research.

A Theory of Co-operation and Competition

MORTON DEUTSCH

The concept of "co-operation" and the interrelated concept of "competition" are rarely missing in discussions of inter-personal or inter-group relations: implicitly they play a key role in the writings of many social theorists. Yet despite the obvious significance of these concepts for the understanding and control of social process,[2] there has been little in the way of explicit theorizing and virtually no experimental work with respect to the effects of co-operation and competition upon social process. The work in this area has largely been concerned with the effects of the individual's motivation to achieve under the two different conditions. None of the experimental studies has investigated the interactions between individuals, the group process that emerges as a consequence of the co-operative or competitive social situation.

The purpose of this article is to sketch out a theory of the effect of co-operation and competition upon small (face-to-face) group functioning.

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Basic Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. (a) Individuals who are exposed to the co-operative social situation (*Indiv co-op*) will perceive themselves to be more promotively interdependent (in relation to the other individuals composing their group)

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[2] Thus Elton Mayo (see Reference 16) has written, "It is not the atomic bomb that will destroy civilization. But civilized society can destroy itself—finally, no doubt, with bombs—if it fails to understand and to control intelligently the aids and deterrents to co-operation."

Morton Deutsch, "A Theory of Co-operation and Competition," Human Relations, *Vol. 2, No. 2 (London: Tavistock Publications, 1949), pp. 129–152. Reprinted by permission. Footnotes numbered as in original.*

with respect to goal, locomotions, facilitations, etc., than will individuals who are exposed to the competitive social situation (*Indiv comp*).

(b) Indiv comp will perceive themselves to be more contriently interdependent (in relation to the other individuals composing their group) with respect to goal, locomotions, facilitations, etc., than will *Indiv co-op*.

For convenience sake, let us direct our attention to the psychological implications of locomotion in the co-operative or competitive situation. Let us analyze the following hypothetical instance with respect to locomotion in the direction of the goal: "A" locomotes in the direction of his goal and the other individuals in the social situation perceive that "A" is locomoting:

1. *In the co-operative situation* "X" would (be likely to) perceive that he has locomoted towards his goal as a consequence of "A's" actions. Several implications seem directly to follow, if we accept certain additional psychological assumptions:

(a) Substitutability—Since "X" has locomoted towards his goal as a consequence of "A's" actions, there is no longer any necessity for "X" to perform any action which is similar (functionally identical) to "A's". We can derive that "A's" action will be substitutable for "X's" if we assume any one of the following: a principle of "Least Action," a principle of "Efficiency," or that the force in a direction of a region is zero when the person is in that region.

(b) Positive Cathexis—If we make an assumption, which is rather widely accepted, that an entity will acquire positive valence or cathexis (become attractive) if that entity is seen to be promotively related to need satisfaction—it is possible to derive that "A's" action (which results in locomotion in the direction of the goal) will be positively cathected by "X." That is, "X" is likely to accept, like, or reward "A's" action.

(c) Inducibility—The assumption here is a little more complex: Let us assume that the relationship of inducibility derives from the fact that the inducible person perceives the inducing entity to be such that it stands in a causative relationship to the intensification, continued persistence, or lowering of need tension within himself. Positive inducibility[11] occurs when the inducing entity is seen to be promotive rather than contrient with respect to tension-reduction (or when the inducing entity is seen as more powerful—i.e., capable of producing even more tension than the tension existing to be reduced).

Making the above assumption, one can derive that "X" will stand in the relationship of positive inducibility to "A" insofar as "A's" action contributes towards "X's" locomotion in the direction of his goal.

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[11] Positive inducibility is meant to include two related phenomena: (*a*) The production of additional "own" forces in the direction induced by the inducing entity; (*b*) The channelizing of existing "own" forces in the direction induced by the inducing entity.

2. *In the competitive situation* "Y" would (be likely to) perceive that his rivalry ratio with respect to "A" has decreased. The situation here is somewhat more complex than in co-operation. The amount of change in the rivalry ratio would depend upon the distances of both "A" and "Y" from their goals and also upon the distance locomoted by "A." Nevertheless several implications seem directly to follow, if we accept certain additional psychological assumptions (though, it may be that if the rivalry ratio is greater than a certain maximum, or lower than a certain minimum, a rivalry situation will no longer exist psychologically).

(a) Substitutability—It is evident that there will be no substitutability.

(b) Negative Cathexis—The assumption here is parallel to that made in deriving positive cathexis; an entity will acquire negative cathexis if that entity is seen to be contriently related to need satisfaction (therefore, is seen to decrease the probability of need satisfaction). The additional assumption here is that decreasing the rivalry ratio will be seen as decreasing the probability of success. (This additional assumption may only hold within minimum and maximum limits). From these assumptions it is possible to derive that "A's" locomotions in the direction of his goal will be negatively cathected by "Y."

(c) Negative Inducibility[12]—Assuming that negative inducibility occurs when the inducing entity is seen as contrient with respect to tension reduction, one can derive that "Y" will stand in the relationship of negative inducibility to "A" insofar as "A's" actions lead to locomotions by "A" which decrease "Y's" probability of reaching his goal. However, another factor, cognitive in nature, may come into play making "Y's" relation to B one of ambivalence or non-inducibility—the cognition that going in a direction opposite to or away from "A's" would be going in an opposite direction to or away from his own goal.

We can, with the same kinds of assumption, analyze a hypothetical instance in which "B" locomotes in a direction away from his goal. Without detailing the analysis, it is evident that in the co-operative situation, substitutability is not expected, but one would expect negative cathexis and negative inducibility. The competitive situation, again, is not so unequivocal as the co-operative situation. Here one would expect positive cathexis and ambivalent inducibility or non-inducibility.

Facilitations and Hinderings—One can make the same derivations that were made with respect to substitutability, cathexis, and inducibility for facilitations and hinderings, respectively, as those that were made for locomotions in the direction towards or away from the goal. Thus, it is possible to make statements about "helpfulness" and "obstructiveness"—defining "helpfulness" as the act of facilitating locomotion, and defining "obstructiveness" as the act of hindering locomotion.

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[12] Negative inducibility is meant to include two related phenomena: (*a*) the production of additional "own" forces; (*b*) channelizing of existing "own" forces in the direction opposite to that desired by the inducer.

In the *co-operative situation*, if "X" facilitates the locomotion of "A" in the direction of his goal, he also facilitates his own locomotion in the direction of this goal. Assuming that facilitation of locomotion makes locomotion more probable, it is evident that "X's" facilitations of others are likely to result in his own locomotion, and therefore, is also likely to result in tension-reduction with respect to that locomotion. His own actions of facilitation (*helpfulness*) will become positively cathected and will be likely to be manifested in appropriate situations (according to learning theory previously assumed). Using the same kind of analysis one can demonstrate that acts hindering locomotion in the direction of the goal (obstructiveness) will be negatively cathected and will be avoided. For "facilitations" and "hinderings" in a direction opposite to the goal, of course, the converse of the above statements would be true.

In the *competitive situation*, with respect to locomotions of others in the direction of the goal, "helpfulness" would become negatively cathected, "obstructiveness" positively cathected. The converse would be true for locomotion in a direction opposite to that of the goal.

Up to this point, we have made some statements about substitutability, cathexis, inducibility, and helpfulness in each of the two social situations, co-operation and competition, under each of two different circumstances—locomotions, etc., in the direction of the goal and in the direction opposite to the goal. In each of the situations, under different conditions, there is positive and negative cathexis, helpfulness and obstructiveness. To test the theory it is necessary to know which of the conditions are operating. The assumption will be made that under the experimental conditions set up to test the theory there will be more locomotions in the direction of the goal than in a direction away from the goal in both instances. From this assumption and the foregoing analysis it is possible to assert the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: There will be greater substitutability for similarly intended actions among *Indiv co-op* as contrasted with *Indiv comp*.

Hypothesis 3: There will be a larger percentage of actions by fellow members positively cathected by *Indiv co-op* than by *Indiv comp*.

Hypothesis 3a: There will be a larger percentage of actions by fellow members negatively cathected by *Indiv comp* than by *Indiv co-op*.

Hypothesis 4: There will be greater positive inducibility with respect to fellow members among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp*.

Hypothesis 4a: There will be greater internal (self) conflict among *Indiv comp* than among *Indiv co-op*.

Hypothesis 5: There will be more helpfulness towards each other among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

Hypothesis 5a: There will be more obstructiveness towards each other among *Indiv comp* than among *Indiv co-op.*

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. . . [An] attempt will be made to apply some of the psychological implications of the hypotheses derived in the preceding section to the functioning of small face-to-face groups. To draw out these implications for group functioning, additional assumptions will be necessary; these assumptions will be stated when recognized and when feasible. The aspects of group functioning to be considered will for convenience sake be arbitrarily grouped under the following headings: (*a*) Organization, (*b*) Motivation, (*c*) Communication, (*d*) Orientation, (*e*) Productivity, (*f*) Interpersonal Relations, and (*g*) Individual Behavior. No attempt will be made to exhaust the implications to be drawn with respect to these aspects of group functioning. . . .

(a) Organization

Several different aspects of "organization" appear to be relevant to the differences between co-operation and competition: (i) Interdependence; (ii) Homogeneity of Sub-Units; (iii) Specialization of Function; (iv) Stability of Organization; (v) Situational Flexibility of Organization.

(i) *Interdependence*—From Hypothesis 4 (re positive inducibility), it seems evident that one would expect greater co-ordination of effort, as well as more frequent interrelationship of activity, among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

Hypothesis 6. At any given time there will be more co-operation of efforts (working together, interrelation of activities) among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

Hypothesis 6a. Over a period of time, there will be more frequent co-ordination of efforts among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

(ii) *Homogeneity*—If we assume that the individuals composing the various groups, in both the co-operative and competitive situation, differ from one another with respect to ability or personal inclinations to contribute, etc., it is possible from the substitutability hypothesis (Hyp. 2) to derive:

Hypothesis 7. There will be more homogeneity with respect to amount of contributions or participations among *Indiv comp* than among *Indiv co-op.*

The above hypothesis follows from the consideration that the contribution of an *Indiv co-op* can be a substitute for similarly intended contributions by another *Indiv co-op;* this does not hold for *Indiv comp.* In the co-operative situation, if any individual has ability and contributes, there is less of a need for another individual to contribute—this factor is likely to produce heterogeneity in amount of contributions.

(iii) *Specialization of Function*—Making the same kinds of assumptions as above plus the additional ones that the individuals compromising the various groups differ in respect to ability and/or interest in performing the various functions (e.g.—"orienting," "elaborating," "co-ordinating," etc.), necessary for successful task completion (and are aware of these differences in aptitude or interest) it is possible to derive, from the substitutability hypothesis, the following:

Hypothesis 8. There will be greater specialization of function (i.e.—different individuals fulfilling different functions) among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

If we assume some time or achievement pressure, from the substitutability hypothesis it is also possible to derive:

Hypothesis 9. There will be greater specialization with respect to content or activity (i.e.—different individuals taking different aspects of the task and working on them simultaneously) among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

The structure of certain kinds of tasks make it extremely difficult for this type of specialization to take place. So that one would expect fewer differences between *Indiv co-op* and *Indiv comp* on some tasks and more on others.

(iv) and (v) *Stability and Situational Flexibility of Organization*—

If specialization of function occurs, and we assume that expectations are established as a result of this specialization and that these expectations act as a determinant of behavior, we would expect:

Hypothesis 10. There would be greater structural stability (from like situation to like situation) with respect to functions assumed among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.* This difference should increase with time.

From the lack of substitutability among *Indiv comp* one can derive a rigidity, each individual always trying to fulfil all the functions. Stability of structure among *Indiv co-op* may result in some perseverance but there does not seem to be any reason to equate rigidity and stability.

Hypothesis 11. In the face of changing circumstance, more organizational flexibility (change of rules to adapt to circumstance) will be manifested among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

(b) Motivation

There are three things to consider when making a force analysis: (i) direction of the force; (ii) strength of the force; and (iii) point of application of the force.

(i) *Direction of the Force*—From the hypothesis about positive inducibility it can be expected that:

Hypothesis 12. The direction of the forces operating on *Indiv co-op* would be more similar than the direction of the forces operating on *Indiv comp.*

This being the case, other things being equal, one would expect more rapid locomotions—i.e., more rapid decisions and reaching of agreements by co-operative groups. Another point to be considered here is that of the frame of reference with respect to locomotion in the co-operative and competitive situations. In the competitive situation the individual is oriented to locomotions relative to the locomotions of the other individuals with whom he is competing (the rivalry ratio); in the co-operative situation meaningful locomotion units are defined in relation to task completion. If this is the case it can be expected that:

Hypothesis 13. The directions of the forces operating on *Indiv co-op* would be more toward task closure than would be the directions of the forces operating on *Indiv comp*—i.e., there is more achievement pressure on the *Indiv co-op.*

(ii) *Point of Application of the Force*—From the hypothesis of positive inducibility we can assert that a force on any *Indiv co-op* is likely to be paralleled by a force on other *Indiv co-op.* This, if we define *group motivation* as some complex function of the strength of forces that operate simultaneously on all individuals as a function of their interrelationship with respect of positive inducibility, it follows that:

Hypothesis 14. The group force in the direction of the goal in a co-operative group will be stronger than such a group force in a competitive group. This hypothesis has somewhat the same operational significance as hypotheses 12 and 13.

(iii) *Strength of Force*—From positive inducibility we would expect more additional own forces to be induced on the *Indiv co-op* once he is exposed to induction by other members; in the competitive situation due to combined negative and positive induction one would also expect the production of more own forces. If to the concept of the sum of the strength of forces operating on an individual we co-ordinate "interest" or "involvement," there does not seem to be any clear-cut rationale for predicting differences between the situations.

Hypothesis 15. There will not be a significant difference in the total strength of the forces (interest, involvement) operating on the *Indiv co-op* and *Indiv comp* in their respective situations[13] (making the assumptions that situationally irrelevant ego-systems do not become involved).

(c) Communication

The term "communication," in its widest sense, is used to cover any instance of the establishment of a commonage, that is, the making common of some property to a number of things. For the present purpose, we will follow Morris (19) and limit the word "communication" to mean "the arousing of common significata through the production of signs"; the establishment of a commonage other than that of signification, whether it be by signs or other means, again following Morris' usage, will be called "communization." From the communicator's point of view, communication may be considered a special case of exerted positive induction—i.e., the use of signs to induce in the communicatee sign-behavior similar to that of the communicator. Normally, for the communicator, the process of communication stands in a means relationship to some such purpose as informing, persuading, or being expressive of one's self.

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[13] It may be argued that in our culture a competitive situation evokes more basic motives and would thus result in more ego involvement. This may well be true. However, in the present experimental situation, the co-operative groups were in a position of inter-group competition, thus possibly eliminating differential ego-involvement.

There are three principal elements to the definition of communication: (i) "The production of signs," (ii) "the arousing of," (iii) "common significata". Let us see what implications our basic hypotheses have for these different aspects of the communication process.

(i) *"The Production of Signs"*—If we assume that in certain kinds of tasks (notably, tasks in which there are no clearly discernible "objective" criteria of locomotion—i.e., tasks in which the group itself provides the criteria for judging locomotion) the production of signs can be perceived as a means of locomotion, it is possible to make certain derivations (with additional assumptions) about the quantity of such production in the co-operative and competitive situations. First, it should be made clear that the production of signs by an individual within a group can be made with or without the intent to communicate to the other individuals in the group. Thus, an individual can produce signs under the assumption that "talking" is a means of locomoting, or an individual may produce signs with the intent of communicating with some one outside the group (for example, a "judge" or "observer").

From the substitutability hypothesis and the additional assumptions that: (*a*) it is perceived that locomotion takes place either through the utterance of many good ideas (i.e., the production of many signs that will be evaluated highly) or through the frequent persuasion or informing of others via communication; (*b*) quantitative efforts do not seriously interfere with qualitative efforts or that, if they do, quantity is seen to be as or more important than quality: and (*c*) the time space available per unit of time allows for more production of signs than are necessary for optimal, solution of any problem—it is possible to derive:

Hypothesis 16. When the task-structure is such that production in quantity of observable signs is perceived to be a means for locomotion, there will be a greater total of signs produced per unit of time by the *Indiv comp* than by the *Indiv co-op*.

From the hypothesis about the co-ordination of effort (Hyp. 6 and 6a) in tasks one would expect that:

Hypothesis 17. When the task structure is such that locomotion is possible without the production of observable signs, there will be a greater total production of such signs per unit time by the *Indiv co-op* than by the *Indiv comp.*

(ii) *"The arousing of"*—If from the communicator's point of view, communication can be considered a locomotion or a means of locomotion, the state of receptivity (i.e., the readiness to be aroused) in the communicatee stands in a potential relation of facilitating or hindering the locomotions of the communicator. From the hypotheses re helpfulness and obstructiveness (Hyp. 5 and 5a), it can be derived that:

Hypothesis 18. There will be less attentiveness (readiness to be aroused to each other's production of signs among *Indiv comp* than among *Indiv co-op.*

(iii) *"Common Significata"*—If one assumes that attentiveness is a condition for the arousing of common significata, it follows:

Hypothesis 19. The production of signs by *Indiv comp* will less frequently result in common significata among other *Indiv comp* than will be the case for the production of signs by *Indiv co-op.*

Even when attentiveness is present, there seems to be reason to believe that there is greater likelihood of distortion by communicatees in the competitive situation. This is a consequence of the fact that in the competitive situation, locomotion is likely to be perceived in terms of its effect on relative position (the rivalry ratio); in the co-operative situation the locomotion of any individual is likely to be perceived as resulting in the locomotion of the others. The consequence of this difference is that the expressive characteristics of the production of signs are likely to be more significant to *Indiv comp.* A sign is expressive if the fact of its production is itself a sign to its interpreter of something about the producer of a sign. Tolman's concept of sign-magic (doing to the sign what the organism is predisposed to do to the significata of that sign) combined with his concept of sign-gestalt (25) helps to explain why it is likely that:

Hypothesis 20. There will be more lack of common signification, even when attentiveness is optimal, among *Indiv comp* than among *Indiv co-op.*

From the hypothesis with respect to positive inducibility it follows directly that:

Hypothesis 21. There will be more common appraisals (mutual agreements and acceptances) of communications by communicators and communicatees among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

(d) Orientation

There are several aspects of orientation: (i) Orientation of members to each other; (ii) Commonality of perceptions of goal, position, direction to goal, and steps in the path to the goal.

(i) *Orientation of Members to Each Other*—The question here is: How well do the members know each other's opinions, values, aptitudes, etc.? From the hypothesis with respect to communication, one can assert (a qualification must be added with respect to the *Indiv co-op* who communicate little, as per heterogeneity hypothesis) that:

Hypothesis 22. The *Indiv co-op* will have more knowledge about its active members than will the *Indiv comp.*

(ii) *Commonality of Perception*—We will define group orientation to exist to the extent that there is commonality of perception among the members. Group orientation can be assessed in relation to goals, position at a given time, direction to goal, or steps in path to the goal. From the communication hypothesis and from the hypothesis of positive inducibility one can derive that:

Hypothesis 23. There will be more group orientation among the *Indiv co-op* than among the *Indiv comp.*

(e) Group Productivity

There are various possibilities of defining "group productivity." One could define it in terms of motivation reduction of the members, in terms of the entity produced, in terms of a group's realization of its potential, etc. For present purposes we shall consider group productivity in terms of the entity produced by the group, and, in terms of the learning of the individuals composing the groups.

From the hypothesis with respect to strength of group motivation (Hyp. 14), assuming that, other things being equal, locomotion will proceed more rapidly the stronger the motivation, one can derive that:

Hypothesis 24. The *Indiv co-op* (as a group) will produce more per unit of time than will the *Indiv comp* (as a group).

Hypothesis 24a. It will take less time for the *Indiv co-op* (as a group) to produce what the *Indiv comp* (as a group) produces.

If we assume that any or all of the following are negatively related to group productivity (in respect to quality of product): lack of co-ordination, communication difficulties, persisting internal conflict, lack of group orientation, we can derive that:

Hypothesis 25. The qualitative productivity of the *Indiv co-op* (as a group) will be higher than that of *Indiv comp* (as a group).

From the hypotheses about communication and the hypotheses with respect to positive inducibility, with the additional assumption that the individuals composing the various groups have information and a background of experience that could benefit the other individuals, it is possible to derive that:

Hypothesis 26. The *Indiv co-op* will learn more from each other than will the *Indiv comp.* (The more knowledgeable and experienced of the *Indiv co-op* would, of course, learn less than the not so well-informed *Indiv co-op*).

(f) Interpersonal Relations

There are various things to be considered here: (i) Valence of the actions of fellow members, of the group, of the situation, and the extent of the generalization of this property; (ii) The occurrence of group or individual functions; (iii) The perception of effect on others; (iv) The incorporation of the attitude of the generalized other.

(i) *Valence or Cathexis of the actions of fellow members, etc.*—From the hypotheses with respect to cathexis (Hyp. 3 and 3a) we expect the actions of fellow members to be more positively cathected among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.* We would also expect the perceived source of these actions to acquire, to some extent, a cathexis similar to that held with respect to the actions.

Hypothesis 27. There will be more friendliness among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

The extent of generalization of the cathexis will be a function of the centrality for the person of the goals he has involved in the situation of co-operation or competition. Thus, if the situation is important to the person, we would expect his perceptions of the personalities of other members to be affected by the cathexis[14], we would also expect the friendliness or lack of it to generalize to other situations, etc.

Just as Hyp. 27 follows from the original cathexis hypothesis, it seems likely that the cathexis will be generalized to the products of the joint actions of fellow members and oneself—i.e., the group products.

Hypothesis 28. The group products will be evaluated more highly by *Indiv co-op* than by *Indiv comp.*

(ii) *The Occurrence of Group or Individual Functions*—If we define as "group functions" any actions which are intended to increase the solidarity of the group, or to maintain and regulate the group so that it functions "smoothly" and assert that "group functions" are seen to be "helpful" (i.e.—facilitate locomotion) it follows from the "helpfulness" hypothesis (Hyp. 5a) that:

Hypothesis 29. There will be a greater percentage of group functions among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp.*

If we define "individual functions" to include any actions of the individual which are not immediately directed toward task solution and which are not "group functions" (i.e., actions which are obstructive, blocking, aggressive, or self-defensive, etc., are "individual functions") it follows from the "obstructiveness" hypothesis (Hyp. 5a) that:

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[14] See F. Heider [4].

Hypothesis 30. There will be a greater percentage of individual functions among *Indiv comp* than among *Indiv co-op*.

(iii) *The Perception of Effect on Others*—There seem to be two questions here: (*a*) How realistic are the individual's perceptions of his effects on others? and (*b*) What kinds of effects are the individuals likely to have in the differing social situations?

From the communication hypothesis, it was developed (Hyp. 22) that over a period of time *Indiv co-op* should know more about the attitudes of (active) fellow members than is the case for *Indiv comp*. Using the same reasoning, and making the assumption that the communication difficulty with respect to this content is also greater for *Indiv comp*, it follows that:

Hypothesis 31. The perception of the attitudes of the others towards aspects of one's own functioning in the group, etc., by *Indiv co-op* should be more realistic than such perceptions by *Indiv comp*.

From the inducibility hypothesis, it also follows that:

Hypothesis 32. The attitudes of any individual with respect to his own functioning should be more similar to the attitudes of the others with respect to his functioning among *Indiv co-op* than among *Indiv comp*.

From Hyp. 31 and the cathexis hypothesis we can derive that *Indiv co-op* will tend to perceive that they have a favorable effect on the others in the group. If we make the assumption of "autistic hostility" (20)—that is, that hostile impulses under conditions of reduced communication tend to create the expectation of counter-hostility, we can demonstrate that:

Hypothesis 33. Indiv co-op will perceive themselves as having more favorable effects on fellow-members than will *Indiv comp*.

(iv) *The Incorporation of the Attitude of the "Generalized Other"*[15]—The term "attitude of the generalized other" refers to an internalized structure which is developed as a result of introjecting the mutually interacting attitudes of those with whom one is commonly engaged in a social process. From our preceding development it is clear that the development of the "attitude of the generalized other" requires communication and positive inducibility. It follows then, that:

Hypothesis 34. Incorporation of the attitude of the generalized other will occur to a greater extent in *Indiv co-op* than in *Indiv comp*.

The operational implications of the preceding hypothesis are similar to those of the co-ordination and orientation hypothesis. It has further implications in terms of group development which will not be drawn here. For present purposes, the "feeling of responsibility" to other members will be taken as an operational definition of the degree of internalized attitude of the generalized other.

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[15] The concept of "generalized other" plays a crucial role in the social psychology of G. H. Mead (17).

(g) Individual Behavior

No attempt will be made in this study to derive how individuals with certain personality characteristics will behave nor what the reactions of other individuals to such behavior will be in the two different types of situation—co-operation and competition. Suffice it to say, that it is evident that one would expect more behavioral homogeneity in competitive situations than in co-operative situations. It is also apparent that the reactions of others to a "stupid" individual (one who hinders locomotion or locomotes in the wrong direction) or to a "bright" individual will vary significantly from one situation to another.

(h) The Course of Development with Time

From our theory one would predict quite different developments in successful and unsuccessful co-operative groups. Similarly, important developmental differences would occur in competitive situations in which reward over a period of time was all accumulated by one individual as compared with competitive situations in which over a period of time different individuals were rewarded. The derivation of these predictions will not be attempted in this article.

Section C

The Concept of "Group"

In the introductory paragraphs of this article it was suggested that a linkage existed between the conceptualization of the co-operative situation and the concept of group and that this linkage provided the possibility for the derivation and empirical testing of group hypotheses. The task of this section will be to clarify the nature of the linkage and to define some group concepts. As a brief introduction, let us consider the questions: (i) "In what sense, if any, do groups exist?"; (ii) "What are some of the existing formulations with respect to groups?"

(a) In What Sense, if any, Do Groups Exist?

Kurt Lewin (8) has emphasized the importance of the belief in the "existence" of something as a psychological prerequisite for the scientist's interest in that something as an object for scientific investigation. He suggests that "the taboo against believing in the existence of a social entity is probably most effectively broken by handling this entity experimentally." The pioneering works of Lippitt (11) and French (3) have done much to shatter the scientific belief that groups do not exist—the belief, therefore, that the concept of "group" has no empirical reference.

The resistance to the acceptance of the belief in the "reality" of groups stems largely from what Whitehead (27) has called "The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness." The very words used in phrasing the question "In what *Sense* . . ." implied the acceptance of the fallacy that for anything to be real it must have "simple location" in physical space-time. It is clear that many groups do not have the property of simple location; that is, one cannot answer the question "Where?" in terms of a physical space. The lack of physical *locus* for a group has confused many people and has led them to react to the concept of group as though it could have no meaningful empirical co-ordinates. Yet it should be clear that many of these same people have unwittingly accepted concepts such as "the person" which a more than superficial analysis would reveal have no simple locations, fallaciously concretizing concepts which are quite "abstract."

Another related source of resistance to the acceptance of the "reality" of groups, has been the argument that we cannot scientifically speak of a group as deciding and acting, since it is the individuals that compose the group that decide and act. Child (2) has, in answer to such argument, pointed out that the same kind of objection could be raised with respect to considering the individual as a unit; it too is composed of sub-units, which in turn are composed of sub-units, etc. It is clear that this argument has to do with the size of unit that is most fruitful in the investigation of any scientific problem. This is a problem in the pragmatics of science. It is believed that the concept of "group" will have the same value for the study of social phenomena that the concept of the "individual" has had for the study of psychological phenomena (12). It is further believed that the concepts "individual" and "group" have two crucial similar attributes—the idea of organization or patterning of its sub-parts and the idea of motivation; organization being established in the course of purposeful striving in relation to the environment (23).

To sum up, the answer to the question "In what sense, if any, do groups exist?" is simply that groups exist as concepts that have empirical references. Their usefulness as concepts depend in part on the nature of the relationship of the concept "group" to other concepts and in part on the nature of the empirical co-ordinations.

(b) What are some of the Existing Formulations with respect to Groups?

No attempt will be made here to make a thorough census of formulations with respect to groups. Wilson (28) has recently attempted such a summary of sociological formulations. From this summary it is apparent that the group concept is pivotal in the thinking of many sociologists. The works of such sociologists as Durkheim ("The Division of Labor"), Simmel (the effect of size upon group organization, interaction processes, etc.), Von Weise (a classificatory approach to groups), Cooley ("Social Process" and "Social Organization"), Brown ("Social Groups"), and Coyle ("Social Process in

Organized Groups") have much to offer in the way of fruitful hypotheses for experimental research. Wilson, however, summarized his survey by asserting that there exists "a prevailing ambiguity of conceptualization and classification with reference to the group in the whole field of sociology."

Yet if we look carefully at the definitions used by sociologists we find a common core, based on the idea of "interaction." (Some sociologists use the word "group" to include also "categories" based on similarities, "aggregates" based on proximity, as well as "groups" based upon "psychic" interaction). In most usages it is not made explicit whether interaction is defined in terms of an objective, social interdependence or a psychological interdependence. In addition to the criterion of interaction some sociologists, e.g., Znaniecki (29) and Newstetter (21), have stated that the concept of group includes "a feeling of identification," or "realization of a selective bond." Sociologists have, in considering the relationship of the individual and the group, tended to emphasize the incompleteness of the individual without the group (Durkheim's concept of "anomie").

Koffka (6) makes a distinction between "sociological" (geographical) groups and "psychological" (behavioral) groups. He asserts that *sociological groups* are "gestalts" and as gestalts they have characteristics which are somewhat distinctive. In the first place the "strength" of the gestalt (the degree of interdependence) may differ over an enormously wide range; secondly, the individuals composing the group are not completely determined by the group. The reality of the *psychological group* is expressed in the pronoun "we," "we" implying here the feeling of unity in joint action. As used by Koffka the phrase "psychological group" refers to an individual life space, the phrase "sociological group" refers to a group space. He asserts that a sociological group of *n* members presupposes *n* psychological groups. Koffka has many stimulating suggestions to offer with respect to the conditions of group formation, group structure, and with respect to the relation of the individual to the group.

French states two criteria for the existence of a group: inter-dependence and identification. He defines "identification conceptually in terms of two dynamic factors: (*a*) belonging to the group has, for its members, a positive valence, (*b*) compared to the non-members, the members accept to a greater degree the forces induced by the group" (3, p. 275). Interdependence is the basic criterion; not all psychological groups presuppose identification.

One of the most stimulating contributions to the theory of groups and organization is presented in Barnard's "The Functions of the Executive" (1). This work, which must be considered a "basic work" in this field, is too pregnant with ideas to permit any concise summary. He suggests that the word "group" is most appropriately applied to the relationship of co-operation, which is a system of interactions. He also points out, as Koffka has done, (but in rather different terminology) that: (1) the group or organization as a system has properties independently of the persons composing the group; (ii) the persons composing a group possess some characteristics which may not be pertinent to the group and the group, of course, does not completely determine the person. In effect, Barnard uses the term "member" to apply to the group relevant aspects of the person. Any person may have many different memberships.

He asserts "an organization comes into being when (i) there are persons able to communicate with each other, (ii) who are willing to contribute action (iii) to accomplish a common purpose. These elements are necessary and sufficient conditions initially . . . For the continued existence either effectiveness or efficiency is necessary" (1, p. 82). That is, an organization cannot persist unless the individuals obtain more satisfaction than discomfort in the course of directly obtaining the specific objectives of the organization or unless they do it indirectly.

The conceptualization to be offered below, though not influenced by Barnard, is in many respects similar to his.

(c) A Proposed Formulation: Basic definitions:

1. A sociological group[16] exists (has unity) to the extent that the individuals or sub-units composing it are pursuing promotively interdependent goals.

2. A psychological group[16] exists (has unity) to the extent that the individuals composing it perceive themselves as pursuing promotively interdependent goals.

3. A psychological group has cohesiveness as a direct function of the strength of goals perceived to be promotively interdependent and of the degree of perceived interdependence.

The following definitions are reformulations of the above definitions from the point of view of membership.

1a. Individuals or sub-units belong in a sociological group to the extent that they are pursuing promotively interdependent goals.

2a. Individuals or sub-units possess membership in a psychological group to the extent that they perceive themselves as pursuing promotively interdependent goals.

3a. Individuals or sub-units possess membership motive in a psychological group as a direct function of the strength of goals perceived to be promotively interdependent and of the degree of perceived interdependence.

The conceptualization of the co-operative situation . . . is, of course, identical with the definition of the sociological group. It follows that if

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[16] It should be noted that these terms are not being used as Koffka has used them.

Indiv co-op and *Indiv comp* are equated in other respects, *Indiv co-op* will possess more unity as a sociological group than will *Indiv comp*. From the logical and psychological consideration advanced in the preceding sections it would also follow that the *Indiv co-op* will possess more unity as a psychological group than will the *Indiv comp*. Since all the hypotheses in the preceding sections were relative statements, based on the assumption that the *Indiv co-op* and *Indiv comp* were equated in other respects, it is possible to substitute for *"Indiv co-op"* the phrase "a psychological group with greater unity," and to substitute for *"Indiv comp"* the phrase, "a psychological group with lesser unity."

Thus, in effect, through creation of a co-operative and a competitive situation it becomes possible to test empirically the effect of variation in degree of unity or strength of membership motive of a psychological group upon the functioning of groups.

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Reducing Racial Tensions

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

What is a race? Scientifically it is a group of people possessing a distinctive line of biological characteristics. But the cultural anthropologists who are studying the various peoples of the world today cannot find any large group of people which possess biological characteristics that no other group possesses. Hence the term *race* cannot be used scientifically except in some general way to refer to mankind.

Popularly speaking, a race is a group of people who have acquired cultural differences of a distinctive nature and who perhaps possess some more or less distinctive biological traits—which upon examination turn out to be superficial except as some opposing group makes them seem important. The biological differences may be illustrated by the variations in color of the skin, which are not even skin deep but only pigmentation deep, and which do not seem to bear any genetic connections with intellectual abilities or ability to serve the world efficiently.

The nature of race tensions is even more complicated than the nature of races. Race tension is a straining of human relationships that occurs (1) when a dominant ethnic group fears that some of its social values will be taken away from it by another ethnic group or (2) when a nondominant group feels that it is being treated unjustly in one or more particulars by the dominant group. When a dominant group develops fears as described and at the same time a nondominant group develops hatred on the basis of a sense of grave injustice, conditions are ripe for racial tensions to develop into riots.

The reduction of racial tensions depends on a great variety of factors. Only a few of these can be indicated here.

1. In a series of experiments conducted by Lewin, Lippitt, White, and others, the effects of group atmosphere upon the members of different group structures have been compared.[1] In one experimental group, called

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[1] Lippitt and White, "An Experimental Study of Leadership and Group Life," in Newcomb and Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947), pp. 315–30.

Emory S. Bogardus, "Reducing Racial Tensions," Sociology and Social Research, *Vol. 35, No. 1 (1950), pp. 50–57. Permission to reprint this material is given by the author and* Sociology and Social Research. *The beginning of this article is omitted. Footnotes numbered as in original.*

authoritarian, the decisions were made for the group members. In another group, called laissez faire, no decisions were made for the members, but they were allowed to do as they pleased as individuals. In a third group, called democratic, a plan was carried out where policies were developed by common decision, word was distributed by common agreement after discussion, performances of the members were measured by objective criteria, and distance between leader and the group was kept to a minimum. Of the various results obtained in these experiments one stands out, namely, "expressions of irritability and aggressiveness" toward fellow members occurred more frequently in the authoritarian and the laissez faire atmospheres than in the democratic atmosphere. In other words, these experiments seem to indicate that the authoritarian group atmosphere and the laissez faire group atmosphere are factors in arousing racial tensions and that a democratic group atmosphere keeps racial tension down. Hence all who would reduce racial tensions may redouble and treble their efforts in spreading and improving a democratic group atmosphere.

2. Racial tensions bear a direct relation not only to authoritarian and to laissez faire group atmospheres but also to the expression of perverse personality traits, such as fear and hate, and to traits which under provocation become perverse, such as an attitude for security that depends on unjust exercise of power, or ambition that becomes aggressiveness. The lack of personal control of the feelings and emotions under social excitation may stimulate and augment tense interracial situations. One aggravating display of behavior by some of the members of one ethnic group brings out the worst behavior of some of the members of another ethnic group and thus a vicious circle develops until a racial tension moves into a racial riot.

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3. Another factor in racial tensions is sometimes found in the overpopulation of a minority group living in an urban area that a dominant group has circumscribed by restrictive covenants and other procedures. Some newspapers carried reports on March 12, 1940, that race riots were imminent in Detroit and that all the law enforcement forces were being alerted to the dangers. An explanation of the extreme tension was the overcrowding of Negroes in certain circumscribed areas and their "spilling over" into adjoining areas where "neighborhood protective associations" of one type or another were determined to keep the Negroes out. In these overlapping areas, name-calling, vexatious signs, stone-throwing, fist-fighting, and perhaps shooting are components of a grave racial tension situation.

4. The reduction of racial tensions depends on the substitution of fair interracial practices for practices judged unfair by the nondominant group. The much-discussed unjust practices include discrimination against the nondominant group in employment procedures, second-class citizenship,

where members of a minority group (a) do not have the usual voting privileges and (b) are not accorded full legal protection, but are discriminated against in education, transportation, housing, eating, and social status.

While the reduction of racial tensions involves overcoming these discriminations and substituting fair employment practices, fair educational opportunities, and so forth, some people would eliminate these unfair practices by a single bound, but such a perfectionist procedure generally fails. It does not seem possible to jump from gross injustices to perfect human treatment except by the use of force that sometimes involves violence. But force and violence usually breed evils as serious as those they would overcome. Heaven is not reached at a single bound, and the reduction of racial tensions involves substituting fair play for discrimination, step by step.

5. The reduction of racial tensions involves an avoidance of racial stereotypes and an evaluation of people as individual human beings. Stereotypes are not only pictures in one's head, as Walter Lippmann once declared,[2] but they are generalizations based on partial observations or secondhand statements. They are reached by subjective snap judgments rather than by objective and reliable research. In studying Caucasian-Japanese tensions some years ago the writer met a Caucasian woman who asserted that all Japanese are liars. When she was asked how many Japanese she knew, she replied one. What had he done? He had left her employment without telling her that he was quitting. When he was located later, living with his family in another community, he was asked why he had left without notifying his employer, and he replied that he was homesick for his family, but that in Japan for a man to admit such homesickness would be considered a sign of unforgivable weakness. He did not want to manufacture a reason for leaving the Caucasian woman's employment and thus lie to his employer, and so he chose the third course that was open, namely, leaving without explaining. However, our Caucasian friend still insisted that all Japanese are liars, because she had had an unfavorable experience with one, and that was enough for her to stereotype adversely 70,000,000 people.

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6. Racial tensions cannot be reduced permanently unless other concomitant tensions, such as economic tensions, civic tensions, social status tensions, are reduced at the same time. In our Southern states not many years ago as many as 800 commissions on interracial cooperation were organized, composed in each case of both Caucasians and Negroes. About 200 of these commissions achieved tangible results in softening racial tensions, but the

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[2] Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), p. 30.

leaders began to come to the conclusion about 1940 that a permanent reduction of racial tensions would depend on the simultaneous reduction also of economic, civic, and social status tensions. Near the close of the War, in 1944, the general Commission of Interracial Co-operation gave way, except legally, to the new Southern Regional Council with headquarters in Atlanta, and with Professor Howard W. Odum, a sociologist from the University of North Carolina, as its first president. This Council designated all the Southern states as a single region for the purpose of improving simultaneously "the region's economic, civic, social, and racial conditions." The Council began a program of research and action to remold and to articulate public opinion through the radio, the press, speakers, and publications, not just in race relations but along all lines of human relationship together.

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7. Racial tensions may be reduced or prevented if members of a dominant group will cease "scapegoating" practices and instead place the blame for certain conflicts, not on some minority group that happens to be standing by, but where it may belong, namely, on themselves.[5] There are two subterfuges used by "scapegoaters." (1) When they are blocked in some enterprise they put the blame for their own failure upon an innocent bystanding group. When people accustomed to exercising power find themselves deprived of such exercise, they are likely to assume that because they have exercised power in the past they should continue to do so. (2) When people wish to sidetrack public attention from their own questionable doings, they may denounce some other group, usually one not in a position to defend itself. When they have successfully diverted public attention, they slip into office or carry on nefarious practices.

8. Legislation against unfair interracial practices is often urged, because public opinion is frequently unorganized and sometimes confused by misleading propaganda. Public opinion can be manipulated so many times in ways disastrous to nondominant groups.

Laws are important factors in making uniform the uneven exercise of social control through public opinion. They can bring a small number of shrewd persons to account who, under cover, carry on unfair practices. Laws tend to bring the reluctant few in line.

However, legislation is ineffective if not supported by a strong public opinion. A mere majority opinion may not be adequate, for sometimes a recalcitrant minority moved by strong emotions can defeat the will of a lethargic majority which settles back into a daily routine once it has expressed itself at the polls.

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[5] T. W. Adorno and others, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 233.

9. Education is perhaps the most important component in a program of reducing and preventing racial tensions. It begins in the home, kindergarten, and first grades in school. In a recent study of 250 children five to eight years of age, enrolled in kindergarten, the first and second grades, it was found that these children showed an awareness of racial and religious differences, that some had experienced hostile reactions already toward certain groups other than their own, and that their incipient attitudes seemed to reflect the patterns of group prejudice that function in the adult culture.[6] The study indicates a current inadequacy of the public schools and points to the need for definite intercultural programs for children.

Other studies show the need for universal adult education of parents regarding intercultural understanding, for the first transference of group prejudice to children occurs by way of parents, in the home, at the dinner table, and through the use of uncomplimentary name-calling.

A person wishing to reduce local racial tensions may be instrumental in helping to set up an appropriate educational program in some one community institution to which he belongs, for example, an intercultural workshop once a year in his church, or in some social club or fraternal organization of which he is a member. The number of meetings, the place and hours of meeting, the organizational setup, the persons in charge, and the resource persons from the community are procedures that may be decided upon to a large extent by those who apply and who are accepted as workshop members. The members ordinarily come together not only to discuss the different culture patterns represented in the given community, the origins of the differences in these patterns, and the nature of any so-called racial tensions, but also to participate in cooperative activities, such as cooperative recreation. In these discussions and activities ways of alleviating tensions come to the surface. The intercultural workshop functions to create cultural and ethnic understanding, to dispel unjustified distrust, and to eliminate or prevent racial tensions. As a result of participating in an intercultural workshop its members become a leaven in their local organizations; they become more understanding, appreciative, and cooperative in their minority group relationships; they acquire techniques for furthering the intercultural development of the persons whom they meet daily.[7]

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[6] Marian Radke, Helen G. Trager, and Hadassah Davis, "Social Perceptions and Attitudes of Children," *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 40:327–447, 1949.

[7] S. G. Cole, "The Intercultural Workshop," *Sociology and Social Research*, 30:476–83, 1946.

The Social Control of Aggression

JOHN PAUL SCOTT

Keeping harmful fighting down to a minimum is always a major problem in any human society. No matter what the cultural background may be, there are certain common human situations which lead to aggression. For example, sibling rivalry almost invariably occurs between children, and sexual jealousy is common among adults.

. . . different human societies have adopted different methods of cultural control over undesirable aggression, and we commonly think of this problem in terms of striving to control man's primitive animal instincts. However, we find that when we study other animals under natural conditions they seem to have little difficulty in controlling their aggressive urges. The members of any well-established social group tend to live in peace with each other and often seem to set a superior example for human beings. . . .

This suggests that the primitive animal methods for social control of aggression are highly effective and that we might make use of them as well as human cultural methods. There are two chief ways by which animal societies control aggression: the dominance order and the process of socialization.

The Dominance Hierarchy

This was first analyzed in flocks of hens by the Norwegian scientist Schjelderup-Ebbe (66). When two hens meet for the first time, they usually fight each other, and as a consequence one will win and the other lose. The next time they meet they fight again, but this time the losing hen gives up sooner. This goes on day after day, with the result that one hen forms a firm habit of threatening and the other of running away. The hen which pecks is said to be dominant and the other, which runs away or receives the peck, is subordinate. After a few trials there is relatively little aggressive activity. If a small amount of food is thrown down in a well-organized flock of hens,

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they all run after it but keep out of each other's way. Dominant hens threaten the subordinate ones which come close, but there is no real fighting.

Such a flock is organized in a dominance hierarchy. Since its original discovery, this phenomenon has been found in many different sorts of animals, both wild and domestic (15). On theoretical grounds we would expect that wherever animals fight and have sufficient learning ability and powers of discrimination to tell each other apart, a dominance order would be set up, and this seems to be the case.

This kind of social organization is relatively stable and permanent. Once a dominance-subordination relationship is established between two individuals, it will last for months and even years and is very difficult to modify. This is presumably due to the drastic and long-lasting emotional responses connected with fighting and avoidance. . . Animals can be moved up from the bottom of the dominance order by giving them long periods of rest followed by opportunities to fight and defeat weaker animals, but the retraining process is always difficult. Large size or an unusual amount of aggressiveness helps determine which animal wins the first fight, but once the dominance order is set up, it is very difficult to change by altering the relative strength of the pair. Beeman and Allee (8) deprived dominant mice of vitamin B_1 (which at one time was supposed to be a "morale vitamin" for human beings) and found that even when the winning mice were nearly dead of vitamin deprivation they were still able to frighten their subordinates.

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Dominance in Human Societies

Since the dominance order exists so widely in animals, it is logical to raise the question of whether or not a similar phenomenon exists in human beings. A typical dominance relationship is based on an initial fight and the subsequent formation of long-lasting habits resulting from the outcome of the struggle. Since human beings sometimes fight with each other and have tendencies toward habit formation, there is every reason to believe that dominance-subordination relationships comparable to those seen in animals can and do exist. However, we should be wary of assuming that dominance exists between every pair of human beings, particularly in situations where cultural training is involved. In a great many cases people meet each other for the first time without fighting and never do exhibit aggressive behavior, and there should be no dominance order between them.

Several psychological tests include "dominance scores," but these usually refer to a trait of being "masterful," which may involve aggressiveness but frequently does not. This so-called dominance may simply be a tendency to tell other people what to do. This is dominance in the original sense of the word as used between master and servant, but it is not comparable to the phenomenon seen in other animals. Dominance based on overt aggression may be involved, but the same effect can also be achieved by reward training.

On the other hand, there are cases of human behavior which can be interpreted pretty safely as a dominance order based on aggressiveness and habit formation. Children in nursery schools and on playgrounds are frequently aggressive toward each other. There is a strong tendency for the older and larger ones to push or strike the younger, who usually do not fight back and almost never initiate quarrels. Such dominance is frequently seen between brothers in families where overt aggression is allowed. A boy of fourteen and his younger brother are introduced to some girls, and both are considerably embarrassed. A few minutes later the older begins hitting and teasing his brother, who is considerably smaller and offers no resistance. This sort of behavior is extremely similar to that found in the dominance orders of lower animals.

The phenomenon of dominance probably enters into other human behavior but in rather subtle ways. It is possible that the practice of carrying and restraining babies and young children leads to habitual dominance without overt fighting, just as it does between the handlers and young puppies. If so, much of the peaceful behavior between older and younger people may be due to such "invisible" dominance orders.

Territorial Dominance

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Territory is by no means a universal phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and in human beings it is subject to a great deal of cultural modification. In primitive tribes land may not be owned by individuals or families, but there is usually a fairly well-defined line between the territory of one tribe and its neighbors, and trouble is avoided as long as no one crosses the line. Allowing for cultural differences, a well-organized system of territories is an important way of controlling human aggressive activity. The principle of territoriality is often used within social groups by building dwellings for individual families, and this practice is carried to extremes in civilized societies. When houses are combined into apartment buildings in large cities, the territorial system permits a tremendous concentration of numbers with relatively little aggression.

Socialization

. . . if a litter of house mice is raised together the males do not begin to fight each other at the age when they ordinarily begin to attack strangers and may live for many months in relative peace. The phenomenon is probably explained by passive inhibition. As young animals, mice can be stimulated to fight only with extreme difficulty. During this period they form a strong habit of not-fighting with their litter mates, and this is sufficient to overcome any accidental stimulation as they get older. Furthermore, by sleeping in the same nest they associate pleasurable sensations with the other mice, and this habit also tends to interfere with aggressiveness.

Socialization in Animals

The tendency for early social contacts of young animals to be peaceful turns out to be part of the general phenomenon of socialization (71). All social animals appear to have behavioral mechanisms whereby early in life each individual builds up positive social relationships within a certain group, and other mechanisms which prevent the formation of similar social relationships with other animals. The process of socialization has been studied extensively in dogs and compared with what happens in wolves. The young puppies are born in an immature state and at three weeks of age first become psychologically capable of forming social relationships based on learning and experience. At this time they are in close contact with their mother and litter mates, getting food from the mother and keeping warm by huddling with the other puppies. In this way positive social relationships are built up. At the same time the puppies begin to react very strongly against strangers, and without continued positive contact they build up strong habits of fearfulness and aggressiveness toward strange animals and people. In wolves, the young cubs are so fearful and aggressive that it is practically impossible to do much with them except at the very earliest period (about three weeks of age) when they can be tamed fairly easily. In dogs these tendencies have been modified by selection, so that it is possible for a human being to form a social relationship with a puppy during a much longer period.

The process of socialization differs a great deal in different animals but has essentially the same end result. In the case of sheep a newborn lamb will approach any adult sheep and try to nurse but is accepted only by its own mother. Other sheep butt it away, and it soon learns to stay with her. A lamb raised on a bottle will show no fear of people, but one raised in the normal flock soon learns fearful reactions from the other sheep and avoids close contact with people.

Socialization and Aggression in Human Societies

It is impossible to find out what the primitive methods of socialization in human beings might have been, but we can see some traces of positive and negative mechanisms in the development of the human infant. Up until five or six months of age a baby will accept any adult without fear. This is, of course, an easy age at which to adopt a child. A little later, babies begin to show fear of strangers and may cry when picked up by them (81). This tendency seems to last until at least two years of age and perhaps longer. If the tendency were allowed to develop, the child would learn to avoid everyone except members of its immediate family, and this occasionally happens with children who are raised under very isolated circumstances. For civilized living it is desirable that a child form other positive contacts. A child in this stage will do this readily provided it is given company and parental support. The mother takes the child to visit other people, and if she holds him and allows him to make most of the positive advances by himself, he will form at least moderately pleasant associations with them.

Assuming that he has not learned to avoid strangers, the child of three and older tends to indulge in considerable playful aggressiveness. In many children this is a standard method of getting acquainted with a new child. If unchecked or unsupervised it should theoretically lead to a dominance order based on fighting. From the viewpoint of the cultural ideal of our society, it is desirable that no strong relationships of dominance and subordination be built up between children. No one wants his child to be at the bottom of a dominance order and become the child who is always picked on. Considerable supervision is required if this is to be avoided. The watching adult should allow as much free play as possible, but step in when necessary to help encourage the group to take up constructive activities which lead away from serious aggression. At the same time the supervising parent or teacher should remember that it is not psychologically desirable to repress all aggression. Rough games and playful wrestling do no harm so long as the contestants are reasonably evenly matched and neither one gets badly hurt.

As children approach the age of eight or so, boys in particular have an increased tendency to form play groups or gangs. This means that a child is increasingly likely either to take part in group aggression or to become its victim. This is a good period in which to give some instruction on the techniques of handling the problems of aggression, for by this time children are capable of understanding a great deal, and still listen respectfully to their elders. Here again care should be taken that aggression is not completely suppressed but guided into harmless or possibly useful channels. Part of the desire for group activity can be satisfied by clubs such as those provided by Cub Scouts and Brownies. Combats between groups can be guided into games, although most children of this age prefer imaginative "war games" to athletic contests with more rigid rules. This is also the age when harmful aggression first acquires considerable social importance, and the child who goes too far may be labeled a "juvenile delinquent."

Studies of juvenile misbehavior (31) indicate that it is important during this age for the parents to keep track of what the child is doing. He does not need to be under constant control of an adult but if left completely unsupervised is almost certain to think of ways of getting into trouble. Group activities which lead to some sort of danger or aggressiveness are the common experience of boys of this age.

During adolescence, the amount of aggressiveness exhibited by boys is almost undoubtedly increased by the greater activity of the male hormone. Boys become more active and easily stimulated in a variety of ways including aggression. In our own culture the traditional method for handling this problem is the athletic contest, and the method works reasonably well where it can be generally employed. Unfortunately, a large proportion of boys are eliminated from such contests by athletic programs emphasizing a single team for the grade or school.

In general, the primitive types of socialization found in animal societies are effective in building peaceful relationships within a relatively small group of individuals. In human groups, and particularly in large civilized societies, it is desirable that children form peaceful social relationships with large numbers of people. Our society has developed cultural modifications of the process of socialization which are at least moderately effective in reaching this end, but a considerably more effective job can be done by applying some of the newer scientific principles. There are some ways, however, in which neither our traditional nor modern methods of socialization are completely satisfactory, and this is particularly true of methods of controlling group aggression.

Cultural Outlets for Group Aggression

As we have seen, dominance organization and the process of socialization are effective and reasonably satisfactory ways of controlling overt aggression between individuals, and these basic psychological methods are well integrated with our customs and culture. Group aggression is a more difficult problem, and territorial dominance is the only type of social control mentioned above which has much effect upon it. Other methods exist, some of which are partially satisfactory. Most of them attempt to control and channel group aggression into relatively harmless activities.

The Initiation Rite

Initiation ceremonies are found in many primitive human societies as well as in highly civilized communities, not excepting the more highly educated portion of our own society. The problem of college hazing is a perennial one for deans and presidents, and in some cases has led to the suppression of the fraternities and other organizations which fostered it.

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From a psychological viewpoint the important thing about the initiation ceremony is that it is preceded by a period in which aggression against the initiate is licensed to all members of the group. The candidate is not supposed to fight back but to endure it and show how brave he is. Punishment is supposedly meted out for infraction of the rules of the organization, and in this way the initiate is trained to act like the other members of the group.

... the entrance of a new individual into a group tends to be a frustrating experience for the members, and the disturbed emotional reaction of the newcomer further stimulates them to aggression. The initiation ceremonies have the effect of releasing this aggression in a socially regulated way which is presumably less harmful than if the group is completely unrestrained by custom. Another effect is to set up a strict dominance order in which the initiate is subordinate to all the older members.

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We may conclude that these ceremonies often do no particular harm and may actually produce considerable emotional satisfaction for both parties if they are applied with good judgment and under strict limitations. But at its best this traditional method is not perfectly satisfactory, and we badly need some new methods for taking care of the problem of controlling aggression where strangers enter a group. An ideal method should be reasonably safe and enjoyable, should not require continual enforcement by outside authority, and should leave room for individual differences in behavior.

The "Peace Army"

One of the regular outlets for intergroup aggression recognized by our culture is group athletics, and we have many games which fulfil this purpose. We have invented football, baseball, and basketball, and have adopted the even rougher sport of lacrosse from the Indians. In the northern part of the United States and in Canada, ice hockey is the culturally favored outlet.

These games have great emotional satisfaction for the players. Spectators are often able to identify with them and release a great deal of aggression, both verbally and in imagination. However, such vicarious outlets are much less rewarding than overt aggression, and the majority of young people have to lead less satisfactory lives than the players in regard to the release of aggressive feelings.

Aggression is always enjoyable when one is the winner or stands at the top of the dominance order, and it is doubly enjoyable when combined with group activity. It is also a great deal safer for the individual who is part of a group. The psychologist William James (40) recognized these facts many years ago and in his essay "The Moral Equivalent of War" suggested that young men be given the opportunity to find substitutes for group aggression. His idea was the formation of a "peace army," which could be used to build public works, to fight disease and poverty, and to assist in public calamities, such as forest fires and hurricanes. Very few young people would enjoy themselves in a world from which all danger had been removed and all aggression suppressed. There is an age from about fifteen to twenty-five when people enjoy living dangerously, as the auto accident rate among young drivers testifies.

Certain service organizations have adopted William James's idea on a limited scale, but perhaps its most extensive trial was given by the Civilian Conservation Corps, created to provide employment for young men during the depression of the 1930's. For several years the members of the CCC built roads and created camp grounds in the state and national parks, at the same time having considerable opportunity for adventure and outdoor living. As far as the author is aware, no complete scientific evaluation of its effect on aggression was ever made. When the United States became involved in World War II the Civilian Conservation Corps was abandoned.

An interesting fact emerged from the war itself; that with the vast majority of young men enrolled in the Army and Navy the domestic crime rate decreased markedly. The idea of channeling group aggression into constructive but moderately dangerous group activity appears to be one which is soundly based on scientific principles and one which fits in well with our type of culture. The "peace army" deserves a more general and prolonged trial in a form adapted to present circumstances. There is now a large standing army in the United States and every likelihood that we will have to maintain a substantial armed force for many years to come. Although history is full of examples of the dangers which militarization brings to democracy and individual liberty, there is a real opportunity to counteract some of these dangers by using our armed forces for constructive activities in addition to the necessary military maneuvers. This would be valuable even from a military viewpoint, since one of the curses of peacetime military service is low morale and an inevitable feeling of idleness and uselessness. Soldiers could be used to explore and bring back information about little-known parts of the world and even outer space, to build public works, to experiment with group psychology and leadership, and to learn more about the effects of stress and strain upon the human body. To some extent this is already being done, but it could be given a great deal more emphasis. In this way service in a "peacetime army" could become a more honorable occupation, a means to control individual and group aggression, and an example of constructive activity for the rest of the world.

The Control of Warfare

In the cultures of the past, war has often held an honored place as an outlet for aggression, but it has now become so much more destructive and dangerous that the chief problem of modern civilization is to try to stop it. We have considerable knowledge about the regulation and control of individual aggression, but we should not assume that these simple principles can be easily applied to the problem of controlling warfare. Aggression might be brought completely under control within one human society, but this is of no help if the neighboring society starts a war. The essential problem of preventing war is one of controlling all human societies, or at least of controlling key individuals within them. While the simple psychological and biological principles stated here may be of some help, it is very difficult to see how they can be easily applied to a whole society. As stated before, a major portion of scientific effort still needs to be centered on this problem.

Part of the difficulty lies in social organization. Where human societies are organized for the purpose of carrying on war (and there are few which are not), there is always the danger that war will occur. Universal changes both in organization and in cultural ideals must take place in all important human societies before real progress can be made. The present situation, with the majority of civilized societies organized and capable of war, is a dangerous one. This situation is only hopeful in that all the major powers are now committed to the ideal of international peace. There is no important country in which warfare is being preached as a desirable way of life as it was in Nazi Germany. On the other hand, two of the major powers are committed to the ideal of warfare within a society and are preaching the ideal of revolution. The situation is dangerous, but, as was stated long ago, civilization can be considered a race between knowledge and destruction. The moral is obvious for those of us who are in a position to make contributions to knowledge.

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The Integrative Functions of Conflict

ROBERT C. NORTH, HOWARD E. KOCH, JR., and
DINA A. ZINNES

Human groups and associations of all sorts—from the family, clique, clan, and tribe to the largest religious organizations and states—are often in conflict (19, p. 289; 22, p. 56). The assumption is not uncommon, indeed, that "peace within and conflict without" are essential characteristics of group life. Closer examination suggests, however, that conflicts exist within the various groups themselves—within even the most cohesive and durable—and contribute substantially to their perpetuation (10, pp. 123, 141; 41, p. 238; 48 pp. 1016–17; 17, p. 1).

In considering both intergroup conflict and that occurring internally between component parts of a single group, two kinds of effects may be distinguished. On the one hand, conflict may result in the destruction or disruption of all or certain of the bonds of unity which may previously have existed between the disputants. On the other hand, conflict may strengthen pre-existing ties or contribute to the establishment of unifying bonds where none before existed. It is with the latter that we are concerned in the present paper: given the existence of a conflict, under what conditions, if any, will that conflict produce a stronger bond between parties than that which existed theretofore? In short, what are the integrative functions of conflict?

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Unit of Concern

For the purposes of this study the unit of concern is the group. More specifically, we are interested in the integrative function of conflicts within and between particular groups, namely, those which may be designated

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organizations.[2] . . . an organization consists of people who share at least one common purpose and who are able mutually to communicate and thus to co-ordinate their activities.

The Concept of Conflict

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In our terms, a *policy condition*—denoted for convenience as c_i—is defined as an organizational purpose or goal with a time specification. In 1775, for example, the thirteen colonies maintained the policy condition *no taxation without representation.* The policy conditions of an organization emerge from its decisions and thus reflect its communication structure, that is, its network of authority relationships or the pattern of who communicates with whom. A communication, in this sense, is a directive which, if accepted, will influence the behavior of the recipient.

It should be noted that we further define policy conditions as being *conscious* or *unconscious.* In the latter case, according to our definition, there is no explicit declaration of the policy condition—though it can be inferred from the behavior of the organization.

Since goals (or aims) and methods (or means) are always relative to the context, it follows that any given policy condition can be either a goal or a method (or both). At any given moment an organization will entertain policy conditions with different time specifications. Such policy conditions can be classified into sets, ordered sequentially, wherein the attainment of any given policy condition in the set requires the acquisition of all those preceding it in time.

By definition, it can be said that two or more policy conditions are incompatible if they cannot obtain simultaneously. A *conflict* develops whenever policy conditions are incompatible.

All policy conditions which are mutually incompatible at a given time (regardless of whether they issue from the same organization, different organizations, or a combination of both) are said to constitute a "problem" or a *conflict situation.* For convenience, a policy condition can be related to its appropriate problem area by the addition of an appropriate superscript, e.g., c_i^l. Thus, whereas the subscript serves as a label for a particular policy condition, the superscript indicates the particular dispute.

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It is important to distinguish two types of conflict, *latent* and *overt.* In a latent conflict, no party is attempting—by any decision or overt act—to achieve its c_i. By contrast, overt conflicts are those in which one or more parties do attempt to effect some change in the situation.

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[2] "Formal organization is that kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, deliberate, purposeful" (3, p. 6).

A participant in any overt conflict, in our terms, can choose among four types of action: a non-violent bid, which we will designate by (m^j_1); a non-violent commission (m^j_2); a violent bid (m^j_3); or a commission of violence (m^j_4). As in the case of the c^j_i's the *"j"* denotes the specific conflict in which the *"m"* is being used. We shall designate a general means by (m^j_k), where k goes from 1 to 4, i.e., can come from one of the four categories. This last does not represent any kind of rank order implying the more or less desirable alternative; they could be listed in any order. We differentiate, of course, between (m^j_k) and $(m^j_k)t$. An (m^j_k) simply specifies an action, while an $(m^j_k)t$ suggests that procedures from a given category of means have been designated for the resolution of issues relating to a *"j"* problem over time.

We define an (m^j_1) non-violent bid as an offer, proposal, or threat without implication of casualty-taking. Such a bid is normally conditional in its connotation. In the sphere of international relations the means category (m^j_1) normally includes the exchange of messages and negotiations which do not imply the taking of casualties.

An (m^j_2) commission of non-violence is an act, performance, or transaction without implication or consequence of casualty-taking. Clearly, an (m^j_2) type of settlement can be used to resolve both non-violent and violent conflicts. The parties to a conflict, indeed, can decide upon (m^j_2) actions to take the place of violence; or they can establish $(m^j_2)t$ agreements to regulate and confine a violent conflict, or, having fought a war, they can use an (m^j_2) settlement to formulate the new relationship. Among states the (m^j_2) category of conflict resolution includes negotiation, good offices, arbitration, conciliation, adjudication, and other recognized procedures. The addition of a time specification, $(m^j_2)t$, suggests that non-violent procedures have been agreed upon for the solution of further conflicts related to a given problem. The qualified category $(m^j_2)t$ thus embraces treaties and other international agreements and integrative instruments which depend on mutual free consent for their force.

The means category (m^j_3) bid of violence embraces all more or less conditional communications of intent—including promises and threats, whether explicit or implicit, genuine or feigned, oral, written, or symbolic—which rely upon inference of casualty-taking for their force. In this sense a sudden mobilization may be as effective a threat as a written ultimatum. An $(m^j_3)t$ relationship is again a procedure for settling issues pertaining to a given problem—but by the exercise of threats of force by one of the parties rather by mutual voluntary agreement.

An (m^j_4) commission of violence is an act which results in one or more casualties. The qualified category $(m^j_4)t$ would emerge from a formal declaration of war, i.e., the statement by a government of its intentions to commit continuous violence in order to resolve its particular "*j*" conflict with the other party.

It should be clear that any "*m*" (means) can be viewed—in a somewhat different perspective—as a goal or policy condition. Thus a battleship is a goal for its builder and a means for its captain; the Marshall Plan, an end from one perspective and a means from another. It is always possible, then, to convert an "*m*" into a "*c*" or a "*c*" into an "*m*."

The Concept of Integration

The term *integration* can be used in at least six distinctly different ways, and the concept, in consequence, tends to have remained somewhat ambiguous. Thus integration can be considered in terms of the following:

1. *Probability of violence given a conflict situation.* As used in this sense by the Deutsch study, integration can be defined as the probability that conflicts will be resolved without the use of violence. For these purposes violence is said to occur when one party produces a casualty—that is, the loss of one human being by any one of a variety of means—in another party. Thus, as the probability increases that any conflict will be resolved without the use of violence, the amount of integration between the parties increases.

2. *The frequency of conflicts between any given number of organizations.* In this definition integration is a function of the *number* of conflicts that arise between the organizations during a given span of time. Thus, as the frequency of conflicts between two organizations decreases, the extent of integration between them is said to increase. Again, integration is viewed as a continuum.

3. *Agreement on policy conditions.* Integration between *n* organizations (where $n \geqq 2$) is here a function of the number (and probably also the significance) of the compatible policy conditions. Considering two organizations, one would measure their degree of integration in terms of some average of their compatible policy conditions. Thus organization A may have a total of ten c_i's and organization B a total of fourteen, and the compatible c_i's (between A and B) may be six. To measure the integration between the two, we would take some average of 6/10 and 6/14. Integration, of course, is again a continuum.

4. *The degree of interdependency between* n *given organizations.* In this instance the integration of *n* organizations increases to the extent that their policy conditions are interrelated. Thus one organization, to achieve a particular policy condition, may depend upon the attainment by another organization of one of its policy conditions. The attainment of the United States policy condition of "containment of Russia," for example, has required a South Korean policy condition of independence from the North Korean regime.

5. *Interlocking communication systems or structure.* This definition has two implications. First, the integration between *n* organizations is a function of the number and/or significance of the communications exchanged. In the second instance, *n* organizations become more integrated as the communication structure or authority pattern tends to cross (or disregard) organization boundaries. Thus the thirteen American colonies became progressively more integrated as, first, the Articles of

Confederation and, later, the Constitution established a federal authority and communication structure cutting across the old, relatively exclusive boundaries.

6. *The overlapping of membership.* Here the integration between *n* organizations increases as the overlapping of membership increases. There will be complete integration, of course, when the membership completely overlaps. This circumstance may occur in either one of two ways. In one case, an organization may contain the one beneath it. Thus the integration of the fifty states is complete within the federal structure of the United States. In the other case, all organizations may have the same membership.

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The Integrative Effect of Conflict

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In the present section we shall consider how the bonds between two parties are affected by the conflict and its resolution—whether these bonds are strengthened or weakened, for example, and whether the duration of the relationship between the parties is likely to be relatively long or short. In the two succeeding sections we will consider, first, the circumstances under which the parties to a conflict, in the course of the resolution process, become participants in a wholly new organization—such as the public international unions—designed to regulate the problems at issue; and, second, the ways in which the resolution of a conflict can be negotiated or "engineered" to achieve what we designate as an (m_k) relationship.

A. The Integrative Effect of Conflict on Ties between Parties

Some measure of integration exists in any overt conflict situation by virtue of the very fact that an overt conflict implies some contact between the parties. It would be difficult, indeed, to isolate any phase of an overt conflict which does not imply interaction, communication, and, hence, the establishment and maintenance of a substantial body of ties between the conflicting parties.

It should be clear from preceding pages that the resolution of a conflict between two parties may be achieved through an (m_1^j), (m_2^j), (m_3^j), or (m_4^j) procedure or through a combination thereof. The question now arises how and to what degree the extent of integration between the parties—or the durability of the relationship between them—is affected by the category of action chosen.

Our focus is upon those (m_k^j) relationships which have resulted in rules or procedures or institutions for regulating or containing or controlling conflicts on a particular issue or group of issues.[7] In these terms $(m_2^j)t$

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[7] "Conflict tends to give rise to regulations and norms governing its conduct and restraining the forms in which it is being fought out" (10, p. 121).

relationships—non-violent relationships entered into by the mutual free consent of the parties—give rise to custom, law, and institutions at every level of organization—family, clan and tribe, churches, and nation-states.

It must be kept in mind, however, that throughout the course of history many organizations—and much custom and law—have had their genesis in $(m_3^j)t$ relationships which have been imposed by one party at the expense of another and which depend upon force or the threat of force for their effectiveness.

Both $(m_2^j)t$ and $(m_3^j)t$ relationships, then, may serve as mechanisms for integrating groups of a given magnitude into larger organizational units. Here, of course, we must carefully distinguish once more between (1) conflict and the resolution of conflict inside a given party to an $(m_2^j)t$ relationship; (2) conflict and the resolution of conflict between the parties to an $(m_2^j)t$ relationship; and (3) conflict and the resolution of conflict between a given $(m_2^j)t$ relationship, as an entity in itself, and other like entities. If NATO were designated as an $(m_2^j)t$ relationship, for example, we would distinguish conflicts internal to a member state, such as the United States, from conflicts among the states participating in the $(m_2^j)t$ relationship and also from conflicts between NATO and the Communist bloc.[11]

We postulate that durability of a given $(m_k^j)t$ relationship will be the function of two main variables: the relative "p" capability of each party, that is, his power or relative capacity for inflicting his will; and the amount of "d" dissatisfaction evoked by the relationship among the respective parties. For the time being, at least, we shall measure a party's dissatisfaction in terms of the "price" he is willing to pay to change his circumstances, that is, to achieve his policy conditions. When a party is faced by two more or less equally unsatisfactory—or two more or less equally satisfactory—alternatives, the relative "v" importance will also come into play as a variable.

The durability of a given $(m_k^j)t$ relationship will depend also upon the precedents, that is, upon whether or not previous agreements have worked to the satisfaction of the parties and have been generally long lasting.

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"International law has formulated rules of belligerent procedure which define in detail the respective rights and duties of the contending parties. The state, or status, of war represents, therefore, the new legal relations arising between two or more states engaged in war" (16, p. 443).

"In methods of warfare, as in other social situations, conduct is therefore determined by the network of relations by which the individual is surrounded and by which his behavior is affected" (19, p. 296).

[11] These various "levels" or "orders" of conflict should be distinguished also from conflicts between a given organization and the larger, perhaps somewhat looser, societal context within which it functions. Thus: "There are conflicts between the interests of different individuals within a group, and between the interests of smaller groups within a larger society. There is also conflict between society with its law and the individuals and groups which compose society" (17, p. 37).

It should be evident that an $(m_k^j)t$ arrangement between parties can be reached in a number of ways. The two parties may enter into an agreement of their own respective free wills; or one may dominate or conquer the other and then impose a settlement; or the parties may, through the pressure of some overriding circumstance, enter into an uneasy compromise; or one or both parties may deceptively conclude an agreement with the intent of using it for concealed ends. Against this background it is possible, by arranging the capability, importance, and dissatisfaction variables of the parties in different combinations, to suggest a number of durability and also behavior hypotheses. Illustrative of these possibilities are the following:

	A		B
p	high	p	high
v	high	v	high
d	high	d	high

Under this set of circumstances it seems probable that the durability of the agreement will tend to be long, but the effectiveness will tend to be low. Here the significant question appears to be this: at what point will the high dissatisfactions of A and B bring the $(m_k^j)t$ to an end? Will it be, perhaps, at the point where one party—correctly or incorrectly—perceives its capabilities to have risen somewhat higher than the capabilities of the other party?

	A		B
p	high	p	low
v	high	v	high
d	low	d	high

In this pattern one might anticipate high durability and—in view of B's low capability—a considerable measure of effectiveness. A, in short, will be in a position to dominate B and enforce B's adherence to the agreement. Over time, B's stored dissatisfaction may amount to a growing frustration. If, then, B's capability should begin to rise for any reason, there is a strong possibility of his striking against A even before $B_p \geqq A_p$.

If we assume, on the other hand, that B's capability will remain low and that his dissatisfaction will diminish with time, if seems reasonable to predict his gradual acceptance—as custom or law—of the once irritating settlement. This, indeed, is how time functions on the side of the invader by gradually resolving a whole range of conflicts separating him from the vanquished.

B. The Emergence of New Organizations

At first glance it would seem that the emergence of an organization might be detected in terms of the number of j problems which the parties have resolved through $(m_2^j)t$ agreements. Under this condition the emergence of an organization between or among parties could be specified by measuring the number of resolved j's—an organization being defined at a certain level of resolved j's . . .

Further reflection suggests, however, that the number of j's is not by itself a sufficient criterion of organization. Most major powers maintain a large number of treaty relationships—even with intensely antagonistic states—without achieving any significant integration with any of them. On the other hand, highly integrated federal structures, such as the United States under the Constitution, specifically delegate the resolution of all but a relatively small number of j's to the various component parts.

It should be possible, of course, to calculate the degree of integration between or among the interacting parties in terms of the six criteria already put forward in this paper: (1) probability of violence between the parties; (2) the frequency of conflict between them; (3) agreement on policy conditions c_i; (4) the extent of interdependency of c_i's among the given organizations; (5) the extent of interlocking of communication systems or structures; and (6) the overlapping of membership. Yet measurement against these scales alone fails to provide us with a clear indication of the point where interacting parties move beyond cooperative relations as independent units and begin to merge as a single federation or other organization of a new order. Before trying to describe this point of change, we will find it helpful to consider certain definitions of organization.

According to Chester Barnard (3, p. 83), an organization comes into being when (1) there are persons able to communicate with each other (2) who are willing to contribute action (3) to accomplish a common purpose. And from a somewhat different viewpoint Kenneth Boulding (9, p. 57) has referred to the organization as "a structure of roles tied together by lines of communication."[13]

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[13] "A social organization is a structure of 'roles': any vacancy in the role structure—i.e., any role without an occupant—creates pressure to fill the vacancy with an appropriately skilled person. It is this property of being an open system which enables organizations to live longer than any of their parts—presidents, deans, and professors come and go, but the university goes on forever" (8, p. 123).

"The first element in the description of an organization is a static structure of parts—its geography or anatomy, its organization chart or balance sheet or molecular structure" (8, p. 122).

"The next step in the development of an organization model is its description as a 'machine,' or energy transformer. Any organization depends on some source of energy for its continued existence—food and light in the case of the biological individual, to which may be added coal, oil, and other sources in the case of manufacturing plants or armed forces. Scarcity of energy sources may be an important source of competition and issue conflict, for what is taken *by* one organization may be taken *from* another" (8, p. 123).

"The next step in the organization model is to describe it as an 'open system' or more generally, as a 'growth system' or dynamic open system. A static open system is a structure which is maintained in the midst of a stream or throughout of its constituent parts" (8, p. 123).

"Overlaying or embedded in the complex of informal organizations, which is the aggregate we call great national, and local societies, is the network of formal organizations. If we

The willingness of any participant to contribute action will depend upon the satisfaction which such participant perceives accruing from the association. . . .

If incentive is insufficient to satisfy a critical number of participants, the association must find means of persuasion or perish.

Beyond this, there is also a tendency on the part of human beings to "internalize" the associations which provide them with satisfactions. At the deeper levels of such acceptance the conscience of the individual virtually speaks for the family or the church or the nation, and an attack on any of the "internalized" groups is perceived by the member as an attack upon himself.

In view of these considerations, then, it seems feasible to measure any given $(m_k^l)t$ relationship along a spectrum in terms of (1) the number of roles that serve it; (2) the pattern and extent of the communications network; (3) the importance to the participants of both the relationship and the purposes; (4) the satisfactions derived from it; and (5) the degree to which the relationship, its purposes, and its other aspects have been "internalized" by the participants.

Since states, as large organizations, contain a vast variety of smaller organizations and suborganizations within their jurisdiction, a large number of conflicts in individual attachments and loyalties is inevitable—as is the appearance of incompatibilities among the various component groups. . . .

As we have already suggested, an analysis of conflict and the resolution of conflict among the domestic suborganizations of a state will reveal some general propositions about conflict and the resolution of conflict between that state and other states with which it is associated. Conversely, too, we may expect a state's transactions with other states to have some effect upon its domestic subgroups—as well as upon the component groups of the other transactor states.

Pluralistic societies, for example, allow and often encourage loyalty to a large variety of institutions—the Crown or the Constitution, a church, one of two or perhaps several political parties, the family, and many other associations—and depend upon checks and balances among them for cohesion and stability. . . .

A country within which the divisions have cut too deep, according to Eliot, is a danger to itself, while "a country which is too well united—whether by nature or by device, by honest purpose or by fraud and oppression—is

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examine this network it quickly appears that there are a few strands of formal organization that are clearly dominant and relatively comprehensive, all other formal organizations being directly or indirectly attached to and subordinate to them. They are of two types, now known as churches, that is, formally organized religions; and states, formally organized political interests" (3, p. 96).

a menace to others" (14, p. 60). On the basis of his studies among African tribes Max Gluckman has commented similarly:

> The conflicts between the loyalties held by a man thus, in a wider range of relations, establish order and lead to a recognition and acceptance of obligations within law. A man's several loyalties strike at the strength of his loyalty to any one group or set of relations, which is thus divided. Hence the whole system depends for its cohesion on the existence of conflict in smaller sub-systems [17, pp. 19–20].

One would expect that, when the various associative factors in an organization coincide, they tend to reinforce each other. The use of "cross-loyalties" to weld together the parts of a confederacy is a common phenomenon. Thus:

> When the exchange of goods or services, religion and nationality is coterminous, that is, is restricted to one isolated and autonomous group, the bonds within the group and the hostilities toward those outside are likely to be relatively absolute. But when positive elements overlap the boundaries of several groups, hostilities tend to be limited [19, p. 303].

In somewhat different terms, however, multiple group affiliations within a larger body—by encouraging a proliferation of loyalties and consequent conflicts which criss-cross the society—prevent deep cleavages along a single fracture line and in this way contribute also to a general cohesion.[16] Pluralistic societies, taking advantage of this tendency, foster a multiplicity of institutions to which individual loyalties can be attached. The consequent conflicts, widely dispersed, are resolved largely by compromises, adjustments, adjudications, and accommodations among the various competing parts.

More specifically, the conflicts of a pluralistic order tend to be communicated freely and openly whenever the over-all system is unquestioned by the members—and wherever the symbol of leadership survives undamaged irrespective of the conduct of the incumbent. . . .

Modern pluralistic states tend to divide their central authority between a part that is fixed and one that is removable. The fixed portion (throne, constitution, or other symbol) holds the loyalty, respect, and affection of the people, whereas their inevitable hostilities and discontent can be directed against the removable parts (president, prime minister, cabinet, parliament, congress, interchangeable parties, and so forth). In this way "rebellion" is licensed and waged more or less peacefully through elections, the rise and fall of cabinets, and the alternation of political parties and leaders (40, pp. 196–97).

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[16] "Conflicts may be said to be 'productive' in two related ways: (1) they lead to the modification and the creation of law; (2) the application of new rules leads to the growth of new institutional structures centering on the enforcement of these new rules and laws" (10, p. 126).

"A society, therefore, which is riven by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction, may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split along just one line. For each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together by its inner conflicts. It is not such a paradox after all if one remembers that every species of collective strife tends to knit together with a sense of fellowship the contenders on either side" (41, p. 165).

Monolithic societies, by contrast, find themselves unable to tolerate such free competition of loyalty and association. An attack upon the leadership in such orders is tantamount to an attack upon the whole system. In the long run, therefore, they either develop their own ways for controlling internal conflict—thus preserving the over-all $(m_k)t$ relationship—or they undergo revolution or disintegration. Characteristically, successful states of this sort institutionalize the "internal enemy" and the "external enemy"—usually conceived as being in close league with each other—and seek to project popular hostilities upon these scapegoats.

In reality we would not expect to find any given state fitting either the pluralistic or the monolithic model.[18] Rather, we assume that states—tending toward one or the other model—move back and forth along the pluralistic-monolithic continuum depending on a variety of circumstances. Certainly in time of war we would expect a generally pluralistic state to become increasingly monolithic.

Similarly, we do not maintain at this point that a monolithic state is either more or less aggressive than a pluralistic one. Only on the basis of a careful examination of empirical evidence would such a conclusion be valid. We do postulate, however, that the institutionalizing of the outside enemy and the inside enemies—whether found in a generally pluralistic or a generally monolithic state—are of great importance to both the conflict and the integrative processes.

We would expect, for example, that any conflict arising from incompatible policy conditions between states would be aggravated if either or both were traditionally inclined to identify the other as a major outside enemy. So, too, we would expect the identification of any large number of "internal enemies" to intensify aggressive external behavior of a state in time of crisis.

Conversely, the threat of an external enemy—and that of an internal enemy, too—is likely to increase the cohesion of the "ingroup" organization (10, p. 140). Thus struggle against the out-group and mutual aid within are opposite aspects of the same situation. It is well known, of course, that in a monolithic state, such as Communist China, where scapegoats are institutionalized, the rank-and-file dissatisfactions—almost irrespective of their character—can be diverted by the elite against "internal enemies" and "external enemies" and thus be made to enhance cohesion.

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[18] The characteristics of the internal communications system may also provide useful criteria for differentiating degrees of pluralism. Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that pluralistic systems tend to depend upon a maximum of "double-tracked" communications in many directions, but especially between the leadership and the rank and file within the political structure. Monolithic systems, on the other hand, tend toward "one-way" communications whereby decisions are made by the leadership and passed "downward" as orders or directives (9, p. 100). The only information moving toward the peak of the hierarchy tends to be that which is asked for. It should be noted, however, that states frequently transmit "mandate" through less clearly defined channels.

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We have postulated above that the durability of a given $(m_k^l)t$ agreement will be the function of the "p" capabilities of the parties, the "v" importance of the "j" problem to each of the parties, and the amount of "d" dissatisfaction evoked by the agreement among the various parties. The durability of a complex organization—such as a state—will be the function of a similar variables, except that there may be more j's involved, and the "parties" to the relationship are likely to consist of the ruling elite, on the one hand, and an initially loose amalgamation of the "exploited masses" or other rank and file who feel that the state fails to represent their interest.

It is a common pattern for the ruling elite, being comparatively well satisfied with things as they are, to maintain policy conditions which largely embody the status quo, while the rank and file demand more and more as they begin to see possibilities for bettering their circumstances. In such circumstances the "top" and "bottom" of a state system may occupy wholly different positions on a "d" scale. Thus, if y represents the elite view of the status quo: if c_1^n stands for the combined policy conditions of the elite; if x equals the rank-and-file perception of things as they are; and if c_2^n is substituted for the combined policy conditions of the rank and file, then the system is in a potentially revolutionary situation. . . .

On this same basis it is possible to put forward a number of propositions about the probable behavior of states and other organizations according to their internal "d" patterns and also according to the position of the state on a "d" scale. In these terms a state with a low d distributed through the system will tend to make relatively low demands upon its environment and will tend to be non-aggressive. . . . By contrast, a state with a high d will tend to make high demands upon its environment and will tend to be aggressive—especially if its "p" capability has been low but is rising rapidly[21]. . . . It is postulated that this tendency will obtain even though the j's at issue among the rank and file may be quite different, substantively, from those at issue among the elite.

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[21] "War between challenger and dominant nation . . . appears most likely when the challenger approaches but has not quite overtaken the dominant nation in power. In other words, an approximate balance of power increases the danger of war, while a clear preponderance of power in the hands of the satisfied nations assures world peace. However, other factors also play a role.

"War is especially likely if the challenger at its peak will roughly equal the dominant nation in power. Such a nation cannot hope to obtain a clear supremacy through internal development. Its only hope of taking the dominant nation's place is to unseat it in battle" (36, p. 440).

In each case, the p (capability) of the decision-making elite to act will depend upon a certain degree of minimal support from the rank and file. When the elite loses this minimal support, the state, being unable to function, is liable to revolution or disintegration. It can be postulated, however, that a state with a relatively satisfied elite and a dissatisfied rank and file will tend to react aggressively and even precipitously to an external challenge which the decision-makers perceive as threatening to the status quo. Both Austria-Hungary and Russia tended to fall into this category in 1914.

The Negotiation of Conflict

The discussion so far has been confined to an analysis of certain processes of conflict and the way they appear to lead toward integration. At this point the question arises how and to what degree the parties to a conflict situation can be integrated by negotiation or manipulation on the part of parties to it—or by third parties acting as mediators or adjudicators.

In general, it is possible to distinguish four ways of dealing with a given conflict: (1) the parties can withdraw from contact with each other (8, p. 133); (2) one party can dominate or even absorb or destroy the other party; (3) the parties can compromise; or (4) the parties can, to one degree or another, integrate freely on a basis of equality. In these terms it becomes evident that m'_1, m'_2, m'_3, and m'_4 categories of action can all lead to domination or to compromise, whereas a true integration—integration on a free and equal basis—is achieved only through $(m'_2)t$ relationships, that is, through voluntary consent and non-violent means. The sole exception, noted heretofore, lies in the circumstance where an initial conquest or other act of domination becomes universally accepted by the subject people through the passage of time and through gradual "internalization."

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The resolution of conflict, other than by avoidance or conquest, depends generally on two central factors: the reduction of the intensity of the conflict and the identification or development of one (or more) overriding "c" policy conditions or—in somewhat different perspective—the achievement of a genuine $(m'_2)t$ integration which subordinates the original incompatibility (8, p. 133).

It is evident, on the one hand, that a conflict is always concerned with a distribution of power. Indeed, an exertion of power is prerequisite to the retention of a share in the determination of future relations—as well as for the acquiring or retaining of other benefits perceived as the "reasons" for conflict (33, p. 400). An immediate and indispensable goal of any party to a conflict, therefore, is the achievement of victory—either complete or partial. On the other hand, it must be recognized that either or both parties can be brought to modify their original perceptions of "victory" and "defeat" (33, p. 400). Modifications of this sort can be achieved to one degree or another, both by "compromise" and by genuine "integration."

Compromise, according to Harold Lasswell, is

> that mode of resolving conflicts in which all parties agree to renounce or reduce some of their demand. A compromise, in contrast to a dictated solution such as involved in coercion and conformity, implies some degree of equality of bargaining power. The agreement involved in compromise is also to be distinguished from that involved in integration. In the former case each party is able to identify the precise extent of his losses and gains; in the latter, new alternatives are accepted of such a kind as to render it extremely difficult to discern the balance between concessions made and concessions received [24, pp. 147–49].

In general, the compromise method of dealing with conflict is probably better understood than the true integration method if for no other reason than that it is the way, other than by domination, that most controversies are settled (31, p. 31).

The first step toward compromise, as toward true integration, consists in a reduction in the intensity of the conflict. On the face of it much of this intensity derives directly from the incompatibility of the points at issue with the unsatisfied needs of each party dominating the situation (29, p. 92). Further investigation may reveal, however, that the intensity may also be in part a function of the tension level or "social atmosphere" of the parties (29, p. 89). Thus, as we have already had reason to imply, there is likely to be a close correlation between dissatisfactions that are inherently internal to each party and the dissatisfactions which arise from the incompatibility between them. This will be particularly true of the state which customarily displaces its domestic dissatisfaction upon institutionalized "internal" and "external" enemies. Obviously, also, all these dissatisfactions with tangible inadequacies and frustrations become mixed with vague "sentiments and emotions" to endow attitudes toward the conflict at hand with an "unreasonableness" which is difficult to pin down or alleviate (33, p. 401). It is thus common for a would-be mediator to find in each of the parties to a conflict a "fight set" which gives rise to "obscurities, conscious or unconscious" (31, p. 37). It is no accident that warlike solutions usually spring from warlike expectancies and preparation (1, p. 63).

In a conflict situation of high intensity it can be accepted as almost axiomatic that both parties will be capable of considerable dissimulation, conscious or otherwise (33, p. 401). It need hardly be stated, of course, that "all this applies to ourselves as well as to the other side" (31, p. 32).

The initial step, then, is for each side to "lay its cards on the table," that is, to state its policy conditions and to enunciate clearly the nature of its own dissatisfactions. In the course of this process it will likely become evident that the parties will have some common interests, however minimal. The next step will be for each side to re-examine and perhaps re-evaluate its own desires against those of the other party and against the implication of the total situation. It may then become evident to either or to both sides that one or two formerly unperceived elements in the total situation are more important than some aspect of the proclaimed policy conditions. "Behavior," according to Kenneth Boulding, "consists of movement into the most highly valued part of the *total* image. A shift in the value ordering, therefore, even without any change in the rest of the image, can produce profound, even revolutionary, changes in behavior" (18, p. 127).

Whereas, initially, there was a situation where

$$A \rightarrow c_1^1$$
$$B \rightarrow c_2^1,$$

it may now emerge that A will settle for $c_1^1 - x$ if B will agree to $c_2^1 - y$. This new arrangement may result from the fact that the x and y elements in the two policy conditions are perceived by the parties, on closer analysis, to be much less important to them than the aspects of the situation which they agree mutually to preserve. Or the arrangement may emerge from a new perception on the part of the two parties to the effect that the consequences of non-settlement or of violent settlement are likely to cost more than the issues are worth.

Despite the frequent use of this method for resolving conflicts, there are serious limitations inherent in it. All too frequently at least one party feels that he has been deprived of a highly important aspect of his policy condition. Dissatisfaction is likely to be stored as the deprived party awaits a favorable opportunity to redress the scale of advantages, and the new relationship may turn out to be unstable and unsatisfactory to both.

The true integration of two desires—in contrast to their compromise—signifies "that a solution has been found in which both desires have found a place, that neither side has had to sacrifice anything" (31, p. 32).

This situation can be brought about either by an alteration of the desires of one or both sides or by an alteration of the problem itself—through a change of the environment or through the achievement of some other solution that transcends the original issues and provides a condition satisfactory to both parties.

With true integration, as with compromise, the first step is to uncover the conflict, face the real issues; and the next is "to take the demands of both sides and break them up into their constituent parts" (31, p. 40). The third step, again as with compromise, is for the parties to evaluate and possibly revaluate the issues. It is assumed, under such circumstances, that neither side ever "gives in" but that there often comes a moment when interests on both sides are suddenly perceived in a new perspective and "unity precipitates itself" (31, pp. 38–39). So it frequently comes about, once an integration is effected, that the compatible, even co-operative, effort compels a change in the whole motivation of the two parties (3, p. 41), and a new relationship emerges. In this fashion true integration becomes a kind of spontaneous "flowing together," a merging of purpose, which makes it possible for the interests of the parties to dovetail, "to fit into each other," so that all participants find some place in the final solution. Such an arrangement, over time, may lead to a mutual acceptance of role images to the point where each side knows almost precisely what to expect of the other (8, p. 130).

In this way, once certain fundamental problems (but by no means a large proportion of the total problems outstanding) have been successfully integrated, even two nations with a history of warfare between them can perceive and tolerate each other's roles and live peacefully together as do the United States and Canada.

Clearly, this kind of integration must depend upon freely conceived, freely initiated effort and not upon domination by any force whatsoever of one party over the other. Both sides must be "sincere" in regard to this particular integration, and the authority must emerge from the reciprocal, unifying process. Thus legitimate authority comes to flow from co-ordination—not co-ordination from authority. Under these circumstances, then, the force of the new relationship emerges from the free consent and positive co-operation of the participants and not from any outside force or from the domination of one party over the other. Each party perceives this welfare inherent in the functioning of the integrative relationship. This proposition suggests that the people of the world will not be able "to make an international settlement and then erect some power to enforce it; the settlement must be such as to prove its own momentum" (31, p. 204), its own creative coherence. To achieve true integration on a given issue, it will not be sufficient for either party merely to react to the other or merely to wait for events to take their course. The task for the statesman concerned with the resolution of conflict is not so much to predict favorable moments as it is to create favorable situations.

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Personal Contact in School and Change in Intergroup Attitudes

H. E. O. JAMES

When in 1948 Dr. Tenen and I began to study the attitudes of English adolescents towards foreign peoples with a survey covering 11- to 15-year olds, we were greatly impressed by the importance they attached to personal contact. Many said that they couldn't be certain without personal contact; some even said that they couldn't give an opinion at all about people they hadn't met. The spontaneity with which such remarks were made—for they were made in unguided interviews and there were no questionnaires to put ideas into their heads—and the many accounts of the effects of personal contact, persuaded us to concentrate our study upon the problems of personal contact as a determinant of ethnic attitudes. (The term 'ethnic' is used to cover both nationality and racial origin.)

Personal contact does not always improve ethnic attitudes. That was clear enough from the interviews in our initial survey, even if we had not known that feelings are sometimes bitterest when different peoples live side by side and meet daily. What decides the effect of personal contact upon ethnic attitudes?

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We enlisted the aid of two African women teachers whose personalities, command of English, and teaching skill were such as to make it likely that they would get on well with their pupils; and we arranged for each to be put in sole charge for a fortnight of a mixed class of 13-year-olds in a school whose social climate allowed of good relations between teachers and pupils. Twice before and twice after this fortnight the children were given unguided interviews at intervals of six weeks. During the fortnight the classes were kept under observation.

The interviews and observation of the classes led to the conclusion that

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relations between African teachers and English children were good. Ratings of attitudes towards Africans, based on the interviews, showed a statistically significant improvement during the six weeks period between the second and third interviews, i.e. the period in which the African teachers spent a fortnight in the school. There was no significant change for better or worse between either the first and second or the third and fourth interviews. Of the 43 children who took all four interviews, the attitudes to Africans of all but two improved during the experimental period, and even these two did not worsen; during the control period 40 did not change in attitude towards Africans, one changed for the worse, and two for the better.

An analysis of the content of the interviews showed statistically significant decreases in items indicative of fear, dislike, and distrust of Africans, their colour, appearance, and ways. It also showed significant increases in items indicating a better opinion of and liking for Africans than before; they were found to be nicer, more likeable, more civilized, better educated, and more like white people than had been expected by the children.

It could reasonably be concluded from the evidence that the development of friendliness and liking between African teachers and English children had led to an increase of liking for and friendliness to Africans in general.

This conclusion has been corroborated in unpublished and independent studies by two of my students. Feakes found an improvement in attitudes to Chinese after visits by a Chinese to a school class and after lessons about China and the Chinese. Khan found a similar improvement in attitudes to Indians after visits by an Indian teacher and lessons about India and the Indians.

We have not tested the converse of this conclusion; it seemed undesirable to investigate the effect of putting an African curmudgeon—if one could have been found—in charge of an English school class. There is, however, anecdotal evidence in the interviews of the initial survey to make its truth probable.

How did the change for the better come about? The children spent a fortnight with a new teacher who was both a new person and an African. Right from the start the new teacher was regarded both as a person as an African, as a person and as a specimen or sample or representative of Africans in general, as a person and as a member of a different ethnic group. It is probable that if personal contact with members of a different ethnic group is to affect attitudes towards that group, then neither aspect should overshadow the other. If the new teacher had been regarded simply as a person or simply as an African, attitudes to Africans would probably not have changed. In the one case affection for a person would have developed, but it would not have affected existing attitudes to Africans; in the other, existing attitudes would have dominated the interaction and been little changed thereby. It is probable that the African aspect was the more prominent in the early stages and the personal aspect in the later, but during the critical period they were both in evidence.

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In personal contact there is response to oneself. Unlike events in books and films, what happens is affected by one's own actions, words, and looks. There is an immediate and urgent interplay between the participants. This interaction is dynamic in that it is concerned with issues that matter to the participants, and exploratory in that the responses enable the participants to find out what they want to know. Because of these features, because it answered or seemed to answer the questions that mattered to them, personal contact was not only an effective maker and undoer of attitudes, but often seemed to these children the fundamental, sometimes the only valid basis for ethnic attitudes. In personal contact they felt that they penetrated to a person's innermost 'nature', as they called it; that they really got to know persons and through them peoples.

The questions children want answered about persons are linked with powerful emotions and motives. They need reassurance against their fears, assurance of security, and promise of friendliness, sociability, and enjoyment—if they can get them; if they can't, then at least they need to know what to expect. They want to know how people will act towards them, what their intentions are, whether they are well or ill disposed, whether they will be friendly and like them, or whether they will be unfriendly and unsociable, or even actively hostile. And they feel that personal contact can tell them. They are convinced that if a person has behaved towards them in a kind and friendly manner, has appeared to like and be interested in them, has willingly joined in their activities and talked with them, even about herself and her affairs, if they have enjoyed being with her and if she has appeared to enjoy being with them, then this is the best guarantee for the future and the clearest evidence that she is well-intentioned towards them and has a good 'nature'.

So much they need to know even when the newcomer is of their own kind; but if she differs from them in physical appearance, speech, dress, and way of doing things, then they also need to know whether such a person differs fundamentally from themselves or whether despite appearances she is really the same as themselves. If they feel that they are dealing with people like themselves, then they know what to expect and can discount appearances.

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Personal contact, especially in the searching form of a fortnight with a school class, is well adapted to fulfilling all these purposes and to effecting considerable changes in attitude. How well, my collaborator and I have come to appreciate during the last two years whilst trying, not without success, to improve the ethnic attitudes through other media and without the aid of personal contact. Evidence of civilization and similarity can, for example, be effectively conveyed in other ways, though perhaps less effectively than when embodied in likeable persons. But for getting to know a person and through her a people, for building up an attitude to a person that can serve as both model and driving force for an attitude towards her people, there is nothing to equal it.

Two features of the experiment should be noted. The African teachers were women, and this may have made contact easier and its effect upon the children greater. Women are probably less disturbing or more reassuring to children than men are; certainly women and children are often excepted when dislike is expressed for a foreign people. Probably too, the reminder that Africans are not all men, is reassuring when one considers the preponderance of men amongst foreign visitors and foreign troops in a country and in 'foreigner' roles in films and other fictions.

Furthermore the bulk of teacher-pupil interaction consisted of group experiences; even when interaction was between the teacher and one or two pupils, the rest of the class was usually present. There undoubtedly was much informal discussion amongst the children of what all or most had witnessed; a consensus must have been reached, for opinions were remarkably alike in essentials. Certainly knowledge of group endorsement must have strengthened the conviction with which these opinions were held.

Both of these were favourable but not indispensable circumstances. There are many accounts in the interviews of both contacts with men and contacts with outside groups that effectively changed attitudes.

The new attitudes that resulted from the contacts with the African teachers were usually stereotypes in the sense that the same description and the same effective attitude were applied to all or most Africans. The stage of treating foreigners as persons and on their individual merits and not as members of out-groups is not easily or quickly attained by most. This is of course an example of generalization from what is logically an insufficient number of cases—a difficult thing to avoid when experience is limited. At least it can be said that the new stereotypes, being favourable to Africans, were likely to lead to the seeking rather than the avoiding of contacts, and being not only friendly but also free from some gross misconceptions and containing more truth than before because of contact with genuine Africans, likely to promote sounder and friendlier thinking about Africans than their predecessors. They at least laid a sound foundation for further development.

Certain limitations to generalization from our experiment should be noted. The social relations and climate in both the school and the community it served were such as to allow of good relations between African teachers and English children, though they did not guarantee them. It is easy to see that conditions outside or inside the school might have imposed such role relations between Africans and English or between teachers and pupils as to make good personal relations very difficult to achieve. Furthermore where different roles are culturally prescribed for the members of different ethnic groups, attitudes are likely to be stronger and more sharply defined than they were at the outset in our experiment. In such cases personal contact, however good, may be insufficient to change attitudes.

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Integrations and Mal-integrations in American Middle Class Family Patterns

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FLORENCE KLUCKHOHN AND JOHN P. SPIEGEL

. . . a majority of the peoples of the world tend to be familistic to some degree. They tend to emphasize either the Lineal or Collateral relational principle rather than the Individualistic one. It is the American pattern that is more atypical—if for no other reason than its reflection of the extreme stress on Individualistic relations. However, there are other ways in which the dominant American ensemble of value orientations is unique. There is an extraordinary emphasis on Doing in the range of the *activity* orientation and the accenting of Future Time. Indeed, this latter orientation goes so far that we often appear to have forgotten how to enjoy the present for its own sake. Perhaps this accounts for the existence of what David Reisman[17] has called our "fun morality"—a compulsive search for enjoyment through ritualized and institutionalized "entertainment" in which having fun, having-a-good-time, has to be planned for and "achieved." The difficulty here is that if one has to "plan" to enjoy the future, spontaneity tends to be vitiated by the time the future becomes the present.

That there may be some other difficulties flowing from the severe stress on these value orientations, will be taken up shortly in our examination of American family patterns. Here it is sufficient to point out that there is a good deal of harmonious interlocking of the value orientations in the ramification of roles that constitute our social system. The emphasis on achievement requires a considerable planning for the future, a step by step thinking out of the means-ends patterns by which future success may be

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[17] David Riesman: The Themes of Work and Play in the Structure of Freud's Thought, *Psychiatry* 13:1–16, Feb., 1950.

Florence Kluckhohn and John P. Spiegel, "Integrations and Mal-integrations in American Middle Class Family Patterns," in Integration and Conflict in Family Behavior *(August, 1954), Part 5, pp. 15–19, Report No. 27. Copyright by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Inc. Reprinted by permission. Footnotes numbered as in original.*

secured. At the same time, this preference for far-flung and distant aims tends to place a great premium on the young—those with the most future ahead of them. . . . Without a selective sanctioning of Individualistic over Lineal and Collateral relations, the individual would never be free to realize his plans, to leave his family, his home town or his job for a better situation. Along with the planning and achievement values is synchronized the optimism derived from our emphasis on Man's Mastery of Nature. Our conviction that we can always improve matters by thoughtful care and planning, our belief in "progress" through "scientific achievement" gives our industrial, job-centered society its characteristic stamp, and thus supports the system of mobile occupational roles through which the plans for achievement are to be realized.

If we now observe how the dominant American value orientations are reflected in the patterns of American family life, we face problems of selectivity and special emphasis. For it is possible to speak of *The American Family* only if we realize that we mean the ideal or typical family of the dominant middle class. Actually there is no such thing as a single family type which can be said to be representative of all America. . . . there exists a kind of consensus regarding the relationships and roles that should exist in the "Good Family." There is, in other words, a kind of model family according to which all others tend to be judged and like which many others are striving to become. It is this model which is the typical of the middle class.

The typical middle class family today is a small nuclear family. . . . In addition to being small, this typical family is in many ways an isolated one. This is to say that it is an independent unit, both economically and socially. Even though its members always recognize the fact of relatives—grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins—the relational bonds with these relatives are not, in most cases, strong ones. Although personal preference may, and often does, make them strong, there are no binding rules . . . which make it necessary always to accept and get along with relatives.

Let us take the relations between siblings in the typical American family as an example. It is easy to assume that the bonds of affection and antagonism experienced by the siblings as they grow up will gradually even out in adulthood and appear as permanent attachments. Yet an honest scrutiny of this assumption will reveal by the time they are thirty-five or forty years old, many of the members of the typical middle-class family will be closer to their associates and friends than to their brothers and sisters. The actual separation and emotional distancing may be screened by sentimentality[18] and fitful, last minute gestures on birthdays and anniversaries, but it is there all the same. . . .

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[18] Sentimentality, in this context, means an increasing emphasis on the symbolic aspects of the relationships which simultaneously become emptied of significant content.

If this is the situation where Collateral relationships are concerned, the weakening of the Lineal bonds among the generations is still more poignant. The son or daughter who moves away from parents both geographically and occupationally comes to sense an ever deepening emotional chasm in the relationship. In part this is linked with the deep strain on the dependent needs against which the child must strenuously defend himself if he or she is to fulfill the demands for independence and self-reliance occasioned by our value orientations. . . .

It is not our intention to shock with what may seem to be cynical objectivity, nor yet to place a value, positive or negative, upon our own value orientations and the customs in which they are reflected. Nevertheless, in all fairness, it must be pointed out that in some ways American family patterns put quite severe strains upon individuals. Since our aim is to present a method for dissecting out the mal-integrations in family patterns of living which underlie the mental ill-health of the individual, it is necessary to attempt to pin-point some of these strains.

A prominent source of difficulty is the situation of older people in our society. Excluded from living in the homes of their children, often retired from jobs merely because of age and thus cut off from the occupational interests which have absorbed their creative energies for so many years, older people tend to become increasingly isolated from meaningful relationships. As the life span grows longer and longer, the interest span for such persons tends to shorten. We have to some extent overcome the hazards of their inability to rely financially on their children through social security measures and the tremendous elaboration of insurance devices. But the gap which severs dependent relations between the generations makes it impossible for the aged to rely emotionally, as well as financially, on their children. . . . older people in our society can expect to be told that they are old-fashioned, their opinions out of date, and their capacity to give helpful advice based on long experience with life strictly limited. With our impatient march into the future and our restless pursuit of change, the wisdom of an older generation is not likely to count for much. The Council of Elders is notable for its absence, and the role of elder statesman finds hardly an applicant. Thus the rewards of our intense planning for the future—if a person lives long enough—follow the law of diminishing returns.

Space does not permit here an inquiry into the complicated effects of this required separation between the generations on individual personality structure or on the behavior disturbance in the individual. This is an area of intense research activity in the field of personality study, most of which is highly fruitful, even though the relation between cultural value orientations, social structuring, family patterns, and the individual's adjustment is frequently not recognized. The sequence of relationships observed by

Parsons[19] and others with respect to the so-called American "youth culture" point to another kind of strain in the society. It is not generally understood that the behavior of the more or less typical American adolescent is not universal. In many other societies adolescence is a period of fairly smooth transition to adulthood. The wild fluctuations between extreme dependence and disdainful and defiant independence, the gyrations from idealism to cynicism, from lush romancing to hard-bitten, stripped-down sexual aims, and from cringing conformity to last ditch non-conformity are attitudes largely unique to our own social system. Threaded through all the adolescent attitudes is the power of the gang, or the adolescent peer group with its own, unique and frequently spectacular behavior patterns.

Parsons points out, discussing the origin of the power of the peer-group, that the adolescent in our society is caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, he grows up in a small, nuclear family in which all his dependent needs must be satisfied in relation with a very few persons. Consequently the libidinal attachment, especially to the mother, grows very strong. On the other hand, the child is expected to become an adult in whom extremes of self-reliance and independence can be easily mobilized. How is he to resolve this discontinuity between childhood training and adult expectations? . . .

The adolescent peer group, then, is the mechanism through which the most workable solutions are provided. Instead of having to rupture his ties to his parents through a violent wrench as adulthood approaches, he can transfer them in part to his peers. Where his own lack of experience and uncertainty make it difficult to get along without the support of his parents, the solidarity of the peer group will back him up, whether or not his parents approve or disapprove his behavior. Furthermore, the adolescent in our society is considerably inhibited in his attempts to try his wings and discover his own abilities and natural bents—in the words of Erik Erikson,[20] to determine his personal sense of identity—by the prolonged tenure in the school setting. School is considered by most people to be chiefly a preparation for life, rather than an experience in its own right. Because of the technical requirements of our culture, it must be continued long after the adolescent has reached the point where he must determine his identity. As a result, however, the adolescent is sealed off from many of the aspects of the adult world which he is expected to be able to identify with and soon to master. This is perhaps the reason why so many young people develop neuroses, or at least discover their existence, after graduating from school, or at the point of graduation. At any rate, youth culture provides a framework of behavior half-way between the world of the child and the world of the adult. The roles in the peer group are distributed between those aimed at pleasure, play, and fun, and those whose goal is a serious "project." Even where the latter occasionally or frequently verge on delinquent or deviant goals—depending on the nature of the group—they nevertheless feature the orientation toward planning, organization, and achievement which are so important in our system of values.

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[19] Talcott Parsons: *Essays in Sociological Theory—Pure and Applied.* Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1949, chapters X and XI.

[20] Erik H. Erikson: *Childhood and Society.* New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1950.

Another source of strain in our family patterns can be found in the role of the father. One aspect of his role is the tremendous responsibility he must bear for the welfare of his wife and children. In many societies . . . no man is made to feel that he, and he alone, is solely responsible for the well-being of his family. There are parents, brothers, even uncles and cousins, to be called upon in times of crisis. Many American men feel that they would rather borrow from a friend or even a stranger than from a relative—so strong is the push toward independence. The proliferation of welfare agencies and other community mechanisms for absorbing the slack between emotional and financial income and output are becoming more acceptable but still encounter the resistance toward "accepting help" or "charity" associated with our value system.

The great resourcefulness and responsibility required in the father role is well integrated with the Doing aspects of his orientation toward life. As a result he is apt to be highly concentrated on his business or occupational role. There are several ways, however, in which this concentration is not so well integrated with other family roles. It means that he must, in the usual case, spend an enormous amount of time away from his home and family. Thus the amount of sharing of roles—of real companionship—between husband and wife comes to be reduced frequently far below the optimum, and the marital pair find themselves driven increasingly apart as their marriage progresses. Another strain arises with respect to the father-son roles. With father out of the home so much, the son is thrown very much together with mother. Not only are the mutual bonds thus intensified, but also the mother must then carry the lion's share of the training of the children and instituting of controls. She tends to assume a disproportionate amount of the moral authority for the whole family. For the son this means that the distribution of internalized traits which compose his psychological identifications with his parents is heavily weighted toward mother. The resulting feminine identification—especially the feminine superego—as well as the strong affective tie toward her then constitute mechanisms difficult to integrate later on with the initiative and aggressiveness demanded by ego details in accord with our value system. This situation is not helped by the fact that father's occupation often remains a mystery to the son. His occupation is obviously a focus of great interest and value and, therefore, an important way of identifying father and of identifying with him. Yet middle class occupations take place, for the most part, far from home and are difficult to describe operationally. How many middle class sons know what their extremely active fathers really do on the job?

But none of these strains are as severe as those found in the wife-mother role.[21] Indeed, if we were asked to point to the most strategic spot in the American family system for an effecting of constructing change in it, we would certainly single out the feminine role. The reasons for the choice are many, and the whole of the feminine role problem which obviously includes the difficulties in both the husband-wife and the mother-child relationship is exceedingly complex. Here we shall point out only a few of the major strains which relate to the differential participation women are permitted in the patterns which express the dominant American value-orientations.

Compared to the masculine role, that aspect of the total feminine role which we label the wife-mother role is not well geared into the dominant value system. The mother of a family is not expected to express herself in an individualistic autonomous role in the way the father does in the occupational system. Instead she is expected to have a *collateral* orientation in which she puts the interests of the group as a whole above whatever individualistic interests she may have. She is, much more than the father, expected to play a "representative" role in her relations outside the family . . . today, the representativeness is found in the expectations we have that mothers will be the ones to represent the family at parent-teacher meetings, in the community churches and in a host of other community affairs. There is even a rapidly growing trend, especially in the suburbs, for women to take a far more active part than men in the community governmental affairs. Everyone is aware, for example, of the work that groups such as the League of Women Voters do in this field of activity.

Some women find a great deal of satisfaction in such roles. Some find satisfactions in the work of women's clubs, book clubs, music or art organizations. However, many do not. In the first place, the various activities have a diffuseness which do not permit to women the concentration upon central goals which is so characteristic a part of the dominant American achievement patterns. Second, almost all of the specified activities are mainly defined as women's activities in which men do not participate, and such a definition not only leads to an ever widening segregation of the spheres of the sexes but also tends to give to the activities themselves an evaluation of second order importance. It is almost as if it were being said that men should tend to the truly important affairs in American life—those relating to the sphere of the economic—while the necessary matters of lesser importance can be safely left to women up to the point the issues become critical.

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[21] The material on the feminine role in United States culture has been adapted from Florence R. Kluckhohn, "America's Women," [*Patterns for Modern Living: Psychological Patterns*, ed. O. H. Mowrer. Chicago, The Delphian Society, 1952,] chapter 3.

Even though there has been an increasing acceptance of women in the all important occupational system—a fact which is evidenced by Labor Bureau statistics which record some 18,000,000 women in the labor force—there still is an expression of grave concern about the mother who works outside the home. Often a definite condemnation of the working mother is expressed. Delinquency, psychological disturbances of all kinds in children and the divorce rates as well are frequently attributed in some large part to the fact of the mother being out of the home on a job. The American mother is not, in other words, expected to have an active part in those aspects of American life which best express the Doing activity and Future Time orientations. Hers is a vicarious participation which depends upon what a husband, a father or a son, and not she herself accomplishes.

The frustrations which result from these variant definitions of woman's role would not be serious if it were not for the two facts that the domestic component of the wife-mother role has been increasingly demeaned as a prestige role and that women have been poorly trained to play that part of the total role.

In most respects American girls from babyhood through adolescence are trained to play individualistic and competitive roles which are similar in nature to the masculine roles. Throughout childhood and youth the girl child goes to school with boys and competes for many of the same goals. True, little sister may find a doll and carriage under the Christmas tree while brother has a train, but in spite of this or other differences it is expected that the girl will learn to look after herself all through adolescence and beyond, even forever if need be. The hope is expressed that she will not have to remain independent and therefore need not use much of what she has learned. Instead—and this is the great problem—she is expected, upon marriage or certainly after children are born to give her attention to motherhood and household duties for which she has had little or no training.

This lack of training, together with a lack of traditional methods for the rearing of children, creates in many women great anxiety about the mother role. Most American women desire children and most have definite aspirations to be "good mothers." Moreover, in the society at large the idealization of the women is primarily an idealization of her motherhood. There is, in other words, considerable pressure for women to be good mothers and high prestige rewards for achieving the goal. But just what being a good mother means or how to become one are questions many women find difficult to answer. All too often there is a slavish comparison of both one's self and one's children with those of friends or neighbors, or an anxious following of the prescriptions and suggestions of the latest theories of child care and training. Motherhood, like almost everything else in the society, becomes both competitive and instrumental. Or, as some have remarked, motherhood in many middle class circles is fast becoming professionalized.

All of the difficulties encountered in playing the mother role are enormously increased by the low evaluation placed by most women themselves and the society as a whole on the domestic component of the wife-mother role. In earlier periods of American history the housewife and mother role were a unitary role. Today in the minds of men and women alike the two components are fairly clearly separated, and the attitudes towards the housewife aspect of the total role are markedly negative. One has only to glance over the advertisements in current magazines to realize that the home as a house to be managed is constantly pictured as a mild variety of a penal institution. Almost everyone defines housework as drudgery—something which one does because one has to. The prestige rewards accorded domestic interests and accomplishments are not at all comparable to those which can be won in the occupational sphere or in other kinds of activities. Of all the evidence which supports this conclusion the most telling is the toning of the phrase so common on the lips of women: "I am *just* a housewife."

Since being a housewife is an inevitable part of the mother role it has not been at all unusual for mothers to convey to idea to children—whether consciously expressed or unconsciously made known in behavior—that mother deserves so much because she has given up so much and done so many things she really did not enjoy.

Even in the cases where women willingly accept the housewife role as a necessary aspect of motherhood one sees many instances of maladjustment when the time comes for children to leave home and go on their own. The mother's job in our particular kind of society and especially when families are small does not long endure. Dr. Margaret Mead has commented:

> Every social pressure to which she, the mother, is subjected tells her that she should not spoil her children's lives, that she should let them lead their own lives, that she should make them independent and self-sufficient. Yet the more faithfully she obeys these injunctions, the more she is working herself out of a job. Some day, while she is still a young woman . . . she will be alone, quite alone, in a home of her own."[22]

In an action oriented, future-time minded society, having no job to do engenders a feeling of uselessness which in turn creates emotional disturbance. Most of us have witnessed the disoriented behavior and emotional stress of women whose children have grown up and gone. Some respond by clinging to children; others try desperately to fit into jobs with the outmoded skills they learned and used years ago; others become unnecessarily fussy housewives; some are merely restless. But whatever the response or the degree of disorientation it should be plain that the demands of the role which is patterned rather inconsistently in terms of both dominant and variant value orientations are not easily met. There is considerable confusion in the minds of many women as to just what is expected of them, and the confusion affects all family relationships.

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[22] Margaret Mead: *Male and Female*. New York, William Morrow and Company, 1949, p. 337.

But in this instance as well as all others we have stressed the existence of problems not to demonstrate that the dominant family system is falling apart, but rather to set up an analytical model for the isolating of some of the processes related to the psychological strain and ill health. In fact, if it were our purpose, we would devote an equal if not greater amount of space to demonstrating successful integrations within family patterns, and among the family, the social system and the system of value orientations. Given our basic values, the typical roles within the middle-class family structure appear, on the whole, to be well fitted to the functions of the family within the larger social system. The system of individualistic roles and autonomous functions within the family is remarkably well suited to and good preparation for the degrees of freedom and independence which our industrial society calls for. The weakening of ties between the generations is practically mandatory if the family is to be adjusted to the amount of freedom for geographical and social mobility which our occupational system requires. Such an accounting of the good fits within and around the family is part of the well balanced appraisal which this report can only suggest, rather than document.

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Residential Integration: The Case of Hyde Park in Chicago

SOL TAX

In 1952—a short six or seven years ago—our neighborhood in Chicago was in a state of panic. What had grown from the village of Hyde Park into a fine urban community of 75,000 seemed doomed. Thousands of poor Negroes were moving in; large apartments were being reconverted into small ones, turning middle-class buildings into rows of tenements along streets rapidly becoming slums. There were strange people in blocks where neighbors were all familiar faces. There was a rash of new crimes: burglaries, purse-snatchings, and occasional rapes. People could not safely walk the streets in the evening except in groups.

Middle-class white families who had lived for years in Hyde Park and Kenwood were moving away, seeking safety. So were middle-class Negro families who had moved in only months earlier because they wanted decent housing outside of a Negro ghetto. All were being engulfed by a tidal wave of population from the segregated, long-contained black belt at the borders of our neighborhood.

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Today, in November of 1958, the atmosphere is remarkably different. The neighborhood has not only been saved, but it will soon be far better than it ever was; a garden spot within a great metropolis. On November 7, 1958, the city council put the last legal approval on the so-called Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan. This meant final approval of concrete plans—building by building and street by street—to destroy blight, overcrowding, and substandard housing. Nor does anybody doubt that these plans will materialize; not only do we know that everything is indeed settled,

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Sol Tax, "Residential Integration: The Case of Hyde Park in Chicago," Human Organization, *published by the Society for Applied Anthropology, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring, 1959), pp. 22–27. Reprinted by permission.*

legally and financially, but we also have before our eyes what we have already accomplished as a sample of what we shall now see unfold. In these six eventful years, part of our neighborhood has already been cleared. The Hyde Park projects "A" and "B" passed their legal hurdles two years ago, the slum buildings are all gone, and new building has begun.

By now people have moved back from the suburbs. Those who like to live in a university area, and close to the center of the city, no longer have doubts that they can do so. The price of good real estate in the neighborhood is skyrocketing. New housing is only a matter of time.

Meanwhile, the amount of crime has so sharply decreased that we no longer think of it as a special problem. Doubtless this is due to better policing, but this, in turn, has its causes. It is all part of what has happened in our community; part of an unbelievable success story. It is my task to tell this story very briefly.

The acceptance of our Urban Renewal plan is hailed as the first case of an urban neighborhood's being saved from becoming a slum: the stitch in time that saves nine. Important as this is—and important as it is that the University of Chicago will be saved from rot and decay—it is even more significant that, in Chicago, for the first time, through this plan, we are breaking the pattern of racial residential segregation which has characterized cities in the North.

The chief point to be made, however, is that nothing at all could have been done if racial integration had not been an explicit and integral part of the plan. The miracle of urban renewal could only have been accomplished by accomplishing the greater miracle of racial integration. And nothing would have happened without deliberate social action.

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Early Community Action

During the 1940's, there was a rather successful community council in Hyde Park which brought together representatives of more than thirty-five service clubs, PTA's, businessmen's associations, churches, and so on. We were engaged in programs of community betterment: clean-up campaigns, youth programs, and the like. The property owners association and the real estate office of the University of Chicago were, of course, represented. Our board of directors was composed overwhelmingly of so-called liberals, representing churches, schools. etc. There were no Negroes because, of course, there were none in the neighborhood.

In 1948 and 1949, the board became conscious of the "changes" which were occurring at the north end of our neighborhood, where none of us actually live. We appointed a committee on the matter. Nothing was done. What was there to do? In some neighborhoods in Chicago the answer was rioting, violence, and bombs to keep the Negroes from moving into a white area. An organization like ours might have organized something like this. In our liberal community, action in that direction was unthinkable—and as far as I know not even whispered. The only thing there could be for us to do was to be reconciled to a mixed neighborhood and to develop a program to keep it a good neighborhood. But recall that we all knew that, when Negroes moved in, whites moved out, and this had already begun to happen. Those in our organization who represented property interests could hardly misrepresent their organizations by supporting policies based on wishful thinking. Had our community council tried to do anything at all, it would have broken apart. Our heads were in the sand.

Another organization was needed, a membership group which could act. In November of 1949, a few of our leaders founded the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, whose program was specifically to develop an interracial community of high standards. It included middle-class Negroes, as well as whites, and set out to do the impossible. With a remarkably talented and far-seeing woman as executive secretary, they began to organize block groups to try to control rumor and the possibility of violence and to give confidence to good neighbors who wanted to stay in a stable interracial neighborhood. Psychologists and sociologists experimented here. They made community surveys to gather knowledge on the basis of which to act. They developed techniques to control illegal uses of property and illegal physical alterations. Here the lawyers and real estate professionals came in. Later, there came a time when building materials could not come into the neighborhood without the alarm being sounded—here is where watchful housewives came in. Our local community newspaper, the *Hyde Park Herald*, always reflecting our liberal community spirit, became a help and a forum. But, in the first months and years, for all the work and good will, the slums could not be contained; the overcrowded black ghetto continued to spill over; the whites continued to leave; and, by the winter of 1951–1952, we found ourselves in the situation of panic which I described in the beginning. Mind you, the Community Conference had not retreated at all; it was working harder than ever, trying to stem the growing panic and remove its causes. It might be a forlorn hope, but it represented the only possibility. For the eventual outcome, it was critical that the Conference held the fort while other forces mobilized; critical in that it was educating on the side of positive policies; critical that it was learning how to deal with the community at the grass roots. But, for all its importance, then and for the future, the Conference was still only a pinprick from the left. The university and business interests had heads still in the sand, although it later became clear that the new chancellor and board of trustees of the university had, meanwhile, been facing the realities of the situation and were preparing to act.

It was the increase of crime, particularly crimes of personal violence, which brought the great breakthrough. In 1952, the word "planning" was still a bad word in our community although this seems unbelievable now. The word "race" was still embarrassing. But everybody was against crime.

One evening the Hyde Park Community Council announced as its topic for the regular monthly meeting, the problem of crime. Instead of the usual two or three dozens of representatives, a hundred or more overflowed the meeting room and set up an emergency committee.

This committee now feverishly prepared a mass meeting, at which our public officials could be questioned. Everybody seemed interested. We obtained the use of a university hall, seating over 1,000 people. Some 2,500 people came that evening and it was the event which symbolized a change. The community would do something to save itself.

In preparation for the meeting, our committee drew up a plan to propose the formation of a new organization. We called it the South East Chicago Commission. Many thought the word crime was in the name. But the resolution indicated that the purpose was to deal with the causes of crime, the deterioration of the neighborhood, etc. The word planning was omitted, but planning was implied in every syllable.

It was at this point that the university took its new position. The morning of the meeting, the chancellor approved our statement and agreed to chair the organizing committee of the new South East Chicago Commission. A month later, there was a second mass meeting, also overflowing, at which the committee reported. We were all set. Chancellor Kimpton became the chairman of the SECC.

* * * *

Rehabilitation Plans

One evening late in 1956, I happened to sit in on a meeting of a committee of the Community Conference which was charged with maintaining an interracial neighborhood. They were discussing a report which would set up a new Tenant Referral Service which would attempt (among other things) to place white families in dwellings where they were needed to stem the tide. There were Negroes and whites on the committee; and it was touching to listen to them grappling with an impossible decision. They had learned from experience that mixed buildings did not work; when a Negro family moved into a building, there seemed no way to keep that building from turning. The next line of defense, if we were to have integration, was, therefore, to have mixed blocks; some buildings would be white, others Negro. If a family moved from a white-tenanted building in a mixed block, it was necessary to replace that family with another white family. Otherwise, the building would turn and, eventually, the block would turn.

It is true that the Tenant Referral Service would also try to place middle-class Negro families in blocks which were exclusively white. But they knew this was not the emergency task for which the Tenant Referral Service was being organized. They knew that they were agreeing to a system which, for the most part, would discriminate in favor of whites. It is true that the Conference was working hard for "open occupancy" all over the city, and for programs to help Negroes to get more and better housing more cheaply; they also understood that, if they succeeded in establishing a good mixed neighborhood, it would do more in the long run for Negro housing than if we bowed to the inevitable extension of the segregated ghetto. Nevertheless, it must have been painful for these dedicated, liberal people to agree to a program of racial discrimination which, for any success, implied some sort of a quota system.

Meanwhile, both of our community organizations had begun plans to rehabilitate the whole area. A house-by-house urban renewal survey in the spring of 1956 laid a solid foundation for realistic plans. We could not stem the tide, perhaps; but we could tear down our slums, thus eliminating the ghetto area, and try to control matters better in the rebuilding.

In the nature of the case, it was clear that any plan to save our neighborhood physically would require reducing the density of population. The most deteriorated parts would go; the people to leave would be the poor newcomers, the slum dwellers, almost all of them Negroes.

I do not know how many saw, at this time, the sort of moral crisis which we faced. It seemed clear to me that this great urban renewal program, which was obviously the only thing which could save our neighborhood and community, would probably fail because our moral position before the world would become clouded. Sensitive federal agencies and the city council of Chicago would eventually have to approve anything proposed for our neighborhood. We needed to keep our skirts exceedingly clean on the race issue. Yet, we were forced, in fact, to discriminate heavily, in the matter of housing against the Negroes, the most deprived group in the city.

I should make clear that nobody believes that, from 1948 to 1952, everyone in our neighborhood had suddenly become liberal. The university's reputation was well-tarnished by its years of leadership in keeping Negroes out. The less liberal elements in the community have switched sides because the choice was clearly not between an all-white neighborhood and a mixed neighborhood, but between a mixed neighborhood and an extension of the black belt, which was for them no neighborhood at all. We were united, therefore, partly by conviction, partly by naked necessity, in a program for residential integration.

But the community, and the city as a whole, had reason to suspect our good intentions. Since we could not keep Negroes out, was our whole noble scheme a way to get them out, and then to keep them out, by raising rents beyond their means?

In order for all our hopes not to be dashed at the last hour, it was essential that we get through a plan which would save the neighborhood, at the same time that we were clear in our own minds, and for all to see, that we wanted, and would have, a mixed neighborhood in which people of both races, and even poor people of both races, would live and work together.

What was needed was community discussion of the frankest kind on the most delicate issues, out of which could come basic agreement that the kind of community for which we were working was indeed this ideal. Exactly this has occurred in the past twelve months. Through all the legal processes to develop our urban renewal plan, discussion continued at meetings and in the press—discussion often painfully frank and difficult. In the course of it, we cemented our compact with the future: we would have an integrated neighborhood, no matter what. This community commitment to ourselves, was based on eight years of genuine work in the committees of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, where all problems were faced frankly by Negroes and whites together. In making the commitment now, as a whole community, we overpowered, not only our own doubts, but the suspicions of our intentions as well.

The great test came last spring. We had passed all hurdles of Washington and local agencies; the mayor of Chicago had publicly, clearly, and strongly espoused our cause. It was clear that our plans, as finally amended, would pass the city council.

* * * *

Conclusion

Our task of planning is only begun and I think we have learned that it is never finished. But the task now changes. How do we plan now for the kind of neighborhood that we want? A community like ours is as large as a city, but it has no government of its own. Most of what we can do depends on voluntary associations and the initiative of citizens. What real controls do we have, to put our ideals into practice? Perhaps, when the land is cleared, can we as citizens form a corporation and hold the stock, to develop some of the land as a community project? Our board of directors, responsive to a basic bylaw and the wishes of our stockholding members, could then build and manage a sizable group of dwelling units, strategically located, to assure that no form of racial segregation again sets in.

But, whatever further planning we do, it will now be not only a defensive delaying action. This itself is a great gain. And if, whatever our plans become, they succeed in the future, it will be because, as in the past six years, we have maintained moral unity; and this is only possible if the unity is for the purpose of racial integration, not segregation, based on continued discussion and planning for a community which pays no attention to the color of peoples' skins. I think in this next phase we shall have to face the issues of class differences as well; and, here again, we shall find ourselves discussing difficult moral problems and agreeing, I venture to predict, that the size of a bank account is not a more legitimate criterion for living in our community than is the color of skin. Eventually, we may even face the issue of cultural differences and decide that, in our particular community, not even middle-class definitions of social behavior are the only ones which we can tolerate. Then we might be able to show off a community which is diverse, as well as good, its members selected because that is the kind of community they want to live in. The whole result will be the culmination of a process which proves that a community of people can write its own destiny.

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CHAPTER 3 • *Nonviolence as a Problem-Solving Technique*

A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution

ARNE NAESS

I. Introductory Remarks

Since 1947 a great number of publications in the social sciences (taken in a broad sense) and in philosophy have had peaceful co-operation between the major power constellations of today as a main or subsidiary topic. Various surveys, such as the UNESCO publication *The Nature of Conflict*, show a reassuring richness in aspects and approaches. There has been little done, however, to utilize the vast potential of those attitudes of non-violence which have crystallized in more or less explicit ethical doctrines. Comparatively few publications attempt a synthesis of philosophical and social science approaches. In this paper an example of such a synthesis will be offered.

Any normative, systematic ethics containing a general norm against violence will be called an "ethics of non-violence." (The norm must, of course, exclude war for defensive purposes.) The term "violence" must cover not only open, physical violence but also injury and psychic terror. Th[illegible]rm "hostility" would, perhaps, give rise to more adequate associations. In the following an instance of such an ethics of non-violence, that of Gandhi will be given in a condensed, systematized form. This has not been attempted before. The task is important in part because it makes it more easy to distinguish essentials from non-essentials, and features due to

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particular historical situations from features of general, timeless, or at least very permanent validity or applicability.

II. Systematization D of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution

This part of the paper has a definite, very limited purpose: to give a brief and highly condensed exposition of one part of Gandhi's ethics of conflict.

In the realm of political action, Gandhi's views and precepts were usually explicit. According to his ethics, explicitness is a duty. His politically relevant actions were innumerable, and he made a running comment on them in terms of ethical appraisals. This makes it practicable to work out broad interrelated groups of sentences representing *rational reconstructions* or *models* covering Gandhi's ethically relevant verbal behavior.

The primary sources for this kind of inquiry are historical documents and other materials concerning Gandhi's activities, his own systematic writings, and his correspondence and the conversations, speeches, and so on, which were recorded or summarized by Mahadev Desai and others. Much of this material has already been printed and is easily available.

If I were to mention a publication which has particularly high value for rational reconstructions, I should choose the first volume of his *Non-Violence in Peace and War*. It was not written completely by Gandhi himself. It includes not only a collection of newspaper articles and letters but also recordings of conversations. They are all dated, and most of them refer to well-known political actions going on at the time. The concrete nature of the problems at issue does not reduce the philosophical value of the material. On the contrary. The interpretation of ethical texts of professional philosophers are usually hindered by an almost complete lack of reference to application in concrete situations. This holds good for Plato, Hobbes, Nietzsche, and others. Even constructed examples are sometimes lacking. Without abundant application to concrete and well-known situations, ethical doctrines are almost impenetrable to analysis.

In the following, one particular version, "D," of one particular rational reconstruction in the form of a normative system will be outlined. The system belongs to the class of systems which outline, reflect, or portray not all Gandhian thought but Gandhi's *ethics of group struggle between 1907 and 1934*. It does this, as far as I can judge, sufficiently closely and extensively to be considered an adequate rational reconstruction.

The version D is a condensed and therefore to some extent a rough exposition of the system. Concerning the adequacy of systematization D, the following should be added: The norms N1–N25 and most of the hypotheses are selected on the basis of a survey of norms and hypotheses in Gandhi's writings. Some of our formulations are rather close to those of Gandhi,



Diagram showing Derivations in Systematization D

others are only indirectly or in part derived from him. Our main concern has been to assure that all norms of group ethics necessary to justify and explain *satyagraha* (as described by Gandhi) are included, in a rough way, in N1–N25 and that no norm is contrary to the spirit of the formulations found in Gandhi's texts. Thus completeness or comprehensiveness has ranked high in our choice of D as a first approximation to an optimal version of the system.

The (necessary) documentation in testing the degree of material adequacy of the systematization D requires a separate article. Most of the quotations and comments required in such documentation are already published (in Norwegian) (2).

The question will not be raised as to what extent systematizations and systems may differ and still belong to the class of adequate rational reconstructions. There are presumably considerable changes in content which might be made without doing violence to the available observational material.

The ethics of group struggle is conceived in this article as a part of ethics in general, but with a certain amount of independence: the total set of its norms is derived from a small number of norms which concern group struggle and a set of (non-normative) hypotheses.

The dependence of the part upon the whole of ethics is structurally shown by the derivation of the basic norms concerning group struggle from norms of other parts of ethics. This dependence is also indicated by the fact that some of the norms of the particular version of the ethics of group struggle outlined here ("systematization D") can be derived from norms of other parts of ethics by processes of inference which do not include the basic norms of the ethics of group struggle. Thus norm N8, "Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent," in systematization D is derived from norm N4 and hypothesis H9, that is, from "If you are not able to subsume any of a group of relevant actions or attitudes as in themselves violent or constructive, then choose that action or attitude which most probably reduces the tendency to violence in the participants in the struggle" and "You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating and provoking him." But norm N8 might as well be derived from a code of conduct concerning behavior toward others, whether participants in a struggle or not. The historical data permit (of course) a number of different explications of the derivation of the top norm N1 of systematization D from top norms of general ethics. Here is one possibility, the *D-systematization. It is expressed in terms which certainly require much comment but which may be good enough for the present purpose of illustrating the dependence of the ethics of group struggle upon other parts of ethics:

**N1*. Seek complete self-realization.

**H1*. Complete self-realization presupposes that you seek truth.

**H2*. All living beings are ultimately one.

**H3*. Violence against yourself makes complete self-realization impossible.

**H4*. Violence against any living being is violence against yourself (derived from *H2).

**H5*. Violence against any living being makes complete self-realization impossible (derived from *H3 and *H4).

**N2*. Realize non-violence and seek truth (derived from *N1, *H1, and *H5).

N1. Act in group struggle and act, moreover, in a way conducive to long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence.

The derivation of N1 from the basic general norm of self-realization permits us to picture the ethics of group struggle as an application of that norm to particular situations. It should be noted that N1 is not characteristic of consistent (or rather extreme) pacifist positions, since it may be argued, without attacking N1, that killing in group struggle may in some situations be more conducive to the long-term, universal reduction of violence than non-killing.

Systematization D

N1. Act in group struggle and act, moreover, in a way conducive to long-term universal reduction of violence.

Sentence N1 is intended to express *the* top norm of the system. All other norms are conceived to be derivable from this norm + hypotheses. *The normative power of the system rests with N1 and N1 alone.* Instead of using the phrase "hypotheses and norms of the system," we might as well have the phrase "descriptions and prescriptions." The term "hypothesis" is used because it suggests what we wish to emphasize, the empirical, a posteriori, character of the statements. Since all norms of the system except N1 are prescribed only under the condition that certain hypotheses are true, the whole system except N1 is, in principle, open to scrutiny from a scientific point of view. That is, the validity of every single statement of the ethics of group struggle depends upon the truth and tenability of a set of empirical hypotheses, *testable only by the techniques of the social sciences*. This is asserted here in relation to systematization D only, but other systematizations would show a similar implicit dependence upon social science.

The top norm N1 is preferred to a norm simply saying "Do not use violence," because, among other things, it would be too narrow. N1 envisages a reduction of violence, not only the reduction of one's own violence. Gandhi demands not only personal abstention from violence but a conduct that does not provoke violence on the part of the opponent or anybody else affected by our conduct. Thus we should not humiliate him by certain kinds of passive resistance, because this is likely to produce hatred, which, in turn, may strengthen his disposition towards future use of violence.

There is another important aspect of N1: it requires that we act in group struggles and do not run away from the area of conflict. Here the basic attitude of the *karamayogi* reveals itself: one cannot retreat to the solitudes of the Himalayas in order to follow N1, because non-violence by mere isolation from others is not likely to induce non-violent behavior in others. It is by personal interaction in conflict situations that we can best reduce violence.

The use of the term "violence" in Gandhian texts is such that sometimes rather narrow and sometimes rather broad concepts can be made to fit the occurrence of the term. On the whole, "violence" is used to include much more than physical violence and injury. In this article we shall leave much of the ambiguity and vagueness untouched. For the purpose of systematization of a somewhat higher level of verbal precision than D, the following definition may suffice:

Definition 1: "The person P is violent toward the person Q in a given situation S (or at a given time T)" shall mean the same as "The person P is injuring or coercing, or he intends to injure or coerce, or he would, if given opportunity (in that situation) injure or coerce the person Q in the situation S (or at the time T)."

The person Q may be P himself. In a next approximation to an adequate systematization, the terms "injure" and "coerce" would also either have to be carefully introduced or substituted by others.

H1. The means determine the results.

Gandhi formulated his view on this point in a most categorical way. For instance, he wrote: "Means and ends are convertible in my philosophy of life. They say 'means are, after all, means.' I would say 'means are, after all, everything.' As the means, so the end." And he has expressed his idea in this way: "The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree." H1 might also be thus formulated: The character of the means determines the character of the results.

Hypotheses H2 and H3 below are derived from H1. They may, however, be considered separately; those who hesitate to accept Gandhi's strong view of means and ends should not make their evaluation of H2 and H3 wholly dependent on H1. The latter is difficult to confirm in its extremely general form.

H2. In a group struggle you can keep the goal-directed motivation and the ability to work effectively for the realization of the goal stronger than the destructive, violent tendencies and the tendencies to passiveness and despondency only by making a constructive program part of your campaign and by giving all phases of your struggle, as far as possible, a constructive character.

A quotation from his paper *Harijan* (1946) indicates how important Gandhi found this hypothesis: "By hammering away at it through painful years," replied Gandhi, "people have begun to see that there is a potency in non-violence, but they have not seen it in all its fullness and beauty. If they had responded to all the steps that had to be taken for the effective organization of non-violence and carried out in their fulness the various items of the eighteen-fold constructive programme, our movement would have taken us to our goal. But today our minds are confused because our faith in constructive work is so weak."

We assume tacitly that the goal is acceptable from the point of view of Gandhi's ethics as a whole. This assumption is used in relation to other hypotheses and norms of systematization D. The system is conceived as a part of a general system of ethics, and directives as to how to fight for a bad cause are irrelevant. This note is important because otherwise one cannot assume, as in H2, that there is an incompatibility between goal-directed motivation and destructive, violent tendencies.

H3. Being violent counteracts long-term, universal reduction of violence.

The qualification "long-term, universal" is used in order to provide a basis for the argument that, even if the short-term result of a war or of a minor violent act may be complete suppression of a large-scale violence that at the moment is threatening, the long-term effects of the violence are likely to result in more violence than was avoided as an immediate result.

N2. Make a constructive program part of your campaign and give, as far as possible, all phases of your struggle a constructive character.

Norm N2 is conceived to be derivable from N1 and the hypothesis H2.

N3. Never resort to violence against your opponent.

This norm is conceived to be derivable from N1 and H3. Actually, as formulated above, no derivation is, of course, possible in any strictly logical sense. Such derivation would require complete formalization of the system. Here we can only offer a point of departure for explications with adequate logical relations. Remarks similar to this are called for in many other instances in the following where the terms "derive" and "derivable" are used.

N4. If you are not able to subsume any of a group of relevant actions or attitudes as in themselves violent or constructive, then choose that action or attitude which most probably reduces the tendency toward violence (i.e., violent actions or attitudes) in the participants in the struggle (partisans as well as opponents).

This norm is derived from N1 as a specification of it (it might also be conceived as derived from N1 and H1).

The next norms are derived from norms N2, N3, and N4 with the aid of further hypotheses. In order to facilitate surveying the systematization as a whole, we shall write it out in a somewhat schematic way.

A norm is said to be on level k, $k > 1$, if it is directly derived from a norm of level $k-1$ together with certain hypotheses or as a specification of it. A hypothesis is said to be of level k, if it is used in the direct derivation of level $k+1$.

First-level norms and hypotheses:

N1, H1, H2, H3.

Second-level norms and hypotheses:

N2. Derived from N1 and H2.
N3. Derived from N1 and H3.
N4. Derived from N1 or from N1 and H1.

H4. You can give the struggle a constructive character only if you conceive it and carry it through as a struggle *in favor of* human beings and certain values, thus eventually fighting antagonisms, but not antagonists.

H5. It will have a constructive effect on you yourself and on those for whom you struggle if you live together with them and do constructive work for them.

H6. It will create a natural basis for confidence in you among those for whom you struggle if you live together with them and do constructive work for them.

H7. All human beings have interests—at least long-term interests—in common (derivable from *H2).

H8. Co-operation on common goals reduces the chance that the actions and attitudes of the participants in the conflict will become violent.

H9. You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating or provoking him.

Thus, if as part of a boycott of a university or a shop you lie down in the corridors so as to make it impossible for those opposed to the boycott to avoid stepping on you, your opponent is humiliated. He may refrain from entering the building for respectable ethical reasons or do it with resentment and anger. He is not likely to be won to your case, but, on the contrary, he will be more willing to use extreme measures in the conflict.

H10. Thorough knowledge of the relevant facts and factors increases the chance of a non-violent realization of the goal of your campaign.

Gandhi always acquired a thorough knowledge of relevant circumstances before he acted, and he warned his adherents against advocating his cause before they knew well the different aspects of the problems concerned.

H11. Secrecy and distortion or avoidance of truth reduce the chance of a non-violent realization of the goal of your campaign.

As has been indicated above, in the *D-systematization, the demand for truth was central in Gandhi's ethics.

It might be pointed out here as a subhypothesis that the intention to keep certain plans, moves, motives, and objectives secret influences our behavior so that we cannot face our opponent openly; such an intention is also more easily revealed to the opponent than we are likely to believe.

H12. You are less likely to take a violent attitude, the better you make clear to yourself what are the essential points in your cause and your struggle.

H13. Your opponent is less likely to use violent means, the better he understands your conduct and your case.

On the whole, Gandhi would insist that we inform our opponent more completely and especially by action, not mere proclamations.

H14. There is a disposition in every opponent such that wholehearted, intelligent, strong, and persistent appeal in favor of a good cause is able ultimately to convince him.

Gandhi tended to include any normal person in the intended field of validity of this hypothesis, interpreting "normal" wide enough to cover Hitler. A person's capacity to convince the opponent may be inadequate, but it can be developed.

H15. Mistrust stems from misjudgment, especially of the disposition of your opponent to answer trust with trust and mistrust with mistrust.

There are many examples in Gandhi's writings of this conception of trust and mistrust. His life likewise offers examples of the way he trusted people strongly opposed to him and the courage he thus proved. He repeatedly risked his own life by believing that he could trust his opponents when he met them personally.

H16. The tendency to misjudge our opponent and his case in an unfavorable direction increases his and our tendency to resort to violence.

H17. You can win most thoroughly with non-violent means by turning your opponent into a believer in and supporter of your case.

No effort has been made to derive some of the hypotheses from others. By suitable modifications, H15 and H17 might be derived from H14.

Third-level norms and hypotheses:

N5 (derived from N2 and H4). Conceive your struggle and carry it through as a positive struggle *in favor of* human beings and certain values, thus eventually fighting antagonisms, but not antagonists.

It may be mentioned, as an example, that Gandhi in his most famous campaign supported the people in making salt rather than instigate them against the empire salt producers and their factories. The situation desired was anticipated. One should fight the antagonism, not the antagonists.

N6 (*derived from N2 and H5 or from N4 and H6*). Live together with those for whom you struggle and do constructive work for them.

N7 (*derived from N2 and H7 or from N4 and H7 and H8*). Try to formulate the essential interests which you and your opponent have in common and try to establish a co-operation with your opponent on this basis.

N8 (*derived from N3 or from N4 and H9*). Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent.

N9 (*derived from N4 and H10*). Acquire the best possible knowledge of the facts and factors relevant to the non-violent realization of the goal of your cause.

N10 (*derived from N4 and H11*). Do your utmost in order to be in full accordance with the truth in your description of individuals, groups, institutions, and circumstances relevant to the struggle.

N11 (*derived from N4 and H11*). Do not use secret plans or moves or keep objectives secret.

N12 (*derived from N4 and H12 and H13*). Announce your case and the goal of your campaign explicitly and clearly, distinguishing essentials from non-essentials.

N13 (derived from N4 and H13). Seek personal contact with your opponent and be available to him.

N14 (derived from N3 or from N4 and H16). Do not judge your opponent harder than yourself.

N15 (derived from N4, H14, H15, and H16). Trust your opponent.

N16 (derived from N4, H14, and H17). Turn your opponent into a believer in and supporter of your case.

H18. You provoke your opponent if you destroy his property.

H19. Adequate understanding of your opponent presupposes personal *Einfühlung.*

H20. Avoidance of misjudgment of your opponent and his case presupposes understanding him and his case.

H21. If one keeps in mind one's own fallibility and failures, opponents are less likely to be misjudged in an unfavorable way, and their case underestimated intellectually or morally.

H22. Every political action, your own included, is likely to be based, in part, on mistaken views and to be carried out in an imperfect way.

H23. You make it difficult for your opponent to turn to support of your case if you are unwilling to compromise on non-essentials.

H24. It furthers the conversion of your opponent if he understands that you are sincere.

H25. The best way of convincing your opponent of your sincerity is to make sacrifices for your cause.

H26. During a campaign, change of its declared objective makes it difficult for opponents to trust your sincerity.

Gandhi has in mind the expansion of objectives at moments of weakness in the opponent, and contraction when it seems that the strength of the opponent has been underrated.

Fourth level of norms:

N17 (derived from N8 and H18). Do not destroy property belonging to your opponent.

N18 (derived from N14 and H19 and H20). Cultivate personal *Einfühlung* with your opponent.

N19 (derived from N10 or from N14 and H20). Do not formulate your case and the goal of your campaigns and that of your opponent in a biased way.

N20 (derived from N14 and H21). Keep in mind and admit your own mistakes and weaknesses.

N21 (derived from N14 and H21). Keep in mind and admit the possibility that you are factually or morally mistaken, even when you sincerely believe that you are not.

N22 (derived from N16 and H22 and H23). Be always willing to compromise in non-essentials.

N23 (derived from N16 and H24). Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent.

N24 (derived from N16 and H24 and H25). Be willing to make sacrifices for your cause.

N25 (derived from N16 and H24 and H26). During a campaign, do not change its objective by making its goal wider or narrower.

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III. Application to Efforts of Peaceful International Co-operation

The foregoing system of norms formidably restricts the field of justifiable forms of conflict resolution. It is, however, the claim of the proponents of ethics of non-violence *that such a system does not leave out any effective form of conflict resolution.* It is presupposed that the goal is justifiable from the point of view of general ethics. It is claimed, therefore, that no effective (powerful, adequate) form is excluded for those who fight for a good cause against opponents who fight for a bad cause. The criteria of goodness offered by Gandhi and others are such that no statesmen of today would openly reject them. That is, contemporary men in power would proclaim their goals to be good in the sense required.

In view of this; the ethics of non-violence claims to give the effective means of reaching at least one of the goals of the major powers in present-day international politics, namely, that of peaceful co-operation in the minimum sense.

Grave questions arise immediately, however, when this common goal is seen in combination with other goals of more traditional kinds, such as ideological or economic domination or leadership. Here the antagonists impute to each other the most sinister designs. But the possibility that the antagonist is fighting also for bad causes, according to each of the participants, does not, according to the above, make the non-violent forms of struggle less effective. It reduces the chances that non-violent methods are wholeheartedly adopted, but not the chances of success, if adopted.

Which are now the main forms of struggle which satisfy the non-violence norms? In a general way, using a powerful slogan, they may be characterized as forms *effecting a liquidation of antagonism, not antagonists.*

In order not to lose contact with the forms that have been actually tried out with a fair degree of success, the techniques of Gandhi will be taken as representative examples. His field of action was threefold: international politics (South Africa and India versus the British Empire), interracial, interideological conflicts (Hindu-Moslem riots, etc.), and economic conflicts (management versus labor, village industry and agriculture versus mechanization, etc.).

The more extreme forms of struggle (strikes, fasting, etc.) will here be called "Gandhian *satyagraha*" and will be considered to make up a subclass of forms satisfying the norms and hypotheses of version D. Before Gandhi resorted to *satyagraha*, his activity would go through five interrelated phases:

1. Accumulation and analysis of factual information concerning the conflict (on the spot). Unbiased exposition of the main facts relating to the conflict, with extensive use of the opponents as judges (*audi alteram partem*).
2. Clarification of essential (long-range) interests in common with the antagonists (*presupposition*: there are always common interests).
3. Tentative formulation of a limited goal for immediate action acceptable to both parties in terms of common interests and in accordance with the ultimate norm of self-realization.
4. Discussion of the tentative formulations, person to person and face to face, and not merely as negotiators or representatives. Clarification of the instrumental value of the limited goal is resolving a part or aspect of the struggle.
5. In case of persistent resistance from one of the parties concerned, search for a compromise without giving up essentials. That is, search for a compromise affecting limited interests, not basic values.

If, *and only if*, these activities did not bear fruit, Gandhi would consider it justifiable (and effective) to resort to *satyagraha*.

The different forms of *satyagraha* planned and used by Gandhi were adapted to a very different situation from that confronted by a man who intends to contribute to conditions of peaceful co-operation between the major power constellations of today. There are two major differences of situations: (1) Personal contacts between the opposite groups (Indian-English, Moslem-Hindu, etc.) were very extensive and intensive in India (and South Africa). The present problem relates to groups with very small personal contact. Further, (2) in India it was mainly a question of relations between a physically mightier and a physically weaker group, whereas today there is roughly an equilibrium, both sides being eager not to let the other be physically stronger.

Gandhi's forms of *satyagraha* will therefore not be described in this paper. Gandhi himself stressed that, for him, the basic tenets of non-violence are central, not *satyagraha* as developed by him or others.

It is our contention that a renewed scrutiny of the non-violence norms, independent of Gandhian *satyagraha*, will lead to important considerations as to the attitudes and measures to be taken in international politics. It is characteristic of this situation that the five conditions necessary to justify extreme forms of struggle are not, or only in part, fulfilled.

The basic norm of the ethics of group struggle does not permit a mere personal avoidance of violence but requires us to take part in struggles and in such a way as to reduce the chances of violence in general. Applied to problems of co-operation between East and West, this means that it is the duty of all concerned to partake in solving them.

According to hypotheses H2 and H4 and to norms N2 and N5 (we refer consistently to systematization D), the struggle between Soviet-oriented and NATO-oriented powers must be given a positive content. This has, for example, the implication that one should avoid any step merely dictated *against* an institution (anti-communism, anti-imperialism) or, even worse, *against* an individual or a group of people. One's actions should have the character of being *in favor* of positive values and principles *in support* of human beings. It is, furthermore, in accordance with these hypotheses and norms if one co-operates on what are considered to be common objectives and tasks, possibly on the common tasks and objectives of mankind, both in the relation between the power groups and in areas outside them, e.g., in technically underdeveloped countries.

Hypothesis H3 is applicable to the idea of preventive war, preventive terror, or any other violence engaged in, in order to reduce a greater amount or a greater intensity of violence.

It is not possible here to examine each norm and hypothesis separately. N9, which stresses the importance of a thorough knowledge of the facts and factors relevant to the struggle, is of considerable importance, however.

This applies not only to statesmen but also to the people at large. Enduring efforts to create, in all countries, a first-class research and information service and education dealing with international relations are highly important.

N13 and also other norms and hypotheses stress the necessity of maximum *personal* contact between those engaged in the struggle. The evident consequence of this is a policy of opening the borders. It breaks N13 to use a social boycott to mark moral indignation (e.g., to stop student exchanges between two countries in order to mark moral indignation concerning an action undertaken by one of these countries) or to refuse entrance into the country before certain conditions are fulfilled. There are no conditions under which one, according to Gandhi, can refuse to meet one's opponent; and, as this refers to all participants, it s not a norm affecting contact only between politicians.

The personal contact norms and hypotheses go against the assumption that real understanding of the struggle can be reached on the verbal plane. That is, the mass communication media are insufficient vehicles of information. The understanding at present between the eastern European and western European population must, according to this, be largely illusory, since personal contacts are at a near-zero level. According to H11 and other norms and hypotheses, on the other hand, the good effects of personal contacts will be reduced or impeded if they are exploited, e.g., for propaganda purposes, i.e., if the truth norm is not respected.

The above shows that even if the already developed forms of *satyagraha* will be applicable only after an increase in international personal contacts, the ethics of non-violence has considerable bearing upon the problems of coexistence.

The prescriptions resulting from application of the norms of non-violence are, on the whole, such as are put forward as recommendations from various groups of researchers in social science. The chief differences are found in relative priorities and in the ultimate justification of the actions prescribed.

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On the Meaning of Nonviolence

JOHAN GALTUNG

1. Approaches to the Study of Nonviolence

In this article an effort will be made to clarify the concept of nonviolence (NV) and indicate what kind of research would be needed to explore its potentialities further. Thus, the article does not present original data nor does it elaborate a theory of nonviolence. Rather, it is an effort to strip the concept of nonviolence of some of its surplus meanings, to lay it bare so to speak—and then see what is in it from the point of view of theoretical and empirical social science. In doing this one may run the risk of getting too far off the mark, of depriving the concept of too much of its content—but this will be discussed during the process. The point of departure is simply this: is it possible to do anything with a concept so overloaded with emotional connotations, so embedded in ideology, or is it—perhaps like alienation—one of these concepts that should preferably be split into components that are then subjected to separate scrutiny?

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What this reveals is only how problematic the concept is, and how necessary it may be to give the study of NV a new deal conceptually by starting a discussion of it from another angle, so to speak. This other approach would have nothing empirical for its support, but it may direct the attention towards empirical analyses, some of them within the classical purview of NV, some of them outside. One would bring to the discussion a new "intension", a normative rather than descriptive definition. Broadly speaking one may distinguish between an analysis of the concept in value terms and in other terms,. here referred to as action terms. Thus, one may start right out with a definition of NV as a value and then try and find the patterns of action that are compatible with the value in the sense that they do not

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Johan Galtung, "On the Meaning of Nonviolence," Journal of Peace Research, *No. 3 (1965). Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

directly or in their consequences lead to states of the world where the value does not obtain. In a sense this is the ideal approach, but it presupposes a very clear image of what NV is about.

Since we do not feel we have that image we shall prefer a second approach, starting with a typology of a special kind of actions which we shall call "influence techniques" and then work ourselves towards not one but a set of definitions with that typology as a point of departure.

* * * *

2. An Action Theory Approach

Nonviolence will here be conceived of as a style of action, where by actions we shall mean, in this context, patterns of behavior observable by others. Thus, we are not concerned with inner states of mind as long as they do not enter an interaction sequence between two parties. Thus, we start out with the traditional sociological paradigm involving two actors in interaction, Ego and Alter (they can be individuals, groups or nations), engaged in an action dialogue. We put ourselves in the position of Ego, we watch Alter emitting an action and try to find out what went on before he so did; because we are concerned with the problem of influencing his action in a nonviolent way.

To get at a reasonably systematic basis for the derivation of some principle of influence, consider the following (simplified) scheme of how an action is arrived at. We assume that Alter in a situation S has a finite set of action-possibilities (A), where by an "action" we mean any set of properties that Alter exposes in S, manifest or latent, by omission or by comission. One has to make a distinction here between the actions that are conceivable, the actions that are objectively possible for P to perform, and the actions that are subjectively possible—that he "can" perform. We assume that the following conditions have to be fulfilled for an action to be chosen from an action-space, A:

1. The action has to be biologically possible,
2. The action has to be physically possible,
3. The action has to be perceived or cognized,
4. The action has to be "worth while", which means the value-balance from
    a. the intrinsic value of the action,
    b. the internalized sanctions (personal sanctions),
    c. the institutionalized sanctions (social sanctions) has to be maximum relative to the same value-balance for the other actions in A.

* * * *

All this is as seen by Alter. From Ego's point of view it looks different: he is concerned with the consequences for him or for some system of which he is a part.

He also has an idea of the range of actions open to Alter (Ego's perception of *A*, E(*A*)), an idea which may be correct or incorrect. All degrees of overlap between A(*A*) and E(*A*), the perceptions the two have of the actions A can perform in S, are empirically possible. Over this set of actions Ego defines a value-function, giving for each action the value of the action as seen by Ego. This value is what we have called "intrinsic", it is what Ego derives directly from Alter's actions. Thus, if for simplicity we assume that A(*A*) and E(*A*) are identical, *A* is divided into these nine combinations:

TABLE 2. THE EVALUATIONS OF ALTER'S ACTION-SET.

		Alter's evaluation			
		positive	neutral	negative	
Ego's evaluation	positive	+,+	+,o	+,−	N+.
	neutral	o,+	o,o	o,−	No.
	negative	−,+	−,o	−,−	N−.
		N.+	N.o	N.−	N

If we use N as a symbol for number of actions, then the problem of influence from Ego's point of view is the problem of arriving at as high values of N+. and as low values of N−. over time as possible. Thus, a simple measure of the degree of satisfaction Ego obtains from Alter's actions after a sequence of N emitted actions would be:

$$M: \frac{N+.\ -\ N-.}{N}$$

The value of the measure lies in the possibilities it opens for a simple measure of influence: one calculates the measure before and after an influence policy has been pursued and calculates the gain $M_{\text{after}} - M_{\text{before}}$ relative to M_{before}. The obvious circumstance that influence will have to be measured relative to what one obtains with no influence policy is thus built into the measure.

One might now calculate the degree of agreement between the evaluations by Ego and Alter of what Alter is doing (or of what Ego is doing if we choose to change the vantage point). If the agreement is *high*, i.e. if the distribution is concentrated on the main diagonal, then one may talk about *integration* of the value standards since they both pursue the same actions and avoid the same actions; if the distribution is concentrated on the bidiagonal, then the disagreement is high and there is *conflict* since what one of them pursues is what the other one avoids; and if there is neither agreement nor disagreement but close to statistical independence, then there is a basis for *coexistence* if Ego and Alter agree to build their interaction sequence around main diagonal rather than bidiagonal actions. It should be noted that for this type of analysis covariance (positive or negative) is not enough, for the covariance is maximum also when the distribution is concentrated on one of the diagonals parallel to the main diagonal or the bidiagonal. The analysis must be in terms of agreement or disagreement.

One might also make a distinction here between *weak conflict*, where $N +, + = 0$ which means that there is no action that both parties value highly and *strong conflict* where also $N +, 0 + N0, 0 + N0, + = 0$ which means that whatever Alter chooses to do the action is negative to at least one of them. In both cases Ego will be concerned with the problem of steering Alter in the right direction and away from the wrong choices—which is precisely the problem of influence. Thus, conflict behavior is only a special case, a particularly difficult case since Ego can no longer point to an action agreeable to both of them.

The problem is now to what extent our paradigm of how an action is arrived at gives us a heuristically useful basis for a typology of influence mechanisms. Ego's problem is essentially 1. to make Alter perform actions of the type $+, -$ and 2. to make him refrain from actions of the type $-, +$. In other words, it is simply to direct Alter away from certain actions, and towards other actions. This should be easy if Alter's evaluation of the action is neutral because that means that he may do it and then he may refrain from doing it—and it represents no problem at all if the two evaluations coincide. Hence, there are essentially two kinds of influence:

the negative approach: increase the probability that Alter refrains from actions negative to Ego,

the positive approach: increase the probability that Alter performs actions positive to Ego.

According to the general model this must be done by facilitating the selection of positive actions and impeding the selection of negative actions. Here is a chart of the possibilities that arise from this kind of thinking:

TABLE 3. Patterns of Influence

Dimension of influence	*Negative approach*	*Positive approach*
1. Biological	1. Reducing human capabilities	7. Extending human capabilities
2. Physical	2. Increasing constraints	8. Decreasing constraints
3. Cognitive	3. Delearning of old action-possibilities	9. Learning of new action-possibilities
4. Axiological, intrinsic	4. Based on dysphoria	10. Based on euphoria

Dimension of influence	*Negative approach*	*Positive approach*
5. *Axiological, internalized*	5. Based on bad conscience	11. Based on good conscience
6. *Axiological, institutionalized*	6. Based on punishment	12. Based on rewards

This catalogue of influence techniques is in a sense a catalogue of human interaction itself, for any human action or interaction will have components along these twelve dimensions although some of them may be zero. On the negative side are the three most drastic techniques of human influence if they are interpreted in the extreme sense: complete biological incapacitation called death, complete physical constraint called isolation (prisons and asylums) and complete delearning called brain-washing—with the last technique so far less developed. If these three techniques, singly or in combination, are applied so as to cut off the entire negative region of *A*, then the axiological constraints have no function. But if there is some leeway left after the first three have been operating, then the axiological constraints become operative, and may narrow down the range of actions further. And then there are all the positive techniques. The problem is now what this scheme looks like relative to other schemes for the analysis of influence.

In an earlier article[5] we have used a tripartite typology of techniques of influence, based on such authors as Morgenthau, Sorokin and Etzioni. To provide for continuity in the thinking about influence and compliance the relations between the present twelve-fold and that three-fold typology should be pointed out, since this may also clarify some issues. It is actually quite simple:

TABLE 4. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN TYPOLOGIES OF INFLUENCE.

System reference	*personal*	*social*	*physical*
Morgenthau's terms	persuasion	bargaining	force
Sorokin's terms	familistic	contractual	compulsory
Etzioni's terms	normative	remunerative	coercive
Present typology	internalized sanctions	institutionalized sanctions	biological physical, negative only

In practice, however, the distinctions are not that sharp. Thus, if a fence is built so big that Alter is not able to climb it, is this a biological or physical constraint? We will say it is a physical constraint since nothing has been done to Alter; it is the moment when he is deprived of health (and for that reason is unable to climb the fence) that a biological constraint is introduced. And where is the borderline between bodily harm used as a negative social sanction, and bodily harm used as a biological constraint? One suggestion is as follows: bodily harm used as a social sanction only functions as a constraint insofar as it is anticipated, for it comes after the action has been committed; bodily harm as a biological constraint is prior to the action. But this important distinction is blurred in practice, because bodily punishment may later serve as a biological constraint, and a biological constraint may also be used as a bodily punishment—as when an enemy soldier is killed 1. because he has invaded the nation, 2. to prevent him from advancing further.

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[5] Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, "Patterns of Diplomacy," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1965, p. 104.

If one compares tables 3 and 4 it becomes evident that the tripartite division of Morgenthau, Sorokin and Etzioni omits the two dimensions we have called "cognitive" and "intrinsic". The latter is strange in a sense since the case of actions organized around intrinsic values, with no internalized or institutionalized norms interfering, is well known in social science theory: it is the case of *anomic* action. Actions are evaluated for their intrinsic value, there are no norms that interfere. Or rather: the norms are not supported by sanctions.

As to the cognitive dimension its importance is so obvious that that alone may be one reason why it has not been used as a focus for organizing theory. But just as much as there is a social process that corresponds to the internalization of norms, *socialization*, there is a process that corresponds to the extension of the perceived action-space, *learning*, and this will be made use of later.

However, the major difference between table 3 and table 4 is not the circumstance that table 3 expands the trichotomy from table 4 by adding two more and splits "force" into a biological and physical component. *Rather the difference lies in the vertical axis of table 3, the distinction between the negative and positive approaches. By and large social science theory has been so concerned with the horizontal division into kinds of influence that this distinction has been lost sight of.* One finds references to good vs. bad conscience and positive vs. negative sanctions etc., but not efforts to construct theories that probe into what social systems, organizations or even societies would look like if they were organized around one or the other of these approaches. It is at this point that the old debate about where the borderline between violence and nonviolence is located may become useful.

3. The Borderlines between Violence and Nonviolence

There are several axes in this dilemma. One of them takes for granted that violence refers to bodily harm and nonviolence to the abstention from it and asks: *which bodies?* One can imagine here a system of concentric circles where each new circle adds one more class of "bodies" to those who have already been defined as sacred in the sense that they should be exempt from bodily harm. In the center stands Ego himself, around him are the primary groups of which he is a member (this might include his nation), outside that again the groups of which he is a non-member but nevertheless relates himself to (enemies) and tertiary groups that only exist as categories to him (convenient targets of prejudice)—and then come the circles that would include nonhuman forms of life ranging from mammals down to flowers and lower organisms. This system may be refined and much of the debate about nonviolence is concerned with how many circles should be included.

Another axis of this problem will become increasingly relevant with the development of certain gases and other biological and chemical agents that can be subsumed under the heading of non-lethal violence (NLV)[6]. Actually, this is not the most fortunate term because many forms of violence are not lethal. The classical types of violence based on *piercing* the body (knife, sword, bullet), *cutting* it (sword), *crushing* it (catapults etc.), *burning* it (flame-thrower, napalm), and *explosions* (which are based on combinations of the first four) may also be nonlethal. Alter may emerge wounded, not dead, whether this was deliberate or due to inefficiency. The point is rather that such violence is *reversible*, it is temporary only, and may serve the purpose of incapacitation as long as necessary instead of forever. For this purpose gases are not necessary, the techniques above can all be used when a policeman aims for the legs of an escaping bandit. Gases merely have some tactical advantages from this point of view, insofar as they probably can be designed precisely to this purpose, like when the surgeon prefers a scalpel to an ax for an operation. As biological incapacitation NLV is certainly violence, but as for the circles of decreasing identification above it is not obvious where the exact borderline should be drawn. However, we are more concerned with a third axis of the problem.

One can look at the list of twelve techniques in table 3 and ask: where does the borderline between violent and non-violent techniques of influence run? In other words, what is the "essence" of violence, what is the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that something should satisfy in order to qualify as a violent technique? Moreover, it is obvious that violence and non-violence form a dichotomy so that anything is one or the other? Are they contradictories? Contraries? Two separate and independent dimensions?

We shall distinguish between four concepts of violence and try to arrive at useful definitions of non-violence by way of an analysis of violence.

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[6] A. C. Nunn, "The Arming of an International Police," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1965, pp. 187–191.

1. *Violence as biological incapacitation.* This concept of violence is probably the most widely used, even though it is often qualified by such conditions as "direct", and "intended". The concept is linked to the idea of health, violence is deliberate health-reduction.

2. *Violence as reduction of action-space.* This concept of violence would also include such techniques as physical constraint and brain-washing since they both imply a reduction of the action-space of Alter so that he no longer has any choice.

3. *Violence as negative influence approach.* This concept of violence would also include all other efforts to decrease the probability that a negative action is selected.

4. *Violence as influence.* This concept of violence would include all efforts to influence Alter at all, claiming that any influence is interference with his free will.

By negation, we get four concepts of non-violence . . .

* * * *

Violence or the *narrow* concept of violence is based on bodily incapacitation or deprivation of health alone—all other efforts to influence would be defined as non-violence. It seems reasonable to refer to this as the *negative* concept of non-violence. Against this one may object that physical and perceptual constraints cut slices off the action-space of Alter so that he no longer has any choice; even if he wanted to perform the negative act he is no longer free to do so because it is no longer physically possible for him, or he no longer sees the act as possible. Thus we arrive at what we shall call the *middle* concepts of violence or non-violence. Against this concept of violence it may be objected that there is only a shade of difference between suppressing or repressing an act in the mind of Alter and making it so unattractive through manipulation of value-standards, internalized sanctions and punishments that the real borderline is between the positive and the negative approach to influence. With the negative approach human possibilities are narrowed down, one tries to cut down on human variety, reduce it. There is also the free will argument: by using the negative approach one tries to scare Alter away from action-choices, thus making him less free to choose an action in the negative region. This would lead to what we may call the *broad* concept of violence, or the *positive* concept of non-violence: *violent influence is the use of the negative approaches, non-violent influence is the use of the positive approaches.* Thus we define violence as any activity that aims at reducing human action-spaces by excluding actions, non-violence as any activity that aims at enlarging action-spaces by including actions or making them more attractive. This gives non-violence a positive content different from merely abstention from violence in the biological sense—and this should be expressed by means of a positive term. However, no such term has so far gained universal acceptance among workers in the field.

The rather rudimentary "free will" argument used above can also be stretched into the field of positive techniques of influence. It can be argued that any effort to influence Alter in a conflict situation changes the value-function he has defined over his action-space, whether it is by cutting off actions, by imputing negative values to undesired actions or by imputing positive values to desired actions, and that any change is an interference with Alter's decision and that any interference is some kind of violence. Correspondingly, there would be a concept of non-violence excluding any effort to influence Alter. We shall refer to these concepts as the *total* concept of violence and the *vacuous* concept of non-violence, respectively.

The vacuous concept of non-violence which accepts human actions only insofar as they do not influence others in their choice will be rejected as uninteresting. It does not belong to a world where human interaction and interdependence are both inevitable and desirable to most. Moreover, it is empirically empty because any interaction will contain elements of influence since no action-dialogue can be said to be entirely value-neutral to the partner in the interaction. Hence, it is fulfilled in isolation, but not in the kind of enforced isolation mentioned as the extreme of technique no. 2; in the voluntary isolation of the hermit. In an isolation of this kind, according to sociological theory, an essential prerequisite for bringing out what is distinctly human in human beings is no longer present, which means that this kind of non-violence best can be classified as self-defeating.

Since the medium definitions are less sharp and interesting we are essentially left with narrow and broad concepts of violence and the corresponding negative and positive concepts of non-violence. These concepts merit further consideration, with no tendency to be invidious and declaring that one is more "correct" than the other.

First of all, it should be noticed that what we said about Ego and Alter being individuals, groups or nations also applies to the typologies. The distinction between violent and non-violent techniques of influence is certainly not restricted to the field of international interaction in general, or in international conflict in particular. It can be meaningfully applied to all three levels and also to all possible combinations: conflicts between individuals and groups (e.g. social ostracism), conflicts between individuals and nations (e.g. delinquents) and conflicts between groups and nations (e.g. exploitation of an underdog group). Thus, just as the problem of influence is universal, it concerns all levels of human interaction at all times and all places, so is the problem of non-violent influence. Whether a social system, built around non-violent techniques of influence—in the positive or negative senses—is viable is a matter to be decided on the basis of the best theory and data available. As long as no decision is reached analyses and ideologies become less interesting if they limit themselves to less than all these levels of human interaction.

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5. Nonviolent Action Reexamined

Since the whole purpose of the preceding sections has been to get a theoretical lever for the theory of non-violent actions, some such actions will now be examined in this light. In so doing, Gene Sharp's work in the extensional tradition of non-violent analysis is most helpful,[21] it is by far the most comprehensive and analytically useful work produced in the field. And it brings out one of our fundamental points: that nonviolence so far, and particularly in the Western as opposed to the Gandhian tradition is basically negative non-violence based on the negative approach to influence. There exist elaborate techniques to impede the choice of negative actions, short of biological incapacitation, but extremely little explicitly on how to channel interaction into the desired directions.

Thus, in general the following statements are probably correct: 1. most nonviolent actions have been engaged in by people as deeply biased in favor of negative influence as the society around them, 2. they have refrained from violence in the narrow and biological sense also for the simple reason that they have not had access to its tools, arms, 3. the distance between the NVA group and its antagonists has been considerable, partly as rank distance in the society (between classes or ethnic groups), partly due to polarization in conflict (as during a fight of liberation) and this has impeded the development of more positive techniques. Inventiveness has been employed to increase the reservoir of negative techniques short of biological violence. Because of their structural similarity with biological violence, as negative techniques of influence, their practice of non-violence has not yielded training in positive techniques of influence, which means that the probability will be high that violence will be used once the nonviolent group gets access to arms—for instance after national "independence", or "equality" has been obtained.

To discuss briefly some of the major forms of NVA one has to get at some of the principles behind them rather than discuss them separately. Some of these principles are very closely related to the typology of influence, some of them have components along several dimensions of that typology. However, although various forms of non-violent action can be classified and analyzed using the typology of table 3, the non-violence tradition has given some particular and highly interesting variations of the general theme of how to make other people do what you want them to do—and even want to do it (which is the difference between influence and accepted influence).

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[21] Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action: A Study in the Control of Political Power* (forthcoming). Also see his chapter in Roberts, Frank, Naess, Sharp, [*Civilian Defence* (London: Peace News, 1964)], and the two appendices prepared by him on "81 cases of nonviolent action" and on "definitions of a few key terms."

5.1. The Structuring of the Action-Space Approach. One of the most important aspects of non-violence is its effort to use dramatic techniques to point out to Alter how his actions are perceived by Ego. These techniques must be interpreted against a background of violent resistance with discontinuous jumps between acquiescence on the one hand and outbursts of violence on the other. Violence also has the function of announcing to Alter where the negative actions are located, and a difficulty in some forms of conflict behavior has been precisely to detach announcement from incapacitation, physical constraint and punishment. The non-violent actions include such dramatic forms as particular types of picketing and vigilance, often combined with sufficient self-inflicted suffering (standing all day, sitting in front of an embassy all night, swimming, marching etc.) to underline the message.

What is apparently missing here is a way of pointing out to the antagonist in which direction the positive actions are located. This is closely related to the problem of form and content of demonstrations. To take an example from the occupation of Norway: Norwegians who demonstrated against the Germans by wearing red caps ("jøssinglue"), or paper clips in their lapels. The communication was probably faulty because the message was unclear: these symbols emerged more or less by chance and had a clear anti-German connotation in addition to being a way of announcing one's own stand. But as communication of what one wanted the Germans to do it was probably unsuccessful. There are two reasons for this. Such communication was to some extent taken care of by other means, and there is a basic reason why communication of what the antagonist should *not* do is more easily done than communication of what he should do:

The clearest technique for communicating the positive aspect of Alter's action possibilities, from the point of view of the reservoir of non-violent actions, is probably found in the approaches that can be described as "positive role-playing" and the "status quo ante" approach. In the first approach Ego engages in role behavior of such a kind that if Alter responds adequately, within the role language Ego tries to establish, then Alter's actions would be positive. In the second approach Ego continues as before unperturbed by Alter's bad actions—this approach presupposes that Alter somehow has changed the situation to the worse, otherwise "continues as before" would simply mean acquiescence.

These techniques notwithstanding, why is it so difficult to point out positive actions? This is probably best illustrated by well known aspects of the contemporary international situation. A stalemate in the power struggle may lead to some kind of (temporary) balance, which in turn may lead to very clear demarcations of the zones of proscribed behavior with penalties attached to them: if you cross this borderline (literally or otherwise) the result is war. One hears less about the positive actions, and the reason seems partly to be that there is little belief that they will occur, partly that so much of the role-playing in the conflict situation (whether one plays the game violently or non-violently) is built around the image of the role-partner as always engaged in negative action, and partly because conflict polarization leads to the definition of the adversary as all out wrong. To indicate to him actions that are positive short of complete conversion is seen as an indication that less than complete conversion is needed, and as a temptation to relax in the efforts to draw home a complete victory. Consequently, no gradual path of conversion is pointed out.

5.2. *The Physical Approach.* Since we assume that all efforts to engage in biological incapacitation are ruled out in a system of nonviolent conflict resolution, the next possibility lies in the general physical approach. Isolation, confinement, would be included in a repertoire of negative nonviolence but not of positive nonviolence, and the same applies to sabotage. By itself there is no reason why sabotage could not be included in negative nonviolence, provided it is carried out in such a way as not to harm any life. In order for this to be fulfilled the sabotage will probably have to be directed towards things that are under one's own possession and jurisdiction and that the antagonist might profit from. A scorched earth tactic deprives the antagonists of some of the physical means of his negative actions, and is harmless for him biologically. He can protect his *own* possessions from sabotage by a nonviolent group by tying individuals to it in such a way that any harm to the property will mean loss of human lives (the use of hostages on board trains, etc.)—but this would not only apply to the sabotage of things that are not under the antagonist's jurisdiction. A special case is mass migration to deprive the antagonist of the access to oneself by putting it outside his action-space, or escape, or hiding. In all cases Alter is deprived of gratification because of physical constraints in the system, and there is a negative amplification effect (see 5.4).

Again the approach has a distinct bias to the negative side. One might compare it, not with violent sabotage where the point is to do maximum damage both to personnel and property, nor with total abstinence from sabotage, migration or similar techniques, but to a positive use of this kind of manipulation of the action-space. One might not only destroy mines, harbors and other facilities so that an invader could not make use of them, but facilitate his participation in other activities considered desirable, such as common enterprises, coproduction, etc., and seeking contact with the adversary (the opposite of escape). Much training is probably needed before an approach of this kind would no longer be regarded as treason, deeply embedded as people are in the idea that only the negative approach is appropriate in conflict situations. To harm own property instead of Alter's is already a radical idea.

5.3. The Sanction Approach. In principle, the sanction approach is obvious. It consists in building an action-chain so that Alter gets back what he has given Ego, in kind. Thus, if Alter's action was negative for Ego he will get back a reaction that is negative for himself; if his action is positive for Ego he will get a reaction that is positive for himself. The idea is then, very simply, that he will prefer the positive action since this will reward him, not the negative action that will punish him, and for that reason will prefer the positive action. This is, of course, only true if 1. the gratifications Alter may get from the action (intrinsic, internalized) do not outweigh the deprivation Ego's punishment may inflict upon him, and 2. that Alter is rational (in the sense of probability-weighted sums of utilities). In other words, the idea would be to see to it that "attack does not pay", in this the nonviolence approach is precisely like military deterrence theory based on the fear of anticipated consequences.

But the emphasis is on negative sanctions that do not kill, or at least not directly. The typical cases fall under such headings as strikes, economic and social boycott and noncooperation which are all linked to Alter as a sanction that will hit him negatively. As such they also have an announcement function in pointing out where the negative regions are located, and they have the function of "amplification" that will be analyzed in the next section.

. . . there is a scarcity of positive sanctions, one reason being that many would have difficulties rewarding the antagonist at all for anything short of complete identification with Ego, and even then would have their suspicions about foul play. One solution lies in the idea of positive sanction as a value increment in the positive direction: the positive sanction would consist in repeal of the negative sanction as when a prisoner's term is commuted. But this would presuppose that the negative sanction has already been applied, and the difficulty with negative sanctions is always their tendency to have feedback effects leading to escalation.

This scarcity of positive sanctions in conflict situations is not found equally in all social systems, of course. Turning to table 2 a formula for the availability of positive sanctions can be found: that N + , + is different from 0. If there are actions that both parties regard as positive, then Ego can use such actions to reward Alter even when Alter engages in negative behavior. In cases of weak conflicts he may even use some actions neutral to himself but still positive to Alter. It is only in cases of strong conflict that Ego no longer has any such actions at his disposal—the action-space is divided so that Ego has to engage in actions negative to himself to reward Alter. Thus, the psychological and other costs may be too heavy. In other words, positive sanctions seem to presuppose that there already is considerable agreement about how to classify actions and a reservoir of actions agreeable to both. This is the case in most lasting primary relationships, such as family and friendship relations where the scope of influence is so extensive as to produce many conflicts, and the action-spaces so extensive as to provide for actions positive to both parties. In secondary relations this area is so small that a conflict may leave the parties with no reservoir for rewards, but the conflict is also less likely.

Apart from the circumstance that it may seem presumptuous to build an ideology around the idea of abstaining from a small subcase of negative approaches as long as one makes freely use of all the others and demonstrate more inventiveness in finding new negative sanctions than in finding positive approaches, one may doubt the instrumentality of this kind of nonviolence. Imagine that economic boycott is used against a group or a nation, and imagine that it is 100% effective for the sake of the argument. No doubt, it *may* force Alter to yield because the punishment threatens his system with disintegration—*in casu* with death from starvation. Even though this particular way of dying or deteriorating is not prominent in the list of violent techniques mentioned above it is difficult to see any principal difference—and the same may apply to strikes. It is difficult to tie a doctrine of nonviolence to the abstention from short-term physical violence (piercing, cutting, crushing, burning) and not to long-term biological violence (poisoning, diseases, starvation)—whether the latter are the results of open conflicts or patterns of exploitation.

And it is also easy to imagine ways in which this kind of sanction may fail completely. An economic boycott is like violence in the narrow sense a relatively crude weapon. If it can be applied in such a way as to hit exactly the persons who are real antagonists, as in many industrial strikes and in the Montgomery bus boycott, then chances may be high of success. But very often one will have to hit larger entities because trade and other commercial relations are built around larger units. One may want to punish the leaders of a nation but the economic blockade will hit the entire nation and give the leaders the opportunity to 1. displace the impact downwards in society so that it may hit precisely the underdog groups one wants to help, and 2. use the sanction to strengthen internal cohesion and rally the total nation against the sanctioning agent. To what extent this happens we do not know, we know of no systematic study comparing the impact of economic sanctions with military sanctions—or any systematic study of economic sanctions in the world community of nations for that matter.

5.4. The Amplification Approach. One strategy which plays an important role in non-violence is the idea of negative reaction to negative action and positive reaction to positive action, but directed against Ego, not against Alter. Thus, if Alter performs a negative act towards Ego, then Ego will see to it that the action is amplified in negative direction so Ego is harmed even more. Similarly, a positive action can be amplified. As a limiting case here comes the idea of an amplification factor of 1, in which case this is identical with the laissez-faire approach (see 5–6).

Both in the negative and the positive cases does amplification presuppose that some conditions are fulfilled:

1. The final impact on Ego is visible to Alter.

2. The link between action and reaction is set up in such a way that Ego can reasonably claim Alter as the cause of the final impact. In general, this may imply:

   a. the connection is published in advance, so that Alter cannot claim ignorance,

   b. the connection is beyond Ego's control, at least after Alter has initiated his action.

One simple reason for this preference for amplification as a technique is found in the nonviolent group's situation in the most cases: he is weak, unable to inflict suffering upon Alter, able to inflict suffering upon himself, and with some imagination able to structure the situation so that even though the suffering hits Ego, Alter is its cause. The idea is then that this will make Alter refrain from negative action since the effects will become too negative—he will cause more suffering than he can stand. On the other hand, if Alter engages in positive action he will be doubly rewarded by the impact it will have on Ego.

In the literature on nonviolence the well-known cases refer to amplification of negative actions. The typical example is the strike, or any other action which has this pattern: Ego announces what he considers negative (not granting a salary increase, not granting civil rights, not granting exemption from military service, not granting independence) and announces that he will make the effect even more negative. Thus, for a conscientious objector to enter military service is already negative; to take a long prison term (presumably) even more negative. What Ego has to do is to see to it that the negative effect is actually beyond his control, and the classical way of doing this is by means of public commitment to an ideology in a culture where ideological inconsistency is considered an important loss of face. The suicidal techniques used by the Buddhist monks in Vietnam may serve as an example. Strikes as used by labor in Western countries are other examples but not so pure, since the strike is both negative sanction against the employer (he loses one of the factors of production) and an amplification of a negative action because the striker suffers (if he is too well protected by the trade union when on strike, then the amplification effect will disappear).

The nonviolent tradition has to a large extent consisted in substituting for the negative sanction the negative amplification approach.

In other words, there has been the well-known attempt to direct aggression against oneself rather than against the adversary. One simple reason for this has been the circumstance that the nonviolent group is usually an underdog group, more able to increase its own suffering than that of the topdog group. But this is not all there is to this seemingly masochistic behavior.

Rather, there is the idea of using own suffering 1. as a means to strengthen internal cohesion and purification, 2. as a way of "stirring sluggish consciences" to use Gandhi's expression. The latter is important in our context, for it means that this is the technique imagined by most NV authors and actors to make for internalization of Ego's values in Alter. Theoretically it is a way of communicating, not only that Ego is willing to suffer and to stand by his views, but also a more direct communication from heart to heart of important values. Whether it works that way is largely unknown, we know of no technically adequate piece of research on how this technique has been received by the antagonist.

There are three obvious difficulties: Alter may refuse to face the final impact on Ego by some technique of remote control, he may refuse to see himself as the cause of Ego's amplified suffering and claim that the amplification is Ego's own responsibility, and he may say and also feel that if Ego wants to assist Alter in inflicting negative values, so much the better. All three factors are stronger the greater the physical and social distance between the antagonists. If distances are very small it does not seem unlikely that identification, based on a mixture of empathy and projection, with the adversary will give negative amplification a high preventive effect. Alter will simply not be able to stand the sight of conspicuous suffering, the demonstration of "see what you have done to me" (which, incidentally, is also one of the psychopath's techniques for manipulating his environment).

In close social relationships positive amplification is both important and effective. The idea of "helping others to help themselves" is an example: Alter does something positive to Ego and gets an increased effect because Ego can build the value into his system and make it grow. Positive amplification is like a good investment: the father who contemplates giving a sum of money to his son will be encouraged to do so if the son promises to invest it at a good interest rate (by converting the sum into shares or education, for instance). Again the assumption is that it matters to Alter that Ego can increase his value stock—but under that condition amplification is probably an interesting technique for increasing empathy because Alter is trained dramatically in seeing his own actions as causing suffering or joy in Ego.

5.5. *The Role-Playing Approach.* This approach is important both in its own right and in its relation to all the foregoing approaches. In a sense it summarizes quite well some of the most essential aspects of NVA. The idea is as follows.

Alter emits actions that are perceived as negative. To these actions by Alter adequate responses are defined for Ego. Thus, Alter may have occupied Ego's nation and started levying taxes, issuing orders to the labor force, etc. Or, Alter may be a topdog group engaged in some type of exploitation of the underdog group. Or, Alter may be the executioner, beckoning the victim to step forward and meet his deadly weapon. Whatever is the precise nature of Alter's negative action there is implicit in it a prescription to Ego to engage in an action dialogue so that Alter can carry through his negative action sequence. This prescription from Alter to Ego may or may not be backed up with extreme negative sanctions, e.g. in the form of deprivation of biological or mental health, in case Ego does not comply.

Ego now has a choice of three courses of actions:

1. He may engage in the action dialogue with Alter—pay his taxes, carry out the tasks, sell his labor at too low prices, step forward to be executed. This may be called the course of *cooperation* or acquiescence.
2. He may cut off the action dialogue with Alter and not engage in any other dialogue in its place. That is, he will refuse to carry out prescribed actions, which means that he from Alter's point of view engages in acts of omission, or non-cooperation, or passive civil disobedience to use some of the standard terms. We shall refer to it as *negative role-playing.*
3. He may engage in another action dialogue with Alter, thus hoping to lure Alter into a set of actions that would be more rewarding to Ego. Since these actions are negative or at least not positive from Alter's point of view (because the implication is that he will not carry out the action Alter has prescribed) this will be an act of commission, or (sometimes) direct action or active civil disobedience. We shall refer to this as *positive role-playing.*

Take the case of the occupied nation. The occupying force, Alter, consistently engages in action obnoxious to the occupied, Ego. If, now, Ego plays the complementary role to Alter—a reaction we so far have ruled out completely—then this will reinforce Alter's behavior or at least turn his attention away from behavior alternatives. The status as occupied has many role-alternatives: there is the possibility of resistance, the possibility of servility, etc. But the strategy of "positive role-playing" in this case would include neither but rather involve a refusal to play the role of the occupied at all. In other words, a sort of pretense would be set up, acting as if the occupier is there for some other purpose, refusing to act out the adequate response to him as occupied nation at all. In the case of disarmament this is what unilateralism is about.

Or take the case of the mother whose child shouts all kinds of dirty words at her. She may throw him into a room and close the door (physical constraint), punish him (negative sanction), exaggerate her own negative reaction by bursting into tears (the see-what-you-have-done-to-me approach) or engage in role-playing. Cooperation would probably consist in shouting back, leading to verbal escalation; negative role-playing would consist in the well-known pretense of hearing nothing and positive role-playing in efforts to distract the child away from the activity by starting playing with it, hoping to get it on that interaction hook. The idea would be always to have some kind of substitute activity available. Thus, the point about answering evil actions with good actions is not to be kind, but to invite to an action-sequence that might be positive to both parties. The condition is, just as for positive sanctions, that N +, + is not empty or at least that it is not a case of strong conflict, and the condition for this again is a basis of integration underlying the conflict. Needless to say, a major function of role-playing, negative or positive, lies in the way it structures the action-space, and where this is concerned it is probably more effective than symbolic demonstrations and protest. The Key here is internalisation: by engaging in a positive action-dialogue Alter may eventually not only to behave but also accept the behavior.

5.6. The Uniformity Approaches. Finally a set of approaches sometimes connected with the idea of nonviolence and all implying uniformity in response should be mentioned. There are essentially five ways in which Ego can stabilize his action response to Alter's negative actions in a uniform way, which is not necessarily a constant way. Ego may

always emit positive actions
always emit neutral actions
always emit negative actions
stabilize at a very low level of interaction (*passive resistance*)
continue as if Alter did not exist (*status quo ante*)

The major objection to all these techniques would be precisely their uniformity, there is no way of structuring Alter's action-space in the way wanted by Ego since Ego's response is independent of what Alter does. Thus, "always emit positive actions" should not be confused with positive sanctions, positive amplification or positive role-playing. Positive sanctions come after a positive action by Alter, positive amplification likewise—and positive role-playing is not merely any kind action emitted by Ego but the opening action in an effort to establish an action-dialogue. Thus, it will have to be well chosen, so that an adequate response from Alter is within the set of possible actions Alter may engage in. And correspondingly for "always emit negative actions": it is not the same as negative sanctions, negative amplification or negative role-playing. To emit neutral actions has no structuring effect either and the same applies to the passive resistance except insofar as it coincides with negative role-playing or non-cooperation. Nor does "continue as if Alter did not exist" constitute a way of influencing Alter, since it means that a positive interaction sequence will not be initiated either. At best this may lead to a state of isolation and "negative peace", non-war, not to a state of "positive peace", cooperation. In other words, even though elements of these kinds sometimes have been included in nonviolent campaigns, they have hardly been influence techniques because of the uniformity—but *may* have been effective because of the elements of sanctions, amplifications and role-playing inherent in this kind of behavior. Of some traditional importance here is the technique known as "turning the other cheek" which is uniformity combined with negative amplification. It amplifies the evil inflicted by Alter, but since it does so uniformly, regardless of what Alter does it will hardly have the same educative effect as a refined combination of positive and negative techniques of the five kinds mentioned above.

The same actually applies to a seventh kind of uniform behavior which we have not treated: that Ego inflicts suffering upon himself without using Alter as the agent and a trip-wire mechanism—as in negative amplification. Ego may tell Alter that he will start "fasting until death" or some similar action provided Alter commits such and such an action or fails to conform to such and such a demand. But in so saying there is already an ultimatum which means that the suffering is Alter-inflicted, not just Ego-inflicted. Thus, purely Ego-inflicted suffering does not belong in a tradition on nonviolent influence, or not in any other system of influence for that matter. In that connection it should be pointed out that there is no sharp distinction between Ego- and Alter-inflicted suffering, one may have all kinds of combinations depending on to what extent it is up to Ego to alleviate the suffering after Alter has initiated the negative action.

6. Conclusion

Thus, we have essentially commented upon these elements in NVA:

TABLE 7. A Survey of Nonviolent Techniques of Influence.

	negative	*positive*
structuring of action-space	protest	point out what is desired, in a gradualist way
physical dimension	sabotage, escape, migration	facilitate cooperation, facilitate contact
sanctions	strikes, boycotts	reward immediately for positive actions, also reward for conflict-irrelevant actions
amplification	Alter-inflicted suffering	Alter-inflicted gratification for Ego
roleplaying	non-cooperation passive civil disobedience	direct action active civil disobedience unilateralism

This can be compared with corresponding lists in the literature, and seems to us to be relatively exhaustive of what is usually included in such lists and at the same time indicative of possibilities of expansion.

If we compare this list with the typology in the table 3 there are some comments that come naturally. Thus, the positive aspect of the biological dimension is absent from the list, unless one might say that it is included in all the other positive approaches to enlarge Alter's action-set. We would imagine that in the future this will be a major technique of influence, for instance with gases or other agents that have such biological effects—as distinguished from, for instance, contemporary *ataraxica* that mainly provide biological constraints.

To continue the comparison: the cognitive dimension is taken care of under the heading of structuring actions. This is actually a mixture of showing which action possibilities exist *and* of defining their value. One can hardly attach sufficient significance to the importance of teaching participants in a conflict action possibilities—and we have mentioned role-playing as the most important educative device here. But it can also be done by means of propaganda, by means of persuasion and intellectually. Thus, the best service peace research could do to the world today probably consist not so much in understanding conflicts better as in providing politicians with an enormous repertoire of actions short of violence that can be applied in conflict situations. In other words: to extend the region of positive or at least neutral action-possibilities in conflict situations.

The physical dimension has its direct counterpart in table 3, whereas the remaining three are somewhat different. Negative sanctions are sometimes referred to as means of nonviolent coercion, and we have already announced our doubts as to the validity—from the point of view of nonviolence even in a limited sense—of this technique of influence.

The remaining two have been classified as techniques to facilitate internalization, although little is known in a systematic way about the precise mechanisms at work. Actually, it may be said that the whole nonviolent approach is focussed around the idea of internalization—for that reason it is not coercion, nor is it ordinary persuasion, for persuasion has the connotation of verbal communication. Nonviolence is built around the basic hypothesis that persuasion is more effective if it is expressed in action terms, rather than as words.

Turning to table 7 again the whole system can now be integrated theoretically from this point of view. Thus, what is ruled out in a system of NVA is not only deprivation of somatic health but any action that one-sidedly deprives Alter of something: action possibilities, (for the biological, physical or cognitive reason), and positive value (because of dysphoric actions, punishments or bad conscience). Any negative technique of influence used alone on Alter and not coupled with some other technique would not lead to accepted behavior of a kind acceptable to Ego—according to this kind of thinking. This would apply to such punishment techniques as boycotts and strikes or physical sabotage directed against Alter's property, except under one condition. Ego's actions may hit Alter provided they also hit Ego (negative amplification: "you force me to do this unto you which in turn has this bad consequence for me") as if to emphasize that the conflict makes both of them suffer together. Thus, physical sabotage or economic boycott that do not also hit Ego would be structurally completely identical to military techniques where the aim is to do maximum damage to Alter at minimum expense to Ego. It may be efficient both as a physical constraint and as a negative sanction, but not lead to accepted behavior patterns. In both cases Alter is taught to see himself as the cause of his own bad fortune, but in the nonviolent methodology he is also taught to perceive himself as the cause of joint suffering—provided it functions according to theory.

We know of no micro-level research in the tradition of modern social science that can provide us with some tests of this hypothesis about the role of negative amplification. Nor is it easy to find good research bearing on the hypothesis that much will be gained by adding a maximum of positive techniques to the mixture of negative techniques and negative amplification mentioned. But this is the fault of social science, not of nonviolence, and may lead to a multitude of interesting research projects.

But apart from this, what are the implications of this study into the nature of various concepts of nonviolence? We suggest the following:

1. Biological violence, apart from moral objections, is exceedingly crude as a technique of influence since it works on the body alone and usually on the conservative side; it deprives Alter of too much rather than of too little.

2. The other negative techniques are, when used alone, structurally similar to biological violence and do not constitute interesting approaches to the study of influence.

3. This notwithstanding there is little doubt that much could be obtained in terms of reducing the negative consequences of conflict behavior if negative influence techniques short of biological violence were more numerous and better developed. This is easier in tightly integrated social systems than in loosely integrated ones (such as the international community of nations) since a negative sanction may be given as a decrement in the flow of positive value. Hence, there is much to gain from a tighter integration in the international community in terms of increase in the sanction reservoir, short of violence.

4. This applies even more to the possibility of using positive influence techniques, especially positive sanctions. The tighter the integration, the

larger the area of actions positive to both parties and the higher the possibility (*ceteris paribus*) of switching from a negative interaction sequence to a positive one.

5. In order to do this a reservoir of positive actions is not enough; there must also be training in seeing such actions as possible. A major factor here is the tendency to request nothing short of complete conversion from the adversary, a tendency that increases with increasing polarization in the conflict. How this can be changed into a more gradualist philosophy of conflict behavior is not known—but it is probably linked to very basic concepts of identity and the notion that a partial acceptance of the adversary is treason to one's own cause. This attitude, again, may be part of the "stripping for action" needed for participation in violent conflict.

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Pacifism as a Policy

G. C. Field

By this phrase I mean, in general terms, the view that no state or community or group of people ought ever under any circumstances to resort to the use of armed force against another group.* So far as this is not based on a supposed immediate moral intuition, beyond the reach of argument, it has to be judged by the standard of human welfare. War is judged by its results and accompaniments, and it is argued that these necessarily, or at any rate in any circumstances that are in fact at all likely to occur, outweigh in evil any results that could arise from not fighting. 'War is the worst evil that can possibly befall humanity', as we have been told more than once. Stress is laid on the obvious evils, moral and material, that war brings with it, both while it is being waged and afterwards. The futility and ineffectiveness of war is particularly emphasised. 'War settles nothing.' 'All wars contain the seeds of more wars in the future.' These are some of the phrases that we most frequently hear. Finally, it is argued that there are alternative methods which can meet any situation, more effectively, at the least, than war can. What are we to say about such a position?

That war, in itself, is a very great evil only to be advocated, if at all, as an alternative to an even greater evil may be taken as common ground to all parties. One does not need to be a Pacifist to believe that. But war is a complex phenomenon, and it is very necessary to distinguish between the different elements involved in it if we are to arrive at any sort of estimate of how evil it is, in order to balance it against the evil of possible alternatives. Thus, the loss of life necessarily involved in all wars is an unqualified and irreparable evil. Yet, on the whole, the moral judgment of

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*Of course, the only practical question at issue, particularly in the present connection, is whether one community ought to be pacifist in face of other communities which are not. It should really be hardly necessary to explain this. But some of the more naïve objectors have at times put forward to the Tribunal the—obviously true—statement that if everyone were pacifist there would be no more wars as a ground for some people being pacifist when the rest of the world is not.

G. C. Field, "Pacifism as a Policy," Pacifism and Conscientious Objection *(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), Chapter 2, pp. 20–49. Reprinted by permission.*

mankind has never admitted that, either from the point of view of the individual or of the society, life in itself is such a supreme good that everything else should be sacrificed to its preservation and that nothing is worth dying for. At any rate the burden of proof rests on those who maintain that it is. The same applies to the mental and physical suffering, the disablement or loss of health which war brings to so many. It is different with the material destruction and the economic damage caused by war. For, bad though that is, it is not as a rule, except in the case of irreplaceable objects of artistic or historical value, irreparable. It is interesting to note that, if the statisticians are to be believed, the national income in this country which had remained stationary from 1900 to 1914 began to rise again after the war was over, and, with a temporary setback in 1930–1, continued to rise till the outbreak of the present war. It appears, too, that income became more evenly distributed and that the rise was most marked in the lowest income groups.

The whole question of the economic effects of a war is highly complicated and cannot be discussed here. It may suffice to enter a warning against the temptation, to which some pacifist writers seem inclined to yield, to put down everything that happened after the war as the result of the war, or, more indefensibly still, to speak as if everything bad was the result of the war while everything good happened in spite of the war. Thus, one pacifist writer spoke of unemployment as a result of war, on the basis of our own unhappy experience of it, while ignoring the fact that France had no unemployment and Italy hardly any for at least twelve years after the end of the last war. This general warning might well be borne in mind in attempting to estimate the results of war in other fields besides the economic.

But most pacifist writers would probably lay more stress on the moral effects of war. And, in attempting to estimate these, another distinction, which should be obvious but does not appear to be so, should always be borne in mind. That is, the distinction between the effects that show themselves while war is actually being waged and the effects that endure for a prolonged period after the war is over. It is easy to show that many of the moral standards that we most value normally tend to go by the board during a war. It is equally easy to show that, in many cases, war calls out degrees of heroism, devotion and self-sacrifice for which peace gives little opportunity. But it is far more important, in both cases, to know how far these tendencies continue to work afterwards. And here the matter is by no means so obvious. Indeed, one may safely say that there is no good evidence that patterns of behaviour acquired during a war necessarily endure after it is over. There are obvious tendencies working in the opposite direction. For habits that are developed as a response to the stimulus of a particular sort of situation are much less likely to continue when the situation is obviously and entirely altered, as in the transition from war to peace and vice versa, than they are when it is a matter of the small and gradual changes which go on all the time in peace.

One may see an illustration of this in the matter of habituation to the use of violence and the disregard of human life which are necessarily developed in large numbers of people during a war. It is alleged by some pacifist writers, Dr Cadoux among them, that this tendency is carried over from war into peace. Yet the experience of the last war suggests the exact opposite. One of our leading social investigators wrote in 1927: 'Prophecies were freely made during the war to the effect that the population would be brutalised, and that the hundreds of thousands of men who had been trained to attack and kill and take it all in the day's work would not restrain themselves in days of peace. No prophecy seemed on the face of it more reasonable, but no prophecy has been more completely falsified by the event.'*

There is one particular evil that is often charged to the account of war about which a word or two more requires to be said. That is, the supposedly bad effect that war has on our general standards of veracity. 'Truth is the first casualty in war', as the well-known epigram has it. Some years ago Lord Ponsonby published a study of the falsehoods which were given currency during the last war. This was, of course, itself a work of propaganda, and the collection of specific instances that it gave made, at first reading, an impressive effect. But as a serious study it suffered from three cardinal defects.

In the first place, it was no doubt true that a large number of false stories did spring up during the war, from a variety of causes. But simply to collect them together by themselves may give a very false impression. We want to know how typical they were of the state of public opinion in general. How widely were they spread? How many people believed them and for how long? How far were they criticised and corrected? What sort of proportion did they bear to the honest and accurate accounts that were given? We should have to answer all these questions before we could decide how seriously to take these alleged effects of war.

Secondly, we cannot make a sound judgment about these effects without comparing the falsehoods that arise in war with the falsehoods that arise in peace. It would be possible to draw up a most impressive list of these latter from periods of acute political controversy, and also, it must be added, from certain periods of acute religious controversy. The fact is that any strong emotional attachment to a cause tends to lower one's standards of fairness and accuracy. This applies, incidentally, to the cause of peace as much as to any other. When we recall some of the propaganda in

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**Social Structure of England and Wales*, by Carr-Saunders and Caradog Jones, p. 198. The relevant statistics with regard to crimes of violence are given on the same page.

the period that preceded the present war we might well feel justified in asserting that Truth could not be the first casualty in the war as she had already been fatally injured in the campaign for peace.

Finally, the book commits the fallacy which has just been discussed of failing to distinguish the effects which appear during a war and cease afterwards from effects that are relatively permanent or, at any rate, endure for some considerable time. The most that Lord Ponsonby's arguments could prove would be that during the excitement of the war there was a certain lowering of standards in this respect. And, regrettable though this would be, it would obviously be very much less serious than a relatively permanent tendency in this direction. And for this no evidence is offered at all. Indeed, I should have thought that it was clearly not the case. This is only one more illustration of how necessary it is in balancing the evils of war against the evils of a possible alternative to consider the probable duration of each as well as their intensity over a limited period.

This brings us to the great weakness of most of the statements of Pacifism as a practical policy. It is easy for them to be eloquent about the obvious evils of war. But all this is beside the point unless it is combined with an equally clear picture of the evils of the alternative in any particular situation. In the circumstances that gave rise to the present war it is clear beyond a doubt that the only possible alternative to fighting was not that peace of wishful thinking 'a peace by negotiation' nor certain concessions of territory or economic privileges but complete subjection to German rule, which, as has been abundantly shown, would claim to control not only political or even economic activities but all intellectual, spiritual and cultural life also. Comparatively few conscientious objectors seem even to have attempted to imagine for themselves what this would mean. In a number of cases we have found them simply refusing to believe, or even to look at the evidence for, any accounts of German oppression or cruelty. Such an attitude is fundamentally as dishonest as a readiness to accept without scrutiny any stories to the discredit of an enemy. Even in the modified form that is to be found in more sophisticated pacifist literature it involves distortion of fact which could be compared with the most violent war propaganda. Other objectors have talked light-heartedly about trying to convert the Germans to Pacifism* or about going on teaching what they believed to be true without, apparently, giving a moment's thought to the question what opportunity they would have of doing that under German rule.

In general, they never seem to ask the question whether the moral and spiritual values which they believe to be threatened by war would not be far more seriously threatened, and over a much longer period, by German domination. Would a high standard of truthfulness be preserved for long under such a rule? Or consider the matter of the growth of hatred and bitterness which is often adduced as one of the special evils of war. There is plenty of reason to think that with most people unresisting subjection to a particularly ruthless and oppressive tyranny is likely to produce a bitterer and more prolonged hatred than fighting. In some cases such an attitude under the stress of long-continued oppression might eventually give place to a kind of masochistic servility and submissiveness. But this is really more destructive of the worth of human personality even than aggressive hatred. It is futile for the Pacifist to reply that he does not want either of these things, and that he advocates submission without either hatred or servility. If he advocates submission as a policy for the nation we must think, not of what a few rare souls may achieve, but of what the effect will in fact be on the great mass of the people. And that is not a matter on which we are free to choose. We can put ourselves, and others, into a situation. But how we and they will come to feel in that situation is, in the main, not in our control.

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*At the time of the attack on Greece one applicant, on being asked what he thought the Greeks ought to do, replied that they should lay down their arms and try to convert the Germans to Pacifism.

The more thoughtful Pacifist, however, would probably meet this argument in a different way. He might admit that long-continued oppression or aggression might produce results such as these. But he would pin his faith rather to the possibility of a change of heart in the oppressor or aggressor in response to the attitude that he would have the victims adopt. There are two methods that have been suggested for producing this result, the way of non-violent resistance and the way of non-resistance. These two are often confused, and there is a certain amount of excuse for that in that one may pass into the other by a series of intermediate stages. But they are none the less different and ought to be distinguished.

Non-violent resistance implies an organised refusal to co-operate in any of the work of the country, with the intention of compelling the oppressor to a change of attitude by the discomfort and inconvenience that this causes. This method is particularly associated with the name of Mr Gandhi. . . .

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The way of non-resistance, on the other hand, lays the emphasis in an entirely different direction. It would not, of course, exclude the possibility of disobedience to the oppressor in particular cases where the conscience of individuals told them that an act that they were ordered to do was morally wrong. But that is not what it relies on. There is no suggestion of organised refusal of all obedience or co-operation in order to bend the will of the aggressor by the discomfort and inconvenience that this would cause him. On the contrary, the emphasis is always on friendliness and good will, and it is argued that a continued display of love and gentleness and charity would, in the end, soften the heart of the aggressor and win him over to more peaceful ways. This will seem to many mere sentimentalism, and, indeed, as the idea was often presented to us, it would deserve to be so characterised. A naïve reliance on love as a sort of magic force capable of doing anything, and an entire lack of knowledge of any relevant example or any clear picture of how it could work in particular circumstances were the most obvious features of this sort of argument.

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The conclusion of all this seems inevitable—that a Christian pacifist attitude can never be effective against those who meet it with a definite rival creed of their own, which inspires and satisfies them, particularly when that creed leads them to success by its standards. It is futile to talk as if there was something so inherently attractive about Christian Pacifism to all types of temperament that it was bound to prevail. It is a great weakness of many Pacifists that they are so deeply convinced of the truth of their belief that they feel that it must really have a superior appeal to any rival creed, and that the adherents of the rival creed cannot truly believe in it as deeply and fervently as the Pacifists do in theirs. There is nothing in experience to justify such a supposition. It seems, then, that the most that the Christian Pacifists in face of a really aggressive opponent could hope for—and that with no great confidence—would be that they might so disarm hostility as to be allowed to exist as a small tolerated sect, a refuge for a minority of peculiar temperament, on the condition that they should renounce all responsibility for and all attempts to influence the general direction of the affairs of the larger community.*

This illustrates a weakness, which has already been mentioned, in even the best of the presentations of Pacifism as a possible policy for a national state. That is the failure to see clearly the difference between what is possible for a small voluntary society, which only those who feel wholeheartedly in sympathy with its views need join, and a wider compulsory society, such as a state, which has to include every kind of person within a given area of the most varied views and temperaments. And there is a more particular issue involved here. Christian Pacifism, or indeed any kind of Pacifism, cannot be considered merely as a practical policy, but involves a whole change of heart and the adoption of a completely new spirit and attitude. Indeed, a pacifist policy in practice without the attainment by the great majority of those concerned of a completely pacifist state of mind would give us the worst of both worlds and could only be the most complete failure. Yet the attainment of a state of mind is not a policy in the sense in which we generally use the term. It certainly could not be discussed and decided by democratic methods at a General Election. And the thoughtful Pacifist might be invited to consider the situation that would arise if a pacifist government were elected by a bare majority, in which there would inevitably be many who were momentarily attracted by all sorts of motives other than a completely pacifist state of mind, while a strong minority remained entirely opposed to the whole doctrine. I venture to suggest that a pacifist government, if it were to survive as such at all, would find itself driven rapidly along the road to complete totalitarianism. For it could hardly tolerate behaviour, or even propaganda, contrary to pacifist principles if it was to have any chance of success for its policy.

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*That would certainly involve the renunciation of any right of criticism of the actions of the rulers, and probably of any attempt at proselytising.

There is a further point. Any policy which demands a change of heart and a conversion to a new attitude of mind in large numbers of people can only be a long-term policy. And it can only be pursued at all if certain conditions exist which make it possible. But if these conditions are threatened the long-term policy cannot by itself meet the immediate threat. Some Pacifists would claim that in the very long run even the conditions that made the threat would cease to be operative. That is a matter of faith, not of argument. But, in any case, it seems a very perverted moral point of view to regard with equanimity the existence of a preventible evil for a long period, perhaps for centuries, because it is believed that it will eventually die out.

It remains, then, to deal briefly with the pacifist counter-attack on the ineffectiveness and futility of war. The retort to those who point out the failures of Pacifism, that the use of force also sometimes fails, does not take us very far. The non-pacifist is only too well aware of that. But he is in an essentially different position from the Pacifist, for he is not advocating the use of force as a universal principle or a good in itself, but as one possible means to an end, only to be used if there is a reasonable chance of success and if no other means are available. These conditions are to some extent calculable, and, though there will always remain the possibility of mistake as in all human affairs, it is at least possible to be saved from committing oneself to the use of force when there is clearly very little chance of these conditions being fulfilled.

But the more sweeping pacifist slogan—too sweeping for some of the more reasonable Pacifists—'Wars settle nothing', is, if it is taken to mean what it says, a simple and obvious absurdity. "It would be far truer to say that every war settles something. The fact that our language and institutions are English, and neither Welsh nor Anglo-Saxon, was settled by war. War decided that Rome and not Carthage was to be the mistress of the Mediterranean world, with all that implied for future civilisation. The frontiers between Christianity and Mohammedanism were, in the main, settled by war, and have proved impervious to all peaceful missionary effort. War decided that Spain was not to rule in Holland nor the Turks over the Christian states of the Balkans. It decided that Canada was to be a British not a French dominion, that the United States was to be an independent Republic, and that it was to be one Republic, and not two or more. And the list could be multiplied indefinitely. Indeed, it would be hard to find a statement that is more decisively refuted by the facts of history."

Hypothetical arguments about what might have happened if people had behaved differently do not demand much attention. If it were argued that the same results could have been achieved, in those circumstances, without fighting then it would plainly be untrue. If it were argued that better results could have been attained, we must be careful to avoid ambiguity. If everyone everywhere was a Christian Pacifist or if no one wanted anything strongly enough to fight for it, very likely things would have been much better. But the supposition is too remote from any realities even to have much meaning. If, on the other hand, it were meant that it would have had better effects if one side had always refused to fight so that the side that was prepared to fight had had its way, we are still in the region of unprovable hypothesis, and we should need far more details to be filled in by the imagination before we could even argue it. For one thing, it would make a good deal of difference which side was supposed to have given way. But the more one thinks about it the more impossible does it become to base any rational argument on such imaginary hypotheses. Certainly in some of these cases a good many other suppositions would have to be made to make the contention even plausible.

There is reason to suspect that the obviously false proposition that wars settle nothing has been confused in the minds of many Pacifists with the quite different proposition that no war settles everything. At least so one would judge from the number of arguments produced at the Tribunal which implied that the war could not be justified unless by itself without any further effort on anyone's part it would automatically solve all difficulties and, in particular, bring about a state of perpetual peace.* Of course no sane person would ever claim that any war could do that. Obviously new problems will always be arising, and new efforts will be called for all the time to deal with them satisfactorily. But that does not alter the fact that, in certain circumstances, the conditions which make it possible to deal with them satisfactorily could only be secured by war. And that, if it is correct, would be sufficient to justify the non-pacifist's position.

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*This seems to be at the back of the great play that many conscientious objectors make with the phrase 'a war to end war', as applied to the last war. I suppose the argument, which they evidently feel is of great weight, is that the last war was entered upon to end war—they sometimes assert this in set terms—it failed, and therefore no war can end war. In fact, the last war, like the present one, was not entered on to end war but to prevent certain definite evils from happening. After it was started, someone coined the phrase, 'Let us make this a war

As for the more specific charge that wars always lead to further wars because of the legacy of hatred and bitterness that they leave behind them, it is difficult to find any historical basis for such a sweeping generalisation. People are so obsessed by the supposed example of Germany and the present war that they forget that twenty years ago we ourselves were at war with Turkey, and that now we are almost allies. The American Civil War, though it left some bitterness for a number of years, has not resulted in any further war. We have had a hundred and thirty years of peace with the United States since the last war. The South African war has not led to another war. It is true that there is still some racial ill-feeling there. But that was among the causes rather than the results of the war and diminished rather than increased after it. The Maori wars a century ago have resulted in perfectly happy and harmonious relations between British and Maoris. A hundred years ago there was a civil war in Switzerland which has produced a completely united and contented nation. And the list might be multiplied indefinitely. Anyone given to historical generalisations might produce instances to support the view that a really complete and unmistakable defeat is the surest way of making a nation peaceful in the future. But, in fact, none of these generalisations are really decisive.

Perhaps a word might be said about the relation between the last war and the present one, not because of any real logical relevance to the discussion, but because of the constancy with which it reappears in a certain type of pacifist argument. 'The present war is the direct result of the last one' is a phrase which we have heard repeated on numerous occasions. By itself such a phrase is too vague to have very much meaning. But a more serious attempt to give some specific content to it is made by those who trace the present war to the bitterness caused by the Treaty of Versailles, which led to the rise of the Nazi movement. In some presentations of the argument it is possible to trace the further unspoken assumption that, once the war had been started, it was inevitable that the treaty which ended it would be as unjust and oppressive as the Treaty of Versailles was.

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to end war'. But obviously that was not intended to suggest that winning the war by itself would be enough to end all wars. Clearly that was a matter for future policy, and the fact that we failed once is neither an argument that we must necessarily always fail nor that we ought to allow the specific evils we are fighting against to have their way. I might add, here, a further point that ending the war by the adoption of Pacifism, even if that adoption could be general, would not necessarily guarantee us against any more wars in the future, unless we assume that Pacifism, once adopted, would never be abandoned by subsequent generations. This assumption is in fact generally made by Pacifists. But no grounds are ever given for it, and it is certainly not self-evidently true.

The relevance of this question to the duty of fighting Nazi Germany is not really very great. For anyone who believes that the results of the triumph of Hitlerism would be of incalculable evil, and that they can only be prevented by fighting, his duty to fight is not in the least affected by past events. A well-known foreign writer once suggested that if we were faced by a homicidal maniac, whose mania had been aggravated by our mistaken treatment of him in the past, the fact that we were partly responsible for his condition would not be regarded by any sane person as a reason why we should allow him to kill ourselves, still less other people for whom we were responsible. Analogies are dangerous things, but this one seems of more validity than they generally possess.

But, putting this aside, the assertion that the present war was the result of the Treaty is itself not free from ambiguity. Does it mean that, given the Treaty, whatever policy had been pursued afterwards would still have resulted in the rise of Hitler and the present war? Or does it mean that, given the Treaty, the policy which was pursued subsequently was the only one that could have been pursued? We seem to be trenching here on the metaphysical problem of the Freedom of the Will which is better left for discussion elsewhere. But it is interesting to note that the Pacifists, who seem inclined to postulate absolute freedom of choice in the results that would follow from the adoption of a pacifist policy, lean towards an absolutely deterministic doctrine of fatalism and inevitability when it is a question of the results of war.

It would be out of place to attempt a discussion of the nature and effects of the Treaty of Versailles here. Most people would now recognise that the explanation of war in general, and this war in particular, would have to be looked for in something much deeper or more complex than a single, simple factor like this. Even as a proximate cause the influence of the grievances against the Treaty as in incentive to the rise of Nazism has, in the past, been greatly exaggerated. Hitler has himself described the difficulties that he experienced in rousing German feeling on the subject. It is, I suppose, arguable that, at the time Hitler rose to power, the issues were so nicely balanced that any change in what went before would have turned the scales the other way. Whether that would have meant that there would have been no war is another matter, but at least it would have been a war of a different character. Alternatively, it might equally be argued that if the Treaty had been more severe and Germany further weakened or kept in subjection there would have been no Hitler. But, in any case, most observers agree that the major cause in creating an atmosphere favourable to Hitlerism was the economic crisis. It was part of the propaganda of the Nazis to proclaim the Treaty as the cause of the sufferings of the German people. It is natural for everyone to welcome a scapegoat. But that could have been done just as effectively whatever form the Treaty had taken.

Further, it is relevant to point out that Hitler was not an isolated phenomenon. Italy set the example, both of totalitarian dictatorship and aggression against other states. And Italy was not a defeated power, though it is true that she did not gain as much as she would have liked. But the first example of large-scale aggression was given by Japan, also something approaching a totalitarian state, and Japan was not only not a defeated power, but was hardly more than formally a belligerent. Japan is, indeed, a striking example of the way in which a taste for aggression grows with success in it. There is no doubt that the example of Japan's successful aggression had a good deal of influence in Germany and still more, perhaps, in Italy.

To return to the main issue. The upshot of the preceding argument is that the Pacifist has entirely failed to make out a case for denying the commonsense view that partial or one-sided Pacifism, either within a country or between countries, means the domination of the more violent and aggressive elements, with all the evils that that brings. He has equally failed to produce any rational grounds for the belief that these elements are in the least likely to be converted from their belief in violence and aggression by anything that the Pacifist can do or say. If these arguments are sound, therefore, it is clear that by any standard of social or individual welfare on earth, human happiness, the reign of justice, even the establishment of good will between men, absolute Pacifism as a policy cannot be defended. And anyone who takes any degree of responsibility for the political ordering of the world is bound to accept to some degree the standard of human welfare . . . .

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CHAPTER 4 • *Cultural Factors and Social Integration*

Is the Biological Evolution of Man Completed?

THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY

Far-reaching cultural transformations have manifestly taken and are taking place. Do genetic changes accompany the cultural ones? White (1949) believes that "in the man-culture equation over a period of a million years, we may assume some absolute increase in magnitude of the biological factor. But during the last hundred, or even the last fifty thousand years, we have no evidence of an appreciable increase in mental ability." The assumption of the psychic unity, or uniformity, of mankind is probably pivotal in the working philosophy of a majority of anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and of not a few biologists. They maintain that biological evolution has achieved the genetic basis of culture and run its course; it is now a matter of the past. The genetic basis of culture is uniform everywhere; cultural evolution has long since taken over.

Up to a point the above view is justified. All healthy individuals of *Homo sapiens* have a capacity to learn a language, any language, and to acquire a culture, any of the cultures any group of people have anywhere. This capacity is one of the biological universals of our species, like walking erect, the approximately nine-month pregnancy term, or the nonopposable big toe. There are no genes for the French or Chinese or Hottentot language or

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Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Is the Biological Evolution of Man Completed?" Mankind Evolving *(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 320–327. Reprinted by permission.*

culture. Our genotype confers on us a remarkable plasticity of cultural development. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that this plasticity is itself a species trait, formed by natural selection in biological evolution (Dobzhansky and Ashley Montagu 1947).

It is, however, a fallacy to think that specific or ordinal traits do not vary or are not subject to genetic modification . . . Phenotypic plasticity does not preclude genetic variety. There may be variations in the degree of plasticity; or some of the functions or roles which exist within a culture may be more congenial, and hence more easily learned, than others.

White (l.c.) is on firm ground when he denies that an "appreciable" change in the "biological factor" of human mental ability during the last fifty thousand years can be rigorously proven. If anything, he is overgenerous when he concedes that such change is proven for the last million years. There is no way to make the experiments necessary to secure such a proof. We cannot plant some identical twins to be reared by Peking man or by the Neanderthalians and leave cotwins to grow up in a modern society. We cannot give IQ tests to a sample of Cro-Magnons or, for that matter, to contemporaries of Plato or Charlemagne. The "proof" has to be based on inference. It cannot be otherwise, since what is at issue is whether certain historical events have or have not occurred. Anti-evolutionists have said again and again that evolution is not "proven." We cannot reproduce in the laboratory the changes which transformed the three-toed horse into the one-toed one or those which led from *Australopithecus* to *Homo.* It is an inference (and at that, one questioned by some competent authorities) that the bones of our ancestors were once upon a time not very different from those of *Australopithecus.* Darwin did not claim to have observed evolution, except that under domestication. He claimed that evolution can be inferred from what he did observe.

Emergence and development of culture makes adaptation to changing environments by means of genetic changes less binding than it was in precultural times. Man did not need to grow warm fur to cope with cold climates, because he donned warm fur garments. But there is really no way for culture to ward off genetic change altogether. Culture does not make human environments stable and uniform; far from it. The tempos of environmental changes have grown and are growing. Given environmental flux, the necessary and sufficient condition for genetic change is availability in populations of genetic variants, some of which are better and others less well adapted to shifting environments. Natural selection will do the rest—it will multiply the favored variants and depress or eliminate the unfavorable ones. The crux of the problem is, thus, how much genetic variance is available in human populations. This can be established by observation and experiment.

The diversity of human beings is seemingly endless. Granted that our senses are better trained to perceive differences between humans than between sheep, sparrows, or Drosophila flies, the human species must be regarded an extraordinarily variable one. What parts of the variance are genetic and what environmental is inadequately known. Human genetics has much to learn. This much is, however, certain: whenever the matter has been studied, both genetic and environmental components of the variability have usually come to light. And this is what one might have expected on theoretical grounds.

The Feedback between Genes and Cultures

. . . No modern geneticist thinks that there existed in our ancestors or that there appeared by mutation some special genes "for culture." The transformation of the prehuman ancestral species into the "political animal" involved mutational changes in most or perhaps in all gene-loci. It is the whole genetic system which makes us human. However, many, or most, genes are represented in human populations by two or by several alleles. Has this genetic variability any relevance to culture? I believe that it has. Discussions of this matter are often plagued by a sheer misunderstanding. Some people are looking for a one-to-one correspondence between genetic and cultural traits. They find no such correspondence: there are no genes to make you a painter or statesman, or gangster; the Negro race is not homozygous for a nonexisting gene for jazz music, nor are the Balinese genetically dancers or the Jews merchants. The matter is considerably more subtle.

Genes create the setting for cultural traits, but they do not compel the development of any particular ones. An imaginary, extreme but, I hope, instructive illustration is that if mankind consisted of individuals of one sex only, countless cultural changes would follow. . . . the suggestion of Brues (1959) is that the way of life of settled agriculturists favored and was favored by different bodily constitutions than the cultures based on hunting and pursuing game. It is known that rigid caste structure has genetic consequences different from and less desirable than those of social systems which accord to their members a rough equality of opportunity. Indeed, any major social or political change is bound to be reflected in an alteration of the gene pool of the population subjected to such change. This is a consequence of the fact that the magnitude as well as the direction of natural selective pressures depends on the environment, and the environment that exerts a decisive influence on the human species is the social environment.

The changes taking place in our modern world need rethinking in the light of genetics as well as that of sociology and politics. From the beginning of human history until recently, countless multitudes endured scarcity, hunger, disease, exposure to the elements, and misery of all kinds.

Privations were believed to be the order of nature. Industrial and scientific revolutions have taught people otherwise. People learned that misery is unnecessary, that the world has the means for providing a decent living to all. There will be no return to the old beliefs, not even if the "population explosion" would result in a real shortage of the wherewithal for decent living. In one way or another, people will check the uncontrolled population growth and will secure what they now regard as their just right.

Certain consequences seem probable, not to say inevitable. Instead of most of the world producing raw materials and a few countries arrogating to themselves the roles of industrial and cultural centers, industrialization on a global scale is assured. Technical and scientific training will be widespread if not universal. Urbanization, more and more people living in urban communities, will continue. Now, city life favors a different kind of relation between people than does rural existence. Rural folk were traditionally members of communities in which everybody knew everybody else and everybody felt morally obligated to give and entitled to receive help in case of need from other members of their community. Urban life favors replacement of the desire for neighborliness by the desire for privacy: many an inhabitant of New York City neither knows nor cares to know who is living on the other side of a partition wall. It is chiefly, if not exclusively, from members of one's nuclear family that one hopes to receive assistance and succor when in need.*

A Russian adage had it that "God is too high, the Czar is too far." But nothing is too far with modern means of communication. While expecting little from their immediate neighbors, people expect more and more from their states, nations, and governments. Democratic or totalitarian, governments will assume greater and greater responsibilites for the welfare of their citizens. Demands for a closer approach to an equality of opportunity for all citizens of a state, and eventually for all citizens of the world, will be irresistible. The advice of a high church authority to the poor, "to take delight in the prosperity of elevated persons and to expect confidently their assistance," is unlikely to be accepted, least of all by members of a society atomized to a multitude of nuclear families. With relationships between members of a community becoming more and more impersonal, people expect and indeed demand assistance from the state. And everybody feels equally entitled to such assistance.

Now . . . equality of opportunity has genetic consequences different from

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*After this and the following paragraph were outlined, I heard A. Inkeles, of Harvard University, expound somewhat similar but much more thoroughly argumented ideas at the Conference on Evolution, organized by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in November 1960 (See *Daedalus*, Summer 1961).

those of hierarchical, stratified, and caste societies. Equality decreases the wastage of the genetic potential of the human species. It favors manifestation of talents which remain hidden in societies that let high culture and refinement flourish while a great majority of people live in misery and ignorance. We need not raise here the difficult question of the role of the individual in history. It will be generally conceded that persons like Leonardo, Newton, Beethoven, Darwin, Dostoevsky, or Einstein have made priceless contributions to the treasury of culture of our species. And although this cannot be proven rigorously, it is extremely probable that these individuals carried rare and precious constellations of genes. . . . Now, if these gene constellations had appeared among Indian untouchables or Negro slaves or even in the slums of our cities, their carriers might not have accomplished much. Humanity would be the loser.

Equality of opportunity is an ideal not uniformly appealing to everyone. Continuation of hereditary privileged classes has found an outspoken and highly articulate defender in the poet T. S. Eliot (1948 and other writings). To Eliot, equality of opportunity endangers the refinements of civilisation. In his view, a culture must be an "organic" whole, while equality of opportunity presupposes "an atomic view of society"; only an entrenched aristocracy can guarantee continuity of culture from generation to generation. (See Williams 1958 for a temperate but critical discussion of these views.) Hardin (1959) fears that as class competition decreases, competition between individuals increases in intensity and vindictiveness. "The complete elimination of classes would mean the installation of a dog-eat-dog society." He insists that mankind's biological as well as cultural welfare demands competition of many separate class or race populations; some of these will become extinct, while others will survive and repopulate places "left vacant by those that have succumbed."

The basic error of these views lies, it seems to me, in the implied assumption that equality of opportunity and mitigation or elimination of inter-group competition is tantamount to uniformization, leveling, disappearance of genetic and cultural variety. But this is not necessarily the case at all. Genetically, the gene exchange between Mendelian populations leads to their fusion in a single population, but there will be much greater interpersonal variability, and, I suspect, a greater number of nervous breakdowns, in that single population than there was in the previously isolated, separate populations. The variety of human genotypes, and hence of inclinations and abilities, is increased, not decreased, by hybridization. I suppose the same is true on the cultural level also. A large and complex society should be better able to provide for specialized talent and to tolerate unconformity than a small homogeneous group. I, for one, do not lament the passing of social organizations that used the many as a manured soil in which to grow a few graceful flowers of refined culture.

Of Rats and Men

The failure of some nations and races to evolve high cultures is often taken as evidence of their genetic incapacity. Unfavorable environment is at least as likely to be responsible. Cultural advancement is hamstrung in populations where most people are infected with malaria, hookworm, or other infectious or parasitic diseases. The state of public health inevitably has repercussions in the cultural sphere. Populations in which the life expectancy is twenty-five years offer different cultural settings from those with a life expectancy of seventy years. Hereditarians as well as environmentalists will be well advised to remember that health is conditioned by environmental as well as genetic variables. However, as medicine and hygiene reduce or eliminate environmental hazards, the importance of genetic variables will loom larger and larger.

The National Health Education Committee (1959) estimates that about 17 million people in the United States suffer from some form of mental disease, about 4.8 million are mentally retarded, about 70 million have eye defects, 345 thousand are blind, etc. It is at present futile to try to estimate what proportion of these afflictions are genetic and what environmental. As pointed out repeatedly, these are not discrete categories. One may hope that, at least in the long run, only a fraction, perhaps a small fraction, of this human misery will remain incurable. Myopia is an eye defect which often has a genetic basis, yet it is corrected environmentally—by wearing glasses. The magnitude of the genetic load may, nevertheless, be influenced by culture and may influence culture at least by speeding up or applying a brake to its progress.

Richter (1959) is one of the writers who foresees the biological twilight of human evolution brought about by the influences of culture. His argumentation may be taken as representative of a school of thought having many adherents. Our ancestors lived the wholesome lives of wild animals. They struggled and fought for survival; natural selection held full sway; the strongest and cleverest survived; the rest succumbed. This has resulted in the development of man's finest qualities. In technologically advanced societies natural selection has come to a halt: birth and death rates being low, necessities of life assured to everybody, environmental hazards and epidemics controlled—the unfit survive and reproduce their kind. According to Richter, the process that has transformed the wild rat into the domesticated laboratory rat is also working in human evolution.

Norway rats *(Rattus norvegicus)* have been kept in laboratories since sometime between 1840 and 1850. The modern laboratory rat belongs to a well-defined variety that differs from its wild progenitor in many ways. The laboratory rat is entirely dependent on "the protected state of the laboratory where food, water, mates, and shelter are provided, and the struggle for survival no longer exists." Among other differences, laboratory rats have smaller adrenal glands and less resistance to stress, fatigue, and disease than wild rats. Thyroid glands have also become less active in laboratory rats, while, on the contrary, sex glands develop earlier and permit a greater fertility. They have smaller brains and are tamer and more tractable than the active and aggressive wild rats.

The genetic changes which occurred in the laboratory rat would, undeniably, make them unable to compete successfully with wild rats in the environments in which the latter normally live. But it does not follow that laboratory rats are decadent and unfit; nor does it follow that the "welfare state" is making man decadent and unfit—to live in a welfare state! What Richter has overlooked is the obvious fact that the laboratory rat is manifestly fit to live in its environment—which is the laboratory cage. Indeed, laboratories maintain stocks of laboratory rats, not of wild rats. The laboratory rat is not a decadent product of the absence of natural selection, it is a product of rigid natural selection in laboratory environments. Being tame, tractable, unaggressive, and fecund confers upon it a high fitness. And inasmuch as these qualities depend upon the lessened activity of the adrenal and thyroid glands, having these glands less active than in the wild rat is also a part of the high fitness. The contention that civilization or the "welfare state" set aside natural selection in man is not necessarily true either.

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Human Values in a Changing World

LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY

... "What I relate," Nietzsche wrote in 1888, "is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism. ... Our whole European culture is moving for some time now, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade, as toward a catastrophe: restlessly, violently, headlong. ... Why has the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the values we had hitherto thus draw their final consequence; because we must experience nihilism before we can find out what value these 'values' really had."[1]

Progress Is Questionable

Nietzsche regarded Christianity as the value system to be discarded and replaced by a new one. One possible answer to Nietzsche's demand for new values was the notion of progress, the belief that science and technology will carry mankind into a paradisiac future. It needs no elaborate discussion that, up to comparatively recent times, the belief in progress was the dominant ideology of our civilization, and that now we have become doubtful. ... Whether the sum total of human happiness and misery has increased, decreased, or remained approximately constant during the course of human history nobody can tell because there is no yardstick to measure it. Considering two total and a number of minor wars within the life span of one generation, the balance does not automatically jump in favor of our epoch as against the Thirty-Years' War, the Spanish Inquisition, or the French Revolution.

We must, therefore, dig deeper. It goes without saying that the notion of progress is intimately connected with the biological notion of evolution.

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[1] F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, Preface.

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As in geological times the living world has advanced from lowest to ever higher animal and plant species, so mankind progresses from primitive to ever more advanced states, the peak presently attained being Western civilization of the twentieth century. This implies a problem which, I presume, is the question posed to me in a discussion on human values: Can human values be derived from and reduced to biological values? It may be surprising or even shocking to some of you that the answer of at least one biologist is a well-considered "No."

Biological and Human Values

The basis of the parallel between organic evolution and human progress is what is known as the postulate of reductionism: that is, that biology should eventually be reduced to physics and chemistry and, correspondingly, the behavioral and social sciences to biology. Put in a somewhat different way: as a living organism is an intricate physicochemical system, so—it is assumed—human behavior is a particularly involved complex of the ways and factors of behavior present in subhuman species.

In my opinion, this is not so. I rather believe that the field of science, speaking in the way of gross oversimplification, consists of three major levels: physical nature; organisms; and human behavior, individual and social.

Let me make clear what I do not mean and what I do mean by this statement. I do not mean that there are absolute discontinuities between those levels. Being a biologist with strong leanings toward physical theory, I obviously do not mean that physics and chemistry are not the indispensable groundwork of biology. In a similar way, biology is the indispensable groundwork of the science of human behavior. What I do mean, however, is that the notion of emergence is essentially correct: each higher level presents new features that surpass those of the lower levels.

Let us apply this scheme to human affairs. What is unique and characteristic in human behavior? The answer, I believe, is simple and unequivocal. The monopoly of man is the creation of symbolic universes in language, thought, and all other forms of behavior.

Man's unique position in nature is based upon the predominance of symbols in his life.[2] Except for the immediate satisfaction of biological needs, man lives in a universe not of things but of symbolic stand-ins for things. A coin, for example, is a symbol for a certain amount of work done or utilities available; a document is a symbol of *res gestae*; a word or concept is a symbol of a thing or relationship; a book and a scientific theory are fantastic piles of accumulated symbols; and so forth ad infinitum.

This, then, indicates the difference between biological and specifically human values. Compared to the biological categories of "useful" or "harmful" for the survival of the individual and the species, what we call human values are essentially symbolic universes that have developed in history. You will find this definition applicable to any field of human activity, be it science, technology, art, morals, or religion. These symbolic universes may be adaptive and utilitarian in the biological sense, as when technology allows man to control nature. They may be indifferent, such as Greek sculpture or Renaissance painting which hardly can be claimed to have contributed toward better adaptation and survival. They may be outright deleterious if the breakdown of his little symbolic universe leads an individual to commit suicide, or the conflict of larger symbolic worlds leads to war and extermination on a large scale.

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[2] L. von Bertalanffy, "A Biologist Looks at Human Nature," *Sci. Monthly*, 1956, 82:33ff.

The viewpoint that I have brought forward appears to open many considerations of which I can follow only a few. Take, for example, the neurological and evolutionary aspect. The prerequisite for man's unique achievement obviously is the evolution of his brain. Speaking in terms of a crude oversimplification justly deserving the ire of the neurologist, we may distinguish the old brain or paleencephalon, the organ of primitive functions, instincts, and drives, and the new brain, the cortex or neencephalon which is the organ of the day personality, of conscious perception, feeling, voluntary action and, in particular, of the symbolic functions characteristic of man. Now if we survey the series of brains from lower vertebrates up to man, the characteristic is progressive cerebralization, that is, increase in the quantity and complexity of the forebrain. Consequently, what we call human progress is essentially an intellectual affair, made possible by the enormous increase of the forebrain. Owing to this, man was able to build up the symbolic worlds of speech and thought, and some progress was made in science and technology during the five thousand years of recorded history.

No development, however, is seen on the instinctual side, for the perfectly good reason that there is no anatomical substratum for it. This applies to both positive and negative aspects of behavior. Rousseau's idyllic image of the good natural man, spoiled only by civilization, and Freud's image of man as a born aggressor, patricide, and fornicator, precariously kept in bounds by the Censor, are equally romantic and unrealistic. Man is a tolerably monogamous species, he is a social animal, and he has inborn parental and filial instincts. This instinctual equipment, however, is not specifically human even though it may be the basis for conventional moral codes. Rather it is shared by any number of animal species which partly exhibit such instincts in far greater perfection. And there is, of course, the debit side of the ledger. We have progressed, in some five thousand years, from primitive mythology to quantum theory, and in some 150 years from the steam engine to the hydrogen bomb. But it would be a slightly optimistic view that general moral standards have progressed since Laotse, the Buddha, or Christ. This is a simple consequence of anatomy, namely, that the human cortex provides some 10 billions of neurons for intellectual achievements, but hardly a basis for a parallel development on the emotional and instinctual side.

The same problem can be envisaged from the viewpoint of cultural anthropology and history. The man-created symbolic universe partly depends on categories which are universally human, and partly on categories developed historically within a certain civilization.[3] The first fact accounts for the conformity of a Golden Rule of behavior common to all higher religions; the second, for the solecisms of moral codes. Moral values are indeed different for modern Europeans, Pueblo Indians, Kwakiutls, and Dobus as Ruth Benedict has so vividly depicted in her *Patterns of Culture*;[4] so much so that normal ways of behavior in one culture would be considered schizophrenic in another one. This all depends on the symbolic framework of cultures or even different frames of reference within one culture: what is penalized as murder in civilian life is labeled heroism in the frame of reference of war.

Nihilism—The Breakdown of a Symbolic Universe

If we accept the viewpoint offered, Nietzsche's quest quoted in the beginning, and many disquieting phenomena, fall into place like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. The phenomenon termed nihilism by Nietzsche is nothing else than the imminent breakdown of a symbolic universe. You will find this definition applicable to any field of human behavior and activity. The economic symbol of money has lost its connection with reality; a banknote does not represent any more a fixed quantity of gold or of commodities but is subject to continuous re-evaluation, to inflation, sometimes at an astronomical scale, and other machinations. Art used to be a symbol-system representative of a certain period in a certain culture. Today's "art" seems to extend from the finger-painting of a chimpanzee, recently reproduced in *Life* magazine and presenting a good example of modern nonrepresentative pictures, to the homey covers of the *Saturday Evening Post*. Even the symbolic universe of science, which is about the only solid thing we have, is shaky in certain aspects and places. The same symbol, democracy, means exactly the opposite when uttered in the West or in the Communist world. The symbolic system of religion which, abstracting from its intrinsic values, at any rate has developed organically in the long course of history, is supplanted by kaleidoscopically changing pseudoreligions, be they scientific progress, psychoanalysis, nationalism, soap opera, or tranquilizers.

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[3] L. von Bertalanffy, "An Essay on the Relativity of Categories," *Philosophy of Sci.*, 1955, 22:243ff.

[4] R. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, Houghton Mifflin, 1934.

All this does not mean that we necessarily behave worse than our predecessors, or that our predecessors were better than we are. It does mean, however, that there used to be established symbolic standards which were taken for granted even by the trespasser, sinner, and reformer, while now they seem to be disappearing.

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Still another aspect is what might be called cultural regression, using the term precisely in the psychoanalytic sense. Partly, even the term "mental fetalization," in the sense Bolk used the word for certain anatomic characteristics, would seem in place. The comic strip, the peeping tom in the modern form of scandal magazines, the touching infantility of television, the well-filled refrigerator as a sort of nourishing womb, the penis symbolism of the Cadillac,[7] the father image of Eisenhower—all these and many other things are nothing but regression to infantile states. This does not mean that automobiles, refrigerators, or Eisenhower may not in themselves be excellent things; but it does mean that the attitude is not that of what psychoanalysts call a mature ego.

No wonder, then, that the breakdown of the symbolic universe leads to the experience of being lost in a meaningless world. This experience, as formulated by individuals of a high intellectual standard, is existentialist philosophy.

For the many who lack sophistication, there are two other outlets: crime and mental disease. Juvenile delinquency reaching a peak under optimum economic conditions—what else can it mean than the practice of a philosophy of meaninglessness?

And there is that other outlet—mental ailment to the tune of some 10 million cases in the United States, or the 52 per cent mental cases of all hospitalized patients.[8] It is often maintained that the stress of modern life is at the basis of the increase of mental derangement. This stress is bad enough, but the theory is demonstrably false. It is a statistical fact that in times of extreme stress, as for example, the blitz in England, neurotic disorders decreased rather than increased.[9] Measured in terms of stress, all of Europe, after war and postwar experience, should be a gigantic madhouse, which patently it is not. It appears that the shoe is rather on the other foot: neurosis reaches its peak not when biological survival but rather when the symbolic superstructure is at stake. When life becomes intolerably dull, void, and meaningless—what can a person do but develop a neurosis? These neurosogenic or even psychosogenic conditions can even be reproduced in the laboratory as in the well-known Montreal experiments[10] where subjects, isolated from incoming stimuli, developed a model psychosis with intolerable anxiety, hallucinations, and the rest.

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[7] "The fundamental fact about American male psychology is the fear of impotence. Let's give the men, therefore, the One Big Symbol that will make them feel that they are *not* impotent. Let's give them great big cars, glittering all over and pointed at the ends, with 275 h.p. under the hood, so that they can feel like men!" S. T. Hayakawa, "Sexual Fantasy and the 1957 Car," *Etc.,* 1957, 14:163ff.

[8] W. Menninger, in *Los Angeles Times,* September 14, 1957.

[9] M. K. Opler, *Culture, Psychiatry, and Human Values,* Thomas, 1956, p. 67f.

Is There a Remedy?

All these considerations, which could be continued for a Thousand and One Nights, are apt to show that culture, that is, a framework of symbolic values, is not a mere plaything for the human animal or luxury of the intelligentsia; it is the very backbone of society and, among many other things, an important psychohygienic factor.

What, then, can we offer for a reevaluation of human values? For a minority, there is what Maslow has so aptly labeled and described under the term "peak experience."[11] This, however, is reserved for an esoteric few. I am neither concerned with, nor competent on, matters theological. However, looking at things from a detached, scientific and historical viewpoint, it appears that the value system of Christianity has proved to be singularly persistent and adaptable to varying cultural frameworks. Of course, this means that I am in contradiction to Nietzsche, with whom I started these considerations.

In summary, the diagnosis I have tried to make may appear pessimistic. There are, however, some hopeful aspects. Our present conference and other developments clearly show that these problems are no longer bypassed and neglected but are a matter of serious concern. Where there is insight and a will, there might be a way. Thus, I believe the purpose of our meeting will be fulfilled by making it understood that a new symbolic universe of values must be found or an old one reinstated if mankind is to be saved from the pit of meaninglessness, suicide, and atomic fire.

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[10] D. Bindra, Presentation in: *Discussions on Child Development,* ed. by J. M. Tanner and B. Inhelder, 1957, vol. 2, Tavistock Publications, Ltd.

[11] A. H. Maslow, "Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences." To be published, *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1959.

Culture and the Experience of Value

DOROTHY LEE

My paper will deal with culture as a factor in the experience of values; that is, it will discuss some ways in which culture mediates value for the experiencing individual. It will deal mainly not with human values but with value itself. By human values, by *a* value or a system of values, I mean the basis upon which an individual will choose one course rather than another, judged as better or worse, right or wrong. We can speak about human values, but we cannot know them directly. We infer them through their expression in behavior.

Human Values and Value

What I refer to as value—not *a* value—resides in the situation, in the field in which an individual participates. What I have called *a* value is a part of the cultural system; what I call *value* resides in the reality that is mediated by culture. According to this view, we experience value when our activity is permeated with satisfaction, when we find meaning in our life, when we feel good, when we act not out of calculating choice and not for extraneous purpose but rather because this is the only way that we, as ourselves, deeply want to act. I believe that value can be experienced only when relatedness with the surround is immediate and, in a sense, active; when the self is not only open to the experience of the other but also, to use Dewey's term, in transaction with the other. To experience the other on the basis of a prior category would be to introduce an interruption into the relationship. According to this view of value, prelabeling, analysis, assessment, calculation, measurement, evaluation, all erect barriers that may diminish or even destroy the value content of a situation.

The value experience I speak of here has reference to all reality. When the self is in transaction within a social situation, we speak of social value; though the experience itself is personal, it is bound to have value for the transacting other, also.

Abridgment of pp. 165–177, "Culture and the Experience of Value," by Dorothy Lee, from New Knowledge in Human Values, *edited by Abraham H. Maslow.* *Copyright © 1959 by Research Society for Creative Altruism. Reprinted with the permission of Harper & Row, Publishers.*

Universality of Social Value

My thesis here is that the good is held to be social in all or nearly all societies and that cultures are structured in such a way as to maintain and enhance social value and, each in its own way, to furnish for the individual situations rich in social value. Cultures differ widely in the forms of the behavior patterns furnished, through which social value enters the life of the members of the society, and in the multiplicity and effectiveness of these patterns. They also differ in the kind of self they enable the growing individual to develop, the degree of sensitivity they foster, the definitions of self and of other they offer as basic to relatedness.

* * * *

To show how culture mediates value, I shall speak first of two societies where, in different ways, there is an emphasis on infusing the life of the members with social value; and next I shall speak of the openness of the self, which makes immediate experience of value possible.

Relatedness—Arapesh

We take first the Arapesh of New Guinea, as they were when Margaret Mead visited them in 1931. For these people, the stress on the enhancement of social value was so strong as to overshadow all else. All their food-getting activities—their agriculture, their gathering, their hunting, and even the processing of the food—were hampered by constant interruptions, suffered continual interferences and distractions; there was appalling inefficiency and waste of time and energy. As a result, they never had enough to eat their fill, they always seemed hungry, even during their feasts, which themselves would have appeared to us pitifully meager even as everyday fare. Yet the Arapesh maintained the pattern of their situations in the face of near hunger; they persisted in arranging their working time uneconomically and in being prodigal with their presumably little energy. Their structuring of food-getting may have been inefficient from the point of view of food production, but it was eminently efficient from the point of infusing value into their lives.

. . . Margaret Mead writes: "The ideal distribution of food is for each person to eat food grown by another, eat game killed by another, eat pork from pigs that have been fed by people at . . . a distance." A man walked miles with his coconut saplings to plant them on the house sites of others, he gave his pigs to relatives in distant hamlets to feed and tend for him, he hunted only to give his kill away, since the lowest form of humanity was the man who ate his own kill, even one tiny bird. The system actually forbade a man to eat of his own kill; but it did not forbid him to give his pigs to his own wife to tend or to plant all his trees by his own house.

Taboo and preference, however, went hand in hand toward creating a wide gap between ownership and possession: what a man possessed he did not own, what he owned he gave to another. This gap then provided continuing opportunities for experience in social value. Thus it was ensured that the Arapesh had little to eat; but it also meant that every mouthful they consumed had been the medium of social participation and contained social value.

Social value was channeled into experience through a variety of ways, regulations, attitudes, behavior patterns. Any surplus of food, for instance, however small, was always temporary, as it was always the occasion for inviting others to a feast. The kinship system again was seen as something to be manipulated as a medium for discovering avenues of relatedness. And, quite often, the relationship with a given individual would be traced through a rambling route which brought in a large number of intermediate relatives.

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. . . social value so permeated the lives of the Arapesh that it would have required deliberate effort to cut it out of experience. Mead describes how, even when a man was walking alone through the jungle, he was in a sense carrying his society with him, so that what he saw along the way was not a vine, a piece of wood, but rather a vine to be picked for Y's roof, a plank for R's house. And the walk he was taking most probably had reference to a social framework.

The enjoyment of the value in the social situation depended, I believe, on the presence of a capacity to apprehend with immediacy. There were no barriers between self and other, no gaps to be bridged. The Arapesh self could participate in the other, and in fact the relations between a man and his wife, a man and his child, were codified in this way. A man "grew" his wife, from the time when she came as a child to join the household of his parents. He "grew" her the food he grew or killed for her; that is, he gave her of his self. In the same way, a good father grew his children. Together, throughout the period of pregnancy, husband and wife grew the child. Before and after the birth of the child, the food the father provided, what he did, and what he refrained from doing all went into growing the child. His time, his energy, his physical exertion, his good will and concern, his skill, his very self became incorporated in his wife and children.

And this conception of the self, I believe, was basic to the experience of all social value. In all of these food is involved. "Good" food, valued food, is food grown by one person and given to another; so that the "ideal distribution of food" which Margaret Mead describes, is actually an extension of the principle of "growing" of the wife and child; it was putting one's self into the other. For the Arapesh this "growing" is identical with value. The word for *good* and *the good* (*jap*) is the word for *grow*.

Relatedness—Oglala

In the culture of the Oglala Indians of this country, value was interpreted and infused into experience in an entirely different way, through an entirely different set of human values. Here relatedness was overtly recognized and sought as the ultimate value. It was indispensable for the growth and strengthening of a man to achieve relatedness with the manifestations of the Great Spirit—earth, plants, animals, stars, thunder, etc.—broadening in scope and intensifying through life. But relatedness was good in itself, relatedness ultimately to all; and man must be a worthy relative. So the emphasis was on rigorous development of the self, both through and for relatedness. In addition, a man was responsible for his social unit, or rather *as* his social unit, since he was an interpenetrating part of his camp circle, representing it in his person; and a holy man was eventually responsible for the actualization of the universe. Therefore, to enhance onself, to strengthen oneself, meant to enhance the unit of relatedness.

* * * *

On the surface, Arapesh and Oglala mediated value in diametrically different ways, and their values were widely different. The Oglala valued what we call the manly, both in man and woman. The Arapesh valued that which Mead has called maternal. The Oglala food-getting was impressively efficient; if they hunted in groups, it was for more effective results, not for the sake of being together. The Oglala individual often spent time alone; and he sought his religious experience ultimately in solitude, alone in the midst of the manifestations of the Great Spirit with whom he sought communion. Yet, in his person, he represented his camp circle; his prayer to Wakan Tanka, The Great Spirit, was: Help me that my people may live. And into the pipe he smoked to The Great Spirit at this time had been introduced with painstaking symbolism all the four groups of animals, the cardinal directions, the seasons, the times of the day, the earth, the sky, the region below. At this time, while alone, with the pipe in his hand, the Oglala seeker represented the entire social unit, reaching out for communion with the entire universe. And this was the prime situation of social value.

Relatedness and the Open Self

It is obvious that at the base of both Arapesh and Oglala concepts of social value lies a conception of the self as open; otherwise, the value situations which I presented could not have been experienced. There was an assumption of a degree of continuity between self and other: the self was not an element, complete in itself, capable of being completely removed from the surround. When an Arapesh man left his territory, for example, a part of his very self stayed behind, in his wife, his children, and, to a lesser extent, his many relatives who had eaten of the food he had grown and of the game he had killed. Conversely, it had been possible for the Arapesh man to relate himself in this way to his wife and children and other relatives, and to find value in this relationship, because he had an open self.

In both the cultures that I presented, the conception of the open self lies at the base of the enculturation of the individual as well as of the structure of behavioral situations. But here the similarity stops. The two societies differ as to the way in which they present the open self to their members.

I believe that the fully open self was presupposed in the Arapesh culture, and the emphasis was on furnishing, finding, creating a multiplicity of occasions for the exercise of the open self in transaction. The Oglala concentrated on enhancing the openness of the self, on developing in the growing individual an immediacy of apprehension; on enabling the individual to transact within an increasingly broadening field, on refining and intensifying the experience of the open self. When the concept of the open self is present, we find it at the base of probably all patterned behavior.

Among the Wintu Indians of California, I found the concept of the self expressed in the morphology of the language. For example, in a Wintu tale that I recorded, a man, speaking of his sick son, added a suffix to the verb: *I am ill (koyu)*, and now said, "I am ill *(koyuma)* my son"; and later, added the same suffix to *get well (modu)*, and said, "I want to get well my son." With the aid of this suffix, a chief haranguing his people about the coming of the Whites was quoted as saying: "You shall hunger your children, you shall hunger your horses." When this suffix occurred with a verb such as *I ate*, I found it easy to translate the phrase as "I fed my child." But here I was probably violating the meaning of the Wintu speaker. *I fed* presupposes a separate, bounded self acting upon another separate bounded self; I did something, whether desired or not, *to* someone else. If there is consistency in the meaning of the suffix, I believe it must always be translated in such a way that it expresses some kind of immediate participation in the experience of the other; so that, I do not *feed my child*, but rather: "I eat in respect to my child," "I hunger in respect to my child," "I am ill in respect to my child"; that is, I am open to the experience of my child. This is only one of the many cases where the linguistic forms as well as the cultural structure of the Wintu expressed their peculiar formulation of the openness of the self.

To say that the self is open is not to say that the self is fused with, or submerged in, the other. In all the cultures that I have studied reference is made to a differentiated self. In the Wintu language, for example, in addition to the personal pronouns we have at least two suffixes whose function is to differentiate and emphasize the self; and, in the case that I cited above, the father who participated in the son's illness was named in distinction from the son. The Wintu did not use an *and* when they spoke of two or more individuals; in our terms, they would say not: John *and* Mary have arrived but: John Mary they have arrived. This may imply that the coming of John and the coming of Mary are not separate to be joined by an *and*; yet John and Mary were clearly differentiated.

When I was in my teens, I was tortured by a question that I think would never have disturbed the Wintu or the Arapesh or the Oglala. If I dashed out to save a child from death or maiming at the risk of my own life, would I be doing it for *the child's* sake or for *my* sake? Would my act be altruistic or selfish? Upon which of these values would my chosen action be based? Would I be saving his life so that he could enjoy it, or would I act only because I could not bear to live with myself if I did not try to save him? This question of course presupposed a conception of the self as closed, in limited, purposive interaction.

In a society where relatedness stems from the premise of the open self, such a question would be nonsense. In such societies, though the self and the other are differentiated, they are not mutually exclusive. The self contains some of the other, participates in the other, and is in part contained within the other. By this I do not mean what usually goes under the name of empathy. I mean rather that where such a concept of the self is operative, self-interest and other-interest are not clearly distinguished; so that what I do for my own good is necessarily also good for my unit, the surround, whether this is my family, my village, my tribe, my land, or even nature in general, the entire universe. So the Oglala Indian could concentrate his entire life in developing his self, through rigorous self-discipline and privation, through intense physical suffering, through the systematic sharpening of his senses and the refining of his sensitivity, thus making himself worthy of communion with nature, the manifestation of the Great Spirit, doing all this ultimately for the welfare of the camp circle. What he asked of Wakan Tanka, The Great Spirit, was: "Help me that my people may live," and he could say at his time: "I am the people." Was this egoism or altruism?

I can say, "Help *me* that *my people* may live," only when the self is continuous with the other; and when this is so, whether I enhance myself, whether I expose myself to illness or pollution, whether I allow myself to deteriorate, in every case this is not a matter involving only myself; it is not even a matter purely affecting others; it is rather a situation shared by the other because I am to some extent the other.

A corollary to this view of the self is that, in respecting the other, the self is simultaneously respected. If the other is enjoyed in its totality, it means that the self must also be enjoyed. I cannot trust the other, value the other, unless I also love and value myself. In societies where the individual is ideally at one with, in harmony with, society, nature, the universe, we find that the self has tremendous value. So the Navaho, for example, valuing harmony and relatedness with the universe, believed that to assume the attitude of supplication or of gratitude toward the divine was to devalue or humiliate the divine with whom he was to some degree identified. The Oglala man seeking power through communion with nature had "to prove to some bird or animal that he was a worthy friend," to quote from the autobiography of Standing Bear: "The animal would thereafter observe and learn from the dreamer," and the dreamer also "should do likewise." The Oglala man who sought a vision was, in Standing Bear's words: "Humble without cringing, without loss of spirit. He always *faced* the Powers in prayer; he never groveled on the earth, but with face lifted to the sky he spoke straight to his Mystery." He was in immediate relation to "his Mystery"; yet he was himself, differentiated and full of personal worth.

Psychological Data and Value Theory

ABRAHAM H. MASLOW

Humanists for thousands of years have attempted to construct a naturalistic, psychological value system that could be derived from man's own nature, without the necessity of recourse to authority outside the human being himself. Many such theories have been offered throughout history. They have all failed for mass purposes exactly as all other value theories have failed. We have about as many scoundrels in the world today as we have ever had, and *many more* neurotic, probably, than we have ever had.

These inadequate theories, most of them, rested on psychological assumptions of one sort or another. Today practically all of these can be shown, in the light of recently acquired knowledge, to be false, inadequate, incomplete, or in some other way lacking. But it is my belief that developments in the science and art of psychology, in the last few decades, make it possible for us for the first time to feel confident that this age-old hope may be fulfilled if only we work hard enough.

* * * *

Free Choice Experiments: Homeostasis

Hundreds of experiments have been made that demonstrate a universal inborn ability in all sorts of animals to select a beneficial diet if enough alternatives are presented from among which they are permitted free choice. This wisdom of the body if often retained under less usual conditions, *e.g.*, adrenalectomized animals can keep themselves alive by readjusting their self-chosen diet, pregnant animals will nicely adjust their diets to the needs of the growing embryo, etc.

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It seems quite clear that all organisms are more self-governing, self-regulating, and autonomous than we thought twenty-five years ago. The

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organism deserves a good deal of trust and we are learning steadily to rely on this internal wisdom of our babies with reference to choice of diet, time of weaning, amount of sleep, time of toilet training, need for activity, and a lot else.

But more recently we have been learning, especially from physically and mentally sick people, that there are good choosers and bad choosers. We have learned, especially from the psychoanalysts, much about the hidden causes of such behavior and have learned to respect these causes.

In this connection we have available a startling experiment,[3] which we have been trying to repeat at Brandeis, that is pregnant with implications for value theory. It turns out that chickens allowed to choose their own diet vary widely in their ability to choose what is good for them. The good choosers become stronger, larger, more dominant than the poor choosers, which means that they get the best of everything. If then the diet chosen by the good choosers is forced upon the poor choosers, it is found that *they* now get stronger, bigger, healthier, and more dominant, although never reaching the level of the good choosers. That is, good choosers can choose better than bad choosers what is better for the bad choosers themselves. If similar findings are made in human beings, as I think they will be, we are in for a good deal of reconstruction of all sorts of theories. So far as human value theory is concerned, no theory will be adequate that rests simply on the statistical description of the choices of unselected human beings. To average the choices of good and bad choosers, of healthy and sick people is useless. Only the choices and tastes and judgments of healthy human beings will tell us much about what is good for the human species in the long run.

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Furthermore, any ethical code will have to deal with the fact of constitutional differences not only in chickens and rats but also in men, as Sheldon[4] and Morris[5] have shown. Some values are common to all (healthy) mankind, but also some other values will *not* be common to all mankind, but only to some types of people, or to specific individuals. What I have called the basic needs are probably common to all mankind and are therefore shared values. But idiosyncratic needs generate idiosyncratic values.

Constitutional differences in individuals generate preferences among ways of relating to self, and to culture and to the world, *i.e.,* generate values. These researches support and are supported by the universal experience of clinicians with individual differences. This is also true of the ethnological data that make sense of cultural diversity by postulating that each culture

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[3] W. F. Dove, "A Study of Individuality in the Nutritive Instincts; of the Causes and Effects of Variation in the Selection of Food," *Amer. Nat.,* 1935, 69: 469–544.

[4] W. Sheldon, *The Varieties of Temperament*, Harper, 1942.

[5] C. Morris, *Varieties of Human Value*, University of Chicago Press, 1956.

selects for exploitation, suppression, approval or disapproval, a small segment of the range of human constitutional possibilities. This is all in line with the biological data and theories and self-actualization theories which show that an organ system presses to express itself, in a word, to function. The muscular person likes to use his muscles, indeed, *has* to use them in order to self-actualize and to achieve the subjective feeling of harmonious, uninhibited, satisfying functioning which is so important an aspect of psychological health. People with intelligence must use their intelligence, people with eyes must use their eyes, people with the capacity to love have the *impulse* to love and the *need* to love in order to feel healthy. Capacities clamor to be used, and cease their clamor only when they *are* used sufficiently. That is to say, capacities are needs, and therefore are intrinsic values as well. To the extent that capacities differ, so will values also differ.

Basic Needs and Their Hierarchical Arrangement

It has by now been sufficiently demonstrated that the human being has, as part of his intrinsic construction, not only physiological needs, but also truly psychological ones. They may be considered as deficiencies which must be optimally fulfilled by the environment to avoid sickness and to avoid subjective ill-being. They can be called basic, or biological, and likened to the need for salt, or calcium or vitamin D because:

1. The person yearns for their gratification persistently.
2. Their deprivation makes the person sicken and wither, or stunts his growth.
3. Gratifying them is therapeutic, curing the deficiency-illness.
4. Steady supplies forestall these illnesses.
5. Healthy people do not demonstrate these deficiencies.

But these needs or values are related to each other in a hierarchical and developmental way, in order of strength and of priority. Safety is a more prepotent, or stronger, more pressing, earlier appearing, more vital need than love, for instance, and the need for food is usually stronger than either. Furthermore *all* these basic needs may be considered to be simply steps along the time path to general self-actualization, under which all basic needs can be subsumed.

By taking these data into account, we can solve many value problems that philosophers have struggled with ineffectually for centuries. For one thing, it looks as if *there were* a single ultimate value for mankind, a far goal toward which all men strive. This is called variously by different authors self-actualization, self-realization, integration, psychological health, individuation, autonomy, creativity, productivity, but they all agree that this amounts to realizing the potentialities of the person, that is to say, becoming fully human, everything that the person *can* become.

But it is also true that the person himself does not know this. We, the psychologists observing and studying, have constructed this concept in order to integrate and explain lots of diverse data. So far as the person himself is concerned, all *he* knows is that he is desperate for love, and thinks he will be forever happy and content if he gets it. He does not know in advance that he will strive on *after* this gratification has come, and that gratification of one basic need opens consciousness to domination by another, "higher" need. So far as he is concerned, *the* absolute, ultimate value, synonymous with life itself, is whichever need in the hierarchy he is dominated by during a particular period. These basic needs or basic values therefore may be treated *both* as ends and as steps toward a single end-goal. It is true that there is a single ultimate value or end of life, and *also* it is just as true that we have a hierarchical and developmental system of values, complexly interralated.

This also helps to solve the apparent paradox of contrast between Being and Becoming. It is true that human beings strive perpetually toward ultimate humanness, which itself is anyway a different kind of Becoming and growing. It's as if we were doomed forever to try to arrive at a state to which we could never attain. Fortunately we now know this not to be true, or at least it is not the only truth. There is another truth which integrates with it. We are again and again rewarded for good Becoming by transient states of absolute Being, which I have summarized as peak-experiences. Achieving basic-need gratifications gives us many peak-experiences, each of which are absolute delights, perfect in themselves, and needing no more than themselves to validate life.

* * * *

Self-Actualization: Growth

I have published in another place a survey of all the evidence that forces us in the direction of a concept of healthy growth or of self-actualizing tendencies.[8] This is partly deductive evidence in the sense of pointing out that, unless we postulate such a concept, much of human behavior makes no sense. This is on the same scientific principle that led to the discovery of a hitherto unseen planet that *had* to be there in order to make sense of a lot of other observed data.

There is also some direct evidence, or rather the beginnings of direct evidence which needs much more research, to get to the point of certainty. The only direct study of self-actualizing people I know is the one I made,[9] and it is a very shaky business to rest on just one study made by just one person when we take into account the known pitfalls of sampling error, of wish-fulfillment, of projection, etc. However, the conclusions of this study have been so strongly paralleled in the clinical and philosphical conclusions of Rogers, of Fromm, of Goldstein, of Angyal, of Murray, of C. Bühler, of Horney, Jung, Nuttin, and many others that I shall proceed under the assumption that more careful research will not contradict my findings radically. We can certainly now assert that at least a reasonable, theoretical, and empirical case has been made for the presence within the human being of a tendency toward, or need for, growing in a direction that can be summarized in general as self-actualization, or psychological health or maturation, and specifically as growth toward each and all of the subaspects of self-actualization. That is to say, the human being has within him a pressure (among other pressures) toward unity of personality, toward spontaneous expressiveness, toward full individuality and identity, toward seeing the truth rather than being blind, toward being creative, toward being good, and a lot else. That is, the human being is so constructed that he presses toward fuller and fuller being and this means pressing toward what most people would call good values, toward serenity, kindness, courage, knowledge, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness.

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[8] A. H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Harper, 1954.
[9] *Ibid.*

Few in number though they be, we can learn a great deal from the direct study of these highly evolved, most mature, psychologically healthiest individuals, and from the study of the peak moments of average individuals, moments in which they become transiently self-actualized. This is because they are in very real empirical and theoretical ways, *most fully human.* For instance, they are people who have retained and developed all their human capacities, especially those capacities which define the human being and differentiate him from let us say the monkey. (This accords with Hartman's[10] axiological approach to the same problem of defining the good human being as the one who has more of the characteristics which define the concept "human being.") From a developmental point of view, they are more fully evolved because not fixated at immature or incomplete levels of growth. This is no more mysterious, or *a priori*, or question-begging than the selection of a type specimen of butterfly by a taxonomist or the most physically healthy young man by the physician. They both look for the "perfect or mature or magnificent specimen" for the exemplar, and so have I. One procedure is as repeatable in principle as the other.

Full humanness can be defined not only in terms of the degree to which the definition of the concept "human" is fulfilled, *i.e.* the species norm. It also has a descriptive, cataloguing, measurable, psychological definition. We now have from a few research beginnings and from countless clinical experiences some notion of the characteristics both of the fully evolved human being and of the well-growing human being. These characteristics are not only neutrally describable; they are also subjectively rewarding, and pleasurable and reinforcing.

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[10] R. S. Hartman, *The Structure of Value,* forthcoming.

Among the objectively describable and measurable characteristics of the healthy human specimen are:

1. Clearer, more efficient perception of reality.
2. More openness to experience.
3. Increased integration, wholeness, and unity of the person.
4. Increased spontaneity, expressiveness; full functioning; aliveness.
5. A real self; a firm identity; autonomy; uniqueness.
6. Increased objectivity, detachment, transcendence of self.
7. Recovery of creativeness.
8. Ability to fuse concreteness and abstractness, primary and secondary process cognition, etc.
9. Democratic character structure.
10. Ability to love, etc.

These all need research confirmation and exploration but it is clear that such researches are feasible.

In addition, there are subjective confirmations or reinforcements of self-actualization or of good growth toward it. These are the feelings of zest in living, of happiness or euphoria, of serenity, of joy, of calmness, of responsibility, of confidence in one's ability to handle stresses, anxieties, and problems. The subjective signs of self-betrayal, of fixation, of regression, and of living by fear rather than by growth are such feelings as anxiety, despair, boredom, inability to enjoy, intrinsic guilt, intrinsic shame, aimlessness, feelings of emptiness, of lack of identity, etc.

These subjective reactions are also susceptible of research exploration. We have clinical techniques available for studying them.

It is the free choices of such self-actualizing people (in those situations where real choice is possible from among a variety of possibilities) that I claim can be descriptively studied as a naturalistic value system with which the hopes of the observer absolutely have nothing to do, *i.e.,* it is "scientific." I do not say "He *ought* to choose this or that" but only "Healthy people, permitted to choose, are *observed* to choose this or that." This is like asking "What *are* the values of the best human beings" rather than "What *should* be their values?" or "What *ought* they do?" (Compare this with Aristotle's belief that "it is the things which are valuable and pleasant to a good man that are really valuable and pleasant.")

Furthermore I think these findings can be generalized to most of the human species because it looks to me (and to others) as if *all* or most people tend toward self-actualization (this is seen most clearly in the experiences in psychotherapy, especially of the uncovering sort), and as if, in principle at least, all people are capable of self-actualization.

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1. One conclusion from all these free choice experiments, from developments in dynamic motivation theory and from examination of psychotherapy is a very revolutionary one that no other large culture has ever arrived at, namely, that our deepest needs are *not*, in themselves, dangerous or evil or bad. This opens up the prospect of resolving the dichotomy between Apollonian and Dionysian, classical and romantic, scientific and poetic, between reason and impulse, work and play, verbal and preverbal, maturity and childlikeness, masculine and feminine, growth and regression.

2. The main social parallel to this change in our philosophy of human nature is the rapidly growing tendency to perceive the culture as an instrument of need-gratification as well as of frustration and control. We can now reject, as a localism, the almost universal mistake that the interests of the individual and of society are *of necessity* mutually exclusive and antagonistic, or that civilization is primarily a mechanism for controlling and policing human instinctoid impulses.[11] All these age-old axioms are swept away by the new possibility of defining the main function of a healthy culture and each of its institutions as the fostering of universal self-actualization.

3. In healthy people only is there a good correlation between subjective delight in the experience, impulse to the experience, or wish for it, and "basic need" for the experience (it's good for him in the long run). Only such people uniformly yearn for what is good for them and for others, and then are able wholeheartedly to enjoy it, and approve of it. For such people virtue is its own reward in the sense of being enjoyed in itself. They spontaneously tend to do right because that is what they *want* to do, what they *need* to do, what they enjoy, what they approve of doing, and what they will continue to enjoy.

It is this unity, this network of positive intercorrelation that falls apart into separateness and conflict as the person gets psychologically sick. Then what he wants to do may be bad for him; even if he does it he may not enjoy it; even if he enjoys it he may simultaneously disapprove of it so that the enjoyment is itself poisoned or may disappear quickly. What he enjoys at first he may not enjoy later. His impulses, desires, and enjoyments then become a poor guide to living. He must accordingly mistrust and fear the impulses and the enjoyments which lead him astray; and so he is caught in conflict, dissociation, indecision; in a word, he is caught in civil war.

So far as philosophical theory is concerned, many historical dilemmas and contradictions are resolved by this finding. Hedonistic theory *does* work for healthy people; it does *not* work for sick people. The true, the good and the beautiful *do* correlate some, but only in healthy people do they correlate strongly.

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[11] H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, Beacon Press, 1955.

4. Self-actualization is a relatively achieved "state of affairs" in a few people. In most people, however, it is rather a hope, a yearning, a drive, a "something" wished for but not yet achieved, showing itself clinically as drive toward health, integration, growth, etc. The projective tests are also able to detect these trends as potentialities rather than as overt behavior, just as an X-ray can detect incipient pathology before it has appeared on the surface.

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Growth and Environment

Man demonstrates *in his own nature* a pressure toward fuller and fuller Being, more and more perfect actualization of his humanness in exactly the same naturalistic, scientific sense than an acorn may be said to be "pressing toward" being an oak tree, or that a tiger can be observed to "push toward" being tigerish, or a horse toward being equine. Man is ultimately *not* molded or shaped into humanness or taught to be human. The role of the environment is ultimately to permit him or help him to actualize *his own* potentialities, not *its* potentialities. The environment does not give him potentialities and capacities; he *has* them in inchoate or embryonic form, just exactly as he has embryonic arms and legs. And creativeness, spontaneity, selfhood, authenticity, caring for others, being able to love, yearning for truth are embryonic potentialities belonging to his species-membership just as much as are his arms and legs and brain and eyes.

This is not in contradiction to the data already amassed which show clearly that living in a family and in a culture are absolutely necessary to *actualize* these psychological potentials that define humanness.

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I think the main factual defect in the value theories and ethical theories of the past and the present has been insufficient knowledge of psychopathology and psychotherapy. Throughout history, learned men have set out before mankind the rewards of virtue, the beauties of goodness, the intrinsic desirability of psychological health and self-fulfillment. It's all as plain as ABC, and yet most people perversely refuse to step into the happiness and self-respect that is offered them. Nothing is left to the teachers but irritation, impatience, disillusionment, alternations between scolding, exhortation, and hopelessness. A good many have thrown up their hands altogether and talked about original sin or intrinsic evil and concluded that man could be saved only by extrahuman forces.

Meanwhile there lies available the huge, rich, and illuminating literature of dynamic psychology and psychopathology, a great store of information on man's weaknesses, and fears.[14] We know much about *why* men do wrong things, *why* they bring about their own unhappiness and their self-destruction, *why* they are perverted and sick. And out of this has come the insight that human evil is largely human weakness, forgivable, understandable and also, in principle, curable.

I find it sometimes amusing, sometimes saddening that so many scholars and scientists, so many philosophers and theologians, who talk about human values, of good and evil, proceed in complete disregard of the plain fact that professional psychotherapists every day, as a matter of course, change and improve human nature, help people to become more strong, virtuous, creative, kind, loving, altruistic, serene. These are only some of the consequences of improved self-knowledge and self-acceptance. There are many others as well that can come in greater or lesser degree.[15]

The subject is far too complex even to touch here. All I can do is draw a few conclusions for value theory.

1. Self-knowledge seems to be the major path of self-improvement, though not the only one.
2. Self-knowledge and self-improvement are very difficult for most people. They usually need great courage and long struggle.
3. Though the help of a skilled professional therapist makes this process much easier, it is by no means the only way. Much that has been learned from therapy can be applied to education, to family life, and to the guidance of one's own life.
4. Only by such study of psychopathology and therapy can one learn a proper respect for and appreciation of the forces of fear, of regression, of defense, of safety. Respecting and understanding these forces makes it much more possible to help oneself and others to grow toward health. False optimism sooner or later means disillusionment, anger and hopelessness.
5. To sum up, we can never really understand human weakness without also understanding human health. Otherwise we make the mistake of pathologizing everything. But also we can never fully understand or help human strength without also understanding human weakness. Otherwise we fall into the errors of overoptimistic reliance on rationality alone.

If we wish to help humans to become more fully human, we must realize not only that they try to realize themselves but that they are also reluctant or afraid or unable to do so. Only by fully appreciating this dialectic between sickness and health can we help to tip the balance in favor of health.

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[14] O. Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses,* Norton, 1945.

[15] C. Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy,* Houghton Mifflin, 1951.

The Principle of Cooperation in Behavior

WILLIAM GALT, PH.D.

I

The object of the present paper is to report briefly some of the data which indicate that groups or species of animals, including man, constitute organismic integrations—that they do not represent a mere collection or agglomeration of individuals. My purpose is to cite some of the biological facts which support the view that the species man, as also species of animals lower in the phylogenetic scale, originally constituted a unified totality in which the activities of the component individuals were throughout motivated by the sovereign principle of behavior cohering in the species as an organismic whole.

* * * *

. . . The biologists have gathered much objective, incontrovertible data on the importance of social interdependence and cooperation throughout animal forms, the ethnologists and anthropologists have stressed the existence of social integrity and of internal coordination in the life of primitive tribes, and the scientific world has in general turned more to the study of functioning wholes, having realized that the part is wrongly conceived and interpreted when studied as an atomistic element isolated from the whole of which it is an integral constituent.

* * * *

In psychiatry and sociology the adoption of the newer, more organismic viewpoint has been slower, and the opposition to it more deeply entrenched. The most determined attempt that I know of to bring concepts in these spheres into alignment with the generally changing conceptions in other fields of science has been made by Dr. Trigant Burrow and his associates. In a communication published in *The Journal of the American Medical Association*

William E. Galt, "The Principle of Cooperation in Behavior," Quarterly Review of Biology, *Vol. 15, No. 4 (December, 1940), pp. 401–410. Reprinted by permission.*

as early as 1914 Burrow (6) stressed the social nature of the neurosis and the inadequacy and unreliability of psychiatric criteria which classified some individuals as normal and others as neurotic. As a result of submitting the social group itself to a rigid and inclusive analysis, he has in subsequent writings consistently insisted that so-called normal processes, because of their deviation from biologically consistent behavior, stand in as great need of a critical and exhaustive study as do the processes of the obviously neurotic individual. And by normal processes Burrow means the processes of himself, myself, yourself. He does not refer to normality as some vague generality existing in some remotely abstract sphere. In Burrow's organismic view, normal social processes are essentially of one piece with the bizarre behavior of the neurotic patient. The processes in the patient are not alien to or fundamentally different from those processes which habitually receive social credence and corroboration. From the basis of his inquiries, such categories as psychiatrist and patient, normal and neurotic represent a formulation that is too static and absolutistic to fit into a relativistic view of behavior and its disorders. These conventional categories proved satisfactory only so long as each individual was looked upon as a discrete action-centre without intimate motivational connections with others of his species.

Burrow was thus forced by his experimental investigations of groups to apply an organismic view to human behavior and its disturbances. His position is that originally man as a species represented a unit, a whole, just as a herd of animals or a colony of ants or bees is regarded to-day as a supra-individual complex with emergent properties. The primary basis of motivation for man's behavior had its origin in the species, and this motivation was always in relation to species solidarity. The individual, as a separate motivational unit, was but a conceptual abstraction. As a result of a bio-social *faux pas*, however, the individual has been split off in motivation and feeling from his biological group. He has assumed an arbitrary isolation and individuation which are quite out of agreement with existing biological data. Contrary to our beliefs, our fancies and our cherished suppositions, the individual does not constitute the unit of social motivation and behavior. He no more represents the unit of social behavior than the discrete reflex represents the unit of physiological behavior. The social group, the race or species, is the fundamental unit. The behavior of the individual can only be sane and effective when it is in alignment with this principle. This conception of Dr. Burrow's rests upon firm, biological ground. It possesses in no sense a sentimental, religious or mystical connotation.

II

It will be readily seen that such a change in frame of reference must alter very fundamentally our study and interpretation of behavior. As a matter of fact, Burrow's researches in human behavior must lead to a reorganization of concepts in the field of man's interrelational function . . . The individual is to-day conventionally looked upon as the primary element, the fundamental unit out of which social units and social behavior are secondarily built. The child at birth is assumed to be filled with anti-social tendencies and to be imbued with instinctive ego-drives which are directed toward self-satisfactions antagonistic to others of his kind. The child is thus conceived of as starting life as a self-centered and socially disruptive unit. As a result of contact with the social group about him—first with his parents and later with the wider social community—these destructive, anti-social trends are either sublimated, repressed or disguised, so that the individual succeeds in getting along with others with a certain degree of external harmony. We hear much, then, about the socialization of the individual. Indeed this function is considered the all-important task of social education.

But we may ask how the data which we have from child psychology fit in with this concept. At the very outset we will probably recall that Piaget's interpretation of the development of speech in the child is in alignment with this traditional sociological and psychiatric view. Piaget (31) holds that the first type of speech to appear in the child is ego-centric speech. It is speech not in relation to others but in relation to the child himself. The speech of the child is supposed only gradually to lose its ego-centricity and become social speech as a result of impact with the social forces about him. In a recent article, however, Vigotsky (34) furnishes experimental data to support the contrary view, namely, that speech when it first appears in the child is essentially social in nature and becomes more ego-centric as the child grows older. He considers ego-centric speech as a transition from the social activity of the child to his individual functions, from cooperative activity to the child's own individual activity. The latest experimental results and interpretation in regard to the development of speech in children lend no support, then, to the customary conception of the child as an ego-centric and asocial being. On the contrary, these results support the view that the appearance of ego-centric trends in the child is not due to his intrinsic organization, but rather that they are secondarily acquired.

To pass to other evidence from child psychology, Lewin (22) has emphasized that for the child the boundary between the self and the environment is less defined than for the adult and that the 'I' or self is only gradually formed in the second or third year of life. Other investigators have also referred to the surprisingly slow development in the child of the sense of the 'I' or self, and have laid stress upon the fact that one of the most difficult concepts which the child has to master in his early years is the idea of himself as a separate, localized being, or as an individualized totality in himself. This is a particularly striking and interesting finding, especially when we consider the circumstance that from the background of our present culture the child is exposed from birth to the explicit and implicit assumption on the part of parents and the social milieu that the individual self or 'I' represents the unit of social function, that it is a dynamic totality and is only connected superficially with others through the rather secondary and artificial process of socialization. Now, if the child were by his original nature ego-centric and asocial, as the majority of students hold, it is difficult to explain why the concept of the 'I' or self should present such difficulties for him. It would naturally be supposed that, if this were the case, such a concept would be his guiding principle and would be the earliest personality-constellation to make its appearance. The very fact that personalistic concepts appear at a relatively late ontogenetic period in the development of the child lends much support to the view that such concepts are not in alignment with the natural growth processes of the child's organism but are rather in the nature of conditioned responses which are imposed by the child's contact with the world of adults.

In other words, in the course of its development the child does not go through a process of socialization but, quite the contrary, the process is one that more and more renders him asocial. To avoid being misunderstood let me expand this statement somewhat and explain just what I mean. There is no question but that the growing child is trained in the social amenities, the cultural customs and the types of behavior expected of him in different social situations. But my point is that this training is on a secondary, superficial or conditioned level. It is subsequent and parallel to a process in which there is a weaning of the child from the sense of biological continuity and solidarity with his kind, and the establishment within him of a sense of personal identity, motivation and authority which of its nature must be in conflict with the identity and motivation of others of his social group. Expressed differently, the total social behavioral pattern which is the biological heritage of the human infant, as it is of other animal species, is disrupted, and an undue individuation takes place. This individuation, which in the course of time sets up an autonomous individual with private hopes, desires, wishes, gains and losses, of necessity brings about severe conflict when the desires of two or more elements or individuals happen to interfere with one another. The incentives to behavior have inadvertently become tied up with the individual as an arbitrary centre of action and motivation rather than with the social group as such a centre.

The findings of a number of other investigators give weight to our organismic thesis. Lack of space prohibits more than a very cursory reference to them. . . . As a result of a great deal of experimental work with children in which they were placed in different types of social situations, Charlotte Bühler (4, 5) points out that cooperative behavior among children is more primary than the competitive response in that it much outweighs the latter in the early years of life. Using an experimental situation that would favor the expression of competition, she found that this type of response did not make its appearance until about the third year of life. Gardner and Lois Barclay Murphy (29, 30) have also emphasized the presence in the young child of socially coordinating trends. Such observations will make it increasingly more difficult to adhere to our present psychological and sociological conception of the child as an ego-centric, antisocial being who is welded into the social pattern only by the force of pressure.

III

There are two other fields from which I should like to draw material corroborative of the thesis developed by Burrow. First is the field of anthropology or ethnology. Competent observers of life among primitive peoples have stressed the coordination and social solidarity of these groups, and the remarkable lack of individualism and competition among them. Kropotkin (21) supplies a wealth of material concerning this point. Authorities are in rather general agreement that life among primitive groups is universally based on tribal unity, and that the concept of individualism, as we are familiar with it, is meaningless to them.

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. . . While I am fully aware that a number of anthropological authorities still adhere to the individualistic viewpoint, it would seem that the more recent anthropological, ethnological and archeological students are in agreement in indicating that unbridled individualism is a modern growth, that it is not characteristic of primitive mankind.

The other general field from which I should like to draw supporting evidence is that of the comparative behavior of animals lower in the evolutionary scale than man. As we know, as early as 1890 Kropotkin (21) stressed the importance of the factor of mutual aid in animal life and gave numerous instances of this principle and its effectiveness in securing the survival of the species. He pointed out that even in his concepts of struggle for existence and survival of the fittest Darwin had consistently stressed the fundamental principle of cooperation in the species.

IV

In the preceding section I have cited some of the evidence from the fields of child development, comparative psychology and anthropology as it lends substantiation to the conception of social groups as organismic wholes and as it supports the thesis of the social basis of man's consciousness. Psychopathologists will be particularly interested in the implications of the present thesis as they may relate to the neurosis and psychosis. The various writers who have dealt with the problem of nervous and mental disease have agreed that the fundamental characteristic in these conditions is the presence of conflict. . . .

Now conflict within a personality presupposes that the personality has been split into parts and that these parts have of themselves acquired an undue independence in relation to the whole personality structure. The central principle within the personality as a whole has lost its coordinating power in respect to partial components. The components themselves have become motivating powers in their own right and hence no unified course of behavior is possible. Psychopathologists have long recognized such a division in the personality of their patients and have named one of the most baffling of psychoses, schizophrenia or split-personality. . . . I should like to mention schizophrenia at least tentatively in indicating the possible bearing of social division and conflict upon psychopathological conditions.

I should indicate at this point that Burrow (8, 9) has emphasized the fact that, concomitantly with the partialization that has inadvertently separated the individuals of the race, there has inevitably occurred a partializing effect within the individual himself. . . .

We have already considered the fact that from the viewpoint of biological data there is much evidence to support the thesis that man, with his present mental convictions in regard to the independence and supremacy of the element (the individual) in relation to the whole (the race or species), represents an evolutionary anomaly of development. We have seen indications that such a position is not in harmony with biological data, and that evolution could hardly have proceeded at all if lower forms of life had assumed this arbitrary attitude. We have found much evidence that cooperation is a fundamental property of protoplasm itself and have seen examples of its effectiveness throughout the animal scale. We saw that it was very difficult for the child to delimit his personality, that one of the most difficult concepts for him to acquire in early life was that of being an individual "self," separate and distinct from others. Accompanying the artificial separation of the individual from the race or species, there has been a cleavage in the various physiological systems in relation to the organism as a whole (digestive, reproductive) so that they no longer work in harmonious interfunctioning. At the same time we have seen that there has been a cleavage in behavioral trends, so that conflict, indecision, and their compensatory mechanisms, are rather characteristic of the so-called normal personality.

In the schizophrenic personality, this cleavage in behavioral trends has advanced to such a stage that coordinated activity is precluded, and the individual is no. longer able to get along in his environment. There is at times a rather complete withdrawal of contact with regard to stimuli and reactions relating to situations outside the individual, and a concentration on a fanciful world within. This regression is usually looked upon as an escape from a painful reality which the personality is not strong enough to deal with, and a consequent capitulation to a system of subjective phantasy in which the patient can make of his world what he pleases. Such regressions are thought of as due to a diseased or faulty personality resulting from hereditary weakness, developmental trauma or from a deep-seated habit disorganization. There is evidence, however, for the view that these severe personality disturbances and extreme regressions represent an inability to assimilate socially prevalent modes of thinking and feeling which from an organismic basis are themselves dissociated and pathological.

We know, of course, that community medical hygiene was a very important factor in eliminating the dread epidemics which before the rise of scientific medicine swept human communities. We have need to recognize that community mental hygiene is no less important in dealing with those behavioral disturbances which fill our asylums to-day and which, in the form of crime, war, religious discord, political and economic inequalities, etc. represent socio-pathological processes which are equally epidemic. But if mental hygiene is really to be effective, we must envisage it in a more intimate, inclusive, less projective manner. I think we shall find that, along with Burrow, we must come to the practical realization that our own daily, normal processes of interchange are partitive and disordered in a very real sense and that we must thus meet the vital social challenge of replacing our partial, ego-centric views, responses and habituations with principles and behavior that are more in line with man's fundamental phylo-biological motivation.

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Levels of Sociocultural Integration: An Operational Concept

JULIAN H. STEWARD

I

Many anthropologists who began their careers in research on tribal societies now find themselves involved in the analysis of such complicated contemporary sociocultural systems as China, Russia, India, or the United States. It is not surprising that they bring to these newer tasks methodological tools that were devised primarily for the study of tribal society. Valuable as these tools are for many purposes, they are not adequate to deal with all the phenomena encountered either in the study of modern nations or in the analysis of the acculturation of native populations under the influence of these nations. There is some tendency to meet the difficulty by borrowing concepts and methods from the other social sciences which have had long experience in dealing with contemporary societies. Where this leads to new interdisciplinary approaches it represents healthy scientific development, but often it appears that anthropologists are ready to abandon the unique methods of their own science to imitate the other social sciences. It should be possible to revise basic anthropological concepts and methods to meet the needs of the new and enlarged subject matter.

The greatest need is an adequate conceptualization of the phenomena of sociocultural systems above the tribal level. Because anthropology is distinctive in its primary concern with culture—a concept which perhaps represents its greatest contribution to the social sciences—it seems to be widely held that a general definition of culture is sufficient to dictate problem and method in the study of *any* culture. There would probably be no great disagreement with the bare statement that culture consists of learned modes of behavior that are socially transmitted from one generation

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Julian H. Steward, "Levels of Sociocultural Integration: An Operational Concept," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, *Vol. 7, No. 4 (1951), pp. 374–390. Copyright, Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico. Reprinted by permission.*

to the next and from one society or individual to another. To have operational utility, however, this definition would have to be modified in the case of each particular kind of culture. Our present working definition of culture was devised largely for the study of tribal societies, and it does not at all meet certain needs in the analysis of the more complicated contemporary cultures.

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In the analysis of cultural change and acculturation of more complicated sociocultural systems, there are phenomena which cannot be handled by the normative and relativistic concept of culture. The culture of a modern nation is not simply a behavioral norm, which may be ascertained by the observation of all or of a significant sample of individuals. Different groups of individuals are substantially dissimilar in many respects. Moreover, certain aspects of a modern culture can best be studied quite apart from individual behavior. The structure and function of a system of money, banking, and credit, for example, represents supra-individual aspects of culture. To say that in the final analysis a banking system, like all culture, exists in the minds of men is not to say that its operation can best be ascertained by using the ethnographic method to study the behavior of bankers. The system not only has complicated rules, regulations, and principles of its own, but it cannot be understood without reference to world trade, industrial development, marketing, legal systems, and many other factors. The national aspects of banking can be ascertained from economists who have made them their specialty. It would certainly be approaching the problem in the most difficult way to use the ethnographic method.

Not only is the normative concept of culture inapplicable to certain aspects of modern culture, but the tribal meaning of pattern is a clumsy tool for dealing with contemporary society. A contemporary society is not integrated through uniformities of individual behavior. It is an extremely heterogeneous entity, whose total "pattern" consists of intricately interrelated parts of different kinds. When tribal acculturation under the influence of a modern nation is being examined, therefore, it is impossible to think of the replacement of the tribal pattern by the national pattern. No individuals or groups of individuals carry an entire national pattern. They participate only in very special portions of the entire culture. The "assimilation" of any ethnic minority, therefore, can only mean that certain aspects of the national culture affect the minority culture so as to integrate the latter as a specialized dependent part of the whole. The loss of native features does not mean that a national pattern has finally been adopted. Just what has been adopted will depend upon the individual case.

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In an effort to delineate some of the significant components of contemporary sociocultural systems and thereby to indicate the features which are susceptible to analysis by the ethnographic method, I have previously suggested that these systems can be viewed in terms of levels of sociocultural integration.[1] According to this concept a total national culture is divisible into two general kinds of features: first, those that function and must be studied on a national level; second, those that pertain to sociocultural segments or subgroups of the population. The former include the suprapersonal and more or less structured—and often formally institutionalized—features, such as governmental forms and legal systems, economic institutions, religious organizations, educational systems, law enforcement and military organizations, and others. These have aspects which are national, sometimes international, in scope and which must be understood apart from the behavior of the individuals connected with them.

The sociocultural segments are subcultural groups of individuals whose behavior lends itself to the methods of direct observation used by anthropology. There are several kinds of subcultural groups in modern states and nations. First there are vertical or localized groups, which may represent differentiation that has occurred during national development—for example, subcultures arising from local specialization in production—or else ethnic minorities, which survive from a pre-national period or which as immigrants brought a distinctive culture into the nation. Second, there are horizontal groups, such as castes, classes, occupational divisions, and other segments which hold a status position in an hierarchical arrangement and usually crosscut localities to some extent. These, too, may represent segments which either have been differentiated during national development or have been incorporated from the outside.

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An analysis of national characteristics from the point of view of levels of sociocultural integration suggests that the common denominator may consist of the following components. First, there are behavior traits which result from practices of child rearing, that is, which are acquired by the individual as a member of the family. In a large, heterogeneous society it seems unlikely that families of all sociocultural subgroups will be essentially similar; but the question is a purely empirical one. Second, there is common behavior to the extent that all members of a society are subject to the same national institutions. All individuals obey the same laws, and they may share in some measure national religious, military, social and other institutions. Third, there may be a common denominator that derives from the influence of mass means of communication.

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[1] Julian H. Steward, *Area Research: Theory and Practice* (Bulletin, Social Science Research Council, no. 63, New York, 1950).

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In the growth continuum of any culture, there is a succession of organizational types which are not only increasingly complex but which represent new emergent forms.[3] The concept is fairly similar to that of organizational levels in biology. In culture, simple forms, such as those represented by the family or band, do not wholly disappear when a more complex stage of development is reached, nor do they merely survive fossil-like, as the concepts of folkways and mores formerly assumed. They gradually become specialized, dependent parts of new kinds of total configurations. The many-faceted national culture previously delineated represents a very high developmental level.

The application of the concept of developmental levels, or emergent evolution, to cultural phenomena is not new. The idea that "advanced" cultures are differently integrated than "simple" cultures is implicit in most studies. But its methodological utility has been pretty much ignored, partly, I suspect, because it suggests the now widely discredited schemes of cultural evolution. The concept of levels of integration does not presuppose any evolutionary sequence. In biology, the concept that higher levels of life have different organizing principles than lower ones is in no way concerned with the evolution of particular life forms, such as birds, mammals, or reptiles. Similarly, the same concept applied to culture is not concerned with the developmental sequences of particular cultural types. The cultural evolution of Morgan, Tylor, and others is a developmental taxonomy based on concrete characteristics of cultures. The concept of levels of sociocultural integration, on the other hand, is simply a methodological tool for dealing with cultures of different degrees of complexity. It is not a conclusion about evolution.

Another obstacle to the use of the concept of levels of sociocultural integration is the very strong hold of the concept of relativity. So long as the differences between cultural traditions are regarded as the only important qualitative differences, that is, so long as each culture area is seen primarily in terms of a fixed pattern which endures throughout its history, developmental stages will be thought of in terms only of quantitative differences, as matters of mere complexity. The concept of levels of sociocultural integration provides a new frame of reference and a new meaning to pattern; and it facilitates cross-cultural comparison.

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[3] Steward, *op. cit.* pp. 106–114.

II

Few efforts have been made to specify significant levels of sociocultural integration. The historical approach has been divided between a relativistic emphasis upon the continuity of the traditional pattern and postulation of particular evolutionary stages. Where the approach has been less committed to one of these extreme positions, it has usually dealt only with special aspects of culture, suggesting developmental stages in such features as religion or political organization.

An outstanding contribution which bears directly upon the problem of integrational levels, even though it approaches it somewhat tangentially, is Redfield's concept of the folk society and the folk culture.[4] The characteristics which Redfield ascribes to such a society and culture and which are attributable to a large number of tribal societies and cultures, are descriptive of an organizational type rather than of a particular cultural type. That is, they are intended to characterize societies at a certain level of sociocultural integration in wholly different cultural traditions. Further comparative analysis will no doubt require redefinition of the concept, but for the present purposes we can assume that most of the diagnostic features are significant. Folk societies are small, isolated, close-knit, homogeneous, patterned around kinship relations, oriented toward implicit goals and values, and pervaded by general supernaturalism.

Redfield did not attempt to conceptualize supra-folk levels of sociocultural integration, but in his studies of Yucatan[5] he uses the urban society as a contrasting type. Subjected to urbanization, the folk society is secularized, individualized, and disorganized. Urbanization, however, is but one of the processes through which a folk society may be integrated into a larger sociocultural system; for cities are but specialized parts of such systems. Some folk societies are incorporated into states and nations as regionally specialized subcultures which do not undergo urbanization at all and which are readapted rather than transformed. Even when the folk society is transformed, the individual is not only secularized, individualized, and disorganized but he adopts scientific or naturalistic explanations in place of supernatural ones, he participates in occupational, class, ethnic, or other sociocultural segments of the city, and in general he is reintegrated in a new kind of system.

Redfield's concept of the folk society and the folk culture are based largely on his studies of the Maya Indians of Yucatan. Historically, the Maya villages were once parts of city states and federations, sometimes called "empires," and they became relatively independent after the Spaniards destroyed the state or national superstructure. The evident stability of their society and culture through the upheavals of the Spanish Conquest and later events suggests a fairly high degree of integration. Whether the nature of this integration is essentially similar to that of tribal societies and to what is broadly called "folk societies" in other cultural traditions is a question to be answered by comparative, cross-cultural analysis. It is significant that the term "tribal society" remains an exceedingly ill-defined catch-all. Once a typology of integrational levels is established empirically it will be possible to examine the reintegration of simpler societies into larger sociocultural systems and to make generalizations about process which go beyond what Redfield derived from the process of urbanization.

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[4] Robert Redfield, *The Folk Society* (American Journal of Sociology, vol. 52, pp. 293–308, 1947).

[5] Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago, 1941).

It is certain that further discriminations will require recognition of integrational levels that are lower than the folk level. The biological or nuclear family represents a level that is lower in a structural sense, and in some cases it appears to have been historically antecedent to higher forms. . . .

The nuclear family, despite its many varieties, is basic in every modern society, and it seems safe to suppose that it has always been basic. In many cases, it was probably antecedent to the extended family, band, community, and other multi-family forms. In any event, there are probably several levels of sociocultural integration between the family and the folk society which should be distinguished. And above the folk society there are many significantly different levels of integration. For the purpose of the present exposition, however, it is sufficient to discuss only three levels—the nuclear family, the folk society, and the state. These are qualitatively distinctive organizational systems, which represent successive stages in any developmental continuum and constitute special kinds of cultural components within higher sociocultural systems.

Folk societies or multi-family sociocultural systems develop when activities requiring a supra-family organization appear. Productive processes may become patterned around collective hunting, fishing, herding, or farming. Property rights requiring interfamilial understandings are established. Unity achieved in economic behavior may be reinforced through group ceremonialism, through patterned forms of extended kinship and friendship, and through recreational activities. Society acquires a structure appropriate to the particular kinds of interfamilial relations that develop in the cultural tradition, and patterns of social control and leadership emerge.

One of the most common forms of multi-family integration is an extended kin group of some kind. Not all peoples, however, have a supra-family organization based on extended kinship. The nuclear family may be integrated directly into a larger, multi-kin structure.

What may be called roughly a state level of integration is marked by the appearance of new patterns that bring several multi-family aggregates, or folk societies, into functional dependence upon one another within a still larger system. Communities or other sociocultural segments of a folk type may participate in state projects, such as the construction of irrigation works, roads, religious edifices, and so on; they may produce special foods or manufactured objects for exchange with other communities and for state purposes; they may join other communities in offensive and defensive warfare; they may accept state rules, regulations, and standards concerning property, credit, commerce, and other matters of mutual concern. They frequently accept a state religion. The systems of controls arising from economic, military, and religious needs creates a political hierarchy and a social system of classes and statuses. Qualitatively new institutions appear on the state, or national, level: governmental structure and control of those aspects of life which are of state concern; social stratification; and national cultural achievements. All of these have national aspects that are distinguishable from their varied folk manifestations.

There are many kinds of state sociocultural systems, each having characteristics determined by factors which are peculiar to the area and to the cultural tradition. But all states can be said to represent a broad level of sociocultural organization which is more than the sum-total of the families and communities of which it consists.

There is nothing new in the idea that each stage of sociocultural development entails new forms of coöperation and interaction, and that societies may be arranged in general developmental series, such as family, village, and state, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, and others. The point we wish to stress is that the concept of levels may be used as an analytic tool in the study of changes within any particular sociocultural system, for each system consists of parts which developed at different stages and through different processes and which, though functionally specialized in their dependency upon the whole, continue to integrate certain portions of the culture. The problem of acculturation may be rephrased so that the phenomena can be handled not merely in terms of categories of elements and total patterns but also of functional levels. This is necessary in any acculturational situation involving a modern state or nation, for the different categories of cultural features—religion, economics, government, and the like—cut across the nation, community, class, and family levels, and function differently at each.

* * * *

The concept of levels of sociocultural integration is a conclusion about culture change only in the sense that there do appear to be phenomena which cannot be explained by any other frame of reference. Any aspect of culture—economic, social, political, or religious—has different meanings when viewed in terms of its national functions and of its special manifestations in different subcultures. Stated differently, the individual's participation in culture is of a somewhat different order at the family, community, and national levels. As a member of the family, he is concerned with the most basic human needs—procreation, subsistence, child rearing, sickness, and death. Even where community or state institutions intervene to assist the family, these functions still remain the primary reason for the existence of the family. Because they are directly concerned with biological survival, they are charged with emotions—emotions involving sex, hunger, fear of sickness and death, and social anxieties. In the development of the individual, they are among the earliest learned and the most deeply ingrained. This presumably is why behavior which functions on a family level is the most difficult to change in a changing culture.

The individual, of course, reacts as a total person to his function as a member of the family, community, and nation. Nevertheless, community functions may develop without completely altering the family. New patterns of coöperation and social interaction lift certain responsibilities from the family and make it a specialized dependency of a larger sociocultural unit. But they by no means supercede all of its functions.

State functions, too, may be mediated to the individual through the community or they may reach him directly. But he does not surrender his role in the family and community by virtue of becoming a member of a nation. His relationship to the nation is specialized according to the subculture of his local group of class.

The inference of these observations for studies of national characteristics and national character is clear. Personal behavior is not something that can be understood simply by studying random samples of the total national population. The several aspects, or levels, of national culture we have previously defined—national institutions, national cultural achievements, subcultural patterns, family patterns, behavior in situations involving different subcultural groups, and the common denominator—should be distinguished and the role of each appraised. The significance of each of these aspects will depend upon the particular culture, and for this reason proper conceptualization of the culture studied is essential.

These comments on the usefulness of the concept of levels of sociocultural organization to studies of national characteristics and national character are offered because such studies have wide current interest. The concept, however, will have value to another problem or objective of anthropology which will surely become of major importance in the future. The search for cross-culturally valid laws or regularities has suffered as much for want of adequate methodological tools as for lack of interest. So long as developmental stages within any cultural tradition are regarded primarily as quantitative differences and the traditions are assumed to be qualitatively unique, formulation of cross-culturally significant regularities is foredoomed. If, however, stages are recognized as qualitatively distinctive, the way is clear to establish developmental typologies that are valid for more than one tradition. Even if this typology were based solely on general forms of the kind we have discussed, it would facilitate the analysis of the processes of change from one form to another. Distinction of levels of internal organization within sociocultural systems would also facilitate the discovery of regularities. Instead of dealing with total configurations, which are made virtually unique by definition, it would be possible to isolate special components, which, having been analyzed in their relation to the whole, could safely be compared with similar components in other cultural traditions.

On the Place of "Themes" and Kindred Concepts in Social Theory

ALBERT K. COHEN

The work of those anthropologists and sociologists whose theoretical notions rest upon such concepts as "themes," "patterns," "configurations," or "culture mentality" exhibits significant differences.[1] However, it may be said that all of these concepts, as they are commonly used, are based upon the following assumptions: Every culture has a system of fundamental postulates which may or may not be explicitly formulated but which are so universally recognized and are effective in so many contexts that correct apprehension of them offers a key to the understanding and prediction of behavior in that culture, principally by a process of logical inference of the implications of such postulates for action in particular situations. These postulates, or themes (to employ Dr. Opler's term[2]), are themselves arrived at by a process of induction from manifold observations of concrete behavior.

. . . investigation purely on the level of themes, divorced from a broader theory and conceptual scheme, is not likely to yield more than purely descriptive fruit. Actually, Opler and those who use similar concepts believe that these concepts have more than descriptive value only, and I share that belief. However, the auxiliary concepts and assumptions that fructify the themal type of concept are frequently implicit, and when explicit are usually unexamined.

The first of these assumptions is that culture is logically integrated.

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[1] Dr. Kluckhohn's papers are perhaps the leading discussions of the wide range of senses in which these concepts have been used. *See* Kluckhohn, 1941, 1943. Wolff, 1945, discusses concrete procedures in empirically establishing culture patterns. These problems, however, lie beyond the scope of this paper.

[2] Opler, 1945.

Albert K. Cohen, "On the Place of 'Themes' and Kindred Concepts in Social Theory," American Anthropologist, *Vol. 50, No. 4 (1948), pp. 436–443. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

Prediction from themes can be other than tautological—i.e., prediction back to the very data from which our themes were inferred—if there is a strain toward logical consistency both within personalities and within the social system as a whole. To the extent that this is true, correct apprehension of themes from a relatively small number of observations should enable correct prediction of a wide variety of other, as yet unobserved, behavior. That the assumption of logical integration is to some degree valid is attested by the insight we get from works like those of Ruth Benedict.

But we know also that such integration is a relative thing, that it is more or less present, that it varies in different sectors of activity and in different subgroups or classes. *To the extent that culture is integrated* we can predict confidently from themes derived from a relatively small sample of behavior, but how do we know to what extent? By the degree of congruence between our predictions and our observations! To explain discrepancies without recourse to other variables than themes we must either invoke imperfect integration (to explain imperfect integration!) or we must hypothesize limiting factors in the form of other themes. The former, I think, is Sorokin's[5] method; the latter is Opler's. The former brings us back on the road to tautology, the latter to sheer (note, not "mere"!) description.

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. . . we can predict only to the extent that the culture is integrated! The escape from the dilemma, I suggest, is in viewing themes in the context of a broader conceptual scheme.

I shall start with a set of propositions about the nature of social systems as such, characteristics of social systems which are independent of any particular themes, ethos or culture mentality, but are rather determined by the necessary minimal conditions of the existence of social systems and by the nature of the human material of which they are composed.

I. Any social system, like any personality, functions within and must be compatible with a given concrete situation or range of situations. Although the behavior of the system is in no simple sense determined by the situation, neither is the situation merely a set of "limiting factors" determining the boundaries beyond which variation cannot go. The achievement and maintenance of each variant are possible only on the terms set by the situation. The situation determines in part *what things are possible*, in part *how* these things may be realized. The situation consists of the resources and potentialities, the threats and barriers present in two sets of facts: (1) the human and non-human environment; (2) the human material of which the system is made up.

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[5] Sorokin, 1937. Sorokin's discussion of integration and social science method is vulnerable to criticism because it represents the most systematic and rigorously logical development of the implications of a purely themal system of thought, and therefore encounters most obviously and explicitly the dilemma here described. The problem, however, in less readily recognizable form, to be sure, is common property of the whole range of theories under discussion.

II. With respect to the human and non-human environment, it is clear that the stable concatenation of activities which we call a social system must include arrangements for exploiting, for cooperating with, for propitiating, for defense against both the constant and variable features of (1) other social groups among which it must somehow get along, (2) of the larger social system—or society—of which it may be a part, and (3) of the climate, geology, flora and fauna of its milieu.

III. Likewise, any given system is viable only if it includes adequate arrangements for *procuring, maintaining and motivating* the human material of which it is made. (1) Whether through sexual reproduction, capture, adoption, purchase, or voluntary membership the system must include arrangements for recruiting its substance in numbers adequate to carry on its activities. From this standpoint, the "need for reproduction" is not a need of the person but a need of those social systems which must rely on that method of recruitment—the type of system with which anthropologists are most commonly concerned. (2) The system must have nutritional, hygienic and other arrangements to keep its personnel alive and in decent shape. Again, from this point of view the system is not merely a complicated apparatus for meeting human needs. Rather, the satisfaction of biological and other needs is a condition of the viability of the system.[9] The persons whose needs *matter* and the *degree* and *manner* in which those needs must be met are partly a function of the biological nature of the organism (including sex and age characteristics) and partly a function of the nature and importance of the activities which they perform. (3) It is necessary, further, to motivate these individuals to perform the activities which collectively constitute the system. On the one hand, the nature of the system requires appropriate personalities to sustain it. On the other hand, the nature of the organism sets limits to the range of personality types possible under any conditions (and thus, by implication, to the range of possible social systems) and to the systemic arrangements capable of producing specific personality types.[10] "Motivation" is used here in the broad sense of whatever is relevant in the personality of the actor to the determination of action. This would include what he wants (goal or teleological orientation), his knowledge and beliefs about the situation of actions (cognitive orientation), his attitudes regarding the propriety of alternative means of achieving his goals (normative orientation) and his emotional responses to himself and to other persons and things (emotional or affective orientation).[11] *These orientations to the extent that they may be stated in the form of maxims or propositions, are shared throughout a social system, and are of such generality as to be applicable to behavior in many different contexts, probably include the referents of such terms as themes, ultimate-values, ethos, and eidor.*[12] It is increasingly recognized that the procedures necessary for producing the appropriately motivated type of personality themselves entail disciplines and renunciations that engender tensions and dissatisfactions of various sorts. Likewise, equipping a person with the elements of motivation mentioned above means equipping him with a set of wants and "legitimate expectations," and therefore with a capacity for feelings of frustration, deprivation, and indignation if these wants and expectations are not met. Exceptions to the rule that they are never fully met do not readily come to mind. Therefore, the social system, must also include arrangements for rationalizing frustrating situations and for discharging in a way not disruptive of the system, the tensions generated by the system.

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[9] The biological and other felt needs of some individuals may be systematically denied, ignored, or quaintly interpreted in the form of human sacrifice, institutionalized killing of infants or aged, suttee, etc. Yet such behavior may contribute positively to the maintenance of the system. For this reason, it is necessary that our point of departure be the needs *of the system*, and that the needs of persons be assimilated to the *situation* to which the system must somehow adapt. Although Malinowski came close to assuming this position, he never fully achieved it in his explicitly theoretical writings. *See* Malinowski, 1944, pp. 89–90.

[10] "The nature of the organism" refers not to the needs and potentialities of the neonate but to those of the recruit in whatever condition the system receives him. A military company or a monastery have not the same range of possibilities open to them as a system which receives its recruits *ab utero*. But *any* social system, like an artist, must respect its materials.

IV. Both as consequences and as conditions of all the foregoing, the structure of the system must exhibit certain features:

a. There must be a functional differentiation of activities commonly called role differentiation or division of labor.

b. There must be a differential evaluation of activities and persons in terms of the prevailing value system resulting in a system of stratification.

c. There must be mechanisms and criteria for allocating persons to the stratified and functionally differentiated positions in the social system, or a system of social selection.

d. There must be arrangements, effected through diffuse, decentralized pressures and sanctions, through internalized controls, and through organized "constituted authorities," for the coordination of the activities of the system, for the resolution of conflicts, and for the control of deviation, rebellion and withdrawal: a system of integration.

The foregoing does not imply any correspondence between the performance of specific functions and specific structural features. It is just one very rough list[13] of the kinds of things that have got to get done *somehow, regardless of themes or value systems.* In most instances the conditions of the existence of the system are realized through complex, functionally diffuse concatenations of activities which cut across such conventional rubrics as government, economics, religion, art and education. A list of functions, to be sure, will not tell us *how* those functions will be performed in any particular society, and for this reason the concept "function," like that of "theme," is, if not wholly sterile, of sharply limited significance when used by itself. No single master concept can bear the whole load of a system of theory. The historically derived culture, which includes the (more or less) common value system will determine how, in the main, these functional problems will be met and how successfully. But the themes, value-systems, patterns, or what-not must be oriented to the solution of these problems. If they are not so oriented that behavior consistent with them is at least compatible with such solutions, then (1) the social system will disintegrate, or (2) otherwise change, or (3) there will be discrepancies between the value-system and behavior or "deviation,"[14] or (4) the value system will itself change, although such change may involve the creation of logical inconsistency (imperfect integration) within the value system.

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[11] Parsons, 1937, *passim.*

[12] A knowledge of all four of these orientations is necessary to an understanding of action, and they should therefore be distinguished. Very commonly, however, concepts of the type under discussion fail to make these distinctions and it is left to the reader to guess which one or which ones are implied. Bateson, 1936, however, has at least discriminated, under the terms "ethos" and "eidos," the emotional and cognitive components of action.

Now I believe that such deviation and imperfect integration are practically if not absolutely universal features of social systems. In some cases, and possibly in any case, a system that tried to follow out in behavior, to their logical conclusion, all the implications of a perfectly logically integrated system of themes *could not exist.* There is no mystery, for example, in the absence of perfect integration in the cultures that Sorokin has analyzed.[15] A perfectly "Ideational" or perfectly "Sensate" society would be an impossibility. In the former, people would never get around to eating; the latter would degenerate into a *bellum omnium contra omnes.* There *must be* lack of logical integration in the sense that there must be other themes, logically inconsistent with the "fundamental premises" of the culture, to sanction behavior inconsistent with those premises but necessary for the survival of the system, or else there must be sheer "deviation" or "nonconformity."

On the other hand, it is probable that a certain amount of logical integration is itself a functional necessity, and for that reason a purely themal approach always has *some* value. But putting themes into this kind of context suggests certain new questions: Is it necessary simply to accept logical integration or its absence as a datum? Or are not these things themselves to be explained? Can they be predicted in the light of other knowledge about the culture? What are the positive functions of logical consistency? Does the strain for logical consistency vary with different types of social systems, different sectors of behavior, different cultural *Weltanschauungen?* Can knowledge of themes alone explain the existence of such themes, changes in the themal system of a group, or discrepancies between themes and behavior?

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[13] In addition to the existing literature on "functionalism," unpublished papers of R. Freed Bales and Marion J. Levy of Harvard University have influenced the construction of this particular list.

[14] See Kluckhohn's distinction between ideal, regulative, or sanctioned patterns and behavioral patterns. "But the fact that there is never complete correspondence between sanctioned pattern and behavioral pattern does not prove that the sanctioned patterns are unimportant. This observation shows merely that a sanctioned pattern is only one of a number of the determinants of any action." Kluckhohn, 1943, p. 216.

[15] Sorokin, 1937.

This leads to the necessity for clearly distinguishing two kinds or usages of "integration." If a social system is going to function at all well, the activities of its members must be so ordered that the various functional necessities enumerated above get done without too much frustration, conflict and confusion. Without attempting to define "function" more precisely, I will call such an ordering of activities, to the extent that it conduces to the solution of these functional problems, *functional integration.* The logical consistency of the postulates or maxims expressing the values and beliefs on which behavior proceeds I will call *logical integration,*[16] which is the sort of thing I have been talking about in the earlier part of this paper. As long as we remain on the level of themes alone, logical integration is the only kind we can talk about. Only if we make assumptions about or have knowledge of the needs of the individuals or of the social system can we make statements about the functional integration of a system of themes. It is the requirement of functional integration that makes impossible the full realization of logical integration or makes it possible in varying degrees under different conditions. In this context the dilemma of "imperfect integration" is resolved.

The sheer existence of a social system is all the evidence we need that the conditions of that existence are somehow being met. This truism, childlike in its simplicity, has serious implications for social theory. It implies, for example, that if a social system, in some of its beliefs and practices fails to achieve certain of the conditions of its existence, there have got to be arrangements elsewhere in the system for achieving these things. As a matter of fact, the predictions and expectations of all anthropologists who employ the themal type of concept are consistently—although not always consciously—controlled by these homely and common-sense assumptions. It follows that these assumptions should be given an explicit status in a system of theory, so that they may be critically examined and evaluated, rather than that they should be left as suppressed, haphazard, and uncriticized premises.[17]

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[16] Cf. "logico-meaningful integration" in Sorokin, 1937, Chapter 1.

[17] The twenty themes, for example, in Dr. Opler's admirable analysis of the Lipan Apache (Opler, 1946a) are neither a chance aggregation nor the necessary logical implications of a Lipan ethos nor of one another. *They do, however, in some measure imply one another*, but the implications follow only if we introduce a lot of assumptions about things that have got to get done somehow and things that must somehow be prevented from happening.

* * * *

In Dr. Opler's "Rejoinder" appears the heartening sentence: "I foresee attempts to group themes and to relate them to the psychological, biological, and social needs of man."[22] I should like to add "... and of social systems." But this vision and prophecy, this implied recognition of factors other than themes, is not enough. We must be fully and explicitly and continuously cognizant of the fact that in studying themes we are dealing with only one aspect of a system of theory.[23] We have reached the stage where the concepts culture, social system, social structure, function, functional integration, logical integration, and theme (and kindred concepts) must be more precisely defined *relative to one another*. They must be articulated into a coherent and usable *system* of concepts.

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[22] Opler, 1946b, p. 43.

[23] Whatever its value or limitations in other respects, Bateson's *Naven* exhibits a lively awareness of this fact. This book is an example of bold and provocative thinking about major theoretical problems that cannot be indefinitely evaded.

Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy

Derk Bodde

A. The Goodness Of Human Nature

One of the major problems in Chinese philosophy has been that of the goodness or badness of human nature. Most of all, it has been a Confucian problem, because the Confucianists, more than others, have been primarily concerned with the relation of the individual to society. For the Taoists this problem did not pose itself in the same way, since, in their eyes, what is good means what is natural, and therefore the extent of the individual's goodness depends upon the extent to which he is permitted by society to follow his natural instincts. "Do not let what is of man obliterate what is of Nature," was the Taoist slogan . . . . As for the Buddhists, they, if anything, were even less interested in social relationships per se, believing as they did that these are among the ties binding us to the painful wheel of life and death. We shall have something more to say about Buddhist attitudes later.

The Confucianists, on the other hand, were par excellence men whose minds centered on political and social relationships, and therefore it was inevitable that sooner or later they should find themselves confronted with a major problem: to what extent is man's behavior conditioned by the social institutions under which he lives and to what extent does it spring directly from his own innate qualities? Hints of an awareness of this problem may be found already in Confucius, but Mencius (371?–279? B.C.) was the first to venture a clear-cut answer. Man, he maintained—and in so doing it is conceivable, though not provable, that he may have been influenced by Taoist ideas—is a being born for goodness; in him at birth, therefore, there exists a natural tendency for goodness, as inevitable as

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the natural tendency of water to flow downward . . . . This means that social institutions do not produce, but merely give refined expression to, the shoots of goodness already innate in every man.

This optimistic view was far from universally shared in ancient China. Kao Tzŭ, who debated with Mencius on the subject, advanced a theory seemingly closer to the findings of modern psychology. Man's nature, he said, is at birth simply a bundle of instincts, of which those concerned with food and sex are primary; left to itself, therefore, it is as indifferent to either good or evil as water, left to itself, is to the direction it will eventually take when a passage is opened for it either to the east or to the west . . . .

The Legalists, for their part, were quite uninterested in abstract problems of metaphysics or psychology as such. They were, however, shrewd observers of human behavior as manifested in the disordered China of their time, and, on the basis of what they saw, they concluded cynically that within a state not more than ten people can be found who naturally do good of themselves; almost all men act only through motives of self-interest. This is why, the Legalists argued, no government can be effective unless it be based on a stern system of rewards and punishments, by means of which it can manipulate men's desires and fears for its own purposes . . . .

The most formidable opponent of Mencius was, however, his fellow-Confucian of a later generation, Hsün Tzŭ. More than any other Chinese thinker, perhaps, Hsün Tzŭ preached what may be called a philosophy of culture. All morality, he maintained, is a product of culture and education and therefore would not exist were it not for the civilizing institutions created long ago by the sage-kings through their enlightened self-interest. "The nature of man is evil. His goodness is only acquired training." Man at birth possesses desires which, if unchecked, inevitably lead to strife; only under the constant influence of the mores of his group does he gradually learn to do what is right. . . .

In the next section we shall see how Hsün Tzŭ stressed the need for a structured society in order to curb and harmonize the otherwise anarchic desires of the individual.

Hsün Tzŭ's theory influenced many later Confucianists in varying degrees. Tung Chung-shu, for example, tried to harmonize Mencius with Hsün Tzŭ by saying that man's nature initially contains both selfishness and altruism and therefore can never become wholly good unless subjected to further human training: "Goodness is like a kernel of grain; the nature is like the growing stalk of that grain. Though the stalk produces the kernel, it cannot itself be called a kernel, and though the nature produces goodness, it cannot itself be called good. The kernel and goodness are both brought to completion through man's continuation of Heaven's (work)" (Fung 2, p. 34).

Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.–A.D. 18) asserted somewhat similarly that, "in man's nature, good and evil are intermixed. If he cultivates the good elements, he becomes a good man, but if he cultivates the evil elements, he becomes an evil one" (Fung 2, p. 150). A more deterministic view was expressed by Wang Ch'ung, who said: "There are in truth some (natures) that are good and some that are bad. The good ones are definitely so of themselves, whereas the bad ones may be caused to become good by undergoing inculcation which leads them to exert themselves" (*Lun Heng*, chap. 4; Forke, I, 374). During the next several centuries of Neo-Taoist and then Buddhist intellectual domination, little more was said on the subject until Han Yü, in the eighth century, proclaimed even more deterministically than Wang Ch'ung that men's natures fall into three categories: the superior, which is wholly good; the medium, which may be made to be either good or bad; and the inferior, which is wholly evil (Fung 2, p. 413).

With the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the eleventh century, however, Hsün Tzŭ's pessimistic view, together with the theories influenced by it, was definitely rejected, and that of Mencius became supreme. From then until recent days all major thinkers, regardless of other differences, have agreed that man is by nature good. The only partial exception is Tai Chen (1723–77), a thinker of materialistic tendencies who reacted strongly against the earlier Neo-Confucianists. Thus he denied their contention that man's nature is a metaphysical principle implanted in man at birth, describing it instead in physical terms as consisting simply of "blood, breath, and the mental faculty." There is a difference, he maintained, between what is natural to man and what is morally necessary, and, though man's nature at birth is potentially good, his ability to rise from the natural to the morally necessary sphere depends upon the extent to which he succeeds in developing his mental faculty. Thus Tai, like Hsün Tzŭ, attaches great importance to education and knowledge as molders of human morality.[26]

B. Origin of Evil

What is the reason for this insistence—well-nigh universal during the last nine centuries—on man's innate goodness? Any consideration of this question must begin with a recognition of the Chinese conviction . . . that the universe is a harmony, the basic principle of which is therefore one of goodness; that the human world is an integral part of this harmony; and that man's nature is the vital link between the two.

On this point it is illuminating to contrast the attitudes of Mencius and Hsün Tzŭ. Thus for Mencius, in whom there is a mystical awareness of the oneness of man and the nonhuman universe, the metaphysical justification for the doctrine of human goodness is the fact that man's nature is "what Heaven has given us" (VI*a*, 15). For Hsün Tzŭ, on the contrary, human goodness has no such metaphysical basis but is solely the result of man's own efforts. It is thus unrelated to T'*ien*, or "Heaven," which, by Hsün Tzŭ, is interpreted as simply the name for a wholly naturalistic process.[27]

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[26] Cf. Fung 2, pp. 657–63, and, for the comparison of Tai with Hsün Tzŭ, pp. 669–72. In his theory of the nature, Tai was anticipated in part by Ch'en Ch'üeh (1604–77). Cf. Fung 2, pp. 659–60.

For this reason Hsün Tzŭ urges men not to exalt and conform to Heaven but rather to depend on themselves and to utilize the manifestations of Heaven for their own advantage (chap. 17; Dubs, p. 183). This denial by Hsün Tzŭ of the cosmic unity of man and nature, together with his theory of human nature and static view of history . . . , represents a world view which in later times was decisively rejected by most Chinese thinkers.

If, however, the universe is actually a natural harmony, and therefore imbued with a principle of goodness which, contrary to Hsün Tzŭ, provides the basis for human goodness, we are then again faced by the question which was raised at the beginning of this section: What is the origin of evil? Is it, as has so often been asserted in the West, a matter of original sin or of a devil—figurative or otherwise—who struggles to gain men's souls? The former thesis is, on the face of it, impossible for anyone who, like Mencius, believes that man is *born* good. But the latter is equally unacceptable to him and his followers, since the very idea of forces of good and evil being engaged in a *struggle* with one another violates the basic concept of a self-contained harmonious universe.

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[27] Fung Yu-lan goes so far as to assert that "Hzün Tzŭ's Heaven . . . differs entirely from that of Mencius, inasmuch as it contains no ethical principle" (Fung 1, p. 286). This statement, however, is nowhere explicitly confirmed by Hzün Tzŭ himself, being merely inferential from his total philosophy. In fact, it seems to be contradicted by a passage in Hsün Tzŭ's nineteenth chapter (Dubs, p. 223), in which, in the course of describing the *li* (rites, rituals, rules of correct behavior, traditional mores, etc.), he gives to them a cosmic significance: "They are that whereby Heaven and Earth unite, whereby the sun and moon are bright, whereby the four seasons follow their sequence, whereby the stars move in their courses, whereby all things prosper, whereby love and hatred are tempered, whereby joy and anger keep their proper place."

The mystical tone of this passage, however, accords poorly with Hsün Tzŭ's usual humanistic outlook. Indeed, at the very beginning of the same chapter in which it appears (Dubs, p. 213), Hsün Tzŭ gives an entirely rationalistic explanation for the origin of the *li*, saying that they were originally instituted by the early kings in order to put an end to human disorder. On the other hand, the passage is reminiscent of certain metaphysical interpretations of the *li* found in such Confucian compilations as the *Li Chi*, or *Book of Rites* (see Fung 1, pp. 343–44). As a matter of fact, it happens to be one of several passages in the *Hsün-tzŭ* which also appear almost verbatim either in the *Li Chi* or the closely analogous *Ta Tai Li Chi*. The thesis has already been advanced, on grounds other than those given here, that all or most of such passages do not actually come from Hsün Tzŭ's hand at all but have been incorporated at a later time into the work now bearing his name from these ritualistic texts, rather than the other way round, as traditionally assumed. See Yang Yün-ju in Lo Ken-tse (ed.), *Ku Shih Pien* ("A Symposium on Ancient Chinese History," Vol. VI [Shanghai, 1938]), pp. 138–42.

Mencius himself does not analyze the problem from a metaphysical point of view. He merely says that men do wrong because of carelessness—they forget to preserve and nourish the goodness that lies within them and thereby allow it to be stripped from their natures, just as a once-beautiful mountain may be stripped of its trees until it becomes bare and barren. "But is this," Mencius asks, "the (original) nature of the mountain?" (VI*a*, 8). Thus, he says, "if men do what is not good, it is not the fault of their natural powers" (VI*a*, 6).

Though this answer may be unsatisfying in its failure to explain *what it is* that thus causes men to forget their original natures, it at least seems clearly to avoid the idea of good and evil as two contending forces and to point instead toward another conception much more congenial to Chinese thought. This is, that what we call "evil," far from being a positive force trying to destroy the cosmic harmony, is, on the contrary, just as much a part of that harmony, and just as necessary for its functioning, as what we call "goodness." Or, looked at from a slightly different point of view, it is an occasional falling-away from the harmonious centrality of all things—arising, in the case of man, because of his inadequate understanding of the cosmic pattern.

Formulations of this idea occur both in Taoism and in Buddhism. The Taoists, for example, never tire of pointing out that what men call right and wrong, good and evil, are purely relative concepts, without validity from the standpoint of the universal *Tao*. In Chuang Tzŭ's words: "Because of the right there is the wrong, and because of the wrong there is the right. . . . The right is an endless change. The wrong is also an endless change. . . . Therefore the Sage harmonizes the systems of right and wrong, and rests in the Evolution of Nature" (chap. 2; Giles, pp. 18 and 21).

Chinese Buddhism, too, though from its own point of view, denies the existence of evil as a positive force. Men endure the sufferings of life and death simply because of ignorance; they gain release from suffering through an understanding of its true nature. In either case, the world itself remains unchanged; the only change lies in the individual's own understanding. Hence sin has no objective existence but is only a state of mind. Indeed, it is even possible for enlightened beings to perform acts without incurring retribution for them, which, if performed by other beings, would certainly be sinful.[28]

The clearest statements on good and evil, however, are those of the Neo-Confucianists. Li Ao (d. *ca.* 844), for example, one of the precursors of Neo-Confucianism, maintains that man's nature per se is wholly good but that, when the nature comes to be externally manifested in the form of the feelings or emotions (*ch'ing*), this goodness becomes obscured. This, however, "is not the fault of the nature," any more than it is the fault of an originally pure stream of water that it later becomes muddied by sediment. To prevent the feelings from operating, therefore, is the way to enable "the nature to gain its fulfilment," whereas "when the movements of the feelings continue unceasingly, it becomes impossible to return to one's nature and to radiate the infinite light of Heaven and Earth" (Fung 2, p. 414). Though Li thus distinguishes sharply between the original nature and its external emotional manifestations, he then goes on to say that "the nature and the feelings cannot exist one without the other"; in other words, that they are not diametric opposites, since both are equally aspects of the same universal whole. The doctrine, as Fung Yu-lan points out (*ibid.*), not only stems back to Mencius, but also owes much to Buddhism.

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[28] Cf. "On the Explanation of Retribution," by Hui-yüan (334–416), in which, after citing such acts, he concludes: "Thus the retributions of punishment or blessing depend upon what are stimulated by one's own (mental) activities. They are what they are according to the stimuli, for which reason I say that they are automatic. By automatic I mean that they result from our own influence. How then can they be the work of some other Mysterious

Chou Tun-yi (1017–73) agrees with Li that, though man's nature is originally good, its manifestations in actual conduct do not always conform to the mean; defective conduct of this sort we then call "evil" (Fung 2, p. 446). At about the same time we find the Ch'eng brothers insisting on the fact that goodness and evil are both inherent in the cosmic pattern and therefore cannot be disassociated from one another. Thus Ch'eng Hao 1032–85) says: "That some things are good and some evil is all equally a result of Heavenly Principle. For in Heavenly Principle it is inevitable that some things be beautiful and some ugly" (Fung 2, p. 518). And Ch'eng Yi (1033–1108) says similarly: "Within the universe, all things have their opposite: when there is the *yin*, there is the *yang*; when is goodness, there is evil" *(ibid.)*. These remarks possibly reflect the views of their uncle, Chang Tsai, who said that "the feelings of love and hatred are both equally products of the Great Void" (Fung 2, p. 483).

In the philosophy of Chu Hsi (1130–1200), the great synthesizer of Neo-Confucianism, there is a dualism between *li*, or "Principle," which is metaphysical, and *ch'i*, or "Ether," which is physical. The *ch'i* is the physical substance of which the universe consists. However, what gives meaning and order to the *ch'i*, and makes an organized universe possible, is the immanence in each physical object, whether animate or inanimate, of the metaphysical *li*, or "Principle." In the case of man, this *li* is known as his nature, which, therefore, in itself is invariably good. As externally manifested, however, this goodness can be actualized only imperfectly,

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Ruler?" (Fung 2, p. 274). Cf. also the ninth-century Ch'an (Zen) monk, Hsi-yün, who, on being asked whether certain acts were sinful or not, replied: "It cannot definitely be said that they are sinful or not sinful. Whether there is sin or not depends on the man. . . . The mind should be like a void emptiness. . . . Then to what can sin have attachment?" (Fung 2, p. 404). Cf. also Sec. C below.

owing to the impediments laid upon the nature by the surrounding physical *ch'i*. This *ch'i* differs in its purity (i.e., in the extent to which it allows *li*, or "Principle," to manifest itself) not only as between different species of creatures but also as between individual human beings. This is the reason for the moral differences externally found among different men. As to why the *ch'i* should thus have such differences, Chu Hsi can say nothing more than that they are natural and inevitable. Thus a disciple once asked: "Since *li* is everywhere good, how is it that the *ch'i* is differentiated into the pure and the turbid?" To which Chu replied: "Because, if one speaks only of the *ch'i*, there is some that of itself is cold and some that is hot, some fragrant and some bad smelling" (Fung 2, p. 553).

Here, as far as the *ch'i* alone is concerned, we find the view expressed that so-called "evil," like so-called "goodness," are both inherent elements in a larger whole. In Chu's greater dichotomy between the *li* and the *ch'i*, however, there seems at first sight to be a dualism of the sort so familiar to us in the West. Yet even here, as we shall see in Section 6, this seeming similarity breaks down on closer examination.

Wang Shou-jen, better known as Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529), was the greatest figure in Neo-Confucianism after Chu Hsi, with whom he differed in many important respects. In his concept of evil, however, he conforms to the general line of thinking we have been describing. Thus he says:

> The highest good is the mind's original substance. Whatever goes beyond this original substance is evil. It is not a case of there being something good, and then of there being something evil standing in opposition to it. Thus good and evil are only a single thing. . . . What we call evil is not original evil, but results either from transgressing or falling short of our original nature [Henke, pp. 156–57].

Somewhat later Yen Yüan (1635–1704) strongly attacks Chu Hsi's dichotomy between the metaphysical *li* as being wholly good and the physical *ch'i* as being the source of evil. Actually, Yen maintains, *li* and *ch'i* are inextricably bound together into "a single continuum," of which, therefore, it is impossible to say that one part is good and another evil. "How then," he asks, "can it be said that Principle (*li*) is uniform and single in its goodness, whereas the physical endowment deviates toward evil?" This would be like saying that the eye's (non-physical) power of vision is good, whereas the physical eye itself, possessing this power, is evil. In actual fact, however, "it is only when its (the eye's) vision is led astray by improper things, or blocked or beclouded by them, that its view of things becomes wrong, so that evil can first be spoken of." Thus, for Yen, evil is not to be associated solely with the *ch'i*, nor is it a positive quality in itself. Rather, it is simply a deflection from "Heaven's correct pattern," caused by "enticement, delusion, habit, and contagion."[29]

From this survey of Neo-Confucian opinion, let us turn back for a moment to the Han Confucianist, Tung Chung-shu. He, it will be remembered, partially agreed with Hsün Tzŭ by saying that man's nature, at birth, contains selfishness as well as altruism and, therefore, that it cannot be made wholly good save through human institutions and education. His explanation for this initial mixture of good and evil is that man's goodness corresponds to the *yang* principle of Heaven, and his evil to Heaven's *yin* principle. Heaven imposes restraints upon the movements of the *yin*, and man should likewise confine the operation of the evil aspect of his nature, using for this purpose his intelligence, by means of which he creates his civilizing institutions (Fung 2, pp. 32–35).

Here we should keep in mind the thesis first suggested at the beginning of this paper–that in the West the universe has commonly been regarded as under the control of an external Divine Power, whereas in China it has been regarded as a self-contained organism functioning according to its own inherent pattern. At this point, however, it is necessary to make a further qualification by pointing out that this latter conception, while *generally* true of Chinese thinking, is not necessarily invariably true.

The *Yin-yang* and the Five Elements schools, for example, commonly explain the interrelationship alleged by them to exist between natural phenomena and human behavior in terms of an impersonal and automatic sequence of cause and effect. At other times, however, and without any explanation for the resulting contradiction, they interpret abnormal natural phenomena as the deliberate manifestations of a Divine Power, used by it to warn men of their improper behavior (Fung 1, p. 165).

In Tung Chung-shu, who was heavily influenced by the *yin-yang* ideology, a similar contradiction appears (Fung 2, pp. 55–58). Sometimes, as a result, Tung seems to use the word *T'ien*, or "Heaven," in a naturalistic sense, signifying a natural universe whose movements take place through their own inner necessity, without external guidance; at other times, however, he seems to regard *T'ien* as a conscious power, acting deliberately to control the movements of the *yin* and *yang*, the Five Elements, etc.

The latter concept, as we have seen, provides the metaphysical basis for Tung's belief that man's nature initially contains evil as well as goodness, so that the former must be repressed in order to allow the latter to realize its full potentialities. For as soon as one believes that Heaven acts from without to insure the proper functioning of the universe, it would seem to follow that this universe, if left to itself, would no longer function properly. However, Tung Chung-shu is neither clear nor consistent on this point, so that in his philosophy there remains an unresolved contradiction between a teleological and a naturalistic trend of thinking, of which he himself appears to be unconscious.

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[29] Fung 2, pp. 644–46. In the following century a somewhat similar view was expressed by Tai Chen (cf. Fung 2, pp. 666–68). As pointed out by Fung Yu-lan, however, neither man wholly succeeded in avoiding certain logical inconsistencies in their attempts to break away from Chu Hsi's system.

This leads us to a final consideration of some importance: Hsün Tzŭ, who denies the innate goodness of human nature, also stresses man's separateness from the nonhuman universe, which he conceives of in naturalistic—seemingly almost mechanistic—terms. Tung Chung-shu, on the other hand, while sharing Hsün Tzŭ's views about human nature to a limited extent, nevertheless affirms the unity of man with nature, to which, however, he apparently sometimes attributes volition and even personality. The prevailing Chinese belief in human goodness, for its part, seems to stem from yet a third, peculiarly Chinese, world view, different from that of either of these two men. Unlike that of Hsün Tzŭ, this view asserts that man is an integral part of a larger cosmic pattern, the goodness of which it accepts as axiomatic, simply because it *is* the cosmic pattern; but, unlike Tung Chung-shu's view, it asserts that this goodness is something inherent and spontaneous and not dependent on the volition of any external controlling Power.

C. Universal Salvation

The natural corollary of the foregoing ideas is a firm belief in the universal perfectibility of all men. This, for the Confucianists, means that every man can become a sage and, for the Buddhists, that every man can achieve Buddhahood. Such, at least, is the theory, though, as clearly realized by Confucianists and Buddhists alike, it is one rarely achieved in actual life.

For the Taoists the situation is somewhat different, since, with their relativistic outlook on human affairs, they not only accept the existence of differences between individual human beings as inevitable but insist that true goodness lies in the preservation rather than the obliteration of these differences. In other words, the Taoists maintain that men are necessarily unequal in their external achievements but that they are nevertheless all equally good in so far as they all equally conform to their true natures. Hence they believe it is folly for anyone to strive to become a sage, unless it is truly in his nature to be such. This point of view explains why the Taoists, unlike the Confucianists and Buddhists, are uninterested in the possibilities of universal sagehood or salvation.

Among Confucianists, on the contrary, the belief in this possibility is shared with few exceptions. It is natural that Mencius should give his hearty approval to a saying possibly already current before his time: "All men may become a Yao or a Shun (legendary sage-rulers)" (VI*b*, 2). More unexpected, however, is Hsün Tzŭ's utterance (chap. 23; Dubs, p. 312) of an almost identical saying: "The man in the street can become a Yü (another sage-ruler)." If Hsün Tzŭ, despite his pessimistic view of man's original moral state, could nevertheless have such confidence in the possibility of human improvement through education, it is not surprising to find almost all later Confucianists voicing similar confidence. Thus Wang Shou-jen, to cite but one example, assures us that "the unifying quality of love is as surely possessed by the little man" as by the great one (Henke, p. 204).

It is the Buddhists, however, especially those representing the more peculiarly Chinese developments in Buddhism, who lay greatest stress on universal salvation. For example, Tao-sheng (*ca.* 360–434), who was very instrumental in shaping Chinese Buddhism, boldly asserted that even the *icchantikas* (nonbelievers in Buddhism), since they are sentient beings, are therefore like other men endowed with the Buddha nature and hence capable of achieving Buddhahood (Fung 2, p. 271).

This trend of thought is most spectacularly developed by the T'ien-t'ai school (6th century onward), in which the startling doctrine is advanced that all beings, even the Buddhas, possess two kinds of nature, the one pure, the other impure, and that these natures, for the Buddhas and other beings alike, remain forever immutable: "The mind-substance of each and every sentient being, and of each and every Buddha, originally contains the two natures, without the slightest distinction for all. Throughout they are exactly of the same sort, and have remained indestructible from antiquity until the present" (Fung 2, p. 379).

The only difference between the Buddhas and ordinary sentient beings, therefore, is that the former check the outward manifestations of the impure nature, whereas the latter do not. Even the Buddhas, however, can merely keep latent, but cannot actually eliminate or change, the impure nature, and, conversely, even depraved beings cannot eliminate or change the pure nature. The necessary corollary is that Buddhahood is open to all beings, provided only that they practice spiritual cultivation. This universalistic theory reached its logical culmination with Chan-jan (711–82), ninth patriarch of the T'ien-t'ai school, who proclaimed that "even inanimate things possess the Buddha-nature." "Therefore," he wrote, "we may know that the single mind of a single particle of dust comprises the mind-nature of all sentient beings and Buddhas. . . . All things, being immutable, are the *Bhūtatathatā* (the Absolute), and the *Bhūtatathatā*, responding to causation, is all things" (Fung 2, pp. 384–85).

This powerful affirmation contrasts significantly with the doctrine of the Mere Ideation school, as propounded in China by Hsüan-tsang. According to this school, the evolutions of all beings throughout successive existences are determined by "seeds"—some of them tainted, others untainted—which are imbedded in the consciousnesses of the beings concerned. These differing kinds of seeds, however, are not distributed among all beings equally: some beings are wholly devoid of the untainted seeds, some possess seeds qualifying them merely for the lower stages of Buddhism, and only a few possess the untainted seeds of Buddhahood itself. This, says the Mere Ideation school, is the reason for the differences in nature found among different beings and explains why not all men, but only a few, are capable of achieving Buddhahood (Fung 2, pp. 307 and 339). It is no mere accident that not only in this respect, but in others as well, the Mere Ideation school is the least Chinese and most purely Indian of all Buddhist schools in China. Indeed, it might better be termed "Buddhism in China" than "Chinese Buddhism."

4. Social Harmony

According to Chinese thinking, the world of man is, or should be, a reflection of the nonhuman universe, and man's nature is the essential link between the two. It is time now to examine in detail what has been the major Chinese conception regarding the social order.

Society, in Chinese eyes, consists of a large number of small social units (the family, the village, the guild, etc.), each of which consists in turn of individuals varying greatly in their intellectual and physical capabilities. Because of these inequalities, it is inevitable that class differences should exist. The social order, in other words, is a rationalization of existing human inequalities.

It does not follow, however, that there should be conflict between social classes. On the contrary, the welfare of the social organism as a whole depends upon harmonious co-operation among all of its units and of the individuals who comprise these units. This means that every individual, however, high or low, has the obligation to perform to the best of his ability those particular functions in which he is expert and which are expected of him by society. Thus the ruler should rule benevolently, his ministers should be loyal yet at the same time ready to offer if need be their frank criticism, the farmers should produce the maximum of food, the artisans should take pride in their manufactures, the merchants should be honest in their dealings, and no one should interfere needlessly in the tasks of others for which he himself is not qualified. In other words, society should be like a magnified family, the members of which, though differing in their status and functions, all work in harmony for the common good.

It is in Confucianism that we find greatest insistence on this conception of society as a graded but harmonious organism. For example, the typically Confucian idea that government is the function of a specialized ruling group, and that in it, therefore, there can be no popular participation, goes back to Confucius in his assertion: "The people can be made to follow it (probably meaning a policy decreed from above); they cannot be made to understand it" (*Analects*, VIII, 9). Or, again, the view of society as a corporate body of responsible individuals appears in the answer given by him when asked the way of good government: "Let the ruler be ruler, the minister minister; let the father be father, and the son son" (*Analects*, XII, 11). In other words, let each individual fulfil in practice the obligations ideally expected of him according to his social position.

Mencius has given one of the most candid enunciations of Confucian class theory in two passages of his works:

> Some labor with their brains and some labor with their brawn. Those who labor with their brains govern others; those who labor with their brawn are governed by others. Those governed by others, feed them. Those who govern others, are fed by them. This is a universal principle in the world [III*a*, 4].
>
> If there were no men of a superior grade, there would be no one to rule the countrymen. If there were no countrymen, there would be no one to support the men of superior grade [III*a*, 3].

But it is Hsün Tzŭ, perhaps more than any other Confucian, who has supplied a theoretical justification for social inequality. Strife arises, he says, because all men are born with desires, whereas things are insufficient to satisfy all these desires equally: "People desire and hate the same things. Their desires are many, but things are few. Since they are few there will inevitably be strife." The primary reason for instituting social distinctions, therefore, is that such distinctions are needed in order to insure an orderly distribution of the good things of life without undue exploitation of one group by another:

> If the strong coerce the weak, the intelligent terrorize the stupid, and the people who are subjects rebel against their superiors; if the young insult the aged, and the government is not guided by virtue—if this be the case, then the aged and weak will suffer the misfortune of losing their subsistence, and the strong will suffer the calamity of division and strife. . . . Hence for this reason intelligent men have introduced social distinctions [chap. 10; Dubs, pp. 152–53].[30]

This view of society as an ordered inequality has been taken for granted by all later Confucianists, so that it is sufficient if we quote only the following single typical statement by Tung Chung-shu:

> The Sage observes what it is in the nature of the generality of men that leads to disorder. Therefore in his governing of men he differentiates between upper and lower (classes), permitting the rich to have enough to display their noble position, but not to the point of arrogance, and the poor to have enough to support life, but not to reach the point of anxiety. If a harmonious balance be maintained according

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[30] Cf. also H. H. Dubs *Hsüntze, the Moulder of Ancient Confucianism* (London, 1927), chap. xiv on "Inequality," which is an excellent exposition of the whole Confucian approach to the subject.

to this rule, there will then be no lack of material resources, and upper and lower (classes) will be mutually at peace. Therefore good government will be conducted with ease [Fung 2, p. 53].

If we turn from Confucianism to other early schools, we find in Mo Tzŭ (*ca.* 479–*ca.* 381 B.C.) one of the most striking antitheses to the Confucian way of life. In a manner almost Marxian, he emphasizes the fact of conflicting group interests and waxes bitter over "the large state which attacks small states, the large house which molests small houses, the strong who plunder the weak, the clever who deceive the stupid, the honored who disdain the humble" (chap. 16; Mei, p. 87). Nor does he hesitate to make many sarcastic attacks on the "gentlemen of the world" who condone this state of affairs (Mei, pp. 49, 135, 151, 246). Yet, unlike Marx, he draws no conclusion that the weak should unite to dispossess the strong. On the contrary, he remains well within the major current of Chinese thought by unholding the sanctity of the existing class structure and insisting that reform must come from above through moral indoctrination–which, for him, primarily means his famous doctrine of Universal Love, supported by certain religious and political sanctions. In the latter field, indeed, he goes further in the direction of authoritarianism than the Confucians themselves, by urging the complete intellectual conformity of inferior to superior in an ascending hierarchy consisting of clan members, clan patriarchs, state rulers, the king of the Chinese hegemony, and finally the Will of Heaven. This is his well-known doctrine of Agreement with the Superior (chap. 13; Mei, pp. 72–75).

The real totalitarians of ancient China are the Legalists, however, and it is they who are farthest removed from the Confucians in their insistence that men are inherently selfish and that therefore their unquestioning obedience to the state cannot be gained except through fear. Thus the Legalists, while fully as anxious as the Confucianists to maintain a clearly gradated class structure, see it in terms of a rigid conformity based on force rather than of a voluntary co-operation based on suasion. This fact undoubtedly goes far to explain their subsequent disappearance from Chinese thought as an identifiable group, even though certain of their political devices were perpetuated in modified form under the Confucian state.

Among the early Taoists there is a mixed point of view. Whereas the anarchistically minded Chuang Tzŭ would like to do away with government entirely, Lao Tzŭ accepts it, though grudgingly, and with the proviso that it be made as simple as possible. Much of his little book, as a consequence, is intended as advice for the Taoist sage-ruler. Hence when he says that "the Sage rules the people by emptying their minds" (chap. 3) or that he "treats them all as children" (chap. 49), he shows himself as much a believer in class distinctions as any Confucian, though from a different point of view.

A marked mellowing toward social institutions—undoubtedly the outcome of centuries of Confucian influences—appears in the Neo-Taoist Kuo Hsiang. Not merely does he, like Lao Tzŭ, accept organized government and society as unavoidable evils; as we have seen in Section 2, he even goes so far as to find no necessary incompatibility between the order of nature and the growing complexities of human civilization. Thus the following passage, though undoubtedly not intended by Kuo merely to justify the social status quo, nevertheless is as suitable for that purpose as any to be found in Confucian literature:

> Error arises when one has the qualities of a servant but is not satisfied to perform a servant's duties. Hence we may know that (the relative positions of) ruler and subject, superior and inferior, . . . conform to a natural principle of Heaven and are not really caused by man. . . . Let the servants simply accept their own lot and assist each other without dissatisfaction, . . . each having his own particular duty and at the same time acting on behalf of the others. . . . Let those whom the age accounts worthy be the rulers, and those whose talents do not meet the requirements of the world be the subjects, just as Heaven is naturally high and Earth naturally low. . . . Although there is no (conscious) arrangement of them according to what is proper, the result is inevitably proper [Fung 2, p. 227].

In another statement Kuo eloquently describes the harmony that emerges from seeming disharmony when the above principle is followed:

> Just as the spider and scarab, despite their humble surroundings, can spread their net or roll their ball without seeking the aid of any artisan, so for all creatures, each has that in which it is skilled. Although their skills differ, they themselves are alike in that they all practice these skills. This, then, is the kind of "skill that looks like clumsiness." Therefore the talented employer of men uses those who are skilled in squares to make squares, and those who are skilled in circles to make circles, allowing each to perform his particular skill, and thus to act in accordance with his nature. . . . That is why, being different from one another, their multitude of separate skills seem like clumsiness. Yet because everyone in the world has his own particular skill, the result seems like great skill [Fung 2, pp. 220–21].

Basic in the many attacks made on Buddhism by non-Buddhists during the next several centuries was the conviction that this alien ideology is dangerous to the Chinese way of life. On the one hand, it was felt, the Buddhist teaching that life is suffering is a denial of the Chinese conception of cosmic harmony; on the other, the Buddhist monastic order—an *imperium in imperio*—draws men away from their normal duties and thus destroys the fabric of Chinese society. This attitude appears clearly, for example, in the attacks made by one of the most famous of the critics, Fan Chen (*ca.* 450—*ca.* 515), a man who himself shows both Confucian and Taoist influence. "Buddhism," he begins by pointing out, "is injurious to government and its monks do harm to custom." Then, after going on to criticize the Buddhists for refusing to accept the ordinary round of human existence as natural and therefore desirable, he concludes by saying:

> Lesser people should find sweetness in their cultivated acres, and superior men should preserve their quiet simplicity. Let food be grown and it will not be exhausted. Let clothing be spun and it will not come to an end. Let inferiors present their surplus to their superiors, and superiors practice non-interference toward their inferiors. By the use of this principle there will be sufficiency for life and support for the parents; it will be possible to act for oneself and also for others; the country will remain in order and the ruler will be in his place [Fung 2, pp. 291–92].

There is little doubt that Fan's point of view, reiterated by many later critics, was a primary factor in the ultimate decline of Buddhism in China.[31]

It is not until the nineteenth century, therefore, that we find any Chinese so "un-Chinese" as to advocate the transformation of a class society into a classless society. This, however, is precisely the bold proposal made by K'ang Yu-wei and T'an Ssŭ-t'ung, both of whom, as we have seen in the first two sections, were directly influenced by Western thought. Thus K'ang exhorts: "Let us eliminate the class sphere and bring equality to all men. . . . Let us eliminate the sphere of the family and become 'citizens of Heaven.' . . . Let us eliminate the occupational sphere and foster means of livelihood common to all" (Fung 2, p. 689).

With similar fervor T'an Ssŭ-t'ung describes the coming Age of Universal Peace as one in which distinctions between ruler and subject and rich and poor are all to be obliterated: "Poverty and wealth are equalized. Within a thousand or a myriad miles it is as if there were but a single family or a single individual. . . . It is like the Millennium spoken of in Western books, or the Great Unity found in the *Evolutions of Rites*" (Fung 2, pp. 698–99).

Before concluding this section, we should not overlook a seeming contradiction between the Chinese belief in a strongly hierarchical society and the other Chinese belief, discussed in the preceding section, in the universal perfectibility of all men. In other words, there here seems to be a clash between the practical need of the Chinese for social stability and their theoretical advocacy of social mobility, as implied by their belief in the moral worth of the individual. Undoubtedly, the latter concept explains why certain writers have tried to read a "democratic" meaning into Confucianism, even though the former shows clearly why such "democracy" cannot possibly be equated with Western political definitions of the word.

On the theoretical level the Chinese solved this contradiction by recognizing that, whereas classes are necessary to society and must remain forever immutable as such, the possibility always exists for particular individuals to move upward or downward between these classes. Here, therefore, is another manifestation of the Chinese fondness for solutions which permit lesser change to occur within a greater permanency.

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[31] Cf. also Kenneth Ch'en, "Anti-Buddhist Propaganda during the Nan-ch'ao," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, XV (1952), 166–92; Arthur F. Wright, "Fu I and the Rejection of Buddhism," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XII (1951), 33–47, esp. pp. 43–44.

On the practical level the exemplification of this concept was the Chinese examination system—a device whereby all members of society, with trifling exceptions, were given the opportunity of entering the ranks of the ruling scholar-bureaucracy. In practice, unfortunately, this institution fell short of its avowed aim, owing to the failure of the Chinese state to provide equally broad opportunities for acquiring the education without which success in the examinations was impossible. This meant that most examination candidates came from a relatively restricted group of gentry families, whose political power, as a result, tended to become hereditary as a class, even though the individual members of this class had to prove their intellectual worth anew from generation to generation. Even this situation, however, is remarkable when compared with prevailing Western conditions before modern times, and to the Chinese mind, with its strong preference for working compromises in place of unworkable-absolutes, it must have seemed sufficient. The net result, therefore, is that, though the Chinese social system theoretically left a place open for individual mobility, such mobility was infrequent in practice, save in times of war or political disintegration.

5. *Peace and War*

Since war is the most violent disrupter of social harmony, it is natural enough that it should be overwhelmingly condemned in Chinese philosophy. This is particularly true of the early period, when no unified empire existed, and war between the feudal states was endemic. Thus not only did the Confucians and Taoists denounce war, but also the hitherto unmentioned Dialecticians, whose leaders, Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung (4th – 3d centuries B.C.), were both known as pacifists (Fung 1, pp. 195 and 203). So too were such minor contemporaries as Yin Wen and Sung K'eng, who "proposed disarmament in order to save their generation from war" and preached that "it is no disgrace to be insulted" (Fung 1, pp. 148 ff.). The most famous indictment of war, however, is undoubtedly that of Mo Tzŭ, who in unsparing terms attacked it on both moral and economic grounds. Even for the victors, he said, the cost is so great that "when we consider the victory as such, there is nothing useful about it. When we consider the possessions obtained through it, they do not even make up for the loss" (chap. 18; Mei, p. 102).

Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that all these ancient thinkers were unalterably opposed to war under any circumstances. This, indeed, was made difficult by an embarrassing circumstance, namely, that, among the universally revered sage-kings of early times, several were known to history as having engaged in military campaigns. This fact forced Mencius, Mo Tzŭ, and Hsün Tzŭ alike into the familiar but dangerous doctrine that wars are sometimes "just," provided they be waged by the right person. The ancient sages, these thinkers said, occasionally found it necessary, despite their abhorrence of conflict, to take punitive measures against notorious tyrants or rebels. Such measures, however, would better be described as "chastisement" than as "attack," since their aim, in Hsün Tzŭ's words, was to "stop tyranny and get rid of injury." To this reasoning based on history, Mo Tzŭ added the further argument that the arming of the weak is justifiable as a deterrent to the aggression by the strong. This is why his book, which contains perhaps the most vehement denunciation of warfare in Chinese literature, also contains a group of chapters devoted to the defensive tactics to be used against aggression.[32]

There was only one group of men in ancient China, however, that deliberately exalted war as a political instrument, and this was the Legalists. As followers of *Realpolitik*, engaged in a ruthless struggle for power, they were interested in one thing only: how to create a strong and centralized apparatus of government. To achieve this end, all else must be subordinated, they said, to the two basic occupations of agriculture and war. Yet both, especially the latter, are arduous and poorly rewarded. Therefore, in order to induce people to serve readily in the army, "ordinary conditions should be made so hard for them, that they look upon war as a welcome release from their toil and as a good opportunity for earning rewards. Then they will fight with all their energy."[33] The cold-blooded realism of the Legalists is well expressed in the following passage from the *Han-fei-tzŭ* (chap. 49, middle):

> What are mutually incompatible should not co-exist. To reward those who kill the enemy, and at the same time praise acts of mercy and benevolence; to honor those who capture cities, and at the same time believe in the doctrine of universal love; . . . to depend on agriculture to enrich the nation, and on the soldiers to resist the enemy, and at the same time encourage men of letters; . . . strong government will not thus be gained.

Significantly, however, even the Legalists made no attempt to glorify war. For them it was simply a necessary means to a desired end. In the entire range of Chinese philosophy there has been nothing comparable to

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[32] Cf. Y. P. Mei, *Motse, the Neglected Rival of Confucius* (London, 1934), pp. 96–99, and Dubs, *Hsüntze*, pp. 269–70.

[33] Cf. J. J. L. Duyvendak, *The Book of Lord Shang* (London, 1928), Introduction, p. 83.

Nietzsche's exaltation of the superman and praise of war as morally desirable.

Only one later Chinese thinker, so far as I know, in any way compares with the Legalists in his acceptance of warfare. This is Wang Fu-chih, whose militant attitude stems from his nationalism, which, in turn, combines with his view of history (see Sec. 2 above) to set him sharply apart from the general current of Chinese thought. There are good historical reasons for this phenomenon, inasmuch as Wang lived at a time (the seventeenth century) when China was overrun by the Manchus, and this event embittered him so greatly that he spent much of his life in retirement rather than hold office under the alien rulers.

The ideological result, for him, is an ardent nationalism which causes him to extol the glories of the Chinese race and to laud China's periods of military expansion as expressions of manifest destiny. To bring the barbarians under Chinese rule is, he says, "to expand the virtue of Heaven and Earth and establish the apogee of man." Any means toward this end seems to be justifiable to him, the more so as the barbarians, in his eyes, may scarcely be accounted members of the human race at all: "As for the barbarians, destroying them means no lack of benevolence, attacking them means no lack of righteousness, and tricking them means no lack of good faith. Why so? Good faith and righteousness are principles to be practiced between one man and another, but they are not to be extended to an alien species."[34]

Before leaving this topic, there is one matter that should give us pause, and that is the seeming discrepancy between the attitudes we have been describing and those on a more popular and less philosophical level. On the one hand, to be sure, it is quite true that the soldier did not even hold a recognized place among the traditional classes of Chinese society—a fact implied by the well-known saying (rhyming in the original):

> Good iron isn't beaten into nails;
> A good man doesn't become a soldier.

Yet, on the other hand, it is also true that many of the most popular Chinese novels and dramas—from which, until recently, the ordinary man derived much of his knowledge of Chinese history—deal in most colorful fashion with famous wars and military figures of the past. This, no doubt, can largely be explained by fondness—widespread in China as elsewhere—for gallant deeds of derring-do, especially when sufficiently remote from the present as to become enshrouded in a haze of romantic glamour. Another factor of some sociological importance is that many of China's historical military heroes began their careers as bandits and have become identified in the popular mind as Robin Hood-like protagonists of the people against a corrupt social order. Even in these exciting novels and dramas, however, it is noteworthy that chief applause is often reserved for the man who prefers guile to force for gaining the submission of his opponent.[35]

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[34] Hsi Wen-fu, *op. cit.*, pp. 97 and 99.

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Notes

* Bibliographical Note.—A few Chinese works, because of the brevity of their chapter or paragraph divisions, are cited simply according to these divisions, as follows:

Analects of Confucius	*Doctrine of the Mean*
Lao-tzŭ	*Mencius*

The following works, available in Western translations, have been cited according to these translations, whose wording, however, has often been modified by me in the interests of consistency or greater accuracy:

Book of Changes: James Legge's translation in *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. XVI (2d ed.; Oxford, 1899)

Book of Lord Shang: J. J. L. Duyvendak, *The Book of Lord Shang* (London, 1928)

Chuang-tzŭ: H. A. Giles, *Chuang Tzŭ* (2d ed.; Shanghai, 1926)

Hsün-tzŭ: H. H. Dubs, *The Works of Hsüntze* (London, 1928)

Huai-nan-tzŭ: Evan Morgan, *Tao the Great Luminant* (Shanghai, 1934)

Lü-shih Ch'un-ch'iu: Richard Wilhelm, *Frühling und Herbst des Lü Bu We* (Jena, 1928)

Mo-tzŭ: Y. P. Mei, *The Ethical and Political Works of Motse* (London, 1929)

Seng-chao's *Chao Lun,* or *Book of Chao*: Walter Liebenthal *The Book of Chao* (Peiping, 1948)

Wang Ch'ung's *Lun Heng,* or *Critical Essays*: Alfred Forke, *Lun Heng* (2 vols.; Berlin and London, 1907 and 1911)

Wang Shou-jen's writings and conversations: Frederick Goodrich Henke, *The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming* (Chicago and London, 1916)

Yüeh Ling, or *Monthly Commands*: James Legge's translation in *Sacred Books of the East,* Vol. XXVII (Oxford, 1885), pp. 249–310.

Many other works, unavailable in Western translation, are, for the sake of easy reference, cited according to the quotations made from them in Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, translated from the Chinese by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952–53). The two volumes of this work are referred to as "Fung 1" and "Fung 2."

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[35] Cf. the famous "stratagem of the empty city," recounted in C. H. Brewitt-Taylor (trans.), *San Kuo, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (Shanghai, 1925), II, 371–73. In this episode the sagacious leader Chu-ko Liang (181–234) finds himself, with only a handful of his troops, trapped in a city by an opponent commanding a huge army. He meets the situation by throwing open the gates of the city and calmly sitting on top of the city wall, where he plays his lute in full sight of the enemy. His opponent, convinced that this is a trick and that within the city must be concealed a large force of soldiers, thereupon marches his soldiers away without even venturing an attack.

Integration and Group Structure: An Area for Research

WERNER S. LANDECKER

In an earlier article,[1] different integration variables were constructed for the following major dimensions of a social system: culture, norm-oriented behavior, communication, and division of labor. Each variable constitutes a type of integration which ranges on a continuum of its own. "Cultural integration" is the degree to which cultural standards are mutually consistent; "normative integration" is the degree to which conduct in the group conforms to its cultural standards; "communicative integration" is the degree to which the members of the group are linked to one another by exchanges of meanings; and "functional integration" is the degree to which they are linked to one another by exchanges of services. The purpose of the present paper is to indicate a number of research problems which are suggested by this scheme.

Structural Aspects of Integration

In order to make integration research relevant not only to simple but also to structurally complex groups, basic aspects of group structure must be taken into account. What makes a group complex is the fact that it contains other groups within itself. Thus, the first and most obvious structural distinction relevant to a complex group is that between the group as a whole and a smaller group within it. It will be terminologically convenient to call the larger group, when seen as a whole, the "compound-group," and to call the smaller group within the larger group the "sub-group." This distinction is relative. In contrast to smaller groups within it, the group is

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[1] Werner S. Landecker, "Types of Integration and Their Measurement," *American Journal of Sociology*, LVI (1950–51), 332ff.

Werner S. Landecker, "Integration and Group Structure: An Area for Research," Social Forces, *Vol. 30, No. 4 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, May, 1952), pp. 394–400. Reprinted by permission.*

a compound-group. In distinction from a larger group of which it is a part, the same group is a sub-group.

Thus, in a complex-group one may study the integration of the group as a whole, which will be called "compound-group integration." One may also study the integration of one of its component groups, which will be called "sub-group integration." Insofar as the integration of a sub-group is concerned, one may distinguish between two of its aspects. One approach to sub-group integration is to determine the degree to which the sub-group is integrated into the compound-group. In a sense, the relationship between sub-group and compound-group is as much a phase of compound-group integration as of sub-group integration. Nevertheless, a given degree of compound-group integration is not necessarily indicative of the degree to which a particular sub-group is integrated into the compound-group. The integration of a sub-group into a larger group will be called "extrinsic sub-group integration." In addition, the study of sub-group integration may be focused on the integration of the sub-group within itself. Here, the emphasis is on the relationship among its own elements rather than on its relationship to the outside. With reference to the integration among the units of which a sub-group is composed, the term "instrinsic sub-group integration" is offered.

If these structural distinctions are combined with the four types of integration described earlier, the following classifications suggest themselves.

1. Compound-Group Integration

(a) Cultural compound-group integration,[2] (b) Normative compound-group integration, (c) Communicative compound-group integration, and (d) Functional compound-group integration. Insofar as the communicative integration of the compound-group is concerned,[3] it would be useful to distinguish between its interpersonal aspects and its intergroup aspects. . . .

2. Extrinsic Sub-Group Integration

(a) *Cultural.* Strictly in line with the definition of cultural integration as such, the degree of consistency of sub-group specialties with universals of the compound-group and with specialties of other sub-groups would be the only relevant measure of extrinsic cultural integration. In a somewhat broader sense, this concept can be used to include also the degree to which cultural alternatives, scattered over a compound-group, are found in the sub-group . . . . In its general form, the concept is synonymous with that of "Cultural Assimilation" as it is often used.

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[2] See David F. Aberle, "Shared Values in Complex Societies," *American Sociological Review*, XV (1950), 495ff.

[3] The meaning of "cultural," "normative," and "functional" integration on the structural level of the compound-group does not differ from that of these concepts in general as stated earlier.

(b) *Normative.* The extrinsic normative integration of the sub-group is the degree to which the members of the sub-group conform to compound-group standards. While this is closely related to extrinsic cultural integration, nevertheless it is not the same. For example, a comparison between crime rates of so-called first and second generation immigrants has suggested to many students that the first generation has had a lower crime rate than the second generation although the latter is culturally better integrated into its surroundings. This could mean that the first generation exceeds the second in extrinsic normative integration, while the second generation exceeds the first in extrinsic cultural integration.

(c) *Communicative.* For the extrinsic communicative integration of the sub-group, not all phases of communicative integration as such are relevant. Those measures of communicative integration do not apply which use personal isolation and its symptoms as indices. Instead, extrinsic communicative integration is an aspect of the relationship between the sub-group as a whole and the compound-group of which it is a part . . . . Therefore, indices are relevant here which measure the degree to which intergroup communication is disturbed.

(d) *Functional.* Extrinsic functional integration is the degree to which the sub-group is interdependent with other segments of the compound-group. The negative theoretical extreme of this continuum would be the self-sufficiency of the sub-group. In conjunction with extrinsic functional integration there is always an additional variable present which runs from the extreme of functional homogeneity of the sub-group to that of its functional heterogeneity. Extrinsic functional integration combined with functional homogeneity is illustrated by a minority group heavily concentrated in one occupation . . . . However, extrinsic functional integration can also approximate, in varying degrees, the pattern of functional heterogeneity . . . . Therefore, in measuring extrinsic functional integration one should also specify the degree of heterogeneity involved.

3. Intrinsic Sub-Group Integration

(a) *Cultural.* One can speak of the intrinsic cultural integration of the sub-group in two ways. The meaning of the concept may be limited to integration among those culture traits which are specialties of the sub-group. On the other hand, the concept can be used also with reference to the relationship among all culture traits that are operative within the sub-group, including those which the sub-group shares with the remainder of the compound-group. The relevance of one or the other definition depends on the research problem at hand.

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(b) *Normative.* By intrinsic normative integration is meant the degree to which the members of the sub-group conform to standards of the sub-group. In some instances, it will be difficult to decide whether a norm is a sub-group standard or a compound-group standard.

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(c) *Communicative.* Ordinarily, the intrinsic communicative integration of the sub-group is the communicative integration in the interpersonal relations among its members. A distinction between the interpersonal and the intergroup aspects of intrinsic communicative integration would be necessary only in those instances where the research problem involves a concentric structural relationship among more than two groups. One might think of a study involving a very large compound-group, containing within itself large sub-groups which are divided further into smaller sub-groups. Here it is clear that in dealing with a larger sub-group one would have to distinguish between the interpersonal and the intergroup aspects of its intrinsic communicative integration. However, it can be expected that for some time research will be concerned primarily with simpler structural situations. Therefore it is suggested that, unless qualifying words are used, the concept "intrinsic communicative integration" be employed with reference to the interpersonal aspects of this type of integration.

(d) *Functional.* The intrinsic functional integration of a sub-group is the degree to which its members are engaged in division of labor with one another. On the other hand, the degree to which the sub-group is self-sufficient in relation to the outside is not relevant in this connection but constitutes an aspect of its extrinsic functional integration.

Problems of Research

By combining four types of integration and three structural levels, twelve variables were constructed. The primary purpose of these manifold distinctions was not to classify for classification's sake, but to suggest problems of relationship among these variables, which can be answered by research. The total number of possible relationships among these variables is sixty-six. No good purpose would be served by listing pedantically all of these combinations. In order to show the implications of this scheme for research, it will suffice to present a classification of such relationships and to illustrate each category by a research problem.

This scheme is not a "closed system" of problems, closed not even insofar as integration research is concerned. It is intended merely as a central area of integration research. A good many problems lie within this core. But in addition, there is a multitude of problems concerning relationships between variables within this central area and other variables of sociological significance which as such are not measures of any type of integration. Thus, integration in its several forms can be studied in relation to rates of in- and out-migration, racial and ethnic composition of the population,[4] stratification, population size, rate of social change, institutional structure, or degree of secularization, to name but a few of many possible examples.[5] The remainder of this paper, however, will be limited to problems of relationship among integration variables themselves.

1. Problems of Relationship among Variables within the Same Type of Integration

(a) *Cultural integration on different levels of group structure.* The variables involved here are the cultural integration of the compound-group, the extrinsic cultural integration of the sub-group, and the intrinsic cultural integration of the sub-group. This area of research can be illustrated by hypotheses as to the effect of compound-group integration and intrinsic sub-group integration on the extrinsic integration of the sub-group. How is the rate of cultural assimilation of the sub-group affected by the degree to which its own sub-group culture is integrated and how is it affected by the degree of integration of the compound-group culture to which it becomes assimilated? A plausible hypothesis for research is that assimilation is facilitated by a relatively low degree of integration in the sub-group culture as well as in the compound-group culture.

(b) *Normative integration on different levels of group structure.* A relevant problem is to determine the relation between the intrinsic and the extrinsic normative integration of sub-groups. Is there a direct relation between being a good labor-union member and being a good citizen of the state, "good" in the sense of a high degree of conformity to the standards of the respective group? Is there a similar relation between being a faithful church member and being a loyal citizen? Merely to raise these questions suggests that the answer may not be the same for all types of sub-groups. What may be true for the relation between church and community is perhaps not true for the relation between gang and community. Thus it is probable that in the course of research it will become necessary to distinguish among different types of sub-groups. Presumably, the degree of consistency or inconsistency between sub-group standards and compound-group standards will have to be taken into account.

(c) *Communicative integration on different levels of group structure.* One of the problems that can be raised in this area is to determine the effect of the intrinsic communicative integration of the sub-group on its prejudice against other sub-groups as a phase of its extrinsic communicative integration. Several mutually contradictory hypotheses appear equally plausible. Using as point of departure the assumption that prejudice against other sub-groups is acquired through communication with members of one's own sub-group, one would expect that prejudice increases in proportion to the intrinsic communicative integration within the sub-group. However, a different conclusion would seem to derive from the premise that prejudice is a form of aggressiveness and as such is a function of frustration. A high degree of intrinsic communicative integration in the group is emotionally satisfying for its members while a low degree, involving personal isolation, is frustrating. On the strength of this argument one would expect that prejudice against outsiders is more effectively stimulated by weak than by strong intrinsic communicative integration. It is obvious that the problem awaits an answer through research.

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[4] Robert C. Angell has found that in- and out-migration and racial and ethnic composition are factors in the integration (normative) of American cities. See his *The Moral Integration of American Cities*, Monograph published as Part 2 of *The American Journal of Sociology*, LVII, No. 1 (July 1951), Ch. 3.

[5] R. Smend has developed a factorial theory of integration; see this writer's paper "Smend's Theory of Integration," *Social Forces*, XXIX (1950–51), 39ff.

(d) *Functional integration on different levels of group structure.* An illustrative hypothesis can be stated with reference to the functional integration of the compound-group in relation to the intrinsic functional integration of the sub-group. If one focuses his attention on the society-community relationship as a case of compound-group and sub-group, it seems likely that there is a positive correlation between the functional integration of the one and that of the other. As long as there is little division of labor in a society, one will not expect to find much division of labor within its component communities. As societal division of labor increases, division of labor in the community becomes more and more complex too. Parallel hypotheses can be developed readily with reference to other types of compound-groups and sub-groups.

2. *Problems of Relationship between Different Types of Integration*

(a) *Cultural and normative integration.* Relations between types of integration, such as between cultural and normative, can be studied in several variations. Each type of integration can be specified structurally by being placed on the level of the compound-group or either of the two sub-group levels, extrinsic or intrinsic. Thus, a considerable number of variables are available in the study of relations between broad types of integration. Among the several structural variations that are possible in relation between cultural and normative integration, most fruitful for hypothesis formulation is perhaps that of parallel structural levels for both types, either that of compound-group integration or that of intrinsic sub-group integration. The hypothesis suggested is that the cultural integration of a group is directly correlated with, and a major factor in, its normative integration. It is likely indeed that the higher the degree of integration among the standards of a culture is, the higher the degree of behavioral conformity to these standards will be.[6] Mutually consistent standards probably strengthen each other in their control over behavior. Inconsistencies among standards lead to situations where the same action which is demanded by one standard is prohibited by the other. Thus, a clash between two standards presumably weakens both and lowers the degree of normative integration in the group.

(b) *Cultural and communicative integration.* The interdependence between culture and communication is fairly obvious. Culture provides the shared meanings without which communication is impossible. But it is also true that without communication culture cannot be transmitted and shared. In view of this close tie, one would expect to find direct relations between cultural and communicative integration on parallel structural levels. For example, on the level of extrinsic sub-group integration one can formulate the hypothesis that prejudice against a sub-group, symptomatic of barriers to communication, will weaken in proportion as the cultural assimilation of the sub-group increases.

(c) *Cultural and functional integration.* One of the main assumptions in Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* is that moral consensus weakens with increasing division of labor. It weakens because as division of labor advances, like functions tend to form clusters, as Spencer puts it, and in these clusters cultural specialties develop, some of which are inconsistent with each other. On these grounds one would expect that, within the group, cultural integration and functional integration are inversely correlated. On the sub-group level, however, a low degree of extrinsic cultural integration may be associated either with a low degree of extrinsic functional integration, or else with a relatively high degree in this respect if combined with homogeneity in the functions of the sub-group. Research might be aimed at the hypothesis that an increase in cultural assimilation of a sub-group is accompanied by an increase in its interdependence with the outside, or by an increase in its functional differentiation in its contacts with the outside, or by a combination of both.

(d) *Normative and communicative integration.* A conventional explanation of high urban crime rates is to account for them in part as a result of the anonymity of urban life. Similarly, industrial sociologists have suggested that absenteeism and low output in the plant are related to the weakness of personal ties among workers under conditions of mass production. In these instances, criminologists and industrial sociologists work with variables which have certain elements in common. Crime rates, on the one hand, and absenteeism and low output, on the other, are indicative of behavior which falls short of social standards of a compound-group, either the state or the plant. Thus, what is to be explained in both instances is a low degree of normative integration of a compound-group. The causative factor which is singled out is stated in varying terms, such as anonymity of the individual, impersonality of social contacts, weakness of group ties, or working and living in the mass. The common element seems to be the fact that the ties of communication between person and person are weak and superficial. A low degree in the interpersonal aspects of communicative integration is seen as contributing to a low degree of the normative integration of the compound-group. In general, this view is supported by R. C. Angell's study of the relationship between these variables in the integration of cities. However, he finds also that they may vary independently under conditions of major cleavage within an urban population.[7]

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[6] See Louis Wirth, "Ideological Aspects of Social Disorganization," *American Sociological Review*, V (1940), 472ff.

(e) *Normative and functional integration.* In order to form an illustrative hypothesis, one might relate to each other the extrinsic functional integration and the intrinsic normative integration of the sub-group. A plausible inference from studies of ethnic minorities is that the relationship is negative. If the extrinsic functional integration of the group increases, its conformity to its own distinctive standards seems to weaken. Research is needed to test the hypothesis under controlled conditions.

(f) *Communicative and functional integration.* It is apparent that communicative and functional integration are highly distinct variables. Caste systems, for example, are composed of strata which are functionally interdependent but divided by strong barriers to communication. It may be significant, however, that caste systems combine weak inter-group communication and strong interdependence under conditions where each group is functionally highly homogeneous in its participation in the total system of division of labor. Whether communicative integration tends to be restricted more severely by a low degree of functional integration or by a higher degree of functional integration under caste conditions, is one problem which requires investigation. A closely related problem, more amenable to research, can be raised if one attempts to hold constant the degree of extrinsic functional integration of a sub-group, while varying the degree to which its participation in the larger system of division of labor is heterogeneous. How is its extrinsic communicative integration affected by differences in this latter respect? One may assume tentatively that it varies directly with heterogeneity. This hypothesis can be made more specific by suggesting that strong occupational concentration of a minority group, a situation approximating homogeneity, contributes to prejudice against it, a manifestation of disturbances in extrinsic communicative integration.[8]

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[7] Angell, *op. cit.*, Ch. 10.

[8] Amos H. Hawley has proposed that occupational as well as residential concentration is a major factor in prejudice against a minority group, and that prejudice against a group tends to weaken under conditions of occupational and spatial dispersion. See his "Dispersion vs. Segregation: Apropos of a Solution of Race Problems," *Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters*, XXX (1944), 667ff.

Summary

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The test of the utility of a theoretical scheme lies in its ability to suggest new problems for research and to increase the significance of old ones. New research problems arising from a theoretical framework are those which would not be relevant and interesting from another point of view; problems which would be unlikely to occur to the researcher if it were not for their logical relation to his theoretical frame of reference. Some hypotheses suggested in this paper may have been of this kind. In other instances, hypotheses were discussed which in substance are not novel and which were merely restated in terms of concepts of this scheme or which were subordinated to its categories. Thereby, research problems become relevant to one another which fall into such disparate fields as criminology, industrial sociology, human ecology, cultural anthropology, and social psychology.

In view of this systematizing function of a theoretical scheme, it is unavoidable that the hypotheses which it suggests deal with variables on a high level of abstraction. The point of attack for the researcher ordinarily lies on lower levels. His data are communities, labor unions, college fraternities, families, church groups, ethnic groups, and other relatively concrete materials. Thus, research hypotheses often have to be formulated on a level of abstraction below that of the theoretical scheme to which they are relevant. The hypothesis that absenteeism increases with the size of the plant is not synonymous with, although suggested by, the hypothesis that normative integration decreases under conditions of a decrease in interpersonal communicative integration. The first hypothesis is on a lower level of abstraction than the second. If the former is verified it becomes what Merton has called an "empirical generalization." By verifying the latter we confirm, in Merton's terms, a "sociological theory."[9] It is through the accumulation of pertinent empirical generalizations that abstract theories are tested. The objective of the scheme presented in this paper was to provide for the derivation of hypotheses which can be transformed into empirical generalizations, and become the bases for a system of confirmed theories.

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[9] Robert K. Merton, "Sociological Theory," *American Journal of Sociology*, LL (1944–45), 462ff.

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Books

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PART C

Nation-States Integration

1. *Formation of Internationalist Attitudes*
2. *Interdisciplinary Approaches and Suggestions for Eliminating International Tensions*
3. *Prevention of War as a Step toward Integration*
4. *Behavioral Scientists and International Peace and Integration: Policy Recommendations*

CHAPTER 1. *Formation of Internationalist Attitudes*

The Development of Internationalist Attitudes: I. Hypotheses and Verifications

LLEWELLYN QUEENER

A. Introduction and Hypotheses

Several writers have objected that too many studies of attitude formation neglect promising hypotheses, limit their sources to convenient academic situations, and "explain" the attitudes of statistical, rather than real, people.

The present study sought to avoid these criticisms by using three promising hypotheses, drawing materials from business and professional men, and by substantiating conclusions in life histories as well as in scores.

The hypotheses used are (*a*) that attitude is a positive imitation of prestiged persons and groups, (*b*) that attitude is a negative imitation of non-prestiged persons and groups, and (*c*) that attitude is a form of aggression against frustrating persons and groups.

Hypotheses (*a*) and (*b*) are applications of the Miller-Dollard (2) "matched-dependent" version of imitation. This particular form of imitation is regarded as a species of learning in which the imitator "depends" upon a model to perceive relevant environmental cues. He learns to imitate positively (do the same as) when he is rewarded for "matching" the

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Llewellyn Queener, "The Development of Internationalist Attitudes: I. Hypotheses and Verifications," Journal of Social Psychology, *Vol. 29, Second Half (1949), pp. 221–235. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

model's responses, and, conversely, he learns to imitate negatively (do the opposite from) when he is punished for matching the model's responses. The model, and not the material environment, becomes his "cue-giver."

Further, if an imitator has learned to imitate a model in one situation, there is a tendency to imitate him in a variety of situations. This applies to both positive and negative imitation and has been demonstrated, along with the other phases of matched-dependent imitation, in animals as well as in children.

Applying these principles to the problem of attitude formation, a "prestiged" source (person or group) is thus one whose responses serve consistently as cues to rewarding responses. On the other hand, a "non-prestiged" source is one whose responses serve consistently as cues to punishing responses. Then, applying the further principle that imitation generalizes, it may be predicted that a source thus prestiged or nonprestiged will have had a *variety* of responses positively or negatively imitated. *Among these responses will have been its international attitudes.*

The third hypothesis, (*c*) that attitude is a form of aggression against frustrating sources, is derived from another Dollard (1) hypothesis—the frustration-aggression one. Proportionally as a given social attitude is intrinsic to an individual's (or group's) value system, what better way to attack him than to adopt an attitude the opposite of his own? Certainly this should be a particularly acceptable form of aggression in a society which claims to be highly permissive toward "freedom of expression," "freedom of conscience," "having one's opinion." Among the values of men and groups are their international attitudes. It is predicted that those whom they have frustrated will have hit upon the adoption of opposite attitudes as a respectable kind of aggression against them.

Adapting the above hypotheses for research, two questions were asked: (*a*) Will the respondents hold the same attitudes as do the prestiged (for reasons other than attitude agreement) sources in their histories? (*b*) Will the respondents hold the opposite attitudes from the nonprestiged (for reasons other than attitude disagreement) sources in their histories?

It will be noticed that the research question concerning nonprestiged sources combines two meanings of "nonprestiged": first, it means nonprestiged because *mis-cueing*, and, second, it means nonprestiged because *frustrating*. Although this makes impossible for the present a quantitative evaluation of the two factors taken separately, qualitative analysis of case materials will show both independently operative. In any event, the prestige variable is considered the most important problem at hand.

B. Procedure

Fifty upper middle class New England men (median age: 53) served as subjects. Each was classified as an internationalist if he met either an *action* criterion or an *attitude* criterion. The *action* criterion was met by (*a*) being a member of an international peace organization, (*b*) having written at least one letter to Washington on matters of international peace, and by (*c*) attending numerous lectures and discussions on the problems of world peace. A subject rated 3.5 or above on a 1-to-5 scale (Scale III below) was considered an *attitude* internationalist. By these two criteria the group divided as follows:

Active Internationalists ($N = 16$)	*vs.*	Nationalists by the action criterion ($N = 34$).
Attitude Internationalists ($N = 27$)	*vs.*	Nationalists by the attitude criterion ($N = 23$ including an active internationalist).

Materials were gathered in individual interviews, the median length of which was two hours. Although topics to be examined were completely standardized, each was raised in an informal manner during the interview with plenty of leeway allowed the interviewee in exhausting each topic. Briefly, the topics had to do with (*a*) the international attitudes of the persons and groups in the respondent's history, and (*b*) their prestige relationship to him. Both topics were systematically discussed, beginning with the interviewee's childhood, and passing through the grammar school, high school, college, and since-college phases of his life.

In order to obtain some quantification of the interview materials, three scales were devised for rating each respondent. A condensation of the scales follows:

Scale I

“Prestiged Nationalist vs. Prestiged Internationalist History” in which

“1” means that nationalist sources (persons or groups) in the life history have been much more prestiged than the internationalist ones.

“3” means that the prestige of nationalist and internationalist sources has been equal, or that

“3*a*” neither prestiged nationalists nor prestiged internationalists are present.

“5” means that internationalist sources in the life history have been much more prestiged than nationalist ones.

Scale II

“Nonprestiged Nationalist vs. Nonprestiged Internationalist History.” Instructions in this scale differ in only two ways from those of Scale I:

Note 1: Nonprestige in the sources is to be rated, nonprestige meaning (*a*) that the source is looked upon as an unreliable cue-giver, or (*b*) a source of direct frustration.

Note 2, Important: For purposes of consistency, histories containing nonprestiged nationalists will be given high ratings, while those containing nonprestiged internationalists will be given low ratings.

Scale III

"Subject's Own Attitude" in which

"1" means acceptance of war and its institutions in some way as positive values, and opposition to the identification of this country's interests with the interests of other powers in the maintenance of peace.[2]

"3" means a combination of the two extremes of attitude, or

"3*a*" means the absence of either.

"5" means positive opposition to war, and positive identification of this country's interests with the interests of other powers in the maintenance of peace.

This method of quantification made possible an estimate as to the reliability of the interview materials. Using the first 15 life histories, three independent raters rated each on the three scales. A satisfactory reliability may be claimed for the materials on all three scales, no correlation falling below .73 (uncorrected *r*) and most at .84 or above.

C. Results: Quantitative Statement

. . . it will be seen that internationalists . . . ascribe greater prestige to internationalists in their histories than do nationalists. Further, looking under Scale II, the internationalists ascribe considerably more *non*prestige to nationalist persons and groups in their histories than do the nationalists. Both of these differences between internationalists and nationalists are easily significant.

. . . the relation between the prestige of persons and groups holding given attitudes and the present subjects' own attitudes is made by correlating ratings on Scales I and II with the subjects' own ratings on Scale III. The correlations show that individuals rating high in internationalism (Scale III) definitely tend toward histories of prestiged internationalists (Scale I) and nonprestiged nationalists (Scale II). Conversely, the nationalists reveal prestiged nationalists and nonprestiged internationalists. Subjects' attitudes vary directly with the prestige of sources holding a given attitude and inversely with the nonprestige of those sources.

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E. Discussion

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The main hypotheses of this research are, of course, portions of a broader learning hypothesis. The contention has been that attitudes rise and decline as rewards rise and decline. *Cherchez la récompense* has been the guiding principle in understanding each attitude. It might legitimately be asked why, then, the study was not conducted in terms of learning theory rather than in terms of one phase of it, imitation theory. The answer is that it was assumed that most individuals get their attitudes from *other individuals* rather than from "personal experience." Perhaps more perfect relationships would have been found had the relation of attitude to *all kinds of reward* been reduced to a quantitative statement.

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[2] Persons favoring war as an instrument of internationalist (as contrasted to nationalist) policy were not rated nationalist for this reason. Conversely, persons opposing war were not rated internationalist if their anti-warism resulted in isolationism. Opposition to war had internationalist meaning only to the extent that it was diagnostic of strong motivations toward international coöperation. Favorableness toward war had nationalist meaning only to the extent that it was diagnostic of international non-coöperativeness.

This suggests that the problem of attitude development should now be systematically attacked in terms of learning theory. So long as we seek to correlate attitude with such sociological variables as "the father's attitude" or such psychological ones as "personal adjustment," the uniqueness of each life history must resist us. When, however, we begin relating attitude to variables presumably operative in *all* behavior (e.g., learning), a good degree of predictability may come our way.

F. Summary

1. Respondents' attitudes vary directly with the prestige of persons and groups holding given attitudes in their histories.
2. Respondents' attitudes vary inversely with the nonprestige of persons and groups holding given attitudes in their histories.
3. Nonprestige affects attitude in two ways: (*a*) the nonprestiged (miscueing) source has its attitudes negatively imitated; (*b*) the nonprestiged (frustrating) source has opposite attitudes thrown against it as a form of aggression.
4. In the amount of prestige and nonprestige attributed to internationalist and nationalist sources, internationalist and nationalist respondents differ from each other by easily significant differences.
5. Although personality motifs do not determine the *direction* of international attitudes, they certainly determine the affective *content* of them. Attitudes are re-enforced by serving as vehicles of private motifs.

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The Development of Internationalist Attitudes: II. Attitude Cues and Prestige

LLEWELLYN QUEENER

A. The Previous Article

In a previous article, the following hypotheses were examined: (*a*) Attitude is a positive imitation of prestiged persons and groups; (*b*) attitude is a negative imitation of nonprestiged persons and groups; (*c*) attitude is a form of aggression against frustrating persons and groups.

Using the Miller-Dollard (1) "matched-dependent" version of imitation, a "prestiged" person or group is one who has cued an imitator consistently to rewarding responses. A "nonprestiged" one has cued the imitator consistently to punishing responses.

Employing the Miller-Dollard findings further, it is predicted that a tendency to imitate positively (do the same as) prestiged sources and to imitate negatively (do the opposite from) nonprestiged ones is a tendency which will generalize to a variety of their cues, *including their international attitude cues.*

The following conclusions reached in the previous study are in keeping with the above hypotheses and seem to have been warranted on the basis of both quantitative and qualitative analyses of 50 life histories:

1. Respondents' attitudes vary directly with the prestige of persons and groups holding given attitudes in their histories.

2. Respondents' attitudes vary inversely with the nonprestige of persons and groups holding given attitudes in their histories.

3. Nonprestige affects attitudes in two ways: (*a*) the nonprestiged (*miscueing*) source has its attitudes negatively imitated; (*b*) the nonprestiged (*frustrating*) source has opposite attitudes thrown against it as a form of aggression.

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4. In the amount of prestige and nonprestige attributed to internationalist and nationalist sources, internationalist and nationalist respondents differ from each other by easily significant differences.

It is the purpose of this article to describe and discuss more fully the oft-repeated terms, "cue" and "prestige." Discussed separately at first, it is believed that the two can be combined finally under a concept to be labelled an "attitude cell."

B. Attitude Cues

1. What Cues Had Been Given?

Cueing to war and peace *per se* is not often found in the pre-World War I periods of the respondents' histories. One of the most frequently met comments is that, "People didn't think about the problem before the first war." This does not mean that attitudes were not being expressed for and against war (and its institutions: nationalism, the military) before the first war, but that they dealt with specific wars and practices. (The Civil War continues to be transmitted as an anti-war-attitude target, while the Revolutionary War tends to favor nationalistic practices.)

Only in a few circles of the intelligentsia do war and peace appear as concepts rather than periods in time before World War I. War and peace *per se* would seem to be relatively new additions to the attitude repertory, and peace remains as little more than the absence of war. There is some evidence that cues did not reach even this level of abstraction after the first war in the "lower" classes, however. Thus one respondent with a lower middle class history recalls mainly "talking to a soldier who said the French were awfully friendly," and another simply that "my Mother certainly wished the war would end before I was called."

2. Did Cues Not Specific to War and Peace Transfer?

There is some evidence that a few, the following, did transfer: (*a*) skills in politico-social conceptualizing, (*b*) attitudes strongly adverse to the taking of life.

a. Skills in politico-social conceptualizing. International relations, international government, international society are not concrete facts in the histories of most men. They must exist as concepts, and as difficult concepts at that. As in other complex skills, it may be expected that facility in learning will be proportional to the number of sub-skills already learned. Thus respondents who had already been cued to political and social conceptualizing seem to have profited by a transfer of these learnings to new learnings—international ones.

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b. Attitudes strongly adverse to the taking of life may also transfer to international attitudes. If nationalism means war, and war means killing, a revolt against nationalism and for internationalism (though not necessarily) might be expected more frequently in histories containing a number of cues against killing. Thus Respondent 50 tells of an uncle, "the only hunter in our family," who was scolded in a "half serious" way for his trophies every time the relatives visited him. Respondent 2 reports that his mother "felt strongly against all violence," and 12 was apparently so coached against killing that "even a dead cat" upset him. In each of the men's histories revulsion at the violence of war plays a prominent part in his international thought. *Only such cues of an intense sort would seem to be related to war, however; mere cues to ordinary humaneness do not seem to conflict with the highly sanctioned violence of national policy.*

A special problem of transfer arises in the face of the fact that 12 of the 28 respondents rated internationalists failed to qualify as internationalists by an *action* criterion.[2] The active and inactive internationalists did not differ significantly in the amount of prestige attributed to internationalists in their histories nor in the amount of nonprestige attributed to the nationalists. The prestige-nonprestige hypotheses may "explain" internationalists *vs.* nationalists but not active internationalists *vs.* inactive ones.

If the *prestige* variables do not explain these differences, it seems probable that *cue* variables can do so. Active internationalists may have received *action* cues as well as attitude cues, while inactive internationalists have received only attitude cues. A qualitative contrasting of the two groups seems to substantiate such a deduction. Of the 16 active internationalists at least nine reveal histories of prestiged *active* internationalists. Only two of the inactive internationalists have such histories.[3]

If this analysis is correct, it bespeaks a very small amount of transfer from attitude cues on the part of a model to social action on the part of his imitators. Only as the model is active, and only as his activities approach the nature of internationalist activities . . . is internationalist action to be expected in his imitator.

3. How Are Attitude Cues Given?

Cueing is sometimes by lecture, but several respondents go out of their way to insist that the prestiged sources "never lectured me on the subject." There are, to be sure, instances in which school teachers, for example, are recalled as "showing charts on the costs of World War I," insisting even in

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[2] The action criterion was met by (*a*) belonging to an international peace organization, (*b*) having written Washington at least once on international peace, and attending lectures and other meetings having to do with the problems of peace.

[3] There were other differences. Active internationalists had more frequently had their initial *actions* rewarded. Secondly, some types of inactives were so sophisticated on international matters as to despair of action accomplishing anything.

1917 that "war is wrong," "energetically having us first graders collect peach seeds to make gas masks," sponsoring projects on "the man who sank that ship in Havana harbor," and there are clergymen "preaching unspiritual sermons" against lend-lease or advocating outright pacifism. There are also college professors "lecturing for the League," "stressing the League's failures," or even questioning war as such. *With the sources of greatest intimacy, however, cues are generally given not for the potential imitator, but as expressions of the sources' own convictions.*

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The sources rarely lecture on the G.A.R., but march in every parade; they do not pronounce the D.A.R. as currently unsophisticated, but smirk appreciatively at Grant Wood's portraits or unappreciatively at Norman Rockwell's. An idea and an institution is accepted or rejected in a passing remark or a significant gesture "at the table" and "around the stove."

4. What Factors Determine the Selection of Cues by the Imitator?

It is the overall hypothesis of this study that the amount of prestige or nonprestige held by a cue-giver is the main determinant of the extent to which its cues will be selected by an imitator. This general principle, however, is further analyzable into such sub-variables as the following: (*a*) "cue-intensity"; (*b*) counter-cues in other prestiged or nonprestiged persons; and (*c*) counter-cues in the imitators themselves may influence cue-selection.

a. Cue-intensity. It has already been mentioned that the subtle cues of practice are more effective than the obvious cues of preachment. The essential distinction, however, is not between preachment and practice, but rather between cues which are intrinsic to a cue-giver's ideology and those which are merely matters of occasional verbalization. The imitator must not only receive a cue, but must also receive the impression that it is an *important* response on the part of the model. This would seem to be particularly important where attitude is formed as a form of aggression. Proportionally as an attitude seems important to its bearer would an *opposite* attitude be an act of aggression against him. This "importance" of a model's cues may be referred to as "cue-intensity," and may be expected to function in the selecting of cues by the imitator.

b. Counter-cues in other prestiged or nonprestiged sources sometimes influences cue-selection. It has already been shown in the first article of this series that the cues of even a highly prestiged person or group may be neglected if counter cues are being given by a more prestiged source. Thus Respondent 2 had received as many nationalist as internationalist cues, but prestige lay on the side of the internationalists, and no part of the nationalists' cues has been incorporated into the respondent's own attitude. The nationalists' cues were "seen" but not selected.

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c. Counter-cues in the imitators themselves may determine cue-selection. Presumably in most human relations prestige and nonprestige are reciprocal matters. The person or group which is evaluating is also being evaluated. The imitator is sometimes being imitated by his model. To be sure, in many instances the imitating relationship may be asymmetrical, but in others it may be symmetrical. Where the latter is true, a model may inhibit his own cues in the face of the counter-cues of an imitator if the latter is himself a model

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C. Prestige

1. *What is Prestige?*

Prestige has been defined formally as the function of being regarded as a source of cues to rewarding responses. A material definition of what prestige is and is not follows.

Being regarded simply as a source of rewards is not prestige. For this reason some respondents wished to distinguish those whom they respected from those whom they merely loved. Respondent 49 volunteers this comparison of his mother and father:

> We never crossed him; he was too strong a man; there were a few whippings, and he was a stern disciplinarian, but he wasn't a vicious man. He worked hard, paid his bills, and was no pushover. He would ask for nothing, and there have to be plenty such people to keep the world going. We had no great love for him, but great respect. Mother, now, was more indulgent; she'd give us things.

A source may be prestiged or nonprestiged for (*a*) the behaviors which are its own exclusively, and (*b*) the behaviors by which it represents certain social ideals or anti-ideals. This latter type of prestige is unexpectedly prominent in the histories. Interviewee 49, just discussed, first adopts his father's ways because he is the admired father, it seems; but as the father's personal prestige dwindles with the subject's growing competence to care for himself, the older man's prestige is *perpetuated* as he becomes a symbol of "the kind of people needed to keep the world going." Similarly, No. 14's grandmothers move from the simple prestige of cue-givers for meeting a child's needs to "ideals of womanhood." . . .

The conclusion seems to be that even in childhood new prestige-cue sources impinge upon the individual from various societies so that acquired drives (the "social ideals") arise and the older sources begin to be reevaluated accordingly. If the older sources fall consistently short of the new sources' social ideals, the respondent feels he is "growing away from them," wishes to distinguish between "love and respect," and takes his cues from the sources which deal in the more adult drives toward social "ideals." Respondent 12, for instance, appears to be in some such process now. Asked to rate his parents and a close relative on a 1–5 "like-dislike" scale, he hesitates and finally rates all of them 4, with the comment, "I've grown away from them." The relative at least is suffering from a re-evaluation in which "enthusiastic" internationalists are comparing unfavorably with more sophisticated ones (certain academic ideals).

2. *What Happens When Prestige is "Balanced" on Two Sides of an Issue?*

At least one of two things may happen: (*a*) The imitator accepts the cues of the prestiged sources most proximate in time and space. (*b*) The imitator remains in tension.

a. The imitator accepts the cues of the prestiged sources most proximate in time and space. This formulation was made necessary to understand several respondents with very high or very low internationalist ratings but with only moderate prestige (or nonprestige) attributed to the internationalists and nationalists in their histories. Inspection of the individual histories indicated that most of them had known highly prestiged sources of given convictions at one time or place in their histories and had known similarly prestiged sources of *other convictions* at another time or place in their histories. In the *total* life history there was thus a balancing of prestige on two sides of the issue. Further inspection, however, indicated that the sources most proximate in time and space tended to be represented in the respondent's present attitudes. This is not a *deus ex machina,* but is what might be expected from the principle that, other things being equal, those responses most proximate to the "goal-response" are the ones most easily learned. The numerous interviewees shifting their attitudes to comply with the most proximate models would seem to substantiate this.

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b. The imitator remains in tension whenever prestige is balanced on two sides of an issue. Such a tension may be represented by watered-down attitudes, eclectic attitudes, or attitudes in which a respondent is painfully aware of contradictions in ideology.

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D. Institutions Combining Cues and Prestige

The *specific* sources in which cues and prestige combine are of more sociological than social psychological interest. Psychological hypotheses of the kind used here assume that a cue-prestige connection forms attitudes anywhere and that the particular persons or groups in which the connection occurs simply happen to be, say, a father "status" or family "institution" in many cases. It is to be understood, then, that the institutions described in the following are not to be represented as attitude sources *qua* institutions, but simply as they happen to combine attitude cues and prestige.

1. *Religious institutions* are mentioned perhaps more often than any other. This may be due mainly to an expectation of internationalism in religion mentioned by numerous respondents ("Well, I suppose the church always stood for peace"), and the fact that the liberal wing of religion to which most of them belong has a considerable "social gospel" history behind it. If the church is highly prestiged to the respondent, it may even have outright *pacifist* cues matched as was the case in four subjects. *Apparently, however, the pacifist cue exceeds religion's prestige with most persons, so that one is "shocked" when certain churches go beyond mere internationalism to pacifism as is said to have been the case in the 1930's.*

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. . . Religious prestige plus religious-*pacifist* cues is the necessary formula for the American religious pacifist, then, and even among the pacifists themselves there is a variety of pacifist cues available, Respondents 4 and 50 believing that religious pacifism is mainly pragmatic, while 33 and 43 consider it more a "matter of faith." *To assess the internationalist impact of religion, therefore, is to assess its prestige, on one hand, and its specific cues, on the other.*

2. *The social class* as a point of junction for prestige and cue has been considerably illustrated already. Of particular prominence are the formal manifestations of class status typified by Rotary, Kiwanis, the American Legion, and Sons of the American Revolution. The first of these, at least, has declared itself strongly pro-United Nations, a fact which few Rotarians fail to report. The club apparently represents high status to all members, and its lecturers allow business men to feel themselves not completely outside the "intellectual atmosphere" represented by the university. At least one respondent is aware of the Babbitism charged against service clubs, but even he thinks the charge unmerited. All men mentioning Rotary do so enthusiastically, and Interviewee 19, who is so depressed by the "smallness" of the peace movements, thinks perhaps they should be put in the charge of one of the large service groups. There is the strong impression that such groups are more prestiged than the churches.

3. *That educational institutions* are highly prestiged for the total group and are usually internationalistic in New England, at least, has been noted already. Even this initial prestige, however, does not allow educators to sway subjects far from the families which considered them (the educators) prestiged, although an occasional teacher "who could tell us that east was west," "who was just one of us," "who let us smoke in class," "who was the

first sensitive man I'd ever known," "who taught with great enthusiasm," or "who opened my eyes to the aesthetic side of European culture," may actually form attitudes in the face of the student's earlier training. But in none of these cases do respondents mention certain celebrated pedagogical "techniques" as having influenced them. Rather their emphasis is upon the great capital of prestige carried in a teacher's own behaviors.

4. *The family* not only combines great prestige and a gamut of cues, but also is the surrogate of the other institutions mentioned here. The family often cues to respect for religion or to question "education" or to stay within the accepted class ways. The family thus brings to bear upon the individual a wide variety of institutions, many of which make it their business to deliver deliberately a wide variety of social attitude cues. The family is less deliberate. It seldom "lectures." It is rather "shocked" when one questions Belgian atrocity stories; the mother becomes "upset" as her son approaches induction age; the parents have "liberal friends in for meals"; and the father asks his small son playing at war whether "I'd really want to kill anybody." . . .

E. Summary: "Attitude Cells"

When attitude cues and prestige are combined in one person or group, an attitude-forming situation arises. Cue *plus* prestige are the *minimal* conditions. It is obvious that *prestige* without cues presents no attitudes to be matched, and so forms no attitudes. What is less obvious, but almost as true, is that *cues* without prestige form no attitudes either, because the incentive to match the responses of an unprestiged source is small.

But the formulation, "cue plus prestige," is too simple. A notion of "attitude cells" may thus be adopted to express the hypothetically complete attitude forming situation.[4] To do this, two kinds of attitude cells will be differentiated: prestige cells, and nonprestige cells.

1. *Prestige cells* are of maximal strength when the following conditions obtain:

a. When the prestige of a cue-giver is overwhelming in contrast to the prestige of competing cue-givers.

b. When the prestiged cue-giver is close at hand in time and space.

c. When the responses of the imitator are consistently rewarded by other persons, by the implementation of some private motivation, or at least by the knowledge that these responses are consistent with those of the erstwhile model.

d. When the prestiged source has given *specific* attitude cues: This is optimal.

e. When the prestiged source has at least given cues representing subskills in a given attitude: This is minimal.

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[4] A small amount of these summary materials is based upon the previous article.

f. When the prestiged source's attitude cues appear to be integral to its own reward system: These may be called "intense" cues.

2. *Nonprestige* cells are of maximal strength when the following conditions obtain:

a. When the nonprestige (i.e., miscueing) of a cue-giver is sufficiently great to provide for the learning of negative imitation.

b. When the nonprestige (i.e., frustrating behaviors) of a cue-giver is sufficiently great to instigate another to aggression.

c. When the negative imitator is consistently rewarded for his responses or when the aggressor is consistently rewarded (by tension reductions, by other persons) for his aggressions.

d. When the nonprestiged source (either as miscueing or frustrating) has given specific, or at least similar, cues.

e. When the nonprestige source's cues appear to be integral to its own reward system: This applies particularly to a frustrating source. There would be little aggressive value in attacking an ideology which meant little to a source. To attack a frustrator's irrelevant values would hardly be to attack him at all—thus the importance of a nonprestiged cue-giver's holding an "intense" attitude.

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Internationalism as a Predictor of Cooperative Behavior

DANIEL R. LUTZKER

Theoretical Background

Game theory has been subjected to much research in recent years, so much so that the 1960 convention of the Eastern Psychological Association established a separate topical division for the presentation of papers in this area. The growing popularity of the theory is probably due largely to the fact that it provides the researcher with a framework of microsocial situations in which predictions about behavior can be derived mathematically. Essentially, the theory states that a person will behave in such a way as to maximize satisfaction (utility). Further, the prediction of behavior is based upon expectancy rather than reality. That is, what the individual will do depends upon what action he *expects* will result in the greatest satisfaction. Satisfaction, it should be noted, is not necessarily identical with monetary gain. Other factors, such as the thrill of gambling on a long shot or the desire to win, may dictate that the player choose a strategy which is less remunerative than some other alternative because it has greater utility *to him* than does the alternative strategy.

The term "game" is used to describe not only gambling or the parlor variety of amusements but any situation which satisfies the following three conditions: (1) that some, but not all, of the relevant variables be under the control of any single "player"; (2) that the possible outcomes must be well specified, and each individual must have a consistent pattern of preferences among them; and (3) that all the variables which control the possible outcomes must be well specified (2).

Two major types of games are distinguished: "zero-sum" and "non-zero-sum" games. A zero-sum game is one in which the total won by a player or

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players is equal to the total lost by another player or players. A poker game, for example, would be a zero-sum game since the amounts won and lost sum algebraically to zero. A non-zero-sum game is one in which the gains made by one player are not necessarily made at the expense of another. A contest, for example, in which two or more persons compete for a prize would be a non-zero-sum game since the loser (or losers) does not suffer a monetary loss equal to the prize obtained by the winner.

In a zero-sum game the interests of the players are diametrically opposed. This is not necessarily so in the non-zero-sum game. In this latter type of game the formation of coalitions is possible. For example, two or more players may cooperate for their mutual benefit to the detriment of another player or players.

The very brief outline given above is not intended as an exposition of game theory but rather as a background for the research reported here. For a more complete explanation of game theory the reader is referred to Luce and Raiffa (2).

The Present Problem

The present paper is concerned with an attempt to predict cooperative behavior in a situation in which both cooperation and competition are possible. The experimental situation was a game played by two players, each of whom could make one of two choices, Red or Black. With two choices for each player, there are four possible outcomes, each having a different pay off value.

* * * *

. . . the players can compete with each other to obtain a payoff of 7¢, while the other player gets 4¢, or they can cooperate so that each receives 6¢, on every trial. Red is the competitive choice since it will be chosen only in the hope that the other player will choose Black. Black is the cooperative choice since the player choosing it can expect to do no better than the other player. Note too that, if both players decide to compete, the result will be a 0-0 payoff, whereas if both decide to cooperate, a 6-6 payoff results. Only if the players choose different strategies can one gain more than the other. However, it is unreasonable to expect that one player will continue to choose Black and receive 4¢ while the other continues to choose Red and receive 7¢, at least not without a fight. Thus, for a player to choose Black, he must trust that the other player will do likewise.

A previous study by Scodel and his associates (4), using a different payoff matrix, showed that there was an overwhelming tendency to make competitive choices. Furthermore, this tendency increased as the game progressed. It was my feeling that Scodel's results reflected a basic lack of trust between the players. If a group of subjects having a general attitude of trust were to be run in the game, they would probably behave differently from other subjects.

To find a group of subjects having a general attitude of trust, a scale of internationalism was used. The rationale was simply this: internationalism implies friendly attitudes toward other nations; people who are willing to trust other nations are likely to trust other people; if they trust other people, they should choose Black in the experimental situation.

The internationalism scale consisted of thirty-six statements dealing with political questions. Twenty of the items came from previously published material by Murphy and Likert (3), the E-scale of *The Authoritarian Personality* (1), and other sources. The remaining sixteen were originated by the author with the aid of Scodel.

* * * *

Two groups of subjects were selected on the basis of their extreme scores on the internationalism scale. Those selected for the Internationalist group had scores of 169 or higher; those in the Isolationist group had scores of 125 or less. Thus, the Internationalist group was drawn from the highest 11 per cent of the original population of 484, and the Isolationist group was taken from the lowest 19 per cent. The reasons for this difference is that the isolationists were much less cooperative in regard to participating in the experiment than were the internationalists ($p < .001$), and so a larger number of people from the low end of the distribution had to be contacted in order to obtain the fifteen pairs of subjects desired in each group. In addition, a third group of twenty pairs of unselected subjects from introductory classes the following quarter served as controls.

Pairs were made up simply by arranging an appointment time which was mutually convenient for any two subjects of the same sex in the same group. The subjects were run for thirty trials in the experimental situation. The procedure was to seat two subjects on opposite sides of a table with a screen between them, preventing each subject from seeing the other. The subjects were not permitted to communicate in any way. Each subject was given a switch which could be moved into three positions called "Red," "Black," and "Neutral." They were told to move the switch to either the Red or Black position when the signal "push" was given. The payoff matrix was explained twice, and the subjects were permitted to ask questions about it until it was clearly understood. In addition, a chart showing the payoff values was posted on either side of the screen separating the subjects. The subjects were paid after each trial and could tell quite readily the choice made by the other player simply by referring to the payoff matrix.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were stated:

1. Internationalists will choose Black more often in the game than will isolationists.

2. The number of Black-Black combinations will be higher for the internationalist pairs than for the isolationist pairs.

3. The number of Red-Red combinations will be higher for the isolationist pairs than for the internationalist pairs.

4. The control group will choose Black less often than the Internationalist group, but more often than the Isolationist group.

5. Competition (choices of Red) will be higher in the second half of the game than in the first half for all three groups.

Results and Discussion

Mann-Whitney U-tests were computed to test the significance of the differences obtained. The results were as follows:

1. Internationalists made significantly more cooperative choices than did isolationists ($p < .01$). This is the most crucial finding for our major hypothesis; namely, that internationalists are more cooperative than isolationists. The statistics here are based on the performance of each individual subject, whereas comparisons 2 and 3 are based on pairs.

2. Pairs of internationalists had more Black-Black combinations than did pairs of isolationists ($p < .01$). This result reflects the willingness of the subjects to accept a Black-Black solution. That is, if one subject is cooperative (pushes Black), the other subject could attempt to exploit him by choosing Red frequently. In such a situation player 1 could have a high number of Black choices, player 2 a low number of Black choices, and the number of Black-Black combinations would be low.

3. There was a tendency, though not significant, for isolationist pairs to have more Red-Red combinations than internationalists ($p < .20$). Apparently, the fruitlessness of a Red-Red solution was sufficiently negatively reinforcing to discourage some subjects from pushing Red many times in succession.

4. The control group did not differ from the Internationalist group in regard to number of Black choices, but it did differ significantly from the Isolationist group ($p = .002$). This finding suggests that the differences found to exist between the two experimental groups are not due to the greater cooperativeness of the internationalists but, rather, are due to the greater uncooperativeness of the isolationists.

5. Competition between subjects increased as the game progressed in the Isolationist and control groups ($p = .03$ and $.05$, respectively) but not in the Internationalist group ($p = .67$). Apparently, internationalists are more reluctant than are others to abandon efforts at cooperation.

Summary and Conclusions

* * * *

Also of interest is the fact that a scale of political opinions can be used to predict behavior in a decision-making situation. It is hypothesized that political beliefs in regard to internationalism correlate with a general personality characteristic (i.e., a tendency to trust others).

Some Implications

The implications of this study are many and varied. Evidence has been presented here to show that internationalists differ from isolationists in at least two important ways: (1) they are more cooperative, and (2) they are more reluctant to abandon efforts at cooperation. Projecting this information into an international framework, we find that it becomes apparent that efforts at establishing world peace have a greater likelihood of success if carried on by people whose interests and orientation transcend national boundaries. "Patriotism" and "nationalism" appear to be related to a lack of trust in others and an incapacity to strive for mutual benefit even under conditions where cooperation leads to greater personal gain.

Also, numerous research hypotheses present themselves:

a) It was hypothesized here that internationalism correlates with a general tendency to trust others. This could certainly be subjected to further empirical tests.

b) It is also hypothesized that a correlation exists between internationalism as measured by the present scale and authoritarianism. This seems likely since several of the internationalism items come from the E-scale of *The Authoritarian Personality* (1), and our scale is internally consistent.

c) This suggests further that a whole complex or syndrome of behaviors may be associated with internationalism, similar to that found for the authoritarian. It would be interesting to investigate this possibility.

d) Internationalism aside, it has also been shown here that game situations can be used as behavioral tests of expressed attitudes. Attempts to correlate expressed attitudes with actual behavior may profitably employ a game theoretic model.

e) It has been suggested that intelligence may be correlated with cooperative behavior in the game situation used in this study.[4] While there is no systematic research along these lines, Scodel reports that he ran several mathematics graduate students in a similar situation and found that they behaved no differently from other subjects.[5] However, his payoff matrix differed considerably from the present one and may not be directly comparable. This question bears further investigation.

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[4] Arthur Gladstone, personal communication.

[5] Personal communication.

f) Another possibility which has been suggested is that males and females may differ in regard to cooperative behavior in the game situation.[6] There is experimental evidence to indicate that no sex differences exist in regard to this variable. This, however, is the subject of another paper which is presently in preparation.

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[6] Arthur Gladstone, personal communication.

How Do You Feel about World Peace? A Study of Some Changes in Expressed Attitudes of Senior High School Students

LORETTA E. KLEE

The purpose of this article is to present a summary of some changes in expressed attitudes of a group of senior high school students toward world peace and attendant problems. Use of an attitude survey (opinionnaire) before and after seven weeks of study focused on "World Wars I and II and Efforts Toward a Lasting Peace," revealed a total of 218 changes in expressed attitudes among thirty-three eleventh-grade students. This article is concerned with—what happened, a bit of inquiry as to why results were as they seem to be, and a few suggested resultant implications for classroom procedures in social studies teaching.

Results reported in this summary are based on the written responses of the members of one World History class in the Ithaca Senior High School. Students in the group differed considerably in, scholastic aptitude . . . , attainment in reading skill . . . , chronological age . . . , and experiential background.

Although this study was not set up as a problem in educational research, in a sense all classroom situations may be regarded as experiments in learning. In this instance, the subjects (students) were the same boys and girls throughout the entire seven weeks of investigation. They worked together under the leadership of the same teacher in an environment which had become familiar to them during the eight previous months of the school year. In making an analysis of the findings, comparisons are drawn between the reactions of these same students as recorded before and after they had engaged in common learning activities which are included in a unit of

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study[1] which is a part of the curriculum of all Ithaca High School students.

One reason for including a study of the United Nations in the World History course in the Ithaca High School was to help students to develop positive attitudes toward world peace and related problems. Among the stated purposes are these:

> A perspective for an understanding of the problems involved in building and maintaining an effective peace organization.
>
> An insight into the problems, attitudes, and ideologies which hinder international cooperation.
>
> An attitude of faith and confidence in the ability of men to cooperate for the maintenance of security and world peace.
>
> An acceptance of personal responsibility for improved human and international relationships for world peace.

A problem which immediately arises is that of determining to what extent this objective of "positive attitudes toward world peace" is being attained. It was as a possible means for measuring, at least in part, this attitudinal aspect of teaching and learning that the attitude survey was used.

The attitude survey[2], as used in this study, consisted of 25 statements, purposely controversial, designed to stimulate thinking about problems related to war and peace. The statements were so formulated as to give practical expression to the generalizations stated or implied in the objectives of the unit of study. By keying certain statements to specific objectives, an effort was made to devise a means for detecting inclinations in students' attitudes which might be traceable to their learning experiences. (We were working on the supposition that attitudes, like knowledges and skills, are *learned.*)

It should be explained here that ordinarily classes in the Ithaca High School use the attitude survey as a basis for class discussion and for building a framework around which learning activities within the unit of study are organized. In many of the classes, each statement in the survey is analyzed as to its underlying assumption and this in turn is checked for validity. Then for purposes of evaluation, another series of statements based on the same generalizations is used.

In the investigation being reported in this article, the same attitude survey was used at the beginning and at the completion of the unit of study, *United in Mind.* The purpose in this instance was to determine to what degree changes in expressed attitudes of students would take place without any class discussion or comment by the teacher concerning any specific issues on the survey. By omitting the discussion of specific items, an attempt was made to eliminate the possibility of verbalization, memorization of abstractions, or deliberate registration of the opinions of the class or the teacher rather than individual attitudes toward the ideas expressed.

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[1] *United in Mind,* A Unit of Study on the United Nations, Board of Education, Ithaca, New York, May, 1948.

[2] *United in Mind,* pp. 5–7.

The attitude survey was given on the day before the initiation of the unit of study, *United in Mind*. The students were told:

> "There are no 'rights' and 'wrongs' in this survey. [Your responses will have no effect whatever on your grades in this course.] Your responses should reflect your attitude (feeling) toward the idea expressed in each statement. At some time during the study of the unit on *World Wars I and II and Efforts Toward a Lasting Peace*, your responses will be compared with those of the other members of the class and used as a basis for class discussion.
>
> Mark your responses as follows:
>
> A if you *agree* with the idea expressed in the statement
> D if you *disagree* with the idea expressed
> U if you are *uncertain* as to your feeling toward the idea expressed in the statements."

Responses were checked, tabulated on individual record cards for each student, and filed by the teacher for comparison with results to be obtained when the same survey would be administered at the completion of the unit of study. There was no mention of any of the items on the survey during any class period.

The unit of study with which the students were engaged during the ensuing seven weeks included, among others,[3] these problems: *World Wars I and II—Underlying and Immediate Causes; Possible Ways by Which These Wars Might Have Been Avoided; America's Attitude Toward and Participation in World Wars I and II; The "Peace" that Followed World War I; The Imperative Need for An Effective World Peace Organization in an Interdependent Society of Nations; Advantages of World Peace over World Conflict; America's Responsibility for a Peaceful World Order; Problems Involved in Building a Durable Peace Organization; Organized Efforts Toward Peace Before the League of Nations; The League of Nations—Its Successes and Failures; The United Nations—Its Organization and Charter; How the United Nations Can Function to Maintain Peace; Human Nature and Enduring Peace.*

* * * *

The learning activities, purposely eclectic to meet the varied capabilities and interests of the thirty-three students, included: group planning of problems and methods of attacking them, use of a variety of reading materials, individual and group reports of topics of special interest—debate, forum, panel discussion, art and written expression; talks by three students from Cornell University (World War II veterans); use of one movie and four filmstrips; socialized recitation, and class discussion with the teacher as leader. These learning activities are mentioned in order to give background data for an adequate interpretation of the results obtained from the use of the attitude survey.

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[3] For details of content and methods, see *United in Mind*, pp. 8–37.

Throughout the unit of study, an effort was made to help students learn, through experiences, how to search for facts, analyze issues presented and to clarify their own and group thinking. The teacher avoided giving instruction in "what is right," or "what to think." Members of the class, in general, had a serious, interested attitude toward the learning activities. Discussion periods were, for the most part, characterized by a lively exchange of opinion and a willingness to examine critically the ideas and facts presented by the students themselves and others.

At the completion of these seven weeks of study, the original attitude survey was given again. This time the students were told: "We are asking you to do this attitude survey again so that we can find out if you still feel the same as you did seven weeks ago toward these ideas of war, peace, and human relations."

* * * *

Classroom learnings and activities related to a study of war, peace, and human relations contributed to changes in expressed attitudes on the part of all thirty-three members of an eleventh-grade class in the Ithaca High School. The average number of changes was six. The direction of change was from negative to positive[6] attitudes. There was a marked inclination for students to formulate and express opinions, as indicated by a decrease (50%) in the number of "uncertain" attitudes expressed in the survey given at the close of the unit.

According to the written statements of the students concerned, class discussion was the most important single factor in determining the direction of changes in their expressed attitudes toward the ideas presented in the attitude survey.

Studies of scholastic aptitude, reading attainment[7] and chronological age of the subjects seem to indicate that, for this particular group of students, class discussion was more significant of the number and direction of attitudinal changes than any of the other factors investigated.

From the standpoint of instructional procedures, both the method and the findings of this study are rich in implications. Of primary consideration is the importance attributed by the students to class discussion.

It is readily granted that, without doubt, many changes in expressed attitudes of these students would have taken place within a period of seven weeks even if there had been no instruction whatever on problems related to the United Nations. Nevertheless, the fact that all thirty-three students in this group considered class discussion to be the most important single factor in their varied learning experiences gives it an import which should be weighed critically. Why did these boys and girls ascribe such value to this particular teaching-learning activity?

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[6] "Positive", in this study, is defined as agreement with principles embodied in the United Nations Charter and in the several statements of "Freedom."

[7] Studies of comprehension as well as vocabulary were made for each subject. Figures in this summary are limited to scores in vocabulary.

If "wars begin in the minds of men," then perhaps it may logically follow that processes of group thinking and expression are peculiarly adapted to the study of war, peace, and human relations.

It would be gratifying to believe, as several students stated, that "class discussion and study about the United Nations helped me to do more careful thinking about these things," because then, the method used would have fulfilled its functions—the search for and presentation of pertinent information, detection of misconceptions and half-truths, an analysis of issues, and a quickening of mental initiative on the part of boys and girls to think through to logical conclusions, individually, as a result of the give-and-take of group action.

On the other hand, is there not a possibility that these particular boys and girls (and perhaps other high school students) habitually ascribe more weight to class discussion than to other instructional procedures? Do they feel that the discussion periods are the business or "work" sessions and that the conclusions reached and the uncertainties pointed out there are the ones to be "remembered" or "kept in mind"? Is there a tendency for high school students to regard speakers, movies, field trips, debates, and the like, as interesting but nonessential to the "real business of learning"? If this is true, it is an attitude which has been learned and the implication is perfectly obvious, but it does not alter the basic inference to be drawn from the students' opinion—*what goes on in a class discussion period is tremendously important in terms of attitudes and habits developed as well as in the acquisition of knowledge.*

To the extent that the class discussion period serves as a "clearing house" for an informed public opinion, it is making a positive contribution to the cause of peace, and to American democracy as well. Should the discussion period (in after-school years—the "lodge," "union," or "club") become merely an easy substitute for tough, individual grappling with vital issues, it could easily destroy its unique contributions to enlightened thought and action.

Orientation of College Students toward International Relations

PETER M. BLAU

This paper examines the attitudes of students toward international affairs, with special reference to their ideas on the prevention of war, and analyzes recent changes in these attitudes. First, the factors related to a student's orientation toward the prevention of international conflict will be discussed. This part is based on a survey of cross-sections of the undergraduate male population in 11 universities,[1] which was conducted in the spring of 1952. Second, an analysis of changes in these political opinions will be presented, based on a panel of male and female Cornell University undergraduates, who were interviewed in the spring of 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War, and again two years later together with the rest of the sample.

Orientation toward International Affairs

Although most students in this survey agreed that peace should be preserved, there was considerable disagreement as to the best way to achieve this goal. Some put their faith in international co-operation, even advocating world government, while others felt that only strengthening the military power of the United States would preserve peace.

A score of "orientation toward international affairs" was based on responses to a question asking students to select the most effective means

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[1] The participating universities were: California (UCLA), Cornell, Dartmouth, Fisk, Harvard, Michigan, North Carolina, Texas, Wayne, Wesleyan, and Yale. Whereas representative samples were selected within each university, the total sample is not a representative cross-section of American male undergraduates. However, since a comparison on the major variables revealed only minor differences between universities, there is some reason to assume that the findings also apply to students in other universities.

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for the prevention of war . . . One-eighth of the sample (376) had a score of + 2 or more, and slightly over one-quarter (815) had one of − 2 or less. These extreme groups can be considered the advocates of power and of international co-operation, respectively.

To justify the use of this score, it must be shown that students defined as "power oriented" were actually more war-minded than the opposite group, that they were more ready to utilize military power and generally thought of social relations in terms of power, as the concept "power orientation" implies . . . Power-oriented students were much less likely to oppose war than were those who favored international co-operation, and they were more likely to expect another great war in the near future. The significance that military might assumed in the thinking of power-oriented students is indicated by their belief that the atom bomb is a better deterrent against war than is the United Nations and by the fact that they were twice as likely to advocate Universal Military Training than were students with a co-operative orientation. Power-oriented students were also more prone to think of human relationships in terms of dominance and submission. They were less likely than were other students to question military authority or to disagree with the authoritarian idea that "people can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong."

The political ideology of a student was related to his orientation toward war and peace . . . Power-oriented students were most inclined to interpret American foreign policy as a fight for an ideal. This combination of a belief in military power and idealistic nationalism may seem, at first glance, to indicate an imperialistic attitude. Most advocates of power however, were not imperialists. On the contrary, they leaned toward isolationism, opposing increased concern of our government with the conditions in other countries.

Students who favored co-operation in foreign affairs generally had more progressive political opinions on domestic issues. The greater conservatism of power-oriented students is manifest in their greater tendency to accept authoritarian political ideas, to oppose labor unions, and to criticize governmental action in behalf of underprivileged groups . . .

These relations suggest the existence of two distinct political philosophies. On the one hand, the belief in national supremacy and the righteousness of our cause is accompanied by a distrust of "foreign entanglements" and an identification with the status quo at home, reminiscent of the "America First" doctrine. On the other hand, the ideal of international co-operation is associated with strong opposition to war and a favorable attitude toward New Deal principles.

Factors Influencing Orientation toward International Affairs

The fact that his orientation toward foreign affairs is related to an individual's domestic political philosophy suggests that the former, as well as the latter, is partly determined by his socioeconomic position. Students who came from wealthier homes had a slightly greater tendency to be power oriented, and those whose fathers had lower incomes were somewhat more likely to favor international co-operation. However, differences in socioeconomic status cannot account for the relationship between conservatism and a power orientation, since even when income is held constant, this relationship persists. Taking, for example, only students whose fathers earn more than $10,000 a year, 60 per cent of those with a power orientation, but 30 per cent of those with a co-operative orientation, agree that the laws governing unions are not strict enough. About the same differences exist among students in the other income groups. In other words, whereas ideology and socioeconomic status are related, the interdependence between foreign and domestic ideology is independent of socioeconomic status.

Religious background likewise exerts some influence on the orientation toward international affairs, but this influence works in opposite directions for the major denominations. Among the Protestants, students who attended church regularly were most likely to advocate international co-operation, in contrast to the occasional churchgoers . . . Among the Jews and Catholics, however, the least devout individuals leaned most toward a co-operative orientation.

These differences may well reflect ideological strains within American religious bodies. Although the Protestant churches include many very conservative elements, it is well known that there exists a strong "social reform" and pacifist tradition within Protestantism, particularly among its ministry and its most devout adherents. This seems to reinforce a belief in international co-operation among the most faithful Protestants. Catholicism and orthodox Judaism, however, are more traditional, and perhaps also more authoritarian, religious convictions. Consequently, the student who has broken away from these groups may be predisposed toward a liberal political ideology, which includes a belief in international co-operation.[3]

Contrary to expectation, military experience did not influence a student's ideas about war and peace. Veterans did not differ from non-veterans in their orientation toward the prevention of war, and neither did students in basic R.O.T.C. differ from those who did not take military training. (The incidence of power orientation was slightly higher among students in advanced R.O.T.C., where enlistment is voluntary, whereas basic

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[3] Church attendance and religious affiliation were highly related: 68 per cent of the Catholics, 23 per cent of the Protestants, and 4 per cent of the Jews attended religious services at least weekly. For this reason a slightly larger proportion of Jews (34 per cent) than of either Protestants (26 per cent) or Catholics (28 per cent) had a co-operative orientation.

military training is compulsory at many universities. This suggests that power-oriented students were more likely to volunteer for the military-training program but that this program did not affect the political orientation of students.) Apparently, young people in America successfully segmentalize their roles as citizens and as soldiers. Political convictions, even those directly concerned with war and peace, are thus insulted from the influence of military service.

Ambition was one of the psychological attributes that had some bearing on this orientation. A strong drive toward personal success was associated with a power orientation . . .

The fact that a co-operative orientation was more prevalent among less ambitious students raises the question of whether the failure to achieve a dominant position in his personal life induces an individual to favor co-operation rather than the use of power in general, even in politics. Actually, the opposite seems to be the case. Superior students were the ones most prone to advocate co-operation in world affairs. A third of those whose grades averaged 85 or more did so, as compared with 23 per cent of the students with average grades lower than 75. Lack of success as well as ambition to be successful encouraged a power orientation.[4] Of course, it is more important for many students to attain superior status among peers—to become a "big man on campus"—than to get good marks. The least successful ones in this respect, those who reported that they "never" or "rarely" take a position of leadership in a group, were also not less, but somewhat more, likely to be power oriented than students who thought of themselves as leaders (20 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively). This suggests that the striver rather than the individual who has achieved a dominant position is most inclined to advocate the use of military force.

In summary, a student's ideas concerning the prevention of war are part of his political philosophy. Conservatives tend to favor the use of power; progressives, international co-operation. Factors associated with a liberal political viewpoint, such as certain religious convictions or the absence of authoritarian religious beliefs, also encourage the adoption of a co-operative orientation in international affairs. Spheres separated in our culture from politics, such as military service, have no discernible effect upon this orientation. Ambitious striving for superior status, particularly if frustrated, often finds expression in a preference for the use of power.

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[4] Paradoxically, the students who were less successful in college were most ambitious to get ahead in life. Nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of those whose cumulative average was below 75 considered it "very important" to get ahead, in contrast to less than half (48 per cent) of those with an average of 85 or more. This corresponds to the finding of psychological experiments that level of aspiration is often inversely related to actual achievement. See Kurt Lewin *et al.*, "Level of Aspiration," in J. McV. Hunt, *Personality and the Behavior Disorders* (New York: Ronald Press, 1944).

Changes in Orientation toward International Affairs

The second part of this paper is concerned with the process of change in the political thinking of college students. How have their opinions about world affairs been affected by the crucial international developments since the beginning of the Korean conflict? What is the significance of association at college for opinion change?

To reach valid answers to these questions, it is essential to compare the way students answered the identical questions before and after the start of hostilities. Fortunately, such information is available for 944 Cornell University students, who were interviewed in the spring of 1950, just before the outbreak of fighting in Korea, and again in the spring of 1952. Hence, changes in the attitudes of the same individuals can be analyzed. In addition, response patterns that remained consistent provide a test of reliability.

The distribution of the scores on orientation toward international affairs hardly changed between 1950 and 1952. This similarity, however, conceals compensating changes in opposite directions. One-fifth of these 944 students shifted toward a more co-operative disposition, and about as many (18 per cent) became more power oriented.

An examination of these changes reveals a strain toward consistency. A progressive political philosophy is associated with a co-operative orientation, as has been shown. This is confirmed by an examination of the most reliable responses. Thus, one-third of the students who had favored Wallace or another third-party candidate in the 1948 election expressed a co-operative orientation both in 1950 and in 1952, but only 13 per cent of the supporters of Dewey and 21 per cent of those of Truman did so. (Of course, considerably larger proportions favored co-operation either in 1950 or in 1952.) Since a power orientation was inconsistent with a progressive ideology, the students who indorsed very progressive political programs were most constrained to become increasingly favorable toward international co-operation. Among the third-party followers who, in 1950, had not been advocates of international co-operation, 47 per cent moved toward a more co-operative orientation. Among the corresponding groups of Democrats and Republicans, only 27 and 32 per cent, respectively, moved in this direction.

The same pattern of change can be observed in nonpolitical groups. Women students at Cornell, for instance, were more inclined than were men to favor international co-operation, and to do so consistently. And women were also more likely to shift to a more co-operative position in the course of two years of college life; 44 per cent of them did, as compared with 28 per cent of the men.

These findings suggest that it is not primarily the logical inconsistency of a student's political ideology but rather the influence of his or her associates which induces the strain toward consistency. Since a disproportionate number of women, as well as of progressives, favored international co-operation, those members of either reference group who originally did not share this attitude were under greater pressure to shift toward a more co-operative orientation than were either men or more conservative students.

* * * *

Conclusions

The opinions of college students as to the kinds of international relations that would best serve to prevent another great war are indicative of their general orientations toward social relationships and form an integral part of their political ideologies. Conservatism is associated with a power orientation toward international affairs, and a progressive philosophy with faith in international co-operation. Such faith is more frequent among students who are not very ambitious, and among those who are relatively successful in their personal lives, than among unsuccessful strivers.

Changes in political opinions concerning the international scene occur in the direction of consistency. A power orientation, initially more popular among conservatives, attracts a disproportionate number of conservative changes, and a co-operative orientation, originally more prevalent among progressives, is most often newly adopted by progressives. It appears that this pattern of change is the result of the personal associations of students. The individual's political ideology partly determines the friends with whom he discusses politics. The conservative friends of the conservative student, most of whom reject world government, for instance, constrain him, if he favors world government, to change his opinion to conform with theirs. The same principle accounts for the tendency of the progressive student to become increasingly identified with international co-operation.

This conclusion is supported by the finding that students who have few social contacts and are not well integrated at college are least likely to change their political opinions in any direction. Individuals who experience no difficulty in making friends, who feel well adjusted to college and are members of relatively well-integrated groups, such as fraternities, are not only particularly prone to change with a prevailing trend, but they also have a greater tendency than others to change against the trend of the majority. In the course of shifting their opinion in either directions, they often lose interest in politics.

Integration in a small college, such as Bennington, virtually requires the adoption of the progressive political viewpoint of the majority, as

Theodore M. Newcomb, shows.[10] In as large a university as Cornell, where distinct social groups with divergent political ideologies coexist, integration requires different changes from individuals in different social positions, namely, those that will make their orientation more consistent with that of their associates. Shifts of political opinions in opposite directions, therefore, have the same function of enhancing conformity and social cohesion in the subgroups at Cornell. Isolates have no inducement to change; unwillingness to change makes it difficult for a student to become integrated.

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[10] *Personality and Social Change* (New York: Dryden Press, 1943).

The Attitudes of World Citizenship

THEODORE F. LENTZ

A. The Problem

What is the psychological stuff of which world political unity can be constructed? The present study hopes to be a slight contribution to this question. What can we find out about this phenomenon of worldism vs nationalism in the psychology of the individual? If such a continuum exists, it should be measurable; if it is not measurable, perhaps we are beguiling ourselves with a fiction. If measurable and when measured, we should be able through extensive and intensive processes of correlation to determine: (*a*) more of its nature; (*b*) its relevance as a positive factor in political development, and (*c*) the factors which in turn cause one to be world-minded, as over against national-minded. Perhaps at the outset we can deal only with the symptoms of the factor of world mindedness. However, granted that the factor is profoundly important and that the symptoms are genuine, there may be great value in searching for correlations among the symptoms.

This report draws upon data gathered at two different times, the first in 1936 and the second in 1946. The treatment of the data is the same in both instances. It consists of correlating two items bearing on world mindedness taken jointly with each of the many other items submitted to the same subjects. The simple procedure used was that of choosing two contrasted groups on the basis of the two key items and then noting the individual response to each of several hundred specific items, in order to discover differences between the two groups which were labeled world citizen and national citizen.

B. The 1936 Study

The 1936 data resulted from administering to a volunteer test population a 3,000 item exercise known as the Youth Expressionaire which was

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Theodore F. Lentz, "The Attitudes of World Citizenship," Journal of Social Psychology, *Vol. 32, Second Half (1950); pp. 207–214. Reprinted by permission of the publisher and the author, who is director of Peace Research Laboratory, St. Louis, and author of* Towards a Science of Peace *(New York: Bookman Associates, 1955).*

designed to invoice attitudes, interests, and opinions. The exercise was taken without supervision. The total test population consisted of 763 subjects with a median age of 23 years and a median formal education of three years of college. These subjects represented a fair distribution of economic level for folk of their degree of formal education. From this test population there were chosen the two criterion groups of 200 persons each, who were consistently international and consistently national on each of the two key items. This 1936 study is mentioned for two reasons. First, it is the parent study involving the larger array of items from which many of the smaller number of items were chosen for the 1946 study, and, second, there is both corroboration and variation in the results of the two studies.

C. The 1946 Study

The 1946 data is secured from the submission of a four-page test of 158 items to a population of 514 students in the senior year of high school and the freshman and sophomore years in college with a median age of approximately 19 years. About 30 per cent were veterans of World War II. From this test population was chosen the 200 world citizens and the 150 national citizens on the basis of consistent reaction on the same two key items mentioned above. These two key items . . . are: (*a*) I would prefer to be a citizen of the world rather than a citizen of one country, (*b*) world patriotism should be second to national patriotism.

On the basis of these two items the population was divided into four groups. These groups are:

1. The Consistently International, those reacting positively to 1 and negatively to 2.
2. The Consistently National, those reacting negatively to 1 and positively to 2.
3. The Consistently Acquiescent, those reacting positively to both items.
4. The Consistently Negative, those reacting positively to both items.

From Groups 1 and 2 were selected at random to round numbers the groups for the world citizenship-national citizenship comparison . . . we see that Item 3, "I am *not* willing to surrender my allegiance to the United States in order to give it to a World Government," was agreed to by 8 per cent of the world citizens and 63 per cent of the national citizens, making a difference of 55 per cent, whereas willingness to serve and support an international police force . . . is agreed to by 72 per cent of the world citizens and 24 per cent of the national citizens, making a difference of 44 per cent.

The first 23 items relate to the United Nations, the atomic bomb, national military disarmament, and national patriotism. They are all items more or less relatable on their face to the factor of world mindedness. The next 10 items . . . relate largely to matters of race. They are grouped thus to indicate the picture of racial or inter-group tolerance. The remaining items . . . are, for the most part, items with no obvious relationship to international politics. They are practically all items that have been found to be decidedly useful in efforts at the measurement of conservatism-radicalism. Typical of the findings in the 1936 study as well as the 1946 study, they bear on the various aspects of conservatism-radicalism with respect to economics, education, science, religion, and a variety of sociological as well as personal preferences and admirations.

D. Special Indications

This . . . taken in connection with the 1936 data (not here presented), points to the following specific symptoms. The world minded show: more definite antagonism to war; more hopefulness regarding universal disarmament; more opposition to compulsory military training; less prejudice against people of other nations (including the Scotch, the Turks and even the English in contrast to Americans); less antagonism or aversion to Negroes, Chinese and Japanese in various relationships, including common citizenship, common neighborhood and intermarriage; less partisan enthusiasm toward their own school, community or city as well as nation; less conventional religious feeling; less belief in immortality, missions and efficacy of church attendance; less rigidity in sex ethics, more feminism and less opposition to divorce; less emphaticness regarding the virtue of obedience; more "sympathetic" feeling toward the misfit, the criminal, the unemployed, etc.; less favorable attitude toward censorship of press, radio and movies; more enthusiasm about the liberal and radical in the abstract as well as in a number of concrete issues, such as socialized medicine and industry, revised spelling, the metric system, modern transportation and items of diet and dress.

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E. General Statistical Notes

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We have pointed out that generally there is great corroboration between the '36 and the '46 data. There is one effect, however, which constitutes either an exception or an apparent exception to the rule. The amount of difference between the world citizen and the national citizen, while remaining qualitatively or directionally the same as we pass from '36 to '46 data, diminishes something like 50 per cent in amount. For 28 items studied the mean difference in the items for 1936 is about 28 per cent, a difference approximately six times the standard error of the difference. For 1946 it was less than 15 per cent. It is not likely that this difference can be primarily accounted for purely on the principle of statistical regression, involved in the error of measurement.

There are two possible explanations: (*a*) The two test populations represent different samples of our national population. In age the 1946 group has a lower median as well as a smaller spread. (*b*) A definite factor is at work in our psychological culture due to war and post-war happenings. Might this explanation imply that there is less difference psychologically between internationalists and nationalists now than was true 10 years ago? Is it possible that it is less radical to be international now than previously?

In conclusion, the world citizen seems to be not only more international as shown by his assent to various internationalistic expressions, but secondly more democratic, tolerant, social-minded, and thirdly more liberal in his outlook generally. What the causes of this general social factor are remains to be discovered. There is need to explore and exploit the hypothesis that the behavior of individuals either in high or low places or both, either as private citizens or as representatives of communities and nations, is affected by attitudes not appropriate to Peace on Earth because not characterized by enough good will of men toward one another.

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F. Radical Psychological Grip Needed

If, as Dr. Harold Urey says, the atomic bomb and its contemporary gadgets all add up to the most dangerous situation which has confronted mankind; and if, as many others have said, the only defense for any single nation or for mankind as a whole is the political defense; and if, as one of our, psychologists has indicated, politics is basically psychological, it behooves mankind to take a radical psychological grip upon itself. It is with a mixed sense of irony and humility that one takes time to report a project such as this constituting as it does such an infinitesimal portion of the total investigation needed at a time when the attention and the energy devoted to research on attitudes is so insignificant in comparison to that devoted to research on atoms.

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. . . Psychologists have applied their imagination to the problems of human relations, but our littleness and our lateness is tragic. The relative irrelevance in the application of human intelligence is more and more appalling. Far too little of intelligence (imagination) has been applied to any and all aspects of psychology. Moreover, social psychology, with its special attention to attitude, has received a very small fraction of the psychological endeavor of the scientific mind. Even social psychologists have found little time to attempt to contribute to political science.

Justification for the topic of this research rests on four assumptions: (*a*) that our political crisis is the most important problem facing us; (*b*) that this crisis is a function not only of the achievements of physical science, but also of the failure to solve the problem of psychological solidarity and hence the political solidarity of the human family; (*c*) that whatever solution is achieved will be by way of some form of world government; (*d*) that the success of world government can be aided by a fuller understanding of what we may call, for lack of a better term, world mindedness.

* * * *

American Attitudes on World Organization

ELMO ROPER

The study which is reported here was designed to measure the American public's attitudes toward isolation and several kinds of world cooperation which this country might pursue as a means to peace. Besides trying to learn how many people—and what kinds of people—believe in world cooperation, the study sought to find out as much as possible about their reasons for believing as they do. The study was undertaken with the avowed intention of making the results available to any group of citizens interested in the question of peace and the part this country should take in the world, with the hope that their efforts might be better guided by this knowledge.

In all, 3,502 personal interviews were conducted by trained interviewers among a national cross section of the adult American population during the early part of September, 1953. A "modified area" method of sampling was used to determine selection of the people interviewed. In order to insure breadth of scope in the inquiry as well as to guard against imbalance in the questioning, a committee was formed to consult with the Roper organization in preparation of the questionnaire. . . .

The Backdrop

The mood of the American people on world affairs as we have measured it in this survey is essentially one of guarded pessimism, but not fatalism. The years of international tension have left a mark of awareness of the dangers of imminent war and deep respect for the difficulties in achieving any kind of lasting peace.

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In short, we feel that we are embarked on more or less the only course we could follow in our national quest for peace, but we tend to be pessimistic about the chances of averting ultimate war. We are convinced—on balance—

Elmo Roper, "American Attitudes on World Organization," Public Opinion Quarterly, *Vol. 17, No. 4 (1953–1954), pp. 405–420. Reprinted by permission.*

that the forces of world Communism will probably block and subvert steps that might lead to world peace. But we want Russia *in* rather than *out* of the one organization most people feel is the best hope for achieving peace—the United Nations. We have become realists about how difficult peace is to win. When pressed, we are more pessimistic than optimistic. But we have not lost hope, for we know that our very survival is at stake.

Out of this welter of underlying hopes and expectations emerges a pattern of American attitudes about world organization.

* * * *

. . . The range is wide. The spread is from isolation to hopelessness as the extremes with some form of world organization in between. The vast middle group—nearly 6 out of every 10 people—pins its hopes on the United Nations, either as now constituted or as strengthened. Those who want to go *beyond* the UN—even beyond a strengthened UN—are greater in number than those who want to roll back time and give up on world cooperation.

* * * *

Differences by Groups

International organization has been the subject of a good many generalizations and few facts. For years images have been conjured up about the "isolationist Midwest," about the "world government-minded young people," about the "internationalist East," about "women being less for world organization than men," and a number of others.

The facts from this survey indicate clearly that rather than differences by groups, uniformity is much more likely to be the rule. Isolationist sentiment can be found among nearly every important segment of the population—and in nearly equal numbers. World government support is drawn from nearly every major group—again, in nearly equal numbers.

Part of the significant news from this study is that support for each of the various positions comes from just about every important segment of the population, and that differences between groups are far less significant than we might have been led to believe. . . .

Our study went behind these initial positions and tested for consistency and stability of point of view for each. An examination of these results yields a number of clues about the motivation of the people who took each position. . . :

"The Hopeless"—7%

Seven per cent of the American public believe that there is little use left in struggling for peace. These people are more convinced that another World War is inevitable than any other group among us. They tend to divide into one group which feels that war is absolutely unavoidable and there is nothing anyone can do about it, and another group which feels that since war is inevitable, we should arm ourselves as much as possible. And a few would even start a war with the Russians at the most opportune and strategic moment.

If they were assured that war could be averted through some miracle they now do not believe in, most of these people's second choice as to the course America should follow would *not* be that of isolationism:

TABLE 3. SECOND CHOICE OF THE "HOPELESS" GROUP.

Isolationism	29%
Continue with UN as is	19
Strengthen UN	26
Union of Democracies	8
World Government	14
Don't know	16

* * * *

"Shades of Isolation"—9%

* * * *

As might be expected, these people tend more than others to believe that the United States should have taken a smaller part in world affairs since the end of World War II. Minorities of them—but substantial minorities—think that it might be possible for us to stay out of another war in either Europe or Asia, that we are far from doing the most we can to stay out of another war, but that perhaps we won't be as pulverized by an atomic blitz as some "war-mongers" claim we will.

. . . When given a list of reasons for holding isolationist views, respondents selected the answers shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4. REASONS FOR NOT GETTING TIED UP IN ALLIANCES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

	Total %
There are enough things to do here at home before worrying about the welfare of foreigners	58
All other countries do is to take our money and give nothing in return	55
We can do more good by being a good example to other countries than by getting mixed up with them	53
Countries in Europe and Asia have always been in wars and always will be and we don't have to let them drag us into their wars	42
We will lose our sovereignty if we keep on getting mixed up with other countries	26

It is interesting to note that, compared with the other reasons, the risk of losing our sovereignty as a nation pulled relatively less weight.

By and large, however, the isolationist group is not very confident that their point of view is going to prevail here in the United States. When asked to give their estimate of the chance of their position emerging as the dominant one in this country, 38 per cent thought it would. But 34 per cent felt there was little chance that a majority of people would rally to their banner, and the remaining 28 per cent weren't sure.

Actually, a high 87 per cent reported they have done nothing to spread their points of view, such as belonging to organizations, discussing their position with friends, or engaging in work of other sorts. As a group, they seem not to be very active, despite the great activity of some of their spokesmen.

They seem to be convinced that they are pitted against a concerted campaign on the part of the last Democratic Administrations *and* now the Eisenhower Administration to lead the American people down the road to international involvement. As a group, they are most certainly opposed to America's internationalist foreign policy—past or present.

Interesting is the fact that over the past eight years since the end of World War II, we have little evidence that this group has either grown or diminished appreciably. It remains a tight core of people whose spokesmen have at times bitterly assailed nearly every measure this nation has taken to move closer toward world cooperation. They are more inclined than others today to rely on our own military strength, and there is some sentiment among them—but not a majority—for "getting the war with Russia over with" at the most opportune moment. They have little use for the United Nations, but—since we have it—a substantial minority are willing to endorse the proposition that the UN be strengthened in its power to control atomic energy and to declare war on an aggressor nation. But this is far from a vote of endorsement of the world organization.

These people are somewhat defensive about their position, but hold firm to what they believe is the only course for America to follow. For nearly a generation now, they have been fighting this rear-guard action, and feel justified—not in spite of but rather because of—World War II, the Korean War, and the continuing conflict between the two poles of power on earth. *But* they are only 9 per cent of the population.

"Let's Keep Doing What We're Doing"—21%

Twenty-one per cent of the people in this country feel that the surest, soundest, and best way to work for peace is to work along with the United Nations about as we are doing. As a second choice, most of these people will choose strengthening the UN, rather than return to isolationism.

Most "UN as is" people are convinced that America is in world affairs for keeps. Mostly they are convinced that we would not be able to stay out of a major war in Asia or Europe. They are the most likely group to say that we have been doing just about all we can to prevent another World War. And they tend to take the middle positions on the way to handle our relations with the USSR and the Communist world. These people don't want war, nor do they want appeasement. They want to keep strong militarily, but don't want to close the door to negotiation. Table 5 shows what main reasons they give for holding the point of view they do.

* * * *

TABLE 5. REASONS FOR WORKING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS MUCH AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING.

	Per cent
The world needs a forum where all nations can express an opinion	65
It's a good way to keep an eye on Russia	46
The United Nations does a lot of good work with health, children, and so on	37
It is important to keep the veto the way the United Nations now has it	21
We are doing just about enough as it is. Going any further would mean giving up our sovereignty	21

* * * *

This is not to say, however, that these people conceive of the UN as a debating forum or observation center alone. In answer to a series of direct questions on specific UN powers, a substantial minority said they'd like to see the United Nations reduce armaments of member countries to the point where its own armed forces are larger than any single country; a majority would like to see the UN control atomic energy; and a majority think it should declare war on aggressor nations. Seventy-nine per cent want the UN to do some one or two or all three of these—and every one of them means action.

As a group, these people are confident—90 per cent of them—that their view will remain the prevailing one in the country. They feel they are riding with the majority, in sharp contrast with the isolationists who are defensive and a good deal more doubtful their position will win out in the end.

About half of them don't readily think of any specific thing that would either give the United Nations a serious setback or make it more powerful. But some can foresee a setback as a result of disagreements or a falling out among member nations, or if the Communist world were to become more recalcitrant than it has up to now. On the other hand, some see the United Nations becoming more powerful as it registers more successes as the world teeters closer to the brink of war and people feel they "must look to the UN as the last best hope for peace."

But, as with the isolationists, a full 84 per cent of these people report they do nothing to propagate their position. By and large, these people are conservatives, but also internationalists. They feel they have learned the basic lessons of the last half century, but they don't want to push things beyond the limits they think are workable and feasible.

"For a Stronger United Nations"—35%

* * * *

On the whole, these "strengthen the UN" people feel that the United States has been on the right track in world affairs. They are inclined more than most other groups to believe that there is a chance to avoid World War III. But they feel overwhelmingly that there is no way for this country to escape participation if a war *should* come—either in Asia or Europe. They want this country to depend only partly on a military build-up, but also to undertake fullest possible negotiations with the Communist world to see if some honorable settlement can be worked out.

These "stronger UN" people might be described as the more articulate and perhaps more decisive "first cousins" to the "keep the UN as is" group. When pressed for a second choice, the bulk say they would select this latter alternative. It will be recalled that the "keep UN as is" people mostly selected "strengthening the UN" as their second choice. And as with that group, these people—81 per cent of them—are confident that the chances are very good that their hopes will prevail and the UN will be strengthened in the period immediately ahead.

* * * *

When this "strengthen the UN group" were asked about certain specific UN powers, majorities favored requiring every member nation in the UN to reduce its armaments to a point where the UN has a bigger military force than any other country. Even higher majorities want the UN to control the atomic bomb, and to have the power to declare war on an aggressor nation. A high 88 per cent want the UN to accomplish one or more of the three—reduce armaments, control atomic energy, declare war on aggressors. However, a majority of these people are not willing to hand over authority to the UN to set immigration quotas for various nations, or to determine tariffs and trade laws. Their chief focus appears to be on the military security aspects of United Nations power.

They also are aware of the problem of "giving away too much control over America to the rest of the world." For instance, when asked why they wouldn't go along with the democratic union or world government idea, the chief objections they gave were that these ideas probably wouldn't work, and they impinged on our national sovereignty.

* * * *

All in all, however, these people are confident that the UN will not only survive but will acquire new and greater powers within a matter of a few years. While 80 per cent say they don't do anything to further their beliefs, 20 per cent say they do. . . .

From what these people have seen of the United Nations, most feel there is nothing wrong with the UN that giving it more power and authority won't rectify. They are not critical of the world body and what it has done. They simply would like to see it do more. And the difference between what the UN is now and what it might be, they believe, might be that crucial margin between war and devastation on the one hand, and survival and peace on the other.

"Union of Democratic Countries"—6%

Six per cent of the people feel that in addition to carrying on with the United Nations, we should join in a new partnership with other democratic nations constituting a single government.

These democratic union people are especially pessimistic about the possibilities of averting World War III. They also tend more than others to feel that this country has not taken a large enough part in world affairs since the close of World War II.

Their main reasons for selecting their position are shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7. REASONS FOR FAVORING A UNION OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS.

	Per Cent
A union with other democratic countries would solve a good many of the economic problems now existing between us	66
We have to really combine with other free countries if we're going to beat Communism	60
A union of democratic countries is the most practical first step toward world government	52
We'll never get anywhere trying to work something out with dictatorships	23
After all, there are people in the world no more different from us than Texans are from New Yorkers	17

It is of interest that about half of these people see this proposition as a practical, *first* step toward world government. However, it should also be pointed out that about half the people who are for a union of democratic countries do not see it as a world government step—but perhaps as a substitute for it.

These people tend to be against merely strengthening the UN, on the grounds that the United Nations, even if given more authority, would not have enough power to act decisively. They are against the specific, immediate, world government proposal, chiefly because they believe it won't work and it goes too far, at least at this time.

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While 43 per cent of the people favoring this position do not think the chances are very good for achieving it, and 20 per cent have no opinion, 37 per cent do think there is a good chance for it. But among all, 84 per cent say they don't do anything to spread their point of view.

All in all, these people feel they stand on a middle ground between full and complete world government and something different from the present United Nations. They are, on the whole, not as optimistic over the ultimate success of their viewpoint as those who would strengthen the UN. But they do feel that the United States should take the lead in an endeavor in world organization beyond what has been tried up to now, and in believing this, they are hopeful that their numbers will grow.

"A Government of the World"—11%

The final group are those people who want us to start working now toward one world government for all nations in the world. Eleven per cent of the people in our nationwide cross section hold to this view.

More of these people than in most other groups feel that the United States should have been taking a larger part in world affairs, and they are also more optimistic about avoiding World War III than most other groups. They are also more inclined to think this country could do a good deal more to avert another big war. The chief reasons they give for holding their world government position are shown in Table 8.

TABLE 8. Reasons for Favoring World Government.

	Total %
The money everyone spends for arms could be spent for health, better living standards and education, but only if all or most of the world is united into one government	55
The world is too small to have separate nations any more; what affects one affects them all	41
One government for all nations would let every part of the world develop its full economic possibilities	38
One government for all nations is the only thing that will save us from the atomic bomb	29
It's the best way to get universal disarmament	21

Those people who have formed opinions of what would speed up world government most often cite international tensions between East and West. Some pin their hopes on nations getting used to working together. A few see more education and information as an answer. On the other hand, those who have thought about what might slow up world government mainly fear a war with Russia or a falling out among the nations of the world.

Their criticism of a union of democratic countries is partly because they think it simply won't work, partly out of the conviction that it isn't fair to leave out any nations, and partly because they think it will drive the world even more into two opposing camps. By a 47 to 37 per cent margin, they think the chances are good for a world government, and the median time expectancy is within from 5 to 29 years.

Out of the many approaches and many answers in this study, seven major facts emerge about the American people and their views toward the world today:

1. There is no doubt whatsoever that the adult population of the United States is definitely committed to internationalism and international organization in one form or other.

2. It is evident that the isolationist point of view has been over-represented both in the daily press and in Congress. Only a small minority of the people are die-hard isolationists. Numerically, they are a small segment of the population.

3. For all of the criticism, maligning, and outright condemnation that has been directed at it, the United Nations is still considered the single best hope for peace by a substantial majority of the people.

4. A significantly large percentage of the American people—34 per cent—appear to be at least receptive towards some form or degree of world government. This 34 per cent figure is obtained by totalling all those who selected the world government or democratic union choices as their first or second choices. Equally significant is the fact that if one groups all those who selected a *strengthened* UN either as their first or second choice, the total is 54 per cent of the entire population.

5. Despite the wide-spread suspicion and lack of confidence in the Soviet Union, a majority of the people still want the Russians in the United Nations. The majority of people have not yet closed the door to some kind of honorable settlement.

6. The vast majority of Americans reject the alternatives of appeasement or preventive war. They hold the hope that some kind of negotiations can be conducted between East and West, with the possibility that eventual peace may emerge. The weight of public opinion on how to handle Russia is clearly behind the general outlines of policy initiated by Truman and continued by Eisenhower.

7. Every position—whether isolationist or internationalist—draws its support with great evenness from all parts of the population. The news here is not the differences but the similarities that exist among us on this question of where we go in search for survival.

* * * *

"Ego-Involved World-Mindedness," Nationality Images, and Methods of Research: A Methodological Note

Åke Bjerstedt

During recent years many investigations of how individuals conceive of other nationalities (nationality prejudices, nationality stereotypes, etc.) have been carried out, for instance, in connection with the UNESCO program. Several valuable contributions to our knowledge in this field have thereby been furnished (3). However, it is also obvious that some investigations of this type give a strong impression of methodological rigidity. The most usual method has been to have the subject start out from the label of a nationality ("Americans," "Russians" etc.) and then check from a list of traits made up beforehand those that he considers to be characteristic for the nationality in question.[1]

Some interesting information may, of course, be derived from such instruments; in addition, they are easily applicable to large groups, and the data may without difficulty be analyzed with routine methods. Nevertheless, there seems to be some danger in using *only* methods of this kind. The reasons are many and partly connected with each other. (*a*) Perhaps the subject would never have expressed himself in such definite terms if the instrument used for data collection had not forced him to do so; in such a case he appears to hold *more stereotyped views* of other nationalities than he actually does. (*b*) In other cases he may be aware that negative nationality stereotypes are something undesirable. The test situation cannot leave him in much doubt about what kind of information the experimenter is interes-

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[1] This method is sometimes referred to as "the Katz and Braly technique," after an early investigation (4).

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ted in. The subject, therefore, may try to avoid using these negative stereotyped labels, even though, in other situations, he may show clear indications of nationality prejudices. (*c*) An attitude is characterized not only by its positive and negative signs, which may be derived from choices of "positive" and "negative" trait names, but also by its "intensity," "its differentiation," and its "personal relevance"—to mention only a few of many other important characteristics. In most of these respects the method of trait-checking usually gives little or no information.

* * * *

If we are not satisfied with instruments of this type, what kind of instrument should we choose? This depends, of course, on the specific purpose of our investigation. If we take a general interest not only in the specific characteristics a subject affixes to a specific nationality group but also in the degree to which his international attitudes are personally relevant or easily activated and in the degree to which his images of other nationalities are differentiated instead of oversimplified, then it seems as though relatively unstructured instruments would be advisable. In the investigations that this writer is engaged in at present, he has used, among other things, three such relatively unstructured methods: (*a*) the "CISV[2] Picture-Story Device," where the subject's task is to write stories about an international camp in connection with four pictures (1); (*b*) the "Four-Nationality Story," where the subject is to write a story without pictures but with the instruction that the story should include members of four different nationalities, namely, Russian, American, Chinese, and French; and (*c*) the "EDW Sentence Completions,"[3] where the subject is given a number of unfinished sentences to complete. Some of these sentences are totally *unrelated* to the purpose of studying international orientations but are used as distractors and as means for getting other kinds of information; others are *apparently unrelated* but may be used for indirect information about "ease of activation" . . . etc.; and others are designed for more *direct* information, for example, using sentences starting with the name of a nationality.

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[2] CISV [Children's International Summer Village] (1, 2, 5, 6) is an organization which sets up month-long camps for eleven-year-old children from different nationalities in an attempt to give them a basic positive experience of the possibilities of international cooperative living while they still are easily impressionable. Recently, the attempt has also been made to set up reunion camps, where the alumni of earlier camps could meet again after about five years. The purpose of these reunions is to reactivate the positive experiences from the earlier camp and at the same time to foster in the members a maturation of their interest in promoting international friendship. Such a reunion camp was held during the summer of 1958 in France with male participants aged fourteen to nineteen.

[3] In this preliminary sentence-completion technique, "EDW" stands as an abbreviation for the catchwords "Ego-involved and Differentiated World-mindedness." In this expression we take the word "World-mindedness" to mean a positive interest in international problems and the two modifiers "Ego-involved" and "Differentiated" to describe two specific aspects of such a positive international orientation, which may or may not be found in a specific individual. "Ego-involved" thus is taken to mean that the positive attitude is experienced as "personally relevant" and that therefore, for instance, themes concerning international problems are often in the field of awareness without specific external stimulation. Operationally, we try to get at this specific characteristic ("ease of activation") in the sentence completions by seeing whether and to what extent "international imagery" is evoked by sentence stems which do not give specific stimulation for

The sentence-completion technique is, as a rule, easiest to use both in data collection and in data analysis, whereas the other two give richer material. In many connections it is desirable, of course, to be able to apply an instrument from which analyzed data may be obtained relatively quickly. But one perhaps, nevertheless, asks one's self before the sentence-completion method: Is this technique really suitable to produce material that differentiates clearly between the nationality orientations of different groups? Is it adequate to give indications about such characteristics of international attitudes as their "ease of activation" and "differentiation"?

At our disposal we have material from three different groups of young people about which we—because of their different backgrounds—could expect certain differences with respect to the two aspects just referred to. The number of cases is small (thirty-three persons) and cannot be used as a basis for final conclusions. But it might perhaps give a preliminary idea of whether the sentence-completion tasks used here may elicit differentiating material or not.

The three groups were the following: (*a*) a group of twelve Swedish boys (aged twelve to fourteen) who, at the time of data collection, were in a summer camp in Czechoslovakia; (*b*) a group of nine Syrian boys (aged fourteen to sixteen) who, at the time of data collection, were at the same Czechoslovakian camp; and (*c*) a group of twelve boys from the international CISV reunion camp in France mentioned above (aged fourteen to nineteen). The two first groups were in a camp that was not of CISV type.[4]

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international imagery but rather refer personally to the subject ("international imagery" in cases of "subject-related stimuli"). "Differentiated" means that references to other nationalities and relations between nationalities are not oversimplified, as in the black-and-white statements characteristic of a typically prejudiced person.

[4] According to the principles of the CISV organization, a camp of "CISV type" ought to have, among other things, the following two characteristics: (*a*) many nationalities taking part in the camp (eight to twelve), each of them represented only by a small group of, say, two boys and two girls (in order to facilitate natural contacts and group formation across the boundaries of nationalities); and (*b*) the avoiding of competitive games *between* the different nationalities and instead the encouraging of "democratic interaction" (e.g., by means of children's meetings), where the children have the possibility of deciding on certain parts of the camp program, etc. The Czechoslovakian camp was not arranged so as to fulfil either of these principles. The nationality groups were large and thereby encouraged clique formations within the nationality, and competitive games between nationalities were an important part of the program.

What might one reasonably expect about the international attitudes of these groups? As to the Swedish group one probably would expect a relatively low degree of "international awareness," that is, not a remarkable "ease of activation," but one needing rather explicit stimuli to evoke internationally oriented imagery. Of the three groups, the Swedes, on the one hand, had the lowest average age and, on the other hand, come from a country in which international conflicts and tensions have had few direct consequences for everyday living.

As to the specific Syrian group which attended the Czechoslovakian camp, one might expect a higher degree of "international awareness" (more "ease of activation," i.e., more easily evoked internationally oriented imagery without explicit stimuli). Among other things, this expectation is based on the fact that these Syrian boys were older and—what might be more important—came from a part of the world where political tensions were high.

As to the reunion group, finally, we expect (as we did in the Syrian group) a high degree of "international awareness" ("ease of activation") through the repeated participation in the international camps of CISV. However, in addition, we expect that this awareness will take another form, a more differentiated form, precisely on the ground of this CISV experience . . .

Our question is then: Is it possible to find some of these expected differences between the groups in the data obtained by the simple sentence-completion technique? If so, this would strengthen our belief in its possibilities as an instrument for research in other situations where we have no clear expectations to guide us.

The sentence-completion task started with an item of the "indirect" type, that is, a very general statement which did not directly have any relation to international attitudes: "If whatever I wished could come true, then above all I would wish that. . . . "

* * * *

. . . A low degree of "international awareness" and a low "ease of activation" with respect to international imagery were seen in the Swedish group. With only few exceptions, we found fairly personal and materialistic wishes of the type "car, motor boat, summer house" or "pancakes once a week." In both the other groups we found instead a strong international awareness, with remarkably "easy activation" and international imagery. However, in this specific Syrian group the imagery was concentrated around their own nationality, sometimes rather chauvinistically formulated, whereas among most members of the reunion group we found a more general international orientation focusing on universal peace and friendship. One of those few from the reunion group who had written down a personal wish made this wish, amusingly enough, with some sort of excuse, as if he had done it with a bad conscience!

* * * *

Do similar tendencies appear in those sentences that were more directly connected with the field of nationality images, such as those beginning with a nationality label? The responses to the sentence stem, "American people . . . ," are here presented as one example.

* * * *

Also in this kind of material we see something of the same difference among the three groups: (*a*) the somewhat vague conceptions of the Swedish groups ("are nice"); (*b*) the more differentiated attitude of the reunion group, a characteristic which, for instance, might show up as an ability of combining positive and negative components . . . or as an unwillingness to make any definite statement at all (not answering . . . or evading . . .) and (*c*) the strongly emotionally colored and stereotyped views that characterize this specific Syrian group. Such differences would probably not have been so clearly shown in the type of instrument which we discussed at the beginning of this paper.

The emotional and stereotyped images of this Syrian group are repeatedly found also in the statements about other nationalities: either the picture is a wholly negative one (using terms such as "war-loving," "imperialists," etc.) or it is an undifferentiated positive one ("peace-loving").

* * * *

The specific characteristics of the reunion group, that is, a combination of "international awareness" ("ease of activation" of international imagery) and "differentiation" (as opposed to oversimplification in views), have been discernible also when using methods other than sentence completions in comparison with other groups. This fact corroborates the impression of the reunion group obtained from the "EDW Sentence Completions." The "CISV Picture-Story Device" mentioned above was given to the camp members during the camp (with sixteen members present). As we have described in more detail elsewhere, these stories may be analyzed with respect to what we have called "CNF Imagery," statements referring to "cross-national friendships." The interrater correspondence was high (1); for the reunion group there was, in fact, interrater identity. The more easily activated the positive international orientation of an individual is, the more probable it should be that such CNF themes would appear in their picture stories. A comparison between different types of groups who have written stories to the picture-story device gives the results shown in Table 1. The tendency is clear even though, of course, the percentage of the last-mentioned group should be considered with great cautiousness, since it is based on so few cases.

TABLE 1. THE OCCURRENCE OF "CNF IMAGERY" (PER CENT OF TOTAL NUMBER OF STORIES)

	Per Cent
1. Eleven-year-old children without camp experience	35 (*N* = 100)
2. Participants in two CISV camps at the beginning of camp	41 (*N* = 79)
3. Participants in the same CISV camps at the end of camp	59 (*N* = 79)
4. Participants in the reunion camp	75 (*N* = 16)

Also more personal information from these reunion boys gives a strong impression that the sentence completions and the picture stories do not represent any kind of artifact—anything written to show up a good façade.

* * * *

Hence, in several respects, these various kinds of data tend to confirm our conception of the "reunion group." This indication of correspondence in results was for our purpose primarily of methodological interest. However, it can also be of interest to CISV leaders, since these data do not seem incompatible with the idea of being able to create personally involved and differentiated "peace activists" by means of the specific CISV camp and reunion program.

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CHAPTER 2 • *Interdisciplinary Approaches and Suggestions for Eliminating International Tensions*

Light from Anthropology on Intercultural Relations

ALLISON DAVIS

Modern education tries to use the findings of several sciences in its attempt to aid individual children in the complex organic, emotional, and social process we call learning. The classroom promotes this development to the extent to which the relation between teacher and pupil is one of reciprocal learning. That is to say, the teacher must know the reference points from which the pupil starts—and the most important of these, it seems to me, is the basic social culture in which he was nurtured. Accordingly, my aim will be in general to present evidence to indicate that the pupil's ability to learn the school curriculum, and also the level of his intelligence, are largely conditioned by his cultural environment. A child's performance in school and his intelligence quotient result, in other words, in large part from his earlier efforts to conform to the standards of his family, of his age group, of his play group, of his sex group, and of his other intimates.

More specifically, my plan is to start with a brief consideration of the two major categories of social learning, namely, socialization and accul-

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Allison Davis, "Light from Anthropology on Intercultural Relations," in Cultural Groups and Human Relations, *Karl W. Bigelow, editor. Copyright © 1951 by Teachers College, Columbia University. Selection reprinted by permission of the Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University. All rights reserved.*

turation, next to discuss the role of social status in the individual's development, and then to spend most of my time in reporting the findings from recent research on the very powerful influence of cultural factors upon intelligence and intelligence testing.

Socialization and Acculturation

Let me begin by describing what I mean by some of these terms. I mean by "culture" the basic social habits, emotions, and values of any group of people. From the point of view of the individual, culture may be objectively defined as all that behavior which he has learned in conformity with the standards of some group. This group may be his family, his play associates, his colleagues in work, his same-sex companions, his religious sect, his political party, or all of these groups together. In describing this process of learning the culture, I am going to try to think about the educational process—whether it concerns pupils, or teachers, or school administrators—as something that really takes place within human organisms, and which is stimulated by their contact one with another and with the physical environment. I shall discuss culture chiefly as learned behavior and cultural change, therefore, primarily as a problem in learning. Like all learning, the process of acculturation involves a change in habits; it consists in substituting new rewards and perhaps punishments for the rewards and punishments that have supported the old learning.

The basic early learning of childhood is referred to by American sociologists as the process of socialization. This is conceived to be the procedure through which the individual organism—or child—is taught the fundamental mores, rituals, dogmas, codes, and values of the groups with which he is in contact. The process of socialization bears down heavily and constantly upon the developing human being. Throughout my discussion I want to emphasize the threefold aspect of social learning: the organic, the emotional, and what is called the cultural side; that all three go on within one skin; and that therefore education in school must be conceived in terms of all three. The pressure of cultural demands upon a child's organic drives (upon his desire for food, for air even, for sexual satisfaction, and for many other physical requirements) is extremely severe in infancy and childhood. It is probably for this reason that first learning seems to be the most fundamental and to serve as a model for much learning later on. Early socialization leaves a deep action pattern in the human being for the rest of his life.

* * * *

When it comes to school education, we must begin by trying to understand the pattern of our pupils' original socialization—of their first culture, so to speak. I assume that most of us have to deal with children, furthermore, who are undergoing some change or modification of their early socialization; that is, who are going through the process which anthropologists call acculturation. This is an experience through which an individual, so to speak, unlearns his first learning and acquires part of a new cultural standard. Since I can talk only about conditions which I have studied at first hand, I should perhaps say now that most of my remarks apply to American situations—to communities in New England and in the deep South, and also to certain foreign-background groups in California and the Midwest who are undergoing acculturation to the American way of life. That is to say, I shall be talking about people with low incomes and/or with "ethnic" traditions who are living here and learning slowly and painfully, decade by decade, the culture of the United States. . . . To that extent, then, you must be forewarned and should keep my points of reference in mind.

It seems to me that the crucial factor in this effort to change cultural habits in most Western societies, including those that are colonial, is that of personal status—of socio-economic or just social position. The most powerful motive that makes, let us say, a Mexican-American in California or an African on the Gold Coast want to learn the European culture is the obvious fact that this standard of behavior enjoys greater prestige in the eyes of people who have the highest privileges. In this sense, learning the new culture is the first step, and often of course overestimated as the only step, toward gaining the higher positions and greater privileges which the other society has to offer. It is for this reason certainly that, in this country, various ethnic groups shed their old-world culture very rapidly. . . . in America, the rewards of higher social and economic status are won by those who move up into the middle class of our society. Therefore, the Mexican-American or Italian-American or Polish-American who feels this desire to rise, learns to change his cultural habits very quickly as compared with ethnic groups in the Balkans, let us say.

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The importance of this kind of analysis for school teachers and administrators, of course, lies in the fact that these different social strata have different ways of life and different standards for bringing up children. We know, for example, that in both white and Negro middle-class families, there are methods of early training in infancy and childhood which distinguish them from lower-class families. The same difference runs through a whole range of additional behavior patterns. In our public schools . . . you will find the children of upper-class parents only in certain parts of the West. In America, the upper class does not send its sons and daughters to public schools, and increasingly the upper-middle-class does not. Since the boom years of the war and postwar period, I should imagine, judging from the situation in Chicago, that a good 50 per cent of upper-middle-class children are going to private schools, and that even in the lower-middle-class ambitions parents are sending their children to private schools other than those under religious auspices.

. . . the class system is open. There is movement going on all the time, in America, from the bottom upward and from the top downward. People . . . here can improve or worsen their social position according to what they do, what behavior they learn, and what other people they get to know and are accepted by. The problems of what we call a democratic society in this country, and I am certain within the whole Western world, are connected with a system of social stratification that—in England and America, at any rate—is still essentially fluid. The system is, however, open in a limited sense. I would say that a man born in the top of the working (or lower) class, say a skilled artisan, can, by means of the training he gives his children and the money he provides for their education, give his sons and daughters a boost up one sub-class. If his children get to be lower-middle-class people before they die, they will have "done well." If they succeed in consolidating their position in the lower-middle-class, they will have accomplished a fast move for one generation—even in this country. Those who "rise" from, say, the top layer of the working class to the upper-middle-class are extremely few.

Some of the Implications for Schools

With respect to the impact of social stratification on the classroom, I want to share with you some of the results of my studies and observations and interviews, during 1945 and 1946, in 100 schools located for the most part on the West Coast. I found that almost invariably when I asked why a given boy (let's call him Phil) was a successful and able student, his teacher would answer: "Because Phil comes from a good family," or "is of very good stock." If I asked why another fellow, Henry for example, who was a white immigrant from the Southwest, was doing poorly in his reading, the teacher would usually say: "Henry comes from a very poor family," or "from bad stock." When using such terms, teachers appeared to imply by "stock" some hereditary factor that made for innate superiority or inferiority. They were not aware of the fact that the chief differences between Phil and Henry could be explained on the basis of their early cultural environment. Like the average parent, these teachers—and I would add about 75 percent of all teachers—believed almost with religious fervor that "blood will tell." Because of an exaggerated faith in the importance of heredity, it becomes unnecessary for them to look for any reason to explain why Negro or Mexican or Italian-American children are still reading at the fifth-grade level, when they should be in the eighth grade. The complete answer lies in the statement, "They come from poor stock." This attitude is shared, not only by most classroom teachers, but also by their administrators, by the teachers who trained them, and by their supervisors on the job. Public educators have, on the whole, the mind-sets and habits of our middle class.

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Habits of paying attention in school, of being conscientious about homework, or of competing for the rewards the school has to offer are a part of the same vast cultural setting that determined the behavior of most school teachers and of their families. But just as members of the skilled working class or of the middle class act in response to their cultural training, to their particular system of socio-economic rewards, so do underprivileged children act in accordance with a different culture and system of rewards—with the stake in society which they see for themselves. The habits, for example, of shiftlessness, of so-called irresponsibility, or of so-called lack of ambition actually turn out to be realistic responses to a different physical environment. A child from the slums of Chicago who takes his schoolwork too seriously, who has not learned to fight with his fists whether he is challenged or not, and who has not learned to pilfer from the grocery store, will not be accepted by his gang—by the play group of his fellows. He will be a social outcast. A slum boy who does well in school is necessarily out of tune with his culture. This being generally the case, with some 95 percent of our educators in the public schools from the middle class, and—in Chicago or a cotton county in the South—somewhere from 65 to 70 or 80 percent of the pupils from the lower class, one can see that there is a cultural division—indeed, a real conflict of cultures—going on in the classroom.

Now I want to devote the rest of my time, as I said, to one particular activity which is very popular in our public schools, namely, that of testing intelligence and the so-called ability to solve problems. I wish to discuss this activity in the light of the foregoing analysis of social classes. As I have said, culture may be defined as all behavior learned by the individual in conformity with some group standard. Culture in this sense teaches a child first to recognize certain kinds of social and natural phenomena, and on the other hand not to see or be conscious of other physical and social phenomena which an objective observer would notice. Secondly, culture teaches a system of symbols—in language and other ways—to apply to such phenomena. In the third place, culture teaches the individual how to judge the logical, the necessary relation either between phenomena or between their symbolic representations. Thus culture sets the terms and goals of human problems and provides the inferences which people in a particular setting regard as justifiable. From this point of view, inference is nothing more than the abstracted, predictive value of past experience. From the analysis of past experience, one gains insight or foresight, as we say, which means the highest form of mental activity, namely, the ability to interpret events, to plan, and to see ahead.

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The crucial question about any natural system, for example that within the atom, is: "What organizes its elements, relates them, and maintains the structure of the whole?" In the case of problems of learning, I am convinced that the organizing principles are culturally derived. These principles are learned by individuals through interaction with other individuals in their social environment or stimulus pattern, whatever you choose to call it. Once brought into a given child's problem solving activities, these principles inevitably interact with all his behavior—with acts and skills, for example, that are genetically derived or rooted in his emotions. These cultural principles determine the goal of any learning system subsequently met with; they modify and reorganize other systems so as to make them conform to the standards of the group, whether it be a group of mathematicians or of slum boys. Both of these groups learn to think and solve problems for the most part as groups, and according to principles dictated by the consensus of the group.

Let us look specifically at those factors that make for cultural handicaps or a cultural bias, both in the classroom and on intelligence tests. We have discovered a number of important differences between children of the top and bottom strata, which account for variations in their performance in the classroom and on intelligence tests, and all of these factors are culturally derived. They may be briefly enumerated as follows:

First, the differential amount of practice on the types of problem used in school and on tests is important.

Second, there is a marked difference between the two groups with respect to habits of academic work. We have found it difficult, when using the present standard tests, to get lower-class or slum children to pay attention, even in an individual testing situation and with the tester sitting right beside the child. They tended to look out of the window or at the floor. Binet made the same observation about the children he studied from the French working class. Another aspect of such work habits is persistence. Lower-class children tend to lose interest and give up much sooner than those from the upper class. We tested this by setting problems that involved no difficulty at all, that were just a question of drawing a line through squares, for example. First we gave them a dozen squares to connect, then two dozen, and then three dozen. Lower-class children actually made many more errors than upper-class children in carrying out this purely mechanical job. It was a problem of thoroughness.

Third, the difference is significantly influenced by motivation, we found, especially in schools which placed high value on competition and rewards.

In this connection, perhaps the most important element in school motivation is parental pressure on the child or encouragement to do well. As we know, lower-class children do not get this stimulation; their parents are not interested in their report cards, in whether they are reading well or reading at all, and the like. Another important aspect of motivation is to be found in the degree of positive anticipation which a pupil feels as a result of previous relations in the classroom. We have found this last to be very deep-rooted. Under the best conditions we could set up when testing slum children, we still found it to be true that they were *intimidated*. These boys and girls had never been rewarded in school. I am sure this is the case in practically all schools in which the teaching staff comes from a superior social class or the dominant ethnic group, and the pupils from the socially subordinated group. Here the chief barrier to learning is the children's fear of the school and the teachers. This is a difficulty you cannot get through, over, or under by changing the tests. We found we could work in such situations only by actually rewarding the children, whether in individual or group tests, by telling them that they were doing well, that they were smart, and that we had no disciplinary functions whatsoever.

Finally, there is a very marked difference between the two groups in reading skill and standard vocabulary. Dr. David Stone found a difference of four years' achievement in the familiarity displayed by upper-middle-class and lower-class children with the words used on ten group tests of intelligence. In other words, at the ages of nine and ten years boys and girls from the upper-middle class did as well as lower-class pupils who were thirteen and fourteen years old. The handicap of mere vocabulary is so tremendous, on current testing instruments, that we cannot hope really to measure the relative ability of the two groups with them.

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In trying to eliminate the bias in language, we have experimented with reading the tests aloud to children in the lower class or in certain ethnic groups. We got a statistically significant improvement by these children with this procedure, more than when we read the tests to children from the upper-middle-class. We have also tried changing the words. We have experimented with motivation by promising tickets to the movies. For example, we gave all children two tests five days apart. On the second test, we told them we would give them a ticket good for any movie in town; this offer worked significantly to improve the work of lower-class children but not so in the case of middle-class children. It probably hurt the latter group because they thought it was an insult; they wanted to work for the "good" in it rather than for a bribe. But we had been interested to see whether motivation was a significant factor in lowering or improving performance, and now we know that it is.

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I should perhaps take a minute to say this. We began our study of intelligence tests by taking ten of the instruments most widely used in this country and giving them to all children of the ages nine, ten, thirteen, and fourteen in a certain city in Illinois. This included more than 5000 girls and boys. We next made an analysis item by item, and compared the performance of middle-class and lower-class children on each. Our analysis of the 460 problems on these ten tests established the fact that there was not one item on which the lower-class group did better than the middle-class group. We found only 21 problems that were solved equally well by the two sets of children; these were all very simple matters like that of drawing a line from a square to a circle.

But if this evidence is valid, how can it be explained that we, on our new tests, are finding no significant differences between social classes? I believe that we would find, in large samples drawn from the lower classes, that nature is still producing about as good material genetically as it is in the children who go to private schools. Our whole social culture teaches us that the contrary is true—that intelligence moves to the top of the social scale. My colleagues and I no longer believe that. We believe that in this American society it is aggressiveness that gets to the top—the drive, the thirst, the ambition to move up in the world and to work for that end. If brains really got to the top, then college instructors would certainly be much better off, financially and in every other way, than they are today!

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Light from Sociology on Intercultural Relations

EDMUND DES. BRUNNER

One of the primary objectives of education from time immemorial has been to inculcate in the young the essentials of the culture into which they have been born. In early times and among primitive peoples education, however conducted, was thus wholly an integral part of the total life. As the knowledge of man grew in volume and variety, society deemed it more and more necessary to teach the young skills which at the moment of learning were often not closely related to daily life. Separate institutions, which we call schools, were organized. Whereas once youth was taken out of the day-by-day life of the tribe or village only for weeks or a few months as puberty, in recent times society has called them away from their homes for many hours a day and over an increasing number of years. From the minimum essentials of the skills of communication and simple calculation, an ever growing amount of knowledge has been spread before the young, and compulsions of various kinds—largely social in character—have been devised to force the acquisition of such knowledge. Quite recently education has been used openly to change ideas and attitudes in order to reinforce the power of a ruling group, notably in the various dictatorships, past and present. Democracies also have sought means, within the limits of their philosophies, for inducing education to concern itself with desirable social change.

Education and the Social Sciences

This expansion of the institution of education and of its curriculum has compelled educators to draw on the whole range of human knowledge. This

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knowledge, of course, furnishes the subject matter of teaching. Quite recently some educators have been coming to see that science, and especially social science, can contribute also in other ways to education—or rather, to the institution of education. For instance, barring subsidies by society as a whole, the level of school support is influenced by the wealth of the local social group—community, county, or district. Educational administrators must therefore deal to some degree with economics. The proportion of the total income of a given community or society that can be secured for education, without handicapping other essential services (such as health, for example), is a matter of great concern.

But the issue is not one between economics and education alone. The whole question of social values enters into the matter. In the United States, by and large, the southern states have lower *per capita* incomes than those of the North and West. However, they place a high value on education and spend a larger proportion of their available income on it than do the other states. They get less than the others for this expenditure, on the other hand, measured in terms of the median years of schooling that adults of the region have completed, because of another social factor. The South has two large racial groups in its population, the Negroes and the dominant whites. The culture of the region demands that children of these two races go to separate schools. The South thus supports two systems of education. Anyone, say a visitor from Mars, who set out to reform education in the South by putting all children in the same school would be completely ineffective, therefore, if he dealt with the school alone and what went on within its four walls. He would have to start with a relatively disadvantaged economic situation and with a deep conviction on the part of southern society as to the wisdom and necessity of a dual system of education.

This illustration is offered simply to point up the fact that as education faces forward, its onward march will be more rapid and more sure if it draws on the social sciences for enlightenment as to the nature of the society of which the school is a part. . . . The time is past due when educators and others should recognize that the social sciences are *science* and that, in a small but increasing number of areas within each, research has established conclusions that meet the criteria of scientific validity. It is mainly because the social sciences are new, and because consequently other areas of hypothesis are relatively far larger than those of the older sciences, that the elements of certitude of these social sciences are undervalued and, frequently, not recognized.

One of these social sciences is sociology, the contribution of which to education I am charged with discussing. *The American College Dictionary*, published by Random House in 1947, defines sociology as "The science or study of the origin, development, organization and functioning of human society; the science of the fundamental laws of social relations, institutions, etc." Such things, and more, are a part of the culture of any people, broadly speaking. It is possible that my remarks will overlap to some extent with the contribution of the cultural anthropologist in this series. The boundaries between cultural or social anthropology and sociology are not well defined. The differences are functional rather than fundamental. Oversimplifying for the purposes of this discussion, one may say that the cultural anthropologists have dealt largely with primitive societies, the sociologists with those more advanced. The essential thing is not the technical name but the contribution any given social science can make to education. Sociology can help educators to understand the society in which they work and hence to enhance the value of their approach.

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Sociology and Social Adjustment

... Understanding the culture is essential for any educator anywhere. It is a *sine qua non* of effective teaching and of a functional curriculum. The more primitive the culture, the greater the importance of this understanding in the total equipment of administrators and classroom teachers if they are to be successful. This is the case because the more primitive or disadvantaged the social group, the more likely it is that education will be one of the tools employed to raise the level of local thinking, and to adjust the community to existence in the modern era.

Doubtless we all recognize this. Not so well understood is the fact that the simpler a society the higher the value that is placed on conformity to its culture. The sense of security is bound up with this value. More than once peoples have held so tenaciously to their traditions that, when the threat to them appeared overwhelming, they accepted the alternative of race suicide rather than submit. No program can permanently succeed, no method or technique can get desired results, when it is not in harmony with, or rationalized in terms of, the cultural values of the people the teacher would reach. This culture consists of the habitual and systematized customs by which people make a living, of the social organizations through which they cooperate to achieve their mutual desires and objectives, of the accepted ways of communication among them, of the attitudes, faiths, values, and sanctioned ways of life by which they live.

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... The effectiveness of the educator, and for that matter of the health worker or government administrator, is directly proportional to the skill with which he uses the studies of sociologists or cultural anthropologists, if they exist for his area, or if they do not, the techniques of these social sciences in order to build his program in terms consonant with the culture to which he is responsible.

Here, then, is a corollary to a principle stated earlier. Not only must education understand and proceed in harmony with an existing culture, it must also understand the contemporary social difficulties with which any given group is concerned. The Polynesian culture has points of strong similarity, whether you find it in Hawaii, New Zealand, Samoa, or on Rennell Island, but the problems of the people in these localities differ sharply, and the resources for solving them are far more adequate in the first two islands named than in the latter pair.

This brings me to the only other phase of social organization. . . . organizing the people of an area for some one purpose or a related galaxy of purposes. This is the type of social organization we are very apt to "play by ear." There are many people who can do it well. The highly successful cooperative movement in Nova Scotia, based as it was on hundreds of study groups, was organized with consummate skill. Dr. T. E. Newlin's 260 cooperative groups in Jamaica are another example. Whether he and his staff are sociologically trained or not I do not know, but the results show that, in terms of their culture and their society, they did a good job.

Even skeptics, in rural America at least, now admit that the sociology of community organization is a pretty practical area of knowledge. During World War II we actually organized over 250,000 neighborhoods in rural America in order to speed the dissemination of wartime programs and to get information on local needs and problems. In some states the attempt was made to do this without regard to the sociology of the area. The work in such places had to be done over. The bright ideas of some administrator, as to hurrying the process and using the identical plan everywhere, broke down because they collided with the way the people habitually worked.

Everywhere I've been in this world I find people organized, usually informally, in communities. The inhabitants call these localities home. They are bound together by common interests and attitudes and by the joint use of common institutions such as high school, cooperative, or bank. The usual community in rural America today is made up of a village or town center and the people of the tributary farming area who use the center for supplying most of the services they need. Within the community there are often neighborhoods—seldom larger than 250 persons—smaller, subsidiary, informal groups integrated by family ties or by such institutions as the church or the grade school. We now know that such a small neighborhood has neither the population nor the tax basis to support a high school. The modern rural high school must be based on the total community. Furthermore, some services such as properly equipped hospitals require a still larger base. The larger the service area necessary for an institution, the greater is the problem of organizing the people adequately to procure, equip, and support that institution.

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The principles of community organization are now pretty well known. Sociologists have written both textbooks and accounts of successful community enterprises. These have been based on research. There is no time to detail these principles here, but I must not drop the topic without adding that, in many particulars, the actual job of social organization has to be supplemented by helping the organization to function. In the United States, for instance, a new consolidated school district would need little subsequent assistance. People know what help they can get from the state board of education and the county superintendent. But in new areas such as health or social welfare, local leaders are often poorly informed as to the resources they can tap. They are conscious of their needs but do not know how to operate in order to meet them.

This in turn makes it all the easier for a director, say of a county public health unit in the United States, to lay down his preconceived program. It will be theoretically sound and in practice 95 percent or better correct, but whatever the margin by which he fails to adjust his programs to the local culture and the local organizational structure, will be the measure of his handicap or perhaps even of defeat for the whole program. . .

Sociology has no patent medicine for curing all social ills, nor any tricks with which to solve the puzzles of social organization. Even in a simple society, each situation differs from every other one. Analysis is always required; research is essential. . . .

Suggestions in Conclusion

I will close with two, I hope, practical suggestions. In the first place, let us assume that an educational authority has developed a perfect educational system by following the principles of sociology, by analyzing the relevant social structure and forecasting its probable trends, and by applying its findings to the curriculum and to the administrative arrangements. It could *still fail.* The educational system can bog down if the adults have been neglected. The simpler the culture the more necessary it is to carry the adults along. One of the highly significant things about what Sánchez calls "revolution by education" in Mexico is that the adult was not forgotten. The so-called cultural missions were tied right in with the founding and conduct of the schools. The progress being made in Jamaica is clearly in part due to the educational program of the Jamaica Social Welfare Commission. And it is adult education in Nova Scotia that can rightly claim major credit for developments there which have benefited the entire province.

And in the second place, within the area of adult education perhaps no segment is more important than that of the women. In many simple societies and some far more advanced ones, women are shielded from the world but are all-powerful at home. The amazing success of Dr. MacGreggor in Fiji, in lifting the level of living of the immigrants from India fivefold above what they had known at home, was in part because he did not neglect this group.

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The United States has had much experience with the meeting and mingling of cultural groups. We have discovered that human beings have the same basic needs, no matter by what name they are called, or what means are used for satisfying them. But we are a long way from having attained complete intercultural understanding. We have pretty well assimilated the northern European immigrants and somewhat assimilated certain others. The sociologist has tools for the analysis of cultural groups in terms of such essential elements as their value systems, their social organization and structure, and the social processes by which they operate. Once such an analysis is made, the applied sociologist can begin to stress points of mutual interest and advantage, the contributions of one group to another, and the larger common objectives. He can interpret actions in terms of ends—common ends, if possible—so that even if the action still seems strange to one group, it has at least become understandable. He can always count on the fact, moreover, that some peaceful interaction is bound to take place anyhow. When I saw Japanese, Polynesian, and Caucasian youngsters in Hawaii collecting match papers and trading with one another, or when in Korea I saw the Japanese adopting the Korean system of heating, so much better than their own, I was simply observing this process. When schools accelerate it by respecting the values of all cultures concerned and teaching the good in all, instead of compelling conformity with only one, you have a powerful agent at work in the interests of intercultural relations and adjustment.

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Light from Psychology on Intercultural Relations

MUZAFER SHERIF

A Methodological Approach

When a person starts with methodological questions the implication is that his field is not yet a finished science. There are things to be ironed out. So I must begin with a few words about our approach, in social psychology, to the problem of relations within and between groups. The momentous events of human history in the last decade, and particularly the great changes brought about during the last war and as a consequence of it, have created a hitherto unprecedented state of disequilibrium and flux in the relations of social units and of nations. Modern means of transportation and communication, along with other developments derived from technological advance, have made the world too small for the isolated existence and functioning of nations, small or large, no matter how distant from the trouble centers or how self-sufficient these groups might have previously been. In this general world setting, no human social unit can function as a closed system today. No human grouping, no matter how weak or how powerful, has an entirely independent existence. The current state of world affairs is ever bringing all social units into closer and closer functional relation.

The rapidly increasing concern in many quarters (both academic and more practical) over the vital and frequently grim problems of intergroup relations is an inevitable product of this worldwide situation. A scholar has to keep an eye on international events if his social psychology is to have any realistic contact with the world of reality. Time and again, psychologists have displayed a tendency to be so absorbed in their own abstractions that

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they have lost sight of vitally important factors in real life. Consequently, their psychological formulations have not always been of appreciable use to men in economics, politics, administration, and other more concrete fields. The one healthy viewpoint that social psychologists can afford in this connection is to keep in mind, at every step, that the problem of intergroup relations is not solely psychological and that, hence, they cannot unaided reach generalizations or write prescriptions for resolving tensions. We have to keep a keen eye on concrete developments in the economic, political, military, and related fields. Because of the lack of such realistic perspective in human events, psychological accounts of the causes of group friction—of war and peace or of human cooperation and competition—have been nothing but one-sided abstractions. I feel that it is necessary to make a frank admission of this state of social psychology, to tell you at the outset that one should not expect too much as yet from us social psychologists. We cannot yet produce sufficient light for everyday practitioners to see by. We cannot deliver what we do not have. Social psychology has not yet established itself with the comprehensive and synthesizing perspective I have mentioned. It is still in the state of formation, erratic and inconsistent at many points. I am sure you are finding that out for yourselves as you read or listen to various social psychological presentations.

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. . . Explanations of group or intergroup behavior on the basis of congenital traits or deep-seated instincts are alike one-sided and doomed to failure. This is, however, not to deny the importance of human needs in the analysis of interpersonal or intergroup relations. But motives can be more realistically appraised if they are studied in their actual functioning in a social context. All of our major drives come into play in a group setting of some kind or against a group background. In order to understand intergroup tension, therefore, we must start with the psychological analysis of social units.

Characteristics of In-Groups

Social units may be composed of many individuals, as is the case with ethnic groups or nations, or they may consist of a few members, as is true of cliques, gangs, fraternities and sororities, a neighborhood church, or closely knit clubs of various kinds. Social psychology, which deals with individuals in relation to social situations, is not yet equipped to handle effectively the immensely intricate large groups represented by whole peoples or nations. The same may be said with respect to the huge problems involved in the study of national character. However, even small groups show the essential structural properties of groups of any size. By "structural properties" I do not mean any vague abstraction but the relation among the group's members which is reflected in their behavior and affected by the functioning of the whole. Since small groups lend themselves much more readily to direct observation, and since they possess the essential features of any group, large or small, it will be rewarding at this early stage of developments in social psychology as a science to concentrate on the study of these smaller units. After establishing certain generalizations, we may test their implications for larger groups at a later stage.

It is, in my opinion, especially true that small in-groups formed under the stress of motives shared by the individuals concerned may serve as prototypes for in-groups of more complicated kinds—with respect to the organizational properties revealed in the hierarchy from the leader on down, to their cultural products, such as codes of behavior and the distribution of social roles among the members, and to their positive and negative relations with other groups of a similar nature. . . . Another type of group which is especially good for study purposes is that of a set of people who have become isolated, or set apart, through some extraordinary event—for example, through shipwreck or confinement together as prisoners of war. Under such circumstances we find developing some sort of informal organization and code of conduct which are valid for the particular group during the period of its isolation. Standardized jokes and catchwords are among the group products that tend to arise very quickly in such cases.

With these considerations in mind, I have for the last ten years or so been observing group activities and collecting material bearing especially on the formation of cliques and gangs. As a result, I can suggest a list of minimum essential properties that characterize such groups and their interrelations. A brief glance at these essential features will help to clarify our conception as we proceed toward the most complicated of all problems, viz., intergroup relations. The four characteristics to follow are certainly typical of any small in-group: (1) shared motives of some kind; (2) differing effects of group interaction on individual behavior and experience; (3) a more or less definite structure with established status positions and social roles for all members; and (4) a set of standardized values, mores, or norms. I am using the word "norm" generically to denote any standard of conduct, social value, fad, or fashion accepted by the group. I shall have time only for a few words about each of these features.

First, as to motivational factors. In bringing and holding the group together, shared motives of some sort are basic. These may be rooted in biological need—such as to secure a livelihood, food, shelter, clothing, sexual satisfaction, and the like—or they may be socially derived. The group may give a sense of security to individuals floundering in unstable social relationships. It may center around gaining distinction or prestige, or around common interests, such as hobbies, social ideals, literature, and the like. Since socially derived motives involved in group formation vary from culture to culture and from class to class, their number and kind multiply with the development and differentiation of the larger social structure. Any one or any combination of human motives, whether of biological or of social origin, may function in bringing a group together and in maintaining its identity. And of course these motivational factors are weighty determiners of the direction a group's activities will take, of the nature of its structure, and of the values or norms which will result from interaction among its members.

However, no matter what the original motives were for bringing the group members together, once a group is formed, other motives enter the picture in an important way. For as the individual participates in group activities and achieves some sort of status, he develops a feeling of "belongingness" which is based chiefly on his functional part in the total structure. Thus each member's sense of security becomes closely tied to his feeling of belongingness and to his particular status and role. His very identity and conception of himself are defined in relation to the group. He strives to maintain and enhance his position by conformity to and active support of the group's norms. Even the satisfaction of biological needs, such as hunger and sex, comes to be regulated by these norms. The manner of achieving satisfaction, for example, is prescribed in terms of the individual's position in the group structure and the social obligations and expectations attached to it.

This leads me to the second characteristic feature in my list, the fact that each individual's experience and behavior is affected, and in varying degrees and ways, by the entire interaction within the group. For not only motives but all psychological functions—perception, judgment, thinking, emotions, and the like—are modified in group situations. The differential effects of interaction are not merely something added or taken away, not a stripping off of veneer or the addition of color, in each member's general personality. Rather, they produce modifications in behavior that are different in kind from the individual's previous conduct. Of course, qualitative changes in behavior are not unique to group situations; they develop in any individual whenever important new factors enter into his experience. In group situations, the most salient new determinant is the developing social structure.

Here we have my third feature: the definite structure of each in-group. If interaction goes on long enough among human beings a marked system of relations gets established, usually in hierarchical order with the leader at the top and specific positions assigned to all individual members. This is the case, in fact, regardless of whether or not the group is formally organized and the members are fully aware of the structure's existence. The leadership position is attained, not by the mere possession of certain traits or capacities but by the individual's ability to meet the demands of the particular situation in which the group functions. Under certain circumstances, physical prowess or bravery may be the necessary requirement for leadership; under others it may be a question of intelligence or some special talent, of family background or of social prestige.

As the group organization crystallizes and the relative positions of status get established, power relations inevitably arise. Power is vested in the different members of the group in direct proportion to their position in the status hierarchy. Power thus ordinarily resides chiefly in the leader and those around him, both for the conduct of affairs within the group and for relations with other groups. However, the higher the position in the group structure, the greater is the demand on its possessor that he fulfill his obligations and live up to the expectations of the other members. Once he lets the others down, he is likely to fall in the hierarchy. This means that the leadership position is not a fixed, immutable throne. The leader, like everybody else, is subject to regulation by the group. He leads only so long as he stays within a reasonable range of group standards or norms. If he deviates from the social expectations of his fellows too much, he simply loses his weight in group affairs. Under such circumstances, leadership may change hands. I should think that the case of Ramsay McDonald in England, and the tragic fate of Marshal Pétain in France, were telling illustrations of this point in public affairs. In view of these considerations, attempts to explain developments, achievements, exploits, catastrophic events, conflict or harmony among groups in terms of the personality of leaders *alone* have had very limited validity.

The formation of a group structure generates differential in-group and out-group attitudes. Along with a sense of belongingness, the usual group experience gives rise to a "we-feeling," that is, to a sense of solidarity and loyalty to the interests of the group in spite of various degrees of rivalry and friction among its members. If such competition is carried too far, the individuals concerned face various kinds of correctives, such as demotion, punishment and ostracism. Along with the development of a "we" experience, there inevitably comes about a differentiation of the in-group from all out-groups. This "they" experience may or may not involve tension and hostility, depending chiefly on the nature of the interests of the groups. I shall return a little later to these in-group and out-group attitudes and their consequences.

Finally, my fourth characteristic feature of small groups is their tendency to generate codes and social values or norms. The individual's most important attitudes are formed by the norms of the group and his own status position. It is the functional relation of the group structure and its particular standards rather than any formal pronouncement of aims that is the crucial factor. (This circumstance may explain some existing discrepancies between what we practice and what we preach.) In groups that start without any such codes of behavior these come to the fore in the natural course of interaction.

The norms may include the group's purposes, its values, its notions about its own worth and the worth of out-groups, a scale of social distance by which to measure itself and other groups, methods of enforcing conformity, catchwords, slogans, and similar ideas held in common. It is in the acceptance of such norms, and in the appraisal of his own status by them, that the individual experiences himself as part of the group. His conception of himself is drawn up in terms of the group's standards. His sense of personal identity does not and cannot exist independently of the group setting. In short, the individual cannot be considered apart from, or in contrast to, the groups of which he is a part. So the old but still popular dichotomy of individual versus group simply evaporates into thin air. The individual gains his identity through joining groups and accepting their values and norms as his own.

Tension between Groups

Now we can proceed to a brief consideration of intergroup relations against this background of methodological remarks and of the essential characteristics of small groups. But we must not be too hasty in extending generalizations about in-groups to apply to relations between groups. Most psychological studies to date have dealt with relations within the group and have paid relatively little attention to the intergroup level. Many questions of relations simply cannot be answered unless in-groups are studied in actual contact with other in-groups.

* * * *

Groups do not function as closed systems. The external world and other groups constantly impinge on them. When individuals come to a new group situation or atmosphere, they come with certain attitudes formed earlier in other group situations. . . .

The factors that really count in shaping our attitudes and regulating our behavior—at times against great odds—are those which are organically related to our deepest commitments. If our identifications are unfortunately with autocratic institutions, symbols, and idols, our attitudes and behavior will be regulated accordingly. The available reports on the records of German and Japanese soldiers in action seem to indicate that these men participated rather actively and eagerly in the service of their leaders' dreams of world conquest; otherwise, they would not have been able to fight the way they did. Even current newspaper reports from Germany and Japan are somewhat disillusioning in their revelation of persisting strong identification with blind and self-glorifying nationalism and vested interests. . . .

These points lead me to conclude, first, that it is erroneous to draw conclusions about intergroup relations on the basis of results obtained *solely* from a study of in-group relations. And second, I believe it is misleading to make generalizations on the basis of a single group situation if the individual members have connections with other groups as well. Especially in the highly differentiated societies of the West, individuals are brought up in many different groups which may have contradictory or conflicting values. As they grow older, Westerners usually participate in still other groups. Of course, these various memberships are not insulated from each other. Indeed, it is in my opinion these contradictory group memberships that are largely responsible for the rather difficult plight and confusion of many human beings today. It therefore becomes imperative to consider the consequence of in-groups in connection with other groups. This sort of approach will give us a more promising lead for handling intergroup problems, such as tension and group prejudice.

As has already been emphasized, one of the products of group formation is a delineation of "we" and "they," the "we" to include the members of the in-group. The "we" thus delineated comes to embody a whole set of qualities and values to be upheld, defended, and cherished dearly. Offenses from without or deviations from within are promptly reacted to with appropriate corrective, defensive or, at times, offensive measures. To all individuals and groups comprising the "they" are attributed a set of values or traits. These attributed traits may be favorable, unfavorable, or both, depending upon the nature of the relations between the groups in question. If the interests, directions, or goals of the intergroup contacts in question are harmonious, the "they" group is pictured in a positive or favorable light. But, if the activities and functional views of the two interacting groups clash, then the characteristics attributed to "them" are negative and derogatory. If one group takes the position that another group is in its way for any reason, interferes with its goals or interests, or should be working in its interests, all sorts of stereotypes are developed to justify this position. All doctrines of race superiority are deliberate or unconscious justifications of such a point of view.

Since in-groups are often related to many other groups, a set of attributes and characteristics is standardized for each of them on a scale ranging from positive to negative. An important feature of this scale is the social distance at which various groups are placed from the "we" group, that is, the degree of intimacy or closeness allowed with a particular group in terms of the functional relation between them. Such a scale of social distances exists in most countries of the world today. Since there are many studies of social distance or prejudice in the United States the main features of such scales can be summarized from the American findings.

It has been well established that the notion of social distance is not built up primarily on the basis of factual experience or knowledge, but is handed down by old members to children or new members of the group, chiefly in the form of short-cut dictums. Once the scale is learned and accepted as a basis for defining the individual's position in relation to others, increased contact with members of groups lower in the scale, information about them, or educational attempts to alter the prejudice, simply have no power to affect it. In America, at least, the scale of social distance or prejudice is nationwide for most people in the general run of life, as can be seen from the findings of the social distance studies made by Professor Bogardus. He got essentially the same results in 1926 and again twenty years later in 1946, despite the war, the Four Freedoms, and everything else.

The scale cuts across class boundaries, social demarcations, occupational groupings, and regional lines. In the United States, it can be said that a very similar scale of prejudice exists among rich and poor, in the North and in the South. As the studies of Murphy and Likert and of Horowitz revealed, only those individuals and groups who have dissented in some degree with the larger American setting are free of this prejudice scale. Of course, this does not mean that all individuals or groups in America are equally responsible for the maintenance and perpetuation of prejudice. The problem involves not merely psychological factors, but also economic factors and power relationships which are beyond the scope of this paper.

Since attitudes of social distance are formed as the individual accepts the norms of his group, it is entirely reasonable to suppose that such attitudes can be altered only by the acceptance of membership and a functioning role in a new group. And this is exactly the case, as several studies have shown. The problem then becomes one of creating group situations which will carry over into daily life. For one can hardly expect that attitudes so long and so firmly established can be erased by temporary exposure to new situations. It is this problem that practitioners must face. As social psychologists, we can only say that the attitudes and loyalties generated in the new group situation must carry an emotional and motivational weight greater than those carried over from the old, more persistent groups. Only by creating new loyalties with strong emotional appeal in the day-to-day activities of the individual, as well as in the group situation itself, can the old attitudes be wiped away and replaced.

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Psychiatry and International Understanding

LEO H. BARTEMEIER, M. D.

If we consider the progress that psychiatry has made during the past few years in the field of international relations we see that it is very considerable and that it represents a wholesome addition to our customary preoccupations with clinical problems. When we inquire into the *nature* of what we have learned about international relations, we must admit that our accomplishments have more to do with the development of our interest and our widening sense of responsibility toward these larger human problems and less with any new psychological discoveries or additions to scientific knowledge. Much of what we have learned about international relations during the recent years was in fact already known to at least some of our colleagues in other countries or to those social scientists who had been studying these problems before our interest in them was aroused . . .

The first contribution of psychiatry to international understanding has been the establishment of lines of communication between psychiatrists working in many different countries. The first International Congress on Mental Hygiene in 1930 was a historic moment in that it brought together some 3,000 persons representing 50 nations besides the United States. The American Association for the Study of the Feeble-Minded and the American Psychoanalytic Association prepared the programs of their annual meetings in close cooperation with the Program Committee of the Congress in order that the four programs might complement each other and on the whole represent a completeness not otherwise obtainable. This first international meeting of psychiatrists and representatives of related disciplines was the first great meeting of minds in the application of mental health principles to education, to industry, to the family, and to the life of the community. One session of this Congress was devoted to a world view of mental hygiene,

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Leo H. Bartemeier, "Psychiatry and International Understanding," American Journal of Psychiatry, *Vol. 107, No. 9 (1951), pp. 641–643. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

and one speaker on the entire program of the Congress discussed mental hygiene and world health. This meeting marked the beginning of international understanding in the field of mental health. One of its formal aims was to consider ways and means of world cooperation and of more effective promotion of mental hygiene in the various countries. The lines of communication established by this first Congress were perhaps rather transitory and they were secondary and incidental to the meeting itself. A great many psychiatrists from many different countries became acquainted with each other, exchanged ideas, and learned from one another. The historical importance of this great Congress cannot be overlooked.

It would seem to me that the second contribution of psychiatry to international understanding has been connected with the interdisciplinary or multiprofessional method of studying various universal problems in the field of mental health. In this connection, Dr. H. C. Rumke of Utrecht, Holland, made the following comments as recently as last year:

> Scientifically trained psychiatrists will agree that, as Jackson puts it, psychiatry studies the life of men under a certain specific condition of life; that is, disease; or as Henri Ey remarks, the morbid conditions which deprive man of his inner freedom. The realization of this opens the way to the study of man as such, and just as it is impossible for the neurologist to do any important work without the collaboration of the physicist and the chemist, so, in such a study, the psychiatrist cannot achieve a high professional standard without the help of the neurologist and his team, without the psychologist, without the educationalist, and the sociologist. For such a psychiatrist it is clear that in the realm of mental health—which is not identical with that of psychiatry, nor is a mental health worker necessarily a psychiatrist—progress can only be made by multiprofessional team work.

The pattern for multiprofessional team work has been in existence in the United States for the past quarter century in our child guidance clinics, in which psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and psychiatric social workers have studied and treated both parents and children coming to these clinics for help. The contribution of psychiatry to multiprofessional work was greatly augmented when in 1947 a large number of psychiatrists participated in the work of the Preparatory Commissions for the Third International Congress on Mental Health. Out of these experiences has developed the realization of a need for research into the workings of such multiprofessional groups. In this connection, it is to be noted that the UNESCO Conference on World Tensions, which was an international multidisciplined group meeting in Paris in 1948, made the following statements:

> Many social scientists are studying these problems, but social scientists are still separated by national, ideological, and class differences. These differences have made it difficult for social scientists to resist effectively the emergence of pseudoscientific theories which have been exploited for their own ends.

> Objectivity in the social sciences is impossible to achieve whenever economic or political forces induce the investigator to accept narrow and partisan views. There is urgent need for a concentrated, adequately financed international research and educational programme.

The International Preparatory Commission functioning in connection with the Third International Congress on Mental Health stated, "Team work between those trained in medical, social, and psychological sciences is urgently needed for certain kinds of study. In practice this has been found difficult. An attempt should be made to discover from experiments so far undertaken what methods have been favorable or unfavorable to success." I would remind you again that our efforts at international understanding are extremely recent in origin; that it was not until 1947 that psychiatrists joined hands with workers from the social sciences in studying basic international problems of mental health; that it was not until 1948 that psychiatrists and social scientists from various parts of the world established a continuing organization known as the World Federation for Mental Health. Although this organization, in which psychiatrists are assuming major responsibilities, it but in its infancy, its progress is most gratifying. Unlike the meeting in 1930, the Third International Congress for Mental Health, through its International Preparatory Commission, made numerous recommendations concerning general education, the education of specialists, the education of the general public and research. It also made specific recommendations of an international character to the United Nations and to the World Health Organization.

In other words, psychiatry has made a definite effort to make available any information it has at its disposal to various agencies that deal with problems of international cooperation and understanding. The problem that naturally arises in the mind of every psychiatrist is, first, whether the rôle of the psychiatrist is that of developing a special professional skill by means of which he would promote international understanding or whether his task is to broaden and deepen the understanding of human behavior so that the social scientist and the practical political worker might use this new knowledge in the service of international understanding. As Dr. Lasswell will tell you, international understanding is not a simple matter but a complex system of attitudes enabling us to attain peaceful settlements of difficulties that arise between peoples and groups of nations. Such a system of attitudes is extremely complex and depends upon a great number of factors. As psychiatrists we know, of course, that the emotional, psychological factors are among the most potent ones but as psychiatrists we must train our eye on realities. And therefore it is incumbent upon us not to overlook the fact that economic, social, and religious conditions are either heavily charged with emotions or they arouse most intense and frequently unreasonable emotions among those of us who under ordinary conditions are normal and reasonable. The question then arises: what control has the psychiatrist over those economic, social, and religious factors, the understanding of which is extremely important but which in themselves becloud man's understanding of his own relationships to his fellow man? This question the psychiatrist is unable to answer. It is the practical social scientist, it is the scientific sociologist, it is the cultural anthropologist who must take over the task of pondering the ever-increasing mass of psychological data that the psychiatrist offers. My position might be misunderstood and it might be taken as an attempt on my part to relieve the psychiatrist of his social responsibilities. I do not intend to relieve the psychiatrist from any of his responsibilities, social or moral, but it must be clear that the psychiatrist is not a practical sociologist and is not a magician who by virtue of his knowledge of the psychology of men could be considered as holding the key to world understanding. That is the reason why a gathering like this in which psychiatrists like myself, social scientists, anthropologists, and historians must get together in order to work out the methods, which are as yet to be found, and the ways and means, which are yet to be discovered, for working together to achieve the goal of helping the job of international understanding. . . .

Orthopsychiatry and World Harmony

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

This paper is written from the standpoint of one who accepts the moral ideal of our civilization, that of achieving the dignity of man in theory and practice. I assume that this must be done upon a global scale as quickly as possible by means of all the peaceful devices at our disposal; especially by education and information.

Note that *world government* is not an unqualified goal; we speak of a *world society* in which the political, economic, social, and moral structures are in harmony, and in which the scope of individual freedom is relatively great. We are not in favor of a world concentration camp, a garrison state that is also a prison state.

* * * *

What can orthopsychiatrists contribute? Beyond question, you can contribute facts about the state of public attitudes and recommendations about how they can be modified, as well as personnel advice to the governmental and private associations with which you are connected. What is involved will become more explicit as we consider the strategy of moving toward a less destructive world order. As we examine various elements of this strategy, please consider the nature of the contribution that orthopsychiatry can make. I hope you will make available to me whatever additions or subtractions you would make to what I have to say. All of us who have any access to decision-makers at any level need to pool our insights on fundamental problems of this kind.

Safety

Manifestly, the task of bringing the world society into existence is to strengthen effective demand for it. Effective demand is more than passive acquiescence in the world society as a goal—it includes positive effort

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Harold D. Lasswell, "Orthopsychiatry and World Harmony," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, *Vol. XVI, No. 2 (1946), pp. 381–390. Copyright, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc. Reproduced by permission.*

to bring it about, and the use of appropriate means to the end. Both rational considerations and emotional drives are, of course, involved. It is not necessary to win the support of everyone—we need only strategically situated individuals and groups in sufficient number.

Can we strengthen the demand for unity by influencing expectations about safety? It is evident that to the degree people demand to be safe, they will favor unity above disunity if they expect more safety from a united than a disunited world. Demonstrations of a destructive effect of atomic bombs might be arranged all over the globe, and millions of people brought to visit the sites. But it is cheaper and quicker to reach the masses through the media of communication, and to correlate the content of these media with the direct experience of a few. However, success depends on *simultaneity*. If the leaders of any existing state use censorship and travel restrictions in order to prevent their people from waking up to the nature and magnitude of the atomic threat, the leaders exempt themselves from pressure rising from their own masses for prompt and universal security measures.

It is necessary to obtain agreement about the nature and magnitude of the threat. In the past, unity has been most rapidly attained when states have combined against an external group enemy (the thirteen American colonies *versus* Britain, for example). But the problem of world unity is not strictly parallel, since there is no external group from another planet to serve as the common enemy. And it is not possible to identify in advance the persons who may make use of destructive weapons against the common peace.

Where unity has occurred in the past, the ordinary judgment of the accepted policy leaders of the community was enough to identify the threat. Their statements about the nature and magnitude of the menace were accepted as true, and their proposals for common action were agreed upon. Today special effort is needed to establish the credibility of those who are competent to describe the common threat.

Correct statements about the destructive significance of atomic energy depend upon the mastery of a complex body of knowledge, not upon the ordinary judgment of the accepted leaders of policy. For policy purposes, estimates of the future are of crucial importance. It is vital that accepted leaders of policy be confronted by the overwhelming consensus among the experts; for example, that it is drastically improbable that the offensive power of the bomb will be nullified in the immediate future by other inventions, or that secrecy can long be maintained in one country.

Can orthopsychiatry throw any light upon the way in which the current threat can be presented as a means of bringing affirmative results?

Gain (Economic Value)

Let us consider another value besides safety. Can the demand for unity be strengthened by influencing *expectations about gain?* In the past, movements toward a "more perfect union" have been aided by the expectation of material gain. When it was proposed to set up a Federal government in place of the original Confederation in this country, the new central government took over the bonds of the Confederation. Many bonds were speculatively held by individuals who promptly saw the advantage to them of a new and stronger Federal authority. Can the bond obligations of existing states be taken over by the contemplated world state on terms that are especially favorable for most of the present bondholders?

At the time our Constitution was made, support came from investors in western land who hoped to increase the price of their land by having a central government strong enough to pacify the Indians and hence encourage the movement of settlers. Can investment stakes be created in activities of the world state? For instance, a world corporation can be set up for the production of atomic energy. The securities of existing energy-producing companies (mines, water power, etc.) can be exchanged for securities in the atomic corporation—linking governments, private associations, and individuals with the world state. In order to broaden the social basis of support for the proposal, shares in the corporation can go not only to the shareholders just mentioned, but to associations of business, agriculture, wage earners, professionals, and other groups.

As a means of establishing a closer link between the economic position of the individual and the world state, basic social security can be provided by insurance corporations administered by, or strictly under the supervision of, the world organization. Can orthopsychiatrists suggest other ways of dealing with gain as a means of accomplishing our defined purpose?

Morals

Perhaps, after all, the most direct relevance of intensive personality knowledge will be in the sphere of moral values (identification with the good of humanity). Can the demand for unity be strengthened by influencing demands for conformity with moral standards?

In some areas, moral sentiment is already attached to the conception of a united world, and such groups can be stimulated to intensify the world state campaign. However, many doctrines and practices to which moral sentiment is attached stand in the way of unity: flat assertions of unqualified national sovereignty, class sovereignty, or sovereignty of some special religious, racial group.

To some extent, moral attitudes that stand in the way of a world state can be attacked by creating a moral conflict. A conscience can be set at war with itself if inconsistent and incompatible moral attitudes are invoked in the same individual. (Respect for "divine law" can be opposed to the "laws of man," "natural law," "conventions," etc.) To adopt the new vernacular, we can all split consciences as well as atoms, and this is doubtless our most powerful technique of action.

Here is the place where intensive students of personality can be especially helpful. They are in daily contact with persons who represent practically all the significant groupings in society. This is true whether we think of age, sex, power position, income, respect position, or moral tradition. Were this stream of information pooled, it would be possible to determine the degree to which representative groups are changing their national, class, or world identifications, their demands and expectations.

To what extent can we strengthen the demand for unity by urging specific loyalty to mankind as a whole? By encouraging programs of positive action to multiply friendly contact? As matters stand today, many of the great religious traditions are pro-humanity. The Judeo-Christian tradition is one of respect for the dignity and worth of the individual member of mankind, and the prestige of civilizations that profess the Judeo-Christian tradition has been so great in the past that personalistic elements have been stressed in all rival religions. Obviously, a program of instigating loyalty to mankind will encourage the leaders of every traditional group to take the lead in reinterpreting the tradition in accord with the needs of a harmonious world society.

Some modes of reinterpretation will be more effective than others, and should be observed if our campaign to release humanity for freedom is to progress. If orthopsychiatrists take note of reinterpretations that have been effective in specific cases, these reinterpretations can be disseminated where they can be most successful.

It is not necessary for all to be united on the most general doctrines from which a given moral doctrine is derived or justified. In fact, resistance to the world state can be reduced when philosophers and theologians believe that freedom to differ on ultimate doctrine is to be safeguarded in the world state. And if they believe that freedom of opinion includes freedom to proselytize and to worship, they can support the demand for a united world with even more vigor. In order to sustain the demand for a world state, therefore, as many solemn agreements as possible need to be entered into as early as possible on an appropriate "bill of rights" for the world constitution.

Technicalities of Stimulating Loyalty (Social Images)

Loyalty to humanity can be encouraged by the use of balanced group images in communication. Existing images that circulate in different countries do not necessarily contribute to the strengthening of attitudes consistent with loyalty to humanity. A commonplace example: If Americans are shown on the screen as gangsters, cowboys, and playboys, devoted to lynch law, murder, rape, and seduction, the social image of America is at least somewhat unrepresentative of the truth. It is technically possible (given the desire) to project social images of nations, classes, and skills with balance; i.e., without destructive extremes. It is not a question of playing up only the favorable side of the group. The point is that the major groupings of mankind display traits that are viewed with both favor and disfavor by other major groupings, and that a balanced image is consonant with truth and with the facilitation of respect among men.

Balanced images can be projected if *aggregate* presentations are considered. It is not a matter of dealing with each isolated allusion to a group. Techniques are available to describe the aggregate presentation of images at the focus of group attention.

Since the social images acquired in early life are peculiarly persistent, our educational programs require constant auditing in order to discover the social images they actually succeed in disseminating. Today we have technical means of communication (notably the film) that make it possible, by proper sampling of the varieties of civilization, to acquaint everyone with his neighbor, giving him a gallery of balanced images that improves the possibility of congenial and productive direct contacts.

If we are to be informed of the social images that prevail in different parts of the social structure, we must have the aid of qualified observers who devise a regular reporting procedure that enables them to share observations and suggestions with those responsible for educational and informational programs.

One of the most important of all social images that affect the prospect of world harmony is that of human nature itself. We all know that human nature has been depicted as inherently "bad"—so bad that it imposes its badness on social institutions; or as innately "good" until corrupted by society. There is a great deal of evidence that extremes of optimism and pessimism are unfavorable to the progressive melioration of man's lot, and that a balanced image of human nature is more instrumental to the melioristic end, and more in harmony with the facts of observation. Certainly a balanced picture of human nature gives full recognition to impulses that are both destructive and nondestructive, as well as the possibility that impulses of either kind can be denied full expression. There is an interplay between the impulses of man and the practices of man in society: destructive practices stimulate and facilitate the direct expression of destructive impulses; nondestructive practices, on the contrary, neither stimulate nor facilitate such impulses, since other impulses and channels of expression are awakened and utilized.

Certainly it is reasonable to expect to receive from intensive observers of personality both reports about the state of the human nature image and recommendations about how groups and individuals can most expeditiously receive a corrected image. In the same way, qualified observers can be depended upon to making reports and recommendations touching upon every aspect of the task of stimulating global loyalty. Suppose we mention, in passing, some of these technicalities, such as the development of an emblem of the world state and of humanity. The specialist on education and propaganda is accustomed to handling such details, but he needs the aid of an informed jury of reporters and a panel of advisors if he is to make wise specific selections.

Technicalities (Emblems)

An emblem (such as the "V" sign) can be associated with favorable contexts—flags flown on gala occasions and over important installations (bomb protection headquarters, world health protection stations); world postage stamps; world currency. The emblem can appear on birth certificates, marriage certificates, passports, authorized films.

The visual emblem needs an auditory counterpart in this day of the rediscovery of the human voice (thanks to radio). An example is the four powerful musical notes used as a signature by many of the United Nations.

If the "V" is used, the "4" motif can be combined with it, as was often done during the war (a dot and dash arrangement). The four supplementary marks can for some purposes be combined with words representing the Four Freedoms, formulated as positive goals of the world state: Freedom to Live, Work, Speak, Worship (Freedom to live is "freedom from fear" stated positively; and Freedom to Work is "freedom from want" stated affirmatively. Freedom of Speech and Worship were in President Roosevelt's original speech.) Freedom of Speech can be construed to include freedom of inquiry, of communication, and of participation in government.

Distinctive architectural motifs can be employed to augment the number of direct and communicated exposures of the world population to common experiences. The "Victory Arch" can be adapted by allowing for four supporting columns (for the Four Freedoms). Thanks to plastics and other related developments, it is possible to fix upon a color combination capable of being made use of not only in buildings, but on furnishings, and in fibers of all sorts, as well as in printed and painted matter. "The Freedom Arch" could be worked into the design of all buildings of the world state—offices, hospitals, monuments, entrances to grounds.

The foregoing examples do not begin to exhaust the technical possibilities once a central emblem has been chosen, an emblem that can gain meaning through the years in the same way that the "stars and stripes" has significance for the American, and the "hammer and sickle" for the Russian. In every walk of life, in every part of the globe, there are hundreds of opportunities to find favorable contexts in which to enrich the emblem of unity.

De-emphasizing Nations and Classes

At present the prospects of world unity are notoriously endangered by the uncompromising demands made in the name of national or class sovereignties. One method of transferring loyalties away from national states to other parts of society is not only to play up symbols of humanity, but to emphasize city, provincial, and skill groups. "Skill" includes the professions, occupations, vocations, avocations.

Cities and local areas, for instance, can be given more prominence in many ways: sporting events can be between Moscow and Washington, Leningrad and San Francisco, rather than between "America" and "Russia"; exchange of exhibits, correspondence between school children, and reciprocal delegations can be encouraged.

Skill consciousness on a global scale can be encouraged as a means of de-emphasizing national loyalty and of building up positive identifications. All the well-known professions and occupations can be stimulated to develop globally inclusive contacts and programs: scientists, artists, engineers, administrators, plus several hundred others. Avocational skills are reflected in chess, gardening, swimming, plus hundreds of other activities. Avocational skills are especially important in a world of huge populations and diminishing hours of "work."

Language skills can be propagated in order to enable more people to have both "operational" communication and "aesthetic" communication. At the operational level is the cultivation of "basics" (basic English, basic Russian, basic Chinese). Aesthetic communication calls for more thorough mastery of each speech tool and the literary traditions of the group. Among the most "international" of all skills are music and the dance; and they are cultivated by skill groups who are already disposed to be vividly aware of one another.

The success or failure of such technicalities as the foregoing can be constantly evaluated if such qualified reporters, analysts, and directors of human conduct as the orthopsychiatrists are properly articulated with the responsible heads of unity campaigns.

The Control of Fear and Anxiety

Besides the lesser technicalities there are fundamental questions of strategy on which guidance is needed, such as the control of fear and anxiety. Fear and anxiety reactions must be controlled in order to strengthen the demand for unity by assent. Fear is a proportionate reaction to danger; anxiety is an exaggerated reaction. It is rational for men to fear the consequences of the atomic bomb. But it is not rational to be shocked into pessimistic immobility; or to indulge in exclamations of horror, without coming to grips with policy alternatives; or to be terrorized into a preventive war solely to relieve feelings of acute insecurity.

The control of fear calls for knowledge of what the other fellow is up to—knowledge of whether he is preparing a hostile attack and has hostile attitudes, or whether he is preparing no such attack and has friendly attitudes. This knowledge can be obtained about other peoples if qualified persons are able to get access to them and to make uncensored reports (physicists acting as inspectors for an atomic energy control authority).

The control of anxiety is more complex than the control of fear, because it calls for the presentation of knowledge in *emotionally acceptable form.* It is not enough, for instance, to be told by proper authority that the atomic bomb is under control; the telling must be made convincing by being communicated according to the pattern that groups have learned to accept as authoritative. (Some groups believe that you shout and gesticulate when you are sincere; others that you adopt a calm tone and understate.) Anxiety-control can proceed to some extent by means of insight. During the war the acceptance of wild rumors in some groups was diminished by insight technique—by creating speech and thought-forms to challenge such communications.

But protection against anxiety must go further, if we are to be protected against anxiety attacks that precipitate war in the name of "preventive" war. I am sure you will agree that it is most unlikely that mutual confidence will be sustained if contact is limited to a thin trickle of officials. It is no longer safe to allow any country to withdraw from ample, neighborly contact with the rest of mankind. Privacy is too dangerous to all concerned, since a secretive, seclusive policy breeds anxiety and destructiveness.

How, more specifically, can we draw Russians into the world community? Here is one of the concrete opportunities of a professional organization of your kind. Possibly you can develop means of productive exchanges of persons and scientific materials with your opposite numbers inside the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

Let me draw together some of the suggestions touching orthopsychiatry that have been made in this discussion. One recommendation is for an adequate *reporting* of current observations of attitudes found in daily contact with people in all regions and in all positions in the social structure. Second, is *recommendations* based upon direct observation of how persons of a given pattern of predisposition can be brought at minimum psychic cost to participate in achieving a more harmonious world society. And third, is *advice* touching upon every social problem in which the human factor is significant, as in mass information and education, and in personnel management. Fourth, is professional contact across frontiers.

I am not proposing that orthopsychiatrists should abandon what they are doing and take to the rostrum, or transform themselves into agitators in the arena of politics. The recommendation is that they begin by linking their everyday participations in society with policy in such a way that useful knowledge is not wasted. Further, I am not proposing that orthopsychiatrists serve only government. So great is our respect for plural initiatives and institutions in America that we hope to get the best results through the autonomous, though integrated, activity of private *and* public associations. This association might act as a group through appropriate committees and staff to make itself more effective in transforming our present society into a less destructive global order.

In effect, this is a plea to continue some of the procedures that proved so effective in war into the crises of peace. During the war, the role of orthopsychiatry was brought into closer working relations with high policy than ever before. The accumulated knowledge of physicians, anthropologists, and related specialists was drawn upon for factual knowledge, technical, and strategic advice.[1]

Today as we look out upon a humanity threatened by its own ingenuity, divided by a bipolar structure of power, disunited in morals, scattered in focus attention, and unstable in economic organization, we cannot wisely rely upon ordinary means of social action. What we do need is to become more, rather than less, integrated with the task of reducing the level of human destructiveness.

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[1] A humble, somewhat amusing instance: "Psychological Warfare" learned that peasant folklore in Japan said that disaster would come if foxes were visible at night. Foxes were treated to turn their coats phosphorescent, and they were carried across the Pacific—only to arrive after Hiroshima.

How to Live with People Who Are Wrong

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

"What we need to say, as American People, and say in unmistakable terms, is that we are right."*

So said a resounding and much-praised recent speech on current foreign policy in the United States Senate. Doubtless millions of Americans find it reassuring to know that in an uncertain world and in our quarrels with the perverse representatives of other countries, whatever happens, we are right. The problem, therefore, as we define it at present, seems to be a) how to induce our opponents to agree that we are right, and conversely, that they are wrong; or b) how to live in the meantime as amicably as possible with people, who, to us, are wrong. As regards the first alternative, and in spite of occasional "thaws" in the cold war, there appears to be no reasonable prospect in the foreseeable future of a change of viewpoint on either side. Accordingly, whether we like it or not, it appears that both parties are destined to live for some time with people whom they consider wrong. This essay explores some possible improvements in the techniques of such living.

The situation itself is not unusual. Nearly all of us have had experience in living with people whom we consider wrong. Most family quarrels and community disagreements arise and have to be endured because people consider each other wrong. What makes the present impasse in foreign relations so critical is our reluctance to utilize even the traditional techniques that have been invoked successfully in such situations during the whole of recorded history. Such techniques are usually called compromise, forbearance, or toleration. At their best, these processes result from a more careful

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*Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut; *Congressional Record*, Feb. 26, 1959, p. 2725.

George A. Lundberg, "How to Live with People Who Are Wrong," The Humanist, *Vol. 20, No. 2, (Humanist House, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1960), pp. 74–84. Reprinted by permission.*

and accurate appraisal of the situation as a whole. Such reconsideration seems to have been involved in the abandonment of religious warfare.

After many centuries of religious wars, both political and religious leaders apparently came to the conclusion, reflected in the Peace of Westphalia (the treaty ending the Thirty Years War), that it is possible to live quite peaceably with people who are considered completely wrong in their most fundamental beliefs. We need not become involved in the question whether the professed religious grounds were in fact the real reasons for the Thirty Years War. What is probably indisputable is that seventeenth-century Europeans were weighed down with the most ironclad prohibitions of any form of compromise with sin, or with people who held false beliefs. Nevertheless, both the clergy and the secular princes managed to get together on a sort of permanent *modus vivendi* regarding religious issues which avoided the moral incongruity widely felt today at any suggestion of compromise on political and economic ideologies and ways of life.

We have not been able to achieve, as yet, in the field of politico-economic ideology and practice an adjustment of the type which fortunately has been achieved within the domain of religion. By making compromise equivalent to "appeasement" and identifying the latter as a flagrant immorality, or at least a tactic of proven futility, we deprive ourselves of the historic techniques of dealing with situations exemplified by the cold war. In short, history seems destined to report that the leading statesmen of the twentieth century were less skilled in the technique of living with politico-economic deviants than with religious dissenters.

This is not to imply that the shift from conversion by the sword and the general approach of the Inquisition to the religious *modus vivendi* was not bitterly contested in the time of transition. The then incumbent Pope, with plenty of Protestant support, denounced the Peace of Westphalia which he declared "null and void, a curse, and without any influence or result for the past, the present, or the future." There was much clamor in religious circles for the resumption of the Holy War. Nevertheless, both Catholic and Protestant princes were sufficiently impressed with the devastation and futility of ideological war (even without airplanes and atom bombs) to abstain from further holy wars and, for the most part, from ideological wars in general.

Of course, wars continued over boundary disputes, territory, trade, colonies, and other tangible considerations which adjustment to a changing world doubtless requires from time to time until more effective and economical means of settlement may be developed and adopted. Also, many countries and communities have, down to the present time, suffered bitter internal struggles over religious doctrines. But the international wars of the past two centuries were not primarily of an ideological character. It remained for the United States of America in 1917, under the moral lash of Woodrow Wilson, to reverse our historic policy and return to the highly moral plane of religious war. The Democracy *versus* Autocracy-Communism controversy is clearly of this character.

* * * *

Social World Picture

To merit consideration, an alternative policy should first of all provide a method and a technique of securing agreement on important questions without resorting to war. In the second place, an acceptable alternative policy should not demand too great interference on either side with the individual's spiritual, ideological, aspirational predilection—what is usually called a person's "philosophy of life." What methods and instruments have been developed over the centuries that appear to fulfill the above requirements to a high degree in the fields where these methods seriously have been tried?

One of the most significant things about the highly developed physical sciences, such as chemistry and physics, is their remarkable capacity to compel agreement on answers to physical and chemical questions. At the same time, scientists allow themselves the widest imaginable liberty and difference of opinion regarding ultimate values and philosophies of life. Consider in this connection the sharply differing views of three scientists of great distinction.

First and most briefly, representing one extreme, we have Bertrand Russell declaring with his customary clarity:

> "I am myself a dissenter from all known religions, and I hope that every kind of religious belief will die out." (*The Will To Doubt*, p. 17)

Second, in a somewhat intermediate position, we have the words of Albert Einstein:

> "The more a man is imbued with the orderly regularity of all events, the firmer becomes his conviction that there is no room left by the side of this ordered regularity for causes of a different nature. For him, neither the rule of human will nor the rule of Divine Will exists as an independent cause of natural events. . . . In their struggle for the ethical good, teachers of religion must have the stature to give up the doctrine of a personal God . . . . Whoever has undergone the intense experience of successful advances in this domain of scientific thought is moved by profound reverence for the rationality manifested in existence. By way of understanding, he achieves a far-reaching emancipation from the shackles of personal hope and desires, and thereby attains that humble attitude of mind toward the grandeur of reason incarnate in existence, which, in its profoundest depths is inaccessible to man. This attitude, however, appears to me to be religion in the highest sense of the word."*

**Ideas and Opinions.*. By Albert Einstein. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc. 1954. pp. 48–49.

Consider finally the following position of Felix Mainx, author of the monograph on Biology in the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, of which Bertrand Russell is a member of the Advisory Committee:

> "By 'World Picture' (Weltbilt) and 'Philosophy of life' (Weltanschauung) we shall here understand well defined domains of human spiritual life. By 'World Picture' will be meant the total representation of the world which we can form on the basis of all statements of empirical science. . . . On the other hand by 'Philosophy of life' is to be understood the totality of all the emotionally tinged strivings and ideas of a man, the totality of his value judgments, of his ethical and esthetic maxims . . . . It is the conviction of the author of this monograph that *every* philosophy of life rests on a faith, on a decision to trust, which can only be reached from an inner human experience . . . . The synthesis between philosophy of life and world picture, as a spiritual task of every time and of every man is therefore never only a matter of empirical science, but always a matter of faith. The author of this monograph, who counts himself fortunate in having as a Catholic Christian, a positive belief, has always felt this consistent synthesis to be the greatest fulfillment of the spiritual life." (Felix Mainx, "Foundations of Biology," pp. 82–83.)

Is it possible that the gulf which separates Eisenhower and Khrushchev (or for that matter, Karl Marx and Thomas Aquinas) is any greater than that dividing Russell and Mainx? Yet both of them, as well as the less extreme Einstein, subscribe to a common method in giving us a reliable picture of our physical world. As a result of such agreement regarding the world-picture, it is possible for all three to reach a considerable measure of agreement regarding the probable costs and consequences of what man can and may do in such a world. These costs and consequences may then be calmly weighed in the balance of people's respective value-systems. Whatever choice we make under these circumstances will at least be a deliberate and calculated action.

Such agreement on a method of reliable estimation of probable consequences of man's action is exactly what is lacking regarding political, economic and social questions. For example, Germany appears not to have expected a two-front war. American hopes to make the world safe for democracy were not realistic estimates of the consequences of our participation in the First World War. Our miscalculations of the consequences of the Second World War need no recapitulation. One of the reasons for these errors was that we did not have, (and do not have), a common *social* world-picture nor a fully or generally accepted method of arriving at one.

I have not said that agreement on a social world-picture necessarily would result in agreement on social *goals* any more than a common physical world picture has resulted in agreement on physical goals. Agreement on the method of producing the atomic bomb did not at all produce a unanimous judgment on the part of the scientists concerned as to whether to drop it on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The scientists did agree that the physical results of dropping the bombs would be essentially as predicted and subsequently observed. All I have said is that a common and accepted scientific method permits the development of a verifiable theory of human society (social world-picture) and makes possible a realistic estimate of the results of different possible courses of action. Foreseeing these costs and consequences might in turn inhibit the adoption of a given policy, the results of which can be shown in advance to be disappointing from the point of view of the value-system we cherish.

The Behavioral Sciences

For an indefinite period, it seems certain that we shall have to live with people whom we consider wrong in their thoughtways, and in some of their other major behavior patterns. We are likely to continue to deplore certain types of political and industrial organization and value hierarchies different from our own. What is needed is some arrangement which will permit relatively peaceful co-existence in spite of our differences. We have advanced the idea that the instrument of such a *modus vivendi* regarding the physical world has been found in physical science. The rapidly developing social and behavioral sciences must ultimately play a similar role in human social relations.

This conclusion is predicated on a development of the behavioral sciences comparable to that of the physical sciences. Only the future can finally demonstrate the validity of this predication. Suffice it to say that the behavioral sciences are making considerable headway and are undoubtedly here to stay—and to develop. Some of the developments which may have revolutionary impact are already on the horizon. Consider, for example, the recent invention of the fabulous computers which make it possible for one man to solve in a few minutes problems which without the machines would require a hundred years. Granted that technological improvements cannot of themselves advance science, few will question the importance to the physical and biological sciences of improved microscopes, telescopes, and all the paraphernalia of the scientific laboratory. Less well known, but of tremendous significance, is the recent development of improved techniques of precise measurement of attitudes, values, and public opinion. Or consider, for example, the possible significance of "game theory" in the social sciences. The basic conditions in any game (in game theory) include such factors as 1) risk and uncertainty, 2) conflict of interest, 3) statements of *all possible alternatives*, and 4) weightings of these possibilities according to *the preferences of the players*. These factors may also be the crucial ones in many non-game social situations. Impressive new developments in "decision theory," "information theory," and "communication theory" are also under way.

Many of these more promising leads are highly abstruse and have been hitherto explored mainly by advanced mathematicians. To suggest that such theories may produce answers to the question posed by the title of this paper may seem like giving him who asks for bread not only a stone, but a whole truck-load of gravel. The ways of science are notoriously involved and laborious. Much basic scientific work looks to quite a distant future for its practical results. No wonder that the simple declaration that "we are right," seems a less bothersome answer.

Among the common objections to any solution which looks beyond the immediate present is that, as one much-admired economist put it, "In the long run we are all dead." An even more famous expression of the same idea is, "After me the deluge." It is doubtless true that in the long run "we" are all dead, but it is precisely the function of the social sciences to point out and deal with the fact that while individual statesmen and economists are (perhaps fortunately) all dead in the long run, human society has continued to exist for hundreds of thousands of years and is likely to continue—atom bombs notwithstanding. National and international policies designed only for the lifetime or term of office of the incumbent officials cannot be expected to be very effective even in the short run, as the cold war so clearly shows. Day-to-day adjustments will be necessary under any policy. But successful national policy cannot consist *only* of "play-it-by-ear," daily stop-gap measures. It is not a matter of "waiting" for the social and behavioral sciences to develop. It is a matter of developing the behavioral sciences as rapidly as possible *while* we make the best day-to-day adjustment we can.

Technique of Cooperation

We have distinguished sharply two types of questions, those that deal with a) preferences, aspirations, and hopes, and those which deal with b) verifiable, predictable facts and sequences of events. Doctrinaire communism, or capitalism are examples of the former type. That is, they are philosophies of life or preferences not arrived at by scientific procedures. A mature science of economics dealing with the probable cause-and-effect relationships in production, distribution, and consumption of economic good would be an example of the second type of question. We have attempted to show that wide disagreement on philosophies of life is compatible with quite peaceful co-existence and cooperation provided there is agreement on the methods and conclusions regarding the facts of empirical science. The so-called ideologies which so agitate us currently may turn out to have very little to do with the practical business of living in a community.

This is not to question the importance of philosophies of life and ideologies to the adherents thereof. As is well known, ideologies of the most fantastic sort have for considerable periods of time sustained people under the most trying circumstances. We have merely pointed out that wide disagreements on philosophies of life are compatible with survival and with peaceful community living, whereas certain other questions regarding, for example, public safety, health, and subsistence in a highly specialized industrial civilization require a minimum of recognition and conformity by everyone.

Is this separation of two types of questions historically defensible? We have already referred to the consequences of the abandonment of large scale religious wars in the Western world. The Peace of Westphalia made no compromise regarding ideology, nor did it prohibit the respective parties from trying to proselyte and convert the world to their own way of thinking. The treaty merely stipulated certain practical arrangements in international relations, while leaving ideological issues severely alone. Thus it became permissible for members of different religious factions to observe the more usual amenities of community living, which in time developed into the present practice of rather cordial overt relations between members of different religious denominations.

This moderate cordiality does not imply any compromise of doctrine. When the Catholic Church periodically invites other Christian sects to return to the one and only true faith, they do so in a friendly and compassionate spirit, but they make it unmistakably clear that, after all, the Protestants are wrong. The Protestants usually receive this invitation and its implication with politeness and tolerance but point out that unless the Catholics abandon certain errors of doctrine, unification cannot be considered. In the meantime, both continue to work together for community objectives on which they agree, and overt hostility is highly exceptional. Each faction proselytes in a mild manner, and the missionary work of each goes forward with some success at the other's expense. Ideologically, both declare as a matter of course or as an implicit postulate, that it is their ultimate purpose to conquer the world, not by force, but by gradually convincing everyone that does not subscribe to the true doctrine that they are simply wrong. Why should not situations like the cold war be similarly adjusted?

We have employed the contemporary world picture of physics and chemistry to implement our material preferences; the results far transcend those achievable under the alchemists' world picture. In the same way it seems legitimate to use the new social world picture which the behavioral sciences may provide in implementing our ideological and spiritual preferences. Now, if these preferences happen to be world peace, harmony, and justice among nations, *a more highly developed technique of cooperation and compromise* could make all the difference between achieving or not achieving our preferences.

In short, our present blundering may be regarded as a confession of technical incompetence in the management of human affairs rather than as attributable to malice and perversity on the part of our opponents. To remedy this technical deficiency is the purpose and the proper province of the social and behavioral sciences.

This view is apparently not entirely discounted even in circles where we might least expect it to appear (albeit inadvertently). Writing in *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1959), Nikita S. Khrushchev said:

> "Is it possible that when mankind has advanced to a plane where it has proved capable of the greatest discoveries and of making its first steps into outer space, it should not be able to use the colossal achievements of its genius for the establishment of a stable peace, for the good of man, rather than for the preparation of another war and for the destruction of all that has been created by its labor over many millenniums? Reason refuses to believe this."

The significant note in this statement is that the "colossal achievements" referred to are those of *generally accepted science* (which will some day include the behavioral sciences) – East and West – not the results of the turgid conjurings of Karl Marx (with or without the Lenin-Stalin dispensations). When Western leaders make a corresponding acknowledgment regarding their private revelations that "we are right," we shall be under way in the business of living with people who are wrong.

An Inductive Approach to Intercultural Values

THEODORE BRAMELD

In the degree that intercultural education has been identified during the past decade in America with the larger movement called progressive education, it tends quite plausibly to reflect both the strengths and weaknesses of that larger movement. While strengths are many indeed, one weakness of the latter is a tendency sometimes to gloss over the necessity of basic philosophic analysis: progressivists are so eager to *get going* with their fine plans for turning education into practical, active experiences that they frequently seem impatient with the continuous importance of clarifying and explicating their own premises.

More specifically with regard to value theory, one often hears it said, for example, that intercultural education rests upon such beliefs as "the brotherhood of man" or "the dignity of personality" or "the great democratic tradition of equality and freedom." Once these clichés are uttered, however, the topic of values ends. Apparently this is enough to satisfy many practitioners; hence they move on immediately to the "important" business of implementation.

Now it is obvious that we cannot on every occasion stop to re-examine the meaning and dependability of these clichés. We nevertheless are guilty often not merely of negligence, but of gravely weakening the entire structure we are trying to erect. For no structure is stronger than its foundations. When we ignore or merely assume that our foundation of values is entirely reliable so long as it consists of pleasant-sounding phrases with which few would quarrel, we threaten the whole program and purpose of intercultural relations. We are little better than the indoctrinators of religious or political absolutism: they too proceed from uncriticized premises; they too contribute to a weak culture in that its members have never learned, through

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Theodore Brameld, "An Inductive Approach to Intercultural Values," Journal of Educational Sociology, *Vol. 21, No. 1 (1947), pp. 4–11. Reprinted by permission.*

the dialectic of self-criticism and opposition, whether their own beliefs are really healthy and strong.

The question of whether the philosophy of progressivism, when we are patient enough to study it, does provide an adequate theory of value is a technical question which need not especially concern us here. Undoubtedly its most profound thinkers—John Dewey particularly—contribute richly to such a theory. What is now overdue, however, is a concerted effort at reformulation in terms appropriate to a period already passing the period of history of which Dewey's pragmatic liberalism is the highest symbol. In this brief article it is only possible to suggest some of the avenues of exploration toward that objective.

The problem, so far as intercultural relations are concerned, is this. If you and I say that we regard as immoral the exploitations, discriminations, and segregations suffered by Negroes or Jews or Mexican-Americans, *why* most basically do we?

* * * *

The task of approaching the problem of values inductively is further complicated, however, by the question: "Who are *we*?" More specifically in terms of intercultural relations, one of the most common and most potent of arguments against, say, racial equalitarianism is that great numbers of people in the world simply do not have this range of drives and wants which you and I—of the educated minority—may concede that we have. Granting, for example, that sexual satisfaction is virtually a universal want, how can it possibly be argued that the want of recognition or fairly immediate meaning is universal? And if it cannot be proved that our pattern of goal seeking is common to others, are we not simply trying to impose that pattern upon dissimilar people? Are we not, after all, pretty much like the "do-gooder" missionaries who aim to embrace the reluctant heathen within their own dogmatic faith?

In answer to these questions, it is necessary to admit frankly that neither religion nor science has established once and for all the precise number or order or quality of wants among diverse peoples. Indeed, since the whole history of human beings and of the cultures within which they live prove the pliability of goal-seeking proclivities, we must concede that such establishment is, in any case, impossible. All that can be shown, at the most, is about four important facts concerning who *we* are—whether a merely sophisticated (if not supercilious) minority, or a reasonably large majority of the races and nations of the world.

First, then, science, and especially anthropology, again assists enormously in showing that, among all our differences, we do possess a striking number of similar wants and of similarly organized efforts to satisfy them. (Just one citation here: "The Common Denominator of Cultures" by

Murdock, in *The Science of Man in the World Crisis,* edited by Linton.)

Second, these common denominators, however few in radically different periods of history, tend to multiply today as acculturation and assimilation accelerate through the impact of such technological inventions as communication and transportation. In other words, it is a reasonably safe conjecture that as more and more people learn more and more about one another, they approach closer to a minimum pattern of similar wants. Such a pattern is temporal and cultural, not eternal or metaphysical, to be sure. But that is all we can properly expect.

Third, the equally evident fact that disagreement about wants is still widespread by no means proves that this disagreement is insoluble. Rather, all it may prove is that, thus far, civilization has failed to provide facilities by which agreement might be achieved. If, for example, Jeeter Lester of *Tobacco Road* seems quite satisfied with a diet of turnips, does this mean that here is in fact his entire goal of food satisfaction? Or does it simply mean that he has never learned enough either about the meaning of adequate diet, or of the possibility of winning such a diet for himself and his children, to know what he actually wants? By the same token, can the Negro hater be right in his contention that shiftlessness is more satisfying to Negroes than initiative and neatness, so long as he does everything in his power to prevent fair testing of the latter alternative? These questions may seem rhetorical to the informed; yet they are crucial to the approach we are now sketching.

Fourth, and following more or less directly from the above three points, the assertion that *our* wants and their satisfaction are therefore also *common* wants claims no more than that they are, or probably could be, those of the *majority.* No matter how seemingly universal a want may be, some individual or group may deny its presence—a denial resulting either from an insistence that the majority simply has failed to recognize its own goal-seeking interests accurately at some point, or from the sheer stubbornness or fanaticism of some individual or group. In either case, there is no way, so long as the democratic process functions in value formulation, by which the dissenting minority can or should be coerced into agreement. As a matter of fact, the minority may conceivably be right. If, as we assume, wants are empirical, and we learn and relearn about them continuously, then we of the majority may need to be convinced that a meaning we previously attached to a certain want has been quite fallacious. But even if the minority is wrong, and it is denying agreement from ulterior motives, we shall have to admit there is no way of finally *proving* it wrong. The subjective element in human wants makes it possible for anyone to deny his existence simply by insisting that he has no such experience as the majority has.

We come, then, to the inference that *the final criterion of intercultural values is the social consensus that can be attained about them.* This criterion, as implied, has at least three essential steps in its complete application: (a) maximum presentation of evidence (especially of science, but also of art, history, religion, and all other spheres of human achievement) about what people want; (b) maximum communication of that evidence—a worldwide process which, of course, increases the exactitude of the evidence itself; and (c) maximum agreement among the widest possible range of people that, upon the basis of this evidence and communication, these are indeed the wants we most deeply seek to satisfy.

Many questions remain, of course. Values (or, we now see, want satisfactions) overlap, ramify, and sometimes appear contradictory. Also, they are so multiple that we need to ask whether they can be synthesized around some great normative generalization—whether, for example, *self-realization* (regarded in a social as well as individual context) could not be accepted as this kind of inductive outcome, and therefore be recognized as a meaningful summary of many particular values.

Educationally, we should be concerned with the problem of how this necessarily abstract statement can be translated into effective intercultural understanding. Here is a question, however, that requires far more extensive treatment than we are now permitted. That a beginning should be made in the elementary school is obvious, for to inculcate the old ethical dogmas uncritically then is to make it well-nigh impossible for the secondary school to undo that inculcation later. Far better, it seems, would be the effort to avoid all use of such dogmas, and to substitute the richest possible experience with the meaning of wants among the widest range of children. In the secondary school, however, systematic examination of the nature of values is practical—in the earlier years as part of larger, functional projects, in the later years as specific units in value formulation. Yet even such units need not and should not become typically academic. Beginning with the living situations of young people wherever they are, they can gradually broaden to encompass the situations of their parents, community citizens, and finally of peoples of distant places. That it can be done is certain, for it has been done by the writer and by others, not only on the high-school but on the college and adult levels as well.

And when it is done, is the social consensus always identical, always unanimous? Of course it is not. To a remarkable extent, however, that consensus, epitomized by self-realization may be stated like this:

Most men do not want to be hungry: they cherish the value of *sufficient nourishment*.

Most men do not want to be cold or ragged: they cherish the value of *adequate dress*.

Most men do not want uncontrolled exposure either to the elements or to people: they cherish the value of *shelter* and *privacy*.

Most men do not want celibacy: they cherish the value of *sexual expression*.

Most men do not want illness: they cherish the value of *physiological and mental health.*

Most men do not want chronic insecurity: they cherish the value of *steady work, steady income.*

Most men do not want loneliness: they cherish the value of *companionship, mutual devotion, belongingness.*

Most men do not want indifference: they cherish the value of *recognition, appreciation, status.*

Most men do not want constant drudgery, monotony, or routine: they cherish the value of *novelty, curiosity, variation, recreation, adventure, growth, creativity.*

Most men do not want ignorance: they cherish the value of *literacy, skill, information.*

Most men do not want continual domination: they cherish the value of *participation, sharing.*

Most men do not want bewilderment: they cherish the value of *fairly immediate meaning, significance, order, direction.*

Resolving Intergroup Tensions, An Appraisal of Methods

GORDON W. ALLPORT

There are two good reasons why we must expect people to cling tenaciously to their prejudices. For one thing, the whole economy of their lives may be erected on the assumption that certain outgroups are inferior, threatening, or contemptible. Their own sense of worth is maintained by debasing others, particularly groups that are as easily defined as Catholics, Jews, Mexicans, Negroes, refugees. Such people feel safe only on an island with their own kind. Their thinking is categorical: ingroups are good, outgroups, bad; ingroups are safe, outgroups, menacing; ingroups, superior, outgroups, inferior; ingroups, clean, outgroups, dirty. Many lives are organized in this manner. Their economy is one of restriction in human relations. It is not to be expected that such lives can be easily recentered.

A second obdurate fact is that prejudiced attitudes receive continual support from the social environment. While the child may learn fragments of the American creed at school or at church, these fragments are ordinarily smothered by much stronger forces in the environment. To him the sanctions of his home and his gang are much stronger than the sanctions of school or church. No child, for example, can escape the ethnic, religious, and class membership of his parents. If they are the victims of prejudice, he automatically becomes a victim. If prejudice is the parental style of life, it becomes his. How else indeed shall the child survive? While there are certainly contradictory elements in the pattern it is not hard to see where the major emphasis lies for millions of children. Lillian Smith has described vividly the predominant impact that falls on the white Southern child.[1]

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[1] Lillian Smith, *Killers of the Dream* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1949).

Reprinted from Gordon W. Allport, "Resolving Intergroup Tensions, An Appraisal of Methods," Toward Better Human Relations, *edited by Lloyd Allen Cook, pp. 37–72, by permission of the Wayne State University Press. Copyright 1952, Wayne State University Press, Detroit 1, Illinois.*

Since the child's circle of playmates is likely to come from the same ethnic, religious, or social class as himself, their influence usually intensifies the family pressure. Needing the approval of his peers the child does not lightly flaunt their mores.

For such reasons as these, little or no change in prejudiced attitudes can be expected. But there are arguments to be made on the other side, reasons for expecting changes under definable conditions.

Prejudiced attitudes, so far as we know, have no hereditary basis. Young children are disconcertingly democratic. Their sense of the clan comes hard and relatively late. When asked the simple question, "What are you?" only 10 per cent of four-year-olds reply in terms of racial, ethnic, or religious membership; whereas 75 per cent of nine-year-olds do so.[2] Not only is prejudice itself learned, but so, too, are all of its ingredients. And what is learned can, theoretically at least, be unlearned; or at least, the learning can *ab initio* be prevented.

What is more, Americans have an inexhaustible faith in environmentalism. We brush aside the aristocratic biases that blood will tell, that caste and caste attitudes are imperishable. We believe in the efficacy of education. Psychologists today are obsessed with "learning theory." Advertising is a national idol and we know that to a degree it controls attitudes. With optimism we overhaul our school curricula, launch publicity campaigns, and march forth to slay attitudinal dragons. I am not saying that all this optimism is justified. But our faith in environmentalism itself is a factor of prime importance. If everyone *expects* attitudes to change through re-training, then of course, they are more likely to do so than if no one expects them to change. The very gusto that attends present efforts to reduce prejudice will bring forth maximum results—and the magnitude of these results may yet surprise us.

Some Research Difficulties

Today we have reached a point where we can begin to submit this dispute to empirical tests. Efforts to improve human relations are as old as the hills. What is new in our age is the ability and the will to evaluate the success of these efforts.

Working, as we are, at the frontiers of the subject we do well to keep the principal methodological obstacles clearly in mind.

(1) It is hard to know what indices of change to look for. Thus at the outset we have trouble with our *dependent* variable. If we decide to rely on the measurement of attitudes before and after a program of action, where shall we find scales that are reliable, valid, and not so transparent that the

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[2] E. L. Hartley, *et al.*, "Children's Perception of Ethnic Group Membership," *Journal of Psychology*, 26 (1948), 387–98.

individual gives only the answers he knows the experimenter expects? Even a good scale incurs the criticism that the verbal response it elicits may not correspond at all to conduct in daily life.

(2) It is hard to isolate the program of action that we are testing. Here we run into trouble with our *independent* variable. Suppose we want to try the effect of a curriculum in intercultural education upon eighth-grade children. How can we make certain the results at the end are not the product of maturation, or exposure to comic books or radio stories, or of a general change in social climate? Even if we prove that the change resulted from the curriculum, how can we tell what features of the program were effective?

(3) It is hard to create satisfactory control groups. Up to now the commonest failing in research has been in the lack of control groups. In Dr. Cook's review of twenty-four recent college programs in intercultural education only four employed controls.[3] It is not easy to find a control population matched with the experimental population for age, intelligence, status, initial prejudice and concurrent experience (in all respects save only exposure to the program itself). Students gossip outside of school about their experience, and thus the control group may be contaminated by the experimental.

(4) It is hard to know when to evaluate the effects of a program. We find it convenient to do so immediately after its close. But the program may have "sleeper effects" and first show its influence months or years later.

There is no need to dwell on the difficulties in this field of research. They are so great that only the most brazen of social scientists will venture to tackle problems of evaluation. But fortunately there are brazen souls, and up to now they have produced not less than 150 evaluative studies. Reviewing this literature, Bierstedt mournfully concludes:

> The findings are bewilderingly diverse. Sometimes there is reported a diminution of prejudice, or at least of adverse opinion; sometimes there is no diminution. Sometimes the conclusion is that prejudice is diminished in this respect but not in that; sometimes the relation is reversed. Sometimes one category of students is reported to be more responsive; sometimes another category.[4]

The problem, we may as well admit, lies at the outer fringe of scientific accessibility, and yet progress is being made. On all sides we encounter the mushrooming of scientific evaluations of social action. Industrial policies are being systematically tested. The efforts of social agencies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to build character are put under the lens of scrutiny. The effects of various styles of college teaching are weighed.

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[3] Lloyd Allen Cook, ed., *College Programs in Intergroup Relations* (Washington: American Council on Education, 1950).

[4] In R. M. MacIver, *The More Perfect Union* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 288.

And now we have scores of studies pretending to evaluate methods for reducing intergroup tensions.

* * * *

Virtually all of the strategies employed in the effort to improve group relations can be placed under one of the following six headings, though each could be extensively sub-divided. This list will guide us in our present survey of findings.

1. Formal educational methods
2. Contact and acquaintance programs
3. Group retraining devices
4. Mass media
5. Legislation
6. Individual psychotherapy

What we want to know is how the above independent variables have presumably affected *knowledge, beliefs, attitudes*, or *behavior* (dependent variables). Unfortunately these four departments of personality are not all one and the same thing. Few investigators are concerned with the differences between them. Yet knowledge may be found to change while behavior remains the same; or beliefs may change but not attitudes. Such inconsistency has been made the subject of a special symposium edited by Chein and others.[5]

For the time being, most investigators are preoccupied in finding a method of measuring change. One cannot be too hard on them for failing to ask *change in what?* After all, a successful measure of any change represents some degree of progress. Eventually we shall have to raise the question whether we are actually measuring a larger portion of the subject's life than our instrument covers. For the moment it is enough to list certain concrete *indices of change*. They alone define what we mean experimentally by the phrase "resolving intergroup tensions." The following list represents an extension of the indices mentioned by Deri and his associates.[6]

(1) *Case studies.* Least quantified but perhaps most convincing are the play-by-play accounts of the introduction of a program. When, for example, we know the total history of an attempt on the part of a trade union or industry to abolish discrimination, or we feel (though we cannot prove) that we know the cause and effect relations involved and how well the attempt succeeded.

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[5] Chein, *et al.*, eds., "Consistency and Inconsistency in Intergroup Relations," *Journal of Social Issues*, 5, No. 3 (1949).

[6] S. Deri, *et al.*, "Techniques for the Diagnosis and Measurement of Intergroup Attitudes and Behavior," *Psychological Bulletin*, 45 (1948), 248–71.

(2) *Social barometer.* The increase or decrease of public discriminatory acts may be a useful guide. Complaints to the police, or incidents in street cars, restaurants, employment agencies—all may indicate the effects of current forces at work within a community.

(3) *Content analysis of public records.* The number of discriminatory advertisements in newspapers, or the filing of legislative bills, or the nature of political speeches, usefully extend the conception of a social barometer.

(4) *Questionnaires and scales.* The most commonly employed device is the before-and-after test used with the same individuals, and, where possible, with a control group. The tests may be designed to measure knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes.

(5) *Public opinion polls.* Trends of favor or disfavor toward minority groups can be noted from poll interviews held in the same locality before and after a program is tried.

(6) *Changes in population and in community activities.* Minority groups may grow more separated or more intermingled as a result of programs. New intergroup projects may be inaugurated. Changes in the composition of community agencies may result.

(7) *Participation indices.* In certain cases the amount that behavior has changed may be gauged by noting the increased time that a person spends with members of minority groups or devotes to intergroup activities.

(8) *Sociometry.* Choices of playmates, friends, or teammates may alter following a program.

(9) *Projective and pictorial techniques.* Tests that avoid direct questioning are gaining in favor. The individual may show a shift in his aggressive, affiliative, or rejective tendencies by reacting differently to pictures, to sentence completion tests, or in his telling of stories.

(10) *Miscellaneous other measures.* The above list is not exhaustive. One might include "reasoning tests" to see whether a given program has enhanced people's ability to think clearly. So with "perceptual" and "cognitive" tests to see whether people think less rigidly and perceive differences more adequately.

* * * *

Conclusions

It is, therefore, perfectly sensible to ask, Where shall change begin? What parts of the system may we attack in order to bring about final alteration in the whole? The present paper has sought to summarize our knowledge in this area as of the present time. Some of our principal conclusions are the following:

(1) Since the problem is manysided there is no sovereign formula, nor

any single method so effective that it commands our primary allegiance. The wisest thing to do is to attack all fronts simultaneously. If no single attack has large effect, yet many small attacks from many directions can have large cumulative effects.

(2) Meliorism must be our guide. People who talk in terms of the ultimate assimilation of all minority groups into one ethnic stock are speaking of a distant Utopia. To be sure, there would be no minority group problems in a homogeneous society, but it seems probable that in this country at least our loss through homogeneity would be greater than our gain. In any case, it is certain that artificial attempts to hasten assimilation will not succeed. We shall improve human relations only by learning to live with racial and cultural pluralism for a long time to come.

(3) It is reasonable to expect that our efforts will have some upsetting effects. The attack on a system always has. Thus a person who has been exposed to intercultural education, to tolerance propaganda, to role playing, may show greater inconsistency of behavior than before. But from the point of view of attitude change this state of "unstructuredness" is a necessary stage. A wedge has been driven that may never be withdrawn. While the individual may be more uncomfortable than before, he has at least a chance of recentering his outlook in a more tolerant manner. Investigation shows that people who are aware of, and ashamed of, their prejudices are well on the road to eliminating them.

(4) Occasionally there may be a boomerang effect. Efforts may serve only to stiffen opposition in defense of existing attitudes or offer people unintended support for their hostile opinions. Such evidence as we have indicates that this result is relatively slight. It is also a question whether the effect may not be temporary, for any strategy effective enough to arouse defensiveness is likely to be strong enough to plant seeds of misgiving. It seems probable, too, that boomerangs occur chiefly in minds with paranoid trends where any stimulus is absorbed into a rigid system. To be sure, there is the ever present danger than a given program may be so badly presented that the public cannot understand its intended meaning. But boomerangs in this sense are due merely to ineptitude and to the failure to pre-test the program, and thus are avoidable.

(5) From what we know of mass media, it seems wise not to expect marked results from this method alone. Relatively few people are in the precise stage of "unstructuredness," and in precisely the right frame of mind, to admit the message. Further, it seems well, on the basis of existing evidence, to focus mass propaganda on specific issues, such for example as FEPC rather than upon vague appeals. Whether advertising the message of brotherhood is effective, we simply do not know. Research in this area is needed.

(6) It seems probable that greatest value comes from programs that

incite deep first-hand experiences. A person's pre-existing pride or his pre-existing circles of affection and affiliation may lead him to resist influences that challenge these ego-involved motives, unless these motives themselves are effectively engaged.

(7) For this reason the teacher or group leader will offer information and new experience within a framework that will allow the individual to maintain his system of pride and affection even while he learns to enlarge it. By working in the community, for example, he may learn that neither his self-esteem nor his attachments are threatened by Negro neighbors. He can even learn that his own security and self-respect are strengthened when social conditions in his town are improved. He can understand that the United Nations, our "last and best hope for peace," will succeed only if the white nations of the earth cease their condescension toward colored nations and colored minorities. In short, for permanent, long-run results, we must be led to see that we have much to gain in terms of security and happiness by inviting more people into our circle.

(8) From this point of view, it is not apology or special pleading for this or that minority group that is needed. What is needed is emphasis upon national and international solidarity, community welfare, and common moral codes. While preaching and exhortation may play their part in the process, the lesson will not be learned at the verbal level alone. It will be learned in muscle, nerve, and gland by child and adult only when it is worked out through participant citizenship.

(9) Hence we see why educators insist upon a democratic school structure to begin with and favor project methods in intercultural education rather than informational methods. Evidence, so far as it goes, supports their preference. Some slight indications also suggest that a good vestibule leading to more whole-hearted participation is the strategy of vicarious experience. Films and fiction may prepare the individual for the more virile lessons of community survey, role playing, and group dynamics.

(10) Since the very essence of prejudice is fallacious categorization concerning the alleged attributes of groups as a whole, prejudice will tend to disappear as children and adults are encouraged to view others as individuals and to evaluate members of outgroups as separate persons. Unless people actually mingle with outgroups—that is, unless segregation is destroyed—they are not likely to learn this basic lesson of individualization.

(11) None of our commonly used methods is likely to work with bigots whose character-structure is so inaccessible that it demands the exclusion of outgroups as a condition of life. Yet strategies that will surely fail in some cases are not thereby damned, for they will not fail in all. Even for the rigid person there is left the possibility of individual therapy—an expensive method and one that is sure to be resisted; but in principle at least, we need not yet despair completely of the extreme case, especially if tackled young.

(12) Turning now to social programs, there is first of all widespread agreement that it is wiser to attack segregation and discrimination than to attack prejudice directly. For even if one dents the attitudes of the individual in isolation he is still confronted by social barriers that he cannot surmount. And until segregation is weakened, conditions will not exist that permit equal status contacts in pursuit of common objectives.

(13) It would seem intelligent to take advantage of the vulnerable points where social change is most likely to occur. It has been pointed out that gains in housing and economic opportunities are on the whole the easiest to achieve. Fortunately it is these gains that minorities most urgently desire. Alert efforts along this line opened more than a million and a half jobs during World War II to workers previously excluded on the grounds of race and creed. Generally speaking, technological conditions in this country are fluid, and new opportunities continually occur. Admittedly it requires ingenuity to take advantage of them. But the general principle of pressing for housing reform and fair employment practices seems psychologically and socially sound.

(14) Generally speaking, a *fait accompli* that fits in with our democratic creed is accepted with little more than an initial flurry of protest. Cities that introduce Negroes into public jobs find that the change soon ceases to attract attention. Sound legislation and ordinance are similarly accepted. As MacIver has pointed out, official policies once established are hard to revoke. They set models that, once accepted, create habits and conditions favorable to their maintenance.

(15) While policy changes and legislation ordinarily mark painless advance, we cannot deny that strong and vociferous pressure may be needed before this gain is achieved. The organized demands of minority groups backed up by crusading and militant liberals have certainly been a factor in many of the gains thus far made. While such strife and contention do not in themselves resolve intergroup tensions, they may in the long run be the most effective factor in changing those parts of the social system that need to be changed before solid gains can be made.

(16) The great peril resident in all these programs is that, in our preoccupation with them, we fall into the totalitarian trap of manipulating people with a handful of psychological tricks. Ultimately, there is no solution to intergroup tensions excepting through the inner growth of serene and benevolent persons who seek their own security and integrity not at the expense of their fellowmen, but in concert with them.

Observations on the Clinical Approach to International Tensions

ROBERT E. OSGOOD

Some recent studies of international tensions purport to contain special insights into the cause and cure of international conflicts that lead to war. They are based upon a distinct conceptual framework and methodology derived from sociological and psychological premises about international behavior. Other tensions studies are distinguished from the orthodox text-book approaches to international harmony and disharmony chiefly by their assiduous refinement of prosaic insights and concepts and by their special vocabulary for translating common sense into "scientific" terms. It is the former group of studies toward which my observations are directed.

These observations are not based on an exhaustive investigation of the entire field of tensions research; so it is not sure how many sociological feet the shoes described here actually fit. However, it does seem that a great deal of the postwar sociological analysis of international tensions is based upon misleading assumptions about the fundamental nature of international society, the ideal state of international relations, and the method of achieving this ideal. Together, these assumptions compose what one might call the clinical approach. This approach regards international tensions—at least those that lead to conflict—as a sickness of the world community. Its chief aim is to eliminate or relieve these tensions so as to restore the community to its normal state of harmonious health. It seeks to do this by direct treatment of alleged deficiencies of behavior and knowledge, which are presumed to cause the tensions. Each of these three assumptions will be analyzed briefly in order to explain in what sense the clinical approach is misleading. The following assumptions are by no means always set forth in such explicit and naked form; nor do all of them

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Robert E. Osgood, "Observations on the Clinical Approach to International Tensions," Social Problems, *Vol. 2, No. 3 (January, 1955), pp. 176–180. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

necessarily appear in every study. Nevertheless, they are all closely and logically related and seem to underlie much of the analysis of international tensions by social psychologists, whether or not it deals with tensions as such. (1)

First Assumption. It is misleading to equate the normal state of international relations with the absence of tensions and to regard deviations from this state as unnatural or abnormal; for the analogy implies that there is a natural harmony of interests, aims, and desires among nations—like the harmonious relations of the parts of a healthy body—and that tensions are inconsistent with the inherent nature of international society—like diseases or functional disorders in a sick body. In reality, the "normal" state of international relations for the foreseeable future is as much disharmony as harmony of national interests, aims, and desires. This disharmony arises, fundamentally, from the intimate and intense personal identification of the individual with the national group, which, in turn, produces that profound and compelling emotional coalescence of individual altruism and group egoism that characterizes modern national allegiances.

Given the fundamental fact of personal identification, tensions and conflicts among different nations' interests, aims, and desires, inevitably arise from the diversity of political, social, and cultural conditions which shape national ends. Since the force of national egoism precludes the orderly procedures of law and government, as well as most of the restraints of conscience and custom, which mitigate and control conflicts among lesser groups within the nation, international relations is more accurately characterized as a struggle for power than as a harmony of interests. A conceptual framework of international relations that minimizes the force of national egoism, the incompatibility of national ends, and the struggle for power by transmuting the ideal of international harmony into the concept of a natural harmony of interests, must lead to faulty analysis of the cause of tensions and to unrealistic expectations concerning the mitigation of tensions.

Second Assumption. The assumption that international relations are normally and naturally harmonious is obviously congenial with the normative assumption that international relations ought to be free of tensions—except, perhaps, for an undefined minimum necessary to human vitality. This normative assumption seems to be inspired by the laudable zeal of the social reformer, who, believing that men are naturally good and rational, strives to abolish the defects in their environment and training that prevent them from acting that way. He hopes that in this manner his scientific knowledge of society will point out the way in which all people, without regard for national or other distinctions, may live together in a spirit of tolerant understanding and settle their disputes by impartial reference to reason, law, and morality rather than by resort to coercion.

Obviously, in terms of this abstract ideal, international tensions that lead to conflicts are bad things and ought to be curbed; and this is, in fact, the guiding aim of the clinical approach. However, I think it is misleading to erect the relief of tensions into a primary value by approaching tensions in the context of an ideal state of affairs, abstracted from the actual political circumstances in which they occur. For, given the actual disharmony and incompatibility of national interests, aims, and desires—for which there is ample empirical evidence throughout the age of nationalism and down to the present time—the relief of tensions can be a good thing only if there is no moral basis for preferring one nation's ends to another's. If, on the other hand, there is a valid moral distinction among incompatible national ends, then the absence of tensions should be taken as a sign of moral blindness or cowardice; and what is really required is an increase of tension, not a decrease.

Actually, of course, the clinical approach is neither morally blind nor cowardly. It simply avoids the moral problem by assuming that the desired absence of tensions and the assumed compatibility of national ends will occur in an ideal world in which all nations subordinate their particular interests, aims, and desires to transcendent moral principles. However, by abstracting tensions from their real political context and, in effect, elevating the elimination of tensions into an absolute value, the clinical approach obscures the real moral problem in international society. That problem is how to maximize liberal and humane values in a world of incompatible and even irreconcilable national ends—ends which are inevitably corrupted with national self-interest but among which moral choice is imperative.

Third Assumption. Consistent with its aversion to power politics and its abstraction of tensions from their actual political context, the clinical approach looks upon conflicts of national interest and power as merely the superficial symptoms of some socio-psychological malady and not as anything fundamentally inherent in the existing conditions of international society. The underlying assumption seems to be that, since international conflicts result from tensions and since tensions occur within the mind, therefore if one can find the psychological roots of tensions, one may be able to modify or eliminate them and, accordingly, get rid of the international conflicts that can lead to war. Since international society is assumed to embody a naturally rational and harmonious relationship among its parts, it follows that deviations from this norm spring from some sort of remediable misbehavior or misunderstanding. Therefore, the clinical approach looks for the psychological roots of tensions in frustrations and maladjustments that interfere with rational behavior among nations and in biases and stereotypes that interfere with mutual understanding. It seeks to relieve tensions by ameliorating the offending frustrations and maladjustments and by correcting prejudices and stereotypes.

One cannot deny that frustrations and maladjustments may contribute in some measure toward creating unwarranted international tensions, but it is highly misleading to assume that the most important or profound source of tensions is the individual's immediate social and psychological environment rather than the international political environment itself. For it is quite impossible to explain actual situations of international tension or harmony by reference to the social and psychological environment alone but quite reasonable and necessary to explain them primarily by reference to the international environment, to its conflicts and incompatibilities of national purpose and power.

An obvious historical generalization illustrates this point: Between the same nations, harmony has often changed to animosity and tension, and animosity and tensions to harmony, in a manner which cannot be explained by any transformation of social or psychological influence not derived from political circumstances. Consider, for example, the change from harmony to tension in the United States' relations with Japan and Germany after the turn of the twentieth century or the change from tension to relative harmony between the United States and Great Britain in the same period.

It is similarly unrealistic to explain situations of international tension or harmony primarily by reference to ignorance, bias, or misunderstanding. Great powers with little knowledge or understanding of one another have enjoyed relations virtually free from tension, as in the case of the United States and Russia before the First World War. Some of the most serious tensions have occurred between nations which understood each other very well and even between nations which shared a similar cultural background and outlook. Thus the shifts in Anglo-American tension during the nineteenth century cannot reasonably be explained by shifts in cultural compatibility or in the level of knowledge and understanding between the two peoples. Mutual understanding may, in fact, be a major stimulus to animosity—among nations as among individuals. I believe that the present tension between the United States and the Soviet Union arises in large measure from a rational understanding on the part of both nations of the profound imcompatibility of their aims, interests, and principles. As for national stereotypes and biases, I think that a careful historical investigation of the changes in one nation's attitude toward another nation would show that it is primarily political relations that determine the stereotypes and biases and not the other way around; and that, insofar as the stereotypes and biases cause international tension, it is largely because they coincide with genuine political incompatibilities.

If these historical generalizations are true, then it is quite misleading to assume that international tensions can be eliminated or curbed by direct treatment of alleged emotional or intellectual maladies presumed to hinder the normal, healthy functioning of the international order. Negative historical evidence is reinforced by sociological and psychological studies themselves, many of which strongly indicate, whether explicitly or not, that the circumstances responsible for relevant individual frustrations and maladjustments, biases and stereotypes, are so deeply embedded in the individual's whole social and cultural environment that it would be prohibitively difficult to alter or manipulate them even if this were otherwise an effective way of relieving international tensions.

Moreover, even if alteration and manipulation were easy, the chances of producing significant changes in international tensions by direct operation upon the social and psychological environment without operating upon the international political environment as well would seem to be extremely unpromising; for there is certainly a two-way relationship here, and, as has already been indicated, the international political environment is the decisive influence. For example, let us concede that international tensions result from a frustration-aggression process. Nevertheless, the direction of aggressiveness toward a particular nation in a particular form under particular circumstances derives primarily from the political relations among sovereign nations.

All these difficulties in altering tensions by direct, clinical treatment are quite apart from the virtually insurmountable practical obstacles in the way of tampering with the social and psychological environment of sovereign, independent nations, even if some impartial body of experts knew what to tamper with and had the technical ability to tamper with it.

Then does all this mean that sociological investigation of international tensions is a blind alley? I think it need not be. If the examination of the social and psychological roots of national behavior in a political vacuum has its limitations, so does the orthodox analysis of purely political relations between national governments. One of the virtues of the sociological approach to tensions is that it goes beneath the legal and institutional arrangements and the formal relations among governments and examines the attitudes, values, and motives which underlie them. Thus it serves to remind us that the study of international politics is a branch of the study of human nature.

An integrated sociological, psychological, and political approach to international tensions might explore fruitful and relatively unexploited fields of research. But an integrated approach requires more than an eclectic methodology. It requires a realistic conceptual framework of international relations, one that takes adequate account of the force of national egoism, the incompatibility of national ends, and the decisive influence of the political environment in which tensions occur. If this requirement were met, then I think that sociologists might tell us a great deal more about how to live with international tensions than about how to get rid of them.

References

Representative expressions of the clinical approach can be found in studies made in conjunction with the UNESCO Tensions Project, which are surveyed by Otto Klineberg in the *International Social Science Bulletin*, 1 (1949), nos. 1–2, 11–21, and Robert Angell in the *American Sociological Review*, 15 (April, 1950), 282–87. See also, Hadley Cantril, ed., *Tensions That Cause Wars*, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1950; George W. Kisker, ed., *World Tension*, N. Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1951; Otto Klineberg, *Tensions Affecting International Understanding*, N. Y.: Social Science Research Council, 1950; Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for Man*, N. Y.: Whittlesey House, 1949: David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology*, N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1948.

The Reduction of Intergroup Hostility: Research Problems and Hypotheses

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IRVING L. JANIS AND DANIEL KATZ

I. Introduction

It is a startling fact that almost the last area to be investigated empirically by the social sciences is the area of the constructive forces in human nature and society which make for the reduction of intergroup conflict. Research attention has focused upon the destructive tendencies in human conduct—upon antisocial action, hostility, distorted perceptions, irrational fears, authoritarian personality structure, and a wide variety of psychopathological disorders. Concern with positive forces has not reached the point of stimulating systematic investigation, perhaps because of the antinormative position of present-day scientists, most of whom feel inclined to leave such matters to philosophers and social reformers. Yet an adequate social science must study the social norms and ethical principles by which men live.

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II. Some Key Variables

A major set of problems requiring both theoretical analysis and rigorous empirical investigation is that of evaluating the social and psychological consequences of the positive ethical means employed by any social movement, organization, or group to achieve socially desirable goals in its struggle against rival groups. A large-scale program of research would be needed to determine under what conditions the various ethical means (independent variables) have the intended or unintended effects (dependent variables).

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Examples of Independent Variables

An excellent source of various ethical procedures that are illustrative of the means to be investigated is the analysis of the Gandhian ethical system prepared by Naess (7). Most of the normative propositions and hypotheses which specify the forms of conduct that will achieve the ultimate ethical goals can be restated in terms of means-consequence relationships. As examples, we have selected eight norms, all of which are here formulated as procedures or policies of social struggle which are means for attaining the various humanitarian ends. Although loosely defined at present, these means can be readily translated into operational terms and investigated as independent variables in systematic research studies:

1. *Refraining* from any form of verbal or overt *violence* toward members of the rival group
2. Openly *admitting* to the rival group one's plans and intentions, including the considerations that determine the tactics one is employing in the current struggle as well as one's longer-range strategic objectives
3. *Refraining* from any action that will have the effect of *humiliating* the rival group
4. Making visible *sacrifices* for one's cause
5. Maintaining a consistent and persistent set of *positive activities* which are explicit (though partial) realizations of the group's objectives
6. Attempting to initiate direct personal *interaction* with members of the rival group, oriented toward engaging in *friendly verbal discussions* with them concerning the fundamental issues involved in the social struggle
7. Adopting a consistent attitude of *trust* toward the rival group and taking overt actions which demonstrate that one is, in fact, willing to act upon this attitude
8. Attempting to achieve a high degree of *empathy* with respect to the motives, affects, expectations, and attitudes of members of the rival group

Besides the foregoing list, many additional examples of positive means could be culled from Gandhi's ethical code (4), from Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* (2), and from other ethical writings which also contain propositions concerning the positive and negative social consequences of using alternative ethical procedures.

Dependent Variables

The effectiveness of the positive means can be assessed in relation to the following outcomes, which constitute the dependent variables to be investigated:

1. A reduction in the incidence and intensity of acts of violence
2. An increase in the willingness of the rival group to engage in arbitration and to overcome the obstacles that interfere with peaceful settlement of disputes
3. Favorable attitude changes among members of the rival group toward the group behaving according to ethical principles

4. Greater motivation on the part of group members to continue working toward the attainment of humanitarian and social welfare goals
5. Greater success of the group in achieving its specific humanitarian objectives
6. Favorable attitude changes among members of the group in the direction of greater commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes with all rival groups
7. Favorable attitude changes among spectators of the struggle (i.e., people who are unaffiliated with either of the contending groups) in the direction of being more attracted to the group using positive ethical means, placing greater reliance in their public communications, and thereby becoming more influenced in the direction of accepting their policies and objectives

In general, the predictions would be that the positive means such as those listed here would, singly or in combination, lead to favorable outcomes as specified by the seven dependent variables. But, in addition to these global predictions, a number of much more refined hypotheses would need to be tested in order to determine the intervening processes which mediate the predicted effects. In the course of investigating the social and psychological consequences of any one of the various means, it will probably turn out that there are a number of different component factors involved that must be separated and investigated as independent variables. For example, the policy of openly admitting one's intentions and plans to a rival group might give rise to three quite separate effects.

1. Revealing material that is ordinarily kept secret may influence the rivals' attitude concerning the *moral status* of the acting group (e.g., they may become suspicious that something more important is being kept secret, or they may become much more respectful of the sincerity of the group).

2. Revealing tactical plans that will handicap the acting group may influence the rivals' attitudes concerning the *strength* of the acting group (e.g., admission of one's plans may be perceived as signs of weakness and ineptness in conducting the struggle or as signs of an exceptionally powerful movement that is capable of being successful without resorting to secrecy).

3. Predicting in advance the deprivations that will be inflicted upon the rivals may have the effect of increasing or decreasing the magnitude of frustration and the intensity of the aggressive impulses aroused when the deprivations subsequently materialized.

Thus investigating positive ethical means may lead to the discovery of a number of different mediating processes, some of which may tie in with broad sectors of theory and research in the human sciences.

Implicit in the foregoing discussion is the expectation that objective evaluations of the consequences of the positive ethical means will include careful investigation of the *unfavorable* outcomes as well as the favorable ones. Obviously, the research would have to be carried out in such a way as to detect readily any instance in which the outcome was the reverse of that specified in the foregoing list of favorable outcomes. In this connection it will be necessary to specify a number of additional dependent variables, representing other types of adverse outcomes. For example, a certain type of positive ethical means may prove to be extremely frustrating to the members who are committed to using it and incline some of them to become defensively *apathetic* and to *disaffiliate* themselves from the group. In some cases the intrapersonal conflicts engendered by prolonged suppression of aggressive impulses might conceivably engender a marked increase in *anxiety* or other *symptoms of emotional tension*. In the long run, consistent adherence to certain of the positive means might result in a marked change in the composition of the membership, with a preponderance of masochistic and other *deviant personalities* being attracted to it.

To detect such unfavorable consequences, the research investigator would need to be alert to any indications of unintended effects that arise in the course of carrying out empirical investigations. Comparisons of instances of favorable outcomes with those of unfavorable outcomes should provide valuable evidence concerning the conditions under which the use of various positive means does and does not lead to the intended effects.

Conditioning Factors

One major set of conditions determining favorable versus unfavorable outcomes has to do with the *combination* of positive means that are employed by the group. For example, admission of one's own plans and refraining from violence may be interpreted as weakness and perceived as relatively ineffective unless accompanied by visible sacrifices for one's own cause and a program of persistent, clear activity demonstrating the group's objectives. Moreover, the use of one means, such as refraining from violence, may strengthen the commitment to the group goal, and this intervening psychological change may facilitate the effective execution of other means, such as making visible sacrifices for one's cause. Thus it will be necessary to study the independent variables in combination and in interaction as well as singly.

The nature of the group struggle is another conditioning factor in the operation of these variables. At least three dimensions of group struggle must be taken into account.

The first dimension is the degree of conflict of interest relative to the community of interest between competing groups. It is generally assumed that non-violent means and positive ethical practices are more applicable to factions within the same institution, since they have so much in common, than to rival nations, where the conflict of interest is high. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the suicidal character of modern methods of violent group conflict has made this distinction less important, since the common interest in survival has become increasingly clear. In any case, it may be possible to discover auxiliary means of making common interests salient to rival nations and thereby increasing the chances of success for limiting international clashes to non-violent conflicts.

A second dimension concerns the psychological closeness of the group conflict to the people involved. The dynamics of enmity between close personal associates and distant peoples may be different. The distance between competing nations makes their struggle less intense on a personalized basis than that between rival factions in the same political party. On the other hand, the more remote, the fewer the reality checks and hence the easier it is for autistic perception, projected fantasies, and hostile distortions to play their role.

A third related dimension has to do with the degree of institutionalization of the channels, or means, of conducting group and national competition and conflict. Violent means of resolving personal and group conflicts may be a direct reflection of the personal aggression of the protagonists, as in frontier community violence, which is an anticipation of legal institutions. But more commonly at the group level, practices have become institutionalized so that there is no one-to-one correspondence between the warlike actions of a nation and the warlike character of its people (5). Most wars are probably fought not because the great majority want to fight but because they accept the legitimacy of the process which has led them into war. All these considerations suggest the need for taking into account the nature of the group struggle in studying the effectiveness of ethical forms of social action. In a final section some aspects of the institutionalization of aggression will be discussed.

Closely related to research on limiting conditions is another field of investigation comprising the study of psychological and social conditions which facilitate the willingness of group members to use the positive ethical principles referred to as the "independent variables." In other words, it is also necessary as part of a systematic program of research to consider the use of the positive means as *dependent* variables and to find out the predisposing factors which enable individuals and groups to limit themselves to positive ethical policies in their struggles with opposing groups.

III. Methods and Techniques

We envisage three phrases for the development, refinement, and testing of hypotheses about the peaceful resolution of intergroup conflicts. They need not constitute a discrete temporal sequence, since there is much to be gained from an overlap in the timing of the phases.

The first phase would consist of the use of existing data at two levels: documentary evidence and primary-source data. The former would call for comparative case studies of *historical instances* of social and political struggles in which the given action policies studies were and were not employed—e.g., studies of various radical, pacifist, religious, and nationalist movements whose social effects can be appraised from available documentary evidence. Primary-source data could be drawn from *interview and questionnaire studies* bearing on industrial conflict situations and factional disputes within social movements, military organizations, political parties, and schools. Of particular relevance would be data on the correlates of different demands and practices on the part of supervisors, union officials, military officers, political leaders, and teachers. This stage of the investigation would furnish some preliminary testing of hypotheses but would serve mainly for the more precise formulation of significant variables and their interrelationships.

The second phase would consist of field studies of *current* and *developing instances* of social and political struggles in which the given action policies are and are not being employed—e.g., collecting systematic interview data in United States southern communities where Negro organizations are attempting to bring about desegregation. The emphasis here would be upon specifying the relevant types of data in advance, whereas in the first phase the studies would be limited by the data which happen to be available. Again this stage could contribute both to the testing and to the reformulation of hypotheses.

The final or experimental phase would consist of field and laboratory experiments. The second phase gives better control over the collection of relevant data than the first, but adequate control of the operative variables requires the use of experimental techniques.

Field experiments, which involve the use of controlled experimental techniques in natural settings, have the advantage that the necessary controls can be taken into account in advance of the investigation. They also have the merit of dealing with the full power of social variables as they occur in a real community setting. Such experiments could be devised, for example, in connection with the program of a social or political group in which alternative action policies are carried out in equivalent towns. (E.g., the co-operation might be obtained of a research-minded national organization which is currently engaging in a social or political struggle within many different communities throughout the country. Certain local chapters in one designated set of communities might be asked to use a given action policy, whereas other chapters in an equivalent set of communities might be asked to use a contrasting action policy. The effects could be ascertained by interviewing representative samples within the two sets of communities and by using behavioral indexes such as incidence of overt violence on the part of rival groups, increases or decreases in membership of competing groups, etc.)

Laboratory experiments of the type employed in current research on group dynamics could investigate some of the variables of interest in contrived settings, but the manipulations would be relatively weak. The advantage of this method would be the possibility of isolating single variables and varying their strength fairly precisely, although within limited ranges. The most efficient use of this method would probably be to deal with very specific questions which might arise from field experiments about the properties of a given variable.

IV. Sample Hypotheses and Problems

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Influence of Instrumental Actions on Group Goals

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. . . repeated behavior of an antisocial character, though originally in the interests of altruistic social goals, will probably lead to the abandonment of those goals as directing forces for the individual. This proposition applies to the leaders as well as the followers within any group or organization.

There are at least four different considerations which make it likely that the long-run losses will offset the short-run gains whenever the leader of an altruistic movement indorses expedient means that are not consistent with the group's ultimate objectives. (1) If leaders justify bad means for good ends, it will create perceptual ambiguity for their followers. Many followers are not steeped in the ideology of the movement, and it is difficult for them to distinguish in many instances the means from the end. (2) They will have less confidence in the sincerity of a leader who is not prepared to sacrifice for the cause. His espousing of expediency may be interpreted by the members as indicating that he is taking the easy way and is not sufficiently devoted himself to take the harder route to his objectives. (3) To restore confidence, the leader is likely to resort to aggressive behavior toward his opponents, to impute to them an exaggerated evil intent, and even to advocate violence toward them. (4) Even a single opportunistic practice by a leader sets a precedent and makes subsequent opportunism easier for the leader and his followers to accept. Since the principle has already been compromised once, further compromise will do little additional harm.

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"Corrupting" Effects of Using Violent Means

Why and under what conditions would the use of violent means be expected to have extremely adverse effects on the individual participants in a social movement or organization? More specifically, what psychological changes within each participant might account for the following two consequences of the use of a violent means for the alleged purpose of attaining socially desirable goals: (a) an increase in the probability that such means will be used again in the future when similar, and perhaps even less demanding, occasions arise, and (b) a decrease in the probability that the group will work toward the achievement of socially desirable goals (i.e., violent means "corrupt" the ends)?

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1. Even when the violent means is socially sanctioned, the users may react with some degree of guilt (as a consequence of earlier moral training or as a consequence of generalization from non-sanctioned forms of violence). Guilt reactions may take the form of (a) high anticipation of being punished by the target group; (b) preoccupation with the question of whether or not the action was correct; and (c) affective disturbances, which may range from completely conscious feelings of guilt to vague feelings of uneasiness with no awareness of the source of the disturbance. One of the typical ways in which people attempt to reduce or counteract such guilt reactions is to attribute evil and immoral intentions to the target toward which their violence had been directed. Such attributions may enable a guilt-ridden person to justify the violent action to himself and to others; it may also involve a projection mechanism which operates as an unconscious technique for warding off guilt (3). The perception of the target as being extremely threatening and evil would have the double effect of (a) increasing the tendency to attack violently again in an effort to weaken the target, (b) decreasing one's willingness to work out compromises with the target group, and (c) altering the conception of humanitarian objectives in such a way as to exclude members of the target group.

2. Participating in any violent action may have the effect of weakening the internal superego controls which are the product of normal socialization . . . . A . . . learning process may go on in connection with each instance of group-sanctioned violent action such that the person's automatic superego controls are lessened and he becomes capable of indulging in more and more extreme forms of violence.

3. Social contagion effects may occur within a group or organization such that when a highly respected leader or member of the group uses a violent means under highly "justified" circumstances, other members of the group become less inhibited about engaging in similar acts of violence . . . .

Constructive Effects of Abstaining from Violence

The next question in the converse of the one just discussed: Why and under what conditions would *abstaining* from the use of sanctioned violent action be expected to have positive effects—e.g., decreasing the probability that violent means will be used in the future, increasing the probability that the group will work toward achieving its original humanitarian goals, and increasing members' adherence to the positive social objectives and moral standards which the group sponsors?

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. . . a given act of abstaining from sanctioned violence may involve a process of *emotional relearning* . . . when the members of a group adhere to a group decision to behave in a conciliatory rather than a hostile way, their anticipations about the dangerous consequences of non-violence may be brought more into line with reality. If their fear of being passive is thereby reduced to some extent, they will no longer be so strongly motivated to engage in violence on future occasions when confronted with a choice between violent and non-violent means of struggle against their opponents.

Guilt mechanisms may also play an important role in the internalization of non-violent norms. Insofar as any act of violence (whether sanctioned or not) generates some degree of guilt, at least a slight degree of emotional tension would be experienced by the average group member whenever he *anticipates* engaging in a future act of violence. A reduction in emotional tension might occur if, at the time when the group member is experiencing anticipatory guilt, a communication from a group leader or an expression of group consensus conveys the idea that the group's goals can be better achieved by abstaining from violence and by using an effective form of non-violent action instead. The decision to accept the recommendation would be reinforced by the *reduction of anticipatory guilt* . . . .

Attitude Changes Produced by Treating Opponents as Potential Allies

Many of the positive ethical means to which we have referred involve more than merely abstaining from violence. Among the examples which we have cited are such means as displaying an attitude of trust toward the members of opposing groups, maintaining friendly personal interactions with them, and seeking to understand their motives and attitudes by deliberately empathizing with them. Although somewhat different rationales for various positive means have been put forth by their proponents, all of them seem to point in the general direction of replacing a hostile, competitive, antagonistic approach by a policy of treating opponents as potential friends or allies. The hypotheses which follow pertain to the use of any positive ethical means or combination of such means, provided that they are employed on the basis of adhering to this general policy.

Just as in the case of using violent means, *social contagion* effects may occur when positive ethical means are used . . . . In this way, a process of acculturation may take place whereby a social technique evolved through the intelligence and ingenuity of others comes to be adopted by people who had formerly accepted, more or less unthinkingly, a general policy of dealing with opponents in a hostile manner.

Other psychological changes may also mediate the effects of adopting, on a tentative basis, the use of positive ethical means. Whenever a member of a group accepts a group decision to use an *unconventional* friendly approach to rivals, he is likely to feel it necessary to justify the fact that he is deviating from the expected course of action . . . . the effort to justify an act of friendly treatment may lead to cognitive restructurings and a shift in motivational pressures, which could contribute to two types of attitude change: (1) reduced hostility toward the rival group and (2) more favorable evaluations of the desirability of using positive means in general.

Nor are the beneficial effects of non-violence confined to the members of the group pursuing this policy. As group members take into consideration the positive attitudes of members of the out-group and stop reacting toward them as if they were deadly enemies, the out-group itself is under less pressure to be defensively aggressive. Thus the opponents may be influenced to engage in fewer acts of provocative hostility, and, in the long-run, some of their leaders and part of the membership may even become motivated to live up to the other group's view of them as potential allies.

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Some Further Consequences and Causes of Institutionalized Aggression

Our major problem today is not protection against the hostile elements among us as individuals capable of violence. Our major problem is with institutionalized forms of violence, as in conflicts between organized groups and nations. Such institutionalized aggression is accentuated by the presence of hostile people in certain situations, but the correlation between the amount and intensity of group conflict and the amount of latent hostility would not be high save under very special conditions. There are situations, however, in which the interaction of the two—personal hostility and institutional aggression—is of far-reaching significance, as in the opportunities which institutional channels may offer for the expression of latent hostility.

There are three psychological dangers in the institutionalization of violence which are worthy of special investigation: (1) the release of latent hostilities under conditions of social sanction of violence, (2) the apathetic condoning of any institutionally approved practice, and (3) the perpetuation and intensification of institutional violence.

1. *The release of latent hostilities under conditions of the sanctioning of violence.*—In Western society the antisocial nature of acts of aggression is communicated to children very early in the socialization process. Aggressive acts toward others are repeatedly censured and punished . . . . But, then, a curious reversal occurs. In certain contexts acts of violence are legitimized and sanctioned by groups and institutions. In times of war almost all sources

of authority within each nation assert that it is noble and proper to kill for one's country. The social support for the antisocial action generally has three elements: the justification of a moral purpose, the justification of legitimacy, and the justification that others approve. Since the traditional inhibitor of violence has been the social environment, violence can assume intense and bizarre forms when the inhibitor is transformed into the facilitator. This is the classic theory of crowd behavior. (6). But whereas in the crowd the social support is limited and temporary, in organized groups the support is more extensive and continuing. Thus within the areas where aggression is socially sanctioned, individuals can resolve their conflicts by indulging their worst impulses and by attaining social recognition and reward for so doing.

One danger in the social sanctioning of violence is that the release of hostility will go far beyond the bounds of what is sanctioned. Supposedly appropriate force is invoked on an objective and impersonal basis to accomplish the group's purpose. In practice, however, the way is open for abuses of various sorts.

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. . . Our contention is that people may perceive and react differently to personal, as against institutional, violence. The former is more identifiable and leads to more personalized resentment, since it is felt to be a direct attack upon the self. The latter induces in its victims more displacement and more generalized hostility. Frequently, however, in the case of sanctioned violence which permits the expression of latent hostility we have a pattern combining both types of aggression. The chances are that this combination will be perceived by its victims as the most unjust of all aggression. There is a tendency to personalize actions which are in any way injurious to the self. In this instance, however, the afflicted individual is right, since there is personal animus in his punisher. But, unlike purely personal aggression, there is no recourse to any form of counteraggression, since the punishment is legal and proper. Moreover, the victim has limited opportunity for even verbally blowing off steam against his opponent. The result is often intense generalized hatred. Where the situation becomes completely intolerable, it may result in identification with the aggressor.

This combination of institutional violence and personal aggression is one reason why group conflicts become intensified over time and become difficult of solution, even when there is a good objective basis for solution. . . .

2. *The apathetic condoning of institutional practices.*—Another danger lies in the passive acceptance of any violence perpetrated by one's own group or even by a rival group if it has some legal sanction. This is a different response from vicarious indulgence in one's own impulses toward violence

and has not received adequate attention. Since the act of force is institutionally sanctioned, it is perceived by many as an objective event. There is no sense of personal outrage, even if the action is directed at deviant group members. This passive acceptance of violence sanctioned by the group, which would otherwise be regarded as basically wrong, is often the result of a compartmentalization in thinking and attitude . . . .

In general, people as group members will condone actions by group representatives which they will not approve of for themselves as individuals. In time the punishments used against individual members by the group will tend to be brought into line with the punishments approved of by members in their personal lives. Brutal forms of physical punishment tend to be dropped from public institutions after they are no longer approved of in interpersonal relations. But in the area of group actions in relation to other groups we permit types of behavior that we do not countenance among individuals. Though such a dual set of standards can be defended, the danger is that the justification comes to rest not on practice and its consequences but on a social myth which asserts the unquestioned prerogative of the institution qua institution. The corrupting effect of such condoning of institutional aggression can be seen in war and postwar periods when encroachments are made on individual and civil liberties. Self-seeking politicians under some cloak of governmental authority can carry such threats to an extreme and still secure the acquiescence of many people, since such institutional attacks against our enemies, external and internal, are assumed to be their legitimate function.

3. *The perpetuation and intensification of institutional violence.*—Personal aggression, lacking institutional supports, is sporadic and variable. When violence becomes an accepted part of the practice of an organization, it not only is perpetuated but tends to grow much like other parts of the organization. This perpetuation and intensification of institutional aggression comes about in three ways: (a) the setting-up of specialized roles, (b) role adaptation, or the effects of taking roles upon personalities, and (c) role selection, or the tendency toward a fit between unusual roles and personality types.

a) By creating special roles, organizational structures do not rely upon chance factors for the performance of various functions but make such performance the systematic work of trained experts. In addition to the motivation intrinsic to the role, the institution enlists a variety of organization motivations such as monetary rewards, promotion or upgrading, group acceptance, etc. Moreover, in any sector of an organization people occupying given roles tend to make their role functions as important as possible, partly because of self-interest in their careers, partly for the encouragement of morale, and partly because of the psychological prominence of their own tasks compared to others they know less about. The armed forces or the FBI is like any other part of a bureaucratic structure in seeking bigger appropriations and more personnel.

b) In the earlier discussion of the effects of instrumental actions upon group goals it was pointed out that such actions affect the value system of the individual. Role behavior, like any other form of behavior, leads to its rationalization. Personal values are brought into line with the individual's action. What he does, he may do as his job, but after a time he sees this as necessary, important, and desirable. Even in those cases where the role is not originally congenial to the personality pattern of its occupant, remaining in the role results in modification of the personality. To be a member of a combat force and to hold pacifist values produces intense internal conflict. If the individual cannot readily escape from the behavioral demands of a role, he will tend to accept the rationalization provided by the organization in order to dull the sharp edges of the conflict. In time, this acceptance undermines old values and builds up a new value system. Thus role adaptation means not only carrying out the required behavior but justifying it as a desirable course of action. Every occupational and professional group develops an ideology which is supportive of its practices to the extent of occasional idealization of its functions. In the same fashion the military, police, and custodial vocations develop values consonant with their behavior.

c) There is a tendency toward a fit between unusual institutional roles and basic personality patterns. The general notion of the fit between bureaucratic roles and personality has probably been overdone, but there is a good deal of truth in the thesis when we are dealing with unusual roles which call for atypical patterns of motivation and behavior. The censor of pornographic literature may sometimes be suspected of enjoying his duty. When an institution permits violence as part of its function, people will be attracted to this role who derive satisfactions from the nature of the work. Thus there is a self-selection process for brutal roles. In the police forces of some American cities, among prison guards, and in the strong-arm squads of some labor unions there will be individuals who gravitate to and remain in these roles (when there are equally well-paid positions open to them elsewhere) who are of a special personality type. Before the professionalization of American police forces there were many cities in which it was not always easy to distinguish between the member of the third-degree squad and the criminal he was bringing to justice.

Institutional support for roles of violence can be a corrupting factor within an organization far more than is generally realized. Even though not all roles of violence are filled by persons with strong needs to discharge sadistic or hostile impulses, such personalities can readily dominate their part of the organization. Less congenial personalities for these roles will tend to drop out over time. The more brutal individuals will remain and, through their continuity in the organization and their greater motivation, will set the pattern of accepted practice. Moreover, their mutual reinforcement of one another may intensify brutal practices and perpetuate them. The history of some concentration camps illustrates this trend. Brutal practices in prisons and among police forces have been difficult to uproot because it would mean the wholesale dismissal of large groups of people—those guilty of flagrant violations and those who are virtual accomplices in such violations.

V. Summary

The purpose of this paper was to show the applicability of the research methods of behavioral science to problems of group conflict and interpersonal hostility. The particular frame of reference employed is that of social psychology. Applications from the concepts and techniques of this field are made to certain aspects of the use of violence and of constructive methods in achieving group goals. A section on methods, moreover, outlines both a general strategy for research investigation and the more specific techniques called for at the tactical level. Some of the normative propositions from Arne Naess's analysis of the Gandhian ethical system are examined as the basis for empirical studies. Particular attention is given to the effects of the use of violence and of abstaining from violence in terms of the psychological processes involved. The concluding part of the paper discusses factors making for the perpetuation and intensification of institutionalized aggression.

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Observations on the European Integration Process

JAN J. SCHOKKING AND NELS ANDERSON

The countries of western Europe are drawing closer together, becoming increasingly linked in matters affecting the basic conditions of their subsistence. Bonds dating back to older days are gradually being reinforced. Each day new bonds are being established. Often the reinforcing and weaving, not always evident in the process, become clearly evident over time.

These developments, with all the occurrences included, have come to be identified as the "process of European integration." It should, however, be recognized that the term "integration" is objectionable in some circles. To the objectors it suggests a rise of power and influence outside the nation-state, and the establishment of authorities to which the several nations, even if retaining some measure of control over these authorities, might be subordinated. Many seem prompted by the fear that in the process of integration the individual nations would lose their identity. Therefore they emphatically resist the introduction of a vocabulary which may be suggestive of the thing they fear. Those holding this view would avoid "integration" as a tempting word susceptible of acquiring symbolic values.

To be sure, "integration" is not a neutral word. On the contrary, it is a loaded term. However, since no better seems available, we have decided to use it. Any other word that might be considered a suitable substitute would be equally loaded, or might become so. Moreover, there is no escape from the conflict of attitudes which so often finds expression in disagreement about terminology.

Europe, indeed, is being integrated. Integration, as we see it, is an on-going process, one having many phases. Some of these phases are easily

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identified while others may not be so. Our task is to indicate the meanings that are attached to the "integration" concept, and this we do without entering into the controversy about its suitability.

European integration embraces the merging of interests and the entering upon systematic cooperation between governments on a permanent basis. This is paralleled by similar moves on the part of private organizations. Integration may involve at the same time public-to-public, public-to-private as well as private-to-private relationships, or some combination of these.

Integration may appear in different forms and may vary as to its contents. It involves the coming together of actors to perform a task in a problem situation and their mutual adjustment while performing the task, at the same time relating the task to other areas of interest and activity affected by it or by which it is influenced. The actors may be public bodies or private organizations. Not infrequently their individual reactions to each other in the situation demanding joint effort may involve tensions. Insofar as the actors eventually do perform the task, do abate the tensions, and do coordinate their interests and activities, integration is being initiated. Integration will come fully into effect if the actors are able to continue the relationships under mutually accepted rules. If they are able in these efforts to keep competition under control and to resolve tensions, this in large part is what integration means.

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Levels and Degrees of Integration

We have been speaking of integration as the mutual adjustment of interacting parties to a common situation. It is no less a continuing process of mutual adjustment accompanied by a mutual accumulation of experience. Precisely because the common situation is normally in process of change, continuous mutual adjustment is necessary. Continuous mutual adjustment is reflected in relationship changes, in behavior changes and in value changes. As the old ways change for new ones, the goals of integration change accordingly. Thus integration as a process is dynamic and tends to generate its own dynamism.

The European integration process reflects degrees of dynamism at different times, in different places, under different circumstances, or among different groups. It gains momentum with time, but at times one country may be more inclined to promote it than another. It may gain or lose momentum under different circumstances, as it gained momentum in Europe during the Korean War. It tends to move with greater facility among those directly responsible for the conduct of public and private affairs than with the general population. Hence we may think of degrees of integration.

All sections of the people become aware of integration when their interests are affected. When governments join hands, the individual is somehow always affected. When the departments of governments have agreed to follow a common course, the interests of citizens are at stake, perhaps their fate.

We think of the individual as performing in different roles: his political role as citizen; his economic role as worker; his social role as neighbor or family member. Other roles are obvious, each being an interest area. These roles are, of course, interrelated, and, with respect to the European integration process, all may be affected; but one role may at certain times be more affected than another. Among the 165 million individuals in the Europe of the Inner Six we can think of different ways each will be affected by one aspect or another of the integration process. If one is affected negatively to "the point of pain," he will more than likely express his discomfort and displeasure to friends, neighbors, and family. He may be less vocal if he is favorably affected, but in any case he will become involved in discussions, even in heated arguments.

However the individual may be affected by events in the integration process, he will not be alone. He will be among many in one group or other. These groups may find it expedient to voice the complaints of their members or express their satisfaction. Here are two types of relationships, those of individuals in the mass and those of organized groups. These may be called the level of personal contact and the organizational level. Personal contact is present at the organizational level, but at this level there is a united voice; the organization speaks for the many.

Integration at the Governmental Level

The nature of the integration process is general and all embracing. It originates from many sources. Its beginnings cannot be attributed to any single initiative. Nor is it permissible exclusively to identify the advance of integration either with any specific kind of action or with the line of conduct followed by any specific type of acting agency.

Nonetheless, particular emphasis should be laid on the behavior of national governments, as these may respond to urges pushing toward integration for political reasons. Governments may realize that the unique position they have as seats of final authority might turn out to be untenable. The minimum of military protection needed may be lacking. They may do likewise for reasons of an economic or social nature and therefore in the field of domestic policy. The means at the disposal of the several governments may not suffice to meet the wants of the civil society, the "société globale" which they are called upon to serve. However, when yielding to such political and social demands, they are embarking upon a road at the end of which final authority may no longer rest exclusively with them. Other institutions besides the nation-state may concern themselves with the vital necessities and continuing interests of all the people. Thus governments may be reluctant to take the irreversible steps. Their pride and honor is involved, which, according to the self-image of the people they rule, are the pride and honor of the nation as a distinct group bent on preserving its own cohesion and exclusiveness. They may hold back because in democracies their authority rests on the consent and recognition of the national community, the social ambitions of which they embody and try to realize. It is not always possible to guarantee in advance that integration actions at the governmental level will not give birth to powers uncontrolled by democratic devices, which are devoid of a democratic foundation.

Such doubts, though justified, cannot be regarded as ultimately decisive. Sheer necessity, however impelling it may be, which if in calling the tune in perfect isolation might easily result in "totalitarian" perversion of integrative measures, takes command only in periods of revolutionary outbursts or under the tensions of all-out war. Normally other factors come into play.

The governments of modern welfare states operate impersonally. While serving the citizens, they usually do so in part by working with the organizations in which groups of citizens are members. It is in terms of these internal services that the departments of national governments may extend their activities over the borders to establish relationships with counterparts in other countries. Government departments have done this for many decades, and they can make these contacts within the pattern of existing powers. European governments, especially since about 1947, have both multiplied the contacts at the administrative level and have entered into various cross-border arrangements at the ministerial level. The latter involve new types of relationships, the pattern for which must be established by conventions or treaties, after which the manipulation of the contracts become functions at the administrative level.

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Integration at Organizational Level

Industrial urban society could hardly manage its affairs without the large private organizations through which people find expression for their diverse interests. With the increasing massiveness and complexity of society the number and variety of organizations representing the interests of the individual in his different roles have increased.[9]

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[9] Landheer seems to regret the large organizations. "The individual creates large groups, either because he is ambitious or because necessity forces him into it. It is this second type of unity that Europe is witnessing, and out of this type of unity a new culture is emerging which has in reality very little to do with the culture of the past" (18).

Organizations in the complex society do much for the individual that he cannot do so well for himself. His organization protects his interests against competing organizations, and it speaks for him before public authority. It represents him as one of its members (12, p. 123). Particularly in the complex society it is almost exclusively through organizations that the individual partakes in the strains and stresses as well as in the good fortunes of contemporary existence. Organizations provide him the opportunity to work. They steadily improve the efficiency of his work, give articulate expression to his wishes, protect his interests, in short, "they formalize his status and hence make him more secure in it" (3, p. 18).

It should be remembered that not so long ago the individualistic view prevailed, which refused to comprehend groups as distinct units, representing more than merely the arithmetical sum of their members. If meeting with the requirements of enacted law, they were regarded as legal persons. In the moral sense, however, it was not recognized that they could have any standing of their own.[10]

The real power of such private organizations comes undoubtedly to a large extent from the number and influence of their members. Yet it stems also from the strength of the group-consciousness of their members and the vigor of their common attachment to the group aim. Burdeau rightly observes: "the manifestations of the collective consciousness are endowed with so strong a power that in the face of it a purely individualistic explanation has no chance of being sufficient."[11] This does not necessarily imply that the group should be regarded as an independent being, capable to react as such, Burdeau continues. Quoting Durkheim (9, p. 127), he adds that "both the group cause and its aim are situated beyond the individuals wanting to go in for these. Consequently, their nature is extra-individual, objective, general. They may impress a larger or a smaller number of individuals, evoke with the inherent similar sentiments and orient their action in the same direction, thus establishing between them a cohesive bond and unity of action."[12]

Indeed, organized groups have their goals for which they strive in concert. They evoke their tradition. They create common loyalties and antipathies. Obviously, the trade union is a group of persons with common feelings which can act together. It would be rash to say that a cooperative society does not embody a moral principle.

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[10] This view is still defended by Ernest Barker (2, p. 71).

[11] "Ses manifestations sont douées d'une puissance en face de laquelle une explication purement individualiste reste inévitablement insuffisante" (6, p. 46).

[12] "En fait, un sentiment est collectif, non parce qu'il serait éprouvé par être indépendant, le groupe doué de réactions propres, non pas mais (Durkheim) parce que sa cause et son terme—étant situés en dehors des individus qui l'éprouvent—sont extérieurs, objectifs, généraux par conséquent, c'est-à-dire capable d'impressioner une pluralité d'individus, de faire naître chez eux des sentiments analogues, d'orienter leur action dans le même sens, bref de créer entre eux un lien de cohésion et une unité d'action" (6, p. 46).

Private organizations may function at the local, national, regional-multinational or world-wide international levels. We see in Europe that some organizations actively try to influence public bodies at the first three, and sometimes at all four, levels. Depending on conditions, their methods may differ at each level. Of the relationship between government and private organizations at the national level (and it holds for other levels), MacIver wrote:

> In approaching the functions of government it is well to remember that government is never a free agent disinterestedly engaged in adjusting its activities to the needs of the times. Every government is caught up in a complex of interests, takes sides in this struggle, shifts its ground as one side or another gains, maneuvers for advantage, and strives through it all to remain in power. Every government is in some measure opportunistic. It dare not alienate any compact body of its supporters. It dare not act so as to strengthen its opponents. It is at the mercy of some range of public opinion, according to the social situation [19, pp. 317–18].

Normally, the interests represented by organizations at the multinational level are the same for which they stand in their respective countries, but the multinational situation may be more complex. They either stand alone in the wider arena or they join with their counterparts from other countries in forming some amalgamated European body, making for a common front. This may present difficulties. National differences may become obstacles. Similar organizations from France, Germany, and Italy may agree on principles in the abstract, but they disagree about some concrete program. German and Italian trade unions may join hands in demanding higher living standards for all workers, but if a common labor market would permit workers of lower living standards to move from Italy to Germany, German trade unions would more than likely put on the brakes. The European public body, in cooperation with interested private organizations in the respective countries, would have to face this problem. It would most likely be resolved by some type of compromise, and there might be a series of compromises after which the problem would disappear or change.

As national governments do in the several countries, so the multinational bodies concerned with pertinent problems may find themselves in between cross-border differences involving worker groups and employer groups. If a multinational body clothed with authority is preparing to establish some rule to regulate economic competition within its region, it would normally consult with the interested private organizations. This has been the course followed by the Coal and Steel Community. This is perhaps the first multinational body to establish a standing consultative committee whose members represent the organizations for labor, industry, and distributors in the member countries (25, pp. 34, 57–58).

These recognized private groups are coming to be known as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's). We note in the 1958 report of the

European Conference of Ministers of Transport that appreciation is expressed for the cooperation that body has received from the "international non-governmental organizations" (II). The Council of Europe recognizes three categories of organizations:

A. Organizations with a special interest in European problems and operating within the European area. Example: the European League for Economic Cooperation
B. Organizations which may be European but may not have a special interest in European problems as such. Example: European Youth Campaign
C. Organizations of a more general nature

The list of recognized organizations would be different from one regional or world body to another, depending on the areas and interest of these.[13] As experience is gained, the non-governmental organizations will move out of the sphere of merely being recognized to an active role in the functioning of these multinational bodies. As already mentioned, the Coal and Steel Community has its consultative committee. Following this pattern, the 1958-established European Economic Community has its economic and social committee of 101 members who represent for the six countries the interests of industry, agriculture, transportation, and trade. While this committee has only consultative status, the fact that it is being consulted deserves to be stressed. It is a composite body in which the inerests of the special groups are debated.

Of these private groups, competing or cooperating at the multinational level, each according to its nature has lines of contact with its branches and its members in the home country. While communication moves up through the organization from the members and down from the control centers to the members, each of these organizations has its own identity, its own dynamism and continuing purposes. It is influenced by its members, and it has influence over its members. Yet it stands somewhat apart, as well as above, its members. In representing its members, the organization makes its own decisions regarding the means for achieving generally defined ends. This applies especially to very large organizations, administratively more removed from the members.

It is possible that private organizations operating at the international level enjoy even more freedom of action than they do at the national level. This enables them to enter into combination with other organizations as negotiations for advantage move in one direction or another. What is important in this connection is that, whether these non-governmental organizations compete or cooperate, they function in a sphere with which their members are less familiar than the national sphere. As they coordinate their activities, without losing their identity or diminishing their integrity, they develop not only working relationships but also rules for working together. Their functioning on the European scene becomes an important phase of the integration process. They stand as middlemen between constituted authority and their memberships.

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[13] *The Special List of Non-Governmental Organizations of the International Labour Organization* recognizes two categories: (*a*) those having an important interest in a wide range of ILO activities and with which it has decided to establish consultative relations; (*b*) those having a special interest in some particular sector of the work of ILO and which may, from time to time, be invited to be represented at special meetings during the consideration of matters of interest to them. *Ad hoc* arrangements are made from time to time with organizations not in either of these categories (34, pp. 47–48).

Integration and Official Initiative

One important aspect of European integration developments is that they are essentially positive. Most of the newly created European institutions are active, having purposes and programs. In one way or another they take the initiative. Certainly they are not coordinated as some would wish, or their programs seem to overlap, or they seem to be working at cross-purposes. But they are working, not "sitting tight" in the traditional way of public bodies. The "welfare state" policies, since 1945 adopted in some form or another by all European countries, gave a new impetus to the tendency to set up dynamic multinational administrations, the need for which in prewar days had already become apparent. At that time economic nationalism and all it implied retained the upper hand. Yet everywhere the deficiencies of the methods then employed were fully recognized.

When the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, in May, 1950, proposed a plan for a coal and steel community, much was said about the element of surprise (13, pp. 327–28). It was a surprise only in that Schuman had not previously taken his British and American counterparts into his confidence. The plan itself was not new. Over a period of several months there had been a number of proposals to establish authorities in one or more of the basic industries: coal, steel, electric power, and transport (13, p. 336). It was less the surprise element than the concreteness of the Schuman Plan that stirred imaginations. It was a spelled-out scheme for approaching and performing a definite task. It was a call for action to get something done. The United Kingdom, as was to be expected, could not support the proposal because, as Harold Macmillan told the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the British people would not accept any plan that might encroach upon national sovereignty. The countries that joined the plan were more receptive (7, p. 24).

In the six countries that joined the Coal and Steel Community all types of opposition to the Schuman Plan found expression, but the prevailing opinions were favorable. Some of the negative opinion was probably less expressive of opposition than of fear that such an organization could not be fairly or effectively administered—essentially "it-can't-be-done" attitudes.

The agency was designed to take the initiative in performing a multinational function. Perhaps never before had a multinational body been endowed with such a positive mandate and clothed with the authority needed for the task.

It turned out that the High Authority, administrative organ of the Community, enjoyed more power on paper than in fact. However free it was from control by the Council of Ministers, it could not disregard that organ which represented the governments of the Community. Without its cooperation, the High Authority could not in full confidence go forward with its work of establishing common markets for coal and steel. All available good will was needed (14, pp. 587–94).

From one viewpoint, the basic task of the High Authority could be called negative. It was a forbidding and enforcement task; for example:

1. To require the national governments to discontinue border tariffs and quotas respecting coal and steel as they concerned other Community countries, and to refrain from extending financial aid to coal or steel enterprises in their own countries.
2. To forbid resort by coal or steel enterprises to competitive practices that might disadvantage coal or steel enterprises in other Community countries. Thus the use of double price lists and formation of monopoly distribution cooperations would be discontinued.
3. To prevent coal or steel enterprises within the Community from forming cartel-like organizations, or the distribution of products to the advantage of some consumers and to the injury of others.

In performing these functions, the High Authority assumed a responsibility for the Community that the national governments had previously assumed in their own countries. However, in cross-border matters the national governments often condoned or even participated in practices which were injurious to competitors in other countries. Now a type of positive regulation had been established in an area where previously none existed, except on a voluntary basis, and the responsibility rested with the High Authority.

But the High Authority was free to perform other functions: provide housing for workers; develop programs for training workers; aid workers in migrating from one work area to another; provide funds to improve production methods in coal and steel; take the intiative in promoting more effective transport. In performing these functions, which are definitely positive, the High Authority acquired a definite leadership identity.

One of the first official acts of the High Authority in 1952 was the imposition of a levy on coal and steel production, effective January 1, 1953. The "first European Tax" provided funds to operate the agency, and the right to impose it was not challenged. It was a directly imposed tax without the intermediate participation of the national governments. In February, 1953, the High Authority established the common market for coal, and in May, 1953, the common market for steel was established.

Role of Court of Justice

As the High Authority was an important first multinational administrative step, so the Court of Justice, about which there had been great skepticism, was the important first step in the jurisdictional realm. The main function of the court was to judge the actions of the High Authority when and as complaints were brought in. Its sources of law were mainly the treaty and its annexes. We summarize briefly the court's jurisdiction, as outlined by Mason:

1. Judging complaints from one Community organ against another
2. Judging complaints of States or enterprises against the High Authority
3. Ruling on complaints of damages against the High Authority
4. Hearing complaints against sanctions imposed by the High Authority
5. Settling disputes between member States regarding the Treaty
6. Rendering opinions on the application or interpretation of the Treaty
7. Judging appeals to suspend decisions of the High Authority
8. Ruling on its own jurisdiction in cases involving organs of the Community brought before national courts
9. Judging complaints against officials of the Community organs [20, pp. 42–45]

Perhaps it was the court more than any other organ of the Community which exemplified what concerted multinational administration really meant. The court was called upon to judge the legality of actions taken or actions proposed, although only as complaints were brought to it.

The court may not, and it has not intruded itself into the administrative work of the High Authority, nor has it made economic decisions, these being outside its scope. But the court could not function without taking economic evidence into account, and its decisions did have administrative pertinence. They set guideposts for future High Authority action within the mandate of the treaty. Moreover, these court rulings served to guide others who might be affected by High Authority decisions and orders. Since the area in which the High Authority operates is continually competitive, any of its actions might lead to court appeals in matters on which the court has not yet ruled.

While the relation of the court (which has in the meanwhile become the Court of Justice for the three European communities) to the High Authority appears to be negative, and while some of its decisions have been against the High Authority, its influence has been positive. Because the court *is there*, the High Authority stands in a firm position for venturing. It gives a position of stability to the Coal and Steel Community on the strength of which the High Authority has been able to secure loans (one from the

United States and one from Switzerland) for promoting developments in coal and steel.

Moreover, since the court *is there*, having become a continuing part of the continuing integration process, firmness is extended to the status of the High Authority. With this background support, the High Authority has been able to demonstrate the possibilities of multinational public administration, paving the way for the acceptance of that more comprehensive community, the common market.

Court of Justice in Operation

A point of interest is that the first four appeals made to the court did not come to trial. Either because the appellants were uncertain about the outcome or because some adaptation had been made by the High Authority, the cases were withdrawn before the oral hearings.

The first case to reach the trial stage was a complaint lodged by the French government on February 9, 1954, asking the annulment of High Authority decisions forbidding the use of double price lists. The court ruled that the High Authority had acted according to its mandate, although the order as issued was unworkable in some respects.

Such decisions served to clarify the treaty and to pave the way for a refinement of procedures. Decisions of the court served to firmly establish the image of the Coal and Steel Community, and we may say they contributed to the educational influence of the integration process.

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What is pertinent to our analysis is that the court, least vocal of all the European institutions created so far, has probably been the most inspiring of confidence in the integration process. Evidence of this confidence is the enlargement of the court's jurisdiction. It is now the Court of Justice for the three European committees.

Integration as Shared Experience

It may be said that the Coal and Steel Community established precedents in multinational administration, and it set the essential pattern of multinational negotiation. It demonstrated that such operations need not encroach upon the sensitive areas of national sovereignty. Indeed, there seems to be some truth in the thesis of Pound, asserting that states can work together multinationally without encroachment on sovereignty much as the state in its area can operate under law without encroachment on the personality of the citizen (22, pp. 7–8).

The Coal and Steel Community program has been a pilot experience shared by organizations and groups in many ways. The first point of pertinence lies in its creation when the time was ripe. Had the idea been postponed two years, it might not have been so readily accepted. The second point of pertinence is that it began as a legally constituted body, a matter of fact operation in a basically economic field. Its milieu was one in which experts worked with the facts in competitive economic relationships, for the High Authority functions in the midst of continually clashing interests.

A third point of pertinence is that this pilot project functioned in the midst of continuous observation. It was especially in the focus of attention of practical people affected by it, persons much more interested in actual operations than in the European movement as such. Much of this scrutiny is now being transferred from Luxembourg to Brussels, the seat of the European Economic Community, which in part is an outgrowth of the pilot project, although much wider in the scope of its activity and intimately touching more people.

The fourth point of pertinence about the Coal and Steel Community may be called psychological. As a shared experience, it tends to present the idea of European integration in terms of ordinary everyday happenings and interests. Integration is coming to be seen as a step-by-step resolving of competitive situations. How this growing interest is being formed would involve a great amount of opinion research and a series of periodic studies of the influence of the various mass media. What we can say is that in 1960 the integration process is understood more in terms of programs and practical specific issues than was possible a decade ago.

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Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-Nation Relations

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HAROLD GUETZKOW

Résumé

This paper develops a theory of how groups meet their members' demands. It is argued that members of social units obtain satisfaction of their economic, cultural, and political needs through participation in social groups, including states or nations. It posits that changing environmental conditions may give rise to new needs or demands on the part of the members of groups. It argues that these new demands may be realizable either through self-reliant policies pursued in isolation or through relations with other political and social units. The theory is concerned particularly with national behaviors—be they individual or group, official or unofficial—which constitute the external responses of people comprising nation-states.

The model essentially consists of the opposition of the two sets of factors. The direction of behavior of a group is schematized as the resultant balance between the strength of factors driving and/or attracting behavior inward and the strength of those factors pushing and/or pulling toward collaboration. The paper discusses factors influencing the choice in each of the two directions and predicts that the individual's and group's behavior at any given time will be determined by the balance between these factors. The direction of behavior of the group is hypothesized to be conditioned upon such past history and current realities as the following:

1.1 and 1.2. The satisfactoriness or unsatisfactoriness of the group's experiences with its self-reliance versus its experiences with collaborative measures.

2.1 and 2.2. The degree to which the ideologies of the group's members are isolationist or collaborative.

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3.1 and 3.2. The extent to which self-reliant means seem practical and advantageous versus the extent to which collaborative means seem feasible and advantageous.

3.3. The extent to which the group's task requires interdependence on other groups or allows the group to pursue its goal in isolation.

4.1. The degree to which the group's leadership perceives isolation or collaboration as supporting or destroying its elite positions.

4.2. The extent to which the members of the group think of collaborative relations as interfering with successful self-reliance.

In addition to factors which give directionality to the behavior of groups, the model hypothesizes that there are auxiliary factors, which may facilitate or hinder the extent to which the group achieves isolation or collaborative, such as:

5.1. The extent to which the groups which interact have common and congruent, rather than contradictory and conflictful, elements in their cultural backgrounds and language-thought processes.

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A Theory of Intergroup Relations

Kinds of Demands

Groups in general are organized to meet human needs; their structures and processes are in part molded by these needs. In the case of a relatively comprehensive and broad-based group, there may be a great range and variety of needs which its members look upon it to fulfil. We can distinguish three basic areas of needs or demands at the level of the nation: (1) economic needs, from the simplest, most fundamental needs for food, clothing, and shelter, to those needs expressed through complex economic relationships, such as access to raw materials, maintenance of high levels of employment and investment, and the like; (2) social-cultural needs, such as intellectual-artistic activities, religious institutions, satisfactory customs for the regulation of primary and secondary group relations, etc.; and (3) political needs. Because of my special interest in this third area, political demands will be broken into three subgroups:

a) Security needs, including protection against coercion by other members of the group itself and by other groups.

b) Group loyalty needs, including the need to identify with and belong to a social unity.

c) Prestige needs, including those satisfied by wielding power.

These needs are universal, although their intensity varies among persons and groups from nation to nation. As empirical work in this area develops, it will be profitable to specify them in more detail with some exactness.

Factors Which Determine How Demands Will Be Met

The basic hypotheses of the model follow:

1. If new demands arise or members believe their existing demands are not being met satisfactorily, one or both of the following responses may occur: (*a*) members may try to satisfy their demands self-reliantly by making internal changes in the group itself, acting in isolation from other groups; and/or (*b*) members may try to satisfy their demands through co-operation with other, external groups by collaboration. Should neither of these alternatives succeed, the demands themselves might be changed, restructuring the alternative responses.
2. If the needs of group members are relatively constant and relatively well satisfied, there will not be any significant impulse for change.

When members of the group are self-reliant, they may seek fulfilment of their demands through the central institutions of the group itself or in a decentralized way through the institutions of its subgroups. For example, in a depression, needs might be met by setting welfare and redevelopment agencies at the national and/or at the local level. When, on the other hand, group members are motivated toward collaboration, they also may seek fulfilment of their demands in a variety of ways. At the local, individual level, for example, citizens may leave the group as emigrants when employment levels are low. Action may also be taken at the institutional level, as when the government, in the very process of making emigration arrangements, initiates interstate co-operation. Or members of different national units may have relations with one another through non-governmental organizations, such as trading companies, professional societies for the exchange of scientific information, and the like.

It should not be especially difficult to categorize particular acts of particular states as "self-reliant" and "collaborative." There will be borderline cases, of course. However, the huge mass of empirical evidence available should make conclusive testing possible. . . . The more difficult, though surmountable, problem will be selecting a field of events to submit to the classification process. One can work with such universes of events as congressional acts for preliminary empirical work, until one focuses more exactly the type of events one wishes to sample.

Whether the unit turns toward self-help or toward interstate relations depends upon many factors. The essay now enumerates some of these factors, with attention to the underlying sociopsychological mechanisms involved in each.

Past Experience Factors

The first set of factors is concerned with the impact of past occurrences upon a group's internal and external relationships. The effect of these past occurrences is exerted by means of learning mechanisms which have been under investigation by psychologists for a number of years.

1.1. Self-reliant experience hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the more consistently and the more fully members' needs have been satisfied through internal or self-reliant measures, the greater the tendency for members to seek solutions to their new needs in isolation.*

This tendency to continue using self-reliant devices arises because members are conditioned by a successful past to expect that the state, or non-governmental institutions within the state, will meet their needs in the future. This is the "transfer" or "generalization" mechanism at work (15). Thus when the group has been functioning well, there are likely to be strong tendencies toward self-reliant behavior. When, on the other hand, members have had unsatisfactory experiences with their group, they are considerably less likely to turn toward their own institutions for the achievement of their demands.

1.2. Collaborative experience hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the more satisfactorily group members have been able to solve their past problems through intergroup relations, the more likely they are to collaborate with other groups when new needs arise.*

This proposition involves the same socio-psychological mechanism as does Hypothesis 1.1. In this case, if members of states succeed in satisfying some of their demands through relations with other states, the satisfaction will be generalized or transferred to expectations regarding future relations. If, on the other hand, the group's past experience with other groups has been unsatisfactory, then its members will tend to avoid such relations in the future. This phase of the hypothesis is particularly important, for it invalidates the widespread notion that sheer contact between nations necessarily produces collaboration. The contact must be satisfying to the parties concerned in order to increase the likelihood of its being attempted again. . . .

Note that in any given situation both these variables are operating simultaneously. It is possible that the self-reliance variable (1.1) might be weak, while the collaboration variable (1.2) is strong, as is illustrated by the receptivity of Japan to United States aid after World War II. Or, contrariwise, the experience with internal measures might be positive and with external relations negative, as some contend was the case in Stalinist Russia. Or both factors might be relatively strong, with conflicts arising because of the contradictory pressures felt by the citizenry, as in France during its first decade after World War II. This simultaneous operation of factors is an integral feature of the model, as will be evident in the remainder of the essay.

Empirical work on these two hypotheses might be carried through by coding successes and failures in the major historical experiences of a group over an extended period of time. The coding procedures now being developed in the social sciences (3, 6) could be adapted to indicate the extent and intensity of a nation's successes and failures in solving its economic, cultural, and political problems. Classifying the events into those dependent upon self-reliant behavior and those involving interstate relations would then yield a crude measure of the two factors.[2]

Ideological Factors

But past occurrences are not the sole conditioners of the behavior of groups. Members develop "sets-of-mind" not only on the basis of past experience but also partly from independently operating ideological factors—religious, philosophical, cultural. An important pair of hypotheses is to be derived from the *ideological* attitudes of a society toward self-reliance and collaboration:

2.1. Self-reliant ideology hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the more widespread the general ideological conviction that the group ought to meet its needs through its own efforts, the greater the tendency to rely on the group alone for solutions.*

This faith in group isolation may spring from a variety of non-rational sources. Often it stems from a virile nationalism, such as is sweeping the newly free Asian countries today. Traditional hostility toward potential collaborators may turn a group toward self-reliant, rather than collaborative, measures. Or a deep-seated suspicion of "entangling alliances" can become so strong that it outlives its usefulness to the nation, producing old responses which do not take changed conditions into consideration. Such an ideology "provides the standards by which a man determines, measures and then justifies his acts" (20).

A particularly significant source of an isolationist or anticollaborative ideology may be the strong sense of attachment to the group which is found in members of especially cohesive groups. We might state this particular relationship as follows:

2.11. End-value hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the greater value that membership in the group has for its members, the greater their tendency to use the group in isolation as a means to their ends.*

There is widespread agreement among students of social behavior that groups are generally organized to meet human needs (12). Their initial value is as an *instrument* by which members expect to achieve their goals. But what began as a means to an end may become an end in itself; an object which once served directly to satisfy needs may become a need-arouser (25). Thus a group which at first served only to satisfy its members' demands now becomes a need, a good in itself, regardless of the instrumental value that the group has or may have had . . . . Then members take pride in the unique identity of their group and are highly sensitive to any arrangements that seem to submerge or threaten it. In their relations at the group level, members will choose to act through their own group to the exclusion of other groups because such instrumental value will again enhance the group's value as an end.

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[2] Deutsch (11) has gone far in the pioneering of the measurement of factors in the relations among nations; see especially his discussions of the measurement of communication, pp. 64–70, the quantification of national assimilation, pp. 130–36, and his chap. vi of case examples on "National Assimilation and Differentiation," along with its technical appendixes.

Groups are sometimes found taking paradoxical positions as a result of the operation of these attachments by their members. They may fail to join forces with other organizations having the same goals for fear of losing their identity in the larger effort, even when the very nature of the common problem seems to necessitate co-operation . . . . Corbett notes how international service agencies have learned to increase their effectiveness by stimulating the "development of resourceful and devoted native organs" within the countries in which the agency operates. "Conducted in this way, the more successful an international service agency proves, the more it would seem to focus the loyalty of its beneficiaries upon their states rather than upon any supranational society" (9).

However, there may be a quite different kind of ideological context within which the member's loyalty to his group may not necessarily be at odds with the seeking of collaborative solutions. The ideology which contrasts with the self-reliant one may be stated as follows:

2.2. Collaborative ideology hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the more widespread the general ideological conviction that the group can satisfy its needs through collaboration with other groups, the greater the tendency toward co-operative intergroup relations.*

Perhaps the strongest non-rational source of an outward-oriented ideology has been the religious or philosophical belief in the brotherhood of man . . . . Once such ideological convictions are held, they are as effective in determining the direction of a group's activities as its past experiences are. Indeed, they may even contradict the lessons of the past and force an interpretation of those experiences so as to make them reinforce, rather than oppose, a fervently held collaborative ideology.

Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 are a pair and operate simultaneously, as do 1.1 and 1.2. If both are simultaneously strong, there will be conflict among the members of the group, which in extreme cases may even fragment it into subgroups. The end-value mechanism (Hypothesis 2.11) gives a "multiplier" effect, depending upon the group to which the attachment is made. If it is made with the individual's own national group, as is usually the case, the factor serves to increase the impact of the tendency toward isolation. If, however, an international organization has become an end value to its members and is the target of the attachment, the tendency will be to induce collaboration among the national units.

Ideological factors are essentially all-encompassing attitudes and hence may be appraised by the appropriate interviewing techniques being developed in the social sciences (5). The foregoing hypotheses could then be tested by comparing the ideology of a number of groups with the direction of their policies over a period of time. Patton (27) has already developed a method of describing ideology which would be directly applicable to the isolation versus collaboration distinction.

Perceptions of the Short Run

The experiences and ideology hypotheses deal with general attitudes toward isolation and collaboration per se. Although these factors are powerful in molding action in the long run, responses to the immediate are often influenced by members' perception of the short-run situation. One of the basic propositions in the psychology of social perception is: "Objects or events that are close to each other in space or time, or resemble each other, tend to be apprehended as parts of a common structure."[3] The pair of propositions which follow postulate tendencies toward isolation and collaboration from the perceptual characteristics of short-run situations.

3.1. Proximity hypothesis: Other things being equal, *members of groups tend to use self-reliant means to their goals when such intra-group measures are more proximate.*

Indigenous techniques for inducing change tend to be structured into short-run situations. Citizens of a nation often feel there are no real alternatives in such remote procedures as collaboration within an international organization or participation in multilateral arrangements with other states. Corbett implicitly used this hypothesis in explaining how international service agencies have learned that "the best means of achieving the common object in each country is to stimulate the development of resourceful and devoted native organs" (9). Internal procedures are familiar procedures. Citizens often can perceive more clearly the structure of the initiation, control, and results of intra-group means. Their executive departments can be expected to implement the group's goals in a range of familiar ways.

But these same factors in the structuring of immediate perceptions also operate in determining the short-run reactions of citizens to the advantages and disadvantages of collaboration, as is asserted in the following hypothesis:

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[3] Krech (17, pp. 76–146); quotation from p. 108; note especially chaps. iii, "Perceiving the World," and iv, "Reorganizing Our Perceptions."

3.2. Advantages hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the more adequately the members of a group envision the techniques of intergroup collaboration as means to their ends, the greater the tendency to move toward collaboration.*

If the advantages to be derived from collaboration are vivid and concretely tied to clearly formulated means, they are likely to be more adequately perceived. When the gains of collaboration are thought of as indirect and marginal, there is little tendency toward intergroup relations. When the fruits of co-operation are remote in time, increasing only after a considerable period of marginal returns, the probability of any initial action is low. This hypothesis predicts, for example, that a nation seeking to control local epidemics would probably be more interested in co-operating with WHO if it offered a short-term medical program of mass inoculation than if it offered a long-range public sanitation program—even if both programs were to have the same cost. An information campaign which makes the long-range or indirect benefits of inter-nation activity seem more concrete and more tangible is predicted to increase collaboration.

Because these hypotheses are directly concerned with the immediate perceptions of group members, data for testing them could be obtained through the various techniques for measuring attitudes. For example, Roper has surveyed attitudes toward world organization among citizens of the United States . . . .The quality of the perception as to the usefulness of international collaboration in achieving American goals would seem to play a powerful part in shaping the behavior of the United States on the international scene. Almond has already studied some of the effects of such perceptions on foreign-policy formulation (1).

But it is not sufficient to confine our attention only to the perceived advantages and disadvantages in an immediate situation; it is important to recognize that the actual physical, economic, and social realities underlying these perceptions also influence the direction in which the group moves. The following hypothesis attempts to formalize the impact of these factors:

3.3. Nature of the task hypothesis: Other things being equal, *by their very nature the group's unsatisfied demands may or may not necessitate relations with other groups for their realization.*

The nature of the task confronted when meeting a group's demand may impose powerful constraints upon the behaviors of the members of a group: This factor classically has been treated in terms of the group's limitations of the natural resources. There are also non-material demands which, by their very content, direct the energies of a group inward or outward. For example, if there exists within group members a strong need to convert disbelievers in the out-group to their own form of salvation they must necessarily turn outward in attempting to fulfil it . . . .

There may be economic or military problems which, by their very nature, require or rule out relations with other groups. A small state with neither the quantities nor the range of raw materials to supply its own needs will seek trading relations with other units far more often than will a large continental power with a wide variety of resources within its own borders. In the military sphere, it has recently become necessary for a nation to extend its security borders by collective defense arrangements with others, since technological developments have made defense areas global. In preindustrial ages these security needs could often be met best by a turning inward to consolidate the domestic defenses.

Internal Group Factors

But experience and ideology, even as they interact with the citizens' perception of the immediate task situation, do not work alone in determining whether the behaviors of groups are collaborative or isolationistic. The following hypotheses are concerned with some effects of the internal structure and functioning of the group, and the effects of intergroup collaboration upon internal group functioning. Other features of group life may be as important, but, for the time being, my effort is limited to these aspects of the group's structure.[4]

4.1. Leadership hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the most leaders believe that a self-reliant or collaborative policy will reinforce their elite position, the greater will be their tendency to pursue such a policy.*

It now becomes relevant to distinguish between the leadership elements of groups and the rank and file of the memberships. The unsatisfied need which motivates action may be felt by the followers, or it may be shared by the leadership as well. In either case the leaders have another purpose, or need, of their own: to maintain and consolidate their own positions as leaders. Leaders tend to view their problems in these terms. In cases where the citizens' demands need to be fulfilled through some specific program, leaders may comply willingly if they see this program as supportive of their own leadership role. Where the membership demands that a need be fulfilled but does not specify, or cannot agree upon, a method, leaders are likely to seek or select that solution which seems also to strengthen their own positions.

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[4] See Cartwright and Zander (7) and Hare *et al.* (13), two excellent collections of basic propositions in the gradually emerging field of group processes.

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Although leaders have their vested interests to protect, it must be remembered that the followers, too, gain considerably from the group. Thus the following hypothesis:

4.2. Expectations of internal interference hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the more interference with need-satisfying internal activities that is predicted to arise from collaboration with other groups, the greater will be the tendency for members to avoid such collaboration.*

A well-functioning, cohesive group has undoubtedly developed practices and behavior patterns for satisfying many of its members' needs. It came into being for this purpose, and in its development, as suggested earlier (Hypothesis 2.11), it probably generated end-value needs for itself, while simultaneously fulfilling others. Hence, if potential collaborating groups or a supra-national organization are thought likely to demand changes in these practices which have been need-satisfying in the past, they will be avoided as dangerous, and "national sovereignty" and other arguments may be called in to resist them.

Auxiliary Factors

There may also be factors which play no role in the original determination of the direction of the groups' behavior but which either facilitate or hinder behavior, once it has been decided upon. One important factor is hypothesized below:

5.1. Cultural background hypothesis: Other things being equal, *the greater the similarity of language, customs, and ideology among nations, the more easily will their members collaborate with one another.*

If the play of forces within a nation results in a period of collaborative policies, the way will be smoother and the chances of success greater if potential collaborators have similar cultural backgrounds. Use of a common language reduces the chance for misunderstandings which on occasion produce needless conflict .... The possession of related cultural heritages provides common norms, so that problems and approaches to problem-solving are likely to be similarly conceived.

Mead has developed a method to appraise empirically the degree to which concepts are shared by two cultures (22). Cattell's efforts to isolate the dimensions along which cultures vary may give us another framework with which to make empirical approaches to this problem (8). Although both these methodologies are in need of further development, it would not seem impossible to measure the similarity of cultures. We could then test the foregoing hypothesis by comparing the extent of collaboration between similar and dissimilar cultures, other things being equal.

One can cite a number of other auxiliary factors which help to influence the success or failure of policy, once its direction has been determined. For example, the possession of adequate, smoothly functioning governmental machinery might be an important enabling factor for a nation choosing self-reliant measures. Similarly, well-developed channels for communication and action at the international level are likely to make collaborative behavior easier and more fruitful. At either of these political levels, on the other hand, cumbersome, ineffective machinery might render action almost impossible. In that case the initial decision in favor of self-reliant or collaborative courses of action would need to be remade. Instead of being merely auxiliary factors which facilitated or hindered group action, such factors as government machinery and communication channels would become prime in altering the very direction of the group's behavior. In such a case, they would operate as experience (1. or 3.) or internal group (4.1) factors, which have already been discussed.

The Model as an Operating System

Characteristics of the Model as a Whole

The hypotheses just presented constitute a model whose central feature is the opposition of factors which, by their relative strengths, determine the direction of behavior. These factors may operate simultaneously with varying intensity upon different segments of the group . . . . Or the factors may operate differently with respect to different coexisting needs. . . . Given this variation in needs and these subgroups within nations, the model predicts much variation in behavior and considerable inconsistency and ambivalence as well.

The extent to which the behavior of group members tends in one direction rather than in another depends upon the relative strengths of the different variables. We might have a relatively simple situation, with factors 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1 strong and their complements (1.2, 2.2, and 3.2), driving behavior outward, weak. If the other factors play no significant part, there will be a strong tendency toward self-reliant measures and much general agreement among group members on the appropriateness of isolation.

However, the model also predicts that the picture at times will be quite mixed, as, for example, when 1.1 and 3.1 are strong simultaneously with a strong 2.2 and a leadership (4.1) looking to intergroup relations to reinforce its position. Here the outcome might depend on the relative *strengths* of these opposing factors, or it might depend on how another factor might overbalance the opposition of forces toward isolation. In either case, with strong tendencies in both directions, we might expect considerable conflict among group members, perhaps even within some individual members, as to which direction ought to be pursued.

The model also predicts two types of stalemates within the group, wherein there is approximately the same balance between opposing sets of factors but at different levels of strength. When the balance is achieved between weak forces, there will be inaction—but little conflict. When the balance is achieved between strong opposing forces, there will be stalemate with inaction, but it will be accompanied by much internal conflict (21).

Since the same direction of behavior may occur because of quite different driving factors, the model assumes that there is an adding of forces, the one to the other. The citizens of one nation might seek external relations because of a strong collaborative ideology (2.2) and, in addition, a wide-spread perception of collaboration as an advantageous direct route to the solution of their problems (3.2). Those of another nation might encourage their government to be active internationally because of highly successful past experiences in this area (1.2) and because the very nature of their task seems to require it (3.3). In these cases, the direction of the behavior will be the same—collaboration. However, the scholar and the practitioner attempting to reinforce or change the directional tendencies must know the sources of the forces, not only the resultant.

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Methods of Producing Change in the Direction of Group Behavior

Our model represents a system of factors, constantly interacting and in flux, which by their relative strengths at any given moment are determining the over-all direction of national policy. In the natural operation of this system, the direction of policy may change as a result of a change in strength of any of these factors. However, if we are concerned with the manipulation of the system to bring about a change thought to be desirable, there are at least two general considerations which might determine our approach.

First, as policy-makers, we would be concerned with ease of change, the relative maneuverability of the specific factors involved . . . . In each case the specific forces operating within the group at the time would need to be explored, their strength estimated, and their susceptibility to change judged, by whatever tools of analysis and measurement were available.

The second criterion is the degree of tension in the system. When there are pulls in both directions, the stronger they are, the greater the conflict or tension among group members. In extreme cases this might fragment and destroy the group.

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Is the Model Tautological?

When one encounters models in the social sciences, one at first may feel that the hypotheses they incorporate are somewhat tautological. For example, Hypothesis 2.1 might seem to be saying simply that if the ideology of a people is anticollaborative, then they will not collaborate. However, closer examination of the relationships between attitudes and behavior dispels this initial impression. There are tremendous differences between ideology and behavior. When attempts are made to measure the variables involved, these differences become evident. Suppose we measure attitudes toward intergroup collaboration by interviewing the elite of one of the nations concerned as to how useful they felt a particular regional development, such as the Colombo plan, to be. The resulting index of social perception could then be used to predict the extensiveness of measures taken by that nation in implementing the plan. When the variables are thus redefined in the terms of the actual testing operation, the distinction between one of the driving factors and its consequence . . . becomes clear.

The Group as the Basic Unit

The model has focused upon the internal functioning of groups,[6] and therein the model may be but a partial description of reality. It may be argued that when one deals with behavior that is outward-oriented, particularly if it involves more than unilateral actions toward, or bilateral relations with, other groups, there may be new supra-unit characteristics which should be taken into consideration.

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When ILO enacts a set of international labor standards, it establishes a new norm to which citizens can appeal in pressing for reforms within their nation and to which governments can refer in instituting such reforms. Here is a new element in the situation, a new code of conduct arising out of and given sanction by the transnational organization. However, even these transgroup factors exercise their influence through the internal functioning of the groups themselves. In the ILO case, any changes which occur in national labor policies are due to pressures from internal subgroups, or to the initiative of national leaders. Hence these transgroup factors, too, can be dealt with adequately in terms of the group as the basic unit.

In describing the internal functioning of this basic unit—the group—I have tended to stress the importance of the group member's perception of the social reality within which he functions as citizen or official. This reflects the fundamental, widely accepted assumption of social behaviorists that realities do not affect behavior until they have been experienced and translated into perceptions. Of course, over time the underlying realities influence the perceptions; for, if policies repeatedly fail, experience and ideologies are re-examined and sometimes altered in light of the vivid evidence presented by the environment . . . . It is difficult for me to agree that the realities are any more limiting than the perceptions: both are of fundamental importance in determining the behavior of states.

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[6] In this way my approach differs from the psychologists, who emphasize the behavior of the individual, as exemplified by Klineberg (16).

The Model Applied to Nations

There will be those who question the validity of my interchanging the terms "group" and "nation" and of applying concepts developed in the study of groups to nation-states. It has sometimes been argued that the sovereignty (4) of nation-states is a unique characteristic, not possessed by other groups. . . . The facts of international life indicate that states, like other groups, are circumscribed in their behavior by political, social, cultural, and economic realities both within themselves and in their external environment. The leaders of nations, just like the leaders of other groups, are dependent for their very positions upon a complex structure of power within the group. For the realization of their aims they depend upon internal and external conditions over which they as leaders exercise only a very partial control.

* * * *

Thus it is not unreasonable to explore hypotheses about the behavior of members in groups to see whether and how they extend to the behavior of citizens in nation-states. In the study of politics, the historian and the traditional political scientist have worked in isolation, removed from the sociologist, anthropologist, and social psychologist. My model endeavors to help cross these artificial academic barriers by developing a general theory of intergroup relations applicable to nations. Even as the model applies concepts about groups to nations, it, in turn, should be applicable not only to nations but to all groups. It should thus be useful in explaining and predicting the behavior of social and community groups, political parties, cities, states, and both regional and international organizations. By identifying a basic similarity among all these units, it may help to refocus thinking and research in them all.

Limitations of the Model

Additional Variables

The model does not enumerate all the factors which play an important part in determining the direction of national behavior. For example, I have not explicitly traced the influence of a possible reduction in prestige at home which might occur when a government shifts from self-reliance to international collaboration. To some extent I have purposely limited the factors to be considered, in the belief that the model's usefulness, in part, lies in its simplicity. To a much larger extent, the limitations arise from my own limited experience in applying the model to specific cases. There can be no doubt that, as particular instances of national behavior are analyzed in terms of the model, many additional factors will come to light and should be given their place in the system.

Nor can I claim that those I have enumerated will, in the long run, necessarily prove to be the most important ones. They are merely factors which appear to be particularly significant in our own national history and in current world developments. If they are useful as a framework for empirical testing, they have served their initial purpose.

Analysis of the Underlying Mechanisms

There is also a need to refine our concepts concerning the various psychological and sociological mechanisms through which the factors operate. An attempt was made, in the paragraphs expanding each hypothesis, to sketch something of the processes underlying it, but the full import of the model will be realizable only after these mechanisms have been delineated more adequately.

For example, someone must sketch out the details of the processes underlying an armaments race. Although Richardson (28) has developed a formal model of the mechanism, it needs supplementation. The members of a group feel unprotected when faced with an external threat. They increase their arms, which is perceived as a tremendous "absolute" increase in security. But the reality indicates that their armament has induced the potential enemy to increase his protection threefold, thus leaving the first group less well protected, despite its felt satisfaction of its security demands. Just how do the "felt" and "real" factors interrelate to produce the interaction? The work involved in refining the underlying mechanisms promises to be a task of considerable dimensions.

Generality of the Model

One of the difficulties with the model is that in its present form it is concerned only with the *direction* of group policy: whether the group will turn inward toward self-help or outward toward collaboration with others. It does not predict the *form* which behavior in either direction might take; yet the latter is often one of the most significant features of national behavior. Will the pressures directing action inward bring about changes in the procedures and objectives of the government, or will they result in an overthrow of the present regime? If the group moves outward, will it be in terms of private, non-governmental organizations or through the official foreign-relations apparatus? If the governmental machinery is brought into action, will it seek bilateral treaty arrangements or some form of multilateral international organization with permanent machinery? Landecker has begun the work of spelling out some of these important details, both in his doctoral dissertation (18) and in his more recent research outline for UNESCO (19). The model of the essay, as it now stands, may be able to predict the general trends in group behavior. But without much further amplification, it cannot predict these most important aspects of the trends.

This brief discussion indicates that the present model has painful shortcomings. But perhaps it will stimulate others to make between formulations or to explore empirical data for use in recasting it. The basic ideas in the model are not new—many of its propositions are implicit in the writings of historians and political scientists. Its contribution lies, I hope, in making the implicit more explicit, so that it may be submitted to empirical testing, refined, and made more adequate.

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The Resolution of Intergroup Tensions: Conclusions

GORDON W. ALLPORT

It is . . . a perfectly sensible question to ask where change shall begin, what parts of the system we may attack in order to bring about final alteration in the whole. The present paper has sought to summarize our knowledge in this area as of the present time. Some of our principal conclusions are the following:

The Need for Many Approaches

(1) Since the problem is many-sided there is no sovereign formula, nor any single method so effective that it commands our primary allegiance. The wisest thing to do is to attack all fronts simultaneously. If no single attack has large effect, yet many small attacks from many directions can have large cumulative effects. They may even give the "system" a push that will lead to accelerated change until a new and more agreeable equilibrium is attained.

The Practical Goal: Steady Betterment

(2) Meliorism must be our guide. People who talk in terms of the ultimate assimilation of all minority groups into one ethnic stock are speaking of a distant Utopia. To be sure, there would be no minority group problems in a homogeneous society, but it seems probable that in this country at least our loss through homogeneity would be greater than our gain. In any case, it is certain that artificial attempts to hasten assimilation will not succeed. We shall improve human relations only by learning to live with racial and cultural pluralism for a long time to come.

Gordon W. Allport, "The Resolution of Intergroup Tensions: Conclusions," excerpt from pamphlet The Resolution of Intergroup Tensions, *published and distributed by the National Conference of Christians and Jews (New York, 1952), pp. 40–49. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

Learning New Attitudes May Be Uncomfortable

(3) It is reasonable to expect that our efforts will have some upsetting effects. The attack on a system always has. Thus a person who has been exposed to intercultural education, to tolerance campaigns, to role-playing, may show greater inconsistency of behavior than before (15). But from the point of view of attitude-change this state of "unstructuredness" is a necessary stage. A wedge has been driven that may never be withdrawn. While the individual may be more uncomfortable than before, he has at least a chance of recentering his outlook in a more tolerant manner. Investigation shows that people who are aware of, and ashamed of, their prejudices are well on the road to eliminating them (5).

The Possibility of a "Boomerang Effect"

(4) Occasionally there may be a "boomerang effect." Efforts may serve only to stiffen opposition in defense of existing attitudes, or offer people unintended support for their hostile opinions (31, pp. 46–50). Such evidence as we have indicates that this result is relatively slight. It is also a question whether the effect may not be temporary, for any strategy sufficiently effective to arouse defensiveness is likely to be strong enough to plant seeds of misgiving. It seems probable too that "boomerangs" occur chiefly in minds with paranoid trends where any stimulus, of any type, is absorbed into a rigid system. To be sure there is the ever-present danger that a given program may be so badly presented that the public cannot understand its intended meaning (20). But boomerangs in this sense are due merely to ineptitude and to the failure to pre-test the program, and are thus avoidable.

Using Media of Mass Communications

(5) From what we know of mass media, it seems wise not to expect marked results from this method alone. Relatively few people are in the precise stage of "unstructuredness," and in precisely the right frame of mind, to admit the message. Further, it seems well, on the basis of existing evidence, to focus mass propaganda on specific issues, such for example, as Fair Employment Practices, rather than upon vague appeals that may not be understood. Whether advertising the message of brotherhood is effective, we simply do not know. Research in this area is needed.

The Value of First-Hand Experience.

(6) It seems probable that greatest value comes from programs that incite deep first-hand experience. A person's pre-existing pride or his pre-existing circles of affection and affiliation may lead him to resist influences that challenge these ego-involved motives, unless these motives themselves are effectively engaged (7; 46, p. 247; 37).

The Idea of Enlightened Self-Interest

(7) For this reason the teacher or group leader will offer information and new experience within a framework that will allow the individual to maintain his system of pride and affection even while he learns to enlarge it. By working in the community, for example, he may learn that neither his self-esteem nor his attachments are threatened by Negro neighbors. He can even learn that his own security and self-respect are strengthened when social conditions in his town are improved. He can understand that the United Nations, our "last and best hope for peace," will succeed only if the white nations of the earth cease their condescension toward the colored nations and toward colored minorities. In short, for permanent, long-run results, we must be led to see that we have much to gain in terms of security and happiness by inviting more people into our circle.

Participant Citizenship

(8) From this point of view, it is not apology or special pleading for this or that minority group that is needed. What is needed is emphasis upon national and international solidarity, community welfare, and common moral codes. While preaching and exhortation may play their part in the process, the lesson will not be learned at the verbal level alone. It will be learned in muscle, nerve and gland by child and adult only when it is worked out through participant citizenship.

The Project Method and "Vicarious Experience"

(9) Hence we see why educators insist upon a democratic school structure to begin with, and favor project methods in intercultural education rather than informational methods. Evidence, so far as it goes, supports their preference. Some slight indications also suggest that a good vestibule leading to more whole-hearted participation is the strategy of "vicarious experience." Films and fiction may prepare the individual for the more virile lessons of community survey, role playing, and group dynamics.

The Basic Lesson

(10) Since the very essence of prejudice is fallacious categorization concerning the alleged attributes of groups as a whole, prejudice will tend to disappear as children and adults are encouraged to view others as *individuals*, and to evaluate members of out-groups as separate *persons*. Unless people actually mingle with out-groups—that is, unless segregation is destroyed—they are not likely to learn this basic lesson of individualization.

Bigots CAN Be Reached

(11) None of our commonly used methods is likely to work with bigots whose character-structure is so inaccessible that it demands the exclusion of out-groups as a condition of life. Yet strategies that will surely fail in some cases are not thereby damned, for they will not fail in all. Even for the rigid person there is left the possibility of individual therapy—an expensive method and one that is sure to be resisted; but in principle at least, we need not yet despair completely of the extreme case, especially if tackled young.

Social Programs

(12) Turning now to *social programs*, there is first of all widespread agreement that it is wiser to attack segregation and discrimination than to attack prejudice directly. For even if one dents the attitudes of the individual in isolation he is still confronted by social barriers that he cannot surmount. And until segregation is weakened conditions will not exist that permit equal status contacts in pursuit of common objectives.

Finding Points of Leverage

(13) It would seem intelligent to take advantage of the vulnerable points where social change is most likely to occur. It has been pointed out that gains in housing and economic opportunities are on the whole the easiest to achieve (64). Fortunately it is these gains that minorities most urgently desire. Alert efforts along this line opened more than a million and a half jobs during World War II to workers previously excluded on the grounds of race and creed (18). Generally speaking, technological conditions in this country are fluid, and new opportunities continually occur. Admittedly, it requires ingenuity to take advantage of them. But the general principle of pressing for housing reform and fair employment practices seems psychologically and socially sound.

We Adjust to Change

(14) Generally speaking, a *fait accompli* that fits in with our democratic creed is accepted with little more than an initial flurry of protest. Cities that introduce Negroes into public jobs find that the change soon ceases to attract attention. Sound legislation and ordinance are similarly accepted. As MacIver has pointed out, official policies once established are hard to revoke. They set models that, once accepted, create habits, and conditions favorable to their maintenance (41, p. 248).

The Place of Action

(15) While policy changes and legislation ordinarily mark painless

advance, strong and vociferous pressure may be needed before this gain is achieved. The organized demands of minority groups backed up by crusading and militant humanitarians have certainly been a factor in many of the gains thus far made. While such strife and contention do not in themselves resolve intergroup tensions, they may in the long run be the most effecive factor in changing these parts of the social system that need to be changed before solid gains can be made.

These conclusions express only the preponderant weight of evidence at the present time. They are subject to revision in the light of future researches. But they seem sound enough to offer considerable guidance in the framing of policy and practice.

Final Word

There is one peril resident in all three programs designed to change attitudes. It is that in our preoccupation with them we fall into the totalitarian trap of *manipulating* people with a handful of psychological tricks; and at the same time fall into a theoretical pit, falsely assuming that intergroup tension is a surface phenomenon. Actually its roots lie deep in human character. Ultimately there is no solution to the problem of intergroup tensions excepting the inner growth of serene and benevolent persons who seek their own security and integrity not at the expense of their fellowmen, but in concert with them. The methods we have surveyed may contribute to this end. In proportion as they do so they will have substantial and lasting value.

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CHAPTER 3. *Prevention of War as a Step toward Integration*

Some Considerations Related to the Conduct of International Conflict without Violence

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GAP

. . . we shall attempt, within the confines of our competence and experience as psychiatrists, to examine some means by which conflict can be conducted and resolved without resort to violence. We recognize that these means, when they are applied to disputes between nations, acquire political ramifications that range beyond our sphere of proficiency. We hope, however, that some of the principles derived from our experience and the literature may be applicable to the broader arena of international discord.

Conflict as a Stimulus to Adaptation

. . . although warfare is not inevitable, human conflict in one form or another is. Moreover, the clinical experience of psychiatrists in dealing with intrapsychic as well as with interpersonal and intergroup conflict amply confirms that conflict has important adaptive aspects as well as destructive potentials, and that it is often the essential matrix out of which emerge constructive change and growth.

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Periods of intense conflict are characteristically times of *crisis*; that is, situations in which the capacity of the organism to meet the challenge is in doubt. At such times of precarious equilibrium, new approaches, changes in the issues, development of new relationships, or shift of the conflict to another plane may be accomplished more easily than under less stressful circumstances. In the individual, such development crises as adolescence may be important in precipitating constructive or destructive developments (63). In group psychology crises may have an integrative effect in conflict situations by virtue of the fact that conflict keeps opponents in vigorous contact with each other (64) and mobilizes their energies in the direction of mastery of the presumptive danger. Groups characteristically manifest integrative tendencies under the threat of external attacks, and may, in fact, react with disintegrative trends when the external challenge is removed. . . .

Undue focus upon rapid resolution of conflict may result in an unnecessary sense of failure when progress seems to be limited, thereby making further efforts even more difficult. Emphasis on conduct of the conflict as an ongoing process, and on *progress* rather than *resolution*, may be generally more realistic and constructive. Some conflicts can never be resolved with finality, since any solution demands excessive sacrifice from the antagonists. Pride and "face" often require extended conflict before there can be progress toward resolution. However, even when neither side is willing to capitulate, to make concessions, or to compromise, continued conduct of the conflicts may lead to greater clarification of the issues, to opportunities for each party to test the soundness and validity of different positions, and eventually to a better understanding of the factors responsible for the differences. . . .

The function of conflict and crisis as precipitants of change is illustrated by the international crisis over Soviet nuclear missiles installed in Cuba in 1962, which impelled American and Soviet diplomacy to achieve a significant step towards decreasing tension between the two nations. According to Khrushchev,[1] the Soviet Union's confidence that the United States would stand by its word was increased by the fact that the United States had lived up to its agreement not to invade Cuba. Many commentators regarded this as an important factor in the limited test-ban agreement of July, 1963. Thus crisis situations, while potentially perilous, may alter the management of conflict in ways that are advantageous to all participating parties.

Conflict and Unconscious Motivation

Much individual behavior can be understood as an attempt to adapt to intrapsychic conflicts whose roots may be concealed from awareness. A conflicted individual's descriptions of his feelings often are characterized by rationalizations, displacements, distortions of various kinds, or even denial that the conflict exists.

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[1] Press conference in Moscow, July 1963.

Especially relevant to international conflict is the phenomenon—commonly observed by psychiatrists—of dealing with a conflictual dilemma by externalizing part of it. . . .

This press toward polarities that is generally characteristic of arguments, disagreements, and conflict situations thus often conceals the fact that each party may recognize some validity to the other point of view but is driven to deny it by powerful inner needs to resolve ambiguity. Although externalization of the conflict may achieve some relief of inner uncertainty, it does so at the cost of persistent external stress.

Comparably, on the international scene, national leaders sometimes attribute domestic difficulties to external problems and pressures as a device for displacing blame and responsibility away from themselves onto an outside "scapegoat."

. . . the operation of dynamic mechanisms that may be concealed or even unconscious and hence not readily available for analysis are reminders that virtually every conflict situation involves similar processes, no matter how "objective" the disagreement may seem to be.

Management of Conflict

We turn now to a consideration of various means for conducting, containing, and controlling conflict, as well as of more recent methods employed in group conflict situations. We will examine these methods *in relation to the threat of nuclear war*, without attempting a comprehensive discussion of the whole range of methods for resolving conflict. Furthermore, while we fully recognize the great importance of political, economic, and military aspects of conflict, we will focus on psychological aspects that are also important but often overlooked.

One of the basic dilemmas inherent in the current international struggle is that both adversaries have grown so powerful that the destruction of either side is no longer possible without the aggressor also being destroyed; nevertheless, the conflict between them continues to appear irreconcilable. It has been suggested (69) that historically the way out of such apparently insoluble dilemmas has been to critically re-examine the habitual modes of thought that led to the dilemma in the first place.

. . . The dilemma in the current nuclear arms race is occasioned, partially at least, by the fact that both sides rely chiefly upon traditional strategies to conduct their conflict as they pursue divergent political ideologies. This traditional or "strategic" mode of thinking about international conflicts regards them as struggles in which the only possible outcome is total victory of one side over the other—a view that finds expression in the "Red or dead" formula that has such wide currency.

The leap in our thinking required to resolve this dilemma is to break away from the conception of all conflicts as "zero-sum games" in which one antagonist must lose what the other wins. We must recognize that some types of international conflict today can be resolved only by solutions in which neither side loses and in which sometimes both sides may win (70). . . .

General Field Factors Common to Conflict Situations

Two significant sets of conditions between and within parties that influence their approaches to conflict situations are (1) the degree of trust or distrust and (2) the degree of communication or distance.

1. *Trust vs. Distrust.* Resolution of conflict or even its containment within nondestructive limits is generally dependent upon some element of trust. The concept of trust embodies the expectation that the behavior of another will stay within a spectrum of actions that will not be harmful. Mistrust, the expectation of damaging results from an interaction, also covers a spectrum, ranging from an annihilative consequence to a neutral midpoint.

The degree of trust between opposing parties in conflict situations enormously influences their views of the conflict, their evaluation of the possible outcome, and the tactics they will use to defend their interests and pursue their ends. Complicating the trust-assessment process is the commonly held feeling that opponents are either trustworthy or not; that they must be either close friends or sworn enemies. Such a sharp dichotomy, based on feelings rather than judgment, ignores the broad gray zone between the extremes, in which opponents may be trustworthy in limited ways or in specific ways. The greater the mistrust, however, the more likely are the contenders to see the conflict in absolute terms and to react with intense emotionality. The issue becomes oversimplified ("death to the enemy!"), the opponent is viewed as satanic, and the risk of defeat is perceived as catastrophic, justifying the most extreme forms of self-defense, including pre-emptive attack.

A modicum of trust, even slight, enables the contenders to maintain more controlled views of the conflict. While they see the implications of loss as serious, the contenders no longer include the risk of annihilation as part of the outcome. The essential contribution of trust to a potentially deadly conflict situation is the mutual recognition that, however great their differences, the contenders nonetheless respect each other's right to exist. The consequent shift away from a "battle to the death" increases the likelihood that some of the points in conflict will be resolved. In this sense, trust may be understood as an ally of reason and an antidote to the irrational and the passionate.

With still greater mutual trust, the contenders are increasingly likely to see the issues with fewer distortions due to fear, and they are better able to understand the issue as the opponent views it, whether or not that view is acceptable.

Central to the maintenance of trust, and perhaps to its creation as well, is the development of a conviction that the adversary can be relied upon not to alter his actions in unexpectedly harmful ways. Such a conviction, however, can develop in the absence of any realistic basis for it. Contrariwise, even the most benign behavior may evoke suspicion in the presence of great distrust.

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Since the extreme positions of absolute trust and absolute mistrust seldom apply to real conflict situations, the problem remains to determine how much trust or mistrust a particular situation or adversary realistically warrants . . . *although unrealistic trust usually is dissipated sooner or later by the behavior of the adversary, unrealistic mistrust tends to be self-validating.*

It is not necessary to depend blindly upon the benevolence of an adversary to achieve an agreement with him. One may even question his basic motivation or ultimate goals and still trust him to abide by a contract *when this is clearly in his own best interest.* In this way, the demonstration of a partial congruence of the self-interests of two contending parties may lead to at least limited agreement between them, even in the absence of mutual good will. Each bases his trust on the probability that the other will act in his own best self-interest. Though such agreements are sometimes precarious, since the definition of "self-interest" may shift, they may nonetheless provide testing opportunities that can subsequently lay a basis for more solid trust.

* * * *

However, resolution of conflict between adversaries need not depend upon mutual trust, or even upon the coincidence of self-interest, if each trusts the benevolent operations of a third party. Within a system of law, for example, the confidence of each party in the judiciary system promotes resolution of the conflict even though the adversaries may be ineradicably suspicious of one another. Comparably, opposing nations may find a path to conflict-resolution by trusting a mediating or arbitrating third party . . .

2. *Communication vs. Distance.* The vastly increased volume of communication made possible by modern technology has not only changed the conditions of conflict but also created new opportunities for its resolution. Because hostility tends to disrupt communications(71), it can be assumed that conflicting groups are not communicating as adequately as they should and that improved communications may often help each group to correct its own distortions about the other. It must be borne in mind, however, that increased communication between adversaries does not automatically

reduce tension between them. Indeed, being forced to remain in contact may even heighten hostile feelings between them . . . Thus, . . . in some conflicts temporary withdrawal may be advisable.

On the other hand, informational gaps about an adversary may become filled by tension-increasing false perceptions, stereotypes and phantasies that become indistinguishable from reality. To the extent that increased information replaces fantasy with fact and clarifies each side's perception of the other, the "enemy" becomes more differentiated and therefore more manipulatable. This may mutually relieve anxiety (73).

Communication becomes more effective when it is personally transmitted, but even in these circumstances distortions in reception may impede understanding. One observer, after assessing the experience of escort-interpreters of the Department of State with visiting foreign leaders, concluded that (a) visitors interpret their observations in terms of powerful preconceptions; (b) information is perceived in terms of one's own national communications system and experiences; and (c) more genuine understanding can be achieved by becoming familiar with the visitor's expectations and habits of communication and thereafter presenting information in a form that is familiar and meaningful to him (74). . . . Communications between members of the same societies take place in the matrix of shared customs of speech, forms of courtesy, and a common ideology. When this matrix is absent, frustrating misunderstandings may arise. If the communicators belong to societies that are not on a friendly footing with one another, these misunderstandings can lead to mutual accusations of obstinacy and bad faith, further impeding the communication process. It is very easy to violate canons of good manners in a strange country, thereby affronting its people (75).

* * * *

Some Alternatives in the Management of Conflict

To facilitate our inquiry we have chosen a model of conflict situations that examines the alternatives open to one, two, and three parties, where each party may be composed of one or more units. While admittedly oversimplified, this model offers descriptive classification of conflict management that ranges from relatively uncomplicated actions to more complex ones.

* * * *

Actions Taken by One Party in Conflict Management

1. *Avoidance and withdrawal.* Although maintenance of communication by contending parties is usually prerequisite to resolving their conflict,

there may be times when the antagonists can advantageously reduce or break off contact with each other. Many situations in which nonviolent maneuvers have been successful have involved the possibility that one or both parties will withdraw. Indeed, in some instances it is the threat of withdrawal that acts as a major force toward obtaining conciliation. The steadily increasing density of population, however, makes avoidance less and less available as a means of managing interpersonal conflict.

Similarly, the progressive "shrinkage" of the world makes withdrawal less and less available as a technique of managing international conflict. As human societies are deprived of the tension-reduction values of certain forms of withdrawal, the needs for other methods of conflict management are enhanced.

2. *Assertive use of nonviolent behavior.* Under this heading we shall briefly consider psychological aspects of certain modern methods of conducting organized group conflict that are based on the renunciation of violence. Nonviolent methods of conducting conflict deserve serious study by behavioral scientists on at least two counts: (1) they have highlighted certain generally neglected psychological principles that may have wide implications for controlling violence in the conduct of all conflict; and (2) they are evolving to meet new conditions, so that some of their techniques may ultimately be found appropriate to international conflict (48).

* * * *

In considering nonviolent modes of conducting conflict, it is well to remind ourselves of the distinction between behavior and motivation. The terms "violence" and "nonviolence" as used here refer respectively to the presence or absence of destructive behavior as the means of conducting conflict. They should be distinguished from such a term as "aggression," which refers to the motives that give rise to behavior.

In conducting conflict there is a spectrum of nonviolent behavior with respect to its degree of overt activity or passivity. At one end of the spectrum there is a higher ratio of passivity to activity in certain forms of passive resistance; "sit-ins" or "lie-downs" are illustrations of this, although a considerable degree of activity is involved even in these, in the very act of going to the demonstration site, carrying signs, and expressing verbal protests. Toward the other end of the spectrum the activity-passivity ratio is reversed. This is instanced by the expert peace teams in India, who intervene actively and assertively where conflict threatens and who attempt, by Gandhian techniques, to divert the conflict into non-violent channels (78).

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On initial consideration these approaches do not seem to be immediately applicable to international conflict. They have been used only within societies by groups that could not hope to prevail by violence, and their effectiveness has depended on continuous personal contact between members of the opposing groups—conditions that are not met in conflicts between nations that are geographically separated and heavily armed.

It is questionable, moreover, whether a group that appears to have no compunction against killing others could be constrained by nonviolent methods. . . . In some circumstances, a group cannot overcome its adversary by any means. However, in contrast to violent approaches that increase the cohesiveness of the opposing group, nonviolent methods under some conditions heighten the disruptive forces within the group. Thus if these methods can be appropriately modified in this type of predicament, they may hold out more hope for success in the long run.

A final major limitation to the general effectiveness of nonviolent approaches is that they have succeeded to date only in a context of some shared values between the adversaries. . . . One method that people use to free themselves from the inhibition against slaughtering their own kind is to dehumanize their adversaries by viewing them as without morals or as supremely wicked. Those who employ nonviolent methods generally seek to restrain their opponents from violence by insisting on their common humanity. They try to exemplify the opponent's ideals and values as dramatically as possible and to evoke them in their own defense. . . .

Such behavior, in effect, makes an ally of the aggressor's conscience. If he resorts to violence, he violates his own moral standards and humiliates himself before both his own group and his adversaries. This aspect of nonviolent compaigns calls attention to the desirability in a conflict of determining what introjected values of the aggressor may thus be appealed to.

In addition to attempting actively to *inhibit* violent behavior in the adversary, nonviolent fighters *avoid stimulating* it by refraining from a display of fear or counterviolence, or from attempts to humiliate him.[2] Instead, they show respect for the adversary and attempt to direct their attack at his behavior rather than at his person or his motives. One fights the deed, not the doer; the antagonism, not the antagonist.

Techniques of nonviolent action try to restructure the field of conflict so that the contending positions become steps to a larger goal. To this end, they involve a continuous search, even in the midst of conflict, for interests shared with the opponents and efforts to make them visible; and an emphasis upon constructive moves rather than purely negative ones (78) . . .

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[2] An exception to this, which also illustrates that nonviolent methods, like violent ones, cover a wide spectrum and can appeal to many different values, was the behavior toward the Nazis of the Danes and Norwegians. Apparently they powerfully unsettled the occupying forces by showing contempt for them, thereby attacking their self-concept as members of the "master-race."

Perhaps the most hopeful aspects of nonviolent methods lie in their effects on the participants themselves. Nonviolent campaigns have demonstrated that it is possible to create group standards powerful enough to hold ordinary persons to nonviolent courses of action despite extreme provocation. These group controls in turn strengthen internal controls against resort to violence (82). Groups practicing nonviolence, no less than those in battle, are motivated by strong allegiance to a guiding set of values and depend for their success on tight discipline, group solidarity, and strong charismatic leaders.

Group standards of nonviolence have also performed the feat of reversing the time-honored, stereotyped link between violence and courage. A major psychological determinant of the arms race seems to be the effort to overcome fears of weakness and helplessness . . . Each side, by building more weapons, tries to reassure itself that it cannot be intimidated and equates willingness to resort to war with courage and honor.[3] For the nonviolent fighter, resort to violence is a sign of cowardice, and adherence to nonviolence is a demonstration of manliness, courage, and determination. Exclusive reliance on nonviolent techniques increases the sense of self-worth of their users; it may even afford a socially useful, indirect channel for discharge of aggression and hostility (79). This remarkable achievement may have great potential relevance for discovering how to overcome one of the major psychological drives toward war.

3. *Unilateral initiatives inviting reciprocation.* Some have suggested that international tension may in time be reduced through a series of graduated, unilateral acts that are intended to invite reciprocation by the opponent and so make possible even further tension-reducing steps, (24,84,85,86,)[4]. The aim of these actions would be to induce mutual trust by demonstrating to the enemy that we can be trusted, rather than by demanding that the enemy first convince us that he can be trusted. *To be effective, such unilateral acts would have to diminish the fears of the opponent without increasing the fears of the home population.* This action model is the reverse of the present nuclear arms race, in which graduated unilateral actions invite reciprocal tension-*increasing* behavior by both opponents.

This proposal is ingenious and rests on sound psychological principles. Nevertheless, there are at least two grounds for questioning whether unilateral acts can reduce tension when undertaken in a context of intense mutual fear and mistrust. First, since each side assumes that all actions of the other must be malevolently intended, an action that seemingly attempts to reduce tension might be regarded by an adversary as a ruse intended to lull it into a false sense of security. Thus the action might heighten tension rather than reduce it. Osgood argues that persistence in unilateral acts would eventually overcome the adversary's suspicions. Unfortunately, until reciprocation occurred, each unilateral act might increase the anxiety of the home population, making the next act more difficult.

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[3] President Kennedy may have betokened a change in this pattern, at least on the part of the United States, when he said: "We do not need to use threats to prove that we are resolute"(83).

[4] Charles Osgood of the Institute of Communications Research at the University of Illinois has been among those actively engaged in promoting one such program. Some of the elements included in Osgood's program are (24):

This calls attention to the second doubt concerning such an approach: that moves or actions that appear to concede something to the opponent are apt to be felt by the home population, and perceived by the opponent, as evidence of weakness. Therefore instead of reciprocating, the adversary might be more likely to respond by increasing the pressure in the hope of gaining further concessions. To avoid this, tension-reducing moves designed to evoke similar behavior by the opponent ought not to be undertaken at times of crisis or under pressure. . . .

Actions Taken by Two Parties in Conflict Management

1. *Competitive coexistence.* Opposing parties may mutually agree under a variety of circumstances to desist from active efforts at destroying each other. The power of each may grow to such proportions that victory of one over the other is no longer possible. The conflicts then settle into a chronic "cold war" in which each adversary, wherever possible, takes every opportunity to score against the opponent but abandons the effort to destroy, overwhelm, or subdue him. . . .

Competitive coexistence is made possible by the realization that, as described above, not all competition need be a zero-sum game. Adversaries may compete without necessarily encompassing the destruction of either one. It is not easy for most people to tolerate acceptance of coexistence with a hostile party. Yet, there are survival advantages to techniques of com-

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1. The unilateral acts must be perceived by the opponent as reducing his external threat. (Possible methods: exchange of scientific information and personnel, imposition of self-inspection, neutralization of territory, deactivation of bases, and so forth).

2. The unilateral acts must be accompanied by specific invitations to reciprocate.

3. Unilateral acts must be planned in sequence and continued over considerable periods regardless of reciprocation by the opponent and without requiring prior commitment to reciprocate.

4. Unilateral acts must be announced in advance and widely publicized to allied, neutral, and enemy countries as part of a consistent policy.

5. They must be carefully graduated in risk potential *so as not to endanger our "heartland" or reduce our fundamental capacity for retaliatory second strike.* This offers to the home population the psychological support for tension-reducing actions within tolerable limits of security. Thus the minimum capacity for effective deterrence would *not* be reduced by unilateral action, but further reduction, hopefully, would be arrived at through negotiation in the atmosphere of greater confidence and trust produced by the previous tension-reducing actions.

petition in which both sides gain, rather than one side exclusively gaining at the other's expense or both sides losing totally, as would be the case in nuclear war. Intergroup conflicts and competition structured in this way often markedly strengthen each of the contending groups.

A competitive, win-lose orientation of parties in a conflict situation may make any compromise short of complete success virtually unacceptable, since it will be less than the maximum and hence evidence of weakness. Laboratory studies on the behavior of individuals in competitive situations suggest that the capacity to threaten injury to the opponent significantly increases the competitive orientation of both sides and consequently reduces the likelihood of their reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement (46).

Making clear the consequences of a failure to agree may often force a change in the competitive stands of both parties. For example, a strike may, over the course of time, make the high cost of unresolved disagreement painfully evident to both union and management. In the arena of international politics in the thermonuclear era, however, the danger exists that the adversaries may not come to such a realization until they have become irreversibly committed to acts of annihilation.

2. *Negotiation.* When one party to a disagreement possesses overwhelmingly superior power, it can dictate the outcome and the weaker party must be satisfied with whatever it can get. With an approach toward power equality between the parties, however, there is increasingly greater likelihood that demands by one upon the other will lead to threats on both sides to use whatever sanctions may be available, including violence. Unilateral solutions are then no longer possible. When trials of strength fail to settle the issue or are simply too costly to employ, negotiation or bargaining becomes the method of conducting the conflict.

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The attainment of the kind of relationship that enables negotiations to proceed depends, among other things, upon the availability of adequate channels of communication. . . . Their usefulness, however, appears to be a function of the degree of competitive orientation of the parties in conflict, i.e., the degree to which the desire to reach their own goal subordinates the desire to achieve agreement on a common goal. Some findings from laboratory experiments (90) suggest that the greater the competitive orientation of the parties, the less likely will they be to use such channels as do exist. Results are better, however, when communication is required rather than voluntary.

Some degree of mutual trust and respect appears to be crucial for the achievement of successful negotiations in union-management relations and, by inference, in international conflict as well (36). With it, opponents see each other as earnest and honest, even if in error, a broader range of concessions can be offered, a more comprehensive agreement can be obtained, and the resulting agreements can be more readily accepted as fair and warranting adherence.

However, the deadly paradox of the problem of trust in negotiation lies in the fact that the achievement of mutual trust is both the goal of the negotiations and the prerequisite for them. Being both the means and the end, trust produces, by its absence as well as by its presence, a circular situation. Trust enables agreement, agreement augments trust. This in turn broadens the area of negotiation and encourages further agreement. Contrariwise, a loss of trust provokes declaration of "bad faith," a resort to legalism, and a rise in skepticism about the opponent's intentions. With the appearance of suspiciousness, behavior tends to conform to expectations in a manner described earlier as the self-fulfilling prophecy, and trustworthiness becomes increasingly hard to establish or believe.

Another problem that complicates negotiations, especially in this age of mass media, is that of multiple audiences. The negotiator occupies a position somewhere between two audiences: (a) his opposition across the table, with whom he is trying to bargain; and (b) the silent but influential (and often far from homogeneous) party "over his shoulder," namely, the other members of the group he represents. He must consider each response and each offer through a triple perspective: how it looks to himself, to his adversary, and to his own constituency. Depending upon the issues at stake and the level of feeling developed in relation to them, the negotiator may be free in varying degrees from the need to account strictly and constantly to his constituency. He may have to couple offers at the table with reassurances to his constituency that they do not represent "appeasement" or "losing." Pressures upon the negotiator for continual evidences of success—or at least progress—may be so intense as to limit sharply the range of concession-making open to him. They may force him into such a rigid position that virtually no acceptable alternatives are possible. . . .

The attempt to circumvent these difficulties by conducting negotiations in secret creates a different type of problem. Since secrecy enables negotiators to make "deals" behind the backs of their groups, and potentially at their expense, they breed distrust and threaten the negotiator with alienation from his group. Hence the widespread appeal of Woodrow Wilson's "open covenants openly arrived at" at the end of World War I. Knowing when to negotiate openly and when privately, therefore, requires extremely skillful judgment. A recent happy example of the exercise of this kind of judgment was the confidential correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev that culminated in the successful semipublic negotiations for a limited test ban.

Negotiations are influenced not only by the opposing power groups within each nation but also by nations that are not at the bargaining table. This has often been illustrated by the absence of Communist China at UN deliberations and in other negotiating situations.

Conflicting ideologies may create another important problem that complicates the negotiation process. When an issue becomes "a struggle over principle," it ceases to be negotiable since each side considers any substantial concession tantamount to total capitulation.

Closely related to the problem of ideology are differences in cultural or subcultural standards as to what is appropriate conduct in negotiations. "Negotiation mores" (91) establish a pattern of conceptions about negotiations that are accepted as "ground rules." Examples are the principle of proceeding from the specific to the general and the expectation that an opponent's concessions should be answered with counter-concessions. Unless both sides in a dispute adhere to similar negotiation mores—which is often not the case in disputes between unfriendly nations—the basis for establishing agreement about the very means for pursuing the negotiations is absent and itself becomes an issue. . . .

The very process of negotiating "procedural issues," however, has a legitimizing effect, because it tacitly demonstrates the faith of each party in orderly procedure. Furthermore, negotiations about procedure maintain contact between parties in conflict until they can move forward to substantive questions, although long-continued failure to resolve procedural issues ultimately may cast a demoralizing pall on the whole negotiation process.

Still another problem is presented by the conventional method of attempting to negotiate the toughest issue first, with the hope that it might then be easier to reach agreement upon subordinate issues. A conference agenda that includes subsidiary or even unassociated issues and preliminary negotiations about these can provide a "warm-up" period where the stakes are small and the chance of agreement is large. By leading to a sense of mutual understanding, success in reaching agreement on these issues often enhances the possibilities for successful negotiation on major issues.

3. *Cooperation.* Cooperation between adversaries represents still another approach to conflict management that many people tend to reject emotionally. The possibility of collaborating with an opponent, particularly with an adversary whose fundamental ideology is profoundly contrary to one's own, appears at first glance to be utterly unrealistic. Yet, even in the midst of World Wars I and II (70) the opposing sides cooperated to some extent when their mutual interests were involved. Cooperation promotes satisfaction of the needs of both parties on a voluntary basis through the merging of common purposes. It differs from compromise in that neither party has to make an important sacrifice.

Cooperative activities can yield rewards that reinforce positive attitudes between adversaries and inhibit antagonistic ones. Particularly effective are cooperative endeavors toward superordinate goals that both sides desire but cannot achieve alone. A recent example of such cooperative activity is the research undertaken during the International Geophysical Year, which yielded data that all the participating countries wanted but none could achieve alone and from which all benefited. So successful was this joint undertaking that it has served as a model for cooperation in other international activities, such as the International Refugee Year and the Year of the Quiet Sun. Another example is the collaborative use by the United States and the Soviet Union of artificial satellites for long-range weather forecasting and for communication. Still another example of potential benefit to both sides is cooperation in the struggle to conquer space despite possible military overtones.

Shared goals and professional interests also can be a basis for collaborative activity. Disease control, mental health, population control, and control of starvation and poverty are targets of specialists in every country. These activities are probably stimulated by national rivalries as well as by altruistic motives. Nevertheless, they have the great advantage of directing these rivalries into nonviolent channels. At the same time they benefit human welfare and, to the extent that they are collaborative, improve the general atmosphere, thereby facilitating attempts at conflict control. This was the essential meaning of President Kennedy's "Peace Race" challenge before the United Nations in September, 1961.

Roles of Third Parties in Conflict Management

When two parties are deadlocked in a dispute, third parties may sometimes help to resolve the dilemma, even when the adversaries distrust each other. In most civilized cultures, the judiciary and its accompanying body of legal sanctions serve this function by ensuring that an agreement will be reached and enforced. In most instances the absence of such a third party at the level of international relations means that agreements in this area depend upon the development of some sort of trusting relationship between the parties themselves. In time, specific institutions may be developed or strengthened to surmount this problem and to augment the influence of international law in conflicts between nations. Notable possibilities include the World Court, the United Nations, and mediation committees established under the aegis of the UN. To be useful, of course, a third party must be perceived by each side as not committed to the other one, and both sides must have some confidence in it. The roles of third parties may be informal or formal.

1. *Informal use of third parties: the go-between.* An example of an unofficial third party is the go-between, whose function is to supply informal channels of communication between contending parties when formal channels have

become blocked because the conflicting positions of the adversaries have become too rigid. Because his role is unofficial and his activities can always be disowned, the go-between makes possible the discovery of potential areas of agreement or compromise without loss of face or commitment by either side.

The go-between can be especially effective if the opposing sides recognize that he has the welfare of both at heart and if he can make constructive contributions to solution of the conflict. Such a go-between function is illustrated by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. The participants, being prominent scientists, have prestige in all countries; they are known to be concerned with improving the lot of all mankind, while their loyalty to their own nations is unquestioned. In addition, they bring specialized knowledge to bear on certain crucial areas of conflict, such as arms control and disarmament. Because the conferences have no official status, participants can be relatively flexible. The results of their deliberations are heard with respect by their home governments, who can, however, reject them without increasing tensions because of their unofficial nature. COSWA conferences have been credited with supplying much of the groundwork for the limited test-ban treaty.

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2. *Formal use of third parties: mediation and arbitration.* The official introduction of a third party into a two-party conflict may be illustrated by the use of a mediator or arbitrator in labor disputes. A mediator simply exerts his good offices to aid the parties in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution; an arbitrator offers a resolution that the parties have agreed in advance to accept. To be effective, the third party must be perceived by both sides as neutral, as functioning on the basis of reason rather than emotion, and as identifying with the rights and interests of *both* parties to the conflict. These attributes enable him to help the adversaries find paths that may lead to mutually satisfying results.

3. *Supranational organizations.* In an interchange of open letters (4) between Einstein and Freud, the latter, in discussing the relation between the right and might, expressed the view that wars will only be prevented with certainty if mankind forms a central authority with delegated power to pass judgment upon all conflicts of international interest.

Actually, this has already begun to take place upon a limited scale. The intense and rapid changes following the breakdown of former power centers, the disintegration of colonial empires, the revolution in underdeveloped areas with the rise of new nation states, and the remarkable development of rapid transportation and communication have all stimulated the growth of supranational organizations of many kinds. Conventions regulating postal rates, fishing rights, the use of Antarctica, telephonic and telegraphic cable connections, satellite functions, air and space travel rights, the use of international waters, disease quarantine, and many others are already in existence and reflect a steadily increasing recognition of the complex ways in which modern nations are interdependent.

The awareness that political and economic disputes between nations require something more than simple bilateral agreements or treaty alliances led to the creation first of the League of Nations and later of the United Nations. However, fears that a world organization would lead to serious loss of national sovereignty or to a tyrannical world government, have led to limiting these international organizations to liaison and parliamentary functions that are considerably short of the power of compelling agreement. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the United Nations has already demonstrated its usefulness and has offered a preview of the kinds of functions that a more influential world government might perform.

Apart from its more obvious contributions to world peace in the form of its subsidiary organizations (WHO, UNESCO, and so forth) and in its interventions in military conflicts,[5] the United Nations has also provided a catalytic environment that makes possible many less obvious interactions between nations. Since the UN meets on neutral ground, national representatives can avoid uncomfortable issues of face and protocol and can meet in lounges or hallways for informal exchanges that may lay the groundwork for more official and public agreements. The setting of informality enables personal exploratory contacts between national representatives to be maximally effective. The availability of "neutral" nations may enable the organization to play a mediating role, both through informal channels and officially.

Although UN debates often seem irrelevant or mere "talk," their psychological value should not be underestimated, since they provide an outlet for national feelings of outrage, indignation, and disagreement and thus decrease pressures for more overt—and potentially more disastrous—action. Such "talk" also provides the means for working toward agreements.

The UN also exerts a moral pressure upon conflicting members to continue dealing with one another. This pressure, which tends to favor ultimate working through of disagreements, is not absolute, of course; various nations have "walked out" temporarily from the Assembly or the Security Council. But in each instance they have returned to confront their opponents again:

One of the more important functions that a supranational organization may provide is its symbolic function. Symbolically, such an organization may come to be perceived as the "good father" or "good authority."

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[5] E.g., Korea, Suez, the Congo, and Cyprus.

However, its success in fulfilling this benign and powerful role depends upon its having first earned the trust of people. Trust in this context is a function of widespread recognition that whatever the "parental" organization does, it does not intend to destroy or to permit others to destroy. A trustworthy international organization therefore would require the development of a police force that was strong enough to prevent other nations from destructive behavior, yet controlled enough to eschew a destructive role for itself.

Admittedly, such requirements seem difficult if not mutually contradictory. Without attempting to discuss the political or military feasibility of such a police force (93), we may comment on certain psychological aspects of this issue. It is conceivable, for example, that such an international body may not need to possess physical force of overwhelming magnitude—force big enough to control any nation on earth. When backed by legal sanctions, the mere symbol of authority may be enough to control deviant behavior. The unarmed bobbies of England are a case in point. What would seem to be as important as this symbolic factor, however, is the existence of some mechanism that would make it highly probable that the cause of justice would be served in any dispute and that the violators of international laws or agreements would be punished. Others have suggested that physical force actually may not be as valuable or effective for international policing and punishment as economic and other sanctions (94).

The acceptance of the authority of an international body could serve to stimulate inner behavioral controls, even as local or national authority symbols do. An external object standing for international law and order might thus have a controlling effect on national behavior, much as a red light controls the behavior of an individual motorist. The existence of a larger, benign power may contribute significantly to a more peaceful world order by symbolically indicating that anarchy and chaos will not result. This reassuring function of leadership may appear even in the absence of specific performance by the authority symbol (though ultimately the agency must show effective behavior if this reassurance-giving trust is to be maintained).

The development of a world organization capable of dealing with the potentially destructive behavior of deviant nations will undoubtedly require a period of world-wide education and repeated illustrations of the value and necessity of cooperative international effort. Eventually, this will mean giving up some degree of national sovereignty; but relinquishment of certain national options, such as conducting war, can only occur after many experiences with the advantages of international agreement have demonstrated that the risks involved in such relinquishment are outweighed by the increasingly grave hazards of not doing so.

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The Principles and Practice of War-prevention

EDWARD GLOVER

It is a commonplace of psychotherapy that intellectual convictions regarding the unconscious causes of nervous symptoms cannot be depended upon to bring about their resolution. When it comes to an emotional pinch patients show a distinct preference for 'natural' or 'rational' cures. The nervous dyspeptic may give service to interpretations of the unconscious emotional factors responsible for his illness; but he continues to share with the rest of the population an almost unshakeable belief in the natural and rational procedure of swallowing pills and powders. Should some alleviation ensue, his conviction becomes absolute. Forty years later, hale but still a martyr to dyspepsia, he can be found swallowing with undiminished faith the same brand of powder.

A similar reaction is to be observed among those who concern themselves with schemes for the prevention of war. Even when they are ready to agree that war must be due to unconscious causes, their conversion to this view does not diminish their belief in the efficacy of 'natural' and 'rational' methods of war-prevention. The fact that the measures they suggest may differ in principle or in practice, does not disturb the therapeutic convictions of the pacifist. On the contrary, when they are faced with the flat assertion that before we can hope to eradicate disorders we must first understand their causes, pacifists tend to form a sort of 'popular front' in which internal differences are sunk before the common heresy. The Communist is more consistent. Either he rejects the existence of unconscious causes or he regards them as of mainly academic or at least subsidiary interest. Convinced of the primacy of economy causes of war, he insists on an 'economic cure' which must, however, be forcibly administered after a series of civil or international wars.

Edward Glover, "The Principles and Practice of War-prevention," War, Sadism and Pacifism; Further Essays on Group Psychology and War *(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946), Chapter 11, pp. 194–227. Reprinted by permission.*

The passage. . . to which most strenuous objection has been taken runs:-

"The first effective step towards abolishing war must be the complete investigation and individual understanding of the nature of sadistic impulses, their original form, strength and depth, the history of their modification and inhibition. This will entail equally complete understanding to the defence mechanisms whereby we succeed in remaining unaware of our sadistic urges."

* * * *

Applications to the Group

Turning now to the phenomena of war, it is easy to see that we have to deal with disturbances of the mental function of groups. Certain functions are inhibited, others are hypertrophied, and others again are perverted. As far as the enemy is concerned our love instincts are inhibited and our aggressive reactions are magnified; both of these changes are accompanied by perversions of the aims of certain instincts. Perversions of the instinct of aggression are widespread, and an increase of sexual perversion is also to be observed. Following the same line of approach it is not difficult to indicate the main lines of war-prevention. *The only procedures that are likely to bring about radical changes in war-readiness are those which reduce conflicting stresses of instinct.* This can be effected in two ways: alteration of the *aims* of the instinct, or by effecting a *change in distribution of forces* which will prevent or reduce explosive discharges of aggressive instinct. Next in order of effectiveness comes the *modification of mechanisms,* either by strengthening those that inhibit aggression or reducing the strength of discharge mechanisms which lead to pathological aggression. With this second type of modification is closely associated the *modification of Ego structure.* The aim of the procedure in this case must be the strengthening of the reality functions of the Ego and in particular that part of the Ego which deals with group relations. This must not be unduly disturbed by subjective fluctuations in instinct drives or their associated emotions. Also it must be modified in such a way that a more realistic relation is established between the leaders of groups and the rank and file.

With the help of these criteria we can *classify* the various measures of war-prevention suggested by different schools of pacifism. Some are concerned almost exclusively with the instinctual aspects of the problem. The change of heart called for by religious and ethical groups is an attempt to mobilize and reinforce love instincts in order to neutralize or cancel out the excesses of aggressive impulse that give rise to war. The Communist too dabbles in the psychology of instincts, but combines his policies in that direction with measures of inhibition and with alterations in the political structure of society. As far as the instincts are concerned, his attention is exclusively directed to the restraint of the acquisitive instincts: these in the case of the individual he is prepared to inhibit: group acquisitiveness he would deal with by forcibly establishing an identity of social aim in all national groups, in other words by international communism. Other instinctual devices are intended to distribute (pre)conscious impulses among new and different objects. This is the rationale of the 'football' cure for war. It is modelled on the technique of the outraged husband who, having been worsted in argument by his wife, goes out for a sharp walk during which he now and then kicks unoffending stones from his path. Other schemes of international organization vary in type. International Courts of Justice are in principle concerned with the elimination of instinctual frictions between national groups but have to depend in the long run either on the goodwill of the Sovereign states or on punitive measures. No structural alterations within the constituent groups are envisaged. On the other hand Federalism is essentially a structural device; as in the case of communism it envisages a new structure of government by which internal and external frictions can be eliminated. An organization like the late League of Nations comes under two headings. By building up an elaborate extension of the Diplomatic Services of constituent nations it sought to interpose greater delay between impulse and action. But by its system of sanctions it obviously favoured measures of inhibition. Naturally it is difficult to draw a line between measures of inhibition and punitive measures. Disarmament societies must be ready should persuasion fail to bring about compulsory enforcement of their aims. And an International Police Force, ostensibly an instrument for effecting inhibition by force, is as closely associated with the idea of punishment as the civilian police force from which it takes its name.

When we come to make provisional estimates of the possible value of these methods, it is easier to indicate their comparative than their absolute value. Obviously systems of inhibition are less likely to be effective than techniques of reducing stress, partly because beyond a certain point they are liable to provoke the very outbreak they are intended to control but in the main because they are applied later in the 'tension series' than other measures. They come immediately before action and may be swept aside by the momentum of the war-drive. Punitive and war 'sanctions' not only come last in the series but suffer from the disadvantage that they seek to abolish war-making by making war. By so doing they put a premium on the art of successful war-making.

As far as absolute value is concerned we must either indulge in guesswork or follow the hints afforded by the treatment of mental disorder in individuals. If we adopt the second and more scientific of these courses we must allow for the fact that in all radical treatment of mental disorder the instincts, mechanisms and structures that call for modification are unconscious. In the psychotherapy of groups visualized by different schools of pacifism no account is taken of unconscious factors. The religious pacifist is earnestly concerned with man's impulses but he has no idea of the nature of unconscious impulses. The Communist evidently regards the acquisitive instincts as (pre)conscious in origin. Of the nature of unconscious love and hate he is apparently quite ignorant. The measures of control suggested by the various 'Inhibitionist' schools are also of a conscious type. No consideration whatsoever is given to the fact that the most powerful and effective mental mechanisms are completely unconscious in operation. The modifications of group structure favoured by both Federationists and Communists (or for the matter of that by Fascists) are intended to effect new distributions of conscious impulses. Now it cannot be denied that modification of (pre)conscious impulses, mechanisms and structures can effect therapeutic changes, but they do so to the extent that they promote reduction of unconscious conflict. Experience of psychological disorders occurring in the individual certainly shows that whatever the form of treatment an accurate estimate of curability calls for a fairly shrewd measure of the unconscious forces involved and of the strength or weakness of unconscious mechanisms. While, therefore, it is open to anyone to claim that some existing form of social organization will at some future date bring about the abolition of war throughout the world, he exposes himself to the obvious comments that, so far, it hasn't had this effect, and that estimates of probability based solely on (pre)conscious factors are mere gambles. To these I would impenitently add that the first effective step towards the abolition of war must be the complete investigation and understanding of the unconscious forces responsible for war.

The Problem Restated

Put as briefly as possible the *psychological situation* is as follows:— From shortly after birth until death man is essentially a group animal. During most of his working life his thoughts, feelings and behavior are continually influenced by his position as a unit of a series of groups, varying in size, homogeneity, structure and aim. Even when apparently alone, as for example during sleep, he is still a group animal, since, owing to the prolonged stage of immaturity and dependence through which he has to pass to adult life, his mind develops permanent group characteristics. Moreover, he seeks to mould his group activities after the pattern of his individual wishes and conflicts. His range of direct mental activity is thus extended from apparently individual manifestations to the most elaborate activities promoted by the largest groups of which he is a member. It is still further extended by his capacity to identify himself not only with the totality of the groups to which he belongs but also with groups (or the aims of groups) to which he does not belong. Now his mental activities are concerned with the solution of instinctual problems, some of which, in particular the problems of love and hate, can give rise to the most violent conflicts. One particular outcome of violent conflict is the loosening of destructive impulse, which in turn produces still further conflict. As a result of this double conflict man's inhibition of violence is observed most readily in his relation to other individuals and to small groups. Moreover, when administrative groups establish their authority they tend not only to increase the inhibition of individual violence but to regard violence as a group prerogative. So long as the state limits this prerogative to the infliction of flogging and capital punishment we are bound to admit that, however brutal, barbaric and senseless these punishments are, they do not represent an extensive outbreak of violence. But when any national group exercises the prerogative of making war it increases immeasurably the total amount of destructiveness loosened. Not only so, the state demands that individuals (who must no longer kill on their own account) must now kill in the alleged interest of the group. An expert sniper for example, who, under civil law is threatened with capital punishment if he commits murder, may under military conventions be awarded a decoration for killing a hundred or so enemies of the state. In addition to which the risks of war provide the soldier with opportunities to be killed or maimed which if taken deliberately by a non-combatant would be rightly regarded as evidence in the latter of a suicidal tendency. All non-combatants mentally share in the destructive activities of war by virtue of their capacity to identify with the aims of the state and the actions of combatants. An opportunity is thus afforded them of gratifying vicariously those impulses which otherwise can only obtain the most elaborately disguised gratification in their dreams. *In short, in the series of man's human relationships there is a very obvious and recurring tendency to release violent destructive impulses through his group relations. The power he has for all practical purposes lost as a private individual is regained through the destructive activities of the group.* The problem is whether it will ever be possible to close these last avenues of discharge of aggression: and if so, by what means.

The Principles of Pacifism

. . . this question can be expressed in three different ways: can man modify his impulses: if he cannot, can he nevertheless employ inhibiting mechanisms effectively: finally, can he alter the structure of his mind in such a way that these reinforced inhibitions (or other defensive mechanisms) produce a permanent defensive Ego-system? To all of these questions the student of the (pre)conscious, familiar with the processes of rational reflection, with modifications of conscious wishes, and with manifest changes of character, in a word steeped in the lore of conscious adaptation, is inclined to return a lighthearted 'Yes.' And his optimism is shared not only by professed pacifists but by the majority of more ordinary mortals. The dynamic psychologist, aware that in the long run human endeavour is determined by unconscious impulses, by unconscious mechanisms and by unconscious mental institutions, is not so sure. If pressed on these points he can only state what he knows about unconscious function. He knows that for example although both the aim and the object of some early sexual impulses can be permanently modified, the process of modification is an unconscious one initiated during the prolonged emotional crises of infancy and childhood and only to a very slight extent reinforced in later life. *There is so far little evidence that aggressive impulses can be modified in the same way.* They can be fused with love impulses and, of course, displaced freely but they do not appear to alter their aim of destruction or mastery. In any case the processes of fusion and displacement are unconscious processes. *As far as unconscious mechanisms are concerned, experience shows that under ordinary circumstances these are not modified.* During particular stages of mental development, some mechanisms are more extensively employed than others, but recession of function does not involve any permanent change. Even during psycho-analytic treatment, when the action of certain unconscious mechanisms may be suspended, the alterations that ensue are not due to any change in the nature of the mechanism but to the relief of mental conflict that has been secured. Similarly with Ego-structure. In the course of development and again in old age spontaneous alterations in structure occur but *in mature adult life only the prolonged application of psycho-analytical techniques will bring about any permanent modification in unconscious Ego-structure.* And these changes again are due to the relief of unconscious conflict. Given a severe enough stress, the older forms of Ego-function may be reactivated. Moreover, the changes observed by the (pre) conscious psychologist are not the direct result of (pre)conscious influences but a sign that the balance of unconscious forces has altered. *For (pre) conscious modifications to be successful they must have at least the same force as the mechanisms they are intended to supersede.* The truth is that as far as important or primitive instincts are concerned, the preconscious acts successfully only when its plans are in concert with those of the unconscious. Indeed, if left to itself the preconscious with all its tricks of delay, indecision and doubt would make an unholy mess of the work of human adaptation. This is very clear in the case of the obsessional neurosis. When originally unconscious prohibitions and taboos gain access to the preconscious system and commandeer intellectual processes, they spread in all directions and finally develop into a mountain of rituals which threatens to smother ordinary mental life. Despite the manifold ramifications of the pre-conscious system, and the infinite complication of thought processes, the (pre)conscious is best suited for the solution of sophisticated mental stresses. Fundamental instincts, emotions and conflicts call for more drastic and immediate measures which so far only the unconscious is able to provide.

All this may sound a very depressing account of mental function, although for the life of me I cannot see that it is particularly depressing to know that the unconscious can usually be depended on to do smoothly and automatically what the pre-conscious, despite its pride of intellect, usually bungles. The depression is no doubt a kind of disguised annoyance at any aspersions cast at the efficiency of the intellect. Yet it is surely a commonplace that when emotional crises occur, even intellectual giants are often reduced to behaving like children. In any case there is no point in being depressed. Granted that under present day standards of adaptation war causes society much heavier looses than it brings gains, let us consider instead the evidence on which more optimistic views of war-prevention might legitimately be based.

Needless to say, the most significant observations in this direction are concerned with the possibility of reducing *mental stress* in the community. Experience of so-called cathartic methods of treatment proves conclusively that although we cannot get rid of our primary instincts, we can reduce the mental strains that tend to cause outbreaks of violence . . . the anxieties and guilts produced by unconscious drives frequently lead to aggressive behavior. This has now been amply confirmed by the study of those delinquent states in which violent anti-social actions are the most prominent feature. Reduce unconscious anxieties and hostile reactions begin to disappear. It is true that in some mental diseases, 'persecutory' types of insanity for example, the mechanisms of defensive aggression are not amenable to treatment, but on the other hand it has been well established that the tantrums of apparently normal children can be adequately dealt with by reduction of anxiety. *Obviously then we must distinguish between short-term and long-term methods of reduction,* that is to say, between correction of immediate stresses and keeping stress at a low level from childhood onwards. Both methods no doubt can be applied, but it seems probable that long-term methods are the more promising. I . . . remind the reader that for the effective reduction of infantile stress two environmental policies are necessary—the elimination of anxiety situations likely to provoke unconscious aggression and the elimination of sadistic interference on the part of parents. In short, if we would only study the conditions that contribute to the peaceableness of children we would have a shrewd idea what to avoid or counteract when attempting to reduce their states of aggression. In the nursery as in international affairs it is necessary to have a peace policy and to see that it is pursued patiently and systematically *in bad times as well as in good.* Sooner or later we must make up our minds whether we are going to regard war as a purely adult manifestation or whether we are going to take seriously the view that we cannot alter the adults' disposition unless we commence work during the formative periods of infancy and early childhood. If we take the long-term view, we must see to it that our policies of prevention are both extensive and intensive. Above all we would have to capture the key points from which ordinarily the policies of upbringing are dictated. I am not thinking so much of our formal educational institutions, for although our schools could be used for the spread of ideas and the introduction of behavioristic codes, the emotional influence of the school is negligible compared with that of the family. We could, however, make a good start by instantly dismissing all authoritarian psychologists from the Child Guidance Clinics of all countries. We might not live long enough to observe the cumulative effect of humane upbringing on the 'reality sense' of the community, but we could reasonably anticipate that future generations would. This, as I have pointed out, might or might not produce the marginal effect necessary to limit permanently the chances of war, but it would be worth doing anyhow.

Next in the importance to a general policy of reducing the anxieties and hostilities of childhood comes that of *reducing the specific stress due to the close relation between the sexual impulses and the impulses of aggression*. Naturally the most important factors in this relation are unconscious, and cannot therefore be altered by mere social regulation. We cannot expect to eliminate by conscious means that unconscious identity between fighting and sexual achievement that is due to the symbolism they have in common. Nor can we alter by such means the primary 'death wishes' that are the unconscious reaction to childish rivalry and frustration and which I am convinced do more to perpetuate war than any other peculiarity of human development. But at least we could try to reduce the tangled mass of superstitions and conventions that obstruct all rational adaptation to sexual life. It is difficult to overestimate the reduction in emotional friction that could be secured if more rational codes were applied to sexual problems from infancy onwards. Here again it is unlikely that the change would be radical enough to effect a decisive reduction in war-readiness, but it might bring about a marginal reduction in human misery which combined with other and more radical procedures might have the desired effect.

I have singled out these two long-term methods of reducing mental stress in the community because I believe they are essential to the success of any scheme of war-prevention. I do not believe that war between civilized nations will ever be abolished until we learn how to bring up children in a more reasonable and understanding way than we do at present. Perhaps I should have said until we regain some of the wisdom we have lost. For compared with primitive tribes, civilized nations are immensely backward in their upbringing of children. Let there be no misunderstanding about this. I am not trying to resuscitate the myth of the 'noble savage.' Primitive races are heavily burdened with superstitious anxiety and often give expression to this in ways that we regard as cruel and senseless. They also follow superstitious codes in their upbringing of children. But in many respects their sense of human values is immeasurably superior to ours, and in many instances they treat their children and their children's problems in a natural and sensible way. No doubt their policies would shock our child-specialists and headmasters into sky-fits. But in my opinion the sooner these mentors are shocked into sky-fits the better for our children. The really shocking thing about Western Civilization is that it permits and approves, on both cultural and economic grounds, the delegation of upbringing from the family to every conceivable form of substitute parent or training institution. To my mind it is much more shocking that Anglo-Indian parents should board out their little three and four year old children in Bognor than that a native mother should go to work with her baby slung over her back, or that little tribal children should carry on their sexual play before the indulgent and amused eyes of their parents. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the successful upbringing of children requires a Renaissance of Family Culture. The family must somehow or other win back from the State the rights it has lost; and it must re-establish a scale of values, in which the place of honour is given, not to social achievement but to transmission of humane family culture. Here is another long-term policy to be pursued with patient assiduity and understanding.

Turning to the question of *short-term policies,* we must first of all be clear as to the nature of the *immediate war-strains* they are intended to reduce. Anyone who has waded through the White Papers, Yellow Books and historical treatises that deal with the outbreak of the First World War might naturally assume that the immediate war strains were exclusively concerned with international relations, with power-politics, trade-politics and so forth. And they might naturally conclude that if only these strains could be reduced by the appropriate 'departments' the problem would be solved. However natural it may be this is a serious misinterpretation. *The mounting international tension that precedes a declaration of war is not a cause of war but a preliminary phase of war.* Like the fever that ushers in a serious infection it is part of the 'symptom-picture.' The immediate strains that contribute to war-readiness are of the same nature as those that precipitate mental disorder in the individual. They are probably identical with the individual and social strains that precipitate war-neuroses . . . The war-neurosis represents an internalized war situation, and given the appropriate neurotic pre-disposition is readily precipitated by conditions of 'psychological insecurity.' Hence preventive measures must be directed to the reduction of those anxieties which induce psychological insecurity. It is here that the importance of the economic factor in war-readiness can be accurately assessed. It is the custom of post-war planners to talk of 'social security' as if it were a purely economic consideration. Strictly speaking economic security is one of the factors that contribute to psychological security. But unless economic security is combined with psychological stability and satisfaction in love, family life and work, it cannot be expected to bring about that deeper tranquility that is necessary to maintain a peaceable community. The sharp contrast between war and peace, together with the interpretation of civilian unhappiness exclusively in terms of economic hardship tend to foster the illusion that the peacetime community is peaceable. As yet no quantitative assessments have been made of the envies, jealousies, rivalries, hostilities and the host of other negative emotions that permeate the community-at-peace. Indeed, observers who suggest that these disruptive emotions exist in a state of constant fermentation in every section of society are regarded as unduly jaundiced. It requires little imagination, however, to see that cathartic explosions like war could not occur but for the brewing of malice that occurs during 'peace.'

* * * *

Summary

Summing up these various considerations it would appear that two conditions are essential to the development of a satisfactory peace-organization. First it should represent not simply the will of the population at large but the influence of the family group and of those of the larger group formations that ordinarily run the community and guide its emotional discharge. The time is past when we can afford to leave the Pacifist Movement in the hands of small 'societies' each advocating a nostrum of its own and having no point of contact with the others save its enthusiasm for a cause. In peace-time the real cultural authority of the community is invested in large spontaneously developed groups. Either this authority must be mobilized in such a way that it can control the war-making tendencies of the state or a means must be found whereby some of these constituent groups can hold up a general landslide to war. Once on a time family and territorial interests tried to achieve this aim. In 1642, during the early weeks of the Civil War, some counties proclaimed their 'neutrality' although in the long run the pressure either of Cavaliers or of Roundheads was too strong for them. Indeed, if Church organizations could only succeed in maintaining that the ungodliness of war is a more important issue than state politics, they too might act as a brake on war-making. I do not suggest for a moment that either of these particular expedients would be effective nowadays: it is a long time since either an Archbishop of Canterbury or a Lord Lieutenant of a County could put a spoke in the wheels of national war. But the principle at stake is a vital one. *If state-war is due to a flaw in group organization, it is clear that we must either mobilize more effectively the pacifist forces of the most powerful constituent groups and play them off against the state, or we must play those constituent groups off against themselves and so divide the state against itself.* In short we must adopt the policy followed by the mental apparatus when confronted with individual stresses. When it cannot counter a disruptive drive with a drive of antithetical aim, the mind seeks to set the component forces against themselves.

The second condition is also essential: whatever peace organization is developed should be backed by a powerful scientific organization equipped to investigate fully the complicated problems presented by the social discharge of aggression. Amongst the more urgent of these problems are the following: how to extend the cultural authority of the family and to curtail the spurious cultural authority assumed by the state: how to prevent the exploitation of that superstitious reverence of authority which keeps the most advanced countries in a state of semi-savage unreason and subjection: how to improve and further develop 'delaying' systems whereby a sudden merging of the aggressive impulses of the whole community can be more effectively held up: how to modify those irrational frustrations of creative impulse that lead to the accumulation of aggressive tension in the community. . . . I have singled out here only a few of the issues that seem to me to call for priority of attention. It is scarcely necessary to add that should any discoveries of importance emerge from these various investigations, ways would have to be found whereby they could be given effective political expression. This would no doubt involve a revolution not only in political thought but in existing political forms. It is obvious, for example, that we cannot tolerate much longer existing methods of regulating Foreign Affairs. Organizations for conducting the material aspects of relations between countries are obviously essential and could be expanded with great benefit to all concerned. But the regulation of policy by a small caste of permanent Civil Servants under the nominal direction of the Cabinet is merely a grotesque archaism.

Whatever direction political reforms may take, it is certain that until they are carried out extensively enough, the most ambitious international schemes to prevent war are not likely to be successful. Apologists for the late League of Nations were accustomed to argue that the reason for its failure was the retention by constituent nations of their sovereign status. It would have been nearer the mark to say that so long as the constituent nations did nothing to reduce their war-readiness, the creation of a complicated inter-state organization was not likely to prove a successful inhibiting mechanism. The only sure safeguard against war is that inhibiting mechanisms and counter-forces derived from the love-instincts should be able to operate effectively at the point where break-through of aggression is most likely. If states are themselves inadequate vehicles of love, it is improbable that a network of states will be any more richly endowed. Even the international forces of religion have not been conspicuously successful in mobilizing universal brotherly love, for the simple reason that fraternal relations are from the beginning shot through with the hate that goes with rivalry. On the other hand there is some reason to believe that if only one powerful nation could establish an effective peace organization backed by sound scientific researches, the windfalls it would collect in the form of increased happiness and health in the community would soon tempt other countries to follow suit. This tendency would be greatly strengthened if instead of forming Leagues in which power-politics follow their accustomed political courses, the forms and principles followed by international scientific congresses were accepted. Even during war-time and despite the isolation of scientific bodies from one another, all combatant states share many of their scientific discoveries, though not their resources. But whatever may be the international organization ultimately adopted, its first guiding principle must be that adopted by all scientific bodies worthy of the name, viz., an objective measurement of the data of observation.

I should like to add that although I have suggested the development of a Peace Organization I have not in mind any particular form of organization, still less any idea of 'Committees' or 'Standing Peace Commissions' or 'Departments' or 'Ministries.' It would in any case be ridiculous to suggest specific forms of organization until we know what we are going to organize. *We may reasonably assume that whatever alterations are effected in the social regulation of instinct cannot have permanent effect on war-readiness unless the new codes (mechanisms, techniques) are constantly applied from generation to generation, and so bring about a permanent change in our social structure.* Needless to say the influences exerted must extend throughout the whole community. In the dynamic sense, peace is a state of mind of the community, and peace of mind cannot be achieved unless the whole mind is working in relative harmony. A dependable degree of equanimity is necessary to maintain a good sense of reality in the individual. Similarly in the family group: a capacity for upbringing without violence is a sign of healthy function. The aim of a peace organization must be the encouragement of healthy function in the community. It is not likely to be achieved by the hasty creation of new Ministries eager to demonstrate their bureaucratic prowess by piling ill-considered and compulsory regulations on the top of existing codes. It may well be that even our present old-fashioned social and political machinery would serve to put the preliminary reforms in operation. Just before the War, Parliament was considering the amendment of criminal law. It might conceivably celebrate the declaration of peace by abolishing flogging and capital punishment not to mention many forms of imprisonment. Further, if psychologists everywhere would only agree to learn something about the psychology of children, and if psychiatrists everywhere would only condescend to learn something about psychology, they might bring their growing influence to bear on the upbringing of children. Flogging, imprisonment and the psychological equivalents of capital punishment might then be abolished from the nursery. Bullying and intimidation of children, the compulsory imposition of grown-up codes of convenience, in fact most of the reactionary artifices which go under the misleading label of 'good upbringing' might be restrained. And all this preliminary spade work for peace could be done without putting one brick of a new Ministry on another, without even earmarking for promotion to Cabinet rank as a Peace Minister some Trade Union Secretary, or Chairman of a Steel Corporation or second son of a Viscount.

All this is as may be. It may not be necessary to create a *separate* peace organization. What must be created as soon as possible is a science of politics that will serve to guide politicians. Under our present democratic system politics consists of a running series of squabbles over, shall we say, Free Trade or Protection, or national expenditure, or the regulation of drink traffic, or state control, or dog-racing, or trades disputes. And all the time the major psychological conflicts that affect the happiness and well-being of the population are left to find their own solutions, which usually prove to be superstitious codes handed down to us by our remote and anxiety-ridden ancestors. The main concern of the future science of politics will be to solve the problem of culture transmission. But first the research organizations necessary to give birth to this new science must be created. And these cannot be created until a sufficiency of trained workers can be provided. Far be it from me to join in the current adulation of 'science' or to associate myself with the heresy that 'scientists' should *regulate* our psychological affairs. Then indeed the task of preventing war would be hopeless. For unless the scientists knew how to manipulate the forces of love and hate they would make a greater mess of government than any layman. As I have said the greatest of human revolutions, the change from bestial existence to what we now call, not without right, a state of civilization, was effected in the pre-historic past, at a time, that is, when the instruments of science were sticks, stones and flint heads. No comparable change has occurred since that remote period. If new revolutions are to be brought about they will in all probability be initiated in the same layer of social structure, namely in the family. Only in the family is it possible to strike when the iron is hot, to mould the human mind during its period of relative plasticity. But psychological science may help us to render more effective and enduring the transmission of a less anxiety-ridden culture, a process which if it is to have any permanent effect must be repeated from one generation to another. Psychological science may, and I believe can, help us to remove or lessen those obstacles to culture transmission which by perpetuating human conflict increase our social readiness to make war.

Prescription for Peace: The Biological Basis of Man's Ideological Conflicts

TRIGANT BURROW

I

The situation in which we are all engrossed today, and about which, as students of behavior, all of us are deeply concerned, is the cause of the conflict and dislocation we are witnessing throughout the behavior processes of mankind. We see these behavior dislocations in political, economic, and social disorders (1). . . .

. . . if we are to remedy a disorder, we must first locate it. We must define the area or organ that is the seat of the disorder. With regard to the disturbance that everywhere affects man as a species today, we have failed to approach our problem scientifically because we have failed to recognize that the disorder is *man's* disorder. As I have tried to point out for more than thirty years, it is society that is the patient.

With the individual patient, as we know, our procedure is to restore the disordered function of the organ or area affected, by re-establishing in this organ or area the function common or normal to it throughout the species. Similarly, in our attempt to restore deviate behavior within the sick society of man, we must restore the behavior of that sick society in accord with the biological norm of behavior that characterizes the human species throughout. But, as in the case of the individual patient, our first obligation as students of social man is to discover the area or organ in which the disease resides and determine what is the nature of this disease.

II

The thesis of *phylobiology*, or the thesis of man's social development as

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a species, begins with the beginning of language. The philologists tell us that language probably arose some two million years ago.

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Coincident with this local process or special modification in the cerebral area, reactions which hitherto had engaged the interest and elicited the emotive response of man's organism as a whole now also began gradually to be displaced upward, and to center in a relatively small segment, or within the forebrain of the organism. Thus it happened that with the descent of the generations of men, as with the ontogenetic development of our children and of ourselves today, a tremendous behavioral transformation slowly took place. In the sphere of man's behavior as a social animal, the importance, interrelationally, of the whole organism began little by little to recede, and in its place there was formed throughout the species a new focus of interaction between man and his fellows, as between man and his environment. Man's fellows and his environment were now newly apprehended by him.

III

Like other species, the human species is primarily common and unitary in structure and function. Its instinctual needs and incitements are basically continuous throughout.[4] In a word, the basic behavior of man, like that of other animal orders, represents a condition of homogeneity and solidarity.[5] (7) Man's consciousness—his attention and interest—is primarily unitary and undifferentiated. As a genus, man has consciousness and motivation that is common and uniform. This solidarity of the species extends to the functions of perception, response, and activation. But now with the acquisition by each of us of the facility of speech there resulted the social mechanism of agent and receptor. As occasion demanded, individuals could now stand to each other in the surface relation of subject and object. One might order, another obey; one might ask, another provide; one direct a task, another perform it. As men stood thus opposite one another, projecting words and observing the effect produced, something radical happened to the organism of man. There was the emergence of an altered interrelational function, a socially reciprocal adaptation among individuals that became more and more accentuated; and man was launched upon a new era of human interchange.

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[4] "In the Coghillian scheme, instinct is the total pattern in action. Normal growth and behavior are carried on by virtue of the dominance and regulatory control of this integrating agency over all local and subordinate activities." (6)

[5] There is solidarity not only among the elements or individuals composing the species, but also between the species and its environment.

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IV

. . . the inadvertent development which now took place in man may be described somewhat as follows: With the increasing upward surge of the organism's emotive interests and drives, there was the centering of the individual's interrelational feeling and motivation in the anterior segment of the head and in the face. There was the development of the specially circumscribed function of the brain I later called the symbolic or part brain. For with the enormous complexity and reorganization of function that arose coincidentally with the invention of language, there took place a special systematization within the brain and organism of man. With the upsurge of the emotive behavior of man and its amalgamation with this highly complex code of symbol usage, there developed a partitive behavior organization. In this systematization of man's subjective feelings and interests there was formed a restricted behavioral personality or identity—the partitive identity I have called the *‘I’-persona.* (9)

* * * *

With the segmentation of the species into the separate centers of interest and feeling that comprise each individual, there was correspondingly the separation, the opposition, and the differentiation of individual interests from one another. *The separate feeling of the individual was now the separate identity of the individual.* This separate, autopathic identity became the individual's authority.[6] Hence there was not only the objectively definable difference between agent and receptor, but as a result of the subjective systematization of man's emotive incitements into a partitive segment of the brain and the formation of the separate *‘I’-persona,* man was now composed of *vicarious selves,* of artificially discrete identities. In this personality transformation the emotive drives of the phylum[7] became the wishful drives of the individual. Here is indicated the phylodynamic scope of the social *‘I’-persona.* For in the spurious self-systematization of us all, we now *felt* differently toward one another. Personal sympathy or antipathy for one another replaced man's primary empathy as a phylum, and we experienced a different *feeling relation* toward the environment and each other. Where formerly our common interests had been primary, now our separate interests were primary. Instead of the common consciousness that once united us, a partitive consciousness now divided us. With the insinuation of this partitive self, the *common self-interest of the species was shifted to the personal self-interest of each individual,* and henceforward interrelational conflict replaced the organism's unity and co-ordination as a phylum. This is the breach whose global extension we see today in the irreconcilable ideologies of East and West.

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[6] Autopathic < Greek, *αυτός*, self, *πάθος*, feeling.

[7] Certain of my biological colleagues have taken exception to my use of the term "phylum." They are quite correct, since in this usage I am of course not strictly consistent with accepted zoölogical categories. But in employing this term I do not mean to separate man from the rest of the vertebrates. In my attempt to establish a biology of behavior that recognizes man as an organismic unit apart from our petty ideological differentiations—national, political, religious—I have really been no little cumbered in the matter of terminology. In referring to man as an integrated whole, the term "species" would be zoologically more correct. But the difficulty here is that there is no adjectival form. I therefore adopted the term "phylic," from phylum, which in its original Greek *(φυλον)* meant "tribe." And in line with this usage I chose the combination "phylobiology" to describe our researches into the behavior of man as a biological organism.

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V

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In our finding, affect and prejudice are to be traced to the deviate function of man's symbolic part-brain and its affectively projected dichotomy of "right and wrong." In the reckoning of phylobiology, both communism and capitalism are expressions of affect projection. Both these politically restricted processes in feeling and thinking represent equally the shift of the phyloörganism's motivation and behavior from its function within the organism as a whole, to the retroactive part-function located in the affecto-symbolic segment of the head. This reversal of the organism's total feeling is the biological basis of prejudice and of man's conflicting ideologies. This is the bottleneck in man's emotive behavior today; the genetic basis of his neurosis. Russia is not interested in One World, but only in One Russia. Similarly, America is interested not in One World, but in one American World. With the separate '*I*'-*persona* dominating individual and nation, it could not possibly be otherwise. Each person or nation, being the whole show, must run the whole show. The problem of neurosis and conflict, individual and international, lies within us.

VI

Let us turn, then, to ourselves. Let us turn to the ontogenetic aspect of this biological transformation as it influences the behavior of social groups today. This accident in man's development is, as we have said, a subjective accident. It is an accident that has befallen you and me. Hence unless we return to ourselves—unless we appreciate this accident within our own subjective processes as we live and have our being today in a society of completely artificial personality structures—we shall not be in a position to reckon objectively, and to remedy effectively this subjective defect in our own socio-symbolic evolution. As things stand today, our habitual subjective authority reflexly defends its subjective pretensions and bitterly resents objective inquiry into them. But we can no longer blink the fact that we are all part of this subjective dissociation, and that *nolens volens* it calls for objective observation.

Our group analysis, therefore, was the analysis of ourselves. It was the analysis of the social conditioning of the organism of each participant in it. It was not an analysis of the past. Our concern was not with the ruminations of fantasy or other reminiscent elements. We were engaged in the analysis of the moment as that moment had built up of all preceding moments from infancy on. This technique required our consistent and unremitting challenge of the partitive reactions or affects existing among us as a group, here and now. Through this group process in mutual affect-baiting we came to sense the unnatural displacement of the organism's whole function by a part-function. We came to sense the artificial systematization of affects, the restricted personality formation, that is the autocratic '*I*'-*persona*. Finally, we sensed this bionomic discrepancy to the point of experiencing the physiological stress underlying this emotional congestion —an emotional congestion that had accumulated and become occluded, so to speak, within the symbolic or autopathic segment. This is the impaction and stress we have recognized as ditention in contrast to the organism's total pattern of behavior, or cotention. On the basis of our experiments with the physiological reactions induced by the emotive segmentation coincident with speech, we found it possible to reconstruct, in greater or less degree, the phylogenetic experience of man as a species by reason of the immediate behavioral data derived from the corresponding ontogenetic or individual experience of our experimental group.

Biologically, any human group is a cross section of human society, and human society is but another name for the species man. Our experimental setup, then, consisted of a minute section of the species man; and the aspect of the section under investigation was the functional interaction or the social behavior of the section as a whole and of the separate individuals composing the section. We ourselves—the physicians, students, and patients participating in the investigation—were the material under investigation. We were both agent and receptor. We were the investigators, but we were also the material to be investigated. Our task was to observe as a whole organism, individual and social, whatever ditention or part-function was perceptible within the individual or within the unit as a whole.

In the effort of my associates and myself to investigate within ourselves as a unit or group the behavioral configuration that is partitive or ditentive as compared with the configuration that is common or cotentive, it became possible to distinguish the seat of the disorder that had been inculcated in our childhood as individuals and as a race. With the definition of the focus of our behavioral difficulty as a community or species—with the internal recognition of the area or organ affected by the gradual upsurge of the emotive behavior of man into the cerebral or linguistic segment and its concomitant displacement of man's feeling or emotivity as a whole—we were in a position to tease out, as it were, and sense the needed remedy for our phylopathological differentiation or separation in motivation and behavior. We were able to define the area or pattern of conflict as it affected our own interrelational processes. In this physiological localization of the stress concomitant to the sense of separation or conflict, we were at last "getting warm" in our quest for the required remedy or prescription. We began to discriminate the pattern of ditention, of separation, of private self-interest, from that of cotention or the common, undifferentiated self-interest of man's organism as a species.

The induction of the pattern of cotention, though extremely simple in theory, is in practice extremely unwelcome. But an unwelcome task should not therefore be called difficult. In fairness one can only emphasize the unwelcomeness of a technique of research which attempts to recover a pattern that goes counter to the personal and social pattern now become habitual to man.

VII

Let us now go on to consider the prescription, to the technique of cotention. . . . We have pointed out the universal presence of affect projection, and particularly the tendency to ascribe to others unacceptable feelings resident within oneself; and we have traced this reaction to the modification in brain function that distorts the process of directive attention. The problem of man's behavior, then, is internal to him. It is physiological. It is a problem of his physiological self in action. It is a phylophysiological problem. If man is to employ the phylobiological technique for adjusting his organism's interrelational malfunction, he must resort to measures that will arrest *in himself* habits of ideation that are affect-laden (ditention), and thus intercept surface habits of prejudice and projection that now govern us with the force of an overpowering social reflex. In phylobiology the student must be his own guinea pig. Furthermore, he must *do* something about his internal behavior. Principles and methods in human behavior cannot neglect the role of *doing* or the function of art in maintaining healthy human adaptation.

In the main the task of the investigator is the replacement of affect projection or the emotively colored mentation of the '*I*'-*persona* (ditention), with a sense of the neuromuscular tension that is the concomitant of this habitual social behavior response. As for my associates and myself, a long apprenticeship in the mutual challenge of socially projected affects provided a substantial springboard for our attack. It was the unremitting shock to accustomed psychosocial reactions, and the persistent arrest of a reflexly established social pattern, that first forced into consciousness the presence of the physiological stress coincident to it.

The effect of abnegating mental images, of disavowing one's habitual thinking, was to produce a sense of awareness of the eyes themselves and of the forepart of the head. With the increasing assertion of this awareness, and with its persistent cultivation, this kinesthetic sensation of the eyes and head is sensed as one of weight and stress. Concomitant to this internal perception, there occurs the automatic elimination of one's customary preoccupation with affect-laden images, and one *feels* the problem of his reorientation to be essentially physiological.[16] It has become a problem that is subjective or internal to the organism itself.

We have found that quieting the habitual movements of the eyes assists in the organism's physiological reorientation, since the process of projection is so largely interwoven with the visual function. My own procedure has been to set aside during the day (and night) experimental periods in which I have adhered so consistently to the arrest of the eyes and the concomitant kinesthetic observation of the cephalic area of partitive tension that the background from which it is observed, namely, the organism's primary tensional pattern, or cotention, is forced into recognition and into conscious, directive efficiency. That is, the technique for bringing into operation the pattern of cotenion, or the tensional pattern of the organism as a whole, consists in centering upon the part-area of discomfort and stress, with the resultant arrest of affect images.

After all, cotention is the primary pattern that characterizes the spontaneous behavior of the infant in relation to its environment. This cotentive principle is also operative in the balanced process of integration that characterizes the disinterested mentation of the scientist in his approach to his material of observation and analysis. Indeed, what the child has by nature and the scientist by training, all mankind possesses potentially in the primary unity and integrity of his total organism's relation to its environment. Cotention is man's biological staple; as much so as food or air or soil. *In recovering this basic pattern of behavior one is merely carrying the laws of evolution into the subjective domain of human feeling and motivation now distorted by the affect projection and untruth of ditention and neurosis.*

The technique of cotention, however, like any other technique, is acquired

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[16] I have elsewhere described our instrumental studies of the ditentive and cotentive patterns, both in investigators and students. These experiments gave concrete, objective evidence of differences in the physiology of the organism in the two modes of attentional adaptation. The differences were most marked and consistent in respiratory rate, in brain-wave characteristics, and in eye-movement pattern. (13, 17, 18, 19) The instrumental studies to date are summarized in an appendix to *The Neurosis of Man.*

only through research, or "practice." No student will step lightly from ditention into cotention. Cotention is not a matter of intellectual acumen, but of intestinal fortitude. Its attainment demands constant repetition. The distractions are many and persistent, and the student must return again and again to his experimental task. I can give him no other formula than that of refusing to entertain his customary ideas or affect images, and thus gradually coming to perceive the segment that habitually projects the image. With increasing practice the student will perceive this segment through the characteristic sense of local tension he experiences with the abrogation of his habitual ditentive interests.

* * * *

I think that cotention will not attain practical realization as a phylic discipline except in the measure in which communities of men are educated to the recognition of the false affect values, the surface (wishful) thinking, that now determine their interrelational behavior in all its aspects—political, religious, economic, academic, industrial. Therefore one may not speak of the cotention of the individual without of necessity presupposing the restoration of the cotentive pattern of adaptation in mankind at large—no more than he could speak of eliminating tuberculosis in the individual and not in the phylum. It is only as cotention becomes a community expression that there will be an automatic modification of customary affective, or socially subversive, behavior. I cannot emphasize strongly enough our position that neurosis is a social aberration, and that the essential contribution of phylobiology to the sphere of behavior research is its recognition of the subjective constellation of reactions embodied in the social *'I'-persona*—the field of man's partitive self in action. This, and this alone, is cotention; this is the meaning, the essence, of phylobiology.

VIII

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. . . As a science of subjective man—a science that deals with processes within us—phylobiology is of its nature a discipline applicable equally to scientist and layman. But for both scientist and layman it must be emphasized that only a mature interest in improved methods of human adaptation—only a passionate interest in the organism's fullest measure of balanced function and health in accordance with scientific method, as over against uncontrolled reaction habits—can possibly incite a student to pit his organismic self against the self of automatic habit. In substance, his problem is to exercise the scientific discipline that will give precedence to the delayed reaction in contrast to the immediate response, even where the adjustment will affect his entire personality with all its age-long entail of reflex habituations. Certainly nothing could be more unacceptable to him in the entire pharmacopeia of behavior remedies than a recipe for undermining all that he now knows as his personality, and adopting instead a procedure that will insure a total (phylic) pattern of reaction of which he has as yet no conscious knowledge.

To the student who has not participated in the technique of phylobiology, the situation may look rather hopeless. But from my own experience and that of others, it is by no means hopeless. When man *must* do something, he finds a way to do it. Today it is not only the biologist, the sociologist, the philosopher, the psychologist, and the economist who are concerned with the signs in man of social imbalance and disintegration; men everywhere are hard pressed to reconcile the inconsistencies in our human behavior with a sane program of individual and social adaptation. Men are daily becoming increasingly aware of serious difficulty, of pain and impediment, for which they cannot account. As a consequence, I believe that the habit mechanisms of affect, prejudice, and projection will be brought more and more under scrutiny, and that intelligent men on each side of this divided and unhappy world will demand of themselves the discipline of an inquiry that offers a radical challenge to the accepted behavior precepts prevailing throughout the process of us all. I do not doubt that the needed social discipline, which in our experimental group work came to be exerted upon my associates and myself, will gradually come to exert itself spontaneously over the processes of men, in sufficient numbers and with sufficient strength to give the lie to the behavioral prescriptions—religious, political, ethical, legal, educational—now accepted among us as *bona fide* remedies for a disorder of adaptation which man will in spite of himself be forced to recognize as a *physiological disturbance internal to him.* With the increasing opportunities of contact between individuals and nations, with the closer interknitting physically of men and institutions the world over, there is an intimation, however vague, however inchoate, of a corresponding trend within the process of men toward recognizing, beneath the clash of our superficial ideologies, the essentially common nature of persons and peoples throughout the family of mankind.

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Psychological Approaches to the Prevention of War

JAMES G. MILLER

To talk about developments in the scientific psychological study of the prevention of war is a nearly impossible task, since there are almost no developments. Consequently my remarks must be nearly devoid of factual content, because few significant and reliable findings have yet been made which are relevant to this topic. Nevertheless I shall be discussing an important current trend in social psychology, for an increasing number of psychologists are turning their energies to this area and the first meager results of this new activity are beginning to appear.

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In investigating how the sciences of man may contribute to a solution of this problem, it will be helpful to divide our considerations into three parts: What can be accomplished in the prevention of war over a short-term—that is, within the next five years? What can be accomplished in a medium term of five to fifteen years? And what can be accomplished over a longer period of more than fifteen years?

It is extremely unlikely that any developments in social psychology or in the other social sciences within the next five years can be of sufficient magnitude to meet our present threat, even if there should be great expansion in these areas. . . . it is beginning to be abundantly clear that the scientific method can be applied to social issues, but we have as yet no large body of dependable findings from the application of the scientific method. Consequently it is scarcely conceivable that the sciences of man can in five years be used effectively to prevent the men from pushing the buttons that start the push-button war.

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Researches are under way at present (4) to study how committees operate, how conferences work, and what can be done psychologically to bring about easy agreement and solution of problems by groups. For example, it has been possible to apply rather precise methods of measurement to investigating (14) how groups of varying sizes solve problems. It is also possible to find out how large a committee may become before communication is hampered by the sheer number of people present and before the group cohesiveness is lost so that it breaks down into subgroups. It is entirely possible to study which methods of committee procedure make most easily for agreement and which make for disagreement.

Many of the important decisions of the world are made in committees, and it may be that the implications of this research could be applied in such groups. There is, however, little likelihood that if such studies were applied in the Security Council of the United Nations, they would immediately be effective in bringing about better agreement. In the short run, social psychology certainly has no answer to the United Nations' veto!

Perhaps other psychological methods could be applied in the near future, but they are unlikely to be more effective than those we have mentioned. The difficulty with each of them is that five years is not enough time to do an adequate amount of basic research on personality dynamics and interpersonal dynamics to get sufficient information about determinants of attitudes and behavior to form an adequate basis for planning such approaches to the prevention of war. In five to fifteen years of concentrated, organized effort it might be possible to get the necessary basic data, but in less time than that there cannot be great hope.

Let us turn, then, to a consideration of medium range planning—what the sciences of man, social psychology, sociology, and anthropology, may be able to contribute to the prevention of war in five to fifteen years. The applications of these sciences can be made during this period toward two groups—toward the *peoples* of the world on one hand and toward their *leaders* on the other. Both groups are important and always have been important in the formation of national policies. The difference between one form of government and another, between the extremes of autocracy and democracy, for example, is not a sharply defined qualitative difference between rule by an individual on the one hand and rule by the people on the other. Both leaders and peoples have power in every governmental system. In this matter the difference between one type of government and another is only a question of degree. Policies are always formed by a repeating circle of influence from the peoples to the leaders and back to the peoples again, public opinion forcing the leaders to take one direction and the leaders then determining the flow of public attitudes by responding partly to those opinions while at the same time they turn them into directions which they themselves desire.

What can be done to influence the behavior of the peoples? Because attitudes are either the determiners of behavior or the correlates of behavior, it is worth while to work on their attitudes. The first step in this is having a well-organized system for measuring public opinion and diagnosing mass attitudes. Since we are dealing with a world-wide problem, we should have world-wide measures of attitudes. Immediately will be raised the question of how this would be possible in the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia where censorship is strict and where the peoples are afraid to talk to foreigners. The use of thorough interviews with small samples of the population for public opinion polling has advanced to such a degree (21, 5, 8) that it is probably now feasible for any country which wishes to break through the censorship of another country to keep scientifically informed on public opinion in the other country by training spies in this polling method. Espionage in itself is not a threat to world peace, but rather probably a promoter of it. Of course the factors which make it necessary to have secret rather than overt agents investigating what goes on elsewhere in the world are factors that lead to war, because they are related to drives for political and military power. One might well hope, however, that all other governments of the world have agents in the United States to familiarize themselves with our public opinions and to try to understand our political, economic, and social development, because that sort of communication between peoples can foster understanding rather than ignorance. Ignorance of the desires, aims, and characteristics of other peoples leads to fear and is consequently one of the primary causes for aggression. Since we all think about Russia in connection with the danger of another war, we can refer to Russia to illustrate how scientific methods of foreign public opinion polling could be conducted using the interview method of Likert on small samples of the population. It is probable that less than a thousand American secret agents strategically placed throughout the whole Soviet with equipment for radio or other communication with America, who knew the languages of the Russians and looked like the peoples in the neighborhoods to which they were assigned, could interview selected persons constituting areal samples of the country and report the results of these interviews to America. This knowledge would be of tremendous value to America or to the world in understanding the Russians and planning how to deal with them.

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Various methods of social psychology have been developed and experimented on which can have some effect in changing attitudes. For example, a good many of the principles of advertising are well understood by those conversant with the psychology of advertising. Classical experimental psychology has informed us about determiners of attention; such as, intensity, quality, repetition, suddenness, movement, and variety of stimulation. (19) Other things being equal, a large advertisement sells more candy or soap than a small one; a colored one sells more than a black and white one; one on the outside cover of a magazine sells more than one inside; the first and the last parts of a radio program are remembered better than the middle part, and so forth. These principles can be applied to education or propaganda—call it what you will—that is, to planned ways of changing the attitudes of people.

Another recent development in social psychology and psychiatry which offers promise as a method of changing attitudes is the work on group therapy. (17) The interest in this procedure has been fostered by the fact that individual psychiatric care is too expensive for most people, and the number of patients needing such care is much greater than can possibly be handled individually by trained psychiatrists. During the war psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychiatric social workers often used group therapy, working toward the solution of the problems of a number of patients at the same time. It was generally found that this method had another advantage more important than the time it saved—the very existence of the group was psychotherapeutically helpful. The interactions of the patients on each other were frequently more effective in changing attitudes than a therapist might have been. Similar procedures might well be used for changing the attitudes and behavior of groups of peoples on matters which concern world peace. From some points of view, the repeated wars of our civilization might be called outbreaks of uncontrolled pathological hostility, and it is entirely possible that one approach to this recurrent epidemic disease of our species may be group psychotherapy or some closely related technique.

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We have stated that in the middle range, five to fifteen years, it will be possible to make these various psychological approaches to the *peoples*. Similar approaches can also, as we have said, be made to the *leaders*. We have already mentioned the researches on committee and conference activity. Investigations of this sort can be continued in the five-to-fifteen-year period with a reasonable hope that some of the findings can be applied by many policy-making bodies which settle issues that finally make for war or peace.

Social psychology can also make important contributions to the analysis of intelligence materials of this or any other country. It is important for statesmen and policy makers to have the most accurate facts possible about what goes on in the rest of the world. Only in the light of such intelligence can the best decisions be made. But besides obtaining the intelligence, scientists can interpret the significance of it in terms of their knowledge of human personality, which interpretation will make it more valuable to the policy makers. An understanding of human personality and human motivation is clearly relevant at many points in such interpretations. Psychology for many years has been devoting itself to the study of human personality and temperament, and the principles that are being learned about these areas from clinical contacts and from experimental psychology can well be applied to the analysis of intelligence for the use of the world's leaders.

Psychology can also make valuable contributions to the selection of leaders. Various universities have established schools for training potential civil servants in political science, planning, and management functions, and various other subjects in which they need special training. It is entirely possible that, as the years go by, the electorate will come to feel that this sort of training especially qualifies a man for governmental jobs. During the war rapid strides were made in psychological personnel selection techniques. These techniques might well be applied to the selection of the persons who will receive special training for governmental functions, as well as to the selection of military men and civil servants. Lest we lose control of our fantasies completely, let us remind ourselves that it will be some time before we shall be able to apply such selection to congressmen and presidents—and we might even admit humbly as believers in democracy that we would scarcely wish science pushed to this last pinnacle or abyss, whichever it may be.

Selection techniques are no longer merely intelligence tests or objective tests of mechanical and other aptitudes, but have become a very broad armamentarium indeed, including psychiatric interviews, autobiographies, multiple projective techniques, diagnostic psychodrama, real-life situations (which may have the character of work-samples), sociometric methods, and observations of uncontrolled human relationships which are possible when psychologists live in the same community or house with the persons they are examining. (16, 3) These methods of studying the whole personality in all its facets may enable us to find the sort of leaders who are sufficiently secure that they do not need to relieve their anxieties by driving for power and prestige which comes from dominance over other men; whose emotional life is sufficiently stable that they can be happy with the satisfactions which are derived from service to mankind rather than needing to have their names go down in history for outstanding accomplishments. Selecting men who do not have uncontrolled hostile desires, conscious or unconscious, and training them for leadership may eventually mean that we have leaders in our country or in other countries who are not motivated to lead their peoples on to war.

These are some of the promising approaches which social psychology can make in the middle range of years. What then about long-term planning, from fifteen years on? It is in this period that social psychology really begins to offer serious promise of contribution in the permanent prevention of war. If war could only be postponed for such a long period as fifteen years, there are many sorts of promise in psychological studies.

For one thing, long-term educational plans can be made for the purpose of developing in children and adults wholesome, nonhostile attitudes toward other peoples and other races together with understanding of their ways and customs. Numerous social psychological studies have shown that one's attitudes are largely determined by the groups to which one belongs. (15) Education can be designed to counteract this provincialism of the human mind.

In this long-range period, also, the effect of systematic study of the value systems of the great men of the past, as represented by the Great Books movement, could be carefully investigated. In the upbringing of the next generation such a plan might well be more effective than could possibly be hoped in a short period of time.

Experimentation in educational methods might also well be devoted to an emphasis on emotional education as well as intellectual education. In this field America has been singularly lacking as our increasing rate of psychoneurosis, of divorce, and of the other symptoms of emotional maladjustment indicate. Education must devote itself to the problems of developing mental health, developing inner security, which makes it possible to withstand frustration without arousing uncontrollable aggressions. Education must take on some of the characteristics of psychotherapy and be closely related to the psychiatric care of the nation. Stable and contented people are not likely under usual circumstances to feel the need for fighting others.

Besides these educational and therapeutic measures of a psychological character it will also be desirable in the long run to make many basic theoretical studies—investigations of the structure of human personality, which is the main problem of all psychology. Most of what can be learned in this area will have relevance to the problems of war and peace. But beyond that there should be special studies of the basic drives of personality. How does frustration beget hostility? How do emotions becloud intellectual judgments? How do emotions develop group loyalties and how can these loyalties be applied not only to small groups but to the total community of the world? How do symbols—the swastika, the cross, the star of David, the fasces, the crown of England, the hammer and sickle, the crescent and star—affect behavior and arouse human emotions? Basic researches are also needed on the nature of what the psychoanalysts call superego formation, the development of conscience, the development of the regard of one individual for others, so that he will not overstep their rights, the ultimate of which is the waging of war. Other studies should be made on the nature of the defense mechanisms, on how the individual protects his ego against the attacks of others. And many more investigations should be made on the problems of group belongingness and group loyalty; on improving methods of public opinion polling, techniques of diagnosing trends in cultures or nations so that dangerous developments can be recognized before they have gone too far. MacGranahan, (13) for example, has worked on a procedure for studying the most popular plays of a given period and country as a projective technique reflecting the desires and unsatisfied aims of that nation at that time. Similar group diagnostic methods, many of them perhaps comparable to individual psychological diagnostic methods, should be developed for keeping a constant observing thumb on the pulse of the world.

And finally, procedures should be established for studying group conditioning, group therapy, the alteration of attitudes and of behavior. Discovering scientific ways to accomplish such changes in a predictable fashion is of the essence in controlling human beings in whatever field one may wish to turn.

This speech throughout has not been optimistic and it is not easy to end it with such an air. It is very likely that the present threat to our civilization is greater than any power we have to control it. It is very likely that nothing can prevent another holocaust which will be more devastating than any the world has known before. But there is hope at least to know that a method exists to study the principles of interpersonal relationships. While it is not promising in the short run, in the long run it offers immeasurable hope of finding an ultimate solution to mankind's eternal problem of war. If we can manage somehow to postpone the conflict or to carry on research despite warfare and conduct it on a sufficiently large scale with sufficiently broad support from the peoples of the nation and the world, eventually social psychology and the related sciences may include enough factual knowledge that war can be controlled. At least, it is the responsibility of social scientists despite impending disaster to continue in this extremely important task.

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The Conditions and Prospects for a World without War

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

I. No Lasting Peace within Contemporary Culture and Society

Within the framework of contemporary (sensate) culture and with the type of society and man that express it, no enduring peace is possible. Regardless of what economic and political modifications may be made within such a framework, they cannot abolish international and civil wars, nor can they substantially decrease their magnitude or destructive ferocity. This gloomy statement is the only possible conclusion to be drawn from the relevant empirical facts, as well as from an analysis of the "heart and soul" of modern culture, society, and man.

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II. The Culture and Society Necessary for an Enduring Peace

These gloomy conclusions do not mean that an enduring peace is generally impossible. They signify only that for its realization a new culture, with an appropriate kind of society and man, different from the contemporary one, is in order. The essential characteristics of these can be briefly summed up.[4]

1. The new culture will put less emphasis upon purely sensory reality-value and more upon the truly rational and upon the supersensory-

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[4] See a more detailed analysis of this new culture, society, and man in my paper, "The Task of Cultural Rebuilding," to be published in a volume to be entitled "Intellectual and Cultural Foundations of World Order," by the Institute for Religious Studies.

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metarational reality-value, viewing the true reality-value as an infinite mainfold with three main aspects: sensory, rational, and supersensory-metarational, each within its sphere being a true reality and a true value. This conception of the true reality-value, sponsored by Plato and Aristotle, Erigena, Thomas Aquinas, and Nicolas of Cusa, to mention but a few names, will replace the major premise of our sensate culture. Accordingly, the new culture will be an articulation of this new major premise in all its main compartments: in its science, philosophy, religion, fine arts, ethics, law, and forms of social organization on up to the manners, mores, and ways of living of its individual and group members.

2. Its science will study, through sensory observation, the empirical aspects of the infinite manifold; its philosophy will investigate through mathematical and syllogistic logic the rational and logical aspects of the true reality-value; its intuitive wisdom will give us the notion of the supersensory-metalogical aspects of it through the intuition of great religious and ethical seers, great scientists like Sir Isaac Newton, great philosophers like Plato, great artists like Beethoven and Shakespeare, and great technological inventors inspired to their achievements by intuition.[5] The history of human knowledge is a cemetery filled with wrong empirical observations, false logical reasonings, and misleading intuitions. This means that, taken separately, each of these ways of cognition is fallible and that if it is to achieve a less fallibility it must have the co-operation and mutual verification of the other two ways of cognition. The outlined integralist system of truth gives us precisely this organic integration, co-operation, and mutual verification of all three ways of cognition. As such, it promises to give a more valid, richer, and better-tested truth than that which the dominant, one-sided sensory cognition can give. It eliminates also the contemporary antagonism between, and mutual undermining of, science, philosophy, and religion.

3. Instead of the excessively relativized and atomized utilitarian and hedonistic pseudo-norms of our culture—devoid of their universal binding-power, transgressed at every suitable occasion, and degraded to the level of mere Paretian "derivations," Freudian "Rationalizations," Marxian "ideological beautifications" of the economic, sexual, and other sensate

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[5] Many self-appointed pseudo-empiricists in their attack against intuition as a way of cognition of *sui generis* display a complete ignorance of how most of the great scientific, philosophical, technological, ethical, religious, and artistic discoveries and inventions have really been made. If they were real empiricists and had empirically studied this problem, they would have learned the empirically undeniable fact that most of these discoveries and inventions have been initiated and inspired by intuition (see the facts and literature on that in my *Dynamics*, IV, 746 ff.; see also I. Sikorsky, *The Story of the Winged S* [New York, 1942], chap. xxii; T. Langmuire, "Science, Common Sense and Decency" [presidential address of this Nobel Prize winner to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, delivered in 1942], *New York Times*, December 27, 1942).

"residues," "complexes," "drives," and "interests"—the ethics and law of the new culture, in accordance with its major premise, will be embodied in a set of universal norms binding and effectively controlling the behavior of all, unquestioned and undisputed in their ethical prestige by any other conflicting norm. In their content these universal norms will be a variation of the main ethical norms of practically all great religious and moral codes, form the elemental Golden Rule and Ten Commandments on up to the norms of the Sermon on the Mount as their sublimest expression. Such an ethics and law will stop the atomization of moral values, eliminate ethical and legal cynicism, and abolish the dictatorship of rude force and fraud as the supreme arbiters of human conduct.

4. Again in accordance with its major premise, the painting and sculpture, literature and music, drama and architecture, of the new culture will be quite different from contemporary fine arts. Integralist beauty will be reunited with truth and goodness, so that the new fine arts will become a value-laden art instead of being an empty art for art's sake. Instead of debunking the immortals, the new art will immortalize the mortals, ennoble the ignoble, and beautify the ugly. Instead of being negativistic, centered around the police morgue, criminal's hideouts, insane asylums, and sex organs, it will reflect mainly the eternal values, positive ideals, heroic events, and great tragedies and dramas. Like the comparable art of Greece in the fifth century B.C. and of Europe in the thirteenth century A.D., it will be an inspiring, ennobling, educating, and truly beautifying art instead of being a degrading, demoralizing, and enervating cult of social pathology, as contemporary art largely is.

5. In such a culture man will again be regarded as an end-value, as an incarnation of the divine manifold rather than as a mere biological organism, reflex-mechanism, or psychoanalytical libido, as he is usually regarded now. The value of man will again be lifted far above the utter degradation into which he is now thrown. Accordingly, the practices, institutions, and relationships that turn man into a mere means for predominantly sensate ends will largely disappear.

6. Most of the social institutions that contradict the total character of this new culture will be eliminated. The dominant form of social relationships in such a society will be neither contractual nor compulsory but familistic, similar to the relationships among the members of a good family. The economic and political regimes of such a society will be neither capitalistic nor communistic nor socialistic, but familistic. The enormous contrast between multimillionaires and paupers, the rulers and the ruled, will disappear. Private property will be limited and will be turned into a kind of public trusteeship. A decent minimum of the necessities will be secured for all. The main motives for a socially useful economic and political life will be neither profit nor power but the motive of creative

service to the society—similar to the motivation of great artists, religious leaders, scientists, and true philanthropists. Social institutions that contradict these purposes will largely disappear, those that serve them will be established and reinforced.

7. The practical consequences of the establishment of such a culture will be immense, especially in the field of human mentality, conduct, and interrelationships. The new system of values and truth will abolish the contemporary antagonism between science, philosophy, and religion: they will all be inseparable organs of a unified system of truth, all pointing toward the same verities, validities, and values. The contemporary atomization and relativization of truth, goodness, and beauty will have been terminated. With this there will be an end to the contemporary mental, moral, and social anarchy. An age of certainty will replace our present age of uncertainty. Liberated from the gnawing tortures of uncertainty, the sapping poison of contradictions, and the weariness of confusion, the human mind will once more regain an inner harmony, peace, and happiness. With these qualities its creative vigor, self-confidence, and self-control will be restored. In such conditions most of the contemporary psychoneuroses will evaporate. Universalized truth will unite into one mind all of mankind.

The general devaluation of that which is purely sensate will greatly weaken the contemporary struggle for existence and for material values and will reinforce the quest for the rational and metarational values. As a result interindividual and intergroup antagonisms will greatly decrease, their brutal forms will wither, and man's conduct will be ennobled and made truly social. The same result will follow from the universalized ethical norms rooted into the heart and soul of men. Not so much by external sanctions as by inner power they will inhibit most of the antisocial actions and relationships, particularly the bloody mistreatment of man by man, of group by group. The most brutal forms of crime, civil strife, and international warfare cannot thrive in such a cultural climate and will greatly decrease. The same is true of brute force and fraud as the arbiters of human conduct.

The new fine arts will contribute their share to the same effect. By virtue of their positive beauty they will educate, inspire, instruct, fascinate, and control human beings fully as much as the new science and religion, philosophy, and ethics. Primarily devoted to eternal beauty, the fine arts will serve also, as a by-product, the task of true socialization of *Homo sapiens*. In this way they will contribute generously to an elimination of antisocial activities, relationships, and institutions in the human universe.

Finally, through its regained harmony, peace, and happiness of mind the new culture will make human beings less egoistic, irritable, quarrelsome, violent, and antisocial. Through a release of new creative forces in all fields of sociocultural activity it will make everyone a partner and participant in the most sublime form of happiness—the happiness of a creative genius.

In these and thousands of other ways the new culture will develop a new man—happy, generous, kind, and just to himself and to all his fellow-men. Within the framework of such a culture, society, and man neither interindividual war (crime) nor civil war nor international war can flourish. If they do not disappear entirely, they will certainly decrease to the lowest minimum known in human history.

8. Such are the essential traits of the culture, society, and man necessary for an enduring peace in interindividual, intergroup, and international relationships. Without this framework, as the main condition of peace, all the other panaceas against war are futile. With it, many of these will facilitate its realization. For instance, with this sociocultural foundation the League of Nations and other forms of superstate government will faithfully and fruitfully serve the cause of peace. Without it, such a superstate government will be either as impotent as the defunct League of Nations or, what is still worse, may turn into a world tyranny as cruel as some of the "world empires" of the past. Without it the military and police forces of such a world government will certainly be misused and will eventually serve the cause of war instead of the cause of peace. With it, all the state and superstate governments, no matter what may be their technical forms, will be true familistic democracies. As such they will actively facilitate the maintenance of peace. Without it, no formal republican or democratic regime, even if universally diffused, can ever help—no more so than in the past, when the democratic and republican countries were at least as belligerent as the monarchical and autocratic[6] nations and when the growth of republican and democratic regimes for the last few centuries has been followed by an increase, rather than by a decrease, of war. Without this framework the further increase of scientific discoveries and technological inventions will be of just as little avail as in the past, during which, beginning with the thirteenth century, they have steadily and rapidly increased up to the present time and have been followed by an almost parallel increase of war. The same is true of the development of schools, universities, books, magazines, papers, movies, radio, theatres, and all the other means of contemporary education. Beginning with the thirteenth century, they have been steadily increasing without any resulting decrease of war, revolutions, or crime. This is still more true in regard to such panaceas as a more equitable distribution of the natural resources or a higher material standard of living or a more enlightened self-interest and utilitarian "rationality." Without the foregoing framework any truly equitable distribution of the

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[6] See the data on the comparative belligerency and revolutionism of republican, democratic, and monarchical-autocratic countries in my *Dynamics*, Vol. III, chaps. xii, xiii, xiv; also A. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London, 1939), IV, 141 ff.; Wright, *op. cit.*, chap. xxii.

natural resources throughout all mankind is impossible, just as it has been impossible in the past. The states and nations will remain as egotistic and rapacious as they have hitherto been. Those who believe that a diffusion of democratic forms of government would change this forget that the so-called democracies of the past and the present have been fully as imperialistic as the autocracies. They forget also the unpleasant but unquestionable fact that almost all such democracies, beginning with the Athenian and ending with the contemporary ones, have been based upon the severest exploitation of colonies and "spheres of influence" or have consisted of a vast layer of semifree and unfree population many times larger than the full-fledged citizenship of such democracies.

Likewise an "enlightened self-interest" and utilitarian "rationality" have been growing ever since the thirteenth century, without being accompanied by any decrease of war. One of the reasons for this is the fact that from a deeper standpoint this self-interest turns out to be a blind egotism, and utilitarian "rationality" a most irrational illusion. Utilitarian rationality is defined as the use of the most efficient means for the realization of an end desired. Typically, it has in view only the rationality of the means, and it neglects the rationality of the ends. The present war, which uses the most efficient and scientific means available for the defeat of the enemy is perfectly rational from this standpoint; so also is the activity of a gang of efficient murderers, armed with the best techniques of murder, which is never caught or punished. These considerations show clearly that the truly rational action is that in which the ends as well as the means are rational. An action that uses rational means to irrational ends is particularly irrational. For this reason the utilitarian rationality of our society cannot regard war as irrational, and still less is it able to achieve the abolition of war.

Likewise, without this framework, the panaceas suggested for the eradication of crime, rioting, revolution, and civil war cannot be effective. These irrational phenomena will remain and may even grow in spite of the panaceas, just as they have remained and grown during the centuries of the domination of modern culture. Notwithstanding the fact that these panaceas have been applied with especial liberality in the twentieth century, the glaring fact remains that neither crime, rioting, nor revolution has decreased; nor has the family become any better integrated; nor have suicide and mental disease declined; nor has the intensity of the interindividual and intergroup struggle for existence diminished; nor, if we can measure happiness by the movement of suicide, has man become any more happy. If anything, the objective results have been exactly opposite to what might be expected from the application of the panaceas.

The net result of the preceding analysis is that the suggested framework of the new culture, society, and man is not the manifestation of a preacher's complex, nor is it the "impractical" indulgence of an armchair philosopher in his pet preoccupation, but rather is it a most practical, scientific, and matter-of-fact indication of the *necessary conditions* for a realization of the objective—a lasting peace. Without it, all the other means to building a temple of lasting peace are bound to be impotent or will only produce even bigger and more terrible wars.

III. Prospects

To this conclusion may be raised the objection that the new sociocultural framework is itself unrealizable and utopian. If such an objection were valid, it would only mean that an enduring peace is impossible. In that case all rational persons should stop fooling themselves and others with the utopia of a mankind without war, bloody revolution, and crime and should resignedly accept them as inevitable in the same manner in which we accept death. However, after a careful scrutiny, the objection turns out to be far less axiomatic and unquestionable than it appears at first glance. In other words, the chances for a realization of the new framework, with the enduring peace that it implies, are not at all nil.

First, if mankind is going to live a creative life and is not going to sink either into the somnolence of "a benumbed and ruminating human herd" or into the tortuous agony of decay, the new framework is the only way that is left. The existing framework is so rotten and is progressively becoming so destructive and painful that mankind cannot creatively and contentedly live within it for any length of time. If it cannot be replaced by the new framework, then the end of mankind's creative history, in one of the two ways just indicated, is inescapable. But such a conclusion is far more fantastic in its pessimism than the facts of human history warrant: in spite of the gravity of many of the great crises that have beset mankind throughout history, human beings have always been able somehow to create new forms of culture and society that have eventually terminated the crisis. For the present there is no evidence whatsoever that a new sociocultural renaissance is impossible.

Second, the shift from a withered sensate culture to a form of culture somewhat akin to that just outlined has happened several times in the history of Greco-Roman, Western, and certain other great cultures. If it has been possible of occurrence in the past, there is every reason to suppose that it can recur in the future.

Third, if the birth of the new culture were dependent entirely upon contemporary "utilitarian rationality," its emergence and growth would be uncertain indeed. But fortunately such is not the manner in which one form of culture is ordinarily replaced by another. The replacement is usually a result of the historical process itself, of gigantic, impersonal, spontaneous forces immanent in a given sociocultural framework; and only at a later stage does it become facilitated by truly rational forces that plan and endeavor to build the new culture with all available scientific means. The spontaneous forces immanent in our modern culture have already brought about its phase of decline and crisis; they have already undermined its prestige and fascination to a considerable degree; they have already alienated from it a considerable portion of the population; they have robbed it of most of its charms: its security, its safety, its prosperity, its material comfort, its happiness, its sensate freedom, and all of its main values. Not in the classroom but in the hard school of life millions of people are being incessantly taught by these forces an unforgettable and indelible lesson, comprehensible by the plainest human being, that the existing framework is going to give them "stones" and bullets instead of bread; gigantic destruction in place of creative construction; misery instead of prosperity; regimentation in lieu of freedom; death, mutilation, and suffering instead of security of life, integrity of body, or bigger and better pleasure. With these charms progressively evaporating, this modern culture of ours has no other great values by which to hold the allegiance of humanity. Like a pretty woman whose bodily charms have gone, it is destined to lose more and more the adherence of humanity until it has been entirely forsaken and dethroned from its dominant position in favor of a different sociocultural framework. This point has about been reached by our culture. Its magnificent creativeness, its prestige, and its charms are about over.

Parallel with this defection of humanity from contemporary culture, the same spontaneous forces are generating and increasing the quest for a different sociocultural framework, one which is more creative and adequate and less destructive and painful. This quest is at the present moment the main item in the order of the day: almost everyone is busy with the problems of the future society and culture. Only a few, who nothing forget and nothing learn, still cherish ideas of a restoration of the past and a revitalization of a withered framework. The overwhelming majority understand—if not by calculation and logical analysis, then by plain horse sense—that this is impossible. They recognize the necessity of some framework different from that which we have now.

At this stage the truly rational forces enter the play and take a guiding hand in it. With all the available wisdom and knowledge and with a sense of supreme duty they endeavor to create various systematic blueprints of the new sociocultural framework—to test them, to improve them, rejecting the less adequate ones and perfecting the better ones. New plans, with their philosophies, ideologies, and ways and means of realization, multiply, become more and more coordinated, more and more diffused, continually accumulate a momentum and an ever increasing legion of adherents, until they become a tangible social force. This force grows and in thousands of ways begins significantly to influence human mentality and conduct, science and religion, philosophy and ethics, fine arts and social institutions. The process is slow, develops erratically from day to day, and has many deviations, mistakes, and miscarriages of its own. Altogether, it takes several decades, even a few centuries, for its full realization. Sooner or later, however, it terminates in a dethronement of the previously dominant sociocultural framework and in a rise to ascendancy of the new framework.

In the case of our contemporary culture we have reached the point at which the rational forces are about ready to enter the play. Together with the spontaneous forces of the historical process itself, they will be able to create a new sociocultural framework that will be a rough approximation to the one outlined above. When this objective has been reached, the utopia of a lasting peace will become a reality.

Psychological Impediments to Effective International Cooperation

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GUNNAR MYRDAL

The basic objective in international relations is lasting peace between peoples. The peace we seek is the habitual regulation of international differences by civilised means and patience, and not by violence and the destruction of human beings, goods and values. As a Swede I would particularly remind you that peace "at any price" is no solution.

The task is to make prevail a universal will for permanent peace. In this sense the problem is at bottom a problem of psychology. The will for peace today is dwarfed and distorted by mutual suspicion and fear. As tension is mounting, suspicion and fear may even, and perhaps not only on one side of a dividing line of mutual hostility, inflate the idea of peace as something obtainable only by an "inevitable" war which must be got over with and fast. But we know that in the bitter ashes of a new major war would reign only the peace of death.

The limitations of past and present international cooperation in the political, economic and social fields are well known to us. For we all see as consequences an incredible wastage of material resources and suffer a gnawing away of our communal and individual bodies and souls. I shall describe certain aspects of the frustrating experience on this international level of social relations, and I shall refer to the emotional disturbances which jumble the values by which we act. I hope thus to indicate some of the major factors which block the way to world understanding and to a life-fulfilling and life-enhancing cooperation between individuals and between nations.

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Gunnar Myrdal, "Psychological Impediments to Effective International Cooperation," Journal of Social Issues. *Supplement Series, No. 6 (1952), pp. 5–31. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. Footnotes numbered as in original.*

My attention will be directed to psychological factors of an even more permanent and basic nature which would have been present even if the relations between the Soviet Union and the West had come to develop in the way most people, including statesmen, in the Western countries and particularly in America rightly wished but mistakenly expected during the war. These factors are at work in the attempts of Western—or without-Eastern, non-universal—cooperation which now form almost the entire scope of practical activity of all the organisations within the UN family. Almost all of the United Nations Specialised Agencies are thus, in the absence of Eastern participation, now "Western" in scope. And the fundamental psychological factors are also present in the new Western organizations which were created for their less all-embracing purposes.

II. Attitudes

A corner to start out from may be the observation which must have been made by everyone who has followed at close range the work in the international organizations, that whenever something goes wrong or when an unfortunate incident occurs, this has a much higher news-value than when something happens to be accomplished. International cooperation has continuously a bad press. The responsibility is not the reporters'; they serve a market and deliver the news which is in demand. It is the public which tends to be something more than apathetic. Part of its unfriendly attitude can best be described by the untranslatable German word *Schadenfreude*. This is particularly true of the popular attitude to the work of the international organizations which are still not openly and formally partisan. And this group includes all the organizations under the UN label. I have often felt that the public is in a sense taking a revenge on its own international idealism and its hidden wishes.

Something similar is, of course, true in all other fields of human striving than international cooperation: that a house is built is no news, that it is burnt, is. Any rumour of a scandal around a person in public life, however unjust or incredible, any degradation of a high endeavour, is eagerly inbibed by the public. As most people are schooled and as they are living in the constant experience of tension, maladjustment and frustration, they lust in indulging in what is shabby, weak and insufficient in their neighbours. The masochistic character of this urge is revealed in the fact that it is so often specifically directed against their own leaders and their own innermost ideals. Entering into public life and becoming socially visible as striving for the good therefore means in our countries to doom oneself to much unpleasantness. The publicity which particularly the Americans have become accustomed to organise in defence of the leaders and the ideals seldom really carries home. The public has become conditioned not to believe too much in publicity, except of course when it is discrediting, antagonistic and aggressive.

As I said, this is true in all fields of human endeavour. But in internal politics there are counter-forces. Interests are involved which are commonly experienced as real and specific. Around these interests there are organised pressure groups, movements and parties with which the citizens have identified themselves. This makes for some consolidation of more positive approaches. Also, people tend to become somewhat more rational in their opinions insofar as they are more aware of many issues and how they concern their own welfare. By this means people also come to assemble political experience and knowledge. The further the internal integration of the state proceeds, and the more politics comes to enter upon things of immediate and concrete interest to the individuals, the stronger should these forces of identification and insight which work for realism and rationality become.

In matters relating to foreign policy the rational corrections are much weaker, often almost absent. There a larger space for uninhibited play is left for the impulses of aggression and hostility, so deeply embedded in human beings schooled in the way they are and living as they do under the constant influence of personal bewilderment and insecurity, of squeezed ambitions and inhibited desires. In reality, the increased interest in foreign affairs often serves, and is stimulated by, the need felt for an outlet for suppressed hostility.

This difference is very understandable in a situation where the state is rapidly becoming increasingly integrated while the world becomes disintegrated. On the one hand, to an ever larger number of people internal politics takes on a character of having a clear and concrete significance which is commonly understood and of being related to definite choices which are manageable and more under the control of the will of the citizens. This tends to give a sense of relative security. International politics, on the contrary, becomes a dark destiny, largely outside "our" control, a focus of indeterminate fear. There is an objective element of uncertainty in foreign policy, namely the absence of a certain reasonable predictability concerning the consistency of other nations' attitudes and policies which is necessary for confidence to move ahead in cooperation. It is this element which can be amplified to any degree when attitudes become uncontrolled by reason.

In internal politics we can succeed to circumscribe the scope of partisanship and have a basic personality level where we feel and think in terms of "we". The goal of all education to citizenship is to enlarge the number of people who are capable of feeling this "belongingness" to the whole nation. But in foreign politics there are, indeed, very few people who have such a basic foothold from which they can react in any other way than that of narrow national partisanship—right or wrong, my country.

This all means that there is in existence hardly the beginning of a world community. So extremely few persons even in our most advanced countries are "sufficiently mature to be capable of being 'world citizens'". I am here quoting George Brock Chisholm. . . . Chisholm continued:

> Up until now very few people indeed in any country have really developed emotionally even to a truly national degree of maturity. Such development to a national level requires an equal degree of concern for the welfare of *all* the kinds of people within the nation, irrespective of colour, racial origin, religion, education, social or economic group—or even political party. Few people have reached even this stage of development, and yet only through this stage is it possible to develop to a degree of maturity in which there is a "belonging" feeling in relation to all peoples, and an equal concern for the welfare of all of them. Very few such people have been developed but it is clear that they are the prototype of what the world must have, in large numbers, before there can be any reasonable degree of assurance that the human race will survive for even another generation.

> There is now only one basic importance in the world, the one importance on which the very existence of the race depends, the emotional relationship between the people of the world.

Chisholm wants the employment in international politics of experts on human relations and he requests that all education—from pre-school care to adult education—should be directed towards conditioning people in the direction of becoming world citizens. With this I entirely agree. But I want to add that the gradual success in educating people to national citizenship has been very largely due to the fact that there are in existence organised integrated national states. They have been "learning by doing", which not least in this field remains the superior method of pedagogics. How are we to produce world citizens when we have no world community to train them into? This question is equally as pertinent as the opposite one, to which Chisholm devoted his attention: How are we to create a world community without world citizens to uphold it? Both questions are so crucial because of the disastrous direction of present world trends and their speed.

III. Opportunism and Instability

Another general observation concerns the extreme opportunism and the great instability of public opinion in the field of foreign relations. I need only make a general reference to the big latitudes of the changes in attitude during the last five, ten or fifteen years among the American public to the Japanese, the Chinese, the Germans, the Yugoslavs, the Finns or the Russians. Take also the effort to recall the mountains of books and articles which talented persons manufactured at every point of time to give the illusion of reason and permanency to the popular opinions of the day by rationalising them in terms of national character and national history through centuries back. Remember the writings on the Germans and the Russians in the years before, during and immediately after World War II. The opportunistic rationalisations contained in this literature are revealed by the eagerness with which it was later suppressed in the public mind and concealed by its authors. Even the attitudes towards countries like Great Britain, France and Sweden are highly instable and sensitive to respond, particularly in the negative direction, to what is in the news of the day.

In this connection it must be stated that it is an untrue pretence when it is sometimes said that the likes and dislikes are focused on the political systems of other countries, and not on the nations themselves which are supposedly always liked as people. For all sorts of systems are represented both among the liked and disliked nations. When it is opportune, any political system is swallowed. Among the nations who have experienced particularly violent ups and downs in public esteem during the last decades there are several whose political system has remained about the same. I need only mention Finland, the Soviet Union, and lately Yugoslavia and Spain.

I believe it would be in the service of rationality if this instability and opportunism in public attitudes to foreign nations were more carefully studied by the psychologists and the results widely publicised.[2] A reminder of people's foolishness at an earlier point of time might calm them down a little and make them less cocksure today. I could even see the usefulness of a silent moment at church services and other public occasions devoted to the evaluation of everyone's earlier opinions in the field of foreign policy. But we should not exaggerate the possibilities to reach a greater degree of emotional calm and rationality by research and other intellectual exercises. There is nothing which the public resents so much as being robbed of its follies.

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[2] As an example of the type of facts which I believe it would be useful to place before people as a mirror, I take from a UNESCO study the following account of adjectives chosen by Americans who were polled in 1942 and in 1948 to characterise the Russians:

	1942	*1948*
hardworking	61%	49%
intelligent	16%	12%
practical	18%	13%
conceited	3%	28%
cruel	9%	50%
brave	48%	28%
progressive	24%	15%

P. 526, "Stereotypes and Tensions as Revealed by the UNESCO International Poll", by William Buchanan. *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 3, 1951.

We must now again recall that it is not precisely people's most charitable, their wisest and most rational selves which spring ahead to provide the momentum in the dynamics of attitudes in foreign relations. As I have pointed out, this is rather the field left free for exercising one's floating aggressiveness and hostility. These inclinations are so commonly present in society that to get tough with outside nations easily acquires the character of displaying national virtue. The joining with others in showing dislikes and the standing together in voicing threats and recriminations against other nations actually increase the individual's subjective experience of national "belongingness" and are therefore felt to be unifying moral forces in the people. It is one of the shortcuts to patriotism, an easily available substitute for the true "national maturity" of which Chisholm spoke.

It is a sad but accurate commentary on the mental state of humanity today that it is always so much easier to get people to join against something than for something. The foreigner is the obvious choice of an adversary if one wants to use this means to preserve and enhance the unity of a nation. We can get our compatriots to be against the foreigner rather independently of what he really is and what he wants.

The politician, even the good and responsible politician, operating in the psychological milieu I am describing must often feel pressed to exploit this easy device of directing aggressions outward as a means for acquiring a national backing of his policies. And the same factors are operating on the other side of the national boundaries.

In international relations the existence, or the intentional creation of tension can, as a matter of fact, often render definite tactical advantages in the short run. A government negotiating with other governments may thus strengthen its own bargaining power, if it can get the nation solidified behind it by an extra propaganda dose of antagonism.

Already in its slumbering state the irrationality of the nation at home can be utilised as a weapon in foreign bargaining. This opportunity offers itself in particularly convenient form for the American Government which, according to the inherited American Constitution, does not necessarily carry the confidence of Congress and least of all can rely on its backing on any specific issue. As is commonly referred to by foreign diplomats and negotiators, and understandably resented by them as an unfair practice, it is becoming somewhat of a habit for American negotiators at crucial points in a negotiation to use as a threat the American Congress and the American public as though these were unreasonable and irresponsible and had to be placated in order to come along. They explain that even if they themselves see a point, and even if the Administration would be inclined to agree, this would not be understood and accepted by the Congress and the public, and they, as negotiators, therefore have to maintain their demands. When it is tactically helpful the negotiators may be tempted to picture the Congress and the public as more irrational than they actually are.

As in the post-war period this method of diplomacy has been increasingly applied, and as it had proved tactically a successful method, it has also increasingly become adopted by others, for instance by the Germans. Governments like that of the British have however been operating for centuries within a firmly established parliamentary practice and on the basis of a public opinion that is generally assumed to be, and probably is, calmer and from long experience better educated in questions of foreign relations. They are at considerable disadvantage in this game. For their negotiators are constantly in the position actually to commit their governments and states, and they can hardly even pretend to the contrary. That the development of a diplomacy of attributed pressure is not in its general, long-run effects contributing to effective international cooperation is clear.

More generally, the temptation to appeal directly to the irrational impulses in a nation, particularly concerning the most fateful questions, must often be irresistible. Let us assume that a government feels good reasons for a considerable rearmament or substantial subsidies to prospective allies. A means of getting the citizens to accept the consequent increase of the tax burden is to frighten them a bit more than would be rationally motivated. The temptation to use this device is stronger the weaker the government is, the more it is under attack by the opposition, and the more the nation is conditioned by its history to feel disinclined to making military preparations and forming military alliances in peace-time.

An extra disadvantage with all purposive propaganda of this type is that it cannot be switched off when that might be desirable. Besides, honest men cannot carry on a propaganda directed to the general public without gradually and partly becoming the object of it themselves. It is difficult for anyone to say more than he believes. If he tries, he will end up believing more than he originally did. He had chosen propaganda as a means, but it becomes his master. This amounts to partial abdication of leadership.

I have here referred to honestly motivated politics carried out by responsible politicians. As has often been pointed out, to the demagogue exploitation of the almost boundless potentialities of pitching up hostility to other nations is an easy road to fame, popular backing and power.

It can also be utilised to distract people's attention from distress at home. It can thus serve as a substitute for internal reform. In every country there are for this reason powerful vested interests—besides those conventionally remembered in this connection, the munition industries—which may feel it to their advantage to support an aggressive foreign policy.

Under the influence of all these opportune motives the vocal forces working on public opinion in a country will often over-reach themselves. The turmoil of public opinion as it is represented in the newspapers, as we know, therefore, often gives an exaggerated picture of the unrest among the people. Studies of public opinion polls continue to underline the fact that in general the nation is calmer and more rational than the opinion and policy makers. As has often been referred to in the general literature on the problems of our civilisation, and with considerable truth, the "intellectuals" of the world—those of the urban upper-middle class who have specialised education, who speak in the parliaments, write in the newspapers, who stand up as informed spokesmen on all sorts of public occasions, and who thus are the overt moulders of public opinion—have not on the whole played a very honourable role during the past thirty years. Instead of being a force for understanding and reason they have often tended to be more irrational, opportunistic and unstable than the people they lead and pretend to represent. They have, again on the average and with many notable exceptions, been in the forefront when the national and international disasters of our time were produced.

If we now think of the large under-developed regions of the world, where huge masses of poverty-stricken, illiterate people eke out an existence of utter frustration and where an immense potential volume of aggression is freely floating and almost *ad libitum* can be directed against the rich, the Jews, the Americans and British or foreigners in general, we realise that it must require an almost superhuman level of wise statesmanship on behalf of their political leaders, and in addition an equally almost incredible degree of understanding and generosity on behalf of the industrially advanced nations, if the course of speedy but orderly internal reform shall not be perverted into nationalistic convulsions.

IV. Cultural Isolation

A psychological impediment to effective international cooperation which in this sketch should not be forgotten is the existing cultural isolation between the inhabitants of the different national states. In spite of the increase of touristing around and the rapid development of modern communications generally, it is a question open for debate whether the degree of isolation between the nations is really decreasing to any appreciable extent.

In Scandinavia very notoriously the boundaries between the states are purely the result of historical accidents; they have no foundation whatsoever in geography, race or any other "natural" factor. When travelling there I have been struck by the evidence of how, on the contrary, the more integrated modern state is giving increased cultural meaning and import to the political frontiers.

It shows up in a small matter like the language. Thirty years ago there were in Scandinavia no sharp language boundaries between the States insofar as the older generations were concerned, but only a gradual change of dialect as anywhere else within one of the countries. The younger generation which had enjoyed an improved schooling was, however, different. Today the older generation of thirty years ago has gone and there is now a real language boundary.

More important, however, is the fact that the entire social development during the last two or three generations in Scandinavia has increased immensely the interest ties of every single individual to the community on his side of the boundary. And, on balance, this probably counts more than the very intensive conscious efforts which have gone on in Scandinavia to strengthen the ties between the countries, for instance in the fields of civil and social legislation.

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V. The Personnel

The ministries of foreign affairs in most countries—and this is particularly true of the older countries with traditions from the operation of the "Concert of Europe"—have developed the pattern of handling their matters in a certain seclusion from the general public and, as a matter of fact, also from the rest of the administration and, indeed, the rest of the government. A very amusing essay could be written on the unostensible but effective devices which have been developed in various countries to preserve this inherited situation.

The preceding analysis gives rather strong rational reasons why, to a point, this tendency to continued exclusiveness on the part of the professionals in the foreign policy field is functional and practical. While it was said with much truth that war is too serious a matter to be left to the generals, it can on the contrary be argued that foreign policy is too hot a brick to be handled, without creating grave public danger, by the people, the parliaments or even the governments. The open diplomacy championed by President Wilson has not proved too successful. As a matter of fact, what fruitful cooperation is actually accomplished in international organizations is for the most part reached in private sessions, closed to the public, or in the *couloirs*. And now, as during the time of the League of Nations, the governments regularly bypass the international organizations and attempt to settle issues by use of "ordinary diplomatic channels".

Nevertheless professionalism does not solve the issue in modern democracies. When foreign policy matters become really important, the governments, the parliaments and the general public cannot be kept out. They will break the seclusion and force the issues. Thus, if we want to foster more effective international cooperation, we face the most difficult task of educating the politicians and the peoples for such cooperation. The professionals will nevertheless have a most important role to play in international politics, and not only as executors of the public will.

Meanwhile it is important to recognize that the great bulk of problems actually dealt with in the international organizations are of a technical and detailed nature. For this and other reasons they are not very much in the public eye (except when an incident or striking development occurs). The stand taken on these technical issues has often not even been decided at the cabinet level in the government. Taken together this technical work, which goes on in numerous meetings of all sorts of committees and working parties all around the year, is not at all unimportant. Contrary to the public display of controversy in the gladiator contests taking place at the open conferences, they are the main evidence that under great difficulties and in spite of all an organized international community is gradually coming into being. These closed, technical meetings are run by a special brand of professionals. A brief reference in this paper to the psychology of this type of official and government expert may therefore not be out of place.

In a very apparent contra-distinction to the excitable politicians, journalists, opinion makers and the general public, their whole training has conditioned them to a calm, cautious and almost unenthusiastic approach. Again, in contrast to the general public they are apt to steer for a compromise, not for a usually impossible head-on-victory. For them foreign policy tends to lose most of its moral and absolutistic connotations of good and evil; this is both their strength and their weakness.

As there is nobody listening—the public and the press are excluded—they are not too interested in scoring propaganda points at their meetings. They have usually no illusions one way or another concerning either their opposite numbers or their constituency at home. And they know the limitations under which they and their colleagues are operating. Again I fall to the temptation of quoting Chisholm who, from similar experience, has reached similar conclusions:

> Even now many national delegations cannot behave in as civilized, mature and co-operative way as they know they should do, and as they would like to do, because of the certainty that such civilized, mature and co-operative action would not be acceptable to their own governments or political chiefs. A national delegation cannot misrepresent its own people at home. If the majority of the population of a country is insular, or prejudiced, or antagonistic against some other nation, or aggressive or just plain ignorant, its delegation in the councils of the nations must reflect those qualities in order to keep their jobs.

I am here discussing what the Germans call the *Idealtypus* of professional representatives of a government. As always, the personal element of deviation from the type plays its important role. The presence at a meeting of an unusual man, or a number of unusual men who are filled with the urge to accomplish the maximum of international cooperation which is attainable and who are prepared to take risks with their own governments at home can make all the difference between modest success and failure. Unfortunately these men are rare in the group of professionals I am describing. Scepticism and a narrow cautious consideration of the national interest rather than courageous internationalism is fostered by their training and experience. In the camaraderie of officials from different countries this negativism is actually what they expect from each other and what they mutually respect. A man on a national delegation with too positive an approach is almost a disturbing element to the rest of the delegates.

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. . . it can be observed how in the individual cases a change occurs after a man has taken up his duties in an international secretariat. It occurs as a response to his new role in a changed institutional setting. He almost lays off one personality and fits himself into another. In the typical case he begins to "lean backward" and comes to be aware even of his own compatriots' special interests and prejudices. In the new milieu this behavior corresponds to the expectancy of the group into which he enters and to whose values he tries to accomodate.

This is not an altogether unimportant matter. Of the five "principal organs" of the United Nations of which the Charter speaks—the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat—it is only the Secretariat which is homogeneous in its direct allegiance to the international community. In a sense the members of the Secretariat are the only ones who have a continuous and routine experience of something approaching an image of the still non-existing world community. And they are in the uniquely favourable position of having no direct power but of being compelled to depend entirely on their influence—the influence of skill and tact, of reason and faith.

This is, however, again only the ideal situation which is seldom reached and never completely. A badly recruited and insecure staff, set to work under the impact of continuous high tension and controversy between member governments and increasingly frustrated by the absence of any considerable accomplishments in international cooperation, can sink to any depth of demoralization. Yet, even in a seriously demoralized staff the ideal of international allegiance will often be preserved, hoping for a chance to express itself if ever an opportunity might present itself.

VI. The Organisations

The phrase in the introduction to the Charter of the United Nations: "We the peoples" *etcetera*, is a constitutional falsehood. Many peoples are represented at an international meeting, it is true, but only very indirectly: through delegations, instructed by governments, responsible to the parliaments which in the end are elected by the peoples. Each of the governments is sovereign and a majority vote does not solve any important substantive issue.

In these circumstances, contrary to popular thinking, the veto institution is basic and essential to all practical international cooperation. Important issues between nations can only be solved by means of negotiation and agreement.

It must be clearly grasped that the session of an international organization is everything else than a parliament. The individual member cannot on his own responsibility speak for the world community because he has not the inherent authority of having been elected by a constituency of people. Instead he is appointed to speak as a member of a delegation, on the responsibility of the government of one separate and sovereign nation. No government has the political right, not to mention the moral authority, to speak for the international community as a whole. And each government has the right to decline to agree.

The nations as individual entities are represented, the world as a whole is unrepresented. These reflections are, of course, the inspiration for the dreams about a world government backed by a world parliament elected by the people. Against the background I have given it does not need to be elaborated how totally utopian these dreams are. A totalitarian world state ruled from an imperialistic power centre may be thinkable, but a democratic world state in this historical era is not thinkable. Even an Atlantic federal state is out of question.

International political organizations in our age are primarily organs for inter-state negotiation and possibly mediation and arbitration. If we are dissatisfied with their work, to leap for the fantasy of a panacea is escapism.

My critical attitude towards panaceas does not, of course, preclude that we should try to improve the constitutional setups of the international organizations so that they may work more effectively. However, the machinery should be built and re-built to meet practical needs and reasonable possibilities. As usual, the hard realistic road is to face the situation as it is, analyse its causation as intensively as we can with the intellectual means available to us, and then keep on trying, against all odds, gradually to improve conditions. If only peace can be preserved, international cooperation may in time become considerably more effective than it is today, provided we have enough good people labouring on the task.

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VII. The Basic Psychological Difficulty

In spite of all their very apparent weaknesses as organs for inter-state cooperation, international organisations, when once established, and no matter how ineffective they are in carrying out their terms of reference, show an amazing resistance to death which contrasts sharply with the frequent instability of public opinion in international questions. An example of this is the Bank for International Settlements in Basle: during the war it was many times burned in effigy; at Bretton Woods it was solemnly declared dead and was buried by means of a formal resolution. The journalists danced on the grave. But today it lives stronger than ever, and has been the chosen instrument for setting into effect the European Payments Union, which is one of the more concrete and solid accomplishments of European economic cooperation up till now.

The social scientist seeking to explain this remarkable general experience can point to many causal factors contributing to the durability of international organisations. One is the vested interests of members of the Secretariat in preserving their jobs and their livelihood. Responsible officials, however, feel also the urge of their fundamental allegiance to the common cause of international cooperation, and desire to keep on trying against all odds.

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. . . The main explanation of the fact that the international organisations are regularly upheld even through the most disappointing conjunctures is undoubtedly that people at bottom, and behind all the facade of nationalistic idiosyncrasies, do believe in and do desire international cooperation. This is their general and long-range faith, however negative their attitude may be on particular issues of the day.

It is a little like people's religion and their democratic adherence to the broad ideals of equality for all and of the inalienable right of human beings to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Everyday shortcomings in attitudes and behaviour do not obliterate the general ideal, nor do they exhaust it of significance for how we feel, think and act.

Often its import seems to be a negative one. I have already pointed to the masochistic and perversive character of many of the aggressions. People are constantly revolting against their own ideals, and idealism because of this is not conducive only of what is good. They can even get angry at the United Nations as an institution. But the United Nations is, after all, only the formal container of the efforts of all the governments to cooperate amongst themselves and thus, to a thinking person, not a very proper object for resentment, just as little as is the state of which we are citizens.

But more fundamentally and in the long run the ideal has a positive influence. Against all our weaknesses it tends to determine the trend. Under the turmoil of opportunistic short-range attitudes the general desire for international understanding and cooperation also exists and it has also its shares of influence in the compromise behaviour which human action typically is.[3] The general ideal supports the continuation of the international organisations when they are once in existence. This undoubtedly explains in part the very apparent hesitation in every nation to destroy these organisations even at times when they are not very effective.

An indirect evidence that at bottom people everywhere have a reserve of international understanding and international idealism is also the fact, to which I have already pointed, that when in our international secretariats ordinary persons from many lands are given the opportunity to live in a situation where it becomes their natural role to work for the common good, they so effortlessly change over to this broader allegiance. As a matter of fact, whenever something, even if little, is accomplished in international cooperation—an agreement on a uniform classification of coal, on simplified customs procedures for goods transported across frontiers, a commodity agreement, an agreement on non-discrimination in tariff rates—these accomplishments give participating national delegates feelings of belonging and of satisfaction in serving the larger community which are not dissimilar from those experienced by international civil servants. Every practical achievement, however humble, has, like every failure, a cumulative effect. For it works upon the attitudes to international cooperation which, at the same time, represent its conditions.

The psychological impediments to overcome in making international cooperation more effective are all concerned with how to get governments, and behind them parliaments and ultimately the peoples, to experience allegiance to the common cause, and to do this when, in fact, international cooperation is still so weak. For while, on the one hand, the main means of fostering this larger allegiance are the actual experience of cooperation, cooperation cannot develop except on the allegiance as a basis. This is the eternal problem of man and his institutions. The development of institutions presumes human attitudes fitting them, but such attitudes develop only in response to living in the institutions themselves. That this is the basic psychological difficulty in international cooperation is the thesis of this paper.

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[3] Cf. *An American Dilemma. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, 1944, Methodological Appendix 1 and 10, particularly pp. 23, 1028.

Consistent Reactive Participation of Group Members and Reduction of Intergroup Conflict

DANIEL KATZ

Our fundamental assumption is that there is no longer a rational basis for war or violent struggle between groups or nations because of conflicts of interest or of ideology. Violent solutions of such conflicts in the past are debatable as long-run solutions of competing interests, but, with the development of atomic and nuclear weapons, the common interest in survival has given reality to the pacifist's old contention about the ultimate absurdity of force as the solution of human problems. "The brotherhood of man," writes C. Wright Mills, "is now less a goal than an obvious condition of biological survival. Before the world is made safe again for American capitalism or Soviet communism or anything else, it had better be made safe for human life" (12).

Even before the development of modern weapons of total annihilation, conflicting groups have had much in common. In many wars soldiers had to be strictly enjoined from fraternizing with the nationals of the enemy state. Moreover, the conquering group did not always conquer permanently by force of arms if its cause was flagrantly unjust. Ideas of justice, of humanity, and of democracy have been strangely resistant to defeat on the field of battle. Common ideals are more often shared by the majority of warring groups than is generally realized. The fact that the leaders on both sides use much the same ideology to rationalize the role of their side in the conflict suggests that many of their followers need this reassurance about their own objectives. Thus we assume that, in spite of differences between groups in values and goals, there is sufficient community of interest to make resort to aggressive behavior an irrational means of conflict resolution.

Daniel Katz, "Consistent Reactive Participation of Group Members and Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, *Vol. 3, No. 1 (1959), pp. 28–40. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

I. Causes of War: Background Factors

Our analysis of the causes of war and group conflict will accordingly give greater emphasis to irrational forces as far as the great majority of people are concerned. Specific leaders and specific minority factions may on occasion be operating more on the model of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian man, but, by and large, such a model is inadequate for an understanding of large-scale conflict. An analysis of background factors basic to group conflict must recognize the differential motivational and cognitive processes of three groups: (1) the leaders, (2) the factions, and (3) the masses, as well as the interaction between these groups.

Six sources of irrationality can be recognized as common in many people: (1) latent hostility—the repression-projection syndrome; (2) situational frustration and displaced aggression; (3) defensive group identification; (4) institutional conformity (which need not necessarily be based upon defense mechanisms); (5) apathy or withdrawal, and (6) cognitive near-sightedness or shortsighted self-interest. These six factors vary in the degree of their direct relation to group conflict . . .

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II. The Role of Leaders and Factions

These factors, then, account for the involvement of people in group struggle when it is not to their rational interest to be so involved. They find themselves in war either because their emotions got in the way of intelligent behavior or because they withdrew from the field or because they took actions without considering the consequences. But most of these factors, while they describe the general conditions which make war possible, do not account for the dynamics of any specific conflict. Two other elements must be considered in the process: the role of leaders and the role of factions or leadership groups. Leaders may have the same defensive motivations as followers and, because of their leadership position, may move their countries to war or to the brink of war. Some of the Nazi leaders could be so characterized. But though in certain periods of history fanatical leaders of social movements may have deep needs for aggression, leaders in general show a more realistic motivation, a more rational and intelligent basis for their actions. They are motivated to stay in power and to maintain all the perquisites of their office; they may aspire to even higher positions in the leadership structure; and they may enjoy the challenge of their position. In general, then, they are not likely to indulge impulses which could make for self-destruction. They tend to weigh their decisions with respect to consequences. Nevertheless, such realistic appraisal is no guaranty of the peaceful outcome of the actions of leaders.

The problems of conflicting groups in his own country may be beyond the powers of resolution of the leader. He has no prospect of rising in the power structure or of holding his position in it by a genuine solution of such conflicts. Hence his own selfish interest may dictate a course which rallies the nation by capitalizing upon any conceivable threat to the nation from without. Orwell describes the technique of localized conflicts which keep totalitarian governments in power (13).

Moreover, leaders may appeal to the defensive behavior of potential followers in any situation where there is complexity, uncertainty, and confusion. The opposition party is the party of treason. It is a technique which will lose no votes and may gain some. In addition, leaders must show their basic membership character as representative of the nation, not only to appeal to more people but because, as leaders of the political state, people feel it is appropriate for their leaders to be patriots first and mediators of democratic competition between subgroups second. The common bond between all people in the national state is their identification with national symbols, with national interest, with national history. The leader of a nation can work for the specific realities behind these global emotional symbols, but in times of crisis it is easy to fall back upon the symbols themselves in their capacity to arouse defensive needs.

By "faction" or "leadership group" is meant the heavily involved minority, well organized to represent some interest or some ideological position. Such a faction is a leadership group in the sense that it exerts or may exert a great deal of influence upon national policy. Again its members may be motivated by defense mechanisms, but they can also be working rationally for their own narrow self-interest. The imperialistic ambitions of the oil interests are a case in point. Though we admit that conflicts between nations may arise out of such economic strivings, we deny that this type of rational self-interest is common enough to all members of one nation in competition with another to explain wars adequately on the basis of a rational model.

Another type of factional interest is commonly noted in groups which do not press for war but seek to expand their own roles. The branches of the military service push for the expansion of their own services and together press for the expansion of the military as against the civilian budget. And armament firms may have similar motivation to increase expenditures for their products. The military, however, is often interested more in the maintenance and growth of its own plant than in risking it in war. The German generals were enthusiastic about the support of the Hitler regime in developing the military might of Germany but were reluctant to take unnecessary chances with it. Thus, while some factional interests do not want violent struggle, they develop the machinery for making its occurrence highly probable.

Factions are of importance in national decisions not so much because they write their own ticket with respect to pushing their own narrow group interest as because the influence they exert may be disproportionate to their numbers. Any organized minority pressing for limited but clear objectives is a factor to be reckoned with in practical politics at almost all stages of the political process, from the initial stages of a leader's career to his major decisions when in office. The faction is always active and alert about its program; the masses become alert during crises when the choice of decisions has already been hopelessly narrowed. The doctrine of pluralism sees safety in the competition of many factions, so that labor unions, business groups, and farm organizations find some compromise that is within the public interest. But interest groups pushing for the expansion of the military or for the protection of oil interests in the Middle East have no counterpart in factions urging a program of peaceful solution. Though everyone has a stake in peace, such broad interests have no organization to counter the organized factions urging specific objectives which add up to a pattern of war.

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III. Types of Conflict Outcomes: Compromise versus Solution

We have discussed the motivational forces and the cognitive processes which predispose toward aggressive outcomes of group conflict. In general, we assume that psychological processes which reflect the opposite dimension of these forces will make for non-violent solutions of group conflict. It is also necessary to consider the nature of types of conflict outcomes other than aggressive struggle, in relation to these positive and negative factors. Four types of conflict outcome should be distinguished, only one of which can properly be termed conflict solution or resolution (6). The first type is the stalemate of aggressive conflict in which there is no victory for either side but only a cessation due to exhaustion, with the prospect of renewed struggle over time. The second type is conquest and dominance, the direct result of successful aggressive struggle. This can give the temporary peace indicated by the Russian general who killed off the insurgents in Warsaw and then wired the czar, "Peace reigns in Warsaw." But this outcome was not then, and is not now, a solution of the conflict between Russia and Poland. Conflict solution requires an integration of the needs of both sides to the dispute so that they find a common path or a common goal without sacrificing their basic ethical principles. A common goal represents a shared objective of the majority members of both groups. A common path means that it sometimes is possible to find a course of action which will satisfy differing objectives. . . .

Between the domination outcome and the genuine solution of the group struggle stands a more ambiguous type of outcome—that of compromise. "Compromise" is used here in the true meaning of the term, namely, that the ethical principles of the contestants are compromised by the final *modus operandi* which is agreed upon. This is by far the most common type of outcome for both intranational and international conflict. It does not represent a true solution because the seeds of aggressive struggle still remain and the struggle is either continued at another time or displaced and appears in other group struggles. Negotiation from strength and appeasement are the two poles of the compromise technique. The test of whether or not the conflict has been compromised is to be found in the yielding by the conflicting parties of some essential principle of the social ethics of their group values.

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Leaders can make a horse trade with leaders of a rival group both because they share some common points of interest with them as against their followers and because some faction within their own group could not be mobilized for a stand against the rival group. This faction may have too much in common with the particular rival group to back their leaders on the issues in question. Groups lack sufficient unity and homogeneity relative to the social context in which they operate to fight consistently for their values. The sharp schisms which might divide a nation into warring camps of social class against social class, one religion against another, and one geographical section against the other, are prevented because these lines of division cut across one another, as S. Rokkan has pointed out (14). The price that is paid, however, is to be found in unresolved problems, in apathy and withdrawal from realistic social participation and resulting international strife. The compromise technique within the nation often contributes to the militant action between nations.

IV. The Role of Consistent Reactive Participation in Group Decision by Group Members in Functional and Political Groups

The genuine solution of group conflict both within the nation and between nations is facilitated by any conditions which minimize the role of the six causal factors previously described, as they operate both among leaders, factions, and followers. We shall concern ourselves, however, with only one major type of condition which has to do with the expression of positive forces, i.e., the counterpart of the factors making for hostile group action. This condition is the consistent participation of the many members in group processes and group decisions in their functional and political groups. Moreover, this condition of consistent participation refers to a reactive rather than to a passive role—to a qualitative more than a quantitative criterion. Membership behavior falls into four general types.

1. Token and Minimal Participation

People may go through the minimal motions required of them as members of a group or as citizens. They may sometimes vote on election day, but they vote for a familiar name rather than for the merits of the candidate or for his principles and program. This is an expression of the apathy previously noted. It may be a psychological withdrawal based upon conflicted indecision—the inability to take a stand because of group pressures. Or it may be a truer form of anomie, in which the individual has been unable to form any real attachment to groups or subgroups. Token participation may also signify lack of involvement for the group in question but heavy involvement in other groups. Research findings, however, indicate that this is not the rule, for there is a good correlation between levels of activity by the same people in various groups (3).

2. Routine Compliant Participation

Routine compliant participation is probably the most common form of group participation. People respond to the cues and suggestions from formal and informal leaders in routine fashion and show a very limited conception of their role. This is the pattern previously described as institutional conformity based upon our long training in accepting the rules of the game and the routine obedience to any form of legitimate authority. In any given group, however, routine compliance may represent the low involvement of the individual whose primary attachments are to other groups where he is anything but a compliant member.

3. Sporadic Emotional Participation

People will show intense emotional activity at certain times and for certain forms of group objectives. There may be a critical decision, as when a strike vote comes up in a union. Or the group may be functioning so poorly that an emergency situation is created. Or there may be certain types of group activity involving its emotional symbols which appeal to a certain type of follower. All these cases may provide opportunities for emotional expression by group members. Such expression may be based on defensive identification with the group or on the projection of repressed hostility or on need for excitement in an otherwise drab existence or on a belated recognition of problems and a symbolic dealing with them through intense emotional activity.

4. Consistent Reactive Participation

Consistent reactive participation refers to involvement both over time and over a range of organizational programs. It means too, that the individual is involved in the type of interaction in which he both receives and sends norms. In a political party or labor union, it refers to the small core of active workers who not only take responsibility for the organizational activities but mold party practice and policy by their suggestions and their active interpretation of the directions they receive.

A research program, then, might be directed at three major questions concerning consistent reactive group participation: (1) What patterns of personality and attitudinal and social structure variables maximize consistent reactive participation in functional and political groups? (2) What are the prior conditions for the creation and development of these factors which make for this type of group participation? (3) Under what conditions will this type of group participation lead to a reduction of aggressive group conflict and war?

We have already suggested some tentative answers to the first question but will proceed to make them more explicit. Answers to the second and third questions will not be attempted in this paper, but some of the assumptions basic to the third question will be considered.

V. The Determinants of Consistent Reactive Participation by Group Members

1. Personality Variables

The personality pattern most productive of consistent reactive participation consists of ego-strength, self-understanding, emphatic understanding, and social extroversion. People low in this constellation will more frequently show apathy, compliance, or sporadic participation. These three components are correlated, but the correlation is moderate rather than high. This pattern would constitute the democratic personality, in contrast to the authoritarian personality described by the California investigators (11).

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2. Value Systems

The personality variables described above relate to contentless mechanisms of the person. They may predispose toward values of a given type, but they are not themselves identical with value systems. Value systems refer to affective organizations of beliefs which people hold about classes of objects or symbols.

A. *Internalization of democratic and humanistic values.*—Though the followers of ethical codes which assert the dignity of the human being have not always implemented these values in democratic practice, it is nonetheless true that such a philosophy provides the central reinforcement for our concept of consistent reactive participation. Perhaps in the past the emphasis has been too much on the protection of the person from infringement of his rights and too little upon his responsibility to assume an active role. The internalization we refer to would, however, include both the negative and the positive aspects of democratic functioning. Internalization of values can occur at two levels. The child incorporates the values that his parents hold through an identification with them resulting from both the need of their love and the fear of its loss. Internalization of values at the adult level is more difficult to achieve, but it can result from identification with a leader or from thorough involvement in some process to which such values are the necessary means.

B. *Internalization of specific group goals of a positive social character.*—From the motivational point of view, the taking-over by the individual of the goals of the group gives the dedication which makes for willingness to sacrifice for a cause. From a social point of view, it makes for clarity of the position of the group and so enables others to accept or attempt to modify this position.

3. Belief Systems

Reference is made here not to evaluations heavily loaded with affect but to cognitive functioning.

A. *Realistic conception of institutional functioning as against belief in institutional fictions.*—The realistic point of view would reject two current forms of the superorganic notion which have replaced the old belief in the divine character of the state. One is the mystical view of group action and official decisions as the immutable working of impersonal forces which are beyond the control of human beings. The other is the conception that the authorities, officials, and leaders have full and complete responsibility for public decisions and policies without the intervention or involvement of the people who make up the institution—"the little-people complex" often attributed to the German people. A people who see the institutional structure of which they are a part as existing independently of themselves and of having a life all its own are, in effect, surrendering their role in the decision-making process and are easily led into any form of institutional aggressiveness and struggle.

B. *Belief in efficacy of individual action.*—This is closely related to a realistic concept of institutional functioning but is more specifically oriented to behavior. It can be considered the action orientation accompanying the belief system about the nature of institutions.

4. Social Structure Variables

A. *Source of power and locus of control in organizations.*—Where power is vested in the membership of the organization, leaders have to validate themselves and their policies by votes of confidence from their followers.

They can be turned out of office at the next election, as in political and labor organizations. In business and administrative structures, power is often vested in the top hierarchical group. The group may be the board of directors, who delegate the control function to some top executive. This second type of role structure makes for minimal participation on the part of the vast majority of members because there is nothing about which they have the power to make decisions. Business management often does not understand why its employees who have been treated well will prefer a trade union to the company union. The greater possibility for making decisions about their own welfare is, of course, a weighty consideration for the employees. The institutional location of power and control in an organization then sets the limits for membership participation. In the hierarchical organization there will tend to be apathy about policies and defensive identification with its symbols.

B. *Access to positions of power and privilege.*—Though an organization may be hierarchical on the dimension of power, there still may be possibilities for upward mobility. Thus in a government administrative structure people may attain no decision-making status until they have reached a certain level in the hierarchy, but upward movement in the structure is possible. This openness of power positions counteracts the apathy of the hierarchical organization. The upwardly mobile keep informed and involved on matters of policy. How much mobility is necessary to preserve the belief that the able and loyal person will be rewarded by promotion depends upon many other factors, but often a small amount of real mobility will create a feeling of great openness of opportunity. On the other hand, where there is both a power monopoly in the structure and no upward mobility, the apathy of the members may turn into active estrangement and hostility (5).

C. *Correlation between power, prestige, privilege, and skill gradients.*—The role structure of organizations minimizes participation where there is a hierarchy of power which is correlated closely with privilege, prestige, and skill. In other words, if the people at the top of the hierarchy not only have the power but, in addition, have the interesting jobs and perquisites of office, there is little chance of involving people at the lower levels in the goals of the organization. Hence there is some advantage in some degree of separation of power, privilege, and skill gradients. The prestige gradient will not automatically follow the power gradient if there is such separation.

D. *Institutional use of both common and differential roles.*—If the organization puts all members into common roles almost exclusively, there is little utilization of differential talents of members and hence little personal reward for the exercise of their abilities. On the other hand, if there is no core of common roles, the internalization of group goals will decrease.

E. *Character of multiple group memberships.*—Individuals can belong to a number of groups and still participate consistently if the groups have the same general purposes and values, e.g., trade union, labor youth, labor party, socialist league. If multiple group memberships include groups of conflicting and competing objectives, then we get apathy, whereas similar groups can have a reinforcing effect upon consistent participation. Enough of an overlap of the same key personnel is required to reinforce and reward participation.

VI. Assumptions about the Relations of Participation to Group Conflict

Consistent reactive participation has the following tendencies toward the solution of group conflict:

1. The power drives of leaders are checked. Absolute power corrupts absolutely and has dangerous potentialities for aggressive group action. Absolute power and reactive membership participation are opposed forces.
2. Leaders cannot take their people so readily into violent group struggle through the pressure of some special faction which sees profit in struggle or whose defensiveness is fed by conflict.
3. The instrumentality for constructive solutions for conflicts between groups cannot, as a rule, rise above the level of the instrumental functioning of the groups themselves. If a group normally operates through the blind compliance of the majority, the apathy of many and the emotional release of a minority, and the power motives of its leaders, it is not likely that its differences with other groups will be based upon the positive social values of the many. Water does not rise above its level.
4. The very nature of the basic objectives of the group are dependent upon the consistent reactive participation of the many. Group goals have taken on a positive social and ethical character with the growth of democracy. The divinity of kings, the exploitive police state, the authoritarian church, are not the products of an alert and widespread participation in group decisions.
5. The involvement of the many in reaching a solution of group differences makes possible a broader basis for finding common values and common paths. The people of two competing nations have more community of interest than have the active protagonists of conflict on either side.

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Mahatma Gandhi: A Contribution to the Psycho-analytic Understanding of the Causes of War and the Means of Preventing Wars

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Because of the short time at my disposal, I can discuss only two features of the material contained in a more extensive study of the subject.

1. The achievement of India's independence.
2. The attainment of equal status for the Pariah Caste.

In his own country, Gandhi is revered as a saint, the rest of the world does not even comprehend him. How was it possible that a man without the powers of the state at his disposal, and without any coercive means, became the accepted ruler of one fifth of the world's population? How was it possible that Gandhi, who is rightly called 'The Father of India's Independence', achieved this independence by pacific means at a time when a terror reigned in India and her people were full of hatred and revenge against Great Britain? Moreover, he obtained Caste equality without bloodshed. To throw light onto these problems and to understand their psycho-analytic meaning is the purpose of this paper.

Before he could realize the final task he had set himself, that is, the nationalization of property by these same peaceful means, he was murdered by the secretary of the extreme Nationalists, on 30th January, 1948.

Hatred of Great Britain was rampant in India during Gandhi's youth. Hundreds of years of oppression had completely altered India's character, and turned a peaceloving, friendly people into an aggressive nation, ready

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to wage war to achieve their liberation. Gandhi, as a boy of 15, was inspired by the desire to go to war against Great Britain. His people, he believed, were weak because they did not eat meat, and the English derived the strength which enabled them to master India from meat eating. In his childhood, he was afraid of the dark. He imagined ghosts coming from one side, thieves from another, and serpents from a third. Eating meat, he and a friend with whom he discussed it imagined, would cure all fear. They therefore decided that they too would eat meat, secretly. Gandhi's first attempt to eat goat's meat sickened him, and all that night he was haunted by a nightmare of a live goat bleating inside him. Furthermore, although he tried to steel himself with the reminder that meat eating was a duty to India—a 'reform'—his conscience gave him no peace, and he abandoned meat eating. At about the same time, Gandhi fell into the habit of smoking cigarettes, scavenging stumps, and pilfering the servants' coppers to buy cigarettes. This led him to the more serious theft of a link from his brother's gold armlet. His guilt was more than the 15-year-old Gandhi could bear, and he resolved to confess his sins and seek adequate punishment.

Gandhi's parents were orthodox Vaishnavas from Gujarat, a particularly close and strictly religious community, to whom eating meat was abhorrent. A devoted son, Gandhi was deeply distressed by the pain the knowledge of his offence would inflict upon his parents. His anxiety was increased by the severity of his conscience—the Father from whom he could not become truly independent; yet he consciously resented his strong dependence and rebelled against the parental restrictions. While he feared his confession would come to his father as a 'death blow', the thought of continuous dependence upon him was intolerable. He and his friend therefore decided to die. But this was easier said than done. Their courage failed them and they abandoned their plan to commit suicide, Gandhi deliberating, 'Why not rather submit to continued dependence on his father . . . ' Anxiety and fear of punishment, rather than the liberation of his aggression towards his father, prompted this solution to his conflict. The struggle for India's independence was a displacement of Gandhi's unconscious fight against his father, involving both his feelings of love, and of hate and revenge.

Gandhi described himself as a sensitive child, whose mother, a kind, gentle and compassionate woman, created an atmosphere which softened and spoilt him. The slightest criticism was felt as a severe punishment. His father, although devoted to his family, was strict and relentless in his moral and religious demands. This rigidity of life curtailed Gandhi's freedom, and aroused his death wishes against the father.

Though not expecting corporal punishment, Gandhi believed it was not in his father's nature to forgive easily. Lacking the courage to speak out, he handed his ailing father a letter recording his transgressions, and in fear awaited retribution. Tears streamed down the old man's face as he read his son's confession, moving the young Gandhi to weep with him. Gandhi understood this as a sign of devotion and love, and says of his father's tears, '. . . they cleansed my heart and washed away my sins.' That this deeply religious man did not condemn his son, but loved him, profoundly stirred Gandhi and basically changed his relationship to his father. He called this experience, 'an object lesson in Ahimsa'—the doctrine of non-violence. Ahimsa, his father's doctrine, transformed him and freed him from his aggression. It was all-embracing, including even such lowly creatures as bugs, insects and serpents, which he had formerly destroyed readily. His father had taught him that not the sinner is evil, but the sin. It is the sin which must be fought. This belief freed Gandhi from his own guilt feelings and need for punishment. Thenceforth, he was filled with the desire that all the Indian people should benefit from the lesson he had learned in this personal experience. When someone tried to convert him to Christianity, expounding the doctrine of sin, punishment and redemption, Gandhi replied, 'If this be Christianity, I cannot accept it. I do not seek redemption from the consequences of my sin. I seek to be redeemed from sin itself, or rather, from the very thought of sin.' (Mahatma Gandhi, *My Own Story*.)

Just as his relationship to his father had undergone a change, so did his approach to Great Britain. He now resolved to become a loyal subject of the Crown. During the First World War, he eagerly helped Great Britain with men, money and munitions. This course was opposed by many of his followers, who asked, 'How can you, a follower of Ahimsa, advocate violence?' In reply, Gandhi referred to the attempt made on his life in 1908. His eldest son asked Gandhi's judgement on whether, faced with this position, he should silently witness his father's murder, or defend his life, with violence if necessary. Gandhi instructed him that it was the duty of a son to defend his father, with whatever means were at his disposal.

This same rationale governed his support of Great Britain in the South African and First World Wars. Now Gandhi was the aggressor who fights Great Britain's—his Father's—adversaries. He called this, 'The Doctrine of the Sword' which, in his opinion, did not contradict Ahimsa.

His trust in Great Britain was rudely shattered when, instead of being rewarded with the promised independence, India was offered the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, which further curtailed her freedom. 'I now realize,' he said, 'I was mistaken to look upon myself as a British subject. To Great Britain, I am an Untouchable Pariah'. He called upon the Indian people (the children) to cease co-operating with the Administration (the father), and organized passive resistance against the 'Anti-Asian Laws'. The new position he took up in relation to the British Government he elucidated with the analogy that when a father does wrong, it is the duty of his child to leave the home. In the same way, it is the duty of the subject to dissociate himself from an erring Government, in order to make them aware of their wrong-doing. Identifying Great Britain with his father, he gives them 'an object lesson in Ahimsa', just as he had received it from his father. He too was unrelenting in his moral demands, and did not give in until the offender had been won over. By means of Ahimsa, he wanted to bring about a 'change of heart' in both the Indians and Great Britain. He foresaw the reaction of Great Britain, the suffering that would be brought to his people, and his task was rendered more difficult by the re-awakened anger and hatred of the Indian people towards Great Britain.

Yet he believed that the inconveniences and losses sustained by the withdrawal of India's co-operation from the Administration had to be borne willingly and gladly, according to the eternal law of self-sacrifice which rules that one must continue to love one's adversaries.

The suffering Gandhi demands is a means to an end, the achievement of liberty and freedom. It can be likened to an operation which the patient anticipates with little fear, knowing it will deliver him from a more grievous and lasting ill. The principles set out in this book, *'The Gospel of the Selfless Act'*, underlie the fastings and the strikes he organized. Gandhi's ideal and aim was the liberation of humanity from continuous suffering, and this he hoped to achieve by fasting; a voluntary, self-inflicted suffering. Only when the goal had been reached could he know happiness, as he demonstrated in his last fast. India had at last become independent of British rule, and 15th August, 1947, was declared a national holiday. Everywhere people were rejoicing; only Gandhi could not join in the festivities. Deeply distressed by the fierce battle which was then raging between the Hindus and the Mohammedans, he began his fast in January, 1948, at the age of 78, to further the interests of the Mohammedan minority. 'One can fast for health reasons, or in repentance,' he said, 'But there is another kind of fast; that of the adherent of non-violence, who fasts as a protest against the evil in society . . . The fast shall cease when I am convinced of the reconciliation.' The fast lasted six days, and though he knew that the doctors feared for his life, he welcomed death to release him from remaining a helpless witness of his people's fratricide, and the destruction of the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim cultures. When the warring ceased, he no longer wished to die, and expressed his hope to live to 135 years.

Unlike the masochist, who derives libidinal satisfaction from his suffering, Gandhi had a different aim. He suffered in order to free himself and others from unending agony. Therefore one cannot simply speak of his suffering as aggression turned against himself. Gandhi was convinced that aggression was a major cause of the ills of mankind, and therefore he exerted great efforts to overcome it. Once during a civil disobedience campaign, the

Indians, provoked by the brutality of the Police, retaliated with violence. Gandhi at once called off the campaign. He resolved to give up Satyagraha as long as the people did not yet understand the doctrine of Peace. By educating his people he hoped to lead them gradually towards this ideal, and he planned that a small nucleus of well-tried and sincere volunteers who could enter into the spirit of Satyagraha, should spread the doctrine amongst the people, and by their vigilance keep them to the right path. Thus began his great work of educating the masses. Volunteers were sent into remote little villages, and by these means he hoped to overcome the people's brutality, hatred, and desire for revenge.

Similar methods were employed to abolish Caste inequality. When he learned in September, 1932, whilst he was imprisoned, that the Administration planned to set up separate polling booths for the Untouchables, he threatened to fast unto death. The fast was also aimed at the Hindu community, whose oppression of the Pariahs continued unabated. Gandhi told them that he would willingly be sacrificed if they continued with their present attitude. Not until the British Administration had given in to Gandhi's demands, and the Hindus convinced him of their friendly intentions towards the Pariahs, did he call off his fast. The newspapers published the names of hundreds of Hindu temples which opened their doors to the Untouchables, and Nehru's mother—a most orthodox woman—let it be known that she had accepted food from the hand of an Untouchable. Thousands of prominent Hindu women followed her example, and at the strictly Hindu University of Benares, the Principal and many Brahmans ate at the same table with roadsweepers, cobblers and dustmen. A wave of reform, atonement and self-purification swept the country.

Gandhi's long and untiring battle for the Untouchables was rewarded in 1946, when the oppression of a Pariah was made a punishable offence under the Indian Constitution. An ancient and deep rooted social injustice was thus resolved without bloodshed.

On 15th August, 1947, one fifth of the world's population, a nation of four hundred millions of people who for more than a hundred years had been subject to British rule, became its own master. Gandhi was the true liberator of his country, for by education—or rather, re-education—of his people as well as of the British, he not only achieved India's independence and equality of Caste, but saved India from bloody revolution and a war against Great Britain. Similar revolutions in Europe had cost the slaughter and maiming of millions, and had robbed many more of the means of existence.

Had his father not absolved the young Gandhi, who was a miniature Hitler, from his hate and aggression, these would have grown with him into manhood. He would have waged war against Great Britain and might, even as Hitler, have become the instigator of a world war.

From the foregoing we can conclude that there are means to prevent war and violent revolution, such as the freeing of a child, by means of right education, from its hatred towards its parents. Just as personal hygiene is necessary to prevent illness and epidemics, so one needs psychic hygiene for the prevention of wars. It is therefore essential to produce experienced teachers who sincerely believe that man is without innate guilt or sin.

The Russian Idea of a World without Arms

DISCUSSION AMONG SCIENTISTS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

SH. SANAKOYEV: Today we have decided to cast a glance at the world of tomorrow, a world without arms. I suggest . . . that we share our ideas about this world, and the development of international relations after plans for general and complete disarmament are adopted and implemented. In other words, let us give thought today to the prospects, the direction and paths along which international developments may or can go.

We are, of course, aware of the immense difficulties involved in reaching a disarmament solution and of the stubborn resistance certain circles in the imperialist countries, particularly in America, will put up. We also realise that our partners in the talks do not find it so easy to imagine the future of the old world—the capitalist system—without the continual maintenance of its armed strength directed against its own peoples and without the profits which the capitalist monopolies get from the arms drive.

However, objective conditions now exist in the world which increasingly require a *rational* approach to the disarmament problem. The main condition is the new relation of forces in the world which is far from being to the advantage of the capitalist system. Thanks to this—and this is due in no small measure to the military superiority of the Soviet Union and the other peace-loving states—a new situation has arisen in the world in which imperialism is no longer able to resort to a general war, as in the past, without risking its existence.

Besides, the policy of the arms race and preparation for war, which is of the very nature of imperialism, has in present-day conditions driven the imperialist camp into a blind alley. Although it has created a vast war machine, imperialism today has very limited possibilities for setting it

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From A Warless World, *edited by Arthur Larson. Copyright © 1962, 1963 by the* Saturday Review. *Used by permission of the McGraw-Hill Book Company and the* Saturday Review. *A discussion among Russian scientists and military personnel in Moscow at the editorial offices of* International Affairs *on June 12, 1962. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

in motion. Thus their fear of nuclear-missile warfare and their anxiety for the future of their system compels the present leaders of the imperialist Powers to hold talks about disarmament.

Speeches by Western leaders contain numerous hypocritical statements about their "desire for peace" and even incantations against war. On the question of preserving peace, as on the question of disarmament, we should, in Lenin's words, like to "see as little as possible of general statements, solemn promises, or splendid formulas, and as much as possible of the simplest and clearest decisions and measures actually leading to peace. . . ."

Regardless of the evasions to which the rulers of the Western Powers resort, the objective development of human society has confronted them with this inescapable alternative: either a nuclear-missile war inevitably ending in the final destruction of the capitalist system, or recognition of the peaceful co-existence of states with different socio-economic systems. Peaceful co-existence leads to an improvement of the international situation, an end to the arms drive and the cold war policy. It is the stepping stone that can help mankind to stride over the *barrier*, leaving behind it a world in arms and entering a world without arms.

What will this unknown world without arms be like? What must it be like?

After disarmament, the development of world affairs would naturally enter a new phase. There would be serious, I should say, quantitative changes in the world, the international situation would be normalised, many factors of tension would disappear, and confidence between states would be strengthened.

A characteristic feature of a world without arms will unquestionably be wider and fuller practice of the principles of peaceful co-existence in relations between Socialist and capitalist countries. Implementation of plans for general and complete disarmament will rid international affairs of such phenomena as the arms drive and mistrust between states; the "positions of strength" and the cold war policy, which aggressive circles in the West are now using as a weapon in preparing for war and organising all kinds of reckless military gambles, will lose all meaning.

The need—and what is most important, the possibility—of resorting to force of arms in settling issues will disappear. Negotiations will become the *only* method of settling any disputes between states.

A disarmed world will create suitable conditions for the observance of such an important principle as non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for the sovereignty and national independence of all countries and peoples, big and small. It is no secret that at present talk about the sovereignty and equal rights of states in the capitalist part of the world is, putting it mildly, purely ritualistic.

Can there be any equality between U.S. imperialism, which is armed to the teeth, and the Latin American countries, underdeveloped economically and militarily, most of which are under the complete economic domination of the U.S. monopolies? Can one talk of the full sovereignty of most of the West European NATO countries whose foreign policy is not shaped in their capitals? Is it surprising that such a foreign policy is in direct contradiction to their national interest? The present-day capitalist world is dominated by a cult of strength; the imperialist Powers and their monopolies dictate their will—in the fullest sense of the word.

In the world of tomorrow, in which there will no longer be any armed forces or military superiority of one country over others, the objective conditions for violations of sovereignty and national independence will disappear, and rapid economic and cultural development of once backward peoples will become possible; this will unquestionably further accelerate the development of the whole of human society. Incidentally, it is my belief that one of the main reasons for the sabotage by the top leaders of the United States of any solution of the disarmament problem is their desire to retain, at any cost, their *diktat* over other countries and domination of the capitalist world by their monopolies.

After disarmament new, favourable conditions will arise in the world for a truly peaceful competition between the two systems, Socialism and capitalism. We are sure that this will give our system the opportunity of demonstrating much more forcibly its superiority over capitalism and of showing all men that the future of mankind lies in Communism, which proclaims Peace, Labour, Freedom, Equality, Fraternity and Happiness for all peoples on earth.

F. KOZHEVNIKOV: Our chairman Sanakoyev was quite right in saying that in a world without arms there will be universal acceptance of the peaceful principles of international relations. Accordingly, international bodies, the United Nations above all, will become genuine instruments of universal peace; the various methods of peaceful settlement of any contradictions between states will acquire a new social purpose.

It is a well-known fact that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept any system of controls and guarantees in a world that is disarming, provided the Western Powers sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Draft Treaty of March 15, 1962, envisages a clear-cut and effective system of controls and guarantees on the fulfilling of disarmament obligations. This system rests on the joint statement of agreed principles of disarmament accepted by the U.S.S.R. and the United States between June and September 1961. These principles provide, in particular, for measures "to strengthen institutions for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means."

In connection with the problem of general and complete disarmament Western statesmen and public leaders, politicians and jurists have put forward various projects for reorganizing the present legal order. Endorsing the idea of general and complete disarmament, at least in words, some of them propose that the world legal order should be reorganised as a preliminary to disarmament; others insist that this be done simultaneously with disarmament; still others believe that such a reorganisation should be done after disarmament, i.e., in a disarmed world.

Thus, the leaders of the World Parliament Association, who came to Moscow last year, and with whom we had a useful exchange of opinion, expressed the following ideas about disarmament. They believe that to attain this ideal the United Nations must be drastically remodelled in order to set up:

1. a World Parliament to enact world laws in order to secure and maintain permanent peace;
2. an Executive to administer these laws;
3. International Courts of Justice with compulsory jurisdiction in all matters of dispute concerning these world laws;
4. a world police force to enforce world laws against all those who commit, or threaten to commit, a breach of these world laws; and by these means to secure universal simultaneous and complete disarmament of all nations.

The prominent American jurists and public figures Clark and Sohn, in their interesting book *World Peace Through World Law*, incline to the idea of a simultaneous process of disarmament and the setting up of an effective world police force. In their opinion, other appropriate world organs should be set up on that basis, including an effective judicial or judicial-type system, a world economic development administration, the necessary world legislative and executive organs, and also a system of providing revenue for these purposes.

I think, first of all, that no preliminary conditions should be set for disarmament; the proposed reorganisation of the world legal order is unrealistic, and is unacceptable in principle, for it clashes with contemporary international law which is based on the principles of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems and the sovereignty and sovereign equality of all countries. In substance, these plans for a world law, a world parliament, and world executive and judicial organs mean the abolition of international law, based on the principles of the co-ordination, and not of the subordination, of the sovereign wills of states and peoples.

Y. KOROVIN: It is a very remarkable and curious fact that many Western political leaders and even scientists and scholars, conditioned to the cold war atmosphere for years, find it hard to imagine a disarmed world, and forecast innumerable and inevitable difficulties in the way of its emergence.

Some, such as H. Brown, say these difficulties spring from human nature and man's "inability" to rebuild political and social relations to conform to a world without arms, and wars. Others, like Prof. Th. Schelling of Harvard University, give themselves up to sceptical ruminations, asserting that the despotic states of antiquity were much better able than modern states to combat mutual mistrust and international tension (exchange of hostages and spies, intermarriage of dynasties, etc.). In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, with the eloquent title, "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament", he questions the practical possibility of disarmament inasmuch as after the destruction of military planes, rockets and other delivery vehicles, even "a donkey becomes a means of delivery". Moreover, he says, a lover of military gambles may at any moment become the head of some country, while the international armed forces, designed to serve as a guarantee of universal security, may themselves become the source of a new threat of war.

In the final analysis, Schelling and people like him, turn general disarmament into a utopia, and into a very "harmful" one at that, because, as Edward Teller, "the father of the American hydrogen bomb", assures us, international control connected with disarmament "will give rise to suspicions and to friction", and will "become a source of irritation", in consequence of which "disarmament may lead to frustration, friction and failure"....

Having scared themselves and others by such sinister prospects, American and British scientists and politicians have started an intensive search for original kinds of guarantees against the "dangers" of disarmament. Thus Prof. A. Larson, in his work, *Arms Control Through World Law*, says that it is urgently necessary to draw up an international code of law obligatory for all. It should, in addition, be supplemented by a "code of co-existence" which "would define in precise form those activities of states which would no longer be permitted".

A number of public and scientific organisations in the West have put in considerable efforts to elaborate the organisational forms and activity of international organs of coercion in a disarmed world. In this connection special attention is given to the problem of organising international armed forces, which are regarded as the chief guarantee against eventual aggression by any disarmed state. The point of departure in this reasoning is the hypothesis that such a state would preserve its capacity for aggressive acts, making use of concealed or secretly accumulated weapons and/or a preponderance in its police forces or population, even if armed with the most primitive weapons.

The many Western projects provide for various methods of formation of international armed forces (either from units of all states, or from the Great Powers, or from the small states); different numerical strength (from several tens of thousands to a million and more men); various points of their deployment (in the most threatened areas of the world, at special U.N. military bases, or scattered all over the world); various versions of their armament (from small arms to nuclear weapons); and various forms of their leadership and command.

I think that the basic flaw in all these conceptions is that their authors fail to understand the real causes of aggressions and wars, and in consequence, underestimate the effects of general and complete disarmament.

Let us take a look, for example, as to how the authors of the book *World Peace Through World Law* explain what is blocking general and complete disarmament. They think that the first and most important obstacle is the "reluctance of the average person to make any drastic change in his traditional form of behaviour", or in other words, habit and routine. They add: "The units into which mankind has combined—family, tribe, town, city, national state—have been accustomed to assert or defend their interests, real or supposed, by violence or the threat of it."

The second obstacle, the authors say, is the military profession, "which in many nations has sufficient influence to force their Governments to resist rather than to aid the cause of total disarmament". The authors do not explain that this is because the military leaders are connected with the war corporations and have a vested financial interest in them. They say instead that it is due to their professional "training" and the idea that their profession is "indispensable". That is the third reason.

Fourth comes the "adverse influence" of traditional diplomacy brought up on the habits of Great Power politics. In fifth place is another category of " 'vested interest' . . . an important obstacle to disarmament and peace is the presumed interest of many millions of armament workers in a continuance of their jobs"; this is placed on the same level with the "interest of proprietors in their profits from armament contracts".

Finally, the most serious obstacle of all: "mutual fears and recriminations", dividing the East and the West, and the "poisoned atmosphere" in which their relations develop.

I have given their reasoning in sufficient detail because each of its links is either false in substance or, at best, takes the cause for the effect.

Is there any need to prove that it is not in the nature of the "average person" to destroy his fellow beings but that, on the contrary, he yearns for a life of peace and tranquillity for himself and his near ones? The negative role of the military and diplomats in some capitalist countries is beyond question, but it is negative because they are the agents of monopoly capital, which carries on the frenzied arms drive in its race for superprofits.

As for the "interest" of armament workers in the prosperity of the war industry, the authors are forced to admit that in the process of general disarmament, apart from a possible reduction of taxes and the development of peaceful construction aimed at higher living standards for broad sections of the population, the war industry can be remodelled to turn out peacetime products, with an appropriate relocation of labour and means of production.

The cold war atmosphere in all its manifestations undoubtedly serves as an obstacle to disarmament. But the cold war itself is no meteor fallen from the skies due to causes beyond human control; it is the outcome of a definite political course imposed by persons and groups which are interested in it being carried through.

In trying to outline the real contours of international relations in a world without arms, we should proceed above all from the fact that disarmament itself would create an entirely new international climate, an atmosphere of confidence and co-operation. This does not, of course, mean that the conflicts and frictions dividing the states will disappear as if by magic. They will remain so long as there exists an antagonistic society with all its contradictions and struggles, both internal and international. But with general disarmament the forms of these struggles will undergo substantial change.

Putting it into the language of international law, a disarmed world will be not only rid of all the methods of settling international conflicts by force, but the means of peaceful settlement of international disputes will acquire a new quality. Diplomatic negotiations and consultations at all levels (right up to the top), commissions of inquiry and conciliation, and mediation, arbitration and the international court will be quite different. The disappearance of the possibility of settling differences between states by force will inevitably enhance the importance of all kinds of peaceful legal procedures; instead of being optional many of them will become compulsory, and instead of casual, habitual.

In short, all this will considerably enhance the role of international law in international relations, and will turn it into a permanent code of peaceful co-existence, embracing the numerous aspects of relations between states with different social systems. The states will be faced with the following alternative: either no solution of the disputes arising between them, or settlement by peaceful diplomatic and legal methods.

In a disarmed world, the nature of diplomacy itself will change. Since the diplomacy of military blocs, threats and blackmail will disappear together with the weapons, the diplomatic service will become a means of strengthening and developing international co-operation, a kind of co-ordinating centre uniting and directing the steadily expanding forms of this co-operation—in politics, the economy, science, culture, etc.

F. KOZHEVNIKOV: I am convinced that the fundamentals of contemporary international law should not only be preserved but strengthened in a disarmed world. This applies, I think, also to the basic principles of international justice, which must, however, be improved.

Thus, the International Court of Justice of the United Nations must truly ensure the representation of the chief forms of civilisation and major legal systems of the world.

This important provision remains on paper. There is no doubt at all that the law of the Chinese People's Republic ranks among the major legal systems of the world, but on the bench of the Court there is no citizen of the Chinese People's Republic. Obviously, the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Chinese People's Republic in all U.N. organs must, as a matter of course, entail representation of China's civilisation and her legal system in the International Court. Only a judge who is a citizen of the Chinese People's Republic can be a member of the International Court of Justice from China.

At present, almost all the Socialist countries are parties to its Statute. In view of this, the systems of Socialist law must have fuller representation in the International Court. As with all U.N. organs, there must be fairer representation of the Socialist system and the neutral countries in the International Court of the world. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all legal disputes between states on the basis of free and reciprocal recognition of its legal jurisdiction. This principle must be retained. Of course, states may declare that they recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court unconditionally or with reservations. The right to make reservations is an incontestable sovereign right, but no reservation should clash with the Statute of the Court. However, this does happen in practice. Thus in recognising the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory, some say that it does not extend to disputes which in substance fall within the sphere of "national competence", as construed or defined by the state in question.

The first such formula was put forward by the United States (August 26, 1946), and later by the Union of South Africa and several other countries. It should be noted that the said reservation drew strong objections from many jurists, including American.

Or take the Portuguese reservation. In its statement (on December 19, 1955) recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the Portuguese Government reserved the right to exclude from the sphere of application of the said declaration, at any time it remained in force, one or many definite categories of disputes. Doubt as to the conformity of the Portuguese reservation to Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the Statute was expressed, for instance, by the Swedish Government. Its statement to the U.N. Secretary-General (February 23, 1956) was to the effect that the said Portuguese reservation was incompatible with recognition of the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory. A similar stand in this respect was taken by the Government of India in connection with the question of the right of transit across India's territory.

The Court itself should be more consistent in applying the generally accepted principles of contemporary international law. Unfortunately, that is not always the case.

Y. KOROVIN: I am not inclined to attach too much importance to the need for setting up international armed forces in a disarmed world. Increased pressure from the broad masses of the people on the foreign policies of states, together with strict day-to-day control over disarmament—as general and complete as disarmament itself—will serve as a sufficiently sound guarantee against open or secret remilitarisation, the inevitable precursor and concomitant of aggression.

This matter has been discussed in detail in our press, in particular, in *International Affairs* (Nos. 4 and 5 for 1960) and at international scientific meetings (for example, the Pugwash Conferences of Scientists, and the East-West Round Table). I shall, therefore, confine myself to just a few ideas.

Let us assume, as a hypothesis, that a disarmed state, making use of its great population, or its preponderance in police forces, is either threatening a weaker state or is violating its frontiers. The question is whether or not there is need of a World Government and the maintenance of a permanent international army to settle such an incident?

I think that the U.N. Charter now in force, and the Soviet Union's Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (1962) hold out much simpler and quite effective formulas for averting such developments which in a disarmed world would be pathological. I have in mind Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression) and Articles 18, 27, 36, 37 and 38 of the Soviet Draft Treaty on Disarmament.

It is proposed that at the first and second stages of general and complete disarmament the state parties to the Treaty should conclude special agreements with the U.N. Security Council (in conformity with Article 43 of the U.N. Charter) on making available to the Security Council, at its request, definite units of national armed forces.

These forces, exceeding in the aggregate the armed forces of any would-be aggressor, would apparently be quite sufficient to crush the resistance of an aggressor, apart from the fact that the latter would be subjected to the whole system of U.N. sanctions, ranging from the severance of diplomatic relations to complete economic boycott.

At the third stage of disarmament, i.e., after the national armed forces have been disbanded, the states would have at their disposal strictly limited units of police (militia) equipped with small arms. The International Organisation would also control the areas of their deployment, any considerable movements on their part, their numerical strength, their armaments and arms manufacture. When necessary, the states would have to make available to the Security Council, at its request, appropriate units of the national police (militia) forces. The size of these formations and the area of their deployment would be determined under agreements between the Security Council and the states concerned.

Any possibility of the unilateral use of international armed forces in the interests of one state or group of states would be ruled out by the structure of their command formed from representatives of the three main groups of states existing in the world today, and operating by way of mutual agreement.

I think that the implementation of general and complete disarmament under strict international control, combined with the measures outlined above, would be the most reliable and quite a realistic guarantee of stable and inviolable peace on earth, humanity's age-long dream. That is why there is no need to overload the ship of a disarmed world with such additional freight as a world government with its collective militarism and world bureaucracy of all ranks and types.

SH. SANAKOYEV: We have listened with interest to the opinions of our colleagues, the jurists, but that is naturally only one aspect of the problem under discussion. Now it's the turn of our economists.

L. GROMOV: I wish to speak on the subject that interests me most of all—the problem of employment and work in a disarmed world.

War preparations—whether undertaken for frankly aggressive aims, as in the member states of Western military and political blocs, or dictated by the need to defend the great gains of the peoples in countries which are either building Socialism and Communism or have recently emerged from colonial oppression—everywhere divert large numbers of people, their knowledge and energies to the production and application of means of destruction and annihilation. This is a colossal waste of the most precious capital mankind has, which is, moreover, fraught with the danger of mass annihilation.

Almost 100 million men are now engaged in servicing and improving the modern war machine and keeping it ready for action. This is a powerful, potentially creative force, comprising that part of mankind which is endowed with greater than average youthful vigour, energy and knowledge. It includes tens of millions of uniformed young men in their prime and tens of millions of skilled and experienced workers and hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of engineers and scientists.

Indeed, if men who are the cream of the present generation could apply all the instruments of labour they now use for war in peaceful pursuits, this peaceful army, 100-million strong, could perform miracles in the shortest imaginable space of time; it could transform continents, subdue the ocean and outer space, conquer diseases, gain control of the microworld and make it serve man. Nor is this a utopia. This gives a general picture of the benefits general and complete disarmament could bring mankind if the peoples bring sufficient pressure to bear on those rulers who are heading for war to make them stop the machine busy preparing for war and regear it to peace.

But is mankind capable of making use of these opportunities? After all, in the countries where capitalism with its greed and quest for profits is often an insuperable obstacle to the correct employment of the labour force, millions of people there cannot find work for years on end. Surely the fact that in these countries tens of millions of people are engaged in war preparations and are thus able to earn their daily bread should be regarded as a blessing? Might not disarmament take their jobs from them and even worsen the lot of those who today are pursuing peaceful occupations?

There are many people in the West who endlessly reiterate these arguments. "No butter without rockets"—they keep on repeating so as to din into the mind of the ordinary workingman the idea that the arms race does not mean war—yet—but bread, while disarmament will inevitably bring unemployment and starvation. How depraved are those people who, in order to keep their profits, want to link work and death in an unbreakable chain! These gentlemen are not really worried about the people's bread and butter, but about the fat dividends war orders bring them.

Yet, science and history both prove that even in states where the capitalist system prevents the full employment of labour resources, it is possible to carry out measures which will not only help draw into socially useful labour all who will be released by disarmament from working for war, but will also increase general employment and thereby improve the lot of the working people in general.

After the Second World War when the reduction of the armed forces and the regearing of the economy to peacetime needs proceeded on a much larger scale and at a faster rate than envisaged in our programme for general and complete disarmament, unemployment throughout the West dropped far below the pre-war level and general employment greatly exceeded that level. The existence of specific favourable conditions in that period does not minimise the importance of the special governmental measures undertaken to ease the return to peaceful occupations of people who serviced the war machine.

Similar measures, although better thought out, more detailed and constituting an integral part of national disarmament plans, are fully able in present-day conditions to ensure the switching-over of labour from the war machine to peaceful endeavours, which will not only be a painless but also a beneficial process for the working people in the West.

This proposition is confirmed in calculations by some very competent economists (in the United States, for example, Leontief, Perlo, Lumer and others) and in the assessment made by a Consultative Group under the U.N. Secretary-General, which early this year submitted a report on the *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament.* This report makes a detailed examination of the general and social problems of employment in the Western countries in relation to disarmament. It points to the full possibility of solving these problems painlessly and recommends measures necessary for realising these possibilities which are within the reach of all Governments. Eminent economists who drew up the report make the following indisputable conclusion:

> "The Consultative Group is unanimously of the opinion that all the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind".

It is clear that in the Socialist countries where full employment was achieved long ago, where there is no unemployment and where all resources are used in a planned way in the interest of the people, the switch-over of servicemen and citizens now working for defence to peaceful labour as a result of general and complete disarmament will proceed much faster and more efficiently than in the Western countries.

This is generally recognised and is stressed in the U.N. report on problems of disarmament. It points out, for example, that "no significant problems were created" by the substantial reduction of armed forces in the Socialist countries (called in the report "the centrally planned economies") in 1955–1958 and stresses that "the replies of Governments of the centrally planned economies [to questions about the economic aspects of disarmament.—L.G.] state that there will be no difficulties in absorbing the released [as a result of disarmament.—L.G.] manpower".

Thus, general and complete disarmament will not only bring the peoples the greatest blessing of our time—peace, but will also enrich the peaceful labour of mankind with additional exceptionally valuable resources and will give a fresh stimulus to the economic and cultural progress of society.

V. STRIGACHEV: The question just discussed by my colleague is closely bound up with another one—capital investments in a disarmed world.

The money now spent for military purposes by all states is equal to approximately half of that part of their gross national income which now goes on capital investments. Since war preparations include large-scale construction work—industrial, road, housing, etc.—it is clear that the arms race greatly curtails the possibilities of capital investments of a peaceful character.

In comparison with capital investments, military expenditure is particularly large in the principal Western countries, which are members of military alignments. Thus, on the evidence of U.N. experts, average direct military expenditure in 1957–1959 in comparison with investments in fixed assets amounted to 58.3 per cent in the United States, 34.7 per cent in France, 42.1 per cent in Great Britain, 18.4 per cent in Canada and 16.7 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The ratio is also quite high in underdeveloped countries which have been drawn into imperialist military blocs: 18.3 per cent in Turkey, 29.5 per cent in Greece, 19.5 per cent in Portugal, 21.5 per cent in Thailand, 19.7 per cent in the Philippines and 57.8 per cent in South Korea.

Countries which have fairly recently gained their national independence or are now completing the liberation of their territory, or are protecting their security from colonialist intrigues, are also compelled to make large military outlays relative to investments in the economy.

Thus, general and complete disarmament will give vast opportunities to expand investments in production, in various economic and cultural services and in the development of science and technology.

The need for such investments is quite great, as can be seen in the case of the developed capitalist countries, for example, the richest Western country, the United States of America.

According to estimates of the National Planning Association, published in March 1960, in order to satisfy the most urgent needs of the American people $330,000 million would need to be spent in five years, including $30,000 million on education, $75,000 million on the transport services, $100,000 million on urban improvement and housing, $60,000 million on water supplies and the conservation of water resources, $35,000 million on the public health services and $30,000 million on other measures (purification of air, development of research, etc.).

Annual expenditure for these purposes, mainly in the sphere of capital investment, would come to about $66,000 million, as against their actual level of $30,000 million. Clearly, a large part of the missing $36,000 million could be covered by the budget following on disarmament. One consequence of such large-scale public construction would be the demand for additional private investments in the building industry, various branches of the engineering industry, etc.

The need of the underdeveloped countries in capital investments is still greater. Disarmament will open up especially favourable prospects for them.

Now I will go on to discuss the prospects disarmament holds out for the Socialist countries which do not suffer from underemployment of production capacity and need large capital construction to carry out their sweeping plans.

These countries have to protect their great achievements and their military expenditure is large both in absolute terms and in comparison with capital investments. The Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament report states that military expenditure in the Soviet Union is equivalent to 34.4 per cent of capital investments, in the Chinese People's Republic to 27.8 per cent, in Czechoslovakia to 28 per cent, etc. General and complete disarmament will naturally release huge funds in these countries for additional capital outlays. The planned economies of the Socialist states will ensure the swift and efficient employment of these additional resources in their national economy and for accomplishing the previously mentioned international tasks.

General and complete disarmament, consequently, will create the conditions for a great and fairly swift expansion of that part of mankind's wealth which is embodied in its capital assets and thereby raise the material and cultural standards of the people.

V. RYMALOV: What Strigachev said applies also to the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania which until quite recently were completely excluded from deciding the main international questions. The peoples of these countries are becoming another powerful force for peace.

One of the most urgent tasks facing the underdeveloped countries is to *destroy colonialism finally and completely in all its forms and manifestations, and a disarmed world will provide the most favourable conditions for doing this.* To begin with, in a disarmed world imperialism will finally be deprived of the possibility of waging aggressive colonial wars against peoples fighting for their independence. Peaceful co-existence, which is destined to become the basic principle of international relations, presupposes non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, the granting to all peoples without exception of the right to self-determination and the right to decide their own future.

Thus disarmament, far from retarding, actually accelerates the great revolutionary changes under way in underdeveloped countries. The protracted agony of colonialism, which is still fraught with immeasurable calamities and suffering for mankind, will be less painful and will not exact fresh huge sacrifices from the peoples.

The peoples of the underdeveloped countries know that a society without arms and war will inevitably become a society without colonial and national oppression. There will be no room in it for such disgraceful concepts as "colonies" or "non-self-governing territories". Scores of millions of people still kept by force of arms in colonial bondage will be able to achieve independence without delay and without needless sacrifices. These are not the only political results however which general and complete disarmament will produce by stimulating the collapse of the colonial system.

Besides colonies there are semi-colonial, underdeveloped countries, where anti-national puppet dictatorial regimes, backed up by the foreign armed force, are in power. In a disarmed world the millions in the semi-colonies will gain new opportunities for eliminating the pro-imperialist regimes and establishing genuinely national states reflecting the will and aspirations of the peoples.

The logic of general and complete disarmament will also lead to the abrogation of unequal military and political treaties and the liquidation of aggressive military blocs which now enmesh in their nets a number of politically independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In a world gripped by the arms race and tension such agreements and blocs are used by modern monopoly capital for its colonial expansion in new camouflaged forms.

The peoples of the young sovereign states pursuing an independent national policy are also interested in the early eradication of all vestiges of colonialism. They know that the freedom they have won is not secure so long as imperialism keeps its strong points and military bases in neighbouring countries or in their territories. In a world where the monopolies are still seeking to resolve international issues by force of arms, where mushroom-shaped clouds constantly threaten mankind with another world war, they have no guarantee against intervention by the colonialist, against the restoration of the colonial system in some form or another. Freedom and peace are interconnected—this was the conclusion drawn by the Bandung Conference, and it has been corroborated by the entire record of post-war developments.

For the peoples of the underdeveloped countries political independence is not an aim in itself, but a necessary prerequisite for eliminating the dire economic and social aftermath of prolonged colonial rule. To understand the complexity and the tremendous difficulties of this task we must bear in mind the following facts. The entire large group of unindustrialised countries, inhabited by more than two-thirds of the population in the non-Socialist world, now produces *per capita* only about one-twentieth of the manufactured goods, including less than one-fortieth of the basic metals and about one-sixtieth of the machinery and equipment, produced by the industrially developed capitalist countries.

Agriculture in the underdeveloped countries, which as a rule contributes more than half of their national income, is based on hand labour and primitive implements. Labour productivity in agriculture is but a fraction of that in the advanced countries. The result is that *per capita* national income in the backward countries is only 10–11 per cent of that in the industrial capitalist states.

Social and epidemic diseases and starvation are still rampant in the overwhelming majority of colonial and former colonial countries, and their medical and social services are very meagre. The average life span is much lower than in the developed states, and child mortality per 1,000 of population is four to five times higher.

In the period when imperialism and colonialism ruled undivided over the whole world economic growth rates in the colonies hardly kept pace with the increase in population, and in some cases even lagged behind it. The post-war break-up of the colonial system has accelerated the economic advance of many liberated countries, but on the whole it is still slow. In the last decade, *per capita* real income in all underdeveloped countries rose on the average less than 2 per cent annually. Should these rates be preserved, the eradication of colonialism's most terrible legacy—the vast difference in economic development levels between countries—might persist for many, many decades to come. But mankind has no right to tolerate such a situation.

The peoples not only of these countries but of all other countries without exception are interested in accelerating the growth of their productive forces. There can be no lasting peace and security on earth, mankind will not be able to advance swiftly and in all fields if the vast gap in living standards of different countries remains for several generations, if the economic and social aftermath of colonialism is not eliminated in a brief historical period, if the staggering poverty of the masses in the underdeveloped countries plundered by colonialism is not swiftly wiped out.

Has human society the material requisites for solving, in the foreseeable future, the very complex socio-economic problems confronting the underdeveloped regions? The record of some countries, which have won real independence, the sweeping scientific and technical revolution now under way and the discovery of new, practically unlimited sources of power, show that such possibilities exist. But to exploit them to the maximum people need above all a lasting and durable peace based on general and complete disarmament.

Mankind is now spending colossal sums on the arms race, equivalent to at least two-thirds and, according to some estimates, to the entire national income of all the underdeveloped countries combined. This means that every year a quantity of material values equal to that created by the labour of more than 1,000 million people in these countries is wasted on military purposes. No less striking is the comparison between military expenditure and capital investments in the economy of these countries. The Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament report points out that "despite the inadequacies of the available statistics it appears that the world's military expenditures far exceed the combined gross investment expenditures of the less developed areas; they are probably at least five times as large and may be much greater". Consequently, the employment of even a part of these funds for advancing the backward economy of the former colonial and dependent countries would within a few years send their economic and cultural development rates soaring upwards and would considerably improve the living conditions of their peoples.

In a disarmed world the financial and material resources which the underdeveloped countries themselves are now compelled to assign for military purposes could be *fully* used for these lofty aims. At present their military budgets, although relatively small as compared with the most developed countries, make up the sizable sum of more than $6,000 million annually.

This sum is nearly twice as large as the average annual influx of foreign funds to the underdeveloped countries in the form of net subsidies and net long-term loans. The proportion of military budgets to basic investments by national capital in most underdeveloped countries, as in most other countries, has been above 10 per cent in recent years. According to data in the U.N. report, in 1957–1959 this share amounted on the average to 12.3 per cent in the Sudan, 22.4 per cent in Brazil, 25.6 per cent in Chile, 17.6 per cent in Ecuador, 13.2 per cent in Peru, 26.3 per cent in the Malayan Federation, 24.4 per cent in Pakistan, etc.

V. STRIGACHEV: I can give this example. To ensure a 2 per cent increase in *per capita* national income in the underdeveloped countries (it is now less than 2 per cent) additional capital investments of about $7,000 million are needed every year. This sum, as V. Rymalov pointed out, is roughly equal to the present military expenditure of the underdeveloped countries, and can therefore largely be obtained from internal resources after general and complete disarmament.

V. RYMALOV: Many other economic factors directly bound up with disarmament will also become extremely important in mobilising the internal resources of the underdeveloped countries for carrying out economic development programmes. Once international tension eases off, the quite substantial amount of foreign exchange now spent by these countries for the purchase abroad of arms and ammunition could be used chiefly for importing industrial plant and other means of production. In addition to these newly released financial resources, the switching over to peaceful production of war industry plants, which have been built up fairly rapidly in some Asian and Latin American countries in the last few years, would enable them to increase the output of capital equipment and the other manufactured goods they need.

Moreover, demobilisation will make it possible to employ labour resources in social production more rationally, especially in view of the great shortage of skilled labour in the underdeveloped countries. A substantial part of their technicians and other specialists is now claimed by the army.

I could mention several other factors to illustrate the favourable effect disarmament would immediately have on the economy of backward countries. Their impact can hardly be overstated, but the normalisation of international economic relations once the unequal economic ties existing between developed and underdeveloped countries are abolished, will be especially important. This inequality which arose during the period of domination of the world economy by colonialism and imperialism, still prevails in the world capitalist economy today. In a world without arms and wars, where there will be only a free community of states enjoying full national sovereignty and political independence, inevitably the principles of equal co-operation, mutual assistance and mutual benefit in economic relations between countries irrespective of their political and social system will eventually prevail.

An idea of the benefits awaiting the underdeveloped countries in a disarmed world, after the last vestiges of colonialism in the world economy have been eliminated, is given by data which N.S. Khrushchev brought forward in his report on the C.P.S.U. Programme at the 22nd Congress. At present unequal relations between countries enable the monopolies of the United States and the other Western Powers to extract $20,000 million annually from the underdeveloped countries.

An end to this plunder will most certainly mean a loss for the monopolies, but, on the other hand, it will be a gain for the peoples. The use of these funds for industrialisation and the advance of agriculture in the backward countries will make it much easier to solve a vital problem for mankind, namely, to raise swiftly the living standards of their population of more than 1,000 million. This will be the starting point for quickly expanding their home markets and, consequently, the world market as a whole, and this will create additional favourable conditions for the further advance of productive forces in both the underdeveloped and industrialised countries.

The wide gap in social and economic development can be bridged only through the widest introduction of the latest achievements of science and technology in the economy of the backward countries, but there are serious obstacles to acquiring everything of value created man's genius. The reason is not only that the arms race with all its consequences diverts huge material and technical resources of the developed states which could be used to speed up the economic advance of the former colonies and dependent countries. It is also necessary to remove once and for all the danger of predatory wars and to create everywhere a climate of mutual confidence among nations, in which aid could not be used to the detriment of the recipient countries.

Lenin pointed out that "only great concern for the interests of different countries removes grounds for conflicts, removes mutual suspicion, removes apprehension of any intrigue and creates that confidence, particularly among workers and peasants who speak different languages, without which both peaceful relations among nations and any successful development of everything of value in modern civilisation is absolutely impossible".

General and complete disarmament is the decisive condition for the creation of this kind of international climate. It will open up boundless horizons for the strengthening of friendly scientific, technical, and economic co-operation among the peoples, so needed by the countries liberated from colonial bondage. The opportunities available to the industrial states for passing on their scientific and technical know-how and giving aid to these countries will increase immeasurably in a disarmed world. Demobilisation and the discontinuation of weapons production will release many highly qualified specialists in the industrialised countries who will be able to apply their experience and knowledge to help the peoples of the underdeveloped countries attain a better future.

At the same time industry in the developed countries, freed from the burden of war production, will be able to provide the technically backward countries with the latest machinery, equipment and other goods on an unprecedented scale. The financial basis for assistance will increase many times over.

The principal industrial states are now spending approximately $100,000 million annually for war purposes. If at least a third of these funds now being used unproductively were used to advance the economically underdeveloped countries (this is perfectly feasible since the peoples are interested in consolidating world peace and accelerating the growth of productive forces throughout the world), the general resources for aid to these countries would reach some $35,000 million or $40,000 million annually.

V. STRIGACHEV: Additional annual investments in the economy, health services, housing and the construction of cultural establishments in the underdeveloped countries have to be of the order of $20,000 million—$40,000 million so as ensure a 4–6 per cent annual growth of the *per capita* national income, thus enabling their peoples to overtake the developed states as regards living standards in a historically brief period, within a few decades. This is the sum named by V. Rymalov. As far as the Western world is concerned, this would merely represent the returning of a negligible part of their unpaid debt to the peoples of the underdeveloped countries.

By the way, *disarmament and the consequent development of the economically backward countries would be of benefit for the capitalist states as well, because it would stimulate capital construction.*

Paul Hoffman, well-known American economist, has estimated that "if with the help of the United States and other advanced countries, underdeveloped countries reached our proposed goal of increasing their annual *per capita* income by 25 per cent over the period 1961–1970 [or 2.5 per cent annually—V.S.] it would provide the United States with $110,000 million worth of business over the decade ahead. This would bring the United States exports to these countries to the level of $14,000 million in the year 1970, or more than double the total of our exports to these same areas in 1958".

F. Baade, a West German economist, said: "If *armaments are sharply reduced on a world-wide scale* and the Great Powers agree to assign part of the money thus saved to an international Fund to accelerate the building up of industry in the underdeveloped countries, this would be *a major contribution to a prolonged high level of activity* in the manufacture of capital equipment in the old industrial countries. . . . " Baade assumes in particular that disarmament and the resultant growth of public construction and aid to underdeveloped countries would increase by 1975 the production of steel in the countries of Europe and North America by 50 per cent, necessitating the expansion of the iron and steel industry.

I can give a very vivid example of this. To raise agriculture to what would be regarded as a high level in the capitalist world (one tractor per 40 hectares of land and 30 kilogrammes of fertiliser per hectare), the underdeveloped countries need an addition of 15 million tractors and 17 million tons of mineral fertiliser annually (in 1957–1958 the entire capitalist world had 8.5 million tractors and consumed 19.5 million tons of mineral fertiliser). It is clear that to meet such needs, representing a huge capital outlay, large industrial investments would be required in all countries.

M. Goryainov: We have every ground for believing that general and complete disarmament will open up truly fantastic prospects before the whole of mankind.

Modern culture, industry, science and technology have been built up by the efforts of many and many generations. What they have created is tremendous. But the present generation has been destined by history to make the most significant changes in the life of human society.

It was only five years ago that the Soviet people launched the first sputnik. A little over a year ago a Soviet citizen made the first space flight, with others following in his wake. No doubt, man will land on the moon in the next few years and will visit other planets of the solar system within the lifetime of the present generation.

The present generation can also be proud of achievements in material production. In the last 40 years power capacity per worker throughout the world has increased more than three times (in the previous 40 years this process was nearly three times slower in a country such as the United

States). The increase in power capacity has been particularly rapid in the Soviet Union.

The development of transport and communications has changed all conception of the scale of time and space. The globe has seemed to shrink greatly, and the peoples have drawn much nearer to each other.

Scientists have discovered ways of releasing nuclear energy, which is laying the new foundations of the power industry of the future. The surveyed resources of nuclear fuels (uranium and thorium) contain immeasurably greater power than all known stocks of coal, oil and natural gas combined. Hundreds of thousands of tons of uranium-238 have already been mined and hundreds of tons of uranium-235 have been extracted. (The power contained in already mined uranium is sufficient to meet all the power requirements of mankind for several years.)

If the sources of power which mankind possesses are used rationally the peoples of the world will be saved from such disasters as starvation, poverty, epidemic diseases, illiteracy, etc., even in the lifetime of the present generation.

The material possibilities for this exist and are in the hands of the people.

At the present level of production in the technically advanced countries all man's requirements in food, clothing and shelter and all his spiritual requirements could be fully satisfied. Moreover, it would only be necessary to work not eight or seven, but five or six hours daily.

But that is not all. Speaking of the wealth existing in the world we should mention things which will become available over the next number of years. Eminent scientists are unanimous in their belief that science, technology and industry have created the preliminary conditions so that in the near future (to be more exact, in the next 15–20 years) people will be able to learn how to control thermonuclear reactions of the fusion of light elements. Control of these processes would multiply hundreds of times over existing power capacities and create new material foundations for life on earth, in which complete abundance of the good things of life will be limited only by reason.

Mankind's immediate future within the next few decades—many of us will live in it—will be a world of marvellous achievements, a world of creative thought and joyous labour for every person, a world of universal happiness.

G. POKROVSKY: I think we need hardly speak in terms of decades ahead. It seems to me that the exceptional successes won in recent years in the study of space enable us even now to speak of the possibility of, for example, international co-operation in the further exploration of space and, moreover, *convincingly prove the benefits of such co-operation for all states without exception.*

We all know that the Soviet Union and the United States have invested immense resources and funds in the exploration of space in recent years and have registered substantial achievements. Today it is not difficult to outline definite trends for the successful development of co-operation between our two countries. After John Glenn's flight three times round the earth, following the flights of Yury Gagarin and Herman Titov, N. S. Khrushchev proposed to President Kennedy a pooling of the efforts of Soviet and American scientists in further space exploration for peace and progress.

He put forward, as an example, two tasks which could become the subject of joint exploration and research in the near future. The first is the establishment of a system of automatic earth satellites to ensure world-wide shortwave radio communication and in particular world-wide television.

The second task is the launching of sputniks for meteorological purposes, specifically, for effecting a great improvement in long-term weather forecasting.

How would these ideas work out in practice? I should like to discuss this point today. Since, naturally, I cannot go into a detailed discussion of technical problems, I will deal only with the fundamental aspects of the matter.

It was established long ago that shortwave radio relay lines are the most suitable for radio communication and can ensure all kinds of communication, from the telephone to television. These lines are almost free from interference and can work faultlessly.

But high towers with exactly pointed reflectors are needed for carrying these lines. The towers must be erected at distances of not more than 100 kilometres and must be no less than 100 metres high. This means that radio relay communication can be established only on land since it cannot be established across oceans by ordinary means.

High-frequency electric oscillations can also be transmitted along special cables, but in this case special amplifying stations have to be built at intervals of approximately 10 kilometres, making this type of communication even less widely applicable and more costly.

The situation would be entirely different if high towers were to be replaced by a system of earth satellites. For example, three sputniks flying at an altitude of about 36,000 kilometres above the earth would be sufficient to ensure world-wide television communication (except for relatively small areas around the Poles). By using radio shortwave reflectors mounted on sputniks it will be possible to make all forms of radio relay communication reliable and precise. Moreover, some other tasks could also be accomplished, namely, improvement and extension of international telephone, telegraph and telephoto communication, improvement of sea and aerial navigation, etc.

These measures will extend international ties and enable people in different countries throughout the world to get to know each other better.

Moreover, all world radio communication and television will become much cheaper and more profitable. I estimate that the direct gain could reach nearly 10,000 millions rubles annually.

We may assume that a system of communication via sputniks set up for the good of all countries and peoples will be profitable from the very outset, not to mention the benefits which will swiftly multiply as the system develops.

Space communication facilities, clearly, cannot serve *only one* state: by their very nature they are, so to say, world-wide, global. At the same time they become more and more useful to the extent to which international co-operation becomes more widespread and complete.

The problems connected with the use of sputniks for long-term weather forecasting are more intricate, but still more intriguing.

In this science unfortunately not everything is well under control. It is still impossible to predict the weather for the entire crop period exactly enough to be able to plan agricultural work with scientific accuracy and to determine the size of the future crop. As a result, many countries have suffered and are suffering huge losses; in the underdeveloped countries every crop failure and other calamity due to the whims of the weather—floods, frosts, drought—as a rule cause epidemics, famine and a huge death toll.

It may be assumed—with a fair degree of probability—that better long-term weather forecasts which would make it possible to predict, at least in half the cases, the conditions of the crop and natural calamities would give mankind a saving of not less than $100,000 million annually.

What is needed to make this possible?

For an answer to this question we should recall that various solar radiations which do not reach the surface of the earth but are absorbed in the upper layers of the atmosphere play an essential part in the life of the atmosphere. Of no less significance is heat radiation from the earth into outer space, which can conveniently be observed outside the atmosphere, in outer space.

Data about these radiations and also a picture of the cloud positions distinctly seen from outer space, are very necessary for a complete idea of the processes which take place in the atmosphere and determine the weather. That is why a system of meteorological sputniks for obtaining better basic weather information can greatly extend the possibilities of more precise long-term weather forecasting. The outlays for setting up and operating such a system will of course be considerable, but the benefits to agriculture, transport and other spheres of human endeavour from improved weather forecasts would most likely be tens of times greater than expenditure.

Deeper study of weather-making phenomena will enable man not only to predict but also to control the weather in future. The benefit to mankind is something we cannot even imagine today.

I have mentioned only two examples of the possible use of space for peaceful purposes in the interests of all countries. Of course, the list of examples could be continued *ad infinitum*. But that is not the main thing. The main thing is that mankind *in exploring space has boundless opportunities to solve through joint effort problems of practical benefit.*

There have, of course, already been several instances in international relations when international co-operation has been organised, despite differences in political systems, and this has yielded important practical results.

We can recall, for example, the First International Geophysical Year (1957–1958), the joint study of the Antarctic by expeditions coming from many countries, the agreement between the Soviet Union and France on the study of magneto-electrical phenomena in the upper layers of the atmosphere (the building of twin observatories at Yaransk in the Soviet Union and on Kerguelen Island (France), the International Quiet Sun Year, etc.

This experience shows that life itself impels people to closer and ever wider co-operation: the sooner and the more completely people understand this objective law of our age, the bigger the benefits all the nations will reap, and in the first place, those which display the greatest initiative and resourcefulness in this matter. Attempts such as the United States is making at the present time, to turn the Cosmos into an area for the arms contest, will not only deprive mankind of these benefits but will make more terrible the threat hanging over them.

M. GORYAINOV: Against the background of these staggering prospects, war stands out in all its stark madness.

We may recall that in the last two world wars, imposed on mankind by the imperialists, more than 60 million people were killed and over 100 million were wounded and crippled. Thousands of towns and scores of thousands of villages were destroyed. Over 100 million people were twice sent to the battlefields and about 500 million were made to work for war.

The cost of the two world wars is estimated at nearly $2,000,000 million. How vast this sum is can be seen from the fact that all the national wealth of the United States of America by the end of the Second World War was estimated at $600,000 million.

The wealth of North and South America is estimated at about $1,000,000 million, and of the entire capitalist world at $2,000,000–$2,500,000 million. These rough calculations show that mankind paid for the two world wars unleashed by imperialism with a toll of 60 million dead and 100 million wounded and maimed, and with nearly half of the material values the world possessed.

From 2 to 3.5 per cent of the world's population were killed or maimed and nearly 50 per cent of the world's wealth was consumed in the flames of war—this is the price mankind has already had to pay for the two world wars.

The present-day arms race and the cold war are in the same category as the two world wars. Total expenditure by all the countries on the arms race in the post-war period is close to $1,000,000 million. This sum (in comparable prices) is almost three times greater than the total cost of the First World War. Within the next several years, if cold war expenditure continues to rise at the present rates (it already exceeds $120,000 million annually), the arms race will have cost as much as the Second World War.

In the post-war years direct military expenditure in the United States reached $630,000 million and, together with indirect outlays, $842,000 million.

A comparison of the present cost of war preparations with those before the First and Second World wars is highly instructive.

In 1913, Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Italy spent altogether only $1,100 million to $1,200 million for military purposes. In 1933–1934 the same countries were already spending about $3,000 million and in 1938–1939 some $8,500 million to $10,000 million. Today the arms race is much more expensive: it swallows up over 10 per cent of the labour resources of the world. The arms race has resulted in the building up of a war machine, estimated now at $320,000 million to $350,000 million. This is greater than the cost of the First World War. The cost of the United States war machine is estimated at $160,000 million to $170,000 million.

Financial outlays, however, are only one aspect of the matter. With the invention of nuclear weapons, the means of destruction have become tens of thousands of times more powerful and the "technology" of destruction and murder, hundreds of times cheaper. The destructive potential of stockpiled nuclear warheads (calculated on the basis of data published in the American and British press), expressed in terms of TNT, is 15,000–20,000 times greater than the destructive power of all the explosives used during the Second World War. But even this is not all. To destruction potential should be added the radio-active potential which acts on living nature for a long period, at times over many years.

Stockpiles of nuclear explosives, it has been calculated, are sufficient to contaminate the entire surface of the globe and the adjacent layers of the atmosphere with a high concentration of radioactive substances. Between 50–60 per cent of the land surface of our planet would contain concentrations which after a certain brief period could cause the death of people. On the remaining part of our planet people would get a big radiation dose.

Attention should be drawn to the following: in pre-nuclear wars when people were chiefly the victims of aimed fire, human losses amounted to very low percentages of the world population, while material losses were relatively 20–25 times higher. Today a single nuclear explosion can cause destruction over hundreds and thousands of square kilometres and contaminate people with radio-active fallout over tens of thousands of square kilometres. This would sharply raise human losses both in absolute and relative terms.

One more tragic feature distinguishes the modern war machine from its pre-nuclear forerunner. Formerly, in peacetime armed forces were merely a burden on the economy. Present-day armies can spread death without fighting, in peacetime too, owing to nuclear weapon tests.

It seems to me it is easier in the light of all this, to answer the question: what will disarmament and the banishing of war give mankind?

The most important thing is that the world will be rid of the nightmare of nuclear-missile war. In time the atmosphere will be cleared of radioactive particles harmful to health. The peoples will have the possibility of using colossal sums of money for improving living conditions, advancing culture, for progress and the mastery of the secrets of the Cosmos. Peace on earth is the keystone for mankind's advance to a better life in the near future. In conclusion I want to stress that all peoples must get a better understanding of the full gravity of the menace of a nuclear-missile catastrophe hanging over the world so as to remove it forever.

N. TALENSKY: I should like to draw your attention to an urgent problem which has not however been sufficiently studied—the destruction of armaments and other war material as such and their conversion to peaceful uses.

General and complete disarmament is not for us a propaganda slogan, as some of our adversaries allege, but a real policy. We shall strive for disarmament despite the resistance of the forces of imperialism and shall not give up until we achieve complete success. That is why in spite of all the obstacles raised by the imperialist Powers in the way of general and complete disarmament, we consider it necessary to work out in detail all aspects of this problem.

The Soviet Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament is proof of our thorough approach. The problem of the destruction of weapons and military equipment requires a similar degree of thoroughness, since it is an extremely complicated process. Hundreds and thousands of rockets of different types designed for various purposes, huge stocks of rocket fuel and fissionable materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, thousands of nuclear bombs, rocket warheads and missiles will have to be destroyed. The most diverse types of electronic equipment employed in servicing nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear devices will also be liable for destruction as such.

The destruction of conventional armaments will necessitate an even greater volume of work: tens of thousands of tanks and self-propelled guns, military aircraft and helicopters, hundreds of thousands of machine-guns, millions of rifles and submachine-guns, ordnance pieces of various calibres intended for different purposes and literally mountains of munition for them, are due for destruction.

This, I repeat, would be a complicated process in which political, strategic, military-technical and economic aspects would be closely interconnected. Therefore, since the main component of the disarmament problem is a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, the aspect of armaments destruction should also be kept in mind. In my opinion, it would be useful even now to undertake a serious study of the practical problem of destroying weapons and other war matériel. World and national public opinion would be of great assistance in this respect to both international disarmament bodies and national Governments.

Public participation in the preparation and implementation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament would be extremely useful and even essential, inasmuch as aggressive circles opposed to disarmament even after the signing of a treaty would try on every occasion to hamper its implementation, and to this end would above all take advantage of the complexity of the disarmament process.

Although I cannot even hope to give an exhaustive definition of the problem of destroying armaments and military equipment after the conclusion of a disarmament treaty, I will try to outline some of the basic principles and features of this process. Politically, it should be completely in accord with the treaty, and failure to observe the treaty as a whole or in part should be made absolutely impossible. Strict international control and the efficient working of the control apparatus supplemented by a broad system of public control, on a world-wide and national scale, would serve as a sufficiently reliable guarantee in this respect.

From the strategic and military-technical point of view, armaments destruction process should proceed in such a way that all measures would correspond strictly to the principle of symmetry and mutual balance. At no stage of the disarmament process should any participant be given strategic or military-technical advantages over any other participant; the relation of forces that exist at the time of signing a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and their stability, should not be disturbed.

The danger of an aggressive war in any form should be consistently and steadily lessened until it is reduced to nil. In the light of this principle, the only system of disarmament to have an absolute advantage over all others is that which is based on the destruction, in the very first stage, of the most dangerous armaments and above all the means of nuclear attack: all types of delivery vehicles and military bases which are centres for nuclear attack and aggression. Such a system of disarmament is envisaged in the plan proposed by the Soviet Government.

The political, strategic and military-technical principles underlying the process of implementing a disarmament treaty should be the same for all its signatories. In regard to the economic aspect, prominence should be given to one common principle: in destroying arms and military equipment as such, the possibility of reconverting them to military use should in no circumstances be preserved. Consequently, those types which are designed for delivering a blow should be made incapable of doing so, i.e. they should be either physically destroyed or rendered absolutely unsuitable for war purposes.

War matériel which can be employed without any danger of their being used for military purposes could be transferred to appropriate organisations or persons for peaceful uses. In this case it would become possible in the very process of disarmament to render substantial assistance to underdeveloped countries by turning over to them, say, motor and air transport facilities, various means of communications and so on.

Since war matériel is the product of people's labour and costs great sums of money, it is desirable to regear it as much as possible for use in the national economy. This principle will be most fully and rationally applied in the Socialist countries and in countries where the state controls, even if only partially, the economy. The capitalist countries would perhaps do the same as they did after the last war, when enormous stocks of materials suitable for peaceful purposes were physically destroyed.

In order to express in concrete terms the process of liquidating separate categories of armaments and military equipment, I shall pick out the following aspects. All delivery vehicles should in principle be completely destroyed, but in view of the fact that, as disarmament proceeds, the nature of inter-state relations will radically change and today's tension will give place to peaceful co-existence and broad co-operation, a certain number could be retained for peaceful, mainly scientific, uses under international control.

It is quite possible that a considerable number of powerful intercontinental missiles would be retained, under control, for space exploration conducted on a national and international scale. Disarmament would probably create immediate favourable conditions for linking up meteorological services throughout the world, as Maj.-Gen. Pokrovsky has said. Naturally, the transfer of various kinds of rockets, which can easily be adjusted to peaceful pursuits, to this service will be very useful. The meteorological service will probably take over a considerable proportion of ground installations for the launching of rockets and their control in flight.

The existing rocket stockpiles and launching ramps would provide as ample opportunity for research into the use of passenger and freight rockets and also for establishing a reliable international system of radio communication and television.

It would perhaps also be foolish to destroy nuclear submarines fitted with rockets. Released from military use, they could be widely employed for exploring seas and oceans and assisting the fishing industry, as is now being done by our own extremely popular *Severyanka*.

The forms of destruction of all other nuclear delivery vehicles should also make their use for military purposes absolutely impossible. As for their peaceful uses, these would be determined by considerations of an economic and technical nature. The ancient God of War which tries to prolong its combat life with the help of atomic missiles—atomic artillery—can find no peaceful application whatsoever and should therefore be consigned to the furnace.

Nuclear weapons could be most rationally done away with as follows. Fissionable materials contained in bombs, rocket warheads, missiles and other devices should be extracted and together with reserve supplies form a country's special stock for peaceful uses, as envisaged by the Soviet Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament. It goes without saying that these materials should be rendered useless for the direct re-creation of nuclear weapons and should be kept under proper control. These fissionable materials could serve as fuel for atomic power stations, sea-going ships of various descriptions and so on. They could also be widely used to help underdeveloped countries quickly establish electric power bases.

With their nuclear charge removed, it is hardly possible that bombs, warheads and missiles would find any peaceful application, and they should therefore be completely destroyed. All this should of course be done under strict control so as to make it impossible to violate treaty obligations.

The greater part of conventional armaments which cannot be employed for peaceful purposes should be melted down into metal for civilian uses. Supplies of explosives both in dumps and extracted from shells, mines and bombs can, to a certain extent, be used for peaceful work.

Other types of war matériel in the field or in depots, such as transport vehicles, and communication, construction, road-building and other equipment can be almost entirely used for peaceful purposes. A certain part of such equipment can also be turned over to the underdeveloped countries. For instance, the reserves of communication equipment in modern conventional armed forces are so great that it would be possible to meet the needs of many countries in them.

True, many types of this equipment would have to be readapted, but this would perhaps be preferable to destroying such expensive apparatus. As far as combatant and auxiliary warships are concerned, the following principle should.be applied: all that could be used for peaceful purposes should be retained, while the rest would be subject to destruction. The same principle is applicable to chemical and bacteriological weapons.

These ideas are only an outline of the procedure for destroying weapons and other war matériel. To this should be added procedure for discontinuing military production and liquidating or regearing appropriate enterprises, factory shops, laboratories, etc. It should be emphasized that the basic principles of the process of eliminating all types of armaments have already been set out in the Soviet Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, and the document itself, the stages of, and procedure for, disarmament and the system of control set forth in it, provide the most favourable conditions for real disarmament and the creation of a world without arms and wars.

SH. SANAKOYEV: It seems to me we have had a useful meeting. We have of course made only an attempt at approaching a problem which is no longer an abstract idea: its solution is feasible in the near future. Clearly, the deliverance of mankind from arms and wars will bring great economic, political and social advantages. It will also be a moral victory for the peoples, since general and complete disarmament will at long last free them from the fear of nuclear death, which has nowadays become a serious hindrance to the development of civilisation.

However, it is important to realise that the way to a world without arms is by no means an easy one. This all-important problem of our age can be solved only through the stubborn and difficult struggle of millions of people in all countries and continents. The imperialist rulers talk a lot about peace; experience shows however that all their "peaceable" talk is nothing more than a fancy dress with which they try to deceive the peoples. That is why the struggle for peace is not so easy. In an effort to save the profits they are making out of the arms race, atomic hysteria and the cold war, the imperialists will no doubt do all they can to frustrate general and complete disarmament.

On the other hand, the existing relation of world forces is in favour of peace, progress and happiness. We have therefore every reason to hope that the struggle for peace will in the end be successful.

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CHAPTER 4 • *Behavioral Scientists and International Peace and Integration: Policy Recommendations*

Some Implications for the Study of Politics as a Sphere of Social Decision

KARL W. DEUTSCH

. . . the preservation of individual or group autonomy, or even the preservation of some measure of autonomy for whole nations, or for all mankind, is not limited to problems of politics alone. Rather, the preservation of autonomy involves the whole range of individual and social learning, from scientific discoveries and economic innovations to the most subtle changes in culture, ethics, values, or religion. Nevertheless politics occupies a special position within this range.

Politics involves the steering or manipulation of human behavior by a combination of threats of enforcement with habits of compliance. Such habits of compliance may range from mere fear or apathy to full-fledged convictions of legitimacy and personal identification with decisions; and the threats of enforcement may range from mere marginal policing to all-out foreign military occupation. What is characteristic of politics is that threats of enforcement and habits of compliance will appear in combinations and that in such combinations they may be capable of overriding or modifying many other goals, habits, or preferences that exist in the society.

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Politics may be considered as a decisive sphere of social learning, or as a major sphere of social decision, precisely because it is characterized by this power to override other kinds of preferences. Politics is thus a decisive instrumentality by which social commitments can be produced, preserved, or changed.

For all these reasons it may prove rewarding to study politics from the point of view of autonomy, steering performance, resourcefulness, and power, learning capacity, and self-preservation. What major facilities of communication and memory, what machinery for self-steering, what channels of intake and foci of attention, what operational reserves available for recommitment, and what major patterns of values are found in a given political system?

If we are interested in the future effectiveness or survival of such a system, we may now be able to ask for more than the mere data bearing on crude power. We may ask: What are its facilities and rewards for the encouragement of criticism, its transmission to decision points, and for the responsiveness of the system to it? What are the learning responses of the system, and what are its strategies of commitment? What attempts and arrangements are made in the system to preserve its freedom from idolatry, to avoid the intoxication of success and the worship of ephemeral practices and institutions? What provisions or attempts are made to ensure openness on the part of the system to the needs of outsiders, and readiness to learn from changes in its environment, as well as from new sources of initiative within itself? What is the status of any practice or institution designed to treat the social and physical environment of the system not merely as a source of either obstacles or tools, but as a potential source of challenge, guidance, and vital information? What are the instances of integrative behavior on the part of the system observed in the past, and what are the prospects and instrumentalities for such behavior in the future?

If we could make a political survey in these terms, we might be able to assess more realistically the present and prospective decision-making capacity of a particular government or state.

Eventually we might be able to take part more effectively in the continuing debate between the optimists and pessimists in politics. Conceivably, we might emerge with the Augustinian viewpoint that the probabilities are still heavily against the survival, and for the eventual self-destruction, of every autonomous system. Or we might arrive at the belief that an attitude of awareness of these odds in favor of destruction might in itself be a factor in changing them for the better and that the universe contained enough new resources to offer a chance of extended survival to all those autonomous systems that succeed in maintaining themselves in readiness to respond to them. In any case, we might emerge from such an inquiry with the impression that the warnings of the pessimists are more than a mere expression of fearfulness or gloom and that they refer to very real tendencies inherent in the operation and structure of all autonomous systems; and we could begin to ask how in any particular, historically given political system these tendencies toward self-destruction could be modified in favor of survival.

At the present time we are at best barely beginning to understand a little of the working of human personalities and human organizations. In our search for understanding, it may not be safe to disregard the individual and social insights of thousands of years, laid down in the great philosophic and religious traditions of mankind. The day may come when social scientists who refer to some elements in these traditions will no longer automatically be suspected of obscurantism, or of a breach of professional standards. Perhaps we may look forward to the time when all that is claimed to be true will be permitted to enter the ongoing process of scientific verification, even though that process may fall far short of exhausting it; and when the study of the growth of autonomy, and of the responsibility of persons and groups, will be carried forward with the help of all the sources of relevant knowledge available to mankind.

The Use of Psychiatrists in Government in Relation to International Problems

GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, INC.

The psychiatrist in his every day work is concerned with a great variety of inter-personal relationships and the individual's ability or inability to adjust to them. He has methods for analyzing reactions, reducing tensions and for understanding and dealing with the unreasonable in human behavior. Above all, his task is to observe and understand the manifestations of anxiety, and the extraordinary range and variety of the measures to which human beings will resort in their efforts to free themselves from it. Also, recent advances in the knowledge of group processes add to his understanding of the difficulties that inevitably arise in groups. Therefore, he can be useful in this aspect as a participant in a group working on a problem situation in which each member brings his professional knowledge to bear. Although the orientation of the problem is to its various social aspects instead of to an individual, the psychiatrist, in addition to his concern with the problem, is also interested in the functioning of the members of the group, but in a different way and for a different reason in the situation under discussion. He is concerned here with the individual only insofar as the individual's mal-functioning interferes with the achievement of the group.

In the group the psychiatrist is expected to be more consciously aware than other members of those attitudes and feelings, explicit and implicit (including his own), that are pertinent to the goals of the group, and to use his training as a psychiatrist to bring such factors to light in an objective and acceptable way. In other words, he brings his special training in inter-personal relations to bear upon the successful functioning of the group instead of concentrating on the difficulties of any individual as such, although he may be aware of such difficulties.

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The role that psychiatrists have played in one government agency has been clarified by an official who said that they proved useful in (1) helping to explore the nature of specific situations and the means at hand of dealing with them; (2) helping to find and train other consultants and personnel; (3) helping to tackle problems in strategic planning.

It was this official's opinion that there was frequent need for an understanding of psychological factors, and especially of irrational factors, in situations where the interpretation and consideration of such factors were necessary to the formulation of plans or policy. . . .

The official further emphasized the potential usefulness of the psychiatrist in helping the former to eliminate faulty perceptions or distortions in his thinking or in the group's discussion. He made special note of the psychiatrist's aid in the training of personnel going abroad, e.g., in helping such individuals to recognize the nature and limitations of their assignments and to evaluate objectively their own motivations and behavior in terms of its significance to the nationals with whom they would be dealing. In this way, a psychiatrist can bring to his consultative work with the official a method of observation and interpretation which can complement the experience of the latter.

II. Specific Experiences of Psychiatrists

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A. *Counsellor to individual officials.* In recent years some officials have asked psychiatrists to discuss their assignments with them when they have had questions in regard to policy, to their relationships with co-workers, or with persons of other nationalities with whom they would be working. An official may desire to review his own attitudes which he feels might be impeding his functioning. This kind of situation approximates that to which the psychiatrist is accustomed in his usual work in that it deals with interpersonal relations; it differs in that he is not asked to engage in therapy as it is conventionally conceived, but to use his knowledge to study the objective reality of the situation and the subjective aspects that might limit the usefulness of the official. The psychiatrist may be able in a short time to reduce the anxiety that is associated with the situation and help to mobilize the potentials of the official that relate especially to this situation. . . .

B. *Consultant on personnel.* Psychiatrists have been used rather widely in problems involving the selection of personnel. An unusually interesting and far reaching research and action job was given to a psychiatrist by the State Department. Among other duties, he was asked to work with psychologists to devise tests which would help identify the type of person who could function successfully on overseas duty. These tests were concerned with the person's ability to adjust to new situations, to deal more effectively with his colleagues and with the indigenous people of all classes, and with his attitudes toward his present family configuration. The psychiatrist then went abroad to apply the tests and validate them by personal observation and interviews. These experiences enabled him to suggest ways of improving recruitment as well as selection. He also found out what the men in the field thought had been lacking in their orientation before going out. In full and separate discussions with both our officials and those of the countries visited, he was able to study the effect of various personality and character traits on the success or failure of the work of our officials. From such discussions he could also study the effect of their actions and attitudes on the indigenous officials and population, especially in relation to activities about which they and we have different values. Such findings are, of course, invaluable to adequate selection and orientation. Also, after the psychiatrist presented his findings on the reactions to our operations, to groups of United States administrators in each area studied, they were able to make changes and recommendations on a factual level not hitherto possible.

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C. *Consultant to a group or a government on a specific problem.* Occasionally, a group in a government branch asks psychiatrists to meet with it for a limited period to consider specific aspects of a many-sided situation. Conferences were held with the military regarding the relationship of combat duty to neuroses and the optimal time and place for treatment of combat neuroses. After World War II, military authorities in charge of the occupation of certain foreign countries asked the advice of psychiatrists concerning the influence of the occupation upon the nationals of that country, and also requested assistance in setting up a research division to study the effects of occupation policies. State Department officials in charge of public affairs sections in foreign countries have asked psychiatrists to work abroad for short periods to assist in the carrying out of plans and policies having a social significance to the country involved. Psychiatrists have also been asked to help predict possible emotional reactions and attitudes in relation to planning and policy making. As a rule, the technical experience of the psychiatrist is correlated with data provided by anthropology, sociology, economics and political science. . . .

D. *Observer of group function.* On some occasions psychiatrists and other social scientists have been invited to be present during the meeting of a group, without taking part in the functioning of the group itself. They are invited to follow the discussion with a view to observing such factors as impediments to progress, judging the nature and quality of the leadership, the effectiveness of the use of time, and the analysis of interactions between members of the group. A large number of different methods, some highly technical and mechanical, and others expressing dynamic relationships, have been used. Usually the observer makes a report, which may be written or oral, designed for the use of the leader or the participants or both, in the hope that the observations provided would be useful at future sessions. . . .

E. *The psychiatrist as a participant-observer in a group.* In contrast to the above procedure, psychiatrists have recently been serving more frequently in the role of participant-observer. As such, the psychiatrist may be a guest or a regular member of a group. He may serve as consultant on psychiatric questions or, as is more often the case, on social issues. In addition, he is often made responsible not only for his contribution to the particular problem at hand through his specific knowledge, but also for attention to the processes going on during the discussion, the inter-relationship between two or more participants, their effects on the group as a whole and on the group's progress, and the dynamics of what is taking place. He will then be in a position to analyze and clarify these processes and their effects to the group, or to the leader, or staff. The conduct of subsequent sessions may then be modified in accordance with these interpretations. . . .

Special attention is often given to a study of the behavior of particular participants in a group which leads to the circumvention of fruitful discussion, and of working out ways of dealing with the persons responsible for it. The psychiatrist may discuss his observations and suggestions with the leader or his staff or he may discuss what is going on with the group as a whole. It has also been found helpful in some instances to comment on or question occurrences during the discussion itself in such a way as to elicit, clarify or emphasize an issue or attitude, to call attention to tensions as they arise, or to help resolve a crisis between warring personalities or ideas which threaten the functioning or the continuation of the group. In several international conferences during which differences in interpretation or concepts nearly precipitated open breaks, a psychiatrist was able to deal with the cultural misunderstandings involved. Being accustomed to evaluating attitudes and to making precise, objective formulations of them and of the differences in concepts causing the difficulties, he could help the opposing sides see the more or less hidden attitudes at the root of the conflict. Each side then got a better grasp of the meaning of the issues and their validity, or lack of it, and as a result the concepts of the members were enriched and the scope of the work broadened. During the analysis of the group process, a psychiatrist may also help group leaders to understand their relationships both with individual members of the group and towards the group as a whole. It is recognized, of course, that many persons who are not psychiatrists are highly skilled in promoting and facilitating group discussion.

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F. *The psychiatrist on a social science team.* Although in some of the situations described above, the psychiatrist has been the only non-government person present, in most cases he serves with other scientists such as sociologists, psychologists, economists, and anthropologists as in the example under II B. In such groups the psychiatrist, like the other members of the team, functions as a person with special knowledge, resources, and experience important to groups dealing with problems of broad social implication and requiring to be seen from several points of view. . . .

III. Factors in the Psychiatrist's Job

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A. *Limitations of authority and responsibility.* The psychiatrist's interest, as indicated above, necessarily shifts from primary concern with the health of the individual *per se* to the behavior of the individual in the group in the interests of the group, i.e., from the health of the individual to social health. The functioning of the individual is of concern chiefly in reference to its effect upon the functioning of his associates in the situation under study.

The goals and limitations of the group become those of the psychiatrist, and these are usually set up ahead of time by the administrators. This may prove difficult for some psychiatrists, as most of them have been accustomed to a highly individualistic situation in which they have not functioned under the authority of others. Responsibility for patients is so much a part of the training and thinking of doctors that it may arouse anxiety in the psychiatrist to be in a position in which he is consulted but has no authority to make decisions and no responsibility for his suggestions being carried out. He is invited to consider, analyze, suggest or criticize, but he remains outside the hierarchy of authority. He cooperates with other specialists in the exploration and definition of problems and policy, but he is not responsible for the enforcement of the policy finally determined. His contribution is usually limited to comments that apply directly to the purposes of the meeting or the group process.

B. *Prestige considerations.* The psychiatrist, like other doctors, is ordinarily accustomed to a considerable degree of prestige *vis-a-vis* his patient and the public. In this new role, his prestige or status is based largely upon his information, skill, and ability to relate and function well as one of the group. . . . The psychiatrist for whom the absence of status and authority *per se* represents a frustration, has limited usefulness in such a group.

C. *Preparation and motivation.* To work adequately with an agency, the psychiatrist may need to devote a considerable amount of time before the actual meetings or consultations to acquire an understanding of the subject involved in the conference or consultation. This is especially true if he is not knowledgeable in other social sciences pertinent to the problem and has not had related field experience. It is also helpful, indeed necessary, to become well acquainted with the program, organization, personalities, and ways of operating of the agency which invites him.

A psychiatrist who enters this field needs to be whole-heartedly interested in the problems involved so that the work does not become a matter of sacrifice but of interest in developing a new field of endeavor. It needs to be important enough for him to acquire new attitudes and to increase his awareness and knowledge. The satisfactions of the work must compensate for the fact that it is usually far less remunerative than private practice, and may not enhance his prestige in his own field. Moreover, such assignments often require considerable travelling and inconvenience, especially when carried out abroad. In short, he needs a sense of vocation to make this type of work a satisfying experience.

D. *Avoidance of psychiatric jargon.* Practically all the arts and sciences develop their own vocabularies to communicate new ideas to their fellow workers. This occupational jargon is often not understood outside the immediate circle of the profession. This has been true of all the social sciences including psychiatry and may cause enough irritation or impatience to be a barrier to communication. It has been noticed that the degree of assistance given by a psychiatrist is in direct proportion to the degree to which he can shed his customary professional terminology and translate his concepts into ordinary terms applicable to the problems at hand. However, he needs knowledge of the concepts of the persons with whom he is working and perhaps of their jargon.

E. *Relationship to tensions within the group.* Like other consultants who are outside the official circle and hierarchy, the psychiatrist must remain detached from certain tense and anxiety producing situations which may cause a breakdown in constructive communication. A psychiatrist may, by remaining free from such emotional entanglements, introduce an objective, casual tone into the proceedings. If he remains at ease within himself, his freedom from tension can be contagious and can exert a beneficial effect upon the atmosphere of the group, often without any obvious or direct intervention.

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The Psychological Bases for Permanent Peace

RALPH H. GUNDLACH

Human nature is not the cause nor even the occasion for war, but only one of the many conditions which make war possible. The biologically determined personal factors are the same, in peace and in war.

War is a technique of our modern civilization, just as it has been an instrument of many other civilizations before. Wars arise in society as a device for solving a conflict in interests between groups, organized in states. In our modern societies, warfare has many institutionalized features, just as do depressions and poverty. Wars are not accidental, nor are they the willful product of some warped or bestial mind, but the natural outcome of the peace-time activities that precede the outbreak of hostilities.

Those persons who are seriously concerned with eliminating war from the functions of our institutions must see that superficial changes in personnel or in the form of society will not be sufficient; but that thoroughgoing revisions must be made in the structure of our civilization. These revisions involve changes, it seems to me, that would extend into the basic structure of every contemporary institution, and into the fundamental values and attitudes of every person. The establishment of a permanently peaceful world is no easy matter.

This paper rests upon two beliefs: (*a*) Most of our social institutions have arisen and developed around some need or want of society; but since this development has been a growth largely of accident, happenstance, and minor opportunism, these institutions may not serve their functions well and may even be perverted. (*b*) As a consequence of our present stage of development, however, it is possible for us as members of society to change, voluntarily, many of the forms of our society so that our institu-

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tional habits will efficiently and pleasantly serve our needs. I believe that a planned society is both possible and desirable.

The exposition of this paper, then, starts out with the general course of political action that leads toward peace, in contrast to one that leads toward war.

* * * *

A. The Contrasting Programs for War and Peace

In the course of the experimental work of the *S.P.S.S.I. Committee on War and Peace*, surveys were made of ideas about peace among students, the general public (60), and specialists in the fields of social sciences, and from the programs of peace and religious societies (13). A generalized program, drawn from all of these groups, can be assembled. Such a program of action is shown in the left column of Table 1, and placed opposite it is a parallel program for war. The program for peace is also the program for internationalism, political and economic democracy, and social well being. The opposite is also the program for an extreme nationalism, or fascism, and embodies a disregard for general human well being.

An examination of the table in the light of recent world political events reveals that while the Fascist countries actually seem to have patterned their policies along the militaristic half of this schedule, the politically democratic countries such as England and the United States have not followed consistently either program.

* * * *

In more democratic countries, a larger proportion of the people have a knowledge of affairs and a voice in the policies of government. For the President of the United States there is a realm of policy, which we might view as a brightly lit circle, in which legislative or diplomatic action is expected and will be met with almost universal assent. Beyond this circle, however, lies a darkening realm of doubtfulness and of potentially increasing opposition. How far can the President go, and not split up his support? Of course a great distance can be covered in a series of small acts, each one of which brings a mild storm of opposition; but being an accomplished fact, soon becomes accepted as a basis for further action. Thus public opinion can be led and formed (35, 52, 53).

Nevertheless, the policies in our country that get effected are not a product simply of the number of persons who support the cause, but depend decidedly upon who the individuals are that favor or oppose an issue. It is only at the polls that each voice counts for one. Nor does everyone have an opportunity to vote at election times, what with poll taxes, residence requirements, age, and other limitations (3, 59).

Our problem is to determine the general makeup of the nation, so that we can identify the groups that have the authority in imposing their point of view and in determining the policies of the government. What groups within the nation exercise most control of the power of the state?

* * * *

C. War and the Economic System

The foregoing section states that the dominant class in our society is not the preachers, not the teachers, doctors, nor artists, but the business men. It implies that the controls exercised in politics in our country are tremendously varied, but that the successfully predominant power comes from business men; and that millions of persons who are not business people and who never will be business men still think and vote from the point of view of business. What is this viewpoint?

1. *The Frame of Values of the Economic System.* The basic assumption of the economic system is that the welfare of society is to be achieved by indirection (12). It holds to the theory that if individuals follow their own selfish interests, and fight competitively against each other as hard as can be, the outcome will be beneficial to society as a whole. Private enterprise, individual initiative, rugged individualism, and non-interference of government are the watch-words. These terms, of course, can characterize the activity only of those persons, that small minority of approximately 5 per cent of our population, who own the natural wealth, and the social wealth both of machines and of socially created values (4, 19, 39, 51).

* * * *

2. *The Fundamental Difficulties with the Economic System.* The troubles with our economic institutions are at least twofold. The first is that they do not function for what they are supposed to. The function of an economic system is to provide people with the materials for living: food, clothing, shelter, recreation (22). Our system places the human satisfactions in the secondary place, and puts the first emphasis upon profits and interest. It is as though a hospital were run for the benefit of the owners and administrators rather than for the welfare of the patients.

The second difficulty, which is our concern in this section, is that our economic system offers the greatest rewards for predatory, exploitative behavior rather than for kindly, social or coöperative behavior. And here we approach the psychological kernel of our problem of society and war. Business arrangements require that men be treated as though they were things.

We can divide our environment up into human and non-human elements, into categories of persons and things. There are ways that are appropriate

TABLE 1. A Summary of Various Programs for Peace and for War

Anti-Military Internationalism: Peace	*Imperial Nationalism: War*
1. *Anti-Militarism*	1. *Militarism*
A. War is not necessary, it is the greatest evil	A. War is inevitable, probably a good thing
B. Disarm	B. Arm; navy second to none, big air and army force
C. No compulsory military training in schools and colleges	C. Compulsory military training in schools, colleges and for citizens
D. No draft of men in war-time	D. Draft men
2. *Take Profits Out of Munitions*	2. *Encourage Private Munitions Business*
A. Regulate, or	A. Subsidize private concerns
B. Socialize munitions industry	B. Build material in private, not public yards
C. Or scrap it	C. Award "educational" contracts
3. *Work for International Accord*	3. *Nationalism, Isolationism, Patriotism*
A. Establish a league, world court	A. Stay out of league, world court
B. Negotiate disarmament treaties	B. Depend on arms, not on scraps of paper
C. Lower tariffs, encourage trade	C. Raise tariffs, sell but don't buy, be self-sufficient (for war)
D. Educate for international understanding	D. Educate for patriotic Americanism, hatred for other nations and "isms"
E. Stop exploiting colonies and foreign peoples	E. Protect U. S. investments everywhere in the world
F. Perhaps use sanctions against aggressors	
4. *Establish Welfare and Social Security at Home*	4. *Maintain the Domination of Monopoly Capitalism*
A. Extend production for increased standards of living	A. Maintain scarcity and monopoly prices
B. Extend rights of labor	B. Oppose extension of rights of labor
C. Preserve civil liberties	C. Repress civil liberties if necessary in guise of preserving "free enterprise" and democracy and expand police powers
D. Oppose racial discrimination	D. Support "Americanism" prejudices
E. Oppose discriminatory immigration	E. Stop immigration, deport "undesirable" aliens
F. Adequate relief, old age pensions, job security	F. Balance the budget, except for subsidies to business and armaments
G. Free and extended liberal education	G. Cut educational "frills"; "economize"
H. Income and inheritance taxes	H. Sales tax
I. Consumer protection	I. Oppose government interference with private business
J. Vote by persons	J. Vote by size of investment
K. Change from political democracy and economic autocracy to political and economic democracy	K. Preserve economic autocracy, even at the expense of democracy

for dealing with each of these classes of object. It is appropriate to chop and burn a tree, and to blast a mountain, and it is not appropriate to argue with an avalanche, or to love an orchard.

In terms of this analysis we can divide our activities up into three groups: (*a*) those in which men exercise control over nature; (*b*) those which involve interpersonal relations, which are kindly, coöperative and human; and (*c*) those which involve interpersonal relations in which men treat each other as things, by force, to dominate or be dominated (40).

The first group of activities or occupations involves the control of inanimate and animate but infra-human nature by man, and for human interests. The essential work of the farmer, the fisherman, the logger, carpenter, welder, etc., is to manage, directly or with tools, inanimate material and animals; and it is appropriate that he dominate these things. It is useless to plead with a burnt-out bearing. This kind of work can provide the individual with a productive occupation, and with security. It can be socially useful work. Such activities in themselves, of course, would never lead to war. On the contrary, the problems can better be solved by team work.

The second group of activities would not in themselves lead to war. On the contrary, they constitute the interpersonal relations that are either for the mutual welfare, or for the welfare of the weaker. Such human relations are exemplified by those between doctor and patient, between minister and his flock, teacher and pupil, parent and child, husband and wife. Properly, no exploitation is involved, there is no utilization of force by the stronger for his own personal good, or for the injury of the weaker. The attitudes that appropriately belong in these relations are those of friendliness, reciprocal trust, and love. They are benign, kindly, coöperative, sociable. They constitute the basis for the satisfaction of those human values such as sociability, family life, creative activity (24). Here is the kind of attitude and relation that is appropriate between persons.

The remaining class of activities involves relations of man dominating man. Here in general we find the relations of management to employees, of salesman to purchaser, of advertiser to consumer, of master to slave, of conqueror to conquered. "Let the buyer beware." The parties have conflicting interests, and use what skill and power they may command to achieve the better of the bargain. The aims are competitive, antagonistic, and are directed toward individual profit and control, and not toward mutual satisfaction. This is true despite the fact that business men speak of their "service" clubs.

Conflict and war do not arise from attempts of man to control nature, or of man to coöperate with man, but only from attempts to dominate and use other men. It is this attitude that dominates our present-day society. The personal relations between people are determined by the predatory attitudes of domination; this is the age of advertising and salesmanship, of hard-fisted, non-sentimental business men.

Here lie the roots of our difficulties. Our economic system should function to provide mankind with material security (6, 22, 40); but institutionally it does this not by direct and coöperative action. It does it by indirection, by maintaining that food, clothing, and shelter will flow to all people, providing we permit business men to make profits, through absentee ownership and management, for purposes not of public use, but of personal wealth and power (68). The political state serves to regulate and preserve this system of attaining wealth and power. But in these arrangements, the people who are not absentee owners are liable to treatment by dominance and force, as though they were things, machines, mere hands to be used.

It is not that certain people, or class of people, are bad. The basic difficulty lies in the organization of our institutions; the successful business man can survive and rise only at the expense of other human beings. The war-inducing institutions make us treat other men as property or material, as instruments to be exploited the same as pigs or as oil, to be bought and sold. One can have a stable of racing horses or of baseball players. One can merchandise milk or teamsters. Peace will come and stay only with thoroughgoing revisions of our political and economic institutions, such that the road to success is not through the exploitation of human beings (6, 22, 33, 36, 40, 63, 69).

* * * *

F. Consideration of Proposed Roads to Peace

1. *Devil Theories.* The easiest target on which to focus the blame for war, especially in times of crisis, is some person or class of persons. In the last war it was "kill the Kaiser." Early in [World War II] a large reward was offered for Hitler, dead or alive. There is a general tendency to over-simplify in our society, and to attribute all successes to individual virtue, and evils to some bad man (2). . . . It is easy but erroneous to blame the leaders of the opposition as the war-makers, and their elimination will not result in a peaceful world.

Slightly more sophisticated persons have held that wars are fomented by special classes of persons, such as the munitions makers, militarists, dictators, or international bankers. . . . But again, the activities of these persons are actually within the pattern of the culture, and neither the particular persons, nor the whole collection of them as a class can be properly charged as responsible for wars. These persons function as our institutions permit and encourage, generation after generation, in one state or in another. The problem is not the personal qualities or activities of the person as such, but the institutional setting which rewards this type of behavior.

A more dangerous, but equally fallacious notion, tends to arise during war-time. This notion holds that the enemy is the cause of wars, and that peace will come with his extermination. . . .

2. *Political and Economic Theories.* Very plausible and sweet-sounding are the notions that peace can be achieved by diplomatic agreements between nations. If we could just extend the sway of law and order from beyond the borders of the state to the world; if we could just get the states to give up their sovereign powers; if we could set up an international police force under a league of nations; or even under a union of the English-speaking peoples!

Let us recall that the governments of the various countries are not the people of those countries; and that the governments of a country tend to act in the interests of the classes that are economically dominant in that society. A world league that brought peace would have to be composed of states that had both political and economic democracy at home.

An imposed peace would only be an armistice, leading up to another outburst of war. . . .

The lasting peace will be a people's peace. Force is negative. You can stop people from doing certain things by force, but you cannot get people to do many things in a positive way without their being eager, and interested. People can be induced to think, they can be encouraged to coöperate, they can be charmed to be your friend. But we cannot buy them or force them to love us; nor can we force a nation to be democratic. Our solution involves the extension of democracy, but this cannot be done by force, or from on top.

Of course a lasting peace will involve political changes, with probably the end of militant nationalism and small sovereign states. But the political changes will not be the cause for the peace; the political changes are superficial, and reflect the more underlying social situation. We now have certain economic institutional arrangements, such as the private ownership of the means of production, which actually provide the main driving force for our society. To succeed in our society a person must follow certain rules; as in chess he must make the moves that will check-mate the king. Many of the suggestions to end war are like offering to color the chess pieces, dress them in silk, make the board of rubber, have each piece bow before it takes another piece. But it is still the same game. Changes are idle unless they reach the crux of the issue. People succeed who are owners and managers. Where some people can be owners and managers at the expense of others, and not for their benefit, there is going to be trouble. Where the ownership of productive property is best rewarded when such ownership is used selfishly and exploitively, where ownership gives the power of life and death over thousands of individuals to politically irresponsible persons, then we can expect strife, class war, revolutions, and international wars. We must get rid of the arrangement which demands that we climb on the shoulders of others, or shoot them, in order to be successful.

3. *Moral and Educational Theories.* The fundamental teachings of the Christian Church are contrary to the teachings and practices of our modern business world. Likewise, the teachings in our schools about tolerance and internationalism, constitute a force toward good will (23). Can we rely upon the teachings of morals in the church, home and school, to bring us peace? Could we not bring about a peaceful world simply by instructing all our young in the doctrines of Christianity, brotherly love, cultural and racial broadmindedness, and tolerance; and teach them the sins of war, and of racial and cultural chauvinism?

Important as the various cultural agencies are, alone they are impotent to bring about peace. Indeed one could make a strong case for the view that much of such idealistic teachings in our present U. S. society is actually worse than futile. They train our young in deceit. We teach them a verbal morality, and then require them to practice the predatory rules of business. Our moral and formal educational systems are often called visionary and idealistic because they teach platitudes that are contrary to the rules necessary for success in the "real" world.

Our society affords an example which deliberately sets up a conflict within many individuals between the virtues practiced to achieve success, and the virtues given adolescent homage and adult lip-service. Here is the origin of many of the bold-faced shams in our society, the unconscious deceit of making a commercial success out of charity, as in Service Clubs, Mother's Day, Easter, and even Christmas. Only in a society half-democratic and half autocratic, only in a transitional society, could this lack of correlation between education and the demands of adult life exist. To match and overcome the tremendous mobilization of Nazi power, we must gear the training in skills, attitudes, and virtues of our children and students to the demands of an adult, democratic society. However, the major changes we need to make are not so much in the ideals of our culture which we now teach our children, as in the adult social institutions which now frustrate so many of us and deny these ideals.

The dominant institution in our society is the economic, not the educational nor the religious. Only the bold and rebellious teacher and preacher ever stands out against the "sins of the times." Most teachers and ministers act in conformity with the dominant business philosophy and interests of their community. Nor will the economic institutions be consciously modified by adolescents. Only the coordinated action of a large section of the adult population who know what their interests are and who can exercise the political and economic power to make the formal, institutional adjustment against intrenched opposition, can bring about a reconstruction in society.

G. The Psychological Basis of Ultimate Peace

The psychological basis for war and peace lies in the fundamental emotional organization of mankind. We have some institutions, such as the family which are based on love, considerate kindness, and cooperation. The aim and justification of these institutions is the development of happy human beings. Other institutions demand dominance and mastery over people, or the reciprocal feelings and the frustration of being dominated. The motivation and rewards in these institutions must be changed.

Our capitalistic society predominantly emphasizes the emotional attitudes of dominance and mastery. Only persons who are exceedingly dominant are able to succeed. The emphasis upon dominance as the basic and primary emotional attitude is so strong that it colors and distorts into its pattern even situations which are basically love relations (6, 16, 40).

The solution goes to the roots of society. No superficial adjustments will suffice. The solution consists not in denying that men and women are naturally aggressive under certain circumstances, for we actually need and enjoy vigorous aggressive behavior, nor in denying that we are bound to face many frustrations in our lives. The proposal offered by some pacifists that peace will come when man stamps out his aggressions, and that dominant, aggressive behavior is evil, demands an improbable change in human nature.

The root of the matter is that we cannot get rid of love or of anger; but we can arrange our society so that our love is expressed with regard to people, and our dominance and anger directed against "things!" There are "things" enough to dominate, such as the forces of inanimate earth, sea, and air, and the conditions of ignorance, disease, and hardship. No changes in the superstructure of our institutions will do. It is futile to tinker with the techniques of the international political organizations, or with the national political organizations; or even with many features of the economic and social institutions. We must see that our current institutions are wrong in so far as they encourage success through the dominance of man by man. Our goal must be a society where exploitation of human beings is impossible.

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A Criminological Approach to the Social Control of International Aggressions

Thomas D. Eliot

This paper presents no new facts but will attempt to analyze premises underlying certain definitions of those total-situations-in-process which are called "wars."

The ways in which people define situations determine their attitudes, their conception of their roles, and therefore their acts under the given conditions (cf. W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki,[2] Talcott Parsons,[3] Park and Burgess[4]).

War and crime both involve conflict-attitudes and -processes between an ingroup and an outgroup. Analogies have often been drawn, informally or formally, between war and crime. Each has been defined in terms of the other, and the attitudes and tactics associated with one have then been carried over to the other. The present paper will trace these analogies in an effort to show in what respects they are maps corresponding to the territory, and therefore verifiable in adaptive behavior (Alfred Korzybski);[5] in what respects they are false myths or false analogies based upon definitions of the situation which do not represent actuality or experience and which therefore are self-defeating; and how a corrected frame of reference based on a

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[2] *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (Boston: Badger, 1918–20; New York: A. A. Knopf, 1927), Methodological Note.

[3] *The Structure of Social Action* (2d ed.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1937), pp. 44–47.

[4] Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 69–71, 116–26, 1–86, esp. 10–12, 20–30, 35–56, 67; W. I. Thomas, "The Behavior Pattern and the Situation," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, XXII (1928), 1–13.

[5] *Science and Sanity* (2d ed.; Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press, 1941), pp. 11, 58, 498, 750–51. E. T. Bell is also credited, p. 247.

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sound theory of social control may prove effective in reducing the evils of wars.

I. Crime Defined in Terms of War

In the early history of personal and family feuds, offenses occurred in person-to-person or family-to-family conflicts: a feud is, in a sense, a private war, originating in a wish for vengeance or retaliation, for vindication of honor and/or maintenance of status. Indeed, the latter motive occasionally operated in the absence of any personal injury or hate, or even against a reluctance based upon the bonds of friendship (e.g., Bolli and Kjartan in *Laxdaela Saga*).[6]

In some cultural areas, the shift from the mores of the feud ("code of honor") to those of collective law took the form of redefining certain acts as offenses against the community or against some symbol of its values (e.g., the crown, the tribal god, the state, the public "peace"). The motive continued to be anger, but the vengeance was that of public indignation against an outlaw.

The conception of outlawry introduces the attitudes of ingroup versus outgroup. Cain was an outlaw: his hand was against every man's, and every man's hand was against him. The Wandering Jew and the Flying Dutchman were legendary archetypes of The Outlaw. One *outside* the law had no rights, and those who yielded to impulses of personal good will and mercy toward an outlaw were themselves treated as criminals; there were rewards for killing and penalties for helping an outlaw. The phenomena of lynchings and vigilantes are, in a sense, a surviving vestige.

The outlaw is one who has lost his rights. The police, whether ordinary or political, have always tended to ignore the rights of criminals: the perennial fight for civil rights has often centered around due processes of law for accused persons. Between police and criminals there is not merely law but lawlessness,[7] often condoned by the public: illegal procedures, deceit, "third degree," violence, torture—the end justifying any means. All's fair in war. (In *Our Lawless Police*,[8] Ernest Hopkins devoted a chapter to "The War Theory of Crime," recognizing such a theory as a sinister assumption which underlies, or can consistently explain and "justify," all such practices.)

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Hopkins, echoing every modern criminologist and criminological psychiatrist, proceeded to show that the "war theory of crime" and the corresponding treatment inflicted on "criminals" both at large and captured have been futile and worse than futile. They fail to solve the perennial problem of criminality. Some criminals have been punished, some vengeance has been selfishly satisfied; but the criminals have not been reformed or prevented, and the public and community have not been protected, by the "war against crime." It is almost a unanimous verdict of modern social psychiatrists and criminologists that the war theory of crime is worse than a failure: it has defeated itself and is an admission of society's failure as well as of the criminal's.

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[6] Translated by Muriel A. C. Press (London: Dent, 1899), pp. 173 ff.

[7] For the United States, ample evidence is in the *Report of the National Commission on Law Observance and Law Enforcement* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931).

[8] Ernest Jerome Hopkins, *Our Lawless Police* (New York: Viking Press, 1931).

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II. War Defined in Terms of Crime

In recent history many thinkers have called war a "crime against humanity." But, unfortunately, in so defining the situation, they have usually rationalized the resulting policies in terms of *traditional* attitudes toward crime. It was taken for granted that the *other* group is *the* offender; that reprisals are "deserved punishment"; that "deserved punishments" will deter "offender groups"; and that such punishments, inflicted by the accusers as in ancient feuds, not only slake the revenge of "injured groups" but "satisfy the law of nations," or "vindicate civilized humanity," or placate a god of "justice."

* * * *

The popular crime theory of war does not view war objectively as a total situation in which all participants share causal accountability. War is defined rather as an unprovoked injury by an outlaw outgroup. The latter thereby shows itself to be nonhuman and thus forfeits human rights. It is therefore to be treated inhumanly. The avengers then look inhuman to the "punished," and they in turn react toward such treatment as do most other criminals. Indeed, so much of the suffering of reprisals now falls upon other than the original offenders that the victims naturally consider the reprisal itself as unprovoked crime, calling for counter-punishment. The punished group defines *its* role as a victim gratuitously injured by a "criminal" nation. So the vicious circle is completed and endless. An individual offender or even a family may be exterminated, but a punished nation remains at large.

The crime theory of war has thus proved self-defeating and more mischievous than the war theory of crime. It is mischievous *because* it is based on a war theory of crime.

The popular crime theory of war is the opposite, however, of what is meant by a *criminological* theory of war, based upon a modern, objective definition of criminality-situations.

III. The Criminological Theory of Crime

The major premise of modern criminology is that the community should be protected from crime. A corollary is that criminals and "crime" must be dealt with in such ways as will protect the community. The goal of intelligent penology is, thus, not retribution for past acts but prevention of future acts. The motivation of treatment is not to be "the selfish satiation of sadistic sentimentality" but deterrence or prevention. When certain practices of police and prisons pervert their function from public safety to public menace, such means are not justified. Some means vitiate their ostensible ends.

Sometimes treatments imposed as retributive penalties have proved deterrent. These, even if drastic, can be retained; but, basically, *they are no longer punishments* when imposed for therapy rather than for retribution,—not in hate but with "the ruthless love of the surgeon," as Max Eastman once put it. When the vengeful motivation is consciously and overtly put out of the picture and objective accountability and cure replace guilt and expiation, treatment may more effectively deter the doer and others and better protect the public.

Some treatments imposed without rancor may nevertheless be received in a spirit of rancor: it may be too much to expect of the object of drastic treatment that he view it as "good," imposed with good intentions, or at least without hatred. But there are enough actual instances in which the new philosophy has proved communicable and has actually made a difference in the outcome, to justify greater faith and hope in its possibilities than one can reasonably find in the classical doctrine of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."

The new criminology has been ridiculed as soft and sentimental. On the contrary, it is the old penology that is emotional. Revenge is more emotional than public protection tested by results: since revenge caters to private feelings rather than to the public good, it is as sentimental as pity.

Nor is the new penology necessarily more lenient than the old. Under the old procedure, the punishment must "fit the crime" rather than the criminal, and, if the "fitting" penalty is obviously cruel, the only alternative is pity (dismissal, mercy, acquittal, light sentence, suspension, pardon) and the crime goes untreated. Or the old criminal law that one not legally "guilty" cannot be touched may release, without any treatment, an irresponsible person who is all the more dangerous or endangered on that account. The treatment prescribed after sociological analysis may prove actually more drastic than what would have been imposed under an old-fashioned criminal code.

The modern penologist must accept the fact that even the intelligent treatment of confirmed offenders fails to reform most of them (cf. William

Healy,[9] Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck).[10] But if such failure forces society to segregate or totally eliminate an offender, it is now recognized as failure of the treatment and of the social environment as well as failure of the offender. The resulting resort to more drastic disposition of the case is then made, not in righteous self-satisfaction as a solution, but in regret as a palliative, makeshift, emergency measure. "Punishment" is invoked only in the absence of further insight or for lack of adequate resources of science or social organizations.

Punishment is recognized in modern criminology not as cure or prevention but as a tempting, habit-forming drug, productive of dangerous delusions. Thomas Mott Osborne, when he took over the direction of Sing Sing prison, had the solitary cells torn out because he was afraid he would be tempted to use them.

IV. A Criminological Conception of War and Peace

The final steps in this argument are obvious. If aggressive war is to be defined as crime, then its treatment, if it is to be effective, should follow the principles of intelligent criminology and the goals of international welfare rather than those of sentimental "patriotic" revenge. Here, too, there are encouraging instances of the working of such principles with results less bitter than the results of conquest unmixed with good will.

Only a strong nation, or an inter- or supra-national power, can afford to be rational, patient, self-confident, and generous in its treatment of enemies. This principle may come to be supported by world opinion. To the extent that it is, magnanimity toward an enemy may itself become a symbol of power and prestige: The leaders of a nation, by treating its enemies patiently, without spite, may win new status for their country as one strong and confident enough to be generous to enemies and innocent of greed for power or wealth.

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Modern penology would gradually shift the adjudication of delinquency from old-style criminal courts to a court dominated by chancery procedures and principles operating in the interest of both the community and the alleged offender. This is in contrast with merely retributive criminal prosecutions and convictions, and even with partisan litigation. The function of the chancery process is not the vindication of either contestant but the adjustment of conflicting claims for the protection of the larger community and in the ultimate interest of all parties.

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[9] *Delinquents and Criminals: Their Making and Unmaking* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1926), pp. 68–78 *et passim*; with Augusta F. Bronner and Myra E. Shimberg, "The Close of Another Chapter in Criminology," *Mental Hygiene*, XIX (April, 1935), 217–18.

[10] *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 149–69; *Juvenile Delinquents Grown Up* (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1940), pp. 54–55, 70–71; *After-conduct of Discharged Offenders* (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1946), pp. 20–22, 96–97.

It could be said, then, that a criminological treatment of war might similarly begin with the adjudication of international offenses by a court representing a community of nations beyond suspicion of partisan interests or bias, whose assessments of damages or restraints could not be imputed to hate or selfishness. After such adjudication, in the name of the law of nations, the court's verdict, enforced under an international flag, would less easily evoke hatred toward the "winners" of the decision.

Quite possibly the plaintiff might not win the suit, despite superior power, if the claim proved soluble by means more conducive to collective security and peace. In such cases the plaintiff, in turn, could not logically attribute the result directly to the enemy country and could not take the law into its own hands without itself becoming an aggressor.

Thus the need of a supra-national authority becomes apparent. In the beginning of domestic criminal justice the recognition of the general police power and judicial functions of a community, which include both parties to a dispute, was a milestone. Supra-national police power may similarly become increasingly responsible to supra-national judicial procedure; and this in turn would be responsible only to a valid community of nations, analogous to the local community whose protection is the ultimate goal of domestic criminal procedures. When international coercion is exerted in the name of transnational consensus or a world tribunal, not even the citizens of the convicted nation can reasonably attribute it to selfish guilt, revenge, or greed on the part of the international force executing the orders of the court.

Certain operations of a surgeon, if done in hate or selfishness or as penalty, can be incredibly grisly, as documented by records of concentration camps. Done responsibly in the interest of the patient, after objective diagnosis, the same act achieves a presumption of good will, or at least of hatelessness (cf. Gandhi's *Ahimsa*). If the patient who undergoes the operation, the criminal who suffers the drastic treatment, the nation that is quarantined, restrained, or deprived, is not in a position to impute enmity to the operating agent, it cannot so easily generate counterhatred.

That such hatelessness is not beyond the capacities of our flexible human nature is evidenced by the necessity of creating or rousing hatred to support modern institutionalized wars. The assumption that hate is required in order to motivate war taxes, war effort and combat-morale has led war governments to deluge their people with hate propaganda. Certain peoples are highly ambivalent on such issues. The reluctance of many modern publics, and even of modern armies, to assimilate synthetic hatred is notorious. Many a military outfit in total mechanized war never sees an enemy. People actually at war may, to be sure, hate some symbol or stereotype. Men may fight well, however, merely "for the outfit," for honor and self-respect, as a civic duty, to do a necessary job well, or to get it over with. There is little heritage of hate in many veterans.

In prison camps and war hospitals there is much personal hatred of brutal guards, but also much fraternization. Even Norwegians imprisoned by the Nazis are, many of them, free of animosity. There has always been notorious fraternization of troops with "enemy" civilians and even across the trenches in intervals between active battles. Among the masses of all warring countries, intercultural contacts have become so widespread that public sentiment is that of sorrow rather than of gloating. Modern war is seldom spontaneously popular: it has to be rationalized as "defensive" to rouse loyalty, fear, and hatred. There seems to be a persistent underground stream of latent human good will.[11] Perhaps governments are lagging behind the world public and should overtake and lead instead of dragging us back and down.

The evidence justifies hope for an international propaganda which, while not couched in academic criminological terminology, can motivate any necessary war as a police action of the world community for control of a nation misguided by its leaders and/or by local shortsightedness—rather than in fear or revenge against a nation of devils.

. . . International enforcement, however drastic, would be expressed as order rather than violence.[12] The motivation, techniques, and objectives would be in the ultimate common interest, not for unilateral vindication.

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[11] Cf. Thomas D. Eliot, "Good Will as a Persistent Underground," in *Learning and Peace: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion* (New York, 1948), pp. 161–77.

[12] Cf. John Dewey, "Force, Violence, and Law," *New Republic*, V (January 22, 1916), 295–97; reprinted in *Characters and Events*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929), pp. 634–41, 782–89; and in *Intelligence in the Modern World*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Modern Library, 1939), pp. 486–98.

Preventive War Critically Considered

PITMAN B. POTTER

Members of the American Society of International Law are by inference charged by the Constitution of their Society with doing all that is possible to promote the study and development of international law and the conduct of international affairs on the basis of law and justice. For this purpose it is not sufficient to study and advocate the development of the law itself or for its own sake. Much attention must be given, certainly much more than has been given in the past, to the second section of the mandate, partly because of its own importance and partly to provide the kind of international situation where the law can thrive and be effective—which in turn is calculated to promote peace and justice. Friends of international law cannot afford to evade even the most difficult and delicate issues in the field of international relations on the ground that they are purely political in character.

One of these dangerous issues being widely discussed today is that of "preventive war." Quite frankly a certain number of persons, by no means all of them insane, suggest that the United States should anticipate what they believe to be certain aggression by Soviet Russia against this country, if, indeed, as they would argue, such aggression may not fairly be regarded as already having begun. Just what all the modalities of such action shall be is not specified, but perhaps the general issue may be considered without such precise definition and it might also be just as well to consider the problem in its own right apart from its application in Russian-American relations.

Preventive war as an idea or doctrine has a bad name. It is by no means a new idea and for over one hundred and fifty years it has rather uniformly been condemned. This is traceable, apart from the merits of the case, to the fact that the opposition came very largely—and strongly—from the pacifist segment of opinion or from ardent lovers of peace. Other groups or individuals—governments, officials, realistic students of international

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Pitman B. Potter, "Preventive War Critically Considered," American Journal of International Law, *Vol. 45, No. 1 (1951), pp. 142–145. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

relations—who might (not necessarily, but possibly) see some value or validity in the idea, would be less inclined to speak out in its defense. Indeed it is probably not going too far to say that the idea of preventive military action has been condemned too hastily and too completely to permit a careful consideration of the problem. It has been rather uncritically condemned and a critical reconsideration of the issue may not be out of place in a day when obviously new international arrangements for security action are in view.

One of the most striking and impressive reasons for such reconsideration lies in the fact that in other fields of political activity, national and local, and in other walks of life than the purely political—public health, for example—extensive use is made of the preventive principle and indeed preventive action is in many situations given strong preferences over mere remedial action. The superior value of an ounce of prevention is proverbial. Preventive medicine has tremendous support and has enjoyed tremendous development in recent times. Finally in many legal fields—criminal law, property, public administration, torts, to mention only a few—the preventive principle has been introduced in numerous legal systems, precisely in the more advanced countries of the world. It is believed that much more is to be accomplished on behalf of the individual and also in the interests of the community by taking action in time to prevent injury than by waiting until injury has been done and then trying, at times vainly, to remedy it.

On the other hand, this obviously does not constitute a blanket approval of preventive war, apart entirely from the problem of the applicability to international law and administration of the science or art of national or local government and the administration of justice. In the practice of what we may call simply preventive social action in the local community several prerequisite conditions can be detected by common observation and have indeed at times been formulated by those concerned with such action. The injury feared must be highly probable, if not certain, in absence of preventive action; probable damage to be done by any preventive action must be markedly less than the anticipated injury; the action must be taken on the basis of public law, which is supposed to have involved in its establishment the agreement of those against whom the action is taken; and finally, adequate provision must be made to control the preventive action actually taken, to prevent it from becoming excessive, and to permit possible judicial or at least adequate administrative review afterward. Finally such action is rarely permitted to interested individuals, but is reserved for public authorities, "self-help" having been eliminated here even more completely than in the field of remedial justice.

Obviously, few of these prerequisite conditions exist in the international field; or, rather, while the situation justifying preventive action in the local field may quite conceivably be reproduced on the international level, all of the other apparatus of preventive public action is lacking or is very defective. We do not yet have statutes authorizing such action; we do not have international agents or forces capable of taking such action; we do not have adequate arrangements for control and review. Until the first lack is remedied, preventive military action by a state or group of states or an international organization would seem to enjoy no juridical foundation; this would apply to preventive war by the United States against Soviet Russia. This conclusion may appear to constitute merely a confirmation of the obvious, but it is important precisely because of its limited character and because of the other side of the picture, which is probably more important today than the purely legal aspect.

Thus the conclusion drawn does not preclude action by a state against which aggression in some proper sense of the term already has been begun, although without actual war, especially in a highly competitive international situation where community action for preservation of peace and security is virtually non-existent. This involves the highly difficult definition of aggression, but if we assume such a definition, the action of the threatened state may amount to nothing more radical—indeed, more normal—than self-defense, and this in view not only of common international law but all such instruments as the Pact of Paris and the United Nations Charter. Secondly, the conclusion does not pretend to pass upon the ethical aspects of the matter; at times it may be ethical to violate the law; it was noted that the practical and logical need for preventive action may be quite as great in the international sphere as elsewhere. Thirdly, developments are obviously under way which may provide the necessary authorization for preventive action and even provide the machinery for controlling it and carrying it out and reviewing it if need be. It seems clear that on practical grounds and grounds of theory, both as a matter of international law and as a matter of international administration, we would do well to reconsider the oversimplified attitudes taken toward preventive war in the past, *pro* and *con*, respectively, by some patriots and all pacifists. The device of preventive international police action, nonmilitary or military, is or would be terribly delicate and dangerous, especially if delegated to any particular state or states to carry out—and a unitary international force seems still far in the future. Nothing is to be gained by refusing to keep ahead of events in thinking out the problem, however.

Communications, Arms Inspection, and National Security

KARL W. DEUTSCH

It is becoming quite widely recognized that any decision about the acceptance or rejection of any scheme of international arms limitation and inspection involves the balancing of two types of risk. One class of risks consists of those incurred from continuing a competitive policy of national armaments without any limitation or inspection, formal or informal. Since a growing number of countries are very likely to acquire during the 1960's a supply of nuclear weapons and eventually the means for their delivery, these risks must be considered as not only substantial but growing.[1] The second class of risks consists of those incurred from complying in good faith with an agreed-on policy of arms limitation and inspection—the risk of being deceived by other powers who might sign the agreement and promise to conform to it without in fact doing so. In the total absence of inspection risks of the second kind could be vast; in the presence of some inspection arrangements they would be smaller but would still remain real. It seems very likely that there is no inspection agreement—nor any physical or political method of inspection—under which these risks of inspection could be reduced to zero.[2]

If these considerations were valid, then there is no policy available to the government of the United States, nor to the government of any other major power, that would be completely free from risk. The best that could be done would be to select that policy that promises to be appreciably less risky than its alternatives. The risks of a continuing policy of competitive

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[1] Howard Simons, "World-Wide Capabilities for Production and Control of Nuclear Weapons," *Daedalus* (Summer, 1959), pp. 385–409.

[2] Seymour Melman (ed.), *Inspection for Disarmament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).

Karl W. Deutsch, "Communications, Arms Inspection, and National Security," Preventing World War III: Some Proposals, *edited by Quincy Wright, William Evan, and Morton Deutsch (1962), pp. 62–73.*

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armaments, including the risks of the entry of additional countries, the risks of misunderstanding and false alarms through failures of personnel or electronic equipment, the risks of political crises or the coming to power of extremist leaders in some country, and other risks of this general kind might be considered as growing, and as exceedingly hard to control. In the absence of any international agreement there is little the United States could do about reducing these risks in the case of another country, though we could do something to keep these risks as small as possible within our own political and military establishment.

The risks from the inadequacies or malfunctioning of an international inspection system, on the other hand, including the risks of deliberate evasion, could be reduced to some extent by making any international arms limitation or inspection agreement as realistic as possible. The following pages are dedicated to suggesting in rough outline, some policy considerations that might be useful for making international arms limitation and inspection somewhat more effective and somewhat harder to evade, and, it is hoped, to make it a policy that would be safer to pursue in the interests of the United States than its alternative of relatively unchecked qualitative and quantitative competition in the field of armaments.[3]

Starting from this background we may ask: What kinds of arms limitations might come to be agreed on by the main powers, and policed by a mutual inspection system, capable of giving all participants early warning of any large-scale violations?

Possibilities of Arms Limitation and Inspection

One possible agreement might consist in limiting all major powers, and the lesser ones as well, to quotas of rockets suitable for the delivery of nuclear weapons. These quotas would have to be kept well below the saturation level for any large country. In other words, if a country should decide to use some rockets in violation of the agreement and if it should choose to equip them with warheads, the arms-limitation agreement might have seen to it that there might not be sufficient rockets available for completely saturating any major country that might be chosen as a victim of attack. In pursuit of the same goal, the agreement might well specify that no nuclear warheads may be installed in rockets, that no practice and training flights with nuclear weapons may be undertaken, and that stockpiles of warheads might be limited to stringently inspected quotas. An important part of any such agreement would consist in having no nuclear warheads in any objects put into outer space by any power.

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[3] Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Race: Prerequisites and Results," *Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 41–86.

Other parts of the agreement might specify that no organized target files, guidance grids, and other paraphernalia for the effective direction of nuclear bombardment would be maintained by any major power. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the participating countries would undertake not to maintain any large organized military rocket forces or other military forces above certain agreed-on levels of capabilities.

The over-all result of such measures should be to leave no country with a capability of waging total war quickly after it had begun to violate the agreement, but to force any violating country to spend considerable time in acquiring the needed capabilities for large-scale nuclear war, so as to give other countries ample warning time of the threat confronting them. Given such warning time, other countries would, of course, prepare for countermeasures of defense or retaliation against the violator; and after the arms race had been resumed by all the major powers, the world might be not much worse off than it is now or than it would be by, say, 1984 if no scheme for arms limitation had been attempted.

Under the conditions just envisaged, much would depend upon the competence and effectiveness of the inspection system. If such a system should be enforced by 1984, it might well have developed from its beginnings as a system of inspection by professional staffs, recruited in considerable part from the military, police, and intelligence forces of the participating powers. Inspection within each country might be carried out either by mixed teams, recruited in terms of parity between the home country and foreign countries, or in accordance with some other agreed-on formula for composition. An alternative would be reciprocal inspection under which, for instance, American teams would carry on in the main the inspection in Russia, and Russian teams in the main inspection in the United States. Compromises between reciprocity and mixed inspection teams might well develop, but the principles of parity and reciprocity – in contrast to any as yet unacceptable schemes of majority voting – would remain essential.

The main object of inspection, in any case, would be maintenance of mutual confidence so that no country would be tempted to return to the arms race. The sanction would be, of course, the loss of such confidence. A power dissatisfied with the results of the inspection system, or with what it might consider the imperfect degree of compliance of some other country, would have a double problem. It would have to make credible its own threat of withdrawing from the arms limitation agreement and of resuming the arms race; and it would at the same time have to convince its rivals that it had not merely seized on a pretext in order to take up a course which it had desired in any case. The diplomatic problems thus posed to any great power might be difficult, but they should not be insuperable. If the scheme should have succeeded for a number of years, governments and peoples by 1984 might well have come to take it seriously, as well as to take seriously the complaints or objections of any nation suspicious of violations on the part of its rivals.

The technical capabilities of inspection teams might well be increased by 1984 by further developments in such areas as reconnaissance satellites, infrared photography, the analysis of seismograph readings, and other techniques of this kind. The greatest increase, however, in the capabilities of inspection teams, or of an agreed-on inspection authority of the type of the United Nations (with powers limited to reporting and recommendations, and with sanctions through threats of national returns to the arms race limited to the major powers) would consist in a shift of emphasis in regard to the activities inspected.

Possibilities of Inspecting the Social and Communication Aspects of Armament

The concealment of hardware is a technical problem, and it may be one that might actually have become somewhat easier by 1984, for instance by means of putting some installations under the surface of the ocean on the continental shelves, or putting them on space objects in orbit around the earth. Detection, on the other hand, is also a technical process, and we have already suggested that its efficiency in at least some respects is very likely to increase. The large-scale preparation of war, however, is a social process and so would be its concealment. Neither of these social processes will be particularly facilitated by technical developments. Rather it should on the whole become easier, as time goes on, to detect major changes in the activities and communications of a large community, such as a modern industrial nation. In order to be successful, arms inspections, therefore, will have to be an activity carried out by professional teams but oriented in significant part to the monitoring of human relations and social activities.

Clandestine preparations for large-scale war may well require major preparations in the climate of opinion and legitimacy within the country carrying on these violations of its arms-limitation agreement. The presence or absence of such psychological preparation can be readily monitored from the statistical analysis of the content of mass media of communication, as well as of the materials used in the institutions of indoctrination within each country, such as schools, armies, police forces, national service organizations, and the rest.

Content analysis of mass media might well center on three points. The first of these would be the absence of excessive amounts of inflammatory material. This might involve an agreement of putting quotas on the amount of space which the mass media in each country might devote to particular controversies or disputes. This might relate in particular to space on the front pages of newspapers, loud bulletins in broadcasts, prime viewing time on television, and so on. The upshot of this might be an agreement to maintain in all countries freedom to whisper, but not freedom to shout. Each country, in other words, might well be limited to devoting not more than 2 percent of its news space on any day and not more than 1 percent of its news space during any week to controversies focused on any one particular country, and these limitations might then hold for each particular newspaper or broadcasting station in the country. A consistent violation of these quotas, perhaps by hammering on one particular inflammatory incident or chain of incidents, or on a succession of different quarrels with the same country, could hardly fail to come to the attention of inspectors. If persisted in, this practice in itself would provide the early warning of an impending violation of the arms-limitation agreement which the inspection system is designed to provide.

In the United States, a policy of limiting the freedom of the press to engage in an inflammatory *volume* and *manner* of expression, in a potentially dangerous situation of international conflict, would raise constitutional issues similar to those referred to by Justice Holmes when he said that no man who shouted "Fire!" in a crowded theater could invoke the constitutional freedom of speech. As this well-known "clear and present danger" doctrine (cf. *Schenck* vs. *United States*, 249 U.S. 47, 1919) suggests, the American constitutional tradition would have ample means of invoking legal remedies to defend the public interest against the irresponsible and inflammatory use of mass media of communication in situations that could lead to thermonuclear war and vast tragedy for the American people. Radio and television stations are legally held to even closer limits of responsibility, insofar as they must show that they have been using their allocated channel frequencies in the public interest, when their licenses are to be renewed.

The question would be one of will and motivation to use the legal means of control that are available. Given this desire on the part of the government and of a substantial part of the community, experience shows that even informal suggestions as to what the mass media should or should not play up in the national interest have a way of being heeded to a remarkable extent by the bulk of American newspapers and radio and television networks. If all these safeguards should fail, the President and the administration could still fulfill the United States commitment to moderate any large-scale domestic agitation, by explicitly appealing to the people, as well as by deliberately "making news" and creating alternative foci of attention. Finally, if not even this remedy should prove effective, the violation of the agreed-upon quantitative threshold in the mass media would at least provide an early warning to all parties concerned.

A corollary of this inspection of mass media and of institutions of indoctrination might consist in an agreement to make it illegitimate to advocate violations of the agreement or to conceal them. Individuals might thus be taught by their own governments, acting in concert with their partners to the arms-limitation agreement, that it was their duty to refrain from advocating violations, as well as their duty to denounce any violations of which they should acquire knowledge. A number of opinion polls held in different countries on the question of "inspection by the people" have disclosed among all audiences, including samples of members of the American Legion, a sufficiently high number of people who expressed their willingness to denounce any violations even on the part of their own government, of which they should gain knowledge, to make it very unlikely that any large-scale violations could be carried on in secret for any length of time. Another corollary of the same type of agreement would be the passing of national legislation in all participant countries making it explicitly legitimate to disclose any relevant facts or doubts to inspectors. Suitable offices of such inspectors, perhaps under the United Nations, might well be maintained in most of the scientific and idustrial centers of the participating countries.

Another corollary might be an agreement providing not only for the absence of objectionable material from the mass media of communication in the participating countries but also providing for the presence of material agreed on as helpful to their implementation. Such material, setting forth either the obligation of compliance or the undesirability of violation, might well be carried in the national media of each country over the signature or with the picture of the leaders of the national government and in conjunction with the strongest symbols of political legitimacy accepted in that country. That is to say, the obligation to comply with inspection agreements might have to be publicized within the Soviet Union as a resolution of the Politburo, and embodied in the May Day slogans and in all similar ceremonial settings; in England it might be made a part of the annual speech from the throne; in the United States it might be carried by Presidential proclamation and Congressional resolution.

An agreement to pass suitable national laws, implementing the illegality of concealment and the legitimacy of denunciation of all secret armaments, might be further supplemented by such ancient devices as that of having all judges, as well as all offices of the armed forces and police forces of the participating countries, take a specific oath to uphold the arms limitation agreements.

None of all these and similar devices, singly or together, will insure complete compliance, but they might go very far indeed in facilitating timely leaks, so as to permit the system to fulfill adequately its early-warning function. By making it so extremely unlikely, furthermore, that any large-scale violation could be carried on in secrecy for any great length of time, these measures might very well discourage would-be violators from attempting any such practices.

Mobility of Scientific Personnel as an Aid to International Inspection

Another part of the arms-limitation and inspection agreements might provide for the mutual or international registration of all scientific and technical personnel, such as perhaps all holders of the masters and doctors degrees in the natural sciences and of corresponding degrees of engineering. Professional inspectors might then be able to make sure, at least in the case of samples, of the whereabouts and the accessibility of scientific personnel. The agreement might then explicitly protect the scientist's freedom to travel and to gossip—two propensities which have long been the despair of security officers—and any attempt on the part of any country to conceal the whereabouts of its scientists, to keep them inaccessible to inspectors, or to interfere with their freedom of travel and communication, might serve as prima facie evidence of bad faith in the carrying out of the arms-limitation agreement, and might hence provide another item of early warning. Incidentally, any power proposing such international guaranties for the freedom of scientists might make it hard for its rivals to refuse to agree to them.

Other Control Techniques

Another method of inspection, already proposed by some Western governments in the 1950's, might be the inspection of budgetary allocations. The national incomes of the United States and the USSR were already sufficiently well known by 1959 to make it doubtful that the large percentages devoted in each of these countries to national defense would have been concealed for any great length of time. If the participating powers should agree to publicize their budgets and permit inspections in their budget-making organizations, in addition to agreeing gradually to shorten their work week and step up their spending on nonmilitary uses, either in terms of consumer goods or in productive or public-service installations of various types—it might become very difficult indeed to mobilize, segregate, and conceal the very large financial resources, as well as the large amounts of manpower and material, required for the preparation of total war.

All forms of inspection discussed thus far have been social, economic, or psychological, rather than being oriented toward military hardware. All of them could be made even more effective by agreements for widespread personnel interchange, particularly in the scientific fields, and in the budgetary organizations, among the participating powers. Conventional ground inspection or air and ground inspections by military experts, on a reciprocal or international basis, would then supplement the measures just outlined.

The Problems of Steps and of Spill-Over

Once in operation, the system would amount to the abolition of military secrecy in the participating countries. A complex, but not insoluble, problem would consist in finding an acceptable sequence of steps by which secrecy could be abolished in the participating countries at a time during which each of them still possessed the capability of utilizing the newly acquired knowledge of potential targets in the other countries for striking at one or more of its rivals.

The first steps should deal with matters that cannot be kept secret in any case, and that are thus practically self-inspecting. Agreements on the banning of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, as well as agreements in regard to the content of mass media, the content of national indoctrination, and the general institutional apparatus of legitimacy and legality in all countries all might well lend themselves to implementation in the early stages. Mutual sample tests of opinions and attitudes in the participating countries, as well as the compilation of the personnel roster of scientists and technicians, might then follow. Budgetary controls might come still later, followed by controls of all new installations and all new output. Putting the inspection system into operation might then be completed finally by the disclosure of the last remaining older launching facilities and weapons stockpiles.

Another problem might be that of containing the possible spill-over effects of the abolition of military secrecy into a possible erosion of other social, economic, and political institutions in the participating countries. This problem is likely to be minor in the case of the Western democracies, but may well be serious for a dictatorship such as the Soviet Union. If the system were worked in such a way as to convince the Soviets that they must either continue the arms race, or else sacrifice their type of dictatorship and substitute for it a Western-style private enterprise democracy with complete freedom of the press and freedom of private-interest organizations, they might very well prefer an arms race, somewhat as the governing elites of some other countries might feel, if they should come to believe that the inspection system were used as a lever to force otherwise unacceptable social and political changes upon them. There seems no reason to assume, however, that such difficulties will prove insuperable. It should be possible for the participating powers to develop an inspection system, and particularly an inspection staff, that would concentrate on the business of inspecting and not attempt to reform from the outside the societies which it would be trying to keep from returning to an arms race.

Some Possible Areas for Experimentation and Research

Even under the best conditions, however, schemes for agreed-on arms limitation and inspection will require a good deal of experience, which might best be acquired by carrying on some experiments among like-minded powers within the Western community of nations. This might hold in particular in regard to such matters as the content of mass media, the registration and interchange of scientific personnel, and the disclosure of budgetary data.

In regard to all these matters, more knowledge will be needed. From the perspective of 1961, five areas for desirable studies seem indicated as an aid for a better understanding of the problems of 1984:

1. A study of capabilities in fundamental science and in technological application and innovation, in regard to the probable rapid increase in specific opportunities resulting from activities in outer space.
2. Problems of reciprocal or automatic inspection systems, as regards the technological aspects of such inspections.
3. Problems of social and political inspection, through such techniques as media surveys, monitoring of legitimacy and loyalty of institutions and practices, and the allocation of economic resources to unconcealed locations and uses.
4. Registration, inspection, freedom of mobility, and interchange of scientific personnel.
5. Experiments in regard to both supranational and reciprocal experiments or arrangements in regard to arms limitations, as well as to the joint conduct of nuclear, specific, and space activities among like-minded countries within the Western bloc of nations, but including notably the United States. Studies as to the possible feasibility and the expectable problems resulting from such arrangements between the United States and its closest allies, might go far to throw some light on the problems to be expected in the negotiation, as well as the putting into practice of any agreements, however limited, with less like-minded powers.

The scientific and technological opportunities of 1984 will have demanded in all likelihood a substantial expansion of our capabilities in science and technology. The problem of coping with some of the political consequences of these changes may well require a substantial increase in our capabilities in the field of social science.

Some Problems of United States Security Policy for 1961–1985

Such an inspection policy would be compatible with American national security and strength.

Perhaps the most effective way of strengthening United States security in the space age might consist in amplifying the scientific and innovating capabilities of the United States by a very substantial margin. This policy might be supplemented then by substantial improvements in early-warning capabilities, and by deep-shelter programs for substantial parts of the civilian population. The increase in capabilities for scientific research and technical innovation, however, might well be decisive in the long run. The basic principle for such a policy of raising national capabilities might well be the notion that the learning capacity of a society is in some way proportional to that proportion of its resources that has remained available for a wide range of recommitments, such as might be suggested by future information as soon as it becomes available.

Possible steps toward accomplishing this increase in such capabilities might well form suitable topics for research. Such possible steps might include the following:

1. A substantial enlargement of the pool of trained scientific talent in the United States by means of broad practices of early talent identification and broad fundamental training. This would be a policy aimed at maintaining a relative abundance of high-level technical talent, so as to permit the country to afford giving its young scientists several years of broad fundamental training before letting them commit themselves to specialized applications. It would thus be the opposite of recent Soviet policies, which still appear to have been tailored to a situation of a relative shortage of technicians and which seem to have emphasized very early specialized training for relatively narrow applications.
2. A change in the cultural and educational climate of the United States, particularly in regard to private and public education on the primary and secondary school levels. The climate to aim at would be one stressing scientific and cultural achievement (rather than minimizing it as a departure from general equalitarianism) but at the same time a climate stressing the values of playfulness and curiosity and supporting the intellectual forays of the young with well-founded expectations of early support and follow-up.
3. A partial shift of material resources from relatively sterile military end-products, such as nuclear warheads, bombardment rockets, tanks, etc., to intermediate capital goods that can make a contribution to the economic growth of a society and to its standard of living in peacetime, and that are available for recommitment to a wide range of different needs. Intermediate capital goods of this type might include power stations, machine tools, communication and transport facilities, etc.

Among such intermediate capital goods available for wide ranges of reallocation two categories should stand out:

4. A greatly enlarged scientific-instrumentation industry, capable of turning out a wide range of advanced scientific instruments at low cost to users. It might conceivably be worth while to shift some national resources, both capital and labor, from currently protected industries

such as the wrist watch industry, to a program of federal support for the re-equipment of American universities, colleges, and secondary schools with a wide range of scientific and laboratory instruments, perhaps with the aid of an enlarged National Science Foundation. A by-product of such a program would be an increase in the pool of manpower trained in the use of scientifically advanced instruments.

An even more important category of intermediate capital goods might be found in:

5. Greatly increased capability and installations for electronic computation. Such electronic computing equipment might be developed beyond the current profitable applications of engineering and commercial bookkeeping and payrolls. In particular it might aim at developing a broader range of more flexible tools of thought, like electronic desk computers for designing trend graphs and distribution graphs, fitting and testing them against any set of data put into a computer, and extrapolating them for possible trends or other regularities. Other intellectual tools might be abundant and inexpensive electronic indexing and searching equipment, and cheaper, smaller, and less clumsy devices to take the place of current punched-card techniques. The development of such devices would require the creation of large pools of very broadly trained programing personnel and of far broader and more readily accessible libraries of program routines.

The essential point of such a program would be a substantial increase in the intellectual capabilities of the United States, through creating the conditions for attaining a new level of intellectual teamwork between human beings and man-made computing, searching, and information-processing devices.[4]

None of these suggestions for a possible national security policy during the coming decades can be developed here, but each of the points just sketched might deserve some serious study.

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[4] It is perhaps not an accident that some of the early suggestions in the area were made in 1945 by Vannevar Bush, who at the same time was very interested in the defense capabilities of the free world. See Bush, "That Men May Think," *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXXVI (July, 1945), 105–108, and his pamphlet, "Arms and Free Men," deriving from the same general period.

Psychiatric Observations of International Conferences

MOTTRAM TORRE, M.D.

The International Conference is only part of a much larger whole; a purposeful, planned operation in the continuum of international relations expressly designed as a meeting of individuals or representatives for the exchange of information, feelings and attitudes.

The group or conference goal is usually defined as a collaborative effort to obtain uniformity of attitude on certain subjects which heretofore were inconsistent or even in conflict. But while the conference group is primarily directed to the achievement of such group goals, each delegate also directs his energies towards the achievement of personal goals. Conference organisation should therefore be designed to eliminate all conflicting goals, including most personal ones, so that the work of delegates can be directed to the achievement of the predefined group goals.

If such collaboration is not desired, no conference, however skilfully managed, can achieve it. But even when it is desired, it may be prevented by the breakdown of the conference process itself and it is here that social scientists can help most by a thorough analysis of the conference process and by suggesting methods for correcting or avoiding an "impasse".

On the other hand, even conferences which are well organised may fail because of personal difficulties between the delegates. The study of personalities in action round the table is the most difficult aspect of conference technique, but it must be undertaken if conference procedure is to be understood and improved.

The psychological interactions of conference delegates are similar to those manifested in any group of individuals in touch with each other, whether it be in a class, a mob, a cocktail party or in group therapy. When

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Mottram Torre, "Psychiatric Observations of International Conferences," International Journal of Social Psychiatry, *Vol. I, No. 3 (1955), pp. 48–50. Reprinted with the permission of The Avenue Publishing for the* International Journal of Social Psychiatry. *The beginning of this article is omitted.*

group relationships are unorganised, interpersonal difficulties set up tensions and attempts are usually made to control them. Delegates then begin to formulate rules for conference procedure, just as children spend much of their time making up rules to govern their play.

In social life, individual differences in group behavior are similarly recognised. A hostess planning a dinner party will choose some people because "they fit" and will purposely exclude others because she feels they will not. In the same way, the selection of the "right" delegate seemed to us to be of such prime importance that the methods of selection were thoroughly scrutinised.

In the World Federation of Mental Health Conferences, self selection predominated. In the U.N. Conferences delegates were usually chosen by the parent nations, while representatives of international bodies were chosen by their secretariat. Often the selection was based on personality alone; sometimes, the delegate was chosen merely because it was his turn to attend; only rarely was he chosen because of his conference skill and experience, or because of his specific training in and knowledge of the subjects to be discussed. Since the outcome of the conference depends more on the calibre of the delegates than on organisation, the process of selection should be thoroughly investigated.

Selection should be made by a preliminary examination of the candidate's past conference record, supplemented by various psychological tests. The candidate may then appear before an examining board which judges his emotional stability as well as his general knowledge and reasoning capacities.

In this matter of delegate selection, the following condensed description of the group oral performance test developed by Mr. Milton Mendel for the U.S. Civil Service Commission may prove useful:—

> The total group of candidates is divided on a random basis into sub-groups of approximately five to eight persons. Each sub-group is tested separately. Individuals in the sub-group are given the task, by means of a written statement placed before each person, of discussing topics related to the duties of the position for which the examination is given.
>
> The raters observe the participants and use rating technique similar to those of the individual oral interview, with the important exception that the candidates are also rated on their behavior as members of a group . . . For positions in which group discussions and conferences are an important part of the duties, this test comes close to duplicating an actual work situation. The ability to be a leader and to be a skillful leader is quite clearly revealed. Over-aggressiveness and its converse, timidity, are clearly demonstrated; dogmatic leadership is apparent.

* * * *

A number of other methods have been developed to train prospective conference delegates. Some of these concentrate on personalities and methods of handling them. These are usually classified arbitrarily into popular descriptive types such as the bully, the authoritarian, the snob, the know-all, the show-off, the aggressor, the encourager, the quiet one, the obstructor, the initiator, the organiser and so on.

A good example of this method is used in the U.S. Navy to help its officers to become more effective in conference work. The following extract is from NAVPERS 91139 and is called "Conference Sense":–

> "*The Initiator*"—next to his mother, the conference leader's best friend. Keeps hammering away at the problem, bringing up new ideas, different approaches and so on. Stimulates other participants to the point where they are dazed, white and fanning for air, but frantically thinking. Main fault—his originality and initiative often gets him talking so much that he keeps others out of the discussion; even unconsciously ignores contributions of others. Conference Leader's remedy—suggest you would like to get some other opinion but be sure he understands that you appreciate his help.
>
> "*The Sulker*"—won't take part because he knows much less than the group—or much more. If he knows much less, he's liable to sit around with a face long enough to eat oats out of a churn; if he knows more, he can give the impression that the others look strange to him without brooms in their hands. Remedy—if he knows less, shoot him some easy questions to get him contributing; if he knows more, ask him to help fill in the others. Few of us can resist the opportunity to give the peasantry the pitch.

Another development is the special training of the conference leader as a fully equipped professional in the field of group relationships and conference technique, chosen for his ability to get maximum participation from the group rather than for his specific knowledge of the conference agenda. This type of leader has the advantage of being able to direct the conference without the group members feeling he is influenced by any specialised interests, while there is less personal hostility manifested because he is not involved in the subject matter.

* * * *

For simplicity of presentation, psychological skills have been discussed separately from other social science skills. But it is my firm conviction that a combination of all skills is essential for the understanding and operation of international conferences, and that the combined social science approach offers the greatest promise for the future development of the conference as a tool of international collaboration.

Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Study of War

MAURICE L. FARBER

That man's increased rationality in his technology has not been matched by an increase of rationality in his social relations has become a depressing cliché . . . It has for some time been apparent that psychoanalysis, as the discipline most concerned with man's irrationality, might provide some explanations. Unfortunately, psychoanalysts who have attacked the problem have tended toward a narrow parochialism and extremism, assigning exclusive responsibility to one or two mechanisms and ignoring or rejecting the contributions of other sciences (see, for example (5)). The present paper attempts a fresh evaluation of the psychoanalytic approach.

For psychoanalytic theory to have any relevance to the causes of war, several conditions must obtain: 1.) It must postulate motives which might be satisfied by war. 2.) It must demonstrate that these motives do indeed become engaged in the cognitive idea of war, i.e. in warlike attitudes. 3.) The institutional structure of the society must be such as to allow for the politically effective implementation of these attitudes. We shall consider these points in order.

The Motives

The concept of *aggression* is ubiquitous in psychoanalytic theory. Freud himself, in his earlier writings, inclined toward the view that aggression resulted inevitably from the frustration of unconscious impulses by the strictures of either the outside world or internalized prohibitions (2). Later (3), he seemed to abandon this position for a more basically instinctual one, in which he postulated a universal Death Instinct (Thanatos) which when turned outward manifested itself in aggression. . . .

This later position has not found wide acceptance. Even Fenichel (1),

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Maurice L. Farber, "Psychoanalytic Hypotheses in the Study of War," Journal of Social Issues, *Vol. 11, No. 1 (1955), pp. 29–35. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

whose treatment is fairly strictly Freudian, appears to reject this view in favor of one which stresses frustration as a cause and conceives of aggression as a "mode in which instinctual aims are sometimes striven for" (p. 59).

* * * *

Beyond these basic sources, the intricate and often slippery skein of psychoanalytic theory embodies various other processes which may generate aggression. Thus the psychosexual stage of orality may, especially if frustration has been encountered, produce "oral sadism," which involves originally the impulse to bite the nipple and to incorporate the object, with symbolic manifestations of these in adult life.

In the succeeding anal phase, during which for the first time the child's impulses come into conflict with outside demands, it is maintained that "anal sadistic" manifestations may develop. Frustration and consequent aggression result from the social pressure to get the child to regulate its bowel movements. The feces themselves may become an object of aggression and be pinched off, a process which may later symbolically be applied to people. Moreover, the child derives a certain measure of "social power" from his ability to please or oppose his parents in mastering control of the sphincters and is thus provided with a weapon for fighting back.

It will be seen that neither oral nor anal sadism will universally be manifested in adult life. If these psychosexual stages are successfully outgrown they will not constitute notable sources of aggression later; it is only in individuals who remain fixated at these stages or have regressed to them that such aggression will represent significant personality dimensions.

An important source of aggression in psychoanalytic theory lies in the Oedipus complex. The repressed hostility and rivalry toward the like-sex parent may be discharged overtly in a variety of ways, though most frequently in aggression against authority figures. This again would not constitute a universal source of aggression, but would be important only among those who have not successfully resolved the Oedipal conflict.

Turning from the Freudian school, one notes Erich Fromm's designation of the "sado-masochistic" character structure. According to this formulation, an individual with unconscious feelings of helplessness identifies with a powerful authority figure and reassures himself of his power by aggression against and destruction of those weaker than himself (4).

Thus far we have discussed only aggression, but it should be clear that other motives might be relevant to the problem of war. Masochism, for example, involving a need to receive aggression, may well be involved. As with sadism, the explanations of its origins are various. In the later writings of Freud it is simply a matter of the turning inward on oneself of the "Death Instinct." For many psychoanalysts the explanation lies in powerful guilt feelings with a need for punishment growing out of the internalization of excessive prohibitions and threats by authority figures. Erich Fromm's sado-masochistic character, in his masochistic manifestation, dissolves himself in a great power and thus partakes of its might.

These, then, are perhaps the most important motives postulated by psychoanalytic theory which might have relevance to the problem of war. There are doubtless other sources of aggression as well as other motives involved in warlike attitudes. In any case the theory does postulate motives which might be satisfied by war.

Engagement of the Motives

The second condition which must be met is that the postulated motives must become linked with the cognitive idea of war, i.e. become part of specific, conscious war-like attitudes. That such an engagement should occur is far from necessary; there are many channels other than political into which the aggression plausibly might flow. Indeed, since the aggression is generated originally from within the family drama, it might seem that the aggressive attitudes would be directed against family members and close associates in the individual's personal life.

Actually, psychoanalytic theory would maintain that aggressive feelings toward individuals close to one are apt to be repressed because of the ambivalence and that it is only against more distant people, especially those socially defined as evil, that aggression may openly be felt and directed without attendant guilt. To be sure, a variety of individuals and groups such as minorities may become the butt of the aggression, but it should be noted that other nations are apt with particular neatness to fit this category.

Once war has broken out the engagement of aggressive motives is strongly determined. The enemy or object of aggression is now socially defined, so that the apolitical who never thought in terms of war are now supplied with a focus for aggressions. . . .

Two well-known mechanisms of psychoanalytic theory are relevant here. There are *projection* and *displacement*. In projection, unconscious impulses existing in an individual are ascribed to others. Thus, the subject does not recognize his own aggressive impulses but perceives outsiders as evil and as aggressive toward him. In this mechanism, of course, aggression need not necessarily flow into political channels but its very nature renders such channels particularly attractive. Fears of being attacked by another nation may thus involve irrational projective elements.

In displacement, a feeling such as aggression or love is transferred from its original object to a new and different one. . . .

With regard to displacement, at least, it might be noted that the concept may be translated into terms of more academic psychological systems. For example, Kurt Lewin's concept of "substitute value" and Clark Hull's of "stimulus generalization" would account for a similar process.

The evidence that these processes occur is convincing if not entirely conclusive. . . .

The clinical material would seem to indicate that the idea of war becomes engaged with deep-seated aggressions, but in a variety of complex ways. *There is little doubt that there is no one unique personality structure which can be labeled "the war personality."* Moreover, the attitudinal system usually contains an admixture of conscious and rational elements. From a research viewpoint, therefore, the problem becomes an extremely complicated one.

Individual Attitudes and National Acts

Finally, the third condition demands that individual attitudes favorable to war must have the possibility of translation into effective political action if they are to be relevant to wars among nations. . . .

We are faced here with the problems of formal and informal channels of political influence, which lie within the purview of political science. Also involved are aspects of an area that has barely been explored: the relations between personality and political forms. Only a few simple observations can be made here.

In a democracy, war-minded groups in the population may exert great and sometimes crucial influence upon the policy-making elites. Fortunately, these elites are usually subject to various cross-pressures and are limited in their roles by traditions and laws, but it is probably a basic characteristic of democracies that citizens powerfully driven by aggressive impulses can push their country toward war.

In totalitarian states the elites are less sensitive to (though far from totally independent of) public opinion. They are less bound by established role definitions. Aggression in the personality structures of the elite members therefore assumes decisive importance. The disturbing fact is that the elite of a dictatorship are often what Lasswell has called "specialists on violence" who have achieved their positions because of this quality. That these traits will be manifested on the international scene is almost inevitable. We would appear to have here a socio-psychological reason why dictatorships tend to be war-like. To be sure, there are no guarantees that all individuals who achieve important positions in the governmental elites of democracies will be free of violent aggressions and war-like impulses. War-inclined leaders will merely be less frequent than in dictatorships and their inclinations less easily translated into action.

In general, it would appear plausible on the basis of such considerations that under certain political conditions aggressive ideas in individuals may be politically implemented on a national and international level.

An Empirical Investigation

From the viewpoint of rigorous scientific investigation, it will be seen that the problems treated here are enormously difficult to attack. The concepts employed are frequently defined in ways which render them hardly accessible to the operations of measurement. To the present writer, one lead appeared testable and promising, and a research project based upon it will here be briefly reported.

It will be recalled that one postulated source of aggression is at the anal stage of psychosexual development and that this source may be manifested in adult life if fixation at or regression to this level has taken place. The particular advantage of selecting this source is that the *characteristics of adults who are operating on an anal level have been rather explicitly described*. The chief traits of their character structure are *orderliness, frugality* and *obstinacy*. Orderliness is traced to an acceptance of the environmental pressure to regulate defecation; frugality to a continued indulgence in the early habits of retention based upon erogenous pleasure and upon a fear of losing; obstinacy to a rebellion against the environmental pressures.

In developing a measure of anality these traits were embodied in statements with which college-student subjects could agree or disagree. A "yes" reply is considered an anal indication.

The Anality Scale

1. Once I have made up my mind, I almost never change it.
2. I am annoyed when everything around me is not neat and orderly.
3. I strongly prefer professors who put everything in outline form.
4. I get terribly annoyed with the professor who hardly ever comes to definite conclusions.
5. In general, I spend my money very carefully and give few gifts.

In order to test our hypothesis that these traits are related to aggression in the political area, a scale of political aggressiveness, involving current issues, was developed. Agreement with an item was considered an aggressive response.

The Political Aggression Scale

1. All Communists and those having any sympathy with Communism should be deported from the United States.
2. We are being too soft with Russia and should adopt a much tougher policy.
3. We should keep building up our armaments to the point where we can dominate the rest of the world.
4. The activities of Senator McCarthy in combating Communism are highly admirable.

The scales were administered to 132 university students. A statistical analysis reveals that those high in anal characteristics are significantly more aggressive politically than those low in anal characteristics; 66% of those high in anality are highly aggressive politically, as compared to only 32% of those low in anality.

* * * *

War-like attitudes may thus be expressions of deep-lying personality factors laid down in child-rearing.[2] It is fairly certain that other sources of aggression in psychoanalytic theory contribute to a predilection for war. Motives of a non-psychoanalytic nature, based upon current frustrations and situational factors, doubtless play a part. Within any individual the interaction may well be complex, but the psychoanalyst would doubtless consider the childhood factors as the more determining and basic.

It should be emphasized that the psychoanalytic approach to war is essentially limited to the level of individual motivation. A sociological analysis, for instance, employing group concepts of a very different nature, can doubtless supply other kinds of insights.

Application to Prevention of War

Several approaches to war prevention follow from an analysis at this level of individual motivation. One is the long, hard road of developing child-rearing practices which minimize the production of aggression. Even if we do not accept Freud's earlier views about the inevitability of war because of civilization's frustrations, the question still remains as to whether it is possible to bring up children in modern society without developing a dangerous quantity of aggression. Nevertheless, we do observe that many individuals are not dangerously aggressive and we do know something of the conditions that produce and reduce aggression. Child-rearing practices in our society do change in response to advances in our knowledge (7) and this approach, though difficult and long range, is not hopeless.

A second possibility is to mitigate the aggression through psychoanalytic therapy. Barring new developments in mass therapy, it is obvious that only small segments of the population can feasibly be treated by present psychoanalytic techniques. The possibility that key members of the policy-making elites be psychiatrically screened is perhaps somewhat more feasible, but even here the difficulties and problems are enormous. . . .

Finally, it has been suggested that new displacements for aggression

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[2] The present study demonstrates a relationship between an *adult* personality structure and political aggression. Freudian theory asserts that this personality structure results from certain child-rearing practices. The evidence for this is not conclusive; it is "clinical" in nature, with all its attendant methodological difficulties.

(sublimations) be developed which would serve as alternatives to hostility toward other nations. Unfortunately, our theoretical knowledge on this point is rather thin. It is often difficult to say whether the aggression is being safely siphoned off or aggravated by such activities as watching a boxing match or reading horror comic books. Indeed, what experimental evidence exists is not encouraging: on social attitude scales individuals who showed aggressive attitudes in one area were apt to show them in others. Moreover, individuals who engaged in so-called sublimation activities like playing football were *more* aggressive in general than those who did not (6). The search for a "moral equivalent for war" through sublimation does not appear to be promising. Preventive medicine is perhaps preferable to attempting to stamp out the protean symptom of aggression once it has taken hold.

The psychoanalytic approach to war is, in its orientation, concerned with the individual and his motives, particularly those pervasive ones developed early in life of which we are hardly aware. It does not treat intensively with such processes in the individual as perception and cognition which may well be significant, nor does it concern itself with aspects of the social structure which doubtless are important. It lacks conceptual rigor. And yet there seems little doubt that it deals with some of the most powerful factors causing war.

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Psychological Aspects of Policy Problems in a Nuclear Age

CHARLES E. OSGOOD

Today we are faced with the potentially lethal combination of nuclear weapons against which there is no defence and international tensions from which there seems to be no respite. This paper analyses some of the dynamics of human thinking which, paradoxically, are driving us in a direction we do not wish to go. The analysis leads to certain suggestions for policy.

Evaluation of policies currently being considered is based upon three prime criteria: elimination of the threat to our biological survival, preservation of our way of life, and sheer feasibility. In terms of these criteria, preventive war, mutual deterrence through fear of retaliation, and limited war (e.g., the Kissinger Plan) are found to be inadequate. Mutual disarmament—the ideal solution on other grounds—is found to be psychologically infeasible under conditions of high mutual threat-perception, as the record over the past decade clearly shows.

Before offering what it is hoped will be more constructive suggestions, a psychological analysis of some of the dynamics of controversy is made—analysis of some of the forces which operate in times of controversy to push ordinary disagreement toward mutual destruction. One of these is differences in the assessment of human values, as illustrated in the recent debate between Bertrand Russell and Sidney Hook. Another is the way in which emotion serves to fore-shorten perspective. A third is the relativity of social judgements, the tendency to assume 'naturalness' of one's own evaluative frame of reference and intolerance of other frames of reference. A fourth dynamism of controversy is the way in which heightened emotion restricts awareness of alternatives to what has merely become 'habitual'

Charles E. Osgood, "Psychological Aspects of Policy Problems in a Nuclear Age," Canadian Psychologist, *Vol. 1a, No. 3 (1960), pp. 97–98. Reprinted by permission.*

but what is therefore judged to be 'realistic.' Finally, there is 'psycho-logic'—pressure toward simple evaluative consistency in human thinking which plagues great minds as well as small.

These dynamisms are shown to lead inevitably toward a 'Bogey-man' conception of any enemy. This is clearly brought out when the assumed consequences of complete unilateral disarmament by ourselves or by the enemy are compared. Complete unilateral disarmament is dismissed, however, as psychologically infeasible in our present time, given existing attitudes and beliefs. Yet we must accept the reports of our own informal ambassadors to Russia—many of them scholars and statesmen—that they see a "mirror image" of our own views among the Russian people and leaders. They blame their aggressive behavior on us just as we blame ours on them.

In the last analysis, it is certainly true that today we are plagued with problems of human nature and human relationships. In the search for any long-term solution, we must first ask what are the conditions which support the totalitarian way of life—a partial list would include economic scarcity, social inequality, educational deficiency, information restriction, and perception of external threat. Then we must ask how these conditions can be changed within the existing set-up of competing sovereign states. Two phases seem to be required: first, reversal of the tensions/arms-race spiral, to reduce mutual threat perception to a point where the "iron curtains" which separate East and West can be dissolved and other strategies employed; second, maintaining the peace, in which, over the long run, our way of life tends to prevail.

A policy of *graduated unilateral disengagement*, with explicitly invited reciprocation from the enemy, is suggested as a way of initiating a reversal of the present tensions/arms-race dilemma. A series of publicly announced actions of a tension-reducing nature would be made regardless of prior commitment to reciprocation by the enemy, but with public invitation to reciprocation for each act. The acts would be graded in risk potential according to the reciprocation or lack of it obtained; they would be designed to be cumulative in their psychological impact upon the enemy, but non-cumulative in reducing our capacity for the minimum level of retaliation necessary for deterrence. Unlike Kissinger's "Limited War" proposal, this policy would use our capacity for massive retaliation as the basis for tension-reducing acts, rather than tension-increasing acts, and would hold out the possibility of finally eliminating the massive deterrents themselves. Graduated unilateral disengagement is a means of probing the true intentions of an enemy without destroying a reasonable degree of security in the process.

Human Nature and the Peace

GORDON W. ALLPORT

On April 5, 1945, there was released to the press a Statement signed by 2,038 American psychologists. This statement had its origin during the summer of 1944 in informal conversations among psychologists, about twenty-five of whom contributed to its formulation. Although at no time was the Statement officially sponsored by any psychological organization, the funds for printing and mailing were supplied by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, and the recipients of the Statement were the 3,803 members and associates of the American Psychological Association listed in its 1944 Yearbook. The covering letter soliciting endorsements was signed by the following group of psychologists: G. W. Allport, R. S. Crutchfield, H. B. English, Edna Heidbreder, E. R. Hilgard, O. Klineberg, R. Likert, M. A. May, O. H. Mowrer, G. Murphy, C. C. Pratt, W. S. Taylor, and E. C. Tolman.

While many mail solicitations bring only 25 per cent response and while many psychologists were abroad in war service and hard to reach, the result of this call brought more than a 50 per cent response. Among those replying more than 99 per cent subscribed to the Statement. Included among the signers are 350 clinical psychologists, 230 industrial psychologists, approximately 250 in other fields of applied psychology, and approximately 300 in the armed services. The remainder are in universities and colleges. Minor comments and suggestions were received from 92 individuals. There were only thirteen refusals to sign.

Besides being printed in newspapers, the Statement was sent to 535 representatives and senators in the United States Congress, and to many organizations and individuals prominently concerned with peace-planning and international cooperation. The Statement likewise is printed in the recent Yearbook of the SPSSI, *Human Nature and Enduring Peace*, edited by Gardner Murphy.

Gordon W. Allport, "Human Nature and the Peace," Psychological Bulletin, *Vol. 42, No. 4 (1945), pp. 376–378. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

The full text of the statement follows:

Human Nature and the Peace

A Statement by Psychologists

Humanity's demand for lasting peace leads us as students of human nature to assert ten pertinent and basic principles which should be considered in planning the peace. Neglect of them may breed new wars, no matter how well-intentioned our political leaders may be.

1. *War can be avoided: War is not born in men; it is built into men.* No race, nation, or social group is inevitably warlike. The frustrations and conflicting interests which lie at the root of aggressive wars can be reduced and redirected by social engineering. Men can realize their ambitions within the framework of human cooperation and can direct their aggressions against those natural obstacles that thwart them in the attainment of their goals.

2. *In planning for permanent peace, the coming generation should be the primary focus of attention.* Children are plastic; they will readily accept symbols of unity and an international way of thinking in which imperialism, prejudice, insecurity, and ignorance are minimized. In appealing to older people, chief stress should be laid upon economic, political, and educational plans that are appropriate to a new generation, for older people, as a rule, desire above all else, better conditions and opportunities for their children.

3. *Racial, national, and group hatreds can, to a considerable degree, be controlled.* Through education and experience people can learn that their prejudiced ideas about the English, the Russians, the Japanese, Catholics, Jews, Negroes, are misleading or altogether false. They can learn that members of one racial, national, or cultural group are basically similar to those of other groups, and have similar problems, hopes, aspirations, and needs. Prejudice is a matter of attitudes, and attitudes are to a considerable extent a matter of training and information.

4. *Condescension toward "inferior" groups destroys our chance for a lasting peace.* The white man must be freed of his concept of the "white man's burden." The English-speaking peoples are only a tenth of the world's population; those of white skin only a third. The great dark-skinned populations of Asia and Africa, which are already moving toward a greater independence in their own affairs, hold the ultimate key to a stable peace. The time has come for a more equal participation of all branches of the human family in a plan for collective security.

5. *Liberated and enemy peoples must participate in planning their own destiny.* Complete outside authority imposed on liberated and enemy peoples without any participation by them will not be accepted and will lead only to further disruptions of the peace. The common people of all countries must not only feel that their political and economic future holds genuine

hope for themselves and for their children, but must also feel that they themselves have the responsibility for its achievement.

6. *The confusion of defeated people will call for clarity and consistency in the application of rewards and punishments.* Reconstruction will not be possible so long as the German and Japanese people are confused as to their status. A clear-cut and easily understood definition of war-guilt is essential. Consistent severity toward those who are judged guilty, and consistent official friendliness toward democratic elements, is a necessary policy.

7. *If properly administered, relief and rehabilitation can lead to self-reliance and cooperation; if improperly, to resentment and hatred.* Unless liberated people (and enemy people) are given an opportunity to work in a self-respecting manner for the food and relief they receive, they are likely to harbor bitterness and resentment, since our bounty will be regarded by them as unearned charity, dollar imperialism, or bribery. No people can long tolerate such injuries to self-respect.

8. *The root-desires of the common people of all lands are the safest guide to framing a peace.* Disrespect for the common man is characteristic of fascism and of all forms of tyranny. The man in the street does not claim to understand the complexities of economics and politics, but he is clear as to the general directions in which he wishes to progress. His will can be studied (by adaptations of the public opinion poll). His expressed aspirations should even now be a major guide to policy.

9. *The trend of human relationships is toward ever wider units of collective security.* From the caveman to the twentieth century, human beings have formed larger and larger working and living groups. Families merged into clans, clans into states, and states into nations. The United States are not 48 threats to each other's safety; they work together. At the present moment the majority of our people regard the time as ripe for regional and world organization, and believe that the initiative should be taken by the United States of America.

10. *Commitments now may prevent postwar apathy and reaction.* Unless binding commitments are made and initial steps taken now, people may have a tendency after the war to turn away from international problems and to become preoccupied once again with narrower interests. This regression to a new postwar provincialism would breed the conditions for a new world war. Now is the time to prevent this backward step, and to assert through binding action that increased unity among the people of the world is the goal we intend to attain.

Mental Hygiene and World Peace

KILTON STEWART, Ph.D.

For a long time it has been known that there were groups in the world who had learned to live without war and crime and who needed no police force to prevent violence and aggression. Since these groups had no written language or schools, there was good reason to believe that the education that produced non-violent, coöperative people would be simple and easily mastered and understood by the disciplined minds of Western scientists and educators. On closer investigation, however, it was learned that primitive peoples were usually healthy and coöperative because a certain situation existed. . . .

The mind of the individual was not more unified than our own. In fact, on the contrary, the primitive mind was more split up than that of modern man, but the fragments behaved better. The god-images behaved in the mind of the individual in the same orderly fashion that they did in the myth, and the images of people behaved in the same orderly fashion as they did in the changeless round of the daily ceremonial life of the group. The same people would not be healthy if they were transferred to the changing, chaotic life in civilized countries, and the world could certainly not be converted to their gods and ceremonies.

In the highlands of Malaya . . . live the Senoi. . . . These highlanders have no written language and no knowledge of the world outside their territory. . . . Yet they have evolved a method of education which enables the growing individual to keep hold of the parcels of his power that the dream process gives to the images of things. It enables his elders to use these images as channels that assist the child to become a physically healthy, socially constructive, self-possessed adult.

This method of Senoi education may help modern educators—if they understand it—to create personalities strong and healthy enough to use

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Kilton Stewart, "Mental Hygiene and World Peace," Mental Hygiene, *Vol. 38, No. 3 (New York: The National Association for Mental Health, Inc., July, 1954), pp. 387–403. Reprinted by permission. The beginning of this article is omitted.*

the power behind the modern machine for a coöperative, rather than a destructive purpose, and to attain a lasting world peace.

This primitive educational system based on dream interpretation frees the minds of all the adult Senoi from the type of rigidity on which crime, mental illness, and psychosomatic diseases are now known to be predicated. Our Western scientific and religious education and psychotherapy succeed as well in this area only with the outstanding individual.

* * * *

Most of the social and economic activity in the daily life of the Senoi is determined by dreams, along with the choices, decisions, and interpretations arising out of them in the discussions at the morning council. But the younger children pay little heed to these discussions of their elders. Certainly, they do not learn more listening to them than children in civilized communities could get in school as exercises in connection with art, music, and English, if the child were given a chance in these subjects to express and discuss his dream and fantasy life, along with the other subjects that he is asked to write and talk about at present.

The simple principles, which could be quickly learned and used, at home and in school, to augment modern education in building a healthy mind and body, can be stated as follows:

Every person with whom you are associated builds a pattern of you in his mind. This pattern will either help him to express his feelings, emotions, and impulses toward you and the rest of the outside world, or it will insulate him or wall him off from emotional contact with you and the rest of the social world.

The way you behave toward people largely determines the way your image will behave in their sleep.

* * * *

In sleep, we have the opportunity to observe what the things and people of the outside world have done to our inner structure up to the present.

If the dream image is against the individual, it is proof that his former contact with the outside world has turned the individual against himself. Some wakeful experience has turned the created image against the creator—the individual who is having the dream.

Sleep is inventory time, a balancing of the books. It is the time when the mystic learns that "no feather falls from a bird in flight" that the indwelling God does not observe. It is the time when man has the power of a god to look inside himself. The remembered dream makes the record of this inner balance, with its listed credits and debits, available to those who are managing and directing the social world.

This Senoi way of thinking is not out of harmony with Western findings, although it emphasizes and encourages the creative nature of human beings more than it is usually emphasized in the West, outside of such fields as psychotherapy and religion. Even the man of the street is aware that his mind photographs the things he looks at, and that his emotions respond to them as he is creating his photograph of them. He also knows that he can sense or look at this photograph later, as he reviews an experience in his memory, and that the photograph and the emotion can also be reviewed, re-experienced, or re-created in his dreams.

It is a truism in the West that man's creation often turns against him. He is possessed by his machines. Like Frankenstein, he builds a master that destroys him. He is turned against himself. The Senoi have found a way to observe and reverse this process in the growing child. The child breathes in a whiff of choking smoke, while the adults are burning the underbrush from the land they are clearing. That night the black image of the smoke, with its choking odor and the emotion of terror it aroused, is re-created in the child's dream. He awakens and cries and tells his parents of the black nightmare cloud that choked him in his sleep. They comfort him and say that it was a good dream. In the daytime, he must move away from smoke if it comes after him. But dream smoke is always good. He must move deeper into the dream smoke and, when he does, he will find a treasure that he can tell about when he awakens. He may even find the spirit of the smoke which he can conquer and make his servant.

He dreams of floating happily, of soaring into the air with joy, and is told that in future dreams he must float or soar to some definite place and find a treasure, something that is beautiful or useful to human beings, which he can reproduce or describe when he awakes.

These are the central ideas and policies of Senoi dream education. The adults help the child to reproduce artistic things and to describe and build mechanical things. They encourage him to form friendships and associations, and to organize projects pictured in his dreams.

If a child is attacked in a dream, he is encouraged to fight to the death. It is good to die in dreams, because death leads to the instantaneous rebirth of the dreamer, and permanently exhausts the force of the adversary. It is also good to kill in dreams, even though the attacking dream character wears the image of one of your fellows. The dream character is judged by his action in the dream. If he is antagonistic to the dreamer, he is bad, even though he is using a good image as a disguise.

All dream force is potentially good. It will serve you if you force the dream character to serve you and the group, or if you release this force from antagonistic dream forms by destroying them. This is like saying that even when a man is good, his action may leave an image of him inside your mind that is filled up with your anxiety, or guilt, or fear, and that this image, therefore, must be destroyed in order to release your own negative emotions which are associated with it.

* * * *

The Senoi doctrine is like the Biblical statement that "offense needs must come, but woe unto him by whom it does come." The offense charges the image of the offender with a force antagonistic to the offended. You offend a child if you cause him pain as you pull a sliver from his foot. But the pain is only a fragment of the total situation. The fear occasioned by the pain often disguises itself in the image of a friend. The Senoi dream education proves that this fear, which makes the dream character antagonistic, is released and dispersed as the dreamer outfaces and kills or conquers the antagonistic dream character. It is also released if the dream character stabs, or kills, or strikes the dreamer. It is as if the dream character gives up its individual existence whenever the dreamer, who created it in past time, is willing to reëxperience the shock or pain that turned the image against the individual, in the original painful experience.

The Senoi adult encourages the child to apologize on awakening for antisocial actions he initiates in dreams. The dream image he thus offends is not the person, but is closely related to him and might represent a spiritual fragment of him. If some one treats the child badly in a dream, that person is informed of it, so he will have an opportunity to make his social behavior neutralize or reverse the negative tendency expressed by his dream image. He does this by making some friendly, helpful gesture toward the dreamer.

The dream collections made from various age groups among the Senoi show that their dreams consistently evolve from childhood to adolescence. Gradually, the child does do in his dreams what he is directed to do. Toward adolescence he consistently arrives somewhere, brings back a treasure for the group in his good dreams, and outfaces, conquers, and destroys his enemies in his bad ones. The dream treasures take the forms of songs, designs, poems, stories, and mechanical inventions.

Dream collections made by the author from our own society, and from primitive societies in which no such dream education was carried on, failed to show a similar evolution.

The Senoi practice of regarding the dream as stemming from something that happened the day before or in the more remote past, and as the determiner of other things that should or must happen to-morrow, has an important indirect effect both on the adults and on the children. Since the parents believe that the child's dreams reflect his reaction to their behavior and attitudes toward each other and toward the child, they are careful how they act in his presence and how they criticize him. Since the child's dreams do often depict adults behaving harshly and unreasonably, they have a day-to-day reminder from the child of what accidents or criticisms have been shocking to him, in spite of their efforts to keep environmental images from turning against him.

The child is impressed by the fact that the adults do listen to his dreams and take them seriously, that they do trace them back to shocks, accidents, and conflicts of the day before, and that they do often modify their behavior and ask others to do so, on the basis of the data the dream presents. This gives the child a feeling that he is a creative, functioning member of the social group, from the time he is able to talk. He can give to the adults, as well as accept from them, and the adults take the greatest interest in that which represents his most individualistic expression, that part of his expression which is, in a sense, a reaction against, or a protestation of, the very process of socialization.

This eliminates one of the great reasons for the feeling found in our society that the adults have no interest in the real self of the child, but are only concerned with enforcing their will upon him, and receiving back from him what he has learned from them. The child apparently realizes that the dream is an expression of his inmost self. The data from the Senoi indicate that the adult failure in our society to solicit, accept, and appreciate this most spontaneous expression is one of the reasons for the inferiority and persecution complexes so common in our society, and for the pent-up hostility that so often overflows into crime and war.

* * * *

Senoi dream education produces a whole society of men who can think in terms of one world on an emotional as well as an intellectual plane, and who stubbornly work for peace, with good will toward men, even those who oppose them. Perhaps there is no time to reëducate the world. Perhaps the Communists would not accept the idea of dream education even if it were adopted and successfully practiced in the democracies. Perhaps they would not use it to increase their own health and stability, along with penicillin and other useful practices of the democracies. These things are unpredictable. Scientific psychology does, however, enable us to predict some aspects of the total situation and to speak in terms of probabilities.

Senoi dream education would decrease the probability of war by increasing the good will inside the individual, the good will of the created border images of the mind for the center of the mind. It would increase the good will and cooperation of one individual for another, which would make him less vulnerable to attack and, therefore, less likely to be attacked. It would increase the good will and coöperation of one faction for another and of one nation for another among the democratic allies. It would help give the lie to the old theory that the democracies cannot change and cannot coöperate, and will, therefore, have to destroy each other, even if they are not attacked from without. Most important, it would give layman an opportunity to work for peace on earth by first establishing peace inside the earth that is his body.

Man now has the power to turn the forces of nature against other men to the point where war is no longer profitable, even for the victor. Anything, therefore, that makes men fear other men less will decrease the necessity for war, and increase the possibility of international coöperation, of peace on earth, good will to men.

The Relevance of the Behavioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations

J. DAVID SINGER

Introduction

The past few years have witnessed a rather remarkable intellectual ferment among students of international political relations.[2] . . . In recent years, there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the manner in which our subject was approached, studied, and taught; and this dissatisfaction has produced an impressive array of discussions, on the state of the discipline in general and on the need for theory in particular.[3]

Despite this encouraging self-consciousness, however, there has been little formal attention to the potential role of our sister social sciences in the development of international relations theory; especially has this been true regarding the behavioral social sciences—anthropology, psychology, and sociology.[4] Outside of the articles by Deutsch (1958) and Guetzkow (1958), we have seen almost no serious, affirmative discussion of the relevance of these three disciplines to our own, and neither of these articles was intended to be a formal and systematic treatment of this possible relevance. . . . The purpose of this article, therefore, is to discuss—albeit

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[2] For the growth and development of the discipline, see: Ware (1939); Zimmern (1939); Fox (1949); and Thompson (1952).

[3] Some manifestations of this concern are two recent collections of readings: Fox (1959) and Hoffmann (1960). For a critical review of these, see Singer (1960).

[4] For an excellent treatment of the behavioral sciences more broadly conceived, see Miller (1955). The behavioral social sciences have been defined in equally broad terms to include history, geography, economics, and politics; see Harvard University (1954) and University of North Carolina (1954).

J. David Singer, "The Relevance of the Behavioral Sciences to the Study of International Relations," Behavioral Science, *Vol. 6, No. 4 (1961), pp. 324–325. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher. Footnotes numbered as in original.*

briefly and sometimes superficially—some possible areas in which these disciplines may be expected to make a useful contribution to the development of theory in international political relations. . . . Let us begin, however, by discussing the role of theory itself and its value to the state of the discipline.

The Role of Theory

The major role of theory[5] in any discipline is the inescapable one of permitting the systematic ordering of data, the absence of which deprives that subject of the right to be considered a scholarly discipline. . . . little significance or coherence can be made of the tremendous body of fact which spreads over the space and time of international political relations without some conceptual framework by which these facts may be ordered, interpreted, and assigned meaning. In the absence of such a framework, there is little possibility of distinguishing between the trivial and the crucial, the unique and the uniform, the cause and the effect. . . .

The second major virtue of a body of theory is that it encourages an articulation of assumptions. One of the most striking aspects of almost every text in the field today is the near absence of any spelling out of the author's assumptions. Does he see man as essentially evil, basically good, or morally neutral? Is his image of the international system characterized as normally peaceful, or conflictful? Is his major focus on the larger system, the state, the national elite, the individual, or the environment?[6] Does he view the state as basically sovereign and autonomous, or as the hapless object of external forces, buffeted about by historical inevitability? These assumptions are crucial to an understanding of the scholar's treatise, yet they are seldom spelled out. . . .

Third, and by definition, the use of a theoretical framework would require the observer to make clear and explicit the criteria by which he assigns significance to his data. . . . The scholar would be compelled to spell out his reasons for selecting certain events and omitting others, and for emphasizing one set of variables and ignoring another.

Fourth, a focus on theory could well stimulate a self-generating process out of which might develop a more thoroughly validated or higher-level set of generalizations. Because the use of a theoretical framework requires that we specify and define accurately our variables and parameters, it would permit replication of one man's studies by others during the early stages of development of a body of theory. If several scholars employ the same variables, assign them the same meaning, and reach the same conclusion, that conclusion is more likely to be valid than if it represents the unique result of a single observer's discursive appraisal of a discrete case. Such is the building process in a body of knowledge.

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[5] A theory of international relations would be an orderly and systematic collection of consistent generalizations describing and explaining the behavior of nations in a variety of situations, and the reciprocal relation of such behavior to the characteristics of the larger political system within which the nations interact. Such generalizations might vary widely from the particular to the general, may apply to a specific era and region, or to several, and could focus primarily upon either the actors or the system. But they must be susceptible of empirical disconfirmation, unambiguous as to referents, and clearly differentiate between the descriptive-explanatory and the normative.

[6] For a discussion of this question of focus, see Singer (1959, 1961) and Waltz (1959).

Finally, a word may be in order regarding the relevance of theory for the *practitioner* in the field. The setting in which foreign policy decisions are taken has become increasingly complex and diminishingly vulnerable to control during the twentieth century. As a result, if the statesman is to avoid that ultimate blunder which could plunge the world into nuclear obliteration, he must be better able to predict the behavior of his opposite numbers, and at the same time comprehend the nature of the limitations under which all must operate. In the absence of a fairly well-developed and valid set of propositions concerning the system and its actors, he is much more likely to err.[8] . . .

In summary, the need for theory cannot be overestimated. If the study of international politics is to advance from its current archaic state, in which there is much opinion and little knowledge, and in which one man's assertion is as "valid" as the other's, we must address ourselves self-consciously and deliberately to the development of a coherent body of theory. Can the other social sciences, particularly the behavioral sciences, help us in this endeavor? Perhaps the most fruitful way of exploring these possibilities lies in considering the three attributes which characterize any scholarly discipline: methodology, findings, and concepts. These will be discussed in turn.

The Method of the Behavioral Sciences

In considering the possible usefulness of behavioral science methodology to the student of international relations, one is, of course, merely referring to the general notion of scientific method, applied to the study of man as a social creature. . . . having postulated the relevance of scientific method to inquiries concerning individual and aggregate behavior, our task is that of delineating the major characteristics of such method as it applies to international relations.

One of the most fundamental properties of this scientific method is its acceptance of probabilism—that almost no generalized proposition, no matter how frequently put to the test, represents a universal and absolute truth. . . . Rather, by qualifying the proposition, one might legitimately speak of tendencies under specified conditions. But even then, one must still emphasize that the observed tendency is only accurate on the basis of evidence then available; that is, the uncovering of additional data may readily refute or modify the proposition as articulated. Implicit in the relativistic stance is the awareness that all that a scholar has achieved in a lifetime may be proved erroneous; and moreover, each scholar must constantly seek to disprove or modify his own research conclusions. . . .

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[8] For an excellent treatment of the use of theory in policy making, see Fox (1959, Ch. 3.).

A second major characteristic of the behavioral scientist's approach is his continuing preoccupation with the inductive-deductive continuum. He must constantly be deciding whether the main task of the moment is that of data-gathering or systematization, or, to put it in the terms of John Wisdom (1952), whether to pursue discovery by investigation or discovery by reflection. Intimately involved in this question is whether (the scientist having selected for the moment the latter approach) the hypothesized statement of relationships is operational, i.e., susceptible of demonstration via empirical observation. Furthermore, he must constantly attempt to bridge the gap between discrete fact and high-order abstraction, eschewing the easy path of either extreme. . . .

It might also be appropriate here, despite the danger of belaboring the obvious, to reiterate briefly some of the other attitudes common to the behavioral sciences that are so often ignored by the political scientist concerned with inter-nation relations. One is the concern for replicability as a means of validation by which low-order or middle-order statements may be converted into empirical generalizations of wider scope. And out of this flows, in turn, the emphasis on specificity of variables—the attempt to analyze the variable into each of its dimensions . . . But as long as we believe that such phrases as dependent variable, parameter, selective distortion, social distance, drive-reduction, cathexis, role-mediation, reaction-formation, etc., are mere jargon, we will stumble along, using such important but vague, all-inclusive, multidimensional concepts as tension, nationalism, international atmosphere, ideology, functionalism, etc., in their present imprecise and confusing fashion. And, as a consequence, many of us will investigate different situations in which these are our major variables, will assign them rather different meanings, and will never achieve any professional consensus as to their precise dimensions. Without such a consensus of precision and specificity, replication (and hence validation) must remain only a faint and future hope.[11]

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[11] Lest I give the impression that there is *no* concern for the specificity of variables among international relations scholars, let me note several impressive exceptions, stemming primarily from the Princeton Center for Research in World Political Institutions: Van Wagenen (1955) and K. W. Deutsch et al. (1957); also see Guetzkow (1956), H. and M. Sprout (1956), and K. W. Deutsch (1954).

Research Design

. . . [Let] us refer briefly to the idea of research design, which is in a sense the bridge between the general posture and the specific techniques of the behavioral scientists.[12] The traditionally-trained political scientist or historian normally decides that it would be "interesting" to "know more" about a specific event, sequence of events, or chronological era, and then proceeds to pore over the literature in a somewhat random fashion, occasionally noting certain general trends or configurations; these he often elevates to the heady status of "theory." The more systematically trained social scientist (especially in psychology and sociology), on the other hand, may select his subject on the same grounds; but there the similarity usually ends. At some point in his data-gathering (and in the case of experimental research, prior to such experiments), he must "get organized," or prepare his research design. . . .

First, there must be an articulation of the question or questions to be answered, usually in the form of an hypothesis or hypotheses. This must describe, at the very least, a correlation in the incidence of certain specified phenomena, and at best, a causal relationship among such phenomena, and in each case should spell out the assumptions upon which the hypothesis is founded. Second, all of the variables (independent, dependent, and intervening) need to be defined as precisely and operationally as possible in order that they may be measured in terms of their frequency, direction, or intensity. . . . Third, one must decide upon the sources of data to be employed and the techniques by which these data are to be gathered. If the source is written material, it may be examined by techniques ranging from systematic note-taking to highly schematized content analysis, and interviews may likewise be extremely open-ended or based upon a carefully preconceived interview schedule. During the data-gathering phase, the research design must provide for the avoidance of error in both reliability and validity, and only a carefully prepared design is likely to assure such avoidance. Finally, the research design needs to include the criteria which will be employed in interpreting the data collected and in reaching conclusions; the logical connection between these criteria and the prior articulation of assumptions and hypotheses should be obvious. To the extent that the data shed light on the questions posed, confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses, and produce a logically coherent set of conclusions clearly supported by the data, one has utilized an adequate research design.

. . . In the absence of a research design providing for these characteristics, a piece of research may well produce some adequate description, but it is unlikely to be of much use for explanatory or predictive purposes. And the growth of theory is highly dependent upon explanation; causal relationships must remain the predominant concern of anyone purporting to contribute to such growth.

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[12] Among some of the more valuable treatments of research design are: Jahoda, Deutsch, & Cook (1951, Ch. 3), Chapin (1947), Festinger and Katz (1953), Stouffer (1955), Goode & Hatt (1952), and Shils & Finch (1949).

Specific Behavioral Science Techniques

As to some of the more specific techniques peculiar to the behavioral sciences, it would be folly to attempt any full description or analysis of them here, but a few brief and introductory remarks may be in order. As suggested above, data collection often poses as much of a problem to the international relations scholar as does data interpretation, and the nonpolitical social sciences may hold some useful suggestions for us. Therefore, it might be appropriate to discuss two particularly useful methods of data gathering, one from existing sources, and one which requires that the data first be produced. The first of these is content analysis, which is perhaps the most important specific methodological contribution of the behavioral sciences to those of us whose work is primarily with documents, memoirs, and histories.

Essentially, content analysis is nothing more than a highly systematic method of sorting and collecting information acquired from written (or spoken) communications. What is involved is the setting up of categories into which a preliminary examination of the material indicates most of it will fall. Such categories must, of course, stem from the conceptual framework within which the study is to proceed and should be able to produce answers to such questions as: Which arguments (and with what frequency) does the communication use in order to justify certain types of decisions? What sort of adjectives are employed how often to describe certain people, states, or other phenomena? What goals do the communicators attribute to their competitor? etc. The crucial thing is to devise categories which are mutually exclusive, unambiguous, and discernible, and this is best assured by a number of pretests conducted within a sample of the materials to be coded, with category modifications made as long as the researcher and his coders have any difficulty in deciding (*a*) what is and is not to be coded, and (*b*) into which category it must go. One may, in turn, code for broad themes, particular phraseology, explicit facts, or specific words, to mention just a few. Furthermore, one may code every sentence, entire articles, chapters, books, headlines, or whatever unit most suits the purpose of the study.[13]

The charge is sometimes made that what is gained in precision and accuracy is lost in subtlety and insight—that by imposing a rigid categorization upon the material, one loses the essential flavor or fine qualitative distinc-

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[13] Among the outstanding discussions and applications of this technique are: Berelson (1952; 1954), Lazarsfeld & Barton (1951), and Pool (1959).

> tions. This may well be true, but it is usually a result of unimaginative category-building or the absence of a reasonably well-developed theoretical framework. . . .
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> . . . There is, however, a second criticism of the technique which does seem more justified, and that is the question of efficiency. Content analysis can be extremely time-consuming, normally requires several independent coders, and in the final analysis is still heavily reliant upon the intelligent inference. Though the charge is a legitimate one, it is answerable on two counts. First, one's methodology need be no more elegant than the purpose requires, and it seems unnecessary, for example, to adhere rigidly to the multiple and independent coding procedure in all cases; even if the lone researcher does his own coding, we have a more rigorous process than the traditional reading and intuitive note-taking. Second, the understanding of complex relationships cannot ordinarily be the result of serendipity or casual observation; it normally requires the output of considerable energy If the discipline of international relations is to prosper, we will have to make such investments.[14]

Turning from the exploitation of existing data, let us examine briefly one of the techniques of the behavioral sciences which requires that the data be, in a sense, first produced and then interpreted. The general technique is known as survey research, and the interview is, of course, an integral and familiar element. The purpose here is to ascertain the opinions, attitudes, beliefs, expectations, or recollections of a certain category of individuals. The sample, in turn, is drawn according to whose articulations the researcher is interested in; it might be a small number of government officials who are known to have participated in a particular decision or series of decisions, or it may be an entire nation, or perhaps even several nations. The larger the population involved, the more necessary it is to devise a sampling technique which produces a representative but manageable percentage of the population under study; this process itself is a highly complex one, with a multitude of methodological, statistical, and theoretical pitfalls.

Very briefly, the survey or interview technique requires the following processes. First (regardless of technique or methodology), one must pose the questions to be answered by the study; again, a formulation of hypotheses flowing from articulation of assumptions which are informed by some theoretical scheme is essential. Next, the researcher must decide upon the sort of information which will produce the attitudinal or other variables found in his hypotheses. From here, he begins to phrase the interview questions which will elicit these variables; normally the interview schedule (sequence of questions) will have to be revised several times, with a few pretests run to see whether it does in fact elicit the range of responses anticipated by the hypotheses. Simultaneously, the sample must be drawn, interviewers selected and trained, and the first round of results carefully evaluated for any flaws in the over-all design, the schedule, or the mode of interview. Once the data are in, the evaluative and interpretive process is similar to that employed in working from existing data; as a matter of fact, the results of the open-end or projective type of interview are often best utilized by the technique of content analysis.[15]

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[14] For some relevant applications of content analysis to this field, see the Stanford University RADIR Project studies, including Lasswell, Lerner, & Pool (1952a; 1952b). Truman (1952) wrote a well-balanced review of this series. Also see Berelson & de Grazia (1947), and several of the papers in Lasswell & Lietes (1949). Perhaps the most valuable combination of methodological discussion and application is George (1959).

* * * *

Content analysis and survey research are but two of the many techniques developed and utilized so effectively by the behavioral sciences. As the student of international relations and comparative foreign policy becomes familiar with the literature outside of political science and history, he will discover—and may ultimately come to adapt and employ—a number of others of comparable value.

The Findings of the Behavioral Sciences

. . . Reference here is to the empirical results of the vast amount of research undertaken in psychology, sociology, and anthropology since they became reasonably well-developed fields of inquiry. . . .

. . . Let us . . . refer (again, briefly) to a small sample of the sorts of behavioral science findings which might fill in some of the voids in our own literature, and perhaps correct or modify some of our more erroneous assumptions.

Turning to psychology first, several propositions which have emerged from long years of research suggest themselves to the interdisciplinary political scientist.[17] Perhaps one of the more significant conclusions to emerge from this discipline is that man is a multigoaled organism, pursuing at any one time a variety of goals, several of which may well be incompatible. . . .

. . . Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of this is the dominant contemporary tendency in psychology to speak of human motivation in terms of self-realization or maximization of gain; in either case provision is made for the highly useful phenomenological approach. This approach

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[15] Among the outstanding treatments of survey research are: Hyman (1956), Maccoby and Maccoby (1954), and Paul (1953).

[17] Though these propositions are all conceivably susceptible to upset or invalidation, for the most part they have withstood numerous challenges successfully, and are today as well established as any propositions in the social sciences can ever be.

(and since it encompasses several divergent theoretical positions it can only be called an approach) presumes that there is likely to be some difference in the ways in which any two people perceive a situation, respond to alternatives, or pursue goals, depending upon a number of variables ranging from physical stature to cultural background. The maximization-of-gain concept permits us to deal with the fact that most men not only differ in their goal structures, but also rearrange their own goals, depending upon their perception of the situational field in which they find themselves at any moment. Such a finding may make social theorizing more difficult, but it at least has the virtue of minimizing the likelihood of oversimplifications based upon a nonexistent political, economic, or sexual man.

A second general finding of psychological research which is of considerable interest to the international relations specialist is that man is a highly malleable creature. . . .

. . . not only is there a wide variation in political and social beliefs within any given society and its subcultures, but that those beliefs which do exist at any given time are significantly susceptible to modification. Such susceptibility is, of course, a highly variable phenomenon, depending upon the subject area of the belief and the intensity with which it is held. But for our concern, it is worthwhile to note that most political beliefs are not held with very much intensity; and when they are, their objective referents are often so ill-defined as to permit rather ready manipulation. Again, it must be emphasized that not all beliefs are equally vulnerable to such modification. Values, for example, tend to be more rigidly held than the transitory attitudes which stem from these values, and the ephemeral opinions which derive in turn from both values and attitudes are more manipulable still.

Obviously, if opinions play a significant role in public and elite behavior, and if these are highly vulnerable to modification, one may reasonably anticipate that political behavior is likewise far from a constant or inflexible phenomenon. The result is that the student of international relations must continually consider the nature of the various actors' beliefs at the moment in which he is interested, and must likewise anticipate that the attitudinal predisposition of a large group of people may be quite different several days or weeks or months after its direction and intensity were last evaluated. Such inconstancy is both a dependent and independent variable in relations among nations.

Leaving the field of psychology, we turn briefly to sociology in order to sample some of its findings. One of the more intriguing conclusions of sociological research is that the existence and awareness of an external threat does not necessarily lead to a greater degree of unity and a higher level of integration within the threatened society. . . .

Closely allied with this is the more tentative finding that two social groups in conflict (short of physical violence) may discover that the conflict itself may generate ultimate cohesiveness and union between them. Normally it is assumed that conflict drives groups (and nations) further apart, but if we appreciate that the absence of contact between groups can readily perpetuate mutual antipathy and hostility, we can begin to understand that even conflictful contact may initiate a process the end product of which is high compatibility or some form of organizational merger. The relevance of both of these propositions to international relations should be quite clear, especially to those of us concerned with political integration at the international level.

In the field of anthropology, it hardly seems necessary to point to any findings concerning our area of inquiry. Assuming that one of the sets of variables affecting the behavior of states is the cultural, the researcher need only turn to the work of those who have specialized in the region in which he is interested. Though not all the world's political units have been studied, and some of the research is singularly poor, one may still uncover an impressive amount of information concerning dominant values, elite selection, or domestic political patterns. Also of inestimable value are the Human Relations Area Files [Murdock, 1950], in which eighty-eight major categories (each having from six to nine subcategories) of human activity are cross-classified with those regions which have been studied and reported upon by the anthropological profession. And though many scholars may deride the Files, their utility to the uninitiated is considerable. It is also worth noting that the project has provided a stimulus to comparative work in cultural anthropology and should be equally useful in this regard to the student of comparative foreign policy.

The Concepts of the Behavioral Sciences

Let us turn now from the more obvious and mechanical contributions of the behavioral sciences to that which strikes this observer as perhaps the most crucial category of all—the heuristic. Though less clear and more indirect in their usefulness than either the techniques or the findings, over the long run the concepts of the behavioral sciences will probably emerge as the most relevant, especially in the development of theory. Rather than attempt to dwell at length upon the implications of one or two of the more promising concepts or notions, and still not do them justice, it might be more functional to mention a larger number and make brief reference to their possible relevance for international relations.

First, there are several conceptual schemes which have developed to such a degree that they might qualify under the rubric of "theories," indeed, they are so labeled by many of those from whose disciplines they emerge. Most promising to this writer is that set of notions which we have come to call general systems theory.[19] Proceeding from the assumption that there are "structural similarities or isomorphies in different fields" and "correspondences in the principles which govern the behavior of entities that are intrinsically widely different," this approach seeks to identify such similarities and correspondences (as well as dissimilarities) as might be found in the universes of all the scientific disciplines. In its search for an integrative theory of behavior,[20] general systems theory postulates the existence of a system, its environment, and its subsystems. Some of the key concepts employed are "feedback," "homeostasis," "network," "entropy," and "information," reflecting a considerable intellectual debt to cybernetics. By thinking of the states as subsystems within the international system, which in turn has a particular environment of physical and social dimensions, we are provided with a rather fruitful taxonomy which suggests, in turn, a fascinating array of hypotheses. Within the same context, the idea of homeostasis is particularly suggestive to those of us concerned with balance, stability, and equilibrium in the international system.

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[19] See especially von Bertalanffy (1956), Boulding (1956), and Miller (1955).

Another set of concepts which seems to offer real promise is that employed in the theory of games.[21] The model is one of two or more players (individuals, groups, states, coalitions, etc.) pursuing a set of goals according to a variety of strategies. If the goals are perceived by the players as incompatible, in which only one may win, we have a so-called "zero-sum" game, with the players tending to utilize a "minimax" strategy; if they perceive a possible "win-win" outcome, their strategies tend to deviate sharply from the conservative minimax pattern in which they place prime emphasis on minimizing their own losses and maximizing those of the adversary. The appropriateness of such a model for bipolar international relations seems rather evident.[22]

Another range of possibilities appears when we consider the problem of inter-nation influence. From learning theory, stimulus-response theory, and the concepts associated with reinforcement, we might adapt and modify a wide range of models which could ultimately shed useful light on this central aspect of international relations. To illustrate: Is a major power more likely to shape the policies of a weaker neighbor by punishment, reward, denial, threat, promise, or calculated detachment? Or in seeking to explain the way in which public opinion in a given state ultimately influenced a certain policy decision, we might find some valuable suggestions in reference-group theory, the concepts of access and role-conflict, or some of the models of communication nets. To take another problem area, if one were concerned with the emerging attitudinal characteristics of the international environment, such notions as acculturation, internalization, relative deprivation, self-image, consensus, or animism might prove to be highly productive.[23]

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[20] Boulding (1956, p. 11) emphasizes that "it does not seek, of course, to establish a single, self-contained 'general theory of practically everything' which will replace all the special theories of particular disciplines. Such a theory would be almost without content, for we always pay for generality by sacrificing content, and all we can say about practically everything is almost nothing."

[21] On the theory of games, see the classic von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947); the excellent introductory collection by Shubik (1954); also Williams (1954) and Luce & Raiffa (1957). Of particular relevance for international relations are Schelling (1960)and Rapoport (1960).

[22] For a provocative treatment of the potentialities of "non-zero-sum" game theory, see Schelling (1958).

The point which needs to be stressed here is that political science in general, and inter-nation relations in particular, suffer from a serious paucity of concepts and models by which we might seek to describe, explain, or predict with fullness and clarity. Our conceptual poverty strikes this writer as perhaps the greatest single handicap in the development of everything from low-level empirical generalizations to a full-blown theoretical scheme. Some judicious and selective borrowing and adaptation might definitely be in order.

Conclusions

For some time, the author has awaited a general introductory statement on the role of the behavioral sciences in the study of international relations. Such a statement was deemed to be not only useful to his colleagues but essential to his graduate students during this promising period of ferment in the discipline. But none has appeared from the pen of more experienced and qualified scholars, and the perceived need remained. That a methodological and theoretical controversy has been brewing for some time cannot be denied, and the behavior of the opposing schools of thought has been far from satisfactory. The majority of us has dismissed the behavioral sciences with a cavalier disdain, while those more favorably disposed have seldom done more than utter agreeable platitudes about the importance of being scientific. Elsewhere (Singer, 1960), I have had the temerity to call for a temporary moratorium on "theorizing about theory," on the grounds that this discussion has been so ephemeral and vague as to be no longer intellectually fruitful. Perhaps it will not be too long before another can justifiably issue the same caveat regarding the role of the behavioral sciences in our field, but it is clearly not yet that time. On the other hand, no amount of this sort of academic speculation can serve as a substitute for research which actually attempts to utilize—with appropriate caution and discretion—the methods, findings, and models of these other disciplines. And the primary purpose of this paper is to encourage those who might, by training or predisposition, be inclined to make that attempt.

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[23] Let it be emphasized, here as elsewhere, that I am by no means advocating a primitive sort of reductionism in which a model of interpersonal or intergroup relations is put through a translation machine and then applied lock, stock, and barrel to inter-nation relations. I am merely suggesting that there is probably more of interest in such models than we have appreciated to date.

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Toward an International Program of Research on the Handling of Conflicts: Introduction

ERIK RINDE AND STEIN ROKKAN

A great variety of studies has been discussed and carried out during these years, and it would be difficult to identify one dominant trend in these efforts. It is safe to say, however, that no theme has recurred so frequently in these deliberations as the concern for the *dynamics of intergroup conflicts*: the concern to reach theoretical insights into the relationships between in-groups and out-groups, into the forces making for disruption, violence, and aggression as against the forces making for integration, toleration, and co-operation.

This concern has manifested itself in the planning and conduct of a number of *concrete projects of empirical research* (1) a survey of "nationalist-internationalist" attitudes in an Oslo population (1); (2) a set of projective tests adminstered to cadets to measure reactions to "ego-referred" versus "nation-referred" threat (2); (3) a seven-nation survey of teachers' orientations to international threats (7); (4) an analysis of existing survey data on contacts and co-operative attitudes among the Scandinavian peoples (5); and (5) a program of electional studies focusing on factors making for the acceptance versus the avoidance of intergroup conflicts (8, 9).

This, however, is only part of the story. The discussions between Americans and Norwegians have also been heavily marked by *a long-term concern with the clarification of problems of research strategy in this area of intergroup conflict*: What lines of study should be given priority? What criteria can be used in decisions on such priorities? How can different types of methodology and design be integrated in broad programs of research on these basic problems

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of human survival? A first outcome of these discussions was the Institute Prize Contest for the best paper on "The Relevance of Research to the Problems of Peace." This contest met with a great deal of interest among scholars of many countries, and an impressive number of manuscripts was received for consideration. The winning essays, the one by Quincy Wright, the other by Fred Cottrell, were printed in the volume *Research for Peace* in 1954 (10). An attempt was also made to classify, within a broad analytic scheme, the lines of analysis represented in the various contest essays and the research recommendations made in each of them. This clearly represented only a first step in a long-term process. A large number of highly divergent lines of inquiry were confronted with one another, but little headway was made toward the development of a general framework for the analysis of research strategies in this field. Nevertheless, the volume proved of value in calling attention to the need for concerted action and in stimulating further thinking on these problems. The UNESCO volume on the *Nature of Conflict* (4) flowed out of similar concern for a clarification of the research situation; so did the 1955 collection of papers in the *Journal of Social Issues* (6) and so, indeed, the present *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. The 1954 volume fitted into a pattern of many small streams of intellectual activity and helped to give direction to a variety of efforts in the area.

One central conclusion to be drawn from a review of the research suggestions assembled in the prize contest could be stated in these terms:

> "Concentrate research on *short-term and long-term procedures for handling and resolving conflicts* and do not waste efforts on the analysis of 'causes,' whether of conflict in general or of violence and war in particular."

This emphasis on factors of choice, of decision-making, in the face of conflict situations, was central in the work initiated by Arne Naess and Johan Galtung in the wake of the discussions around *Research for Peace*. They focused their research on the *ethics of non-violent conflict resolution* and undertook an analysis of the *teachings and practices of Gandhi*. The first publication to come out of these studies, a volume in Norwegian on "Gandhi's Political Ethics" (3), aimed at a systematic exposition, a "rational reconstruction," of the ethical norms and the assumptions and hypotheses about human behavior explicit or implicit in Gandhi's statements about non-violent action. This was primarily an exercise in philosophical analysis, but the long-term end was to advance the study of ethical systems through organized cooperation between philosophers and social scientists. The procedure was to extract from the teachings and practices of the leaders of non-violent movements a *set of hypotheses for empirical testing through social science research,* hypotheses about processes of decision-making in the face of conflict, about conditions influencing the choice of policy, and about reactions and repercussions affecting the outcome, the relative success or failure of the policy chosen.

* * * *

The . . . papers presented in this issue are all concerned in one way or another with problems of decision-making in conflict situations—problems in the choice of procedure in dealing with actual or potential oppressors. The papers have been written in the conviction that the analytical tools and the data-gathering techniques of the social sciences should now be brought to bear on these problems of choice between violence and a variety of forms of non-violent action.

These are central problems for the *leaders* and the *active participants* in groups, organizations, and movements of all sorts, but they also concern the *followers*, the *passive supporters*. . . .

In the paper by Daniel Katz the focus is on these feedback characteristics as the central *dependent* variables. The Katz analysis is concerned with the quality of *participation* in decision-making, with the classical problems of consent and obedience in the face of questionable decisions by representatives and leaders. This has become a central theme of inquiry in current research on political behavior; Katz himself has contributed substantially to the study of forces making for higher or lower levels of political participation through his work within the Norwegian program of election research. Only very scant attention, however, has been paid to such feedback-participation factors in the analysis of decision processes leading to violent versus non-violent action in intergroup conflicts. Violent means are clearly more likely to be used in conflicts between leaders accustomed to expect unquestioned obedience from an apathetic mass of followers. Non-violent resistance, on the other hand, depends for its success on a high level of active participation in the movement. Any evaluation of the possibilities and limitations of non-violent resistance techniques must take these factors into account. As emphasized by Katz, this is not a question of *amount* but of the *quality* of participation. Ignorant masses can be mobilized for aggressive action against out-groups and may be energized to take active part in nationalist movements. In a campaign of non-violent resistance, much heavier demands are placed on the active participants, demands on their independence of judgment, on the strength of their loyalty, on their dedication to the cause. We know extremely little about conditions making for success or failure in such campaigns. Here, studies of intergroup conflicts in territories undergoing rapid economic and political change, territories recently emerged or about to emerge from colonial status, might prove of the greatest importance: we are thinking, quite particularly, of the need for systematic studies of the strategies and techniques of resistance movements and "nationalist" organizations in Africa.

In a particularly interesting section of his papers, Daniel Katz discusses the implications of the *institutionalization of the use of violence* within the political system of the nation-state: the monopolization of physical power by the police and armed forces. Conflicts *between* such territorially organized "power monopolies" clearly present problems for research very different from those presented by conflicts *within* centrally controlled territories. Techniques of non-violent action have proved successful in conflicts *within* such territories, in colonial and multiracial societies, between different economic organizations within given nation-states, in resistance movements against occupying forces. Nevertheless, studies of such "within-systems" techniques can be expected to prove of relevance in the analysis of alternative solutions of current conflicts between nation-states. Factors such as the character of citizen participation clearly count in both cases. And the suicidal consequences of the use of the "ultimate" instruments of violence prompt more and more people to give serious thought to alternative methods of conflict resolution at the interstate level.

The papers by Sharp and Galtung seek to clarify some of the issues to be faced in developing research on non-violent alternatives in conflict situations. . . . they represent further steps in the process of developing a framework of concepts and hypotheses and preparing the ground for concrete empirical research.

Gene Sharp is primarily concerned with developing a typology of ideologies of non-violence and identifying the major criteria of differentiation in this complex field. Such analyses of the documents of various movements are of great importance in preparing the ground for systematic "case" comparisons of concrete, historical, or current conflict sequences.

Johan Galtung seeks to place these ideologies and practices in a wider sociological perspective. One of his basic concerns is with the growth of norms of non-violence in the handling of conflicts within widening systems of interdependence. He seeks to show how the Gandhian teaching can be analyzed within a general theory of subsystem integration within wider systems. The crucial point here concerns *the separation of antagonist and antagonism*: this must clearly be interpreted as an attempt to divorce the opponent from his status in the opposing subsystem and to emphasize his role as a member in the wider, common system. In this way the study of non-violent movements links up in an interesting way with current theorizing about the growth of wider systems through the multiplication of "criss-crossing" conflict lines; Karl Deutsch's attempt to identify factors accounting for the widening of "security communities" is representative of this trend. This is clearly a major area for future research: What sorts of conditions tend to reduce the chances for such "system break-through"? What sorts of conditions are likely to favor it?

These diverse analyses of conflict and conflict handling all lead up to a series of questions for empirical social science research. In their concluding paper, Janis and Katz have set out a scheme of variables for such research and presented a set of hypotheses for testing through various procedures of data-gathering. This paper represents a first attempt to sketch the outlines of a program of concrete studies designed to test some of the assumptions underlying the ideologies of non-violence. In the current phase of our work, efforts are being made to broaden this scheme and to integrate psychological and sociological approaches in developing a series of designs for analyses and data-gathering operations. It is our conviction that a prolonged phase of theory discussion and planning is essential in a complex field such as this. We hope to co-operate with scholars and institutions in several countries in developing and unifying this program and in deciding on priorites for concrete research. To be effective, such a program must clearly seek to combine a number of methodologies. *Comparative case studies* of documentary evidence for a number of conflicts must clearly be included. Whenever opportunity arises, we must also be prepared to organize *field studies* in areas of high social tension—a possibility in Sicily is under consideration. Studies in situations of *medium-intensity "within-system" conflicts* have also been discussed—panel interviews with a community sample before and after a strike, etc. Interview studies may also prove useful in gathering data for an analysis of *attitudes toward the use of violence*, the genesis of such attitudes in the socialization process, the development of norms about the handling of violence. Much, of course, will depend on facilities and resources; what is of primary importance is that the program be conceived of as a *long-term commitment* and that it be consistently concerned with the development of a *common framework of concepts and hypotheses*, whatever the heterogeneity of the empirical studies to be included. In presenting the beginnings of such a program to a wider public of scholars, we hope to enlist moral and intellectual support for it and look forward to receiving comments, criticism, and advice which may help us in our further work.

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Research to Establish the Conditions for Peace

W. FRED COTTRELL

Research is most useful where it can predict accurately the probable outcome of a given set of known conditions, or where it can reveal the necessary antecedents for the future emergence of prescribed events. To be useful in the creation and maintenance of peace, then, research must attempt to establish the conditions for peace. The probability of peace can be predicted only if there is agreement, in terms of specific conditions or social relationships, as to what peace means. . . .

Perhaps the simplest and clearest definition takes the negative form: peace is not-war. By war we mean a situation in which a state pursuing policy by means which include physical coercion meets with prolonged, organized, and effective resistance by others also using means which include the use of physical force. Where no other state is involved in this resistance we have civil war, and where another state is involved we have interstate war.

. . . But having thus set the problem, the researcher discovers no single science or set of generally accepted laws or principles to deal with it. The fields of knowledge involved do not provide tested means to deal with even such a recurrent phenomenon as war. The student then must either deal with the evidence on an *ad hoc* and piecemeal basis, or design for his own use a set of propositions through which the evidence may effectively be related to the problem at hand. Students in other sciences confronted with this situation have frequently found it useful to direct their research in terms of hypothetical models. While there is always danger that such models will become so reified that they will interfere with the development of other, even more fruitful, models, the results seem to have justified their continued use.

W. Fred Cottrell, "Research to Establish the Conditions for Peace," Journal of Social Issues, *Vol. 11, No. 1 (1955), pp. 13–20. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

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Model 5: The distribution of values and of power is such that, while war is possible, it is clearly manifest to all those in a position to determine whether or not to resort to war (hereafter called the elite) that war is in this pursuit inferior to other available means.

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Research Approaches Suggested by Model 5

The research using this model must answer a series of questions which include: 1.) Who are the elite in a given state and how do they gain and retain their power? 2.) Which values are highest in the hierarchy of the elite and which of their values will they sacrifice to obtain their higher values? 3.) What are the prevailing values in the society generally and what is the structure through which it is decided which of these values will be given preference? 4.) What means are available to carry out the policies of the elite?

Research may establish that, in fact, this model is unattainable in the real world of the moment. It is possible that it will show that certain elites seek ends which can be attained only through war. War may be found to involve less sacrifice of their values than any other means to the attainment of their ends, and they may have the facilities to maintain their control over the means necessary to carry on war. In such circumstances it is impossible to achieve peace through creating the conditions required in the model. It is possible, however, that even where the values of the elite would dictate war, the elite would not enter into war because of doubt that it could continue to maintain its position under the conditions that war would be likely to produce. Or careful examination might show that, even though assured of its position within a nation, the elite would be defeated because it did not control sufficient means to achieve its objective through war. Thus the researcher might help to assure peace either by showing alternative means of securing the values of the elite or by demonstrating the futility of attempting to secure them even with warlike means.

Research to identify the values of the elite involves generally the same techniques by which the values of others in the society may be discovered. In fact, the propositions are closely related, for the goal of the elite to maintain itself in power demands a knowledge of the values of those over whom they exercise power. If those who govern states make excessive use of physical coercion, they are confronted with a point of diminishing return. They may discover that beyond a given point physical coercion, while possible, yields less at greater cost in terms of their values than does another technique. Thus, those who govern must know not only their own values but also the values of those whom they govern. This is a problem for elites operating only within the boundaries of a state in which their power is considered to be legitimate. They face an even greater problem when they seek to extend their power to areas or spheres outside the range of their present legitimate authority. As we conceive it, the legitimate use of physical coercion by an elite operating in a state derives from efforts in that state to secure universal adherence to the highest values there extant. Thus the study of values should establish something of the order in which they are held in a given society and also indicate which will prevail even when they must be secured through the use of physical coercion. Moreover it should reveal which values will be defended against destruction even when such defense involves the use of force.

The study of values has been part of the sphere of the social sciences. It has also been the object of study by philosophers and others in many other branches of knowledge. The scientist who deals with values is, however, confined to the examination of behavior, and must infer values from the study of behavior. Choice of method and model in this pursuit has been very wide. The subject matter involved has ranged from the study of ideology, national character and basic personality structure to the examination of institutional and other social structure, and of methods of creating or altering values, such as education and propaganda. It is clear that there exists an abundance of empirical evidence from which it should be possible to discover, for example, the degree to which policy has followed the requirements of ideology or has reflected systematically the dispositions of "national character."

Attempts to use such ideal types of analysis in real situations have shown that unless they are supplemented by a study of the power structure in a given state at a given time they are unlikely to provide a specific guide to action. "Good will" or tensions provocative of hatred for the nationals of a neighbor may coexist with a social structure which makes even widespread attitudes of this kind of little effect in determining the most probable course of future action. Thus the study of power structures such as those of large labor unions, corporations, and powerful churches, as well as more specifically political organizations, will provide a means to see which groups or agencies are likely to be able to control which elements of policy, and which coalitions of these groups and institutions are likely to emerge in control of policy.

. . . The relative effectiveness of various techniques of social control in dealing with the creation or modification of values is another topic of great significance for the determination of the probable trends in values in a society.

In general, all of the areas considered up to this point are involved to some degree in the examination of the sociopsychological attributes of values and of correlate social structure. Together such types of research may make it possible to discover what various elites seek; the means, psychologically and sociologically speaking, by which they maintain their position; and the likelihood that their position would influence or be influenced by the decision to resort to war as an instrument of policy. They may also reveal something of the shifting character of the elements likely to characterize the elite as values shift in the society generally. But a choice of means to achieve ends involves more than psychological and sociological elements, and at this point a series of new types of research must be considered.

Importance of Technological Factors

The ability to achieve goals is a function not only of the values of those who cooperate to secure them, but also of the physical means to their achievement that are available. Thus the ability to achieve various goals may be related to the control over natural resources, available technology, the size and composition of population, and the stock of tools and prime movers. Therefore the researcher who seeks to show an elite a peaceful means to achieve its ends must be able to demonstrate the physical as well as the social processes involved. It is of course not possible to discuss here the vast range of knowledge and the multiplicity of research techniques which are thus seen to be relevant to the achievement of peace.

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. . . studies in technology, demography, geography and other physical sciences are an integral part of the effort to predict the appearance of the conditions required to maintain peace.

Similarly, studies in war itself are extremely relevant. If costs of peaceful means to attain values are to be contrasted with those involving war, then the costs of war must be known. War as an instrument of state policy is a calculated risk. If the risk can be predicted accurately, the probability that it will be undertaken should be reduced, for it is apparent that much warfare occurs because one or another of the parties involved underestimates what war would cost. The costs to a weak state which come from resistance may be very great as compared with those that some from making the necessary concessions. On the other hand, the costs even to a Great Power which result from determined resistance by even a minor state may be great enough, if resistance is certain, to make an alternative policy profitable to the elite of the Great Power. Thus the ability to predict the outcome of resistance should aid in calculating various alternatives that an elite may use. Modern technology has so altered the relative power of various elites and different states that reliance on traditional estimates of power has meant disaster. Therefore, only with increased knowledge about modern war can we deal effectively with its alternatives.

Conclusions

Perhaps it is time to indicate some implications of our argument. In the first place, it does not assume that human nature will have to be changed to achieve peace. Man's nature during peace does not differ from his nature during war. One situation tends to bring out what another inhibits. Throughout this discussion we have dealt with war and peace as if they were the consequence of human choice. To abandon that position seems to us to reduce very greatly the potential value of research, for if war results from unknown and unpredictable impulses research can do little but to establish that such is indeed fact; it can do nothing to prevent the fact.

The research described is largely action research. That is, it is presumed that the findings it makes available will modify the action that would otherwise take place; and in turn that the results of action will demonstrate the validity and reliability of many postulates which will, in turn, be modified by examination of action.

Among the prerequisites for peace, the only one the present existence of which seems in doubt is a clear understanding on the part of all elites that war is inferior to peace in pursuit of their values. But even if this estimate should prove to be false and it becomes clear that war will be sought under present conditions, then research can show how structure or other conditions must be altered to deprive presently powerful elites of their ability to choose war, or how some presently existing condition must be altered so that these elites will then choose not to go to war. Presumably, elites now make their decisions on the basis of some kind of calculation about the outcome of war. If they can be shown that scientific research is more reliable in this respect than the myths, hunches, and prejudices that apparently now serve them, then science has demonstrated its worth and will be promoted. But research which is to be tested in action must prove to be valid or it is likely to be abandoned. Those who undertake it must be devoted to the discovery of what is actually likely to come to be, however unpalatable such truth may be to the researcher. Insistence upon programs based on wishful thinking may only serve to rob research of its support and to create the situation which scientific research seeks to avoid; that is, the situation in which decisions are made in error and do unintended damage. Devotion to scientific truth, then, becomes the *sine qua non* of research relevant to peace.

Guide Lines for Research in International Co-operation

GORDON W. ALLPORT

Confronted with the cheerless spectacle of the modern world, an increasing number of today's prophets are saying that our international troubles are wholly *moral.* Technical progress, they point out, brought in its wake a perilous secularization of life. Among its macabre consequences we reckon technological unemployment, technological warfare, and now the black portent of atomic destruction. The present century, in spite of its unexampled inventiveness, has been the bloodiest century on record in terms of international, civil, and criminal violence.

Secularization, these prophets continue, led mankind to forget the Commandments of Moses, the ethics of Confucius, the self-discipline of Krishna, and the vision of Christian Brotherhood. It were better now, they say, for each man to look to his own salvation. Let religion revive. Let character be restored. Only then may we expect human relations to improve.

Can one doubt that these advocates of moral reformation are right in arguing that the great moral creeds of the world, *if taken in their purity,* would help control the ravages of technology? Were men to backtrack from the present gulf of secularization, were they to start practising their creeds, peace on earth would be more readily achieved.

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But the manifest difficulty in accepting this seemingly simple counsel lies not in the falseness or inapplicability of our creeds, but in their sheer antiquity. Many, perhaps most, inhabitants of the earth would recognize "Love thy neighbour as thyself" as a worthy imperative. But this commandment tells twentieth-century man very little about how he may translate his affectionate purposes into action. How, in an age of giant industries,

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Gordon W. Allport, "Guide Lines for Research in International Cooperation," Psychological Factors of Peace and War, *edited by T. H. Pear (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950), pp. 141–157. Reprinted by permission of the author and the publisher.*

bureaucracy, instant communication, and atomic energy, shall one effectively love one's neighbour?

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Perhaps my ethical views are in the modern vein. I may prefer to be guided by the insights of Kropotkin, Lenin, or Dewey. But so long as my moral standards are meliorative and not pejorative, I am confronted always with the need for knowledge in order to implement my belief.

Sound moral purpose is by no means lacking in the world. It still flows from the great creedal literature of past ages, even while it is being reinterpreted in the light of modern conditions. The present chasm between technology and morals, as reflected by the bloody twentieth century, has formed chiefly because physical engineering has outstripped social engineering, because physical science has been allowed to outdistance social science. The worship of technological efficiency, for its own sake, is an almost universally recognized evil; but its control through moral efficiency awaits knowledge and instrument.

Policy, Research and Operations

Perhaps the most heartening event of our times is the establishment of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, its dependent specialized agencies, particularly UNESCO. The last of these in the Preamble to its Charter, strikes the keynote of a new era. "Since wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." The implications are crystal clear: man's moral sense condemns war; let us therefore study scientifically the sources of this evil in men's minds and scientifically remove them.

But it is here that an initial misgiving arises. Can research into the causes of war be translated effectively into operation? During the past five years a certain pessimism has descended upon many of the world's most active social scientists. Aiming to improve morale in wartime, industrial relations in peacetime, amity between races, they have pressed ahead with research and have proffered solutions. For the most part their findings have been disregarded, and their zeal correspondingly dampened. Political expediency, power politics, selfish national purposes, have conspired to overlook, to 'place on file', their counsel. . . .

The situation can be remedied in three ways: (1) Boldness in taking risks is called for. Everyone knows there are serious inherent limitations in social research. It is likely that social investigation can never attain an exactness equivalent to that of physical technology whose ravages it aims to control. Unlike physical and chemical research, social studies are infrequently additive, and their powers of generalization are limited. But just what the inherent limitations of social science may be we cannot tell until an opportunity of adequate scope is given it. The possible imperfectibility of social engineering is no excuse for failing to encourage its growth, or to employ its aid wherever practicable.

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The United States alone spent two billion dollars on the invention of the atomic bomb. What is there absurd in spending an equivalent sum, if necessary, on the discovery of means for its control? And, as the Preamble to the UNESCO Charter states, it is undoubtedly in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be sought. Success cannot be guaranteed; it is entirely possible that social engineering may fail to implement the moral sense of mankind and that mankind may go under. But we shall never know the potential value of social science unless the risk is taken.

(2) Policy makers (I speak of the Department of State as well as of the highest policy authorities in the United Nations) can and should open their minds continually to the documented advice of social scientists. When it is good, they should follow it. Publicity given to relevant research, to the recommendations of social scientists, and to the policies finally adopted, will reveal the extent to which international practices are determined by selfishness and momentary expendiency, and to what extent they conform to the best social knowledge available.

(3) Let social scientists continually strive to attain a standard in research that merits respect. Too often in the past their findings have been trivial or incompetent. Equally often they have failed to make even the soundest of their principles intelligible, or their applicability clear. Psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, economists have *much* to learn about practical orientation of their studies, and about effective means for communicating their results to policy makers.[1]

If developments move in the direction of the three suggestions just offered the integration between policy bodies and social scientists will be greatly improved. Much encouragement comes from the knowledge that during recent years beneficial co-ordination has already been achieved. In numerous instances social science gave indispensable aid to the war effort. In spite of resistance and some hostility social science scored triumphs, notably in the areas of psychological warfare, personnel selection, morale building, effective communication between the government and the public.[2]

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[1] Suggestions for bridging the chasm in communication and for improving the relevance of social research are made by A. H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton University Press, 1945), esp. pp. 390–7; and G. W. Allport, "The Psychology of Participation," *Psychological Review*, 1945, 53, esp. pp. 128–30.

[2] Although a record of the successful wartime applications of social science to administrative policy has not yet been completely compiled, some indication of their variety and nature can be obtained from D. Cartwright, "American Social Psychology and the War," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1946, 10, 67–72.

The scope of these successes is sufficiently great to raise our hopes high for the potential results of team-work between social scientists and adminstrators in the area of international co-operation.

Social research must be international. While the natural scientist or the medical scientist operating alone in his individual laboratory may do significant research, of importance to the entire world, it is safe to say that almost no social research of international significance can be successfully carried forward in this manner. Even if a whole nation should concentrate its energy upon social investigations it is unlikely that it could accomplish much of *world* significance. A single nation's culture-bound outlook is restrictive. True, in the past social scientists of one nation occasionally travelled abroad in their quest for data, but their reports have seldom been broad-gauged enough and free enough from provincialism to serve as a guide to international policy of any type whatsoever.

At the present time barriers of language, of inadequate facilities (especially in smaller and poorer countries), meagreness of intercommunication, and lack of incentive to focus upon common problems, conspire to separate and segregate the social scientists of the world. As yet the resources of their knowledge and skill, as well as their eagerness to aid, have not been tapped in the interests of world peace.

To obtain the concerted effort of the world's social scientists, even in regard to limited and special topics, we now need international stimulation, facilities, and co-ordination. Thousands of highly skilled physical scientists worked in collaboration on a *national* scale for the production of the destructive atom bomb. The control of its destructive potential, and the realization of its latent benefits, will require equally many, and equally able, minds co-operating on an *international* scale.

What Is Known and What Is Needed

International social research need not start at scratch. Already much initial work has been done. Even now a sufficient number of general principles are known, and widely enough agreed upon, to set the guide lines for urgently needed investigations. What is more important, these principles might *immediately* be applied with immense profit to the conduct of international relations if the proper officials were so disposed.

In examining these principles and their usefulness as guides to concrete research and policy, two limitations should be held in mind. First, they are offered as illustrations rather than as a final system. An adequate survey should, of course, have the benefit of wide discussion and concerted approval by a large number of social scientists assembled from many nations.[3]

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[3] The list of principles here offered is not, however, quite as individual and arbitrary as may appear. Several of them are contained in "Human Nature and the Peace," a statement

Secondly, the discussion is limited largely to psychological principles, with some borrowing from social anthropology and sociology. The potential contributions of economics, geography, political science, and history are unquestionably large. But these disciplines fall outside the range of the present survey.

Trends toward Collective Security. Perhaps the first principle to which the social scientist would call attention is the unidirectional historical trend towards the formation of a world government. From the caveman to the twentieth century human beings have formed larger and larger working and living groups. At some time in the dim past families became clans, clans turned into tribes and states. Federations followed. Empires had their day. Commonwealth and regional unions have flourished. During the past century non-political international organizations have sprung up in bewildering numbers, especially among scientific, professional, and recreational groups. The League of Nations, followed by Hitler's sinister and abortive New Order, were chapters in the same saga. The United Nations is the latest and best hope mankind has devised, though it is not necessarily the final effort. Even now it is unclear whether one world is the next step in the series, or whether mankind is doomed first to live through a divided period, a pro- and anti-Russian world.

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Participation in Own Destiny. Various lines of research in recent years have demonstrated the inescapable importance of personal participation in matters affecting one's own welfare. People almost always want to solve their problems for themselves, or at least feel that they play an important part in the process of achieving a solution. International relief organizations have learned that charitable hand-outs seldom strengthen the recipient or win his gratitude. Apathy, boot-licking, or resentment may accompany 'benevolence' of any sort, whether it be alms or an imposed political system. On the other hand, personal efforts at upbuilding and rehabilitation are usually undertaken with joy by a person who feels that the product he achieves will be his own and not suffer destruction or expropriation.

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Economic and Social Insecurity. Persons who feel that their livelihood or safety is threatened generally make poor citizens—of a town, a nation, or of the world. They tend to be defensive, restless, suspicious. Now, since poverty is well-nigh universal, and social insecurity widely prevalent, it becomes imperative to determine the types of provisions, guarantees, and

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subscribed to by 2,058 American psychologists, all members of the American Psychological Association. [See p. 871 of this volume.]

reassurances that are most needed to allay fear and unrest. What are the standards of security and well-being below which no people can fall without social disaster ensuing? Up to now these standards have been guessed at through intuition and in terms of expediency, but only the results of an objective investigation will serve.

While certain minimum guarantees against starvation and disease may be a legitimate objective for all nations acting in concert we repeat that human interests are best served when people themselves are consulted and permitted to play an active part in providing for their own security. Just what sorts of self-help can be encouraged, and in what order of priority, are subjects for research not speculation.

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International Conference Procedure. At the root of much of the vagueness and inconsistency of international decisions lie the human failings that come to light in the work of committees and assemblies. Men, even trained statesmen, do not know how to deliberate efficiently. Up to now in social science only a bare beginning has been made in the study of the processes of discussion, group criticism, and decision.

We may expect much basic work to be done in the future even without international support. But so essential is it for international groups to learn how to employ the most effective conference procedures, that money and time would be well invested in additional investigations.

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Focusing on Children. Social scientists know that in a single generation it is theoretically possible to have a world language, to build universal loyalty to a world state, and to eliminate most racial and national prejudices. They know equally well that the goal cannot be achieved in practice, for it is from their parents that children chiefly learn their social attitudes. The older generation unfortunately inclines to be firmly set in its bitterness and in its blindness. Although children, with their almost limitless plasticity, will acquire much of this burden, they still constitute the best possible focus for our internationalizing efforts. Children can readily identify with symbols of world unity, even while holding inviolate their loyalty to family, neighbourhood or nation. Multiple loyalties are not necessarily incompatible. Wendel Willkie was no less a Hoosier or an American because he acclaimed One World.

To overlook children is to be stupidly inefficient from the standpoint of social engineering. Twenty-five years is not too long to await results in the perspective of social evolution. Social scientists might reasonably advise that adults be largely disregarded in favour of children. The establishment of health centres, nutritional standards, curricular standards, welfare stations, model schools, a children's village, research in social attitudes, social training, and symbols, might well hold the centre of the stage. The children of today are the custodians of the United Nations of tomorrow. The problems we cannot solve they will inherit, and their ability to cope with these problems will exceed ours only if their loyalties are stronger and their initial training sounder.

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The Common Ground of Human Nature. To teach children the ways of peace requires, among other things, a factual knowledge of the peoples of the world. What, up to now, have anthropologists given us? And what have the schools been teaching? Broadly speaking, both have accented the *differences* that divide the families of mankind. Even though there has been little malice in the practice, the results have often been harmful. The American child, for example, learns with horror about headhunters, about infanticide; and he learns to laugh at the Dutch who clop in wooden shoes, and at the quaint observances of Easter among adherents to the Orthodox faith. The implication of inferiority is a usual by-product of our present method of teaching cultural and national differences. Less dramatic, but far sounder, would be the teaching of the common considerations of justice and morality that are identical over vast areas of the earth. Practices that may *seem* to differ dramatically often indicate common aspirations and common values. The prayer wheels of Tibet and the silent Quaker meeting have virtually identical functional significance; so too the initiation rites of the Pawnee and the American high school commencement.

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The desires and opinions of the common man. It is not merely the enduring uniformities and equivalences in culture that need to be known, but likewise the *current* state of world needs and world opinion at successive periods of time. Here too internationally sponsored social research is indispensable.

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. . . To focus on matters that are of *prior* importance to the citizenry would often bring a re-definition of the issues and disclose unexpected solutions. For the root desires of two people are seldom incompatible with one another. When they confront each other with the basic *desires*, co-operation can usually satisfy both sets of interests.

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Communications. A reciprocal research service is required in order to achieve effective communication to the public of all lands. How may radio, motion pictures, television, books, news services, periodicals, lecturers be best employed in order that people everywhere may be informed in affairs of international import?

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Condescension and its Perils. A principle upon which social scientists almost unanimously agree is that human relations founded upon an attitude of condescension are perilous. So far as is known no group of people is content to think of itself as inferior to any other group, nor is any single individual normally willing to regard himself as of less worth or merit than another. In spite of periods of history when slavery or feudalism seemed to lead a temporarily peaceful existence, it may be safely asserted that policies based on condescension will sooner or later lead to violence. In the world today the unrest of citizens formerly regarded as second-class is manifest. Dark-skinned people are moving ahead towards independence. The white-skinned third of the world's population cannot prevent the movement. The English-speaking tenth certainly cannot do so. It is for this reason that an attempt to preserve the older imperial and colonial systems is doomed to breed violence and war.

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Summary

Our plea is for an accelerated development of social engineering based on social research, to the end that we may overtake and control the ravages of a rampant and amoral technology.

The argument assumes that the basic moral sense of mankind is sufficiently established in direction and in motive power to employ with profit the principles and instruments that the nascent science of human relations has already developed and will continue to develop at a rapid rate if adequate support is given.

The principles stated in this paper derive from psychology, sociology, and anthropology. In all probability they would be endorsed by most specialists in these disciplines. Yet a completer list of principles and fuller account of the applications would result if many social scientists were to work in concert upon the problems here treated. Such concerted action should be instigated on an international scale.

Should any 'hard-headed' statesman scorn the guide lines here offered as an expression of futile idealism, he himself would stand revealed as the most impractical of men. For scientific facts in the social field, as in any field, can be disregarded only with peril. The Einsteinian equation, $E = MC^2$, was once dismissed as pedantry. The formula led to the release of atomic energy. The 'pedantry' of social science might even now contribute enormously to the establishment of peace and international co-operation were its applications understood and employed by policy makers.

Yet it is true that social science has as yet by no means realized its potential power as a welder of international relations. Nor will it do so until adequate support is given on both a national and international scale. Since its most needed discoveries pertain to world-wide problems, it is international support that is most acutely needed. The co-operation of social scientists all over the world, as yet non-existent, would not be difficult to achieve.

Though some of the research required for international policy is of an *ad hoc* and momentary character, often statistical in nature, the pivotal investigations that are needed for long-range planning fall for the most part in the areas this paper has surveyed.

In all cases the research here recommended is intimately related to basic principles of social science. These principles, so far as they are now known, and as rapidly as new ones are formulated inductively with the aid of research, should be allowed to direct policy.

There follows a brief re-listing of the essential areas of research mentioned in this paper. Though manifestly incomplete, the topics are both accessible and important. They are intended to serve as a starting point for discussion among interested groups of social scientists and policy makers.

1. Prepare an historical survey of the trend towards larger and larger units of collective security.
2. Determine the conditions for democratic mass participation.
   (*a*) The conditions required for a sense of freedom to build.
   (*b*) The conditions for linking self-interest to the techniques of mutual aid.
   (*c*) The conditions for widening the individual's circle of co-operative enterprise.
3. Determine the effects of economic and psychological insecurity.
   (*a*) Under what circumstances, and in what degree, does insecurity serve as an incentive?
   (*b*) Under what circumstances, and beyond what point, does insecurity engender morbid and anti-social reactions?
   (*c*) Study especially the relation between childhood insecurity and the formation of delinquent and hostile attitudes.
   (*d*) What forms of insecurity lead to national unrest and to warlike sentiments?
   (*e*) What international policies, if consistently maintained, would lead to an optimum sense of security?
4. Investigate international conference procedures.
   (*a*) What are the requirements of effective deliberation and group decision in large assemblies? In committees?
   (*b*) How are these requirements modified when participants are of different cultural and linguistic backgrounds?

5. Direct main efforts upon children.
   - (*a*) How are multiple loyalties created without mental conflict?
   - (*b*) Explore the possibilities of a Children's Village for war orphans or stateless children.
   - (*c*) Prepare international standards for health and nutrition.
   - (*d*) Investigate the conditions for the formation of attitudes.
   - (*e*) Devise model curricula for the elimination of ethnic prejudice and for the explanation of the interdependence of nations.
   - (*f*) Determine on world-wide scale parental aspirations for children.
   - (*g*) Devise methods for keeping policy bodies aware of children and their needs.
   - (*h*) Explore methods for the installation of child training projects in all countries.
6. Determine objectively the common ground of mankind.
   - (*a*) Prepare an encyclopedia of the uniformities and similarities of cultures.
   - (*b*) Interpret cultural difference in terms of functional equivalences.
   - (*c*) Explore in detail the conception of national character.
7. Ascertain current opinion.
   - (*a*) Establish a continuing operation for revealing the state of men's needs, aspirations, opinions; commence in countries where machinery is already available.
   - (*b*) Centre attention upon common needs rather than upon divisive demands.
   - (*c*) Translate findings into implications for policy.
8. Investigate channels of communication.
   - (*a*) Study the merits of all media in respect to their value for international co-operation.
   - (*b*) Experiment with programmes and determine their effectiveness.
   - (*c*) Determine the strategy and tactics of propaganda, and methods for building immunity.
   - (*d*) Trace the dissemination of ideas through rumour, through illicit and authoritative channels.
   - (*e*) Explore continually the problems of polylingualism and the conditions for a world language.
9. Clarify the problem of race.
   - (*a*) Solve the problem of indentities and differences in racial abilities and temperament.
   - (*b*) Prepare authoritative ethnographic maps.
   - (*c*) Examine the psychological effects of policies of condescension.
   - (*d*) Estimate in advance the probable effects of proposed policies respecting bases, trusteeships.
   - (*e*) Determine the causes of xenophobia.

(*f*) Determine the conditions for mutual understanding between individuals of diverse backgrounds.

10. Develop symbols of international co-operation.
    (*a*) What symbols appeal to diverse groups?
    (*b*) Pre-test plans for world centres, flag, music, parks, universities, and other symbols of unity.
    (*c*) Determine means for encouraging the development of effective symbols.

Evaluating Programs for Improving International Relations

OTTO KLINEBERG

Some years ago at a UNESCO meeting on the subject of international tensions, the discussion turned to those specific activities undertaken for the purpose of improving relations between peoples and, more particularly, to the effectiveness of fellowships or exchange of persons. . . . In addition to exchange of persons, which includes fellowships for students, provision for visiting professors, visits from specialized groups such as trade union leaders, such programs may also involve technical assistance, information campaigns through publications and radio broadcasts, visits from artists and musicians, and many similar activities. One of the major goals of these programs is to bring the peoples of the world closer together in terms of cooperation and understanding. The faith and hope underlying these programs have recently been tempered, however, by an admixture of skepticism, directed not at the goals but at the methods used to reach them. What in fact has been accomplished? To what extent are we really obtaining the results we have in mind? How good are our methods? How can they be improved so as to achieve maximum effectiveness?

In one sense there has always been "evaluation" of a sort. Program administrators and those who have participated in action projects at various levels have made reports of progress and in some cases of failure, and it is probable that such reports have often been informative and helpful in further planning. Frequently, however, such reports are fragmentary and subjective; they fail to carry conviction precisely because we can never be sure whether another observer, looking at the same project, might not have come to an entirely different conclusion. It is not sufficient to draw attention to the need for evaluation. What is needed is not merely more

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Otto Klineberg, "Evaluation Programs for Improving International Relations," Chapter 11, pp. 110–121, in The Human Dimension in International Relations, *by Otto Klineberg, copyright ©* *1964 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Used by permission of the publisher.*

evaluation, but more acceptable evaluation, based as far as possible on the rigorous demands of scientific method. The goal must be objectivity—of which one criterion is that different experts, using the same techniques, and equally versed in such techniques, will emerge with the same results. To attain that goal requires emphasis on techniques of evaluation.

* * * *

Evaluation, therefore, may be described as the process that enables the administrator to describe the results of his program, and thereby to make progressive adjustments in order to reach his goals more effectively. It is important to note that evaluation is not restricted to application at the end of a program, but involves periodic investigation at many stages in the process. In the field of the mass media, a methodology has been developed with extreme sophistication, particularly in connection with the effects of advertising campaigns, to which an extensive body of accepted techniques has already been applied. In other fields the development has proceeded more slowly, but in the work of the social scientists a wide range of techniques is available from which the administrator may make his choice. Many of these have been developed for research purposes, and a major problem in certain fields of evaluation is to discover the means by which these techniques may be adapted to administrative practice, and to the requirements of specific projects. Very often, when the social scientist is asked whether one or another method of carrying out a specific program is more effective, his answer will be "I don't know, but I can find out."

One of the aspects of evaluation that may appear rather obvious but that still requires some clarification refers to the question of the goals or aims of any particular action project. This is in essence the problem of *values*. In order that the social scientist may be able to give efficient help to the administrator is the development of evaluation techniques, he must have clearly before him the purposes the administrator has in mind in setting up a particular project. If an educational program is introduced into a developing country, the purpose may be to train an elite, or to raise the general level of literacy, or to improve industrial techniques, or to win friends, or any combination of these. It is usually beyond the competence of the social-science consultant to formulate the goals; without such a formulation, however, his aid will be greatly restricted and may possibly be worthless . . .

Evaluation is now "in the air"; it is, in theory at least, accepted by many (if not most) practitioners and administrators as a necessary corrective to the tendency to proceed as uncritically in the future as one has in the past. At the same time, they are usually unwilling to devote any substantial portion of their resources to the process. They ask that the techniques be an integral part of the project and cost little in time or money. This places a great burden on the social scientist, whose techniques sometimes involve extensive interviewing, as well as skilled and therefore expensive personnel. In the face of this difficulty, he might perhaps best proceed on two different levels of complexity.

First, he could describe those evaluation procedures which are of such a simple and practical nature that their introduction and application can be carried out by intelligent field workers without any special training in the social sciences. If a questionnaire is to be used, for example, the social scientist can help in formulating the questions so that they are relatively free of ambiguity and not too difficult to answer; he may in that case leave it to the administrator to apply the questionnaire. If reports are to be sent back to headquarters from the field, the social scientist may contribute advice regarding their contents, in order to ensure the collection of data relevant to the evaluation process. In such cases, evaluation may be established as an integral part of the ongoing activity. It is not easy to introduce the technology of the social scientist at the applied level of administrative practice, but at least an attempt should be made to bridge this gap.

On the other hand, where such simple and inexpensive procedures do not apply, the social scientist can show what may be done if adequate resources are available. This task is just as important as the other. It is unfair to raise false hopes of satisfactory evaluation without cost, when the situation does not warrant it—as, for example, when detailed interviews must be held with a representative sample of a fairly large population. This simply cannot be accomplished with little or no money; short cuts are not always available. The administrator might ask himself whether, in the long run, his whole budget might not be more wisely expended if each year a certain small percentage were set aside for evaluation, even if one or more specific projects might have to be dropped as a consequence. It is true that during the first or second year he might accomplish less, but it is probable that later on he might actually do a great deal more, because his decisions as to the most valuable activities would be based on definite evidence. This is a difficult decision for an administrator, who is under a natural compulsion to get as much done *now* as he can; it is, however, a decision which the social scientist would strongly advocate.

Evaluation must, as far as possible, encompass effects that are both direct and indirect, immediate and delayed, local and general. The task is not an easy one, but its importance is so great as to place upon both the practitioner and the social scientist the urgent responsibility of uniting their techniques and their experience in this complex field.

In both national and international programs designed to help the developing nations or to improve relations between peoples, important beginnings have been made in the direction of evaluating the effectiveness of such programs. UNESCO, in cooperation with the International Social Science Council, has published a volume on evaluation techniques (UNESCO, 1955) and engaged in the evaluation of some of its own projects, including its exchange-of-persons program; it has also commissioned the preparation of a book describing practical and specific techniques in the evaluation of technical assistance or "development projects" (Hayes, 1959). This last publication indicates the kinds of changes that are strategic in this connection: (1) changes in individuals, their information, skills, and attitudes; (2) changes in social relationships and institutions; (3) changes in "social overhead capital," which refers to the nature and amount of investment in education, public health, public administration, and so on. It then goes on to discuss the various steps in the evaluation process, beginning with a description of the development project, and a statement of its goals; then a decision as to the kinds of data required to indicate the results of the project, and the manner in which these data are to be obtained; then the collection of the desired data, before, during, and after completion of the project; and lastly, analysis and interpretation of the findings, and a discussion of their implications with those persons who are most vitally concerned in it. The final conclusion as to the value of the project may have to be delayed for some time, in some cases several years, in order to determine how permanent and how widespread have been its effects.

* * * *

In connection with the whole problem of the effect of personal contact on intergroup or international relations, the former naive view that "the more contact the better" has been replaced by the more sophisticated position that the *kind* of contact is crucial. It is unlikely that even years of contact between a European overseer and African workers will effect much change in his attitude toward them as long as the status hierarchy remains the same. One discussion of this problem formulates the essential question as: "What kinds of contact under what conditions have what effects on what aspects of intergroup attitudes?" (Cook and Selltiz, 1955). Different contact situations, for example, will not give the same opportunities for the participants to get to know one another, or to accept one another as equals. For this reason it has been suggested that, for contact to be effective in improving relations between individuals or groups, it must be *equal status* contact. This conclusion has been supported by investigations of the effect on whites of membership in the same military units as Negroes, or residence in the same apartment houses. Experiences of this nature may affect not only the specific situation in which the contact has occurred but other situations as well. In the United States, for example, nationwide polls indicate that a substantial majority of the white adult population prefers residential segregation. Among people who have either worked with

Negroes or who have had some experience with them as neighbors, there is still a majority that expresses such preference, but its size is considerably reduced. Among those who have had *both* these experiences, the proportion is still further reduced to about half (Jahoda, 1960).

. . . a second important factor facilitating the improvement of relations under conditions of contact is found in those cases in which the two groups concerned depend upon one another, when the aims of both can best be attained through cooperation. This was true of the military units mentioned above, and to a degree also in the housing study. Sherif *et al.* (1961), in their careful experimental investigation of patterns of behavior in a boys' camp, demonstrated the manner in which common or "superordinate" goals could resolve tensions and create a friendly atmosphere. The question is still unresolved, however, as to whether the same effect would occur with other groups or individuals, and under different conditions. More research and more program evaluation are needed.

Similar problems arise with regard to the use of information as a means of improving the attitudes of peoples toward one another. "The Voice of America" and its counterpart in many other nations, the publications of the United States Information Agency, the UNESCO Major Project on the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values, and many similar activities, proceed on the assumption that information does have a positive effect on attitudes. This assumption has been questioned; one social scientist speaks of "psychological barriers to communication" (Katz, 1947), and others have written on "why information campaigns fail" (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1947). On the other hand, the sociologist Arnold Rose (1947) has analyzed the results of eleven studies on the effect of school or college courses dealing with intergroup relations; in six of these the change was in the expected direction, in four there was no change, and in the remaining one the results were ambiguous. This survey gives no basis for complete pessimism regarding the influence of information, but it does indicate the need to study the effects of any particular information program before pouring into it all of our resources and energy.

The whole area of evaluation potentially represents a fruitful and practical psychological application to the field of international relations. There are at least three major difficulties and sources of frustration in the way of a satisfactory realization of such a program. The first, to which reference was made above, is that, although the operators (those who are responsible for action programs either as adminstrators of field representatives) want evaluation, they want it without having to spend any money or use any large part of the time of their personnel. They ask that evaluation be "built in," absorbed in the regular reporting process, without sacrificing any of the on-going operations. This desire is understandable, but it is most frustrating to those who know something of the complexity of the task, and the need for time, money, and trained personnel in order to accomplish it successfully. The attempt is being made by social scientists to indicate what can be done simply and inexpensively, although at the same time they urge that whenever possible and whenever necessary a thorough and more elaborate evaluation program be undertaken. The feeling of frustration persists, however.

A second difficulty, and one that pervades many of the activities described above, consists in the failure of social scientists to communicate adequately to administrators. Few psychologists are successful in writing in language anyone outside their own discipline can understand and apply. The problem is wider, however, than that of avoiding technical terminology. It involves also the need to place oneself at the starting point and within the frames of reference of those who are responsible for action programs. This may sometimes be done through the collaboration of people from both sides of this particular curtain. Sometimes it requires a closer acquaintance with (and more direct involvement in) the program itself before deciding how it should be evaluated. This is occasionally described as "getting your hands dirty," a phrase that unfortunately may sound just a little condescending. In any case, too few psychologists have taken this time-consuming but frequently necessary method of making themselves more useful.

A third difficulty arises out of the danger that, once the need for evaluation has been recognized, too much may be expected of the evaluator. The task is sometimes exceedingly complicated, for instance, when a government asks to have an evaluation of its whole national program of fundamental education, and care must be taken not to oversell the available techniques. On the whole, psychologists have been careful in their claims, but it may be that this attitude has not always been made as clear as it should be. It was suggested at a recent meeting that they should make their modesty more blatant.

Even modesty may be exaggerated, however, and the social scientist has the right and the obligation to insist that the evaluation techniques at his disposal could improve the quality of action programs designed to promote international relations. There is little doubt in the writer's mind that exchange of persons across national lines and the increase of factual information, are valuable tools in the service of international understanding. They can, however, be made more valuable than they are at present, by more careful consideration of the factors involved.

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Conclusion and Index-Bibliography

CONCLUSION

The human being has propensities which make conflict within himself and on each level of his interaction with others a normal occurrence. However, the present state of knowledge enables us to consider the injury or killing of one person by another to be a pathological manifestation of such conflict.

The means by which human beings and nations can avoid the use of physical violence in settling their differences is receiving more consideration currently than perhaps it ever has. Erik Erikson, in another connection, has eloquently said, "The answer lies in man's capacity to create order which will give his children a disciplined as well as tolerant conscience, and a world within which to act affirmatively."

If we accept this as the answer (which I do), there remains the problem of achieving such an order. Physical violence is ever with us as a costly but readily available solution to all kinds of problems—personal, social, international. In New York City 26,000 policemen armed with guns, clubs, and handcuffs are not enough to protect New Yorkers from each other. At the same time, we accept the portrayal of violence as "entertainment" for ourselves and our children in all media of communication—condemning as individuals, participating as a group.

It appears that the knowledge which an individual possesses is relatively less important in determining his behavior than the pattern which he has developed for handling his problems. That pattern and the degree of his integration with and acceptance of the values of his reference group affect his actions. We know now that men "do not die for facts, but for their perceptions of facts." Yet, to what degree and under what circumstances the operational values of a society affect the perceptions of individuals in that society are questions which involve thousands of variables and defy uniform patterns of correlation.

We should be particularly grateful to psychiatry and psychology for insights which, although they cannot all be empirically supported, are contributing to a better understanding of human unconscious processes, so efficient in mobilizing the resources of an individual and so prominent in affecting *culture* and human actions. These fields, in my opinion, are the vanguard which is advancing laboriously but successfully into that area of inquiry—the human mind. It is from them, probably, that the greatest contributions to the integration of men and societies will be forthcoming.

In this compilation a variety of findings, theories, and hypotheses concerning the dynamics of individual and group behavior bearing on human conflict and integration has been presented. It is not the editor's intention to gather these into a neatly packaged conclusion, nor would it be possible in any case. Rather, it is hoped that the material which has been included here will stimulate evaluation, speculation, and continued exploration in order that, perhaps, one day human grievances on all levels of human interaction can be settled without violence.

J. K. Z.

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